Revolution in The Balance: Budget Cuts Threaten F/A-22 Programme

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Date Posted: 07-Jul-2005

International Defence Review
Revolution in the balance: budget cuts

threaten F/A-22 programme
Lockheed Martin's F/A-22 fighter has impressed the USAF with its advanced stealth, speed,
altitude and integrated avionics capabilities, but US Department of Defense cuts may hit the
Raptor programme before it gets off the ground. Report by Bill Sweetman
It is the best and worst of times for the Lockheed Martin F/A-22 Raptor fighter. Last year, the
fighter emerged from a long and arduous development programme with a successful initial
operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) programme, which demonstrated that the F/A-22
represents a vast increase in survivability and lethality over any other fighter. The aircraft was
proceeding towards full-rate production at a unit cost which, although high, was at least stable.
Avionics problems which had crippled flight testing in 2001-02 had been largely solved and the
aircraft was well on its way to approval for full-rate production, which was attained in April.
Moreover, Lockheed Martin and the US Air Force (USAF) had defined a follow-on development
programme for the fighter that would allow it to perform more than a token role in air-to-ground
strike missions, and also turn it into an effective intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(ISR) platform. That capability in turn would be the basis for a follow-on regional bomber, the FB22, bringing together the F/A-22's key technologies, avionics and weapons capabilities in an
expanded airframe capable of carrying a much greater payload with a greatly increased range.
At the end of the year, however, a leaked memorandum - Program Budget Decision (PBD) 753 from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) threw the programme's entire future into
jeopardy, by planning to terminate production in Fiscal Year 2008 (FY08), after the delivery of 178
aircraft. Before that, the programme had been working with a fixed total cost cap and a flexible
production number; OSD budgeteers expected to see 279 aircraft produced, while the USAF
hoped for more. The lower number has several implications, all of them negative.
It is less than the USAF considers necessary. Cutting the number of aircraft ordered decreases
economies of scale during the production process, thereby increasing the average cost of each
aircraft. Programme acquisition unit cost (PAUC) - the total cost of the programme, divided by the
number of aircraft delivered - goes up even more sharply, because at such low numbers it starts
to be dominated by non-recurring costs.
PAUC is not a very important number in real terms once a programme has completed its research
and development (R&D) phase, because, by that time, much of the money has been spent. It is
therefore not a particularly helpful guide to current or future spending. However, it is the highest
unit cost for any combat aircraft and is widely used - either due to ignorance or intentional
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Article 1 Page 1 of 15
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deception - in politics and the media.
Misleading comparisons
In the case of the F/A-22, PAUC comparisons are particularly misleading when used to compare
the Raptor with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Estimates of the PAUC for the JSF are based
on the nominal 3,000-aircraft programme, as well as on projections, rather than actual numbers,
for JSF non-recurring costs. The result is that JSF looks like a bargain compared with the F/A-22 and has consequently been spared by the OSD budget cutters.
Meanwhile, any investment the USAF makes in improving the F/A-22 yields less operational
benefit, because it delivers fewer improved aircraft and less capability for the same development
cost. This problem is already apparent in the B-2 programme, and is one reason for the slow pace
at which that force is being modernised. The high costs to continue the programme are one
reason why the General Accounting Office (GAO), in a March 2005 report on the F/A-22, argued
that the USAF did not have a "business case" to support the planned programme of production
and upgrades.
The result is a head-on collision between the USAF's plans and the Department of Defense (DoD)
budget. Operationally, the USAF's goal is to attach a 24-aircraft F/A-22 squadron to each of 10 air
expeditionary forces (AEFs), which will rotate through a cycle of 'spin-up', deployment and
reconstitution. This requires 240 aircraft, which in turn requires a primary mission aircraft
inventory (PMAI) of 381 F/A-22s, slightly more than twice the figure in PBD 753.
The issue is being fought as part of the latest Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), now making its
way through the Pentagon. While the USAF probably has no hope of reversing the cuts outright let alone obtaining a commitment to 381 aircraft - the service and Lockheed Martin will have won
a victory if they can defer the closure of the line.
Ironically, though, one of the biggest impediments in the path of efforts to save the programme is
the security regime that was established to protect it. One consistent theme through the life of the
F/A-22 project is that the fighter's classified capabilities are beyond what they are generally
understood to be.
A typical example comes from former USAF chief of staff General Ron Fogleman. In an interview
in the USAF'sAirpower Journal, published in early 2001, Gen Fogleman said that the F-22's true
capabilities have only been hinted at. "In the black world, the F-22 is a truly revolutionary
aircraft," Gen Fogleman said. "On the surface, it looks conventional, like an F-15 with some stealth
capabilities. But the combination of stealth, supercruise, and integrated avionics is a quantum
jump. It will allow the US to cease worrying about air superiority for the first 35 years of the next
century." Gen Fogleman added: "There are only two revolutionary weapon systems in the entire
DoD budget: the F/A-22 and the airborne laser. There are no others."
Discovery and invention
This theme is still apparent. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics president Ralph Heath remarked at the
Paris Air Show in June this year (2005) that USAF pilots flying the F/A-22 are "discovering and
inventing" new ways to use the fighter in combat, "things we never imagined before", says Heath.
"The word back is, 'Holy smokes, this thing is very, very different,'" he adds. Programme officials
predict even more innovations once the aircraft is in service and the 422nd Test & Evaluation
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Squadron at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB) can focus on developing new tactics.
Results from last year's IOT&E, Heath says, convinced him that the F/A-22 and the F-35 will be
"game changers" - as important as the introduction of the first military aircraft and the first jets.
He quotes the Air Force IOT&E summary: "Ground defences could not engage the F/A-22, no
adversaries could survive, and we never knew they were there." Heath adds: "It turned a light on
in my mind. Things are different, beginning now. The world does not yet appreciate the
advantages of bringing together stealth, speed and other advanced capabilities in a new aircraft but such state changes are not always recognised at the time they happen."
Pilots quoted by Lockheed Martin after the IOT&E make the same kind of comments. "The only
way to succeed is if the F/A-22 makes a mistake," commented one Aggressor pilot. "Holy cow,"
said another, "we never got close to them." Yet another commented: "We had a boring afteraction meeting at the bar - I was just flying along and, shack, I'm dead."
IOT&E involved six F/A-22 development aircraft, flying 188 simulated combat sorties. Scenarios
included escort and attack of high-value airborne assets, and escort missions with B-2s and F117s.
But what is missing from this is a clear description of just how the F/A-22 achieves those results,
because any discussion of the fighter's capabilities quickly veers into classified areas - and, in the
absence of any such detailed information, people who are not cleared to know about the details of
the F/A-22 naturally suspect that such general claims are largely hype. The author put this
question to Heath: "Does it help the USAF if, in the course of protecting the fighter's capabilities
from disclosure, it loses the political battle and does not receive enough aircraft?"
"You're asking the right questions," says Heath, adding that security limits are the USAF's
decision. But, he adds, there are "appropriate levels of discussion within the Pentagon and
Congress, if not in the public domain". Heath says too that the USAF "has become more
outspoken" about the fighter as the threat to the programme's survival has become more
imminent.
What unclassified material has been released, however, indicates that the F/A-22's operational
effectiveness is a result of its combination of stealth, flight performance - speed, altitude and
agility - and integrated avionics. The F/A-22 has been designed to be stealthy, and the USAF has
consistently said that it meets that performance requirement. Its supercruise performance maximum speed on military (non-afterburning) power - is quoted at Mach 1.7 between 35,000
and 40,000 ft, leaving excess thrust for manoeuvre: charts released in the 1990s, before post-11
September 2001 security rules came into effect, indicate that the F/A-22, on maximum power, can
sustain a 5gturn at Mach 1.7.
Stealth, speed and altitude
The fighter's service ceiling is 66,000 ft. This is partly a function of speed and the near-turbojet
engine cycle, but the main reason that most fighters are limited to 50,000 ft is that the pilot
cannot breathe long enough or deeply enough to bring the aircraft to a lower altitude if cockpit
pressurisation fails. However, the positive-pressure breathing system, provided to improve the
pilot's resistance togforces, also acts as a partial pressure suit in emergencies. With the system
forcing oxygen into the pilot's lungs, and the counter-pressure vest preventing the chest from
expanding, the F/A-22 pilot can continue to function without cockpit pressure.
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Taken together, the offensive value of stealth, speed and altitude resides in the fact that the
adversary cannot detect the F/A-22 at long range, while the range of the primary air-to-air
offensive weapon - the AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) - is
boosted by up to 50 per cent compared with a subsonic launch. The boost in missile energy gives
the F/A-22 pilot a choice between launching at maximum range and firing at closer range with
more terminal missile speed and energy. The same applies to an air-to-ground weapon: released
from an F/A-22, a GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb has an effective range of 90 km.
In an air-to-air engagement, stealth and performance are backed up by the integrated avionics:
the APG-77 radar, which should be the first fighter-borne Active Electronically Scanned Array
(AESA) radar to enter service; the BAE Systems ALR-94 electronic surveillance measures (ESM)
system; and the intra-flight datalink (IFDL), which functions in much the same way as the datalink
on the Gripen, enabling any aircraft in a four-ship formation to see exactly what the others see.
"In IOT&E," comments F/A-22 programme vice-president Larry Lawson, "we knew where
everyone was and we knew who everyone was."
Supersonic manoeuvrability
AESA is an important complement to stealth, because of its ability to generate a variety of
different beams - narrowly focused point beams; high-power, short-duration beams; and different
and changing waveforms. All of this makes it easier to track and identify targets without giving
away the F/A-22's position. Non-AESA radars in adversary aircraft, on the other hand, can be
tracked over a 360 field of view by the ALR-94, which is considered accurate enough to deliver a
valid AMRAAM solution.
As in the case of Gripen, the use of the datalink to allow one aircraft to track the targets while
others shoot is apparently routine. One JSF briefing chart - almost certainly derived from F/A-22
experience - shows two stealthy fighters staying head-on to the target formation while two others
engage from the side, with radars silent. This results in close-range, high-probability-of-kill missile
shots.
If the adversary does manage to detect the F/A-22 and launch a missile, supersonic
manoeuvrability provides an effective defence. Former F/A-22 chief test pilot Paul Metz calls this
"cranking" - pulling a supersonic turn after firing a missile, forcing a hostile missile to manoeuvre
with rapidly increasing line-of-sight rates. "Cranking after the shot always reduces the enemy's
effective missile range, but a supercruise crank places the F-22 way outside an adversary's
maximum range, even if it could detect the F/A-22," says Metz.
The defensive value of supercruise and stealth is particularly important in the face of surface-toair missile (SAM) threats, which have continued to develop and evolve at a higher rate than fighter
forces.
Stealth delays the detection of the F/A-22 by the SAM radar, even if it does have some capability
against small targets. Stealth plus speed compounds that advantage, reducing the time between
first detection and the last opportunity to engage, which is limited by the kinematic capability of
the missile to reach the target before it turns into a tail-chase. High altitude further stresses the
missile: it needs more time to reach the target and is less manoeuvrable in thin air. Supersonic
manoeuvrability means that the F/A-22 can change its track and predicted position very quickly
and run the missile out of energy. Also, the GBU-39, ALR-94 and synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
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mode will provide the F/A-22 with an effective and jam-resistant hard-target suppression of
enemy air-defence (SEAD) capability. "You can decide whether to kill the target, fly over it or fly
around it," says Lawson.
IOT&E simulated both ground defences and air-to-air engagements with varying numbers of
aircraft - ranging up to 1-vs-8 engagements. In no case did the F/A-22 fail to survive, and one F15 pilot was quoted as saying: "We might as well have been flying T-38s - we can't see him
anyway."
But these results have been a double-edged sword: the PBD 753 cutbacks reflect a view that since
the Raptor has proven extremely effective in air-to-air combat, and since no potential adversaries
are investing in fighter forces that are both large and modern, the USAF can get by with a small
"silver bullet" F/A-22 force.
Air-defence systems
F/A-22 advocates dispute that argument on two levels. "One thing that is misunderstood is the
effect of surface-to-air defences on both air-to-air and air-to-ground operations," Lawson says.
Modernised F-15s - for instance, F-15Cs retrofitted with the APG-63(V)3 AESA - may be able to
provide effective fighter cover, but their operations can be constrained by long-range SAMs. "The
proliferation of air-defence systems is not in the future," argues Lawson. "It's a current problem."
Last year's Cope India exercise, in which F-15Cs engaged in mock combat with Indian Air Force
Su-27s, is also a pointer to future conflicts. The Su-27 is known to be a formidable adversary, "but
the surprise was the training level", says Lawson, "and how experienced and well trained the
Indian pilots were". If US forces face equal numbers, technical parity and well-trained pilots, what
is the affordable solution? "You can train to a yet higher level, or you can modernise the force
with higher effectiveness ratios and smaller numbers."
In fact, one argument for the F/A-22 is economic, despite the fighter's high price tag: the USAF
requires fewer F/A-22s than its current F-15C/D inventory and the fighter is still expected to
require less maintenance and support than the F-15. According to Lawson, the F/A-22's mean
time between maintenance actions, in USAF service, is already better than that of the F-15, after
8,000 hours in service, and it is "on track" for a goal of being three times better at 100,000
service flight hours.
However, operational support is one of two areas that were not fully tested in IOT&E, and that are
the focus of a follow-on operational test and evaluation (FOT&E) that was due to start at Edwards
AFB in July. Although IOT&E rated the fighter as "operationally effective" it assessed it as only
"potentially suitable", because of maintenance issues. "Like any other developmental aircraft, we
have some learning to do in order to maintain it and produce sorties at the desired rate," remarks
Colonel James Clark, USAF F/A-22 division chief. Problems included the perennial issue of
maintenance and repair of low-observable systems such as coatings, access panel edges and
structural gaps. Maintenance issues are receiving "considerable attention", Col Clark says.
Air-to-surface capability
The other element of IOT&E is the demonstration of a basic air-to-surface capability against fixed,
pre-surveyed targets, using standard 450 kg GBU-32/B Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs). Two
JDAMs can be carried, replacing four AIM-120s. The weapon can be released at 40,000 ft and
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Mach 1.5, with a range of up to 48 km.
The programme itself is on track towards the initial operational capability (IOC) date that was set
in the late 1990s. By early May, the USAF had taken 38 operational aircraft in service. Six aircraft
were assigned to Edwards AFB for development and operational testing; seven to Nellis AFB for
tactics development; 23 to Tyndall AFB for pilot training; and two to the 27th Fighter Squadron at
Langley AFB, which is due to become the first operational F/A-22 squadron in December, with 15
or more operational aircraft. The first two Langley aircraft were borrowed from Tyndall; the first
combat-coded, off-the-production-line aircraft for Langley was delivered on 12 May.
F/A-22 production has now reached the two-per-month level that will be sustained throughout the
life of the programme: 14 aircraft were delivered in the seven months between November 2004
and May 2005. According to Col Clark, the production configuration has also stabilised: "Aircraft
are coming off the line to Langley in a very stable condition. We are not having to modify them as
much as earlier aircraft."
The USAF's plan is to stand up the 1st Fighter Wing as the first complete F/A-22 wing at Langley
AFB. The second squadron - the 94th Fighter Squadron - is expected to transition in early 2007,
followed by the third and last, 71 FS, in mid-2008. The second base to get the Raptor will be
Elmendorf AFB in Alaska, which will receive two squadrons in 2010-11.
Under the USAF's original plan, two other bases would have been activated with two squadrons
each, in 2012-13 and 2014-15. Whether this ever happens depends on whether the PBD 753
decision gets reversed. If not, the USAF will comprise five operational squadrons at Langley and
Elmendorf, a training squadron at Tyndall and 16 test and weapons-school aircraft at Nellis.
Development funding
Funding to develop the planned upgrades to the F/A-22 remains in the budget for the time being,
but is in doubt because later upgrades will be accomplished entirely by retrofit, since production
will have ended by the time they are developed.
The first operational F/A-22 is now identified as the 'global strike basic' Block 20, with full air-to-air
capability and the ability to launch JDAM against fixed co-ordinates. The final Block 20 aircraft Lot 5, delivered in FY07 - are due to have an updated and less costly radar array using JSF
technology. The first prototype of this radar, designated APG-77(V)1, was delivered in May and is
due to start testing on the F/A-22. The new radar will also be the platform for new software that
gives the fighter SAR and electronic warfare modes. They are also expected to feature a new
digital electronic warfare (EW) receiver.
Lot 6 to Lot 8 aircraft, the last F/A-22s that survive under the December 2004 cutback plan, are
expected to be delivered in 2008-10 as Block 30, a 'global strike enhanced' configuration,
incorporating provisions for autonomous precision attack with the Boeing GBU-39 Small Diameter
Bomb (SDB). The revised radar gets a high-precision SAR mode, while the diamond-winged,
slender SDB will fly more than 90 km down range or up to 55 km cross range from a supersonic
launch. "You don't have to point the nose at the target," a Lockheed Martin manager observes.
Block 30 encompasses two software spirals (3A and 3B); the second introduces the ability to
launch the maximum load of eight SDBs against separate targets.
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Other improvements in Block 30 include a Link 16 datalink transmission capability - the current
aircraft is receive-only except for line-of-sight communications with other F/A-22s - and the ability
to record data acquired by the ALR-94 ESM system. This potentially turns the F-22 into a
penetrating electronic intelligence gatherer.
The last Block 30s - Lot 8, delivered in FY10, are expected to have new core processing hardware,
probably based on JSF components. However, the GAO noted in a March 2005 report that this
programme - budgeted at US$400-US$500 million - is already behind schedule, and that existing
hardware with some upgrades could support many of the USAF's desired missions.
FB-22 bomber
Under plans before December 2004, Block 40 - 'global strike full' was due to start midway through
Lot 9 deliveries in 2011. One of the biggest changes would be the addition of multifunction side
electronic arrays. Located in the sides of the forward fuselage, just ahead of the inlets, they would
allow the F/A-22 to guide an AMRAAM anywhere within a 270 arc around the aircraft, but would
also be usable for ISR and electronic attack. Block 40 would have the ability to launch precision
attacks against moving targets, with radar improvements and the Increment II version of the SDB,
which would feature a terminal seeker and a datalink for mid-course updates of the target's
position. Another Block 40 change would be a two-way satellite communications (satcoms) link,
providing continuous beyond line-of-sight connectivity and transforming the F/A-22 into a realtime, deep-penetration ISR platform.
The cost and benefits of completing the Block 40 modifications - even if retrofitting them into
earlier F/A-22s would be practical - are still a matter for debate. Lockheed Martin officials suggest
that the improvements will be even more important if the force size is reduced: "The other
capabilities become more important," says Lawson, "because it delivers more capability to the
total force." According to the GAO, however, the USAF is considering cancelling Block 40 and
using those funds to insert some of the planned Block 40 capabilities into Block 20 and Block 30
aircraft.
The debate over the F/A-22 has sidelined discussion of the FB-22 bomber derivative, first
discussed in 2002. In January 2005, the USAF officially adopted a three-phase approach to a new
long-range strike capability. The first step is to continue modernisation of the B-2, B-1 and B-52;
the second is to develop a new interim platform - also called the regional bomber - with an IOC of
2016-18; and the third is to produce a new long-range strike capability to replace today's bombers
from 2035.
The FB-22 is clearly a candidate for the regional bomber requirement, and to some extent is its
inspiration. Without the December 2004 cutback, the FB-22 would meet the bomber's IOC date if
it followed the standard fighter directly into production. Before the cutback was announced,
Lockheed Martin had unveiled a radically modified FB-22, with the current wing and horizontal
tails replaced by a broad delta wing. The fuselage was largely unchanged, apart from a two-seat
cockpit and bulged weapon bay doors to accommodate a 900 kg JDAM.
An open question
The new wing was three times larger than that of the F/A-22, dramatically increasing its internal
fuel capacity to 19,500 kg, and thereby increasing range by a factor of three. (If the F/A-22 has a
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weak point, it is range. The fighter has a radius of action of 1,100 km at subsonic speed, but this
decreases to 900 km with a 90 km Mach 1.5 dash and to 750 km with a 180 km supersonic
segment.) Four underwing hardpoints would be used to carry either AGM-158B cruise missiles or
stealth-compatible weapon pods, capable of carrying weapons as large as the 2,135 kg BLU-113
and the new BLU-122, mated to GPS-inertial guidance kits.
Lockheed Martin asserts that the FB-22 would be far less costly to develop than an all-new
bomber, a claim that is vigorously disputed by potential competitors - including Northrop
Grumman, which has proposed a Rapid Theater Attack aircraft based on the same basic
configuration as the YF-23, which lost to the F/A-22 in the Advanced Tactical Fighter competition
in 1991. "Every way you look at the FB-22, it's a new aircraft," asserts a Northrop Grumman
engineer.
In any event, the FB-22's biggest advantage - the ability to build the aircraft on a 'hot' production
line - disappears if production ceases before the USAF has any money to spend on a regional
bomber. Lockheed Martin has accordingly downplayed the delta-wing FB-22 in favour of a range
of study configurations, tailored to different budget levels. "We have a portfolio of options, some
of which could go through very quickly," comments Neil Kacena, deputy vice-president of
Lockheed Martin's Advanced Development Projects organisation. One example is a relatively
simple F/A-22 derivative with weapon pods and 'morphing' overwing conformal fuel tanks that
would shrink back as they were emptied, reducing drag for supersonic cruise. For the time being,
however, the focus is firmly on preserving the F/A-22 programme.
Whether the QDR will reverse or even delay the cuts announced in December is an open question.
One industry official points out that the difference between these and earlier budget-cutting
exercises is that this time the money was immediately reassigned to other programmes, and
cannot be recovered for the F/A-22 without cuts elsewhere. The extensive upgrade programme
proposed by Lockheed Martin and the USAF has created its own Catch-22: the full upgrade
programme may not make economic sense for a small number of aircraft, but the Pentagon's
leaders do not see a need for a larger force unless the fighter's missions are expanded - which
cannot happen without upgrades.
However, there are still two years to go before long-lead items would normally need to be
acquired for Lot 9, the first lot to be cancelled. That, in fact, is the reason why Lockheed Martin
and its political allies are focused on reversing cuts to the C-130J which had immediate effects. In
two years, the Pentagon will have a different view of the costs of the occupation of Iraq in
particular, and the 'war on terrorism' in general; and the economic outlook for the US will be
different, for better or worse. Time may be the biggest factor on the fighter's side.
RELATED ARTICLES: @janes.com
1 Raptor could hatch a delta bomber,IDR,14 May 2002
2 Joint Strike Fighter - weathering the storm as competitors circle,IDR, 8 February 2005
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The first operational F/A-22 destined for Langley AFB. The aircraft is painted with a metallic
coating that absorbs surface currents, together with an infrared absorbent topcoat. Wing and tail
edges are radar-absorbent material. (USAF)
1039870
An F/A-22 development aircraft is sprayed with water during icing trials. (USAF)
1039874
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Each of four underwing pylons on the F/A-22 can, in theory, carry both a 2,200 litre fuel tank and
two AIM-120 missiles, allowing the fighter to carry missiles with it on deployment. (Lockheed
Martin)
1039853
Clearly visible in this view of an F/A-22 is the right-hand AIM-9 missile, extended in firing position
on its trapeze launcher. (USAF)
1039868
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An F/A-22 makes its first flight in primer coating. Note the different tones around the aircraft's
edges, denoting the use of radar-absorbent material. (Lockheed Martin)
1039855
Ground crew will use a Portable Maintenance Aid - a ruggedised laptop computer - to download
maintenance data and store manuals. A wireless version is being developed. (USAF)
1039873
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A 450 kg JDAM replaces two AMRAAMs in each of the F/A-22's main ventral weapon bays.
(Lockheed Martin)
1039869
The weapon carriers envisaged for the FB-22 are based on smaller pods designed for the F/A-22.
Wind-tunnel tests were carried out, but they are not part of the planned upgrade programme.
(USAF)
1039877
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The FB-22, as conceived by Lockheed Martin in late 2004, had a broad-span delta wing with
stealth-compatible weapon carriers attached underneath it. (Lockheed Martin)
1039876
One of Tyndall AFB's first F/A-22s arrives at the Florida base, which will be the USAF's
schoolhouse for the type. (USAF)
1039875
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Side-mounted electronic arrays will give the F/A-22 a full 270º field of view for active target
tracking, high-sensitivity passive detection and tracking, and electronic attack. (Lockheed Martin)
1039879
An F/A-22 launches an AMRAAM during flight tests. The baseline version for the fighter is the
AIM-120C-7, which has better resistance to jamming than earlier versions. (Lockheed Martin)
1039854
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Tests this summer will clear the 450 kg JDAM for supersonic release from the F/A-22. For the time
being it will be used only against fixed, pre-surveyed targets. (Lockheed Martin)
1039878
AIM-9M Sidewinder launches have been carried out to the limits of the F/A-22s manoeuvring
envelope. The AIM-9X will be introduced later, but there are no immediate plans to add a helmetmounted display to the fighter. It will eventually receive a version of the JSF HMD. (USAF)
1039871
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Revolution in The Balance: Budget Cuts Threaten F/A-22 Programme

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Date Posted: 07-Jul-2005

Revolution in the balance: budget cuts

Copyright IHS Global Limited, 2015

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