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Abstract
It is now well recognized that employees can develop multiple work-relevant commitments, and
that commitment itself is a multidimensional construct. Unfortunately, there remains considerable
disagreement, both within and across work commitment literatures (e.g., organizational, occupational,
union), about what commitment is, its dimensionality, how it develops, and how it affects behavior. We
argue that commitment should have a ``core essence'' regardless of the context in which it is studied,
and that it should therefore be possible to develop a general model of workplace commitment. We
propose such a model based on the propositions that commitment (a) is a force that binds an individual
to a course of action of relevance to a target and (b) can be accompanied by different mind-sets that
play a role in shaping behavior. We demonstrate how this model helps to explain existing research
findings and can serve as a guide for future research and for the management of workplace
commitments. D 2001 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Organizational commitment; Occupational commitment; Union commitment; Goal commitment;
Organizational behavior
1. Introduction
Commitments in the workplace can take various forms and, arguably, have the potential to
influence organizational effectiveness and employee well-being. Despite the increase in
attention given to the study of workplace commitments, there still appears to be considerable
confusion and disagreement about what commitment is, where it is directed, how it develops,
and how it affects behavior. Newcomers to the commitment literature will find several
conceptual frameworks in which commitment is conceptualized as either a unidimensional
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-519-661-3679; fax: +1-519-661-3961.
E-mail address: meyer@uwo.ca (J.P. Meyer).
1053-4822/01/$ see front matter D 2001 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
PII: S 1 0 5 3 - 4 8 2 2 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 5 3 - X
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(e.g., Blau, 1985; Brown, 1996; Mowday, Porter, & Steers, 1982; Wiener, 1982) or
multidimensional (e.g., Allen & Meyer, 1990; Angle & Perry, 1981; Gordon, Philpot, Burt,
Thompson, & Spiller, 1980; Jaros, Jermier, Koehler, & Sincich, 1993; Mayer & Schoorman,
1992, 1998; Meyer & Allen, 1984, 1991; O'Reilly & Chatman, 1986; Penley & Gould, 1988)
construct, each accompanied by a recommended measure or set of measures. Moreover, they
will discover that workplace commitments can take various forms, including commitment to
organizations (e.g., Mathieu & Zajac, 1990; Meyer & Allen, 1991; Mowday et al., 1982),
unions (e.g., Barling, Fullager, & Kelloway, 1992; Gordon et al., 1980), occupations and
professions (e.g., Blau, 1985; Meyer, Allen, & Smith, 1993), teams and leaders (e.g., Becker,
1992; Hunt & Morgan, 1994), goals (e.g., Campion & Lord, 1982; Locke, Latham, & Erez,
1988), and personal careers (e.g., Hall, 1996). Answers to questions about how these
commitments develop, and how they influence work behavior, organizational effectiveness,
and employee well-being vary somewhat across the different frameworks. This state of affairs
can be viewed as a challenge or a frustration to those whose interests are primarily scientific.
It is likely to be particularly disconcerting to practitioners who look to this literature for
answers to questions such as: Should we try to foster commitment in employees? Commitment to what? How? For what purpose?
The purpose of this article is to clarify some of the confusion that exists in the literature
and to demonstrate that it is possible to develop a general model of workplace commitment to
be used as a guide in research and practice. We argue that, if we accept the notion that there
are multiple constituencies within the workplace to which employees can become committed,
our understanding of how these commitments combine to shape organizational behavior will
be greatly enhanced if the conceptualization of the construct itself remains constant across
constituencies. Our objective, therefore, is to illustrate how existing conceptualizations can be
integrated to achieve this purpose. To this end, we review the work commitment literature
with a focus on five basic issues. First, we address the issue of what commitment is and how
it can be distinguished from related constructs (e.g., attitudes, motivation). Second, we
consider the question of dimensionality is commitment a unidimensional or multidimensional construct? Third, we discuss the target(s) of commitment do employees
develop commitment to specific entities, courses of action, or both? Fourth, we examine the
behavioral consequences of commitment. Finally, we address the issue of how commitment
develops. As we consider each of these issues, we develop propositions that serve as the basis
for a general model of workplace commitment. We then describe the model and discuss its
implications for theory, research, and management.
2. What is commitment?
Over the years, commitment has been defined and measured in many different ways (see
Meyer & Allen, 1991; Morrow, 1993; Mowday et al., 1982). Indeed, this lack of consensus in
the definition of commitment contributed greatly to its treatment as a multidimensional
construct (Meyer & Allen, 1991). Even if we acknowledge the existence of multiple
dimensions, or forms, of commitment, however, there has to be a core essence that
characterizes the construct and distinguishes it from other constructs. To establish what that
core essence is, we begin by looking for commonality among the existing conceptualizations.
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In Table 1, we provide a set of definitions taken from the work commitment literature. This is
not an exhaustive list; rather it provides illustrative examples of definitions taken from authors
with very different interests and perspectives. In some cases, the definitions were provided by
authors who viewed commitment as a singular (unidimensional) construct (e.g., Becker, 1960;
Mowday, Steers, & Porter, 1979; Wiener, 1982). In other cases, they were presented as the
common element linking different forms of commitment within multidimensional models (e.g.,
Allen & Meyer, 1990; O'Reilly & Chatman, 1986). Finally, some definitions were presented by
authors who, like ourselves, believe that commitment has a core essence that distinguishes it
from other constructs (e.g., Brickman, 1987; Brown, 1996; Oliver, 1990; Scholl, 1981). For
purposes of comparison of the scientific and everyday uses of the term, we also provide a
definition of commitment taken from the Oxford English Dictionary (1969).
A review of the definitions in Table 1 reveals both points of agreement and disagreement.
All of the definitions of commitment in general make reference to the fact that commitment
(a) is a stabilizing or obliging force, that (b) gives direction to behavior (e.g., restricts
freedom, binds the person to a course of action). Definitions of commitment as it pertains to
more specific targets (e.g., organization, occupation, goal) are more variable in the extent to
which these two characteristics are specifically mentioned. Where differences in the
definitions exist, they tend to involve details concerning the nature or origin of the stabilizing
force that gives direction to behavior. We discuss these differences in more detail later when
we consider the issue of dimensionality.
An important factor to consider in reviewing the various conceptualizations of commitment
is whether commitment can be clearly distinguished from related constructs (e.g., motives,
attitudes). That is, is commitment anything more than a motive to engage in a particular course
of action or a positive attitude toward a particular entity that predisposes a person to behave in
a manner that benefits that entity? If not, commitment loses its value as an explanatory
concept. If commitment is nothing more than a state of mind that exists when an individual
experiences a positive exchange relationship with some entity, it contributes nothing beyond
exchange theories of motivation (e.g., expectancy, equity) to our understanding of organizational behavior. Similarly, if commitment is viewed simply as a positive attitude, there is little
to be gained by continuing to study it outside the confines of more general attitude research.
Interestingly, several of those authors who provided general definitions of commitment
noted that commitment is different from motivation or general attitudes (e.g., Brickman,
1987; Brown, 1996; Scholl, 1981). They suggested that commitment influences behavior
independently of other motives and attitudes and, in fact, might lead to persistence in a course
of action even in the face of conflicting motives or attitudes. Commitment, for example, can
lead individuals to behave in ways that, from the perspective of neutral observers, might seem
contrary to their own self-interest. Elaboration on this point requires a more detailed
examination of the nature of the stabilizing force (see the following section). For now, we
offer the following proposition as the starting point for our model.
Proposition 1: Commitment is a force that binds an individual to a course of action of
relevance to one or more targets. As such, commitment is distinguishable from
exchange-based forms of motivation and from target-relevant attitudes, and can
influence behavior even in the absence of extrinsic motivation or positive attitudes.
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Table 1
Definitions of commitment
In general
``. . . engagement which restricts freedom of action.'' (Oxford English Dictionary, 1969)
``Commitment comes into being when a person, by making a side bet, links extraneous interests with a consistent
line of activity.'' (Becker, 1960, p. 32)
``. . . a state of being in which an individual becomes bound by his actions and through these actions to beliefs that
sustain the activities of his own involvement.'' (Salancik, 1977, p. 62)
``. . . a stabilizing force that acts to maintain behavioral direction when expectancy/equity conditions are not met
and do not function.'' (Scholl, 1981, p. 593)
``. . . a force that stabilizes individual behavior under circumstances where the individual would otherwise be
tempted to change that behavior.'' (Brickman, 1987, p. 2)
``. . . one's inclination to act in a given way toward a particular commitment target.''
(Oliver, 1990, p. 30)
``. . . an obliging force which requires that the person honor the commitment, even in the face of fluctuating
attitudes and whims.'' (Brown, 1996, p. 241)
Organizational commitment
``. . . the relative strength of an individual's identification with and involvement in a particular organization.''
(Mowday et al., 1979, p. 226)
``. . . the totality of normative pressures to act in a way which meets organizational goals and interests.'' (Wiener,
1982, p. 421)
``. . . the psychological attachment felt by the person for the organization; it will reflect the degree to which the
individual internalizes or adopts characteristics or perspectives of the organization.'' (O'Reilly & Chatman,
1986, p. 493)
``. . . a psychological state that binds the individual to the organization (i.e., makes turnover less likely).'' (Allen &
Meyer, 1990, p. 14)
``. . . a bond or linking of the individual to the organization.'' (Mathieu & Zajac, 1990, p. 171)
Job commitment
``. . . refers to the likelihood that an individual will stick with a job, and feel psychologically attached to it, whether
it is satisfying or not.'' (Rusbult & Farrell, 1983)
Occupational/career commitment
``. . . one's attitude toward one's profession or vocation.''
(Blau, 1985, p. 278)
``. . . one's motivation to work in a chosen vocation.''
(Carson & Bedeian, 1994, p. 240)
Goal commitment
``. . . an unwillingness to subsequently reduce goals to a lower level when confronted with error signals.''
(Campion & Lord, 1982, p. 268)
``. . . one's attachment to or determination to reach a goal, regardless of the goal's origin.''
(Locke et al., 1988, p. 24)
``. . . the determination to try for a goal and the persistence in pursuing it over time.''
(Hollenbeck, Williams, & Klein, 1989, p. 18)
``A committed person is thought to adopt a specific performance goal and to persist in attempts to reach it even
through difficulties.'' (Tubbs, 1993, p. 86)
``. . .the degree to which the individual considers the goal to be important, is determined to reach it by expending
effort over time, and is unwilling to abandon or lower the goal when confronted with setbacks and negative
feedback.'' (DeShon & Landis, 1997, p. 106)
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Table 1 (continued)
Commitment to organizational change
``. . . a psychological state that binds an employee to a course of action deemed necessary for the successful
implementation of a change initiative.'' (Herscovitch, 1999, p. 17)
Commitment to a strategy
``. . . involves the willingness of the person to put forth effort to enact the strategy.'' (Weissbein, Plamondon, &
Ford, 1998, p. 3)
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Table 2
Dimensions of organizational commitment within multidimensional models
Angle and Perry (1981, p. 4)
Value commitment
``commitment to support the goals of the organization''
Commitment to stay
``commitment to retain their organizational membership''
O'Reilly and Chatman (1986, p. 493)
Compliance
Identification
Internalization
Penley and Gould (1988)
Moral
Calculative
Alienative
evaluate the various models. We begin with an examination of the two models that have
arguably generated the most research those developed by Meyer and Allen (Allen &
Meyer, 1990; Meyer & Allen, 1984, 1991) and O'Reilly and colleagues (Caldwell et al.,
1990; O'Reilly & Chatman, 1986; O'Reilly et al., 1991). We then briefly review other
multidimensional models and address important conceptual issues that arise from comparison
of the different perspectives.
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highly with one another and showed similar patterns of correlations with measures of other
variables (for exceptions, see Becker et al., 1996; Harris, Hirschfeld, Field, & Mossholder,
1993). Consequently, in their more recent research, O'Reilly and his colleagues combined
the identification and internalization items to form what they called normative commitment.
(Note that this construct corresponds more closely to affective commitment in Meyer and
Allen's (1991) model and should not be confused with the latter's use of the term
normative commitment.)
Compliance (also referred to as instrumental commitment in more recent work) is
clearly distinct from identification and internalization. It differs not only in terms of the
basis for acceptance of influence, but also in its relation to turnover. For example,
O'Reilly and Chatman (1986) found that compliance correlated positively rather than
negatively with turnover. Given that organizational commitment is generally considered
to reduce the likelihood of turnover, this finding has raised some question about
whether compliance can be considered a form of organizational commitment (see Meyer
& Allen, 1997). Examination of the items used to measure compliance, however,
suggests another possible interpretation. The items address employees' motivation to
comply with day-to-day pressures for performance, not with pressures to remain in the
organization. Thus, rather than measuring commitment to remain, O'Reilly and Chatman's compliance measure might assess commitment to perform. If so, compliance is
similar in some respects to continuance commitment in Meyer and Allen's model, but
with a different behavioral focus. We discuss the issue of behavioral focus in more
detail later.
3.3. Other multidimensional conceptualizations
Angle and Perry (1981) distinguished between value commitment and commitment to stay
based on the results of a factor analysis of items from the Organizational Commitment
Questionnaire (OCQ: Mowday et al., 1979; Porter, Crampon, & Smith, 1976). Although it is
generally considered a unidimensional measure, Angle and Perry's analysis revealed two
factors underlying the OCQ one defined by items assessing willingness to remain
(commitment to stay) and the other by items assessing support for organizational goals
(value commitment). Based on these findings, as well as the results of their own research
using a refined measure developed by Schechter (1985), Mayer and Schoorman (1992, 1998)
also suggested that organizational commitment has two dimensions, which they labeled
continuance commitment (desire to remain) and value commitment (willingness to exert
effort). (Note that, although Mayer and Schoorman describe continuance commitment as a
``desire'' to remain, the items used to measure the construct refer primarily to perceived costs
associated with leaving.)
Although there is some similarity between the dimensions of organizational commitment
identified by Angle and Perry (1981) and Mayer and Schoorman (1992, 1998) and those
identified by Meyer and Allen (1991), there is an important difference. According to Meyer
and Allen, the three components of commitment (affective, continuance, and normative)
differ primarily in terms of the mind-set that binds the individual to the organization. The
primary behavioral consequence of all three mind-sets, however, is the same continued
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employment. In contrast, Angle and Perry and Mayer and Schoorman make their distinction
in terms of behavioral consequences rather than mind-sets continuance commitment is
presumed to be associated with the decision to stay or leave the organization, whereas value
commitment is associated with the exertion of effort toward the attainment of organizational
goals. We discuss this difference in more detail later in the context of the behavioral
consequences of commitment.
Jaros et al. (1993) suggested a multidimensional conceptualization of commitment that
also appears similar to that of Meyer and Allen (1991). Specifically, they distinguished
between affective, continuance, and moral commitment (see Table 2 for definitions). Again,
however, there are important differences. First, although both view affective commitment as
reflecting a feeling of emotional attachment to the organization, Jaros et al. placed
considerably more emphasis on the actual affect experienced by employees than did Meyer
and Allen. Indeed, the measure used by Jaros et al. consists of an affect adjective check list.
Moreover, Jaros et al.'s definition of moral commitment (internalization of goals and values)
corresponds more closely to Meyer and Allen's definition of affective commitment than to
their definition of normative commitment. Only in the case of continuance commitment do
their conceptual definitions correspond.
Finally, Penley and Gould (1988) developed a multidimensional framework based on
Etzioni's (1961) earlier work on organizational involvement. Specifically, they distinguished
between three forms of commitment: moral, calculative, and alienative (see Table 2 for
definitions). The definition of moral commitment corresponds closely to Jaros et al.'s (1993)
definition, and overlaps conceptually with affective commitment in Meyer and Allen's model,
and with value commitment in Angle and Perry's (1981) and Mayer and Schoorman's (1992,
1998) frameworks. Their use of the term calculative commitment corresponds most to
compliance as described by O'Reilly and Chatman (1986), and might be more appropriately
considered a form of instrumental motivation (Wiener, 1982) than commitment. Their notion
of alienative commitment corresponds to some extent to continuance commitment as defined
by Meyer and Allen and Jaros et al.
3.4. Implications: commitment as a multiple mind-set
There are clearly differences among the multidimensional frameworks that have been
offered. Nevertheless, there are also important similarities. First, whether made explicit by the
authors or not, a major factor that distinguishes the different forms of commitment from one
another within the various models is the mind-set (e.g., emotional attachment, sense of being
locked in, belief in and acceptance of goals) presumed to characterize the commitment.
Moreover, there is considerable similarity in the nature of the mind-sets represented within
the different frameworks.
Most models include a dimension reflecting an affective bond with the organization.
This dimension has been labeled affective commitment (Jaros et al., 1993; Meyer &
Allen, 1984, 1991), value commitment (Angle & Perry, 1981; Mayer & Schoorman,
1992, 1998), moral commitment (Jaros et al., 1993; Penley & Gould, 1988), and
normative (identification and internalization) commitment (Caldwell et al., 1990; O'Reilly
et al., 1991). Although the basis for the development of the affective bond differs
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somewhat across the various models (e.g., emotional involvement, identification, value
congruence), they all appear to contribute to a mind-set characterized by a desire to
follow a course of action (e.g., continue employment, exert effort to achieve organizational goals). Most models also acknowledge that individuals can become committed to a
course of action because of the perceived cost of failing to do so. Commitment
accompanied by a cost-avoidance mind-set has commonly been referred to as continuance
commitment (Jaros et al., 1993; Mayer & Schoorman, 1992, 1998; Meyer & Allen, 1984,
1991), although Penley and Gould (1988) used the term alienative commitment. Finally,
perceived obligation to pursue a course of action (i.e., normative commitment) was
identified as a separate dimension of commitment by Meyer and colleagues (Meyer &
Allen, 1991; Meyer et al., 1993). Although not clearly distinguished in the other
multidimensional models, normative commitment has been highlighted in some unidimensional conceptualizations of commitment (e.g., Wiener, 1982) and has been found to be
distinguishable from the affective- and cost-based forms of commitment (e.g., Dunham et
al., 1994; Hackett et al., 1994; Irving, Coleman, & Cooper, 1997).
We proposed earlier that commitment is a force that binds an individual to a course of
action. Having now reviewed theory and research pertaining to the multidimensionality of
commitment, we argue that this force is experienced as a mind-set that can take different
forms. Therefore, we offer the following proposition.
Proposition 2: The mind-set accompanying commitment can take varying forms
including desire, perceived cost, or obligation to continue a course of action. These
mind-sets reflect distinguishable components of the underlying commitment construct.
The strength of each mind-set can be measured and, together, these measures reflect an
employee's ``commitment profile.''
Putting labels on these mind-sets is always a danger because labels, literally translated,
typically do not convey the richness of the constructs they are intended to describe. For
present purposes, we use the labels affective, continuance, and normative commitment to
describe commitment accompanied by the mind-sets of desire, perceived cost, and obligation,
respectively. Our decision was based, in part, on the fact that these terms are now fairly well
established in the commitment literature. The choice of the term affective commitment was
perhaps most difficult. Our decision was based on the belief that all of the factors considered
to be involved in its development are likely to be accompanied by a strong positive emotion
that is perhaps the most salient aspect of this form of commitment. We do not use the term
affective commitment, however, as others have (e.g., Jaros et al., 1993), to imply that it
reflects, or should be measured solely in terms of, an individual's affective state. To the
contrary, we believe that there is an important cognitive component to this form of
commitment (e.g., recognition that there is an important purpose in what one is doing).
4. Commitment to what? The entitybehavior distinction
Recall that commitment was defined earlier as ``a force that binds an individual to a course
of action of relevance to one or more targets.'' An important issue to address, therefore, is the
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nature of the targets to which employees become committed. Indeed, a potential point of
confusion in the commitment literature stems from the question of whether employees
commit to a course of action or to an entity. There is a long-standing distinction between
attitudinal and behavioral commitment (see Mowday et al., 1982; Staw, 1977) that some
might argue bears on this issue. As has been argued previously (see Meyer & Allen, 1991,
1997), however, the attitude versus behavior distinction relates more to the processes
involved in the development of commitment than to the focus of commitment. We need to
look elsewhere, therefore, to answer the question ``commitment to what?''
A review of the workplace commitment literature, as well as a consideration of the
everyday use of the term, suggests that individuals can commit to both entities and
behaviors. For example, we read and speak about commitment to organizations, occupations, and unions (i.e., entities), as well as of commitment to work toward the attainment of
goals and the implementation of policies (behaviors). In some cases, commitment is
conceptualized as including both an entity and a course of action. Meyer and colleagues
(Meyer & Allen, 1984, 1991; Meyer et al., 1993), for example, defined commitment in such
a way that it implies a course of action (i.e., continuing membership) of relevance to an
entity (i.e., organization or occupation). Mayer and Schoorman (1992, 1998) identified two
forms of organizational commitment, one presumably having implications for remaining
with the organization (i.e., continuance commitment) and the other for job performance (i.e.,
value commitment). Different behavioral consequences are also associated with the different
forms of commitment within the models presented by Angle and Perry (1981) and O'Reilly
and Chatman (1986).
Careful consideration of existing uses of the term commitment suggests that differences in
focus are largely a function of emphasis. When commitment is considered to be directed at an
entity, the behavioral consequences are often implied, if not stated explicitly. Similarly, when
commitment is considered to be to a course of action, the entity to which that behavior is
relevant can often be inferred even when not stated explicitly. For example, the entity implicit
in commitment to implement a change in policy (e.g., broadening recruitment to reach a more
diverse population) is the objective of the change itself (e.g., increased diversity within the
organization). Consequently, for purposes of developing a general model of commitment, we
argue that there are advantages to continuing to view commitment as being directed at work
relevant entities and courses of action. We suggest, however, that from the standpoint of
understanding and predicting the outcomes of commitment, there may be an advantage to
specifying both the relevant entity and behavior.
This advantage is perhaps most obvious in the case of commitment to an entity. We will
be in better position to predict the outcome of commitment to an organization when we
clearly specify the behavior of interest (e.g., continued employment, attainment of
organizational goals) than when we do not. The same applies, however, to commitment
to a behavior. As we discuss in more detail below, individuals often have considerable
discretion in how they enact the behaviors to which they are committed. Consequently, we
will be in a better position to predict behavior when we know what a person views as the
target of his or her commitment. For example, employees who are committed to providing
quality customer service might behave somewhat differently depending on whether, in their
minds, the intended objective is customer satisfaction or organizational profit. If customer
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Such changes are typically introduced to achieve a desired objective (e.g., customer
satisfaction and repeat business). This is the ``spirit'' of the policy change. The policy, as
stated in a manual, or presented in training sessions, is likely to outline a set of behaviors
intended to achieve the desired objective. This is the ``letter'' of the change. It is rare,
however, that the letter of the change accurately and completely reflects the spirit of the
change because it is difficult to anticipate every eventuality and to communicate the correct
behavioral response to each. Employees who are committed to implementing the change will
be expected to adapt their behavior to be consistent with the spirit of the change. But will
they? The answer might depend on the nature of their commitment.
The fact that commitment can take different forms appears to lie at the heart of these
complexities in the commitmentbehavior relationship. This suggests that we need to look
more carefully at the implications of the different commitment mind-sets on behavior.
Existing research, particularly in the organizational commitment literature, suggests that,
compared to continuance and normative commitment, affective commitment (a) correlates
significantly with a wider range of ``outcome'' measures and (b) correlates more strongly
with any given outcome measure. For example, Stanley, Meyer, Topolnytsky and Herscovitch (1999) conducted a series of meta-analyses to examine the correlations between
commitment, measured using Meyer and colleagues' (Allen & Meyer, 1990; Meyer &
Allen, 1984; Meyer et al., 1993) scales, and turnover, turnover intention, absenteeism, job
performance, and organizational citizenship behavior. They found that all three forms of
commitment correlated negatively with turnover intention (correcting for unreliability in the
commitment measure only), but that the magnitude of the correlations differed the
strongest correlation was with affective commitment ( .43), followed by normative ( .23),
and continuance commitment ( .18), respectively. Correlations with actual turnover were
weaker but showed the same pattern ( .23,
.16, and
.07, respectively). Finally,
affective commitment correlated more strongly than did normative and continuance commitment with measures of absenteeism ( .12, .04, and .04), job performance (.16, .05, and
.06), and organizational citizenship behavior (.29, .19, and .00). These findings are
consistent with Mayer and Schoorman's (1992) observation that value commitment correlated as, or more, strongly than continuance commitment with all behavior and performance
measures with the exception of turnover.
How do we explain these findings? Consider first the finding that affective commitment
correlates significantly with a wider range of outcome measures. One possible explanation is
that, as mentioned, affective commitment is generally defined and operationalized more
broadly than continuance and normative commitment. For purposes of subsequent discussion,
we will refer to the behavior to which an individual is bound by his or her commitment as the
focal behavior. Thus, stated another way, it is possible that the focal behavior is broader in the
case of affective commitment than in the case of continuance and normative commitment.
Consequently, affective commitment is relevant to, and therefore should predict a wider range
of behaviors. This does not explain, however, why affective commitment has sometimes been
found to be a better predictor of turnover intention and turnover than are continuance and
normative commitment (e.g., Stanley et al., 1999). Measures of the latter forms of
commitment tend to specify continued employment as the focal behavior and should arguably
be better predictors of such behavior.
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Another possible explanation for why affective commitment correlates with a wider
range of outcomes is that, when commitment is accompanied by a mind-set of desire, the
behavioral consequences of commitment are perceived by the individual to be broader than
when commitment is accompanied by a mind-set of perceived cost or obligation. That is,
when employees want to engage in a course of action because of attachment to,
identification with, or shared values with the target of the commitment (e.g., organization,
union), they are less sensitive to cues that potentially delimit the behavior. Rather, their
mind-set directs attention to the intended outcome and thereby allows them to regulate their
activity to achieve that outcome. In contrast, when employees pursue a course of action to
avoid costs, or out of obligation, they are more sensitive to conditions that define what is
required or expected of them. Brown (1996) recently suggested that commitment should be
conceptualized to include a specification of the ``terms'' of the commitment. We agree, but
would add that the terms of a commitment can vary as a function of the mind-set that
characterizes that commitment.
This explanation, and the implications we draw from it, are admittedly speculative.
Nevertheless, some support is provided by Morrison's (1994) finding that affectively
committed employees viewed their jobs as encompassing a wider range of behaviors
(including behaviors commonly considered to be extra-role) than those who were not
affectively committed. Moreover, those with higher levels of affective commitment were
more likely than those with weaker commitment to engage in these behaviors. Thus, it
appears that the nature of the mind-set can influence the perception (i.e., specification of
terms) and enactment of commitment-relevant behavior.
If we are correct, affective commitment should be related to a wider range of behaviors
than other forms of commitment even under conditions in which the focal behavior is clearly
specified in the measure. That is, even if we were to measure affective organizational
commitment using items pertaining specifically to a desire to remain in the organization, this
measure should correlate positively with other forms of organization-relevant behaviors (e.g.,
attendance, performance, citizenship behavior). Similarly, measures of affective commitment
to work toward the attainment of an organizational goal, or to implement a change in policy,
will correlate not only with a measure of the focal behavior, but also with measures of
behaviors that fall outside the specified boundaries (e.g., persistence, innovation, strategy
development). Stated more generally, the committed individual always has some discretion in
the specification of the terms of the commitment. The terms are likely to be interpreted more
liberally in the case of affective commitment than in the case of continuance or normative
commitment. For purposes of subsequent discussion, we use the term discretionary behavior
to refer to any behavior that is not clearly specified within the terms of the commitment (as
might be agreed upon by neutral observers), but can be included within these terms at the
discretion of the committed individual.
We turn now to the finding that measures of affective commitment tend to correlate more
strongly with any given outcome variable, including the focal behavior, than do measures of
continuance and normative commitment (Stanley et al., 1999). One possible explanation for
this finding is that the ``binding force'' is not equal for all commitment mind-sets. Individuals
who are committed primarily out of desire might have a stronger inclination to follow through
on their commitment than those who are committed primarily out of obligation or to avoid
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costs. Those who are committed primarily to avoid costs might be particularly inclined to find
ways to get out of their commitment. For example, an employee who stays with an
organization only because his or her skills are uniquely valuable to that organization might
nevertheless continue to search for other employment opportunities where those skills are
marketable. Similarly, an individual who feels a moral obligation to a manager to complete a
project might be inclined to find ways to fulfill his or her obligation more quickly or with less
effort than would be the case if the commitment was based on a strong belief in the
importance of the project. Thus, if we consider the ``pure'' cases of affective, continuance,
and normative commitment (i.e., where the other forms are weak), we expect that the
likelihood that a committed individual will enact the focal behavior will be greatest in the
case of affective commitment, followed by normative commitment and then continuance
commitment. The probability that the focal behavior will occur will be considerably greater,
however, in all three of these cases than when commitment, in general, is weak.
We would expect a similar pattern of effects when we consider the likelihood of more
discretionary behavior. That is, individuals with a strong affective commitment will very
likely engage in behaviors that, although not specified within the ``terms'' of the
commitment, would nevertheless be beneficial to the intended objective. For example, an
individual with a strong affective commitment to an organizational change initiative might
be quite willing to go above and beyond the call of duty to find ways to make the initiative
work. This is less likely to be the case for those whose commitment is based primarily on a
sense of obligation or a recognition of cost for failure to comply with the initiative; indeed,
the latter might be unwilling to do anything that is not actually required of them.
To this point, we have considered only the pure cases of the different forms of
commitment. What can we expect when more than one form of commitment is operating?
We can only speculate at this time, but because we predict that continuance and normative
commitment have a weaker impact on behavior than does affective commitment, it is possible
that combining a mind-set of desire with one of obligation, and particularly with one of need,
might reduce the impact of the commitment compared to the pure affective case. Of course,
we would still expect the likelihood of behavior, whether focal or discretionary, to be greater
than would be the case for normative or continuance commitment alone.
If our predictions are correct, we would expect the pattern of relations between
commitment profiles and behavior illustrated in Fig. 1. The likelihood of both focal and
discretionary behavior should be greatest in the case of ``pure'' affective commitment,
followed by the cases in which affective commitment is accompanied by high levels of
normative and/or continuance commitment. Normative commitment alone is expected to
lead to a greater likelihood of the focal behavior, and possibly discretionary behavior, than
is continuance commitment. Continuance commitment should lead to a greater likelihood of
the focal behavior than no commitment, but no difference is expected in the case of
discretionary behavior.
One final observation pertaining to the behavioral consequences of commitment is that,
even in the case of affective commitment, the correlations are modest. Although various
explanations for this finding have been provided (see Mathieu & Zajac, 1990; Randall,
1990), there is another explanation that follows logically from recognition of the fact that
commitment can take different forms. Because only one form of commitment is required for
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Fig. 1. Probability of focal and discretionary behaviors expected for different commitment profiles.
a focal behavior to occur, that behavior is likely to occur when other forms of commitment
are weak. For example, employees might remain with their organization because of strong
continuance commitment, in spite of weak affective or normative commitment. If so, this
will have the effect of attenuating the correlations between turnover and affective and
normative commitment.
To test this hypothesis, it is necessary to look for interaction effects involving two or more
forms of commitment. To date, only a few investigators have reported testing for interactions
(e.g., Jaros, 1997; Meyer, Paunonen, Gellatly, Goffin, & Jackson, 1989; Randall, Fedor, &
Longenecker, 1990; Somers, 1995). Although the effects observed have been relatively weak,
they do provide some evidence consistent with our hypothesis. For example, Somers (1995)
found a significant interaction of affective and continuance commitment in the prediction of
annexed absences and intention to remain. In both cases, the relation between continuance
commitment and the outcome measure was stronger when affective commitment was weak
(and vice versa). Jaros (1997) found a significant interaction of continuance and normative
commitment in the prediction of turnover intention. Again, the relation between one form of
commitment and turnover intention was stronger when the other form of commitment was
weak. Thus, the pattern of relations reported in these studies suggests that, when any one
form of commitment is strong, it has the potential to attenuate the correlation between
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behavior and any other form of commitment. This is because the behavior is likely to occur
even when the latter is weak.
In light of the foregoing discussion, we offer the following propositions.
Proposition 4a: The mind-sets accompanying commitment have implications for the
probability that certain behavioral consequences of commitment will occur. All three
mind-sets will be positively associated with the occurrence of the focal behavior, but
affective commitment will have a stronger relationship than normative and continuance
commitment. Differences in the strength of association for the different mind-sets will be
even greater in the case of discretionary behaviors affective commitment will have
the strongest positive correlation, followed by normative commitment. Continuance
commitment will not correlate positively with discretionary behavior and might, in fact,
correlate negatively.
Proposition 4b: Different forms of commitment will combine to influence behavior such
that the relation between any one form of commitment and behavior will be greatest
when the other forms are low. Most notably, the relations between the focal behavior
and both continuance and normative commitment will be weak affective commitment is
high. Even affective commitment, however, should correlate more strongly with the focal
behavior when continuance and normative commitment are low.
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317
318
The consequences of commitment are also represented in the model by concentric circles.
The inner circle represents the behavior that is the focus of the commitment. This behavior
can be broadly or narrowly defined. For example, in the case of organizational commitment it
can be as specific as remaining a member of the organization, or as broad as working toward
the success of the organization. In the case of commitment to a diversity initiative, the focal
behavior can be as specific as a change in recruitment and hiring strategy, or as broad as
ensuring that there is a substantial change in the composition of the workforce within a
specified period of time. The focal behavior is that which is explicitly specified in an
agreement between parties (e.g., manager and worker), is recognized by objective third
parties, or is specified in a measure of commitment. Consistent with Proposition 3, the focal
behavior will always be of relevance to some target(s). The target might be an entity (e.g.,
organization, manager, union), an abstract principle (e.g., policy), or the outcome of a course
of action (e.g., goal attainment, change implementation).
The outer circle represents discretionary forms of behavior that can accompany the focal
behavior. As we noted earlier, even when the behavioral focus of commitment is quite
specific, the individual has some discretion concerning how this behavior is enacted.
Consider, for example, commitment to remain in the organization. Employees who are
committed to remain can differ considerably in how regularly they attend work and how
much effort they exert while they are there. Similarly, employees who commit to implementing a change in policy can choose to comply only with the specific dictates of the policy, or
they can adapt their behavior to be consistent with the spirit of the policy. Employees who
commit to work toward the attainment of a goal can persist in spite of difficult challenges that
might arise, or they can quit as soon as they are confronted with a problem that would
``reasonably'' free them from their commitment.
What determines the behavioral consequences of commitment? According to our model,
the focal behavior will occur with a high degree of probability. This is because, by definition,
employees feel bound to engage in this behavior. Being bound out of desire, however, might
be a stronger ``force'' than being bound out of obligation or need (Proposition 4a). Moreover,
commitments can vary in strength an individual can feel anything from ``somewhat
bound'' to ``unconditionally bound.'' The factors determining strength will vary depending
on the mind-set involved, and might include the centrality of the shared values, magnitude of
the costs that would be incurred, or strength of the need for reciprocity. People might also
have multiple commitments with conflicting implications for behavior. For example, being
committed to attend a meeting can conflict with commitment to care for a sick child. The
relation between a particular form of commitment and the focal behavior will also be
moderated by the level of other forms of commitment (Proposition 4b). Consequently, we
would expect a strong, but not perfect, correspondence between a commitment and the
occurrence of the focal behavior.
Whether commitment to a target-relevant focal behavior is accompanied by other
discretionary behaviors will depend on the mind-set characterizing the commitment. In the
case of affective commitment, the individual is bound by desire or a belief in the meaningfulness and importance of the activity. Under these conditions, it is likely that the
individual will define the target behavior very broadly and pursue other courses of action
that are judged to be of benefit to the target (e.g., organization, manager, customer). In the
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case of normative commitment, the individual feels a sense of obligation to enact the focal
behavior. Whether this leads to other target-relevant behaviors might depend on whether the
individual views these behaviors as relevant to the fulfillment of his or her obligation. Finally,
in the case of continuance commitment, the mind-set is one of need failure to enact the
behavior would be costly. If cost-avoidance is the only basis for commitment, the individual
is unlikely to engage in any other course of action not specified in the terms of the
commitment.
The boxes connected by arrows to the outer commitment circle represent the bases for the
mind-sets characterizing affective, continuance, and normative commitment. That is, they
reflect the processes involved in the development of the three commitment mind-sets. These
processes were described earlier and are outlined in Propositions 5a, b, and c. There are many
more specific factors (e.g., personal, job, and organizational characteristics) that can influence
the development of commitment mind-sets indeed these are the levers that organizations
can use in the management of workplace commitments (see Meyer & Smith, in press). We
suggest, however, that these factors are likely to exert their influence indirectly through the
bases identified in Fig. 2.
8. Implications
This general model of workplace commitment has a variety of implications. We discuss
these within three broad categories: theory development, research, and management.
8.1. Theory development
The model presented here incorporates a number of propositions derived from existing
theory. As we noted, some of these propositions are well grounded and others are more
speculative. We invite others to suggest ways in which our conceptualization of commitment
might be refined to better account for research findings. We recommend, however, that any
future developments in commitment theory be guided by the principle that commitment
should have a core meaning regardless of the context in which it is studied. More work might
be necessary to establish what the core essence of commitment is, but we suggest that future
attempts to define and measure commitment to any work-relevant entity or course of action
be consistent with, or advance, the general definitions of the construct provided in Table 1.
8.2. Research
There are many fruitful avenues for commitment research in the future. We address only a
few here that are directly relevant to the model. A major consideration in any line of research,
however, will be measurement. Although the core essence of commitment in our model is the
sense of being bound to a course of action, we acknowledge that this might be difficult to
measure directly. Almost any term one might consider as a way of describing this sense of
being bound (e.g., bound, obligated, compelled, inclined) carries with it some reference to the
accompanying mind-sets (i.e., desire, perceived cost, obligation). This becomes a moot point,
however, if we consider that it is the accompanying mind-set that is most important in
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Table 3
Sample items for work commitment scales
Organizational commitment (membership focus)
Affective commitment
Remaining a member of this organization is important to me.
I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career with this organization.
Continuance commitment
It would be costly for me to leave this organization now.
Right now, staying with this organization is a matter of necessity.
Normative commitment
I would feel guilty if I left this organization now.
I do not feel any moral obligation to remain with my current organization (R).
Organizational commitment (performance focus)
Affective commitment
Working toward this organization's success is important to me.
I am willing to do whatever is asked of me by this organization.
Continuance commitment
I feel as if I have little choice but to do what is asked of me by this organization.
I cannot risk putting in less than the required effort for this organization.
Normative commitment
I owe it to this organization to do what is needed to achieve its objectives.
I feel an obligation to put in a good day's work for this organization.
Goal commitment
Affective commitment
Achieving this goal is as important to me as it is to the organization.
I really want to achieve this goal.
Continuance commitment
It could be costly for me if I do not achieve this goal.
I have a lot to lose by failing to meet my objectives.
Normative commitment
I owe it to this organization to do my best to achieve this goal.
I feel a real sense of obligation to try to meet this goal.
Commitment to organizational change
Affective commitment
Working toward the success of this change is important to me.
Working toward this change is something I want to do.
Continuance commitment
I have no choice but to go along with this change.
It would be too costly for me to resist this change.
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Table 3 (continued)
Commitment to organizational change
Normative commitment
I feel a sense of duty to work toward this change initiative.
I feel an obligation to work toward this change.
R = reverse-keyed items.
determining behavior. Thus, we argue that attention should be directed at the development of
measures of the relevant commitment mind-sets.
In developing measures, investigators should specify the focal behavior and target of
interest. In the past, there has been concern about the fact that commitment measures included
items pertaining to behavioral consequences (e.g., Reichers, 1985). This concern is due
largely to the fact that, if commitment measures include behavioral referents, they can become
redundant with the behavioral intentions that are often used as ``outcome'' measures in the
validation process. We agree that this is a potential problem for the validation process. We
suggest, however, that the problem is not with the reference to behavior in the commitment
measures, but with the use of behavioral intention as an outcome measure. The objective of
commitment research is to predict actual behavior intention is only a proxy variable.
In Table 3, we provide examples of items that assess affective, continuance, and normative
commitment as they pertain to behavior of relevance to various work-related targets (e.g.,
organization, goal attainment, change initiative). To illustrate how the focal behavior can be
varied depending on the interests of the investigator (or practitioner), we include two different
versions of a measure of ``organizational commitment,'' one focusing on membership and
one on the attainment of organizational goals.
Turning to the investigation of substantive issues, there are several implications that follow
from our model. First, as noted above, research on the consequences of commitment should
look beyond the focal behavior to detect the implications of different mind-sets. That is,
although we would expect to find a difference between those who are uncommitted and those
who are committed (in any form) by measuring the focal behavior, the biggest difference in
the behavioral consequences of the different mind-sets are likely to be found in measures of
discretionary behavior.
We suggest that it is also important in future research to examine the interactive effects of
the commitment mind-sets. Zero-order correlations between any single form of commitment
and a behavioral outcome will be attenuated by the influence of other forms of commitment.
Studies that have tested for interaction effects in the past have found some evidence that the
relation between any one form of commitment and behavior is greater when other forms of
commitment are weak (Jaros, 1997; Somers, 1995). The hypothesis stated in Proposition 4b
requires further testing, however, as do the hypotheses concerning profile differences
reflected in Fig. 1.
On the development side, the model identifies several processes that, based on existing
theory and research, appear to be implicated in the development of the different mind-sets. In
the past, research conducted to examine the development of commitment has been relatively
unsystematic (cf. Meyer & Allen, 1991; Mowday et al., 1982; Reichers, 1985). In the future,
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we suggest that the choice of antecedent variables for study be based on their relevance to the
processes outlined in the model. This would not only serve to test the validity of our
hypotheses concerning mechanisms, but would aid in the synthesis of research findings. That
is, rather than appearing like a ``laundry list'' as Reichers (1985) described it, research
pertaining to antecedents of commitment could be organized according to their relevance to
underlying mechanisms (e.g., identification, investment, reciprocity).
8.3. Management
Finally, several recommendations for management can be derived from our general model
of workplace commitment. We use the term management very loosely here to refer to
activities undertaken by leaders in businesses, unions, professional associations and other
organizations for purposes of building commitment to the organization itself or to initiatives
they undertake.
Recommendation 1: Carefully consider the desired outcomes of employee commitment
and the behaviors required to achieve those outcomes. Based on this assessment, determine
whether it is best to focus on establishing commitment to a broad target (e.g., organization),
to more specific objectives (e.g., goal attainment, customer service), or both.
It is important to consider the behavior or performance outcomes that one hopes to achieve
through commitment, as well as the target of commitment most relevant to that behavior.
Commitment to general targets (e.g., organizations) with broadly defined focal behaviors
(e.g., working toward organizational success) is likely to be associated with a general
tendency on the part of members to achieve organizational objectives, but might not help
members to direct their efforts to those objectives considered most important by the
organization. Commitment to more specific objectives might produce the opposite effect
efforts might be directed at achieving the specific objective perhaps to the detriment of the
higher order goals of the organization.
Recommendation 2: Carefully consider what the most appropriate target of commitment
might be in any given situation and help employees to see how the desired course of
action is relevant to the goals and values of that target.
Although, in many cases, it will be desirable to make the organization the target of
members' commitment, there might be conditions under which this is neither desirable nor
possible. For example, under highly unstable conditions in which business organizations
cannot guarantee employment to even its most loyal and effective workers, it might not be
reasonable to expect employee commitment to continue the relationship. It might also be
difficult to get them committed to work toward organizational goals for the sake of the
organization. It might, however, be possible to get employees to work toward those same
goals if they can be shown to be relevant to an alternative target (e.g., profession, customer,
personal career). For instance, employees who are highly committed to there own personal
careers are more likely to work hard on projects they see as instrumental for the development
of marketable skills.
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