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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW RULES OF PROCEDURE (ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION)

BONIFACIO
ESPINOZA
vs.
PROVINCIAL
ADJUDICATOR OF PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION OFFICE OF PAMPANGA and MARIA
QUIBULOY

FACTS
Maria Quibuloy, private respondent in this case, is a coowner and adminatrix of three parcels of land covered
under Transfer Certificate of Title no. 3676 located in
San Nicolas, Lubao, Pampanga. She filed a complaint
against Bonifacio Espinoza, who then resides in San
Agustin, Lubao, Pampanga in the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Office of San Fernando, Pampanga.
Her complaint alleges that petitioner Espinoza had
failed to fulfill his obligation to pay rents and till the
subject parcel of land.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Espinozas petition on


the reason that the same is unavailing and vacuous.
Aggrieved, he then elevated the case before the
Honorable Supreme Court.
In the Supreme Court level, Espinoza maintains that the
PARAD had no jurisdiction to hear and decide
Quibuloys complaint because the jurisdictional
requirement [of BARC certification] under Section 1,
Rule III of the 1989 DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure
had not been complied with. Furthermore, Espinoza also
alleges that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Provincial Adjudicator, for the latter decided
on the aforementioned agrarian dispute without first
resolving petitioners motion to dismiss.

ISSUES
Instead of answering Quibuloys complaint, Espinoza
moved for the dismissal of the same. According to him,
the Provincial Adjudicator lacked or had no jurisdiction
to hear the case because Section 1, Rule III of the 1989
Rules of Procedure of the Department of Agrarian
Reform provides that a conciliation proceeding must
first be held before the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Council. He avers that a certification that the dispute
had been submitted to the BARC for mediation or
conciliation without any success of settlement is a
requirement for the PARAD to acquire jurisdiction over
the case.
Nonetheless, the Provincial Adjudicator set the case for
hearing without issuing a ruling on Espinozas motion to
dismiss. Then, Quibuloy was allowed to present her
evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, the dispute was ordered
submitted for decision. But just before issuance of a
decision, Espinoza filed an answer assailing Quibuloys
personality to institute the complaint, coupled with
other unsubstantiated denials of the latters allegations.
Nothwithstanding the filing of such answer, the
Provincial Adjudicator, having been convinced that
Quibuloys allegations were true and correct, rendered a
decision in favor of the latter. Instead of immediately
appealing to the adjudicators decision, Espinoza
allowed the reglementary period of 15 days to lapse.
Thereafter, he filed a petition before the Court of
Appeals.

(1) Whether or not the PARAD had no jurisdiction


to decide the subject agrarian dispute.
(2) Whether or not the PARAD acted with grave
abuse of discretion for not resolving first
Espinozas motion to dismiss.
HELD
(1) No. The PARAD has the jurisdiction to hear and
decide the complaint notwithstanding the
absence of the BARC certification [invoked by
the petitioner] for the same DARAB Revised
Rules of Procedure provides for the an
exception to such requirement.
The same Rules provided that parties residing
in non-adjoining barangays are exempted from
the requirement of presenting a BARC
certification. Facts reveal that albeit the
parties both reside in Lubao, Pampanga their
barangays are different. Quibuloys residence is
located in San Nicolas while that of Espinozas is
in San Agustin. Hence, the Provincial
Adjudicator did not err in taking cognizance of
the case notwithstanding the absence of the
BARC certification.
(2) No. The PARADs act of dispensing with the
resolution of Espinozas motion to dismiss, did

CASE DIGESTS AND NOTES | BY: TINA SIUAGAN

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW RULES OF PROCEDURE (ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION)


not amount to grave abuse of discretion for
quasi-judicial administrative agencies are not
bound by the technical rules followed in the
court of law.
The Honorable Court further held that:
administrative agencies exercising quasijudicial functions are not bound by technical
rules followed in courts of law. The
adjudicator is given enough latitude, subject
to
the
essential
requirements
of
administrative due process, to be able to
expeditiously ascertain the facts of the
agrarian dispute.
While there may have been a technical lapse on
the part of the adjudicator in disposing of the
motion to dismiss, the assailed acts of the
adjudicator did not amount to a grave abuse of
discretion justifying a writ of certiorari.
Considering the technical flexibility afforded to
agrarian adjudicators, the order may easily be
construed as a denial of the motion to dismiss.
What would have been the prudent recourse
under the rules was to submit an answer
immediately, participate in the hearing and
appeal an adverse decision. Sadly, petitioner
failed to do any of these. It is now too late for
him to dispute the adjudicators decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.


Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGESTS AND NOTES | BY: TINA SIUAGAN

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW RULES OF PROCEDURE (ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION)


ZENON PEREZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
SANDIGANABAYAN

FACTS
Petitioner Perez is the Provincial Treasurer of Tubigon,
Bohol. In December 1988, the Provincial Auditors Office
of Bohol, headed by one Arlene Mandin, conducted a
cash examination on the account of Perez. During the
first day of audit, Perez was absent. However, he was
present during the audit conducted on the next day and
that the cash in his safe was counted in his presence.
The cash counted from Perez safe totaled to Php 21,
331. 79. However, based on the audit finding, Perez was
supposed to have on hand P 94,116.36; hence, he has a
deficit of P72,784.57.
Perez admitted that a portion of the missing funds was
used to pay for the loan of his brother. It was also spent
for the food of his family, and his medications. Perez was
made to acknowledge and sign a cash count sheet, which
indicates the correctness of the amount found in his safe
and that the same had been counted in his presence.
Thereafter, In January 1989, a separate demand letter
was sent to Perez, requiring him to produce the missing
funds (the amount totaling to the deficit).
As a result of the audit, Mandin prepared a
memorandum addressed to the Provincial Auditor of
Bohol, which embodied a recommendation of filing the
appropriate criminal case against Perez. An
administrative case was also filed against Perez in
February 1989, which reiterates his earlier verbal
admission before the audit team. Thereafter, Perez
remitted to the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of
Bohol the amount totaling to the missing funds, in
several tranches.
Subsequently, Perez was charged with the crime of
malversation of public funds before the Sandiganbayan.
He pleaded not guilty in said proceeding. During the
prosecution of his case, when it was his turn to present
evidence for his defense, Perez denied the contents of
his first Answer to the administrative case earlier filed
against him by Mandins audit team. This so because,
according to him, such Answer1 was prepared
WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. With this, he
1

revoked his first Answer and filed a second one, the


latter containing a vehement denial of his liability in the
cash shortage amounting to P72,784.57. According to
Perez, such cash shortage was in the possession and
custody of his accountable personnel at the time of the
audit examination; that several amounts were remitted
to him by such accountable personnel, which
corresponds to various tranches he remitted to the
Provincial Treasurers Office; and he further maintained
that such cash shortage was mainly due oversight.
Perez was convicted by the Sandiganbayan as guilty of
the crime of Malversation of Public Funds as penalized
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Perez filed
a motion for reconsideration before the Sandiganbayan
but the same had been dismissed.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, petitioner Perez
contends that his first Answer in the administrative case
filed against him, should not have been given probative
weight because it was executed without the assistance
of counsel.

ISSUE
Whether or not the verbal admission contained in Perez
first Answer should be disregarded for the same had
been executed without the assistance of a counsel.

HELD
NO. Perezs first Answer may not be disregarded on the
ground that the same had been executed without the
assistance of a counsel for such assistance is not
indispensable in administrative proceedings.
The Honorable Court explained in this case that there is
no law, jurisprudence, or rule which mandates that an
employee should be assisted by counsel in an
administrative case. Further, even though investigations
conducted by an administrative body partakes a
character similar to a criminal proceeding, the fact
remains that under existing laws, a party in an
administrative inquiry may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges filed against
him and of the respondents capacity to represent
himself.

Kindly refer to the bolded sentence in the preceding paragraph.

CASE DIGESTS AND NOTES | BY: TINA SIUAGAN

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW RULES OF PROCEDURE (ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION)

Hence, according to the Court, the right to counsel is


not imperative in administrative investigations
because such inquiries are conducted merely to
determine whether there are facts that merit
disciplinary measures against erring public officers
and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the
dignity of government service.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated


September 24, 2003 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum term, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum term, with perpetual special
disqualification. He is likewise ORDERED to pay a fine
of P72,784.57, the amount equal to the funds malversed.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGESTS AND NOTES | BY: TINA SIUAGAN

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