Journal of Southern African Studies, Volume 27, Number 4, December 2001

A Case Study of Conservation and

Development Con icts: Swazilands Hlane
Road*
JEFFREY D. HACKEL
(California State University, San Bernardino)

Integrated conservation and development projects are now being promoted as the best
means to save wildlife in Africa. However, a case study in Swaziland provides a cautionary
tale about the dif culty of reconciling the two; it also provides insight into how conservation politics were played out during the latter years of King Sobuza IIs reign. In
Swaziland in the late 1970s, a debate occurred about the upgrading of a major road in
Swazilands northeast. The decision was signi cant because the road under question
bisected the countrys primary conservation area: Hlane Game Sanctuary. The debate
centred on the needs of economic development as opposed to nature conservation.
Commercial interests wanted the road tarred; conservationists, on the other hand, believed
that an upgrade would undermine their efforts to establish a viable nature conservation
area in northeastern Swaziland. Instead, they favoured a new route that would be aligned
west of the sanctuary but would cost signi cantly more than upgrading the established, low
traf c volume, route. In the end, the road through Hlane was upgraded. This paper
analyses the decision-making process, using archival and other written records, as well as
interviews with many of the debate participants.

Introduction
Since the 1970s, integrated conservation and development (ICD) has increasingly come to
dominate conservation thinking in southern Africa.1 The term refers to the linking of
conservation with development to protect wildlife, the idea being that rural people must
become better off in economic terms if they are ever to become constituents for wildlife.2
ICD is now favoured over what can be called the protectionist approach in which wildlife
is protected for its own sake, and protected lands are managed solely for the bene t of
wildlife. In this approach, people are generally removed from a protected area, and their
access to resources within the park restricted, if allowed at all. The protective apparatus
* This research was conducted during 198485 and in 1998. A California State University Professional
Development Grant funded the second period of research. I would like to acknowledge the cooperation that I
received during the rst phase of the work, when I did in-depth interviews with many of those actively involved
in the decision to upgrade the Hlane Road. As for the second phase, I would like to thank all those who made
material accessible to me, including the Swaziland Archives staff and the Swaziland National Trust Commission.
Finally, I need to thank James Culverwell for his ongoing help in understanding conservation issues in Swaziland,
and to David Simon for his valuable comments on the paper.
1 Community-based conservation essentially means the same as integrated conservation and development . For
practical purposes, the two terms can be used interchangeably . Another term used is Peace Parks, i.e.
cross-boundar y conservation areas that are promoted, among other things, as a way to link countries in the region
with a common purpose.
2 J. Hackel, Community Conservation and the Future of Africas Wildlife, Conservation Biology, 13, 4 (August
1999), pp. 726734.
ISSN 0305-7070 print; 1465-389 3 online/01/040813-19
DOI: 10.1080/0305707012009075 4

2001 Journal of Southern African Studies

814

Journal of Southern African Studies

includes a strong policing effort to guard against intrusion from outsiders. Con ict arises
because local people see valuable resources within the protected area but are prohibited
from using them. Resentment can be especially strong if the protected area was once used
but is now off limits to the local community.
The wholesale acceptance of ICD by both conservation strategists and practitioners
came about without much critical analysis, as there is relatively little literature available on
the ef cacy of the approach, or on its social rami cations.3 Critics of the approach are now
questioning its conceptual foundation and its likelihood of success. The crux of the criticism
is that ICD is being implemented more as an article of faith than as a controlled
experiment. 4 Indeed, since ICD has been around for over 20 years now, some are
concluding that it has, in fact, been a failure, and that the linking of conservation and
development has resulted in habitat degradation and wildlife losses, with a corresponding
reduction in biodiversity.5 Thus, for many observers, it is still an open question as to
whether conservation and economic development can coexist, much less whether economic
development can act as the foundation of African conservation strategy. The problem is that
economic goals end up taking priority over conservation goals.
A historical opportunity to examine the relationship between conservation and economic
development exists in northeastern Swaziland, where communal, protected and commercial
lands exist side by side.6 Intensi cation of both conservation and economic development
efforts occurred in the 1970s, and although not conceptually linked at the time, both
development and conservation existed together geographically. During the early phases of
both developments, reconciliation of the two seemingly incompatible land uses was
problematic. For the conservation areas to remain viable, either as reservoirs for wildlife or
as aesthetically desirable recreation areas, much care would have to be taken to minimise
the impact of commercial activities. As is often the case, it was not long before an issue
presented itself that determined conservations place in relation to development: the
decision to upgrade the Hlane Road.7 The Hlane Road bisects the Hlane Game Sanctuary
(HGS), the areas most important protected area, and is the main artery serving northeastern
Swaziland (see Figure 1). Upgrading it resulted in a high volume, tarred road that could
handle more commercial traf c.
This article focuses on the decision to upgrade the road, and the debate that led to
it. Government of cials, business people, consultants, conservationists, and King
Sobhuza II (hereafter King Sobhuza), who laid down the ground rules for the debate,
participated in the decision-making process. King Sobhuza, who was sympathetic to
conservation efforts, especially at HGS, dictated that conservation advocates would have an
equal voice with the projects supporters. In essence, the Hlane Road debate marked the
3 E. Koch, Nature has the Power to Heal Old Wounds: War, Peace, and Changing Patterns of Conservation
in Africa, in D. Simon (ed.), South Africa in Southern Africa: Recon guring the Region (Athens, Ohio University
Press, 1998), pp. 5671.
4 A. Noss, Challenges to Nature Conservation with Community Developmen t in Central African Forests, Oryx,
31, 3 (July 1997), pp. 180188; C. Atwell, What if the Emperor has no Clothes? A reply to Martin, Oryx, 34,
1 (January 2000), pp. 36.
5 J. Oates, Myth and Reality in the Rain Forest: How Conservation Strategies are Failing in West Africa (Berkeley,
University of California Press, 1999), p. 310; C. Spinage, Social Change and Conservation Misrepresentation
in Africa, Oryx, 32,4 (October 1998), pp. 265276.
6 J. Hackel, Rural Change and Nature Conservation in Africa: A Case Study from Swaziland, Human Ecology,
21, 3 (September 1993), pp. 295312.
7 In this account, I use the name Hlane Road throughout , although various participants in the debate over the roads
upgrading used different names. The Hlane Road runs through northeastern Swaziland and is a continuation of
South Africas N2 highway, linking the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal and Mpulmalanga. The of cial designation,
as given in the Third National Developmen t Plan, is the Junction Siteki TurnoffMaphiveni Road. This section
was to be completed rst, while the remainder, which runs due north to the Lomahasha border post, was to be
built two years later.

Swazilands Hlane Road

815

Figure 1. Northeastern Swaziland generalised land use map. The area designated as Other has, depending on the
speci c location, the following land uses: commercial livestock ranches, Swazi communal land, the Kings Hlane
meeting place, which is the isolated area between northwest Hlane and sugar lands, and other agricultural activities.

rst time that a major development decision was taken with the full participation of
conservationists.
The Hlane Road decision serves as a cautionary tale for contemporary projects that are
designed to link conservation and economic development, using the concept of ICD as their
conceptual foundation. For example, the Maputaland Transfrontier Conservation Area
(MTFCA) and a subsidiary project, the Lubombo Spatial Development Initiative (LSDI),
are being developed together to promote both conservation and economic growth in the
Lubombo region of Swaziland, South Africa, and Mozambique. The idea behind each
project is to exploit the regions natural resources to promote economic development.
The MTFCA has as its primary objective the conservation of biodiversity;8 the LSDI,
meanwhile, is more focused on economic development.9 Both promote ecotourism as the
8 Peace Parks Foundation, Proposed Maputaland TFCA: Unique Mountains to Mangrove Sanctuary/Lubombo
SDI Has a Key Role to Play, Peace Parks Foundation Newsletter, 2, 2 (April 1998), pp. 45.
9 Lubombo Spatial Developmen t Initiative, Report on the Lubombo Spatial Development Initiative, (Mayville,
South Africa, 1998), p. 44.

816

Journal of Southern African Studies

primary means to increase economic growth, with the LSDI also giving emphasis to
agricultural development. The LSDI literature somewhat worryingly does not list biodiversity preservation as one of its objectives.10 Thus, already in the discussion of the
various projects being developed under the rubric of ICD, there is a lack of clarity as to
whether economic development or wildlife conservation is to predominate. As is often the
case, it will not be easy to reconcile conservation and development in the same area. The
Hlane Road decision shows that development tends to win out, as the more tangible
economic investments and goals are given priority at the expense of wildlife conservation.
As a nal introductory comment, it should be noted that the interviews that provide the
basis for this article include representatives of all the major participants in the debate except
for King Sobhuzas closest advisors they were simply not available for interviews.
Although those voices are missing as direct respondents, independent meeting accounts are
available, as is reporting of the Kings reactions at various stages of the debate. It is these
records, as well as interpretations made by other respondents, that form the albeit
somewhat speculative conclusions about the Kings underlying beliefs and management
style. One surprising aspect of the decision to upgrade the Hlane Road was the apparent
ease with which the King allowed his strongest dictates on the debates rules to be
circumvented.

Context
Although this article will not focus on the link between road issues and development
directly, it will have at its core the relationship between the upgrading of an already existing
road, and the deleterious effects that roads generally have on protected areas. A brief
discussion of context is worthwhile.
Transportation enhancements do not always produce universal agreement as to their
bene ts. This is true because the de nition of progress has grown in complexity during
recent decades, and people do not always share one de nition of progress, or a sense of
what constitutes the common good when it comes to transport issues.11 For instance, it has
become increasing clear during the last 40 years, as environmental concerns have grown in
importance, that roads can lead to environmental harm. This can happen as a road opens
a previously inaccessible area to people, or leads to a deterioration in the ecosystem. Indeed,
some environmentalists make the case that road building is the major problem facing land
conservation efforts.12
The general term used for the in uence of a road is the road effect. A roads effect
is especially severe in the strips paralleling the road at 100 metres on either side: this zone
is de ned as the road effect zone.13 However, recent research shows that roads produce
harmful effects far beyond the road effect zone.14 For instance, roads act as barriers that
may impede or prevent dispersal movements.15 This, in turn, can produce localised
extinctions and mortality, as landscapes become increasingly fragmented and isolated. The
evidence is now so strong on the deleterious effect of roads on ecosystem health that road
density restrictions, and even road bans, are being implemented in many United States
10
11
12
13

Ibid., p. 3.
D. Simon, Transport and Development in the Third World (New York, Routledge Press, 1996), p. 194.
M. Hourdequin , Ecological Effects of Roads, Conservation Biology, 14, 1 (February 2000), pp. 1617.
R. Forman and R. Deblinger, The Estimate of the Area Affected Ecologically by the Road System in the United
States, Conservation Biology, 14, 1 (February 2000), pp. 3135.
14 D. Wilkie, et al., Roads, Development , and Conservation in the Congo Basin, Conservation Biology, 14, 6
(December 2000), pp. 16141622.
15 The problem is species speci c, depending on the dispersal capacity of the organism and its tolerance for barriers.

Swazilands Hlane Road

817

national forests. Moreover, the problems caused by road building are increasingly seen as
a global environmental problem.16
In Swaziland, the issue for the government was whether to upgrade and tar the existing
road running through HGS, or whether to pay the substantially higher costs that would be
needed to build a new road to the west of the conservation area. Signi cantly, besides the
full participation of the conservationists, the debate also marked the rst time Swaziland
decision-makers had to face an argument that called into question the idea that all major
development projects would enhance the common good; it was a point of view that King
Sobhuza legitimised by taking the conservationist position seriously.
Hlane Game Sanctuary,17 which is the anchor of the conservation complex in northeastern Swaziland, has deep roots due to its association with King Sobhuza, and because it is
the premier wildlife conservation area in Swaziland.18 When protected, it contained the last
large remnant of the countrys large mammal populations. This occurred for three reasons:
rst, the climate was humid and conducive to malaria, which limited settlement in the area
until the 1950s. Secondly, the regions dominant economic activity was cattle ranching,
which ensured that the areas habitat was not transformed.19 Thirdly, during much of the
rst half of the century, David Forbes controlled what is now Hlane (then Forbes Ranch),
and managed it as a cattle ranch and quasi-nature reserve. He made sure that wildlife on
his property was not over-exploited. Hence, at the centurys midpoint, much of the northeast
remained intact, with at least some wildlife abundant.20
During the 1950s, King Sobhuza bought Forbes Ranch, and subdivided it into three
units. The rst section was to be used for Swazi homesteaders and managed as communal
land. The second section was retained as a cattle ranch, and the third as the Kings private
hunting ground. In essence, the King wanted this third area to be used for wildlife
protection. 21 Throughout the next decade, however, it became apparent that poachers were
decimating wildlife in all three areas. In addition, at this time, estate agriculture was
introduced to the northeast, resulting in the destruction of large areas of natural vegetation.
Commercial development also brought with it an in ux of job seekers and new settlers, who
found that effective mosquito control had made settlement more feasible. The result was a
continuous reduction of wildlife numbers due to habitat loss and poaching. Consequently,
the King appointed a manager and an oversight committee (The Hlane Committee) to
administer the area, with his primary mandate being to control poaching.22 Soon, poaching
decreased and animal populations rebounded.
In 1967, the King decided to give the western part of his hunting area (west of the main
road) of cial status as a nature reserve while retaining the eastern section exclusively for
himself and under his sole control. Why he settled on this particular arrangement is open
to conjecture. Some believed that he simply wanted to re-emphasise to the manager and
Hlane Committee that this section was under his control.23 In reality, these separate
designations made little difference, as they were managed as one unit under the ultimate
16 See Hourdequin , Ecological Effects of Roads, p. 16.
17 Since the road was constructed, Hlane Game Sanctuary has been renamed by the Swaziland governmen t as the
Hlane Royal National Park. To avoid confusion, I will use the former name throughout this article.
18 J. Hackel and E. J. Carruthers, Swazilands Twentieth Century Wildlife Preservation Efforts: the Present as a
Continuation of the Past, Environmental History Review, 17, 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 6184.
19 Hackel, Rural Change and Nature Conservation in Africa, p. 298.
20 T. Reilly and L. Reilly, The Mlilwane Story: A History of Nature Conservation in the Kingdom of Swaziland
(Mbabane, Mlilwane Trust, 1986), p. 17.
21 I. Grimwood, The Establishment of National Parks: Report to the Government of Swaziland (Rome, Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 1973), p. 16.
22 Hackel and Carruthers, Swazilands Twentieth Century Wildlife Conservation Efforts, pp. 16, 75.
23 Interview with S. Munro, Hlane Committee, Hlane, 23 January 1985.

818

Journal of Southern African Studies

authority of the King. The Hlane manager and the Hlane Committee, moreover, always
remained deferential to the King, being careful not to overstep their bounds in either section
of the reserve.24 As one observer noted, Hlane was the Kings responsibility; it wasnt just
a piece of national land it was one that the King had made clear was his own preserve,
and he took decisions on it.25 King Sobhuza continued to take an active interest in Hlanes
management until his death in 1982. The Kings conservation actions had set the tone for
wildlife preservation in the area, setting the precedent that Simunye and Tambankulu sugar
estates followed when they designated two private nature reserves, Simunye and Mbuluzi
Nature Reserves, respectively.26 With the addition of two more government nature reserves
in the area, Ndindza and Mlawula, and with HGS as the anchor, the northeast now had a
contiguous area of over 36,000 hectares designated as protected land.
There was also signi cant development in the northeast. In the mid-1970s, King
Sobhuza gave his support to the establishment of Simunye Sugar Estate on land adjacent
to Hlane, as the culmination of the general intensi cation of economic development that
came to the area after World War II. Now, in addition to the nature reserve complex, there
were, among other developments, three agricultural estates; an extensive system of major
and minor roads; one railroad line, with another proposed; and two disease fences. The rst
railroad line was built in the early 1960s to transport iron ore from western Swaziland to
Maputo for shipment to Japan. The second line was completed in 1985. Its purpose was to
connect the Natal and Transvaal provinces. The conservationists did not take issue with this
second line because it ran west of Hlane. The two northsouth running disease fences act
as barriers to keep hoof-and-mout h disease from Mozambique from infecting Swaziland
livestock herds. One fence runs along the border of Swaziland and Mozambique, and a
second to the west of the border: it cuts through the Mlawula and Mbuluzi Nature Reserves.
The area between the two fences is the quarantine area: all livestock leaving this area must
be certi ed as disease free.By the end of the 1970s, development had transformed much of
the area. King Sobhuzas support for both wildlife protection and economic development
had produced a situation that would prove impossible for him to reconcile. He had set
himself up as a backer of both economic development a form of which would transform
the landscape and nature conservation.

The Issues
Economic development projects, combined with growing human populations and increased
poaching, had a deleterious effect on wildlife in the area. Wildlife had been plentiful when
the King had bought Forbes Ranch but was under threat by the 1970s, when many species
had much reduced population numbers or had been lost altogether.27 Now the Swaziland
government and Simunye Estate pressed to upgrade and tar the Hlane Road.28 Conservation24 T. Reilly, The Hlane Wildlife Sanctuary: The Population Crash of 1976 and its Associated Causes (Unpublished
Report to the King of Swaziland). Management deference to the King could be seen in the early 1970s when
wildebeest, impala, and zebra populations increased dramatically. Hlane managemen t advised the King that
culling should be done or there would be ecological harm to the reserve. The King refused to allow it in any
part of Hlane. The result was a population crash in 1976. More severe, however, was the detrimental ecological
effect: Hlane had lost much of it vegetative cover to overgrazing, leaving certain areas susceptible to gully erosion
or bush encroachment .
25 Interview with J. Masson, Hlane Committee, 16 July 1985.
26 Although small, the two private reserves are crucial sections of the total reserve complex. Simunye Nature
Reserve is the only section that links Hlane with the rest of the reserves; it also contains a major section of the
Mlawula River. The Mbuluzi Reserve has as one of its borders a lengthy section of the Mbuluzi river, an important
riverine habitat.
27 Grimwood, The Establishment of National Parks, pp. 1617.
28 GOS, Third National Development Plan, 1978/791982/83 (Mbabane, Government of Swaziland, 1977), p. 139.

Swazilands Hlane Road

819

ists objected to the plan, basing their view on the adverse environmental impact an
upgraded road would have on the nature reserves.29 The debate that ensued among
conservationists, government technical staff, consultants, and Simunye Estate managers was
lively and at times acrimonious. Conservationists, because of a decision by King Sobhuza,
found for the rst time that they had an opportunity to affect a decision concerning a major
development project. As one conservationist characterised it, [this was] the rst issue in
which development and conservationists had to come to terms.30 The conservationists,
therefore, proposed several possible alignments as alternatives to the Hlane Road. All were
located west of the nature reserve complex (see Figure 2).31
Those favouring the Hlane Road upgrade included, apparently, the Kings closest

Figure 2. In all, twelve western routes were proposed. Number 1 is the conservationists preferred route. Number
2 is an example of the routes located closer to Hlane. Of these, number 2 was most favoured by conservationists .
29 Hlane Committee (J. Masson) to the Swaziland National Trust Commission (SNTC) on Road Development in
the Hlane Area, 1 August 1977. This correspondenc e is the rst documente d objection found that raises concerns
about a possible upgrading of the Hlane Road to accommodat e the northeasts commercial interests. This and
other letters can be found in the Game Sanctuary Road File.
30 Interview with J. Masson.
31 T. Bennett and G. Maasdorp, A Feasibility Study of Alternative Tarred Routes Between the ManziniSiteki Road
and the Northern Sugar Region (Durban Economic Research Unit, University of Natal, 1980), pp. 1015.
Although twelve western routes were proposed as alternatives, for the sake of clarity, only two are depicted here,
as they show the routes most favoured by the conservationists.

820

Journal of Southern African Studies

advisors. Thus, the Kings involvement was crucial if the conservationists were to have a
chance of winning the debate. The conservationists were using a long-standing strategy that
was summarised by one conservationist as, You get the King to go along and then
everything is OK, because the little guys [government of cials and Kings advisors] would
have to fall into line.32 The hopes of the conservationists rested solely with the King: either
he would have to structure the decision-making process in such a way as to give them a
fair chance of winning, or decide outright in their favour.
By and large, the debate centred on the general pros and cons of a western versus an
eastern Hlane Road route; the debate never reached the point where decision-makers
discussed speci c western routes. At the core of the debate was whether economic or
environmental factors should be considered as most important.
Conservationists viewed Hlane as ecologically unique and aesthetically special. Ecologically, Hlane is seen as an extension of the Kruger National Park ecosystem; geologically,
its soils are derived from the underlying basalt, which has resulted in one of southern
Africas best representations of Acacia nigrescens savannah. 33 In the early part of the
century, even before the lowveld was settled and transformed, Hlane was the place where
wildlife was most concentrated. Conservationists, moreover, valued Hlane as the only
remaining big game area in Swaziland and, because of its history under David Forbes
management and its later association with King Sobhuza, they believed it should be viewed
as a national treasure and that its well-being should be the paramount consideration
whenever government considered land use options in the northeast. Conservationists readily
concurred with an ecological consultants assessment of Hlane as a ne representative, and
ecological equal, of any lowveld habitat in southern Africa and, although in a deteriorated
condition because of wildlife overgrazing, as having great potential under proper management.34 As one prominent conservationist noted: There is nothing quite like Hlane it was
a famous place in the whole of southern Africa.35
Conservationists believed that economic development was taking precedence over
wildlife conservation in the northeast, and they saw that government planners were coming
to decisions about projects and infrastructure development that heavily favoured commercial interests over wildlife protection.36 They argued that upgrading the Hlane Road would
have both severe ecological consequences for the protected lands, and would largely negate
their long-term goal of uniting all the northeastern nature reserves into a single national
park. They wanted the Hlane Road removed from the main road network, and a new route
built west of Hlane. As a compromise, they proposed that the Hlane Road continue to exist,
but as a secondary gravel road.
The conservationists believed that unless they put up a ght over the Hlane Road, their
vision for the northeast as a place where wildlife conservation was central, or even viable,
was hopeless because development pressures were increasing.37 In the worst-case scenario,
although not considered an immediate threat, they saw that Hlane could eventually be lost
to agricultural production. This position was buttressed by the fact that at least portions of
Hlane are suitable for sugar cane, and that some sugar estate managers and government
of cials believed it would better serve the nation if converted to agriculture.38 This was also
32 Interview with James Culverwell, Manager of Mbuluzi Nature Reserve, 14 September 1984.
33 Interview with Ted Reilly, Hlane Committee member, 29 May 1985.
34 B. Walker, Report Prepared for the Department of Works, Power and Communications , Kingdom of Swaziland
on Siteki TurnoffLomahasha Road Project: Reappraisal of Consideration Affecting the Ehlane Game
Sanctuary (Johannesbur g Centre for Resource Ecology, University of Witwatersrand, 1981), p. 5.
35 Interview with Ted Reilly.
36 Hlane Committee (J. Masson) to SNTC, 1 August 1977.
37 Hlane Committee, Hlane Report to 31 March 1982.
38 T. Reilly and L. Reilly, The Lion Roars Again (Mbabane Hlane Royal National Park, 1994), pp. 1820.

Swazilands Hlane Road

821

the view of local people, who largely favoured sugar production at Hlane as a way to
provide more local jobs.39 Conservationists, thus, saw the battle to stop the Hlane Road
upgrade as a last ditch effort to rein in development before Hlane was completely
overwhelmed.
In sum, the conservationists raised six reasons as to why the road should not be
upgraded: (1) Hlanes integrity should not be compromised because it would serve as the
anchor for the countrys nature conservation effort in the northeast; (2) Hlane has signi cant
tangible and intangible value to the nation; (3) roads in general are detrimental to protected
areas, and high speed, high volume roads are especially harmful and dangerous; (4) any
new road for the region should be positioned to the west of Hlane to serve the needs of local
people better;40 (5) a road positioned to the west would, in the long term, be more
economical; and (6) international conservation organisations were aware of Hlanes
signi cance and had recommended against upgrading the road.41
Moreover, conservationists noted that a precedent had already been set: the second
railroad line, completed in 1985, had been aligned speci cally to avoid HGS. Initially, the
new line was to follow the Hlane Road, but it was moved to the west because it went
through HGS. The conservationists, of course, had argued for a more westerly route, and
the railroad planners and Simunye Estate managers accepted this without dispute; indeed
Simunye managers had favoured the more westerly alignment.42
To bolster their position, the conservationists, acting through the Swaziland National
Trust Commission (SNTC)43 proposed and co-sponsored with the Ministry of Works,
Power, and Communications, a feasibility study of the alternative routes to the west of the
HGS. The conservationists proposed the study because they were con dent it would show
that a westerly route would be of greater value to the region than an upgrade of the Hlane
Road, and that any additional construction costs would be more than offset by the
advantages of a western route.44
Government planners opposed the conservationist proposal. They did not want the
delays that would occur if alternatives to the Hlane Road were considered. They concluded
that upgrading the present route was best because recent commercial development in the
northeast dictated that infrastructure improvement be made as soon as possible. Their
overriding concern was to construct a tarred road from Manzini to the northeastern sugar
area as quickly as possible.45 Another factor crucial to government planners was that project
funding had already been secured from the African Development Bank (ADB), and they
had good reason to fear that any delay would cause them to lose the funding.46
Swaziland government planners, then, favoured the Hlane route over a westerly
alignment for the following reasons:47 (1) there was no economic justi cation for establishing a new road when an excellent alignment already existed; (2) the present alignment
would best serve the personal and commercial needs of people living in the northeast; (3)
39 J. Hackel, Conservation Attitudes in Southern Africa: A Comparison Between KwaZulu and Swaziland, Human
Ecology, 18, 2 (1987), pp. 203209.
40 Farrell and Van Riet Partnership, A Study of the Impact of Alternative Tarred Routes on Hlane and the
NorthEastern Region of Swaziland (Pretoria, Partnership Farrell and Van Riet, 1980), pp. 1518.
41 Ibid., p. iv.
42 Interview with Dean Chapman, Railroad Construction Manager, 16 November 1984.
43 The SNTC is a parastatal governmen t agency responsible for, among other things, the administration of protected
lands that are declared as nature reserves under the Trust Commission Act. Hlane did not fall under the Acts
authority.
44 Farrell and Van Riet Partnership, A Study of the Impact of Alternative Tarred Routes on Hlane, p. 20.
45 Interview with G. Maasdorp.
46 African Development Bank Telex Concerning Northeastern Road Upgrading, 30 October 1980.
47 Bennett and Maasdorp, A Feasibility Study of Alternative Tarred Routes; interview with D. Libsekal, Road
Technical Consultant to PWD, 30 April 1985.

822

Journal of Southern African Studies

a company village (Lusoti) with an accompanying shopping centre had been built next to
the main road, and a realignment of the areas major thoroughfare would be commercially
damaging to it; (4) travel time and costs would increase for Simunye people because a new
alignment would lengthen the distance to the western part of the country and the district
capital, Siteki; (5) the present alignment was excellent from an engineering standpoint; (6)
there was no social justi cation for moving the road to the west; (7) construction of a
western route would add substantially to the costs of the project, i.e. by US$1.7 million to
US$7 million depending on the route; (8) a tarred road through the area would not harm
the reserves because it would reduce dust and noise levels; and (9) funding had been
obtained for upgrading the present route, and it would be jeopardised if changes were made.
Government planners thus did not believe that the conservationist arguments were strong
enough to warrant a major reworking of the project, and their recommendation was to go
ahead with the project as originally planned.48
Estate managers had their own viewpoint. Sugar production is the foundation of the
Swaziland economy, and is centred in the lowveld. Presently, the sugar industry produces
approximately 25 per cent of the countrys gross domestic product and 33 per cent its
foreign earnings. It is also, by far, the countrys largest provider of wage employment,
supplying about 25 per cent of the countrys jobs.49 Sugar is worth, depending on prices for
a particular year, approximately Emalangeni(E) 500 million (US$80,000,000) . The northeastern sugar estates produce citrus, which results in foreign exchange earnings of about
E40 million (US$6,000,000) .50
A former Tambankulu Estate manager dated the plans to upgrade the Hlane Road to
1960, 51 when the road from Manzini to Mpaka (south of Hlane) was tarred. Although the
section from Mpaka to Lomahasha was left as gravel, a bridge was built over the Mbuluzi
River at Maphiveni to accommodate the eventual upgrade. Thus, all believed the road
alignment had been set, and that it would only be a matter of time before the tarring
occurred. Moreover, the agricultural community held the belief that the road would form a
natural boundary between the commercial estates and protected areas, for they assumed
Hlanes western section would eventually be used for Swazi settlement or agriculture. The
eastern section could then be used for nature conservation and linked to the Lobombo
plateau. Indeed, they generally believed that any long-term investments in Hlanes western
section as a protected area would be wasted.52 As one estate manager said, we need
investment that generates jobs at low cost [and] there is land, including Hlane, where
cotton, or a variety of other crops, could be grown. You could generate at relative low cost
thousands and thousands of jobs.53 So, from the perspective of estate managers, the road
alignment was set, and it had been selected to serve the future development needs of the
area most ef ciently.54
Until Simunye Estates was built, there had been little need to upgrade the Mpaka
Lomahasha section of the road. Mhlume and Tambanulu Estate residents had been oriented
towards Mozambique and South Africa for shopping and entertainment, and thus had little
reason to drive eastward. When Simunye was built this changed. The new orientation was
48 Interview with D. Libsekal Governmen t Planner, 3 April, 1995.
49 Lubombo Spatial Development Initiative, Report on the Lubombo Spatial Development Initiative, p. 27.
50 Government of Swaziland, Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1995 (Mbabane, Central Statistical Of ce, 1996),
pp. 2627.
51 Interview with C. Kockett, Former Head of Tambankul u Estates, 23 January 1985.
52 Interviews with J. Ranger, General Manager of Simunye Estates, 18 July 1985; M. Boast, Head of the Agricultural
Division, Simunye Estates, 19 April 1985; P. Hughs, General Manager Tambankulu Estates, 5 June 1985; S.
Monroe, Hlane Committee Member, 23 January 1985.
53 Interview with Peter Hughs.
54 Ibid.

Swazilands Hlane Road

823

towards Manzini, Mbabane, and southeastern South Africa. This was because the Swazi
were strongly involved in the enterprise, and because Simunyes managers came primarily
from the Durban area, so their natural inclination was to head south. A nal factor changing
the orientation was that Maputo was no longer available for shopping and recreation
because of the long-lasting war engul ng Mozambique. Simunye personnel thus found
themselves having to travel regularly on a long stretch of hard-to-maintain gravel road. As
a Simunye manager said, We were attracting a new work force who, quite frankly, were
not enchanted with living out in the sticks and smashing up their cars on what was really
a bit of appalling road.55
Simunye had other concerns that went beyond adding a few miles to their drive, or
marginally increasing their operating costs. As soon as Simunye began operations, it faced
losses of E7 million per year because of a plunge in the world sugar price.56 The nancial
predicament did not make them sympathetic to conservation concerns that would only make
their problems worse. In addition, Simunye managers saw that a westerly route would deal
a severe blow to the shopping centre that had been built at Lusoti to take advantage of the
future upgrade and increased traf c projected for the main road.57 Obviously, a westerly
route would act to isolate Lusoti, dooming it chances of being a strong commercial centre.
These factors motivated Simunye managers to oppose strongly the conservationists
proposal. 58 Indeed, as one manager said, [they were] frankly annoyed that the route might
be delayed or even changed because of concerns over nature conservation. They believed
that for the good of Simunye Estate, as well as the area generally, it was best to tar the
road.59
In the meantime, managers of Tambankulu and Mhlume Estates also came to favour an
immediate upgrade of the road.60 Their priority, however, was not a particular route: they
simply wanted an improved road for their own needs. This was dictated by the changed
political and economic circumstances in Swaziland and the region, which increasingly
shifted their orientation to Swaziland. Mhlume and Tambankulu managers did not get
directly involved in the debate, largely because they did not strongly favour one alignment
over the other. In the end, however, they sided with Simunye despite the fact that a western
route would have been marginally more bene cial to them (the western route was, for them,
the shorter route to Manzini and Mbabane). They had concluded that completing the project
without delay was most important, and any debate or lobbying for another route would only
negate that end. Moreover, they were also realistic enough to see that it was more in their
long-term interest to side with their colleagues in the sugar industry than with the
conservationists. 61

The Debate
Debate over the Hlane Road really started in August 1977, when conservationists raised the
speci c issue of Hlanes future in the face of the recently approved Simunye sugar estate,
and the broader question of how development was to be reconciled with conservation
interests. In a letter to the SNTC, the Hlane Committee made the point that a main road
55 Interview with J. Ranger.
56 D. C. Funnell, Under the Shadow of Apartheid: Agrarian Transformation in Swaziland (Aldershot, UK, Avebury,
1991), p. 297.
57 Interview with J. Ranger.
58 Interview with M. Boast.
59 Interview with J. Ranger.
60 Interview with G. Maasdorp, Technical Consultant, University of Natal, 26 March 1985.
61 Interview with T. Bennett, Technical Consultant, University of Natal, 26 March 1985.

824

Journal of Southern African Studies

running through Hlane would make it dif cult to develop the full conservation potential of
the area. The Committee wrote,
that if circumstances permitted it would be far better to have the NorthSouth road skirting the
Hlane area the Committee understands that the PWD [Ministry of Works, Power, and
Communication] has begun to plan the upgrading of the road from Lavumisa to Lomahasha,
possibly to hard-top standard. This would therefore appear to be the time for consideration of
the Committees views.62

As a result of this letter, the Chief Executive of the SNTC wrote to PWD informing the
ministry of conservation concerns and asking that both the SNTC and Hlane Committee be
kept informed of prospective developments on the road.63 This request was not honoured,
as Hlane authorities soon discovered PWD road engineers surveying along the road within
the Hlane for gravel sources for the Hlane road upgrade.64 The conservationists decided that
they needed to voice their concerns directly to King Sobhuza.65 As a result, the King
established a committee made up of people from government, the sugar estates, the SNTC,
and the Hlane Committee to debate the issue.
As the ground rule for the debate, the King stipulated that consensus be reached among
all concerned parties. If consensus was not achieved, the upgrade could not proceed. The
conservationists were delighted with the Kings mandate because it appeared that the King
had given them a veto over the Hlane Road upgrade. If traf c restrictions, such as speed
limits, speed bumps, control gates, or signs, were not accepted as conditions for the Hlane
Road upgrade, they would force a western route.
The Kings directive was without precedence in Swaziland: never before had conservationists been given veto power over a major development project. To bolster their position
further, the conservationists took two steps. First, they secured a letter from the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) to show that there was international
support for the conservationist position. The letter stated that the IUCN had been following
developments on Hlane for a number of years, and that it believed that such a development
would probably be very destructive in its effects on wildlife and should be avoided if at all
possible.66 Secondly, and more signi cantly, the conservationists proposed that an environmental impact study and a transportation study be done. Conservationists believed the two
reports, in combination, would solidify their position by showing that irreparable harm
would be done to Hlane, and that a western road was best for the northeast as a whole. With
the two reports, the conservationists could show good reason for resisting compromise, and
thus would avoid being considered strictly as obstructionists. Both studies went forward in
early 1980: the environmental impact study was sponsored solely by the SNTC, and the
transportation study by both the SNTC and PWD.67
The authors of the western route feasibility study knew that they were dealing with a
controversial issue. Indeed, in the preface of their study they stated, Since the co-sponsors
have con icting interests we have endeavored to present the results as impartially and
objectively as possible to assist them in arriving at a decision that is in the best interests
of society as a whole.68
62 Hlane Committee to SNTC on Road Developmen t in the Hlane Area, 1 August 1977.
63 J. S. Matsebula to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Works, Power, and Communications , 7 September
1977.
64 Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Works, Power, and Communications to the SNTC on the
LomahashaLavumisa Road Project, 8 May 1978.
65 Interview with T. Reilly.
66 A. Phillips, IUCN Director of Programme, to J. Matsebula, Secretary of the SNTC, 12 October 1979.
67 Bennett and Maasdorp, A Feasibility Study of Alternative Tarred Routes, p. ii.
68 Ibid., p. ii.

Swazilands Hlane Road

825

The transportation study assessed thirteen routes: Hlane road and twelve others, all
located west of Hlane. The study found that: (1) a tarred road was now needed; (2) either
the Hlane Road or a western alternative was technically feasible; (3) the cheapest route to
upgrade was the Hlane Road; (4) the extra cost of another route to Swaziland would range
from roughly E6 to E10 million, depending on the speci c route chosen; (5) an environmental impact study must show that a tarred road causes enough extra damage to warrant the
additional costs of building an alternative route; and (6) environmental consequences do not
lend themselves to quanti cation in a cost-bene t analysis.69 The study also stated that a
western route would affect Simunye Sugar Estate most directly. Depending on the route
chosen, up to 50 hectares of cane elds could be lost, and trip distances to and from Siteki,
the administrative centre for the area, and southern Swaziland would increase.70 On the
other hand, Simunye would bene t if an alternative route included, which three of them
did, 71 a tarred spur to Lusoti Village from the Simunye sugar mill such a spur was not
included in the Hlane Road option. The study noted that the distance from Tshaneni and
Mhlume, areas thought to be vital as suppliers of shoppers to the Lusoti village shopping
complex if it were to be a success, would have shorter travel distances.72
The feasibility study, then, attempted to examine the pros and cons in objective terms,
using economic criteria: its tone was neutral. In sum, its authors asked the question which
they concluded was at the crux of the issue: Do the environmental considerations in this
controversy justify the additional public expenditure required to reroute MR 3 [Hlane Road]
to the west of the Ehlane Game Sanctuary?73 They did not attempt to answer this question
because environmental concerns had not been included within the studys frame of
reference: they knew this was to be considered in a separate environmental impact report.
However, the consultants did shift the burden of proof for justifying a new route to the
conservationists, putting the conservationists in a defensive position from which they would
not recover.
The environmental impact study (EIS) came in shortly after the road report, and stated
that the two reports should be read together.74 Its authors knew that the EIS and the road
feasibility study were supposed to buttress one another: the EIS was to provide the
ecological and moral arguments, and the road study was to make the technical argument for
an alternative route. However, by the time the EIS came out, it was too late to see that the
road consultants had produced something quite different from what the conservationists had
expected.
The EIS was not as quantitatively based as the road report, although it did try to put
a value on Hlanes tangible assets (e.g. culled wildlife). It made the case that irreparable
environmental harm would occur to Hlane, and therefore likely preclude HGS from ever
being designated as a national park.75 The report further pointed out, as had the road report,
that besides the tangible assets of land and wildlife, there were also intangible assets
associated with Hlane that must not be ignored by the decision-makers: once they were lost,
they could not be recovered. These included opportunities for environmental education,
scienti c research, cultural and traditional appreciation, and, especially as the country
developed, the preservation of a wildlife site.76 Speci cally, the EIS pointed out that: (1)
future development, including a new railroad line, was going to be to the west of Hlane;
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Ibid., pp. x, 37, 40.

Ibid., pp. 4950.
Ibid., pp. 63, 66, 70. Alternative routes 3, 6, 10.
Ibid., pp. 5051.
Ibid., p. 51. Emphasis in original.
Farrell and Van Riet Partnership, A Study of the Impact of Alternative Tarred Routes on Hlane, p. 29.
Ibid., Introduction.
Ibid., pp. 17.

826

Journal of Southern African Studies

(2) a road to the west of Hlane would bene t a far great number of rural Swazi than would
an upgrading of the Hlane Road (31,800 people versus 8,200 people, with many of the latter
being relatively short-term expatriates); (3) that the preferred route would be one that goes
west of Malahleni, through the village of Ngomane, and then links with the established road
running from Maphiveni to Tshaneni; and (4) a new road would ultimately have to be built
west of Hlane in any case, so why not just do it now.
Conservationist reaction to the feasibility study was strongly negative. Conservationists
had naively taken it as a given that the study would strongly back a western route. Instead,
its decidedly neutral tone had ended up putting the burden of proof on the conservationists
to show that the extra cost associated with their proposal was warranted. To them, the study
had highlighted the nancial advantage of upgrading the Hlane Road while ignoring the
bene ts that would be derived from a western route for Hlane, and the region as a whole.77
As one of the conservationists stated, [The feasibility study] did not take much into account
the environmental position . It preserved the status quo, so here was something the
government was quite happy to accept.78
As damage control, the conservationists produced a statement criticising the two studies.
In this document, they attempted to bolster their position by stressing points of agreement
between the two studies.79 They argued that since both the transportation study and the EIS
concluded that a second northsouth route would be needed eventually, the best course of
action would be to build the tarred, high volume route to the west of HGS and retain the
Hlane Road as a secondary gravel road.
However, those favouring the Hlane Road upgrade emphasised the road study as the
de nitive document: it was objective, it used established economic analysis, and it stated
unequivocally that the economic cost for an alternative western route would be an
additional E7 million, which government economic planners did not believe could be
nanced.80
Another blow to the conservationist position soon followed when, in October 1980, the
African Development Bank (ADB) stated that even the consideration of an alternative route
was not viewed sympathetically because the costs were too high. The ADB discounted
environmental concerns, saying that any change of plans would be extremely costly and
would likely delay the project for two years. The ADB questioned the consideration of an
alternative to the accepted route, it is not clear how the issue of alternative routes arose.
The extra cost for the cheapest alternative route is much too high and [the ADB] shall
be grateful for a timely government decision so that appraisal can be programmed
accordingly. 81 Nonetheless, the debate participants knew the debate was still on, as it was
only the King himself who could make the nal decision. Indeed, the conservationists still
believed that they could stop the upgrade because the King had in place his requirement that
the project could only go forward after consensus had been reached.
Another signi cant player now entered the scene. He was A. K. Hlope, Minister of
Agriculture, and he had been given the responsibility of moderating the debate, producing
the debate minutes, and relaying the outcome to the King. On 24 April 1981, he chaired
a meeting that effectively ended the debate. Signi cantly, the meeting began with no
conservationists present. Eventually, three SNTC members arrived to join the three sugar
estate representatives and Mr Hlope. The Hlane Committee had no representation, except
77 Reilly and Reilly, The Lion Roars Again, p. 20.
78 Interview with J. Masson.
79 Swaziland National Trust Commission (J. Masson), Road Development in North East Swaziland (October 1980),
unpublished SNTC Report, pp. 36.
80 Interview with G. Maasdorp.
81 African Developmen t Bank Telex.

Swazilands Hlane Road

827

for the one member who was both an SNTC commissioner and Hlane Committee member,
because its members had not been noti ed about the meeting.82 This appears simply to have
been an oversight on the part of the meetings organisers, who believed that noti cation to
the SNTC was adequate. The late arrival of the conservationists proved crucial: before their
appearance, a vote had been taken by those present to upgrade the Hlane Road. When the
conservationists arrived, they were informed that a decision had been made.83 The
conservationists, of course, protested the decision, and reiterated that the King required
consensus. They expected all of this to be recorded in the minutes so that it would be
obvious to the King that no consensus had been reached, and thus the King would force the
debate to continue.
Subsequent reactions to this meeting differed. The manager of Simunye Estates, John
Ranger, reported that because the SNTC members arrived late, Mr Hlope had been
deliberately provocative towards them. He interpreted the Ministers tone as one of pulling
their legs, as he informed the conservationists a decision had been taken.84 His interpretation was that the vote was not a completely serious one, and that the backers of the Hlane
Road were having some fun with the conservationists. The conservationists, on the other
hand, came to see in retrospect that they had lost the debate at this meeting, for it had
allowed Mr Hlope to report to the King that consensus had been reached. One conservationist believed that he might have made the fatal error when, caught off-guard by the
announcement that a vote favouring the Hlane Road upgrade had been taken, he asked if
the sugar managers would now agree to ameliorate the situation by accepting road
restrictions. 85 The sugar people agreed that they would accept such restrictions. This
appearance of agreement between the two factions, he felt, paved the way for Mr Hlope to
give the King a false conclusion about what had really happened at the meeting.
Mr Hlope subsequently reported to the King that all parties were now in agreement on
the Hlane Road upgrade, with no mention made of the conservationist objections. Acting
on Mr Hlopes account, the King announced that the Hlane Road would be upgraded.
However, the matter did not end there. Upon receiving word from the conservationists that
they had, in fact, not agreed, the King, on 8 June, called Mr Ted Reilly and Minister Hlope
before him to give their separate accounts of what had happened at the 24 April meeting.
Mr Reilly reiterated that no consensus had been reached. Mr Hlope, when facing the King,
admitted that his account had been false, and that, The sugar people steamrolled me into
it!86 Consequently, the King rescinded his decision, demanding that consensus be
reached.87 Again, it appeared the King had reasserted the conservationists right to veto the
project unless a consensus was reached.
On 10 June another meeting was called to settle the issue. The conservationists now felt
that, based on what the King had said about consensus, Triumph, on the face of it, was
certain.88 However, instead of restarting the debate, the discussion came to an abrupt
conclusion: it was reported by the Kings representative at the meeting that the King, as he
had decreed initially, had decided that the Hlane road was to be upgraded. Over the next
few months, the conservationists attempts to pursue the matter through government
channels, and even with the King, failed.89 There the matter stood until 17 September 1981,
82 Hlane Committee, Report on the Sequence of Events Leading to a Decision to Tar the Hlane Road (17 September
1981).
83 Ibid.
84 Interview with J. Ranger.
85 Interview with P. Forsyth-Thompson , SNTC member, 6 March 1985.
86 Reilly and Reilly, The Lion Roars Again, p. 21.
87 Ibid., p. 21.
88 Ibid., p. 21.
89 T. E. Reilly to King Sobhuza, 14 June 1981.

828

Journal of Southern African Studies

when the Hlane Committee made a last effort to reverse the decision. Since they had not
heard directly from the King, they still held out some hope that the decision could be
reversed. Therefore, they sent a last message to the King stating that because they had not
heard from him directly, [The Hlane Committee] cannot permit any road work to proceed
on Hlane until so directed by his Majesty. They added that, The Committee is not
convinced that His Majesty has yet taken a nal decision to tar the road through
Hlane .90 However, they soon had their answer, as road construction crews arrived
shortly thereafter to begin work. The section from Mpaka to Lomahasha was completed in
1984.

Discussion
Since the completion of the Hlane Road upgrade, Hlane has survived, and has been
designated as a national park by Swazi authorities. The paving of the road, however, has
had the predicted deleterious effects: animal deaths caused by vehicles are high, animal
dispersal between the two sections is reduced, and the areas tourist potential has been
harmed the road noise can be heard from just about anywhere within Hlane.91 Despite
this, the conservationists never pursued the matter of road controls when the road was being
built.92
There can be no doubt that from an ecological and tourism perspective, the Hlane Road
should not have been upgraded, and it is likely that if the debate had come up fteen to
twenty years later, one of the western alternatives would have been selected. This
judgement is based on the fact that not only Swazilands government but also the ADB
have a much more sophisticated environmental viewpoint than they did in the early 1980s.
Indeed, the ADB has expressed regret over the pressure it applied to force Swazi of cials
to accept the Hlane Road upgrade, admitting it had been wrong when it refused to consider
the western alternative.93
One factor that was not fully analysed by any of the parties involved in the debate was
the social bene t to rural people of the various proposed routes. No one did a systematic
analysis of rural opinions on the road issue, or rural needs. In the feasibility study, for
instance, the only mention of the effects on rural people was,
Any one of these alternative [western] routes would, therefore, provide improved transport
links for homesteads on Swazi Nation Land as well as for new urban dwellers at Ngomane and
potential urban settlements, e.g., new coal mining villages.94

The EIS gave the issue more weight, using it to make the point that more needed to be
considered when deciding the issue than short-term construction costs and negative effects
on Simunye Estate. The report argued that a western route would favour rural villagers
more than the Hlane Road:
These people must be provided with adequate communication services for their basic needs of
life such as food and health. At present many rural people have to walk up to 18 km to catch
a bus to Siteki or central Swaziland. Furthermore, roads create development opportunity and
[a western route] would therefore also provide for the agricultural and other development needs
of these rural communities.95
90
91
92
93
94
95

Hlane Committee, Declaration by the Hlane Committee, 17 September 1981.

Reilly and Reilly, The Lion Roars Again, p. 22.
Interview with Dr Libsekal
Ibid.; Swazi News, 17 April 1993, p. 10.
Bennett and Maasdorp, A Feasibility Study of Alternative Tarred Routes, p. 48.
Ibid., p. 23.

Swazilands Hlane Road

829

However, it must be acknowledged that the EIS only super cially analysed the social
importance of the road. In reality, the needs of rural people living west of Hlane were not
a high priority for the conservationists. In essence, the conservationists had seized upon this
issue as a good debating point, and they had hoped it would carry some weight in the battle
for public support.96
Another factor that worked against the conservationist position was the widespread lack
of concern for, if not hostility towards, Hlane. This was true at all levels of society. For
instance, governmental civil servants favoured economic development over nature conservation, believing that, In Swaziland people need land, they dont need game reserves; and,
in Siteki, people want a direct road to Simunye, not a route that would take them miles out
of their way.97 Rural people likewise did not support Hlane as a protected area because
they believed that it was wrong to give animals precedence over people. Most preferred to
see it opened to settlement or turned over to the sugar estates.98
In addition, those favouring the Hlane Road had one further major advantage over the
conservationists they had more direct access to the King. A. K. Hlope serves as an
example, and, in general, the Swazi Royal family had close ties with the sugar industry, and
saw that the economic success of the countrys most important industry was vitally
important to them.99 The conservationists, on the other hand, could never put their case
directly to the King, and had to rely on possibly hostile intermediaries to convey their
position to the King. As one conservationist who also had signi cant governmental
experience said:
It makes it much harder because nobody can get into the presence [of the King] where the nal
decisions are made. So, you put your arguments forward and then it has to go a stage further,
and when it goes a stage further, and you have no means of presenting it, or knowing if it is
presented correctly, it makes it more dif cult.100

Those who favoured the Hlane Road route likely took advantage of the fact that they were
one step further up the decision-making hierarchy than were the conservationists. Their
access to the King, their control over what was reported in meeting minutes, and their
knowledge of how the King worked, and what was important to him as monarch, made it
possible for them to turn around what had seemed like an obviously losing proposition.
The process raises two questions: why was King Sobhuza so reluctant to take a stronger
hand throughout the process? And why, despite the Kings obvious knowledge that he had
been manipulated, did he still approve the Hlane Road upgrade? As to the rst question, one
possible answer may lie in the Kings health during the time of the debate. By the end of
the 1970s, King Sobhuza was near the end of his life (he died in August 1982), and possibly
was delegating more responsibility to others. As one respondent said, I got the impression
that the King was in his dotage and didnt much think about it [Hlane Road]. in fact there
were reports that he was very ill.101 Thus, it may be that the King was generally detaching
himself from governmental affairs. For instance, in 1977, the King had had to deal with a
teachers strike and student protest that could not be resolved by the Ministry of Education.
In this case, the King had left it to the bureaucrats to nd a solution, and they had failed.
Consequently, he intervened personally by summoning the involved parties to a meeting at
which he presided. Although the King promised that all grievances would be fully
96
97
98
99
100
101

Interview with J. Masson.

Interview with T. Bennett and G. Maasdorp.
Hackel, Rural Change and Nature Conservation in Africa, p. 303.
Funnell, Under the Shadow of Apartheid, pp. 213214.
Interview with P. Forsyth-Thompson .
Interview with T. Bennett and G. Maasdorp.

830

Journal of Southern African Studies

investigated, some people left before the King, indicating that there was now a breech in
the respect for the King that had acted to unify the country through his reign.102
It appears that the King had settled on a style of governance whereby either bureaucrats
or his personal representatives would take the lead in dealing with matters of substance. The
King would set the ground rules, stay detached from the day-to-day friction, and then
approve a decision based on his ground rules. As one conservationist who was familiar with
the Kings management approach stated, He left it to [the parties involved] to ght, and
I tell you we [conservationists] had to ght. As can be seen, this approach did not work
well, whether in the teachers strike or in the Hlane Road debate, where his representatives
were in a position to misrepresent the debate so that even the King could be misled. In
both cases, it is apparent that people may have been in a position to manipulate the
decision-making process in ways not possible when the King was younger.
Not all, however, hold to this view. Other respondents believed the King was as
involved as he had ever been, and that the Hlane Road decision-making process was little
different from what they had experienced before. As one respondent said, I think it was
just the way the system worked.103 Those holding this view argued that the Kings
management style had always been one that allowed him to be detached from debate. He
preferred to let the parties involved produce an agreement, which he could then ratify.104
Hence, the Hlane Road decision may simply re ect a proven management technique that
had always served the King well when dealing with contentious issues: instead of getting
too directly involved, he let others argue. Since he was the King, and by nature a consensus
builder who strived for reconciliation and compromise, he could direct the process while
keeping detached from the unseemly side of politics.
An answer to the second question is straightforward, and is based on the importance
placed on the Swazi King being perceived by his people as infallible. When the King
announced his nal decision, he stated that, The mouth that speaks no lies has spoken, and
told the world that the Eastern Route may proceed.105 Thus, when the King became aware
that his decision to upgrade the Hlane road had been made public,106 he could not reverse
himself or reopen the debate: all he could do was reaf rm the decision and end the debate.
Another issue is the role of outsiders in the decision. The ADB added their voice at a
critical moment, and their threat to remove funding raised the stakes. However, they cannot
be held responsible for the rejection of the western route. The conservationists had solicited
support for their position from the IUCN, and it is possible that someone had done the same
with the ADB the timing raises it as a possibility. However, the ADBs concerns had
teeth, as the bank intimated that project funding could be in jeopardy.
The Hlane Road upgrade highlights King Sobhuzas management approach of benevolent authoritarianism, which focused on gaining consensus through compromise. He avoided
making a hard decision by forcing a debate that he hoped would lead to a compromise that
could never really happen. Apparently, he could not see that, in this case, there had to be
a winner and a loser, and that compromise was not possible. Moreover, it is likely that he
accepted being backed into a corner as itself a legitimate end to the debate. Obviously, he
was torn between the alternatives, and thus not strongly wedded to either of the possible
outcomes; there is no evidence that any of the advisors whose false information he acted
upon suffered any penalty for misleading him.
102 R. Levin, When the Sleeping Grass Awakens (Johannesburg , Witswatersrand University Press, 1997),
pp. 146147.
103 Interview with P. Forsyth-Thompson .
104 Interviews with P. Forsyth-Thompson , T. Reilly, J. Masson, J. Matesebula and S. Munro.
105 Levin, When the Sleeping Grass Awakens, p. 21.
106 Apparently, the King was not aware that this had happened until after the rst June meeting.

Swazilands Hlane Road

831

Conclusions
The decision to upgrade and tar the Hlane Road did not fully take into account the negative
ecological effects the development would have on the future of environmental protection in
Swazilands northeast, nor the needs of rural people living in the more populated areas of
the region to the west of Hlane. The primary concern for decision-makers was the recently
built, and nancially troubled, Simunye Sugar Estate. Hlane National Park has suffered
ecologically and as a recreation site because it received low priority after being protected
by King Sobhuza. Hlanes isolation and fragmentation makes it vulnerable to bio-diversity
loss and ecological degradation. The Hlane Road decision represents a continuing pattern
of decisions that have favoured the regions economic development over nature conservation.
Northeast Swaziland has a growing population, with a complex mix of rural communities, protected areas and commercial agriculture. The emphasis has always been on
economic development, despite the growth of a signi cant conservation area. Signi cantly,
the Hlane Road debate gave conservationists an opportunity to make this point, and to argue
that there could be other de nitions of the common good. This issue highlighted for the
nation that there could be losers as well as winners when development occurred, and that
there might be other views concerning the common good.
Despite the conservation loss, the debate can be seen as part of process that has changed
the way land use decisions are made in Swaziland. Now there is a systematic environmental
assessment of all economic development projects and regional landscape planning is at the
core of both conservation and economic development strategy. However, the question
remains as to whether the increasingly sophisticated environmental assessments and ICD
projects, even for southern Africa as a whole, will adequately protect the environment, or
whether, as has happened in the past, environmental protection will be compromised by
larger economic goals that threaten the environment and do not fully take into account the
needs of rural people living in the area. The Hlane Road Debate is a reminder that it is
never easy to reconcile these spheres, and that the environment, even with the best of
intentions, usually comes out the loser.
JEFFREY D. HACKEL
Geography Department, California State University, 5500 University Parkway, San
Bernardino, California 92407, USA; E-mail: jhackel@csusb.edu