Professional Documents
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I
Problems with Friendship and Its Representations. Around the year
1522, the Florentine artist Jacopo da Pontormo composed a painting of two men, one of whom is holding a page with a few lines of
Latin text while the other is pointing at it (Fig. 1). Since the text
turns out to be an extract from Ciceros dialogue De amicitia and
Giorgio Vasari (1976, p. 316) tells us that both men were friends of
Pontormos, the painting has come to be known as Two Men with a
Passage from Ciceros On Friendship or The Two Friends, but its
purpose overall remains enigmatic and continues to provoke many
art-historical questions.1 I, too, propose to ask a question about it
a question much more elementary than those asked by art historians
but central to the purpose of this essay. I can best explain its importance by contrasting Pontormos work with two others, one of a
killing (Fig. 2), the other of an erotic scene (Fig. 3). We can tell that
this is what they are simply by looking, and with a little iconographical knowledge we can tell that we are seeing Judith beheading Holophernes in the first and Mars after one of his encounters with
Venus in the second. We can determine what these paintings are
1
See, among others, Strehlke (2004a, p. 66), Cropper (1986, 2004) and Cropper and
Dempsey (1996).
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about with considerable accuracy on the basis of their visual features alone. But what would we make of Pontormos painting without Ciceros text or Vasaris account? How could we see it as a
painting of friendship?
Figure 1
269
And so they can in the world as well. We cant tell whether two people are friends simply by looking at them on a particular occasion any
more than we can do so in painting, because there is no clear path that
leads from a discrete interaction between two people to their friendship. Even dying for methat staple of our mythology of friendship
does not necessarily show that you are my friend. In A Tale of Two
Cities, for example, Sidney Carton dies for Charles Darnayin his
placebut only out of lovefor the sakeof Lucie, Darnays wife,
and their child. Similar things can happen in life.
Figure 2
ALEXANDER NEHAMAS
Figure 3
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271
ters; of course they do. But only a few novels build their narrative
around friendship, as others do with love, marriage, adultery, family, education, treason, art, revenge, or war and peace.2 Part of the
reason for such a perhaps surprising omission must surely be that,
as William Hazlitt remarked,
in our habitual intercourse with others, we much oftener require to be
amused than assisted. We consider less, therefore, what a person with
whom we are intimate is ready to do for us in critical emergencies,
than what he has to say on ordinary occasions. (Hazlitt 1837, p. 77)
The fact is that friendship is not nearly as often associated with extreme situations or feelings as the epic tradition, which glorifies passion and heroism, sacrifice and death, has taught us. Passion
between friends, in any case, has always proved suspicious: Achilles
desperate mourning for Patroclus death and his bloody revenge in
The Iliad prompted classical Athens to see them as lovers;3 and in
Montaignes ardent description of his feelings for tienne de la Botie, his readers have sometimes felt the stirrings of lust.4 Ordinarily,
friendship is manifested in the most, well, ordinary situations,
which all but the friends themselves are likely to find inconsequential. To establish a friendship, a novel would have to include many
inconsequential moments and events, only against the background
of which, when the extraordinary occurs, would we be able to tell
that the characters act out of friendship and not out of duty, love or
recklessness.
That, though, may not be peculiar to friendship. Little, for example, seems less consequential than the unhistoric acts of George
Eliots characters, people who lived faithfully a hidden life, and rest
in unvisited tombs (Eliot 1908, p. 445). But there is a serious difference. Eliot creates characters who spend themselves like that river
of which Cyrus broke the strength in channels which had no
great name on earth (p. 444) precisely in order to endow their acts
with significance, to trace the growth that springs to life when the
rivers waters finally find their way into the earth. But the events
2
Among great works, one might cite, with reservations, Huckleberry Finn and parts of In
Search of Lost Time. Some recent examples are Verghese (1998), Lott (1999), and perhaps
Ann Patchetts novelistic memoir, Truth and Beauty (2004).
3
The tradition (for which see Plato, Symposium, 180ab) may have begun with Aeschylus
Myrmidons (fr. 228a in Mette 1959).
4
Montaigne (1957); and see Schachter (2001).
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Mark Polizzotti, the novels most recent translator, disagrees: Boring its not, once weve accepted the ground rules, he writes; its re2010 The Aristotelian Society
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The linguistic situation is complicated. The Greek terms philos and philia, which are usually translated as friend and friendship respectively, actually apply to a vast range of relationships, many of whichfor example, that between contractually bound buyers and
sellershave nothing to do with friendship. But since here I am concerned only with the
tradition that emerges from Aristotles discussion, and which has, by and large, understood
itself to be discussing friendship, I will continue to use the modern term.
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their friendships, which are unalloyed goods, are therefore exceedingly rare. But, as I have argued elsewhere, relationships based on
advantage or pleasure are purely instrumental and only genuine
philiathe one form of philia that comes close to what we understand friendship to beinvolves loving ones friends for their own
sake (Nehamas 2010). It turns out, then, that for Aristotle most of
us are actually friendless.
To an extent completely unparalleled in a discipline that sometimes considers agreement a form of discourtesy, the philosophical
tradition concurs. Cicero, Seneca, St Aelred, St Thomas, Francis
Bacon, and many others, including most recent authors on the subject, repeat Aristotles threefold classification, limit true friendship
to the morally virtuous, and consider it an unmixed moral blessing.
Without it, Miltons Adam laments, even Paradise is robbed of
pleasure: With me I see not who partakes. In solitude/What happiness? Who can enjoy alone,/Or all enjoying, what contentment find
(Milton 2003, vii, 3636, p. 176).
It is difficult to know how virtuous the virtuous have to be, since
Aristotle rests content with a reference to Pericles as an example of
practical wisdom (Aristotle 2000, vi.5, p. 107). Cicero, for his part,
takes himself, in contrast to philosophers who make virtue humanly
unattainable, to be defending common sense, claims that he wants
to bring virtue down to earth, and refers to three actual individuals
(the third century bc statesmen Caius Fabricius, Manius Curius,
and Tiberius Coruncanius). His description of their qualities, howeverthey were models of honour, integrity, justice, and generosity
[without] avarice, lustfulness, or insolence, and with unwavering
convictionleaves most of the people I know, myself included,
friendless. John Cooper, more realistic than Cicero, argues that neither in fact nor in Aristotle is friendship restricted to moral heroes
(Cooper 1977, p. 317). Genuine friendship requires neither perfection nor even outstanding accomplishment but only the binding
force within it of someperhaps, for all that, partial and
incompleteexcellence of the character and obtains between people who come to love one another because of their good human
qualities (Cooper 1977, pp. 319, 320). This is a reasonable scaling
down of the requirements of friendship and acknowledges human
imperfection; it does, however, leave the connection between friendship and moral virtue intact. Virtue is what prompts friendship in
the first place, and there is no friendship without it: a genuine friend
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wishes his friend to prosper, because he recognizes his good character and thinks that it is fitting for those who are morally good to
prosper (Cooper 1977, p. 323).
Consider, though, Frederick Moreau, the hero of Flauberts Sentimental Education. His lifelong friendship with Charles Deslauriers
begins when he sees him beat a servant who had called him a paupers brat to within an inch of his life, and takes it as the brave and
honourable thing to do, while Flaubert gives us every reason to consider it impetuous and excessive, typical of the hot temper that had
already provoked the mute hostility of Deslaurierss classmates.
Moreaus love springs not from a recognition of excellence but from
a mistaken interpretation (Flaubert 2004, p. 17).
Even so, and although it is certainly not excellence that binds
these two flawed characters to each other, it is hard to deny that
their friendship is genuine. In the novels final scene, reconciled
once again by that irresistible element in their nature which always
reunited them in friendship (Flaubert 2004, p. 247), they reminisce
about a long-ago visit to the village brothel. Their elaborate preparations came to naught because on entering the house Frederick,
overcome by nervousness, found himself rooted in the same spot,
unable either to speak or to move; after a few excruciating moments, he turned on his heels and, followed by Deslauriers and the
sound of the prostitutes laughter, ran away in fear and embarrassment. Distracted as the two boys were, they forgot to follow the secret route by which they had arrived and returned through the
center of the village, where they were seen and thus provoked a serious scandal. These are the novels closing words:
They told one another the story at great length, each supplementing
the others recollections; and when they had finished:
That was the best time we ever had, said Frederick.
Yes, perhaps you are right. That was the best time we ever had,
said Deslauriers. (Flaubert 2004, pp. 24950)
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through actions that are positively wrong. The two main characters,
Thelma, who seems pathologically flighty and insecure, and Louise,
who appears in much better control of her life and treats Thelma
like a child, leave home for a two-day vacation. On their way to
their cabin, and despite Louises objections, they stop at a bar where
Thelma flirts with an obviously unsuitable man who eventually tries
to rape her in the bars parking lot. Louise arrives just in time and,
threatening the man with a gun Thelma had rather stupidly brought
along, stops the assault. As the two women are leaving, though, the
man makes a crude and nasty comment and Louise, almost gratuitously, shoots him dead. Afraid of the consequences, they decide to
flee to Mexico, but their troubles, mostly because of Thelmas foolishness, multiply. When a young robber with whom Thelma spends
the night runs away with Louises life savings, effectively dashing
their hopes of reaching Mexico, two things happen: Louise finally
loses her self-control and Thelma, who despite her antics had already begun to show signs of independence during the course of
their escape, finds her self-respect. She becomes strong enough to do
things on her ownshe applies the method the robber had demonstrated for her the night before to rob a convenience store, forces a
policeman who was about to arrest them into the trunk of his car
and, together with Louise, who gradually regains her own self-confidence, blows up a gasoline truck because its driver had been making vulgar and obscene gestures whenever they met him on the road.
Eventually, the two women are trapped at the rim of the Grand
Canyon by a throng of police cars blocking their escape and, ordered to give up, they refuse to turn themselves in. Instead, they
drive their car over the precipice, where it remains frozen in midair
to the sounds of B. B. Kings song, Better Not Look Down.
Thelma and Louise are not just friends who do bad things, as
friends often do. The friendship they acknowledge to each other before driving into the canyon is a friendship through which both
women, especially Thelma, become more admirable because of the
bad things they do. It is through bad things that they gradually become equal to each other and to the world and find a way out of the
dead ends to which their lives would have inevitably led otherwise.
They choose, to use an expression that applies to a truly famous
friendship, a short and glorious life over a long and shabby one. We
dont have to think that Thelma and Louis are heroic on a Homeric
scale in order to describe their choice in the terms usually reserved
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for Achilles. And in any case, I am not certain that the behaviour to
which Achilles friendship leads, his bestial desecration of Hectors
body over Patroclus deathdeath, after all, being something that
happens to warriorsis so much more admirable than the crimes
these women commit for each others sake. Friendship can be expressed even through crime, cruelty and immorality.
I must now give an account of an episode on which I will rely centrally as I try to give an answerpartial at best to the question of
the good of friendship. A visiting friend (Ill call him Tom, since
that is his name) decided, on a cold and rainy winter morning several years ago, to come along while I drove my son to school; we were
in a hurry and, since he did not intend to get out of the car, he threw
a raincoat over his pyjamas and didnt bother to wear any shoes. On
arriving at the school, I realized I had a flat tyre and no idea of how
to replace it. Since all the children were arriving at the same time,
traffic was very heavy and my disabled car provided a major obstruction. While I was standing there in confusion, Tom leapt out of
the carbarefoot, in pyjamas and raincoatand took over. The
children stared in complete fascination, some of the adults offered
to help, others just watched or made jokes (one, a colleague, told me
she loved my friends outfit). Oblivious to his audience, Tom fixed
the tyre, drove us to a gas station, where, still in pyjamas, he discussed the situation with the owner, and returned home ready to
start the days work while I collapsed in a useless heap.
If anyone ever asked why Tom is my friend, I most surely would
cite this episode and try to communicate his kindness, generosity
and strong practical sense (also his impatience). But that would miss
the point, which is that he did so in that ridiculous outfit, surrounded by well-dressed people and without a second thought, that his
practical sense exists along with a touching otherworldliness, that it
was completely in character, and so on. Yet even that would fail because it also misses the point, that most important element that can
be expressed but cant be described: that no one else could have
done what Tom did that morning. And if someone objected that fixing a tyre in a silly outfit is not such a rare feat, nor something only
a friend would do, I would replyunhelpfullythat what mattered to me was not just what Tom did but who he is, which no list
of his features, however long, could ever capture. Think how banal
we sound when we try to express our love for another person, how
disappointing the lists of positive features we can come up with
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Some of the dangers of friendship are well discussed in Cocking and Kennett (2000).
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II
The Good of Friendship. The path to an answer begins in an unlikely place, a notorious passage in Nietzsches On the Genealogy of
Morals (i.13):
Just as the popular mind separates the lightning from its flash and
takes the latter for an action, for the operation of a subject called
lightning, so popular morality also separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum behind the
strong man, which was free to express strength or not to do so. But
there is no such substratum; there is no being behind doing, effecting,
becoming; the doer is merely a fiction added to the deedthe deed is
everything. (Nietzsche 1968b, p. 481)
Nietzsche here charges Christianity, whose origins he traces to a revolt of the weak of the Roman Empire against their strong oppressors, with a particular interpretation of the notion of the
subject, a false idea that makes it possible to attribute everyones
manner of life to a free choice. He thinks that Christianity and the
secular tradition that has followed in its footsteps conceive of the
subject, of who I am, as something distinct from everything I do. If
that is right, I should be able to stand back from everything I have
been so far and, unconstrained by anything that is particular to me,
examine the various alternative courses of action available, and
choose among them. I can choose, therefore, whether to act weakly or strongly, and that allows the weak to think that the strong,
who can be dangerous to them, have chosenthough they need not
and should notthe wrong way of life. They can then consider
strength as a vice and so elevate their weakness, that is to say, their
essence, their effects, their whole ineluctable, irremovable reality
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[into] a voluntary achievement, willed, chosen, a deed, a meritorious act (Nietzsche 1968b, p. 482).
There may be several problems, both historical and psychological, with Nietzsches view, but the most obvious difficulty is that his
dismissal of the subject as a fictionthe deed is everything
seems to make it impossible to explain what makes my actions
mine: why are they even actions in the first place and not mere
events that belong to no one at all?
In fact, however, Nietzsche does not reject the existence of subjects altogether, but only of the subject as he claims Christianity
conceives it: a subject that, as he writes, lies behind, separate
from, its deeds, a neutral substratum undetermined by its location
in history and society, altogether free to choose between virtue and
vice. He claims that the agent is not behind but in the deed: our actions express precisely who we are and to a great extent who we
have to be, not what we have freely chosen to be among various different possibilities.7
Even so, however, Nietzsches view is still in conflict with a common understanding of actions as a special group of the events that
constitute the worldevents whose causes we take to be mental: desires, beliefs and intentions. On a physiological level, raising my arm
and my arm going up (it is said) are exactly alike: a movement is initiated as the result of a particular neural event in my brain. The difference is that in one case the brain event is caused by, or correlated
with, my desire to move my arm while in the latter it is only the outcome, perhaps, of a direct electric stimulation of my brain. Nietzsche,
by contrast, denies that intentions are primarily distinct mental states
or events that precede the actions they cause and that, as their causes,
are only contingently connected with them. To think of intention that
way, he would argue, is yet another separation of the doer from the
deed, and it implies that there could be an intention that never leads,
even in principle, to the relevant action.8 The same separation occurs
if, for example, when I intend to tell you I like you but only manage
to sound ambivalent, we understand my action simply as a failure to
say what I wanted to say: on such an understanding, I do actually like
7
The case has been forcefully made by Pippin (2006, 2010). I have presented such a view of
action, applied primarily to the interpretation of literature, in Nehamas (1987). Needless to
say, any such approach to action must also account for the many cases of the failure of
action to fulfil the right intention.
8
See, for example, Davidson (1978).
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youI am, despite my failure, still the person who likes youand I
need to find a better way of expressing myself. If the intention,
though, is in the action, it is in fact expressed in my words, and so am
I: I turn out to be what my words indicate, the person who actually
has ambivalent feelings toward you and I need to consider whether to
acknowledge that fact and live with it or, if possible, to change my
attitudeand myselfin the appropriate way.
Thinking of behaviour expressively indicates that with actions
more complex than moving an arm or a fingercases as popular in
philosophical and neurophysiological discussions as they are uncommon (when you think about it) in real lifeit is difficult to
know exactly what the action and its intention are until the action is
complete. The character of both can change even as the action is being performed. Think, for example, how you often have to say or
write something before you know whether you believe it or not, or
how you find out what movie you want (or dont want) to see only
after your friend makes a particular suggestion. And that is not to
mention actions as complex as writing a poem or, come to think of
it, this essay. These never begin with anything more than a relatively
hazy idea of their purpose and character. To say that my intention in
this essay was to show that friendship is a good is only to say that I
began with that very general notion, which, I hope, I have managed
to refine a bit in the process, my intention gradually becoming inseparable from the essay I produce: I cant tell you exactly what I intended without having you hear or read the piece. Moreover, every
step I took in that direction affected what I could intend to do next
in ways I couldnt possibly anticipate beforehand, and what I took
myself to be doing also kept changing as a result. Whatever my essay has turned out to be reveals the kind of agent, the kind of philosopher, I am. My ideas emerge as I formulate them and my actions
acquire their character as I perform them: it is through them that I
become (and realize) who I am.
Our sense of a particular action, therefore, goes hand in hand
with our sense of the agent expressed in it: we must fit the action
into what we already know about that agent.9 We must therefore try
to see how it is affected by other things the agent has done and how
9
If we are interacting for the first time, we will have to depend on generic assumptions
about the kind of person we seem to each other to be. As we get to know each other better,
our assumptions will become more specific and often force us to revise our earlier understanding. But the situation is in principle the same no matter how intimate our relationship.
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it affects them in turn, and what we already know about that agent
may change in light of that new action. The relationship between
what we already know about people and what we see them do in
the present is hermeneutic, and establishing hermeneutic connections of that sort is the business of interpretation. And as a present
action, in affecting what took place earlier, may require its revision,
so a future action may require a revision of the present.10 The issue
is not purely epistemic. Consider, for example, a married man who
is seeing another woman. Exactly what the man is doing is not simply unknown but actually indeterminate before a certain time: if he
ends up going back to his wife, then it will have turned out that he
was having an affair all along; but if he marries the other woman,
then what he was engaged in may have been a search for his true
self. Until one of these outcomes occurs, there is no fact of the matter about what he was doing.11 Our actions are not only affected by
their past but by their future as well.
Accordingly, our understanding of intention and action is often
provisional. When it comes to complicated and interesting activities
the activities of art are an obvious caseit is impossible to have access to an intention independently of interpreting the action or its
product in each case. That makes it impossible to appeal, say, to artists intentions as a useful standard for measuring how successfully
their works fulfil theman old yet still pervasive view, recently given
new voice by Nel Carroll (2008). If artists, no less than other people,
come to know their intention on the basis of the work itself, their
statements concerning their intentions are essentially third-person accounts of their work. They can still be used as evidence for or against
an interpretation but they cant possibly have the final authority intentionalist critics like Carroll attribute to them. When, by contrast,
our understanding is not provisional, it is partial, generic, and unilluminating. Carroll is right to insist that we have no conceivable
grounds for doubting that Davids Oath of the Horatii was intended
to be a historical painting (Carroll 2008, p. 176). But that attribution, too, is based on an interpretation of the work and not on an
independent retrieval of Davids intention. In any case, the intention
10
For details on this conception of interpretation, see Nehamas (1987; 2005; 2007,
pp. 12038) and the comments of Pippin (2010, pp. 1012).
11
See Williams (1993, pp. 456). I am grateful to Robert Pippin for helping me identify this
reference.
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What I am trying to describe is close to, though not identical with, what Bernard Williams
(1981, pp. 27ff.) has called agent regret. Pippin (2006, p. 143) notes that it fits well with
Nietzsches use (1968b, p. 519) of Spinozas account of remorse as the opposite of gladness (Spinoza 1985, iii.18. Sch. ii, p. 505), although I am not certain that Nietzsches reading of Spinoza is correct.
13
Moran and Stone make a stronger claim: they think that all expressions of intention
have that function. I am not certain, though, that such a model applies to the much more
complicated actions involved, say, in artistic (though not only in artistic) activity. Moran
and Stone are silent on that matter because they consider artistic intentions to require separate treatment and do not discuss them here (Moran and Stone 2010, p. 165 n.30). See
also Davidson (1963, pp. 910).
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ments in everyones life, they are not on their own, despite the best
efforts of American elementary education, grounds for pride or joy.
In themselves, that is, differences dont count. The differences that
count are those that literally make a difference, features that distinguish us from others in interesting, admirable, or even contemptible,
but in any case remarkable, ways. Here, friendsclose friends
make a difference that counts. Perhaps Aristotle was right when he
said that to live alone one has to be either a god or a beast (Nietzsche added their combination: a philosopher).
To see Aristotles point, we must reject not only his restriction of
friendship to men, as philosophy has already done, but also his restriction of it to adults, as, unlike sociology or social psychology, it
has not. When C. S. Lewis (1988, p. 77) described friendship as a
relationship that is almost wholly free from jealousy, he must have
been thinking only of the most idealized adult relationships. He certainly left the obvious and intense pain that broken friendships
cause children and teenagers (and not only them) completely out of
account. But why should being deserted by a friend provoke the
sharp pangs of jealousy or the dull pain of dejection? Not simply, I
think, because of the loss of a playmate, a schoolyard ally, a theatre
companion, or a tennis partner, and not because of the loss of a
secret sharer or someone in whom, as in a mental mirror, we might
be able to see what we couldnt see of ourselves on our own. At the
core of such grief lurks the anguish provoked by a deeper, more pervasive abandonment, a rejection not merely of what we have done
but of what we are. We dont just love our friends for themselves:
we also leave them for themselvesnot just for their behaviour but
for what their behaviour shows about the kind of person they are
which is why What have I done wrong? is always the wrong question. And the reason is partly that, as Lewis in this instance was
right to observe, Friendship must exclude (1988, p. 86).
If I say These are my friends, I imply These are not. That is most
obvious in the friendships of children and adolescents, where it can
lead to crassness and cruelty, but it applies to every other friendship
as well. Our friendships make us different from the others and
many differences that are essential to each one of us emerge through,
and only through, our friendships. So when my friend abandons me,
she doesnt only reject me but also what both of us have become
through our relationship. She rejects my part in what she is, and that
is why saying Its not you, its me is never any consolation.
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Recall, now, the fact that much of what friends do together is unimportant or commonplace. Speaking that way is not exactly wrong:
it is like saying that for most of the people in the schoolyard that
morning Toms behaviour was just eccentric, which is also not exactly wrong. To me, however, what he did was an expression of the generosity, independence, practicality and willingness to help that only
he can display. If someone else had been there instead and, as it happened, duplicated Toms behaviour (pyjamas and raincoat included),
I would have seen something else again. And what I actually saw did
not simply confirm what I already knew about Tom because, although I knew he was generous, the generosity in his action was inseparable from it; it was his particular way of being generous,
which could only be described by describing as exactly as possible
what he did on that rainy morning. That was something I could never have even imagined beforehand; for example, I would never have
thought him less generous had he not come out of the car at all.
What others may perceive as a more or less isolated action and interpret on the basis of limited evidence, connecting it to the little they
know about the agent, friends understand in terms of everything they
know about each other. As their relationship continues, their actions
unfold and get connected to still other actions in light of which they
are reinterpreted. Their new understanding, in turn, can reveal still
other ways of both acting and understanding that, once followed,
again affect the action and the interpretation of its purpose, and so on
without an end that is externally imposed. What my action is, what it
expresses, and who I am are all in flux and come to be together.
But since others also have a hand in understanding my action,
they can affect both what I do and how I understand it, and so what
I am likely to become. The more intimate we are with them, the
more influential their view of me will bewhich is why we are told
to choose our friends with caution. Friends are by no means the
only people who can affect me, but the closer they are to me the
larger the body of knowledge they bring to their interpretation,
which implicates more aspects of myself and affects me more extensively. What I become, therefore, is very much their doing and the
less settled I am in myself, the greater their contributions and the
more pervasive their influence. It is here that we can learn from the
friendships of children, particularly from the ease with which children, adolescents and, to an extent, young adults make new friendships compared to older people. We usually attribute that phenome2010 The Aristotelian Society
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For the view that friendship becomes more difficult for the middle-aged because of their
many obligations, see Blieszner and Adams (1992, pp. 478).
15
Compared to a random-choice model, adults show a clear preference (strong bias) for
people with similar social and demographic characteristics and the less similar two people
are, the less like they are to become close friends (Verbrugge 1997).
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passive: it changes both the knower and the known, and the further
we look into and reinterpret our friends, and so ourselves, the more
extensively we are likely to change. Life is a habit, says Frankie
Blue, the hero of Tim Lotts White City Blue, as the novel begins;
you do something, then you do it again, then again, and before you
know it, thats what you are, and thats who you are, and you cant
imagine being anything or anyone else (Lott 1999, p. 2). But
Frankie doesnt yet know that he is about to fall in love with one
person and to reaffirm an old friendship with another and so become able to acknowledge a painful truth in his past and a joyful
one in his present, which make it possible for him to imagine for a
moment that he might not remain, as he has been so far, forever
Frank the Fib.
Friendship, in short, is a mechanism of individuality; artmore
generally, everything that we find beautiful and to which, to some
extent or another, we abandon ourselvesis another (Nehamas
2007). They spark the need to come to know people and things as
intimately as possible, in their particularity, and understand just
what makes them different from every other thing. They highlight
distinction, they promote variety and differentiation, and that is
where their value lies. But they pull in a direction opposed to that of
morality. Morality demands that we treat every human or rational
agent fairly and impartially. In practice, that means that we should
try to extend such treatment to as many people as possible. That effort demands significant changes on both our parts. We cant assume that people mistreat one another only because of ignorance or
irrationality, that they can always, at least in principle, be convinced
to change their ways: as Bernard Williams once asked, What will
the professors justifications do, when they break down the door,
smash his spectacles, take him away? (Williams 1985, p. 23).17 Our
affections need to change as well. Many significant moral and social
developments have occurred not so much because their proponents
convinced the world with their arguments but because (to cite two
parochial examples), as more women entered the workplace and
more homosexuals began to live openly, the others got used to their
presence and some of them gradually became able to treat them
with trust and respect. The net result of such changes is the creation
of common psychological, institutional and cultural ground be17
291
See the excellent discussion of values that belong to this category, as opposed to values
that are strictly moral, in Railton (2010).
19
That is the central thesis of Nehamas (2007).
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only on what its object is like, but also on who the lover happens in
each case to be. And so to say, as we do, that I love you for yourself
is only a half-truth. The full truth is in Montaignes famous nonexplanation: If you ask me why I love you, I can only say, Because
it was you, [and also] because it was I.20
Department of Philosophy
Princeton University
Princeton, nj 08544
usa
nehamas@princeton.edu
REFERENCES
Acampora, Christa Davis (ed.) 2006: Nietzsches On the Genealogy of Morals: Critical Essays. Lanham, md: Rowman & Littlefield.
Aristotle 2000: Nicomachean Ethics, ed. and trans. Roger Crisp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Barnes, Julian 2006: Flaubert, Cest Moi. New York Review of Books,
53(9), 25 May 2006, pp. 549.
Blieszner, Rosemary, and Rebecca G. Adams 1992: Adult Friendship. Newbury Park, ca: Sage.
Carroll, Nel 2008: On Criticism. New York: Routledge.
Cascardi, Anthony J. (ed.) 1987: Literature and the Question of Philosophy.
Baltimore, md: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Cicero 1923: De Amicitia, ed. and trans. W. D. Falconer. Cambridge, ma:
Harvard University Press.
Cocking, Dean, and Jeanette Kennett 2000: Friendship and Moral Danger.
Journal of Philosophy, 97, pp. 27896.
Cooper, John M. 1997a: Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship. Reprinted
in Cooper 1999, pp. 31235.
1997b: Friendship and the Good in Aristotle. Reprinted in Cooper
1999, pp. 33655.
1999: Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and
Ethical Theory. Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press.
Cropper, Elizabeth 1986: The Beauty of Woman: Problems in the Rhetoric of
Renaissance Portraiture. Reprinted in Ferguson et al. 1986, pp. 17590.
20
I am grateful to the many audience to which I have presented this paper in various forms
for their criticisms and suggestions. The paper itself is, very roughly, the core of a longer,
book-length project on friendship, and that may account for (some of) the casual manner in
which I treat several very complex issues.
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