Almeda vs.

Bathala Marketing
GR No. 150806

January 28, 2008

Respondent Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., as lessee, renewed its

Contract of Lease with Ponciano L. Almeda (Ponciano), as lessor, husband of
petitioner Eufemia and father of petitioner Romel Almeda. Under the said
contract, Ponciano agreed to lease a portion of the Almeda Compound, located at
2208 Pasong Tamo Street, Makati City, consisting of 7,348.25 square meters, for a
monthly rental of P1,107,348.69, for a term of four (4) years from May 1, 1997
unless sooner terminated as provided in the contract.
Facts:

The contract of lease contained the following pertinent provisions which

gave rise to the instant case: SIXTH It is expressly understood by the parties
hereto that the rental rate stipulated is based on the present rate of assessment on
the property, and that in case the assessment should hereafter be increased or any
new tax, charge or burden be imposed by authorities on the lot and building where
the leased premises are located, LESSEE shall pay, when the rental herein provided
becomes due, the additional rental or charge corresponding to the portion hereby
leased; provided, however, that in the event that the present assessment or tax on
said property should be reduced, LESSEE shall be entitled to reduction in the
stipulated rental, likewise in proportion to the portion leased by him; SEVENTH
In case an extraordinary inflation or devaluation of Philippine Currency should
supervene, the value of Philippine peso at the time of the establishment of the
obligation shall be the basis of payment;
During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died.
Thereafter, respondent dealt with petitioners. In a letter,
petitioners advised respondent that the former shall assess and
collect Value Added Tax (VAT) on its monthly rentals. In response,
respondent contended that VAT may not be imposed as the
rentals fixed in the contract of lease were supposed to include the
VAT therein, considering that their contract was executed on May
1, 1997 when the VAT law had long been in effect. respondent
received another letter from petitioners informing the former that

its monthly rental should be increased by 73% pursuant to

condition No. 7 of the contract and Article 1250 of the Civil Code.
Respondent opposed petitioners demand and insisted that there
was no extraordinary inflation to warrant the application of Article
1250 in light of the pronouncement of this Court in various cases.
Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals as demanded by
petitioners but continued to pay the stipulated amount set forth in their contract.
Respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of determining
the correct interpretation of condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to prevent
damage and prejudice.
Issue: Whether or not a petition for declaratory relief is proper
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested

in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive
order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or
validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation,
or statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties
thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is
the question of construction or validity of provisions in an
instrument or statute. Corollary is the general rule that such an
action must be justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is
available under the circumstances.
Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for
declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the subject matter of the
controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are
doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have
been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be
an actual justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one

between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must

be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not
available through other means or other forms of action or
proceeding.
It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the
instant case.
After petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and
in the months that followed, respondent complied with the terms
and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying the
rentals stipulated therein. Respondent religiously fulfilled its
obligations to petitioners even during the pendency of the present
suit. There is no showing that respondent committed an act
constituting a breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus,
respondent is not barred from instituting before the trial court the
petition for declaratory relief.

Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council

GR No. 202242

July 17, 2012

Facts: Under Section 8 paragraph 1 Article VIII of the Constitution,

Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one
representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members. Perhaps in
order to give equal opportunity to both houses to sit in the exclusive body, the
House of Representatives and the Senate would send alternate representatives to
the JBC. In other words, Congress had only one (1) representative.

In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only
seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2)
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001,
decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero
and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner filed a petition for declaratory relief before the
Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court can directly entertain a

petition for declaratory relief

Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction of Section
8 (1), Article VIII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be considered as
that which would result in the adjudication of rights sans the execution process
because the only relief to be granted is the very declaration of the rights under the
document sought to be construed. It being so, the original jurisdiction over the
petition lies with the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC). Notwithstanding the fact
that only questions of law are raised in the petition, an action for declaratory relief
is not among those within the original jurisdiction of this Court as provided in
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
At any rate, due to its serious implications, not only to government processes
involved but also to the sanctity of the Constitution, the Court deems it more
prudent to take cognizance of it. After all, the petition is also for prohibition under
Rule 65 seeking to enjoin Congress from sending two (2) representatives with one
(1) full vote each to the JBC.

Republic vs. Roque

GR No. 204603

September 24, 2013

Facts: Private respondents filed a Petition for declaratory relief before the RTC,
assailing the constitutionality of the following sections of RA 9372: (a) Section 3, for
being void for vagueness; (b) Section 7, for violating the right to privacy of
communication and due process and the privileged nature of priest-penitent
relationships; (c)Section 18, for violating due process, the prohibition against ex post
facto laws or bills of attainder, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as for contradicting
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (d) Section 26,for violating the
right to travel; and (e) Section 27, for violating the prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

Petitioners moved to suspend the proceedings, averring that certain petitions (SC petitions)
raising the issue of RA 9372s constitutionality have been lodged before the Court. The said
motion was granted in an Order dated October 19, 2007.
On October 5, 2010, the Court promulgated its Decision in the Southern Hemisphere cases and
thereby dismissed the SC petitions.
On February 27, 2012, petitioners filed the subject motion to dismiss, contending that private
respondents failed to satisfy the requisites for declaratory relief. Likewise, they averred that the
constitutionality of RA 9372 had already been upheld by the Court in the Southern Hemisphere
cases.
Issue: Whether or not a petition for declaratory relief is proper

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that a petition for declaratory relief is not proper in
this case.

Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief: first , the
subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second , the terms of said documents and the
validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third , there must have been no
breach of the documents in question; fourth , there must be an actual justiciable controversy or
the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth , the issue must be
ripe for judicial determination; and sixth , adequate relief is not available through other means or
other forms of action or proceeding.
Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court observes that while the first, second, and
third requirements appear to exist in this case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth requirements, however,
remain wanting.

As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the
"ripening seeds" of one exists in this case. Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an
existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is
conjectural or merely anticipatory. Corollary thereto, by "ripening seeds" it is meant, not that
sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception
before it has accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and violence of a full
blown battle that looms ahead. The concept describes a state of facts indicating imminent and
inevitable litigation provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing
declaration.
A perusal of private respondents petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed
to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far removed
from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private respondents only assert
general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government could
prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain untrammeled. As their
petition would disclose, private respondents fear of prosecution was solely based on remarks of
certain government officials which were addressed to the general public. They, however, failed to
show how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action geared
towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no particular,
real or imminent threat to any of them.
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that the
controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the abovediscussed allegations in private respondents petition, remain highly-speculative and merely
theorized.1wphi1 It is well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. This private
respondents failed to demonstrate in the case at bar.
Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a discussion on
the availability of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the private respondents
exists in the first place.

Ampil vs. Ombudsman

GR No. 192685

July 31, 2013

Facts: ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and Malayan Insurance Company (MICO) entered into a
Joint Project Development Agreement (JPDA) for the construction of a condominium building to
be known as "The Malayan Tower." Under the JPDA, MICO shall provide the real property

located at the heart of the Ortigas Business District, Pasig City, while ASB would construct, and
shoulder the cost of construction and development of the condominium building.
A year thereafter, MICO and ASB entered into another contract, with MICO selling to ASB the
land it was contributing under the JPDA. Under the Contract to Sell, ownership of the land will
vest on ASB only upon full payment of the purchase price.
ASB, as part of the ASB Group of Companies, filed a Petition for Rehabilitation with
Prayer for Suspension of Actions and Proceedings before the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Because of the obvious financial difficulties, ASB was
unable to perform its obligations to MICO under the JPDA and the Contract to Sell.
Thus, MICO and ASB executed their Third contract, a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), allowing MICO to assume the entire responsibility for the development and
completion of The Malayan Tower. The MOA specifies the entitlement of both ASB
and MICO to net saleable areas of The Malayan Tower representing their
investments.
On 11 March 2005, Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) for 38 units and the
allotted parking spaces were issued in the name of ASB. On even date but prior to
its release, another set of CCTs covering the same subject units but with MICO as
registered owner thereof, was signed by Espenesin in his capacity as Registrar of
Deeds of Pasig City. Notably, Espenesin had likewise signed the CCTs which were
originally issued in ASBs name.
Counsel for ASB wrote Espenesin calling his attention to the supposed amendment
in the CCTs which he had originally issued in ASBs name. Counsel for ASB
demanded that Espenesin effect in the second set of CCTs, the registration of the
subject units in The Malayan Tower back to ASBs name.
Respondents paid no heed to ASBs and Ampils demands. Ampil charged
respondents with Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the
Revised Penal Code and violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019
before the Office of the Ombudsman.

Thereafter, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution in G.R. No. 192685 dismissing
Ampils complaint. For the Ombudsman, the resolution of whether respondents falsified the
CCTs must be prefaced by a determination of who, between MICO and ASB, is the rightful
owner of the subject units. The Ombudsman held that it had no authority to interpret the
provisions of the MOA and, thus, refrained from resolving the preliminary question of
ownership. Given the foregoing, the Ombudsman was hard pressed to make a categorical finding
that the CCTs were altered to speak something false. In short, the Ombudsman did not have
probable cause to indict respondents for falsification of the CCTs because the last element of the
crime, i.e., that the change made the document speak something false, had not been established.
Significantly, the Ombudsman did not dispose of whether probable cause exists to indict
respondents for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

Ampil filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, in yet another setback, the
Ombudsman denied Ampils motion and affirmed the dismissal of his complaint.

Issue: Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsmans failure to find
probable cause to indict respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6)
of the Revised Penal Code, and for their commission of corrupt practices under Sections 3(a) and
(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion in the incomplete disposition of Ampils complaint.
That the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty bound to "investigate on its
own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient" brooks no objection.

Plainly, the Ombudsman has "full discretion," based on the attendant facts and circumstances, to
determine the existence of probable cause or the lack thereof. On this score, we have consistently
hewed to the policy of non-interference with the Ombudsmans exercise of its constitutionally
mandated powers. The Ombudsmans finding to proceed or desist in the prosecution of a
criminal case can only be assailed through certiorari proceedings before this Court on the ground
that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion which contemplates an abuse so
grave and so patent equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
However, on several occasions, we have interfered with the Ombudsmans discretion in
determining probable cause: (a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
(b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions; (c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; (d) When the
acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (e) Where the prosecution is under an
invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g) Where the
court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution; (i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.
The fourth circumstance is present in this case.
While we agree with the Ombudsmans disquisition that there is no probable cause to indict
respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal
Code, we are puzzled why the Ombudsman completely glossed over Ampils charge that
respondents committed prohibited acts listed in Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Nowhere in the Resolution or in the Order denying reconsideration thereof did the Ombudsman
tackle and resolve the issue of whether respondents violated the particular provisions of Republic
Act No. 3019.
Curiously, the Ombudsman docketed Ampils complaint-affidavit as one "for: Falsification of
Public Documents and Violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended." The Ombudsman even prefaced the Resolution, thus: "this has reference to the

complaint filed by Oscar Ampil on 17 September 2007 against respondents, for Falsification of
Public Documents and Violation of Sections 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended."
Despite the admission by Espenesin that he had altered the CCTs and the Ombudsmans findings
thereon, the Ombudsman abruptly dismissed Ampils complaint-affidavit, resolving only one of
the charges contained therein with nary a link regarding the other charge of violation of Sections
3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Indeed, as found by the Ombudsman, the 4th element of
the crime of Falsification of Public Documents is lacking, as the actual ownership of the subject
units at The Malayan Tower has yet to be resolved. Nonetheless, this circumstance does not
detract from, much less diminish, Ampils charge, and the evidence pointing to the possible
commission, of offenses under Sections 3(a) and (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
We are aware that the calibration of evidence to assess whether a prima facie graft case exists
against respondents is a question of fact. We have consistently held that the Supreme Court is not
a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither
questions of fact nor law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion. In this case, however, certiorari will lie, given that the Ombudsman
made no finding at all on respondents possible liability for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019.

Maglalang vs. PAGCOR

GR No. 190566

December 11, 2013

Facts: Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City Branch which was operated by
PAGCOR a government-owned or controlled corporation existing by virtue of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1869. Petitioner alleged that in the afternoon of December 13, 2008, while he
was performing his functions as teller, a lady customer identified later as one Cecilia Nakasato
(Cecilia) approached him in his booth and handed to him an undetermined amount of cash
consisting of mixed P1,000.00 and P500.00 bills. There were 45 P1,000.00 and ten P500.00 bills
for the total amount of P50,000.00. Following casino procedure, petitioner laid the bills on the
spreading board. However, he erroneously spread the bills into only four clusters instead of five
clusters worth P10,000.00 per cluster. Perplexed, Cecilia asked petitioner why the latter only
dished out P40,000.00. She then pointed to the first cluster of bills and requested petitioner to
check the first cluster which she observed to be thicker than the others. Petitioner performed a
recount and found that the said cluster contained 20 pieces of P1,000.00 bills. Petitioner
apologized to Cecilia and rectified the error by declaring the full and correct amount handed to
him by the latter. Petitioner, however, averred that Cecilia accused him of trying to shortchange
her and that petitioner tried to deliberately fool her of her money. Petitioner tried to explain, but

Cecilia allegedly continued to berate and curse him. To ease the tension, petitioner was asked to
take a break. After ten minutes, petitioner returned to his booth. However, Cecilia allegedly
showed up and continued to berate petitioner. As a result, the two of them were invited to the
casinos Internal Security Office in order to air their respective sides. Thereafter, petitioner was
required to file an Incident Report which he submitted on the same day of the incident
On January 8, 2009, petitioner received a Memorandum issued by the casinos Branch Manager,
Alexander Ozaeta, informing him that he was being charged with Discourtesy towards a casino
customer and directing him to explain within 72 hours upon receipt of the memorandum why he
should not be sanctioned or dismissed. In compliance therewith, petitioner submitted a letterexplanation dated January 10, 2009.
On March 31, 2009, petitioner received another Memorandum dated March 19, 2009, stating that
the Board of Directors of PAGCOR found him guilty of Discourtesy towards a casino customer
and imposed on him a 30-day suspension for this first offense. Subsequently, a motion for
reconsideration was filed but was denied.
On August 17, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, before the CA.
In its assailed Resolution dated September 30, 2009, the CA outrightly dismissed the petition for
certiorari for being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before
seeking recourse from the CA. Invoking Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,1
the CA held that the CSC has jurisdiction over issues involving the employer-employee
relationship in all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters such as PAGCOR
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in out rightly dismissing the petition for
certiorari filed before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals erred in outrightly dismissing the
petition for certiorari.
Our ruling in Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority v. SM
Prime Holdings, Inc. on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is instructive, to
wit: Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy
should be exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought. The premature
invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy
away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied

with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and
dispose of the case.
However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the
following exceptions:
(1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5)
when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as
an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount
to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11)
when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable
delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative review is
provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14) where the
issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.
The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se
provides no administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee
like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized
with a suspension for not more than 30 days.

Section 37 (a) and (b) of P.D. No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines, provides for the unavailability of any appeal: (a) The Commission shall decide
upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of
suspension for more than thirty days, XXXXXXXXXXX; (b) The heads of departments,
agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction
to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty
days salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the
Commission, XXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Similar provisions are reiterated in the aforequoted Section 47 of E.O. No. 292 essentially
providing that cases of this sort are not appealable to the CSC.
Nevertheless, decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and unappealable by
law are still subject to judicial review. In Republic of the Phils. v. Francisco, we held:
Since the decision of the Ombudsman suspending respondents for one (1) month is final and
unappealable, it follows that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction to review, rectify or reverse
the same. The Ombudsman was not estopped from asserting in this Court that the CA had no
appellate jurisdiction to review and reverse the decision of the Ombudsman via petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. This is not to say that decisions of the Ombudsman
cannot be questioned. Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are
declared by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of
arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such

administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to

compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings. Thus,
the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or reversed via petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no jurisdiction over
the complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
It bears stressing that the judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a
special civil action for certioraria scribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not an appeal. Suffice it to state that an appeal and a
special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate from each
other. One cannot file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available,
even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a
judgment despite the availability of that remedy, as the same should not be a substitute for the
lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive.
In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law in view of petitioners allegation that PAGCOR has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
CAs outright dismissal of the petition for certiorarion the basis of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and should therefore be set aside.
Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question involved
is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence,
courts exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing factual assessments of the
respondent court or agency. Occasionally, however, they are constrained to wade into factual
matters when the evidence on record does not support those factual findings; or when too much
is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing on record.
Considering the circumstances and since this Court is not a trier of facts, remand of this case to
the CA for its judicious resolution is in order.

Corales vs. Republic

GR No. 186613

August 27, 2013

Facts: Petitioner Corales was the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna for three
(3) consecutive terms, i.e., the 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections. In his first term as local chief
executive, petitioner Corales appointed petitioner Dr. Angeles to the position of Municipal

Administrator, whose appointment was unanimously approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of

Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sangguniang Bayan) per Resolution No. 98-64 dated 22 July 1998. During
his second and third terms as municipal mayor, petitioner Corales renewed the appointment of
petitioner Dr. Angeles. But, on these times, the Sangguniang Bayan per Resolution No. 2001-078
dated 12 July 2001 and 26 subsequent Resolutions, disapproved petitioner Dr. Angeles
appointment on the ground of nepotism, as well as the latters purported unfitness and
unsatisfactory performance. Even so, petitioner Dr. Angeles continued to discharge the functions
and duties of a Municipal Administrator for which he received an annual salary of P210,012.00.
Following an audit on various local disbursements, Maximo Andal (Andal), the Provincial State
Auditor of Laguna, issued an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2006-007-100 dated
6 October 2006 addressed to petitioner Corales who was asked to comment/reply.
Instead of submitting his comment/reply thereon, petitioner Corales, together with
petitioner Dr. Angeles, opted to file a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against
Andal and the then members of the Sangguniang Bayan before the RTC of San Pablo
City, Laguna.
In its turn, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on Andals behalf, who was
impleaded in his official capacity, filed a Motion to Dismiss petitioners Petition for
Prohibition and Mandamus grounded on lack of cause of action, prematurity and
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In its Order dated 17 May 2007, the trial court denied the said Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that Andal was merely a nominal party. The subsequent motion for its
reconsideration was also denied in another Order dated 5 September 2007.
Respondent Republic, as represented by COA, as represented by Andal,
consequently filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals ascribing grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court in rendering the Orders dated 17 May 2007 and 5 September 2007.
On 15 September 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision
granting respondents Petition for Certiorari, thereby annulling and setting aside the
RTC Orders dated 17 May 2007 and 5 September 2007 and, accordingly, dismissing
petitioners Petition for Prohibition with the court a quo.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it ordered the dismissal of
petitioners suit for prohibition

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that dismissal was proper.

The requisites of actual case and ripeness are absent in the present case. To repeat, the AOM
issued by Andal merely requested petitioner Corales to comment/reply thereto. Truly, the AOM
already contained a recommendation to issue a Notice of Disallowance; however, no Notice of
Disallowance was yet issued. More so, there was no evidence to show that Andal had already
enforced against petitioner Corales the contents of the AOM. Similarly, there was no clear
showing that petitioners, particularly petitioner Corales, would sustain actual or imminent injury
by reason of the issuance of the AOM. The action taken by the petitioners to assail the AOM
was, indeed, premature and based entirely on surmises, conjectures and speculations that
petitioner Corales would eventually be compelled to reimburse petitioner Dr. Angeles salaries,
should the audit investigation confirm the irregularity of such disbursements. Further, as
correctly pointed out by respondent Republic in its Memorandum, what petitioners actually
assail is Andals authority to request them to file the desired comment/reply to the AOM, which
is beyond the scope of the action for prohibition, as such request is neither an actionable wrong
nor constitutive of an act perceived to be illegal. Andal, being the Provincial State Auditor, is
clothed with the authority to audit petitioners disbursements, conduct an investigation thereon
and render a final finding and recommendation thereafter. Hence, it is beyond question that in
relation to his audit investigation function, Andal can validly and legally require petitioners to
submit comment/reply to the AOM, which the latter cannot pre-empt by prematurely seeking
judicial intervention, like filing an action for prohibition.
Moreover, prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment ordering the defendant to
desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal, may only be
resorted to when there is "no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law."
In this case, petitioners insist that it is no longer necessary to exhaust administrative remedies
considering that there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and appropriate remedial measure
to assail the imposition under the AOM aside from an action for prohibition.
This Court finds the said contention plain self-deception.
As previously stated, petitioners action for prohibition was premature. The audit investigative
process was still in its initial phase. There was yet no Notice of Disallowance issued. And, even
granting that the AOM issued to petitioner Corales is already equivalent to an order, decision or
resolution of the Auditor or that such AOM is already tantamount to a directive for petitioner
Corales to reimburse the salaries paid to petitioner Dr. Angeles, still, the action for prohibition is
premature since there are still many administrative remedies available to petitioners to contest
the said AOM. Section 1, Rule V of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, provides:
"[a]n aggrieved party may appeal from an order or decision or ruling rendered by the Auditor
embodied in a report, memorandum, letter, notice of disallowances and charges, Certificate of
Settlement and Balances, to the Director who has jurisdiction over the agency under audit." From
the final order or decision of the Director, an aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission
proper. It is the decision or resolution of the Commission proper which can be appealed to this
Court.

If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by

giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted
first before the courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of
the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action. he doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The
availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons
of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose
of the case.

Hipos Sr. vs. Bay

GR No. 174813-15

March 17, 2009

Two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information

for the crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed against
petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsio, Arthur Villaruel and two
others before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, acting as a Family Court, presided by respondent Judge Bay.
Facts:

Private complainants AAA and BBB filed a Motion for Reinvestigation

asking Judge Bay to order the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the
proper Informations had been filed against petitioners and their co-accused. Judge
Bay granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of the cases.
Petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the
Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. They claimed that there was
no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged.

The Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the

reinvestigation affirming the Informations filed against petitioners
and their co-accused.
2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating
the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an appeal of the 10
August 2004 Resolution, reversed the Resolution dated 10 August
2004, holding that there was lack of probable cause.

On the

same date, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw

Informations before Judge Bay.
Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations in an Order of even
date.
Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed
Order, petitioners filed the present Petition for Mandamus.

Issue: Can the Supreme Court compel respondent Judge Bay to dismiss the case
through a writ of mandamus by virtue of the resolution of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City finding no probable caused against the accused and
subsequently filing a motion to withdraw information?

Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal,

corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at some
other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the
respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station; or when the respondent excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is

entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy

in the ordinary course of law.
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to
compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a
discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise
of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him
the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in
which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to
be exercised and not that of the court.
In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we compel
the trial court to do is to grant the Office of the City Prosecutors
Motion for Withdrawal of Informations against petitioners. In
effect, petitioners seek to curb Judge Bays exercise of judicial
discretion.
There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and
discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued
to compel action in those matters, when refused. However, mandamus is never
available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way
or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of
either. In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw
Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be
compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at
bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he
had already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not
available anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse
of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw
Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition
for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.

Social Justice vs. Atienza

GR No. 156052

March 7, 2007

Facts: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027.

Respondent mayor approved the ordinance on November 28, 2001. It became
effective on December 28, 2001, after its publication.
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local
government units, a principle described as the power inherent in a government to
enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals
and general welfare of the society.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE)
entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in
which they agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals was the most
viable and practicable option.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the
Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July
25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending
the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue
special business permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a
reassessment of the ordinance.
Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that
Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of
the terminals of the oil companies.
Issue: Whether or not Mayor Atienza has the mandatory legal duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be
filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to
compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is already
imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined,
clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear
and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty,
which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal
function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and

to adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal
right but to implement that which is already established. Unless the right to the
relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue.
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the enforcement
of the ordinance, petitioner SJS states that it is a political party registered with the
Commission on Elections and has its offices in Manila. It claims to have many
members who are residents of Manila. The other petitioners, Cabigao and
Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.
We have ruled in previous cases that when a mandamus proceeding concerns a
public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested
in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they
need not show any specific interest. Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners
have a direct interest in the enforcement of the citys ordinances. Respondent never
questioned the right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor,
to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city." One of these is
Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no
other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr. we stated the reason for
this: These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of
the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the
transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not
judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the
lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
We need not resolve this issue on whether the MOU and Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002
and 13, s. 2003 of the Sanggunian can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.
Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the
resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave
it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing
that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027
Lokin Jr. vs. COMELEC
GR No. 179431

June 22, 2010

Facts: CIBAC was one of the organized groups duly registered under the party-list
system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14,
2007 synchronized national and local elections. CIBAC, through its president,
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from which its

representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of

qualifying votes. The nominees were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein
petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and
(5) Emil L. Galang.
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of
nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007,
whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted
Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC
thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje.
CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as
the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its
second nominee. The right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to
be thus proclaimed were purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26,
which showed CIBAC to have garnered a grand total of 744,674 votes.
In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc, sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers, issued National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution to proclaim
CIBAC as having won in the May 14, 2007 elections. Subsequently, it issued another
resolution proclaiming CIBAC as entitled to 2 additional seats.
The COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of
CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC.
Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as
the official second nominee of CIBAC. Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No.
7804 promulgated on January 12, 2007; and the resolution dated September 14,
2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054 (approving CIBACs withdrawal of the nominations of
Lokin, Tugna and Galang as CIBACs second, third and fourth nominees,
respectively, and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales and Borje in their stead, based
on the right of CIBAC to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution No.
7804
In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an
inappropriate recourse in law due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as
Representative and her assumption of that office; that Lokins proper recourse was
an electoral protest filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET);
and that, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter being raised by
Lokin.
Issue: What is the proper remedy that should be filed by Lokin who is seeking to be
seated as the second nominee of CIBAC, a petition for quo warranto before the
HRET or a special civil action for certiorari
before the Supreme?

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that it is a special civil action for certiorari.

An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest
between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and
irregularities, to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal
votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed
a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding elections.
A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of
ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible
person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the
action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy because
the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated.
The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto,
for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second
nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-list
organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization to determine which between the
defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal
votes, Lokins case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby
wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list organization. Neither does an action for
quo warranto lie, considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of
Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her.
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the
COMELEC to seek the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC
in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution,
notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The
constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or
resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the
mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in
the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokins petitions for certiorari and for
mandamus against the COMELEC.

De Castro vs. Carlos