SECOND DIVISION

JOSE C. SABERON,

A.C. No. 6567

Complainant,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

- versus -

Promulgated:
ATTY. FERNANDO T. LARONG,
Respondent.

April 16, 2008

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DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In a Complaint[1] filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant, this Court, complainant Jose C. Saberon
(complainant) charged Atty. Fernando T. Larong (respondent) of grave misconduct for allegedly using abusive
and offensive language in pleadings filed before the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Complainant filed before the BSP a Petition [2] against Surigaonon Rural Banking Corporation (the
bank) and Alfredo Tan Bonpin (Bonpin), whose family comprises the majority stockholders of the bank, for
cancellation of the banks registration and franchise. The Petition, he said, arose from the banks
and/or Bonpins refusal to return various checks and land titles, which were given to secure a loan obtained by
his (complainants) wife, despite alleged full payment of the loan and interests.
Respondent, in-house counsel and acting corporate secretary of the bank, filed an Answer with
Affirmative Defenses[3] to the Petition stating, inter alia,
5. That this is another in the series of blackmail suits filed by plaintiff [herein
complainant Jose C. Saberon] and his wife to coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for financial
gain
x x x x.[4] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent made statements of the same tenor in his Rejoinder[5] to complainants Reply.
Finding the aforementioned statements to be totally malicious, viscous [sic] and bereft of any factual
or legal basis, complainant filed the present complaint.

Complainant contends that he filed the Petition before the BSP in the legitimate exercise of his
constitutional right to seek redress of his grievances; and that respondent, as in-house counsel and acting
corporate secretary of the bank, was fully aware that the loan obtained by his (complainants) wife in behalf of
her children had been paid in full, hence, there was no more reason to continue holding the collaterals.
Complainant adds that respondent aided and abetted the infliction of damages upon his wife and her
children who were thus deprived of the use of the mortgaged property.
In his Comment[6] to the present complaint against him, respondent argues that: (1) there was nothing
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper in the way he used the word blackmail to characterize the suit
against his clients; and (2) when a lawyer files a responsive pleading, he is not in any way aiding or abetting
the infliction of damages upon the other party.
By Resolution of March 16, 2005,[7] the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
In his Report and Recommendation dated June 21, 2006,[8] IBP Investigating Commissioner Dennis
A. B. Funa held that the word blackmail connotes something sinister and criminal. Unless the person
accused thereof is criminally charged with extortion, he added, it would be imprudent, if not offensive, to
characterize that persons act as blackmail.
Commissioner Funa stressed that a counsel is expected only to present factual arguments and to anchor
his case on the legal merits of his clients claim or defense in line with his duty under Rule 19.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, as follows:
A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
Moreover, he noted that in espousing a clients cause, respondent should not state his personal belief as to the
soundness or justice of his case pursuant to Canon 15[9] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Investigating Commissioner also opined that by using words that were unnecessary and
irrelevant to the case, respondent went overboard and crossed the line of professional conduct. In view
thereof, he recommended that respondent be found culpable of gross misconduct and suspended from the
practice of law for 30 days.
By Resolution No. XVII-2007-036 of January 18, 2007,[10] the IBP Board of Governors disapproved
the recommendation and instead dismissed the case for lack of merit.
The Commission on Bar Discipline, by letter of March 26, 2007, transmitted the records of the case to
this Court.[11]
Complainant appealed the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors to this Court via a petition filed
on March 7, 2007, under Section 12 (c) of Rule 139-B[12] of the Revised Rules of Court.
Complainant challenges the IBP Board of Governors Resolution as illegal and void ab initio for
violating the mandatory requirements of Section 12(a) of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court that the
same be reduced to writing, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it is based.
Finding the ruling of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent is guilty of grave misconduct to
be in accordance with the evidence, complainant nevertheless submits that the recommended penalty of

suspension should be modified to disbarment. The offense committed by respondent, he posits, manifests an
evil motive and is therefore an infraction involving moral turpitude.
In his Comment to [the] Petition for Review, respondent states that the administrative complaint
against him is a harassment suit given that it was in his capacity as counsel for the bank and Bonpin that he
filed the Answer objected to by complainant.
Moreover, respondent claims that the purportedly offensive allegation was a statement of fact which
he had backed up with a narration of the chronological incidents and suits filed by complainant and his wife
against his clients. That being the case, he contends that the allegation made in the Answer must be
considered absolutely privileged just like allegations made in any complaint or initiatory pleading.
Respondent in fact counters that it was complainant himself who had made serious imputations of
wrongdoing against his clients the bank for allegedly being engaged in some illegal activities, and Bonpin for
misrepresenting himself as a Filipino.
Nonetheless, respondent pleads that at the time the allegedly abusive and offensive language was used,
he was only two years into the profession, with nary an intention of bringing dishonor to it. He admits that
because of some infelicities of language, he may have stirred up complainants indignation for which he asked
the latters and this Courts clemency.
In his Reply,[13] complainant counters that respondents Comment reveals the latters propensity to
deliberately state a falsehood; and that respondents claim that the administrative complaint was a harassing
act, deducible from the fact that [it] post-dates a series of suits, none of which has prospered x x x against the
same rural bank and its owner, is bereft of factual basis.
Complainant goes on to argue that respondent, as counsel for Bonpin, knew of the two criminal cases
he and his wife had filed against Bonpin and, as admitted by respondent, of the criminal charges against him
for libel arising from his imputations of blackmail, extortion or robbery against him and his wife.
Finally, complainant refuses to accede to respondents entreaty for clemency.
This Court finds respondent guilty of simple misconduct for using intemperate language in his
pleadings.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language
or behavior before the Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong
language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.[14]

However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does
not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. [15] Language abounds with countless possibilities for
one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. [16]
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required
by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. [17] In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a
lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.[18]
It is of no consequence that the allegedly malicious statements of respondent were made not before a
court but before the BSP. A similar submission that actuations of and statements made by lawyers before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are not covered by the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
NLRC not being a court, was struck down in Lubiano v. Gordolla,[19] thus:
Respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the National Labor
Relations Commission, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant
of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice and whose
conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.[20]
The observation applies with equal force to the case at bar.
Respecting respondents argument that the matters stated in the Answer he filed before the BSP were
privileged, it suffices to stress that lawyers, though they are allowed a latitude of pertinent remark or comment
in the furtherance of the causes they uphold and for the felicity of their clients, should not trench beyond the
bounds of relevancy and propriety in making such remark or comment. [21]
True, utterances, petitions and motions made in the course of judicial proceedings have consistently
been considered as absolutely privileged, however false or malicious they may be, but only for so long as they
are pertinent and relevant to the subject of inquiry.[22]The test of relevancy has been stated, thus:
x x x. As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory
matters privileged the courts favor a liberal rule. The matter to which the privilege does not
extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no
reasonable man can doubt its relevancy and impropriety. In order that matter alleged in a
pleading may be privileged, it need not be in every case material to the issues presented by
the pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject
of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial x x x. [23]
Granting that the proceedings before the BSP partake of the nature of judicial proceedings, the
ascription of blackmail in the Answer and Rejoinder filed by respondent is not legitimately related or
pertinent to the subject matters of inquiry before the BSP, which were Bonpins alleged alien citizenship and
majority stockholding in the bank. Those issues were amply discussed in the Answer with Affirmative
Defenses without need of the further allegation that the Petition was another in a series of blackmail suits . . .
to coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for financial gain. Hence, such allegation was unnecessary and uncalled
for. More so, considering that complainant and his wife were well within their rights to file the cases against
the bank and/or Bonpin to protect their interests and seek redress of their grievances.
Respecting the assailed Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, indeed only a Notice of
Resolution was transmitted to this Court, together with the Records of the case, which Notice simply stated
that on January 18, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2007-036 in which it:

RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the

Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case
for lack of merit.
Upon such Notice, it is evident that there is no compliance with the procedural requirement that the
IBP Board of Governors decision shall state clearly and distinctly the findings of facts or law on which the
same is based. Thus Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12.
Review and decision by the Board of Governors. - (a) Every case
heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record
and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board
upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and
the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding
thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the
Investigator's report. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The above requirement serves a very important function not just to inform the parties of the reason for
the decision as would enable them on appeal to point out and object to the findings with which they are not in
agreement, but also to assure the parties that the Board of Governors has reached the judgment through the
process of legal reasoning.[24]
With regard to complainants plea that respondent be disbarred, this Court has consistently considered
disbarment and suspension of an attorney as the most severe forms of disciplinary action, which should be
imposed with great caution. They should be meted out only for duly proven serious administrative charges. [25]
Thus, while respondent is guilty of using infelicitous language, such transgression is not of a grievous
character as to merit respondents disbarment. In light of respondents apologies, the Court finds it best to
temper the penalty for his infraction which, under the circumstances, is considered simple, rather than grave,
misconduct.
WHEREFORE, complainants petition is partly GRANTED. Respondent, Atty. Fernando T. Larong,
is found guilty of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT for using intemperate language. He is FINED P2,000 with a
stern WARNING that a repetition of this or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in
the record of respondent.
SO ORDERED.