Squartini, Lexical vs. Grammatical Evidentiality in French and Italian

Lexical vs.
grammatical evidentiality
in French and Italian*
MARIO SQUARTINI
Abstract
This article discusses Romance data corroborating a multifarious account
of evidentiality in which dierent dimensions connected to the source of information are distinguished. It will be demonstrated that the diverse distributional patterns of lexical items as opposed to grammatical forms in the
domains of inferential and reportative evidentiality can hardly be accounted
for unless a distinction is made between the source of evidence, intended as
the locus where the information is acquired (internal or external source
with respect to the speaker), and the mode of knowing, i.e., the process
leading to the acquisition of the information (directly visual, indirectly
through inferences, reports).
1.
The evidential vogue
Since the publication of Franz Boas work (especially Boas 1938: 133)
it has been generally acknowledged that some languages have morphological means for obligatory dedicated expression of the information
source specifying how the information has been acquired, e.g., distinguishing whether it has been directly witnessed (visually, auditorily, etc.)
or indirectly known either as reported information or as the result of
the speakers own reasoning (inferences and conjectures). With respect
to this or similar consensus denitions Aikhenvald (2003a: 19) recently
stigmatized an increasing and gratuitous extension of evidentiality outside its proper domain, a reminder of the misuse of ergativity in the past
decades. According to Aikhenvald (2003a) the limits of evidentiality have
been misconceived, dangerously blurring the distinction between languages where it is obligatorily expressed by dedicated grammatical morphemes and languages where it sparsely appears as a secondary meaning or a pragmatic extension (evidentiality strategies in Aikhenvald
Linguistics 465 (2008), 917947
DOI 10.1515/LING.2008.030
00243949/08/00460917
6 Walter de Gruyter
918
M. Squartini
2003a: 2, 1820). Lazard (2000: 214, 2001), as well as Aikhenvald (2003a:

2), also emphasizes the importance of maintaining a sharp distinction
between grammatical and lexical expressions of evidentiality, the latter
possibly being a universal feature represented by lexical elements such
as the English adverbs reportedly, allegedly, evidently, etc. As is apparent, Aikhenvald and Lazard are mostly concerned with setting boundaries underlining the specic nature of grammatical evidentiality (see
also Aikhenvald 2004: 147151). In what follows, the opposite view
will be taken, exploring how an integrated account of both grammatical and lexical evidentiality can contribute to a better understanding of
the whole domain. In so doing a comparison will be drawn between the
lexical and the grammatical expressions of indirect evidence in Romance,1 mainly focusing on the domain of inferentiality. It will be demonstrated that a combined treatment of lexical data and grammatical
markers permits us to draw attention to the distinction between two different evidential notions, the mode of knowing or type of evidence as opposed to the source of evidence. Although already pointed out (Botne
1997: 523524), so far the interplay of the two notions has been neglected
in most classications, separately focusing either on the source of evidence (Frawley 1992: 413) or on the mode of knowing/type of evidence
(Willett 1988), or explicitly avoiding the distinction (Aikhenvald 2003a:
26, fn. 2).
The results presented in this article will also demonstrate how languages such as French and Italian, that only have evidentiality strategies (Aikhenvald 2003a: 1820) and not a regular system of dedicated
evidential grammatical axes, can contribute to the discussion surrounding the classication of evidential functions. Instead of biasing the results,
the very fact that they are derived from evidentiality strategies, raises additional questions on whether the distinction between the source and type
of evidence depends on the poorer grammatical status of evidentiality in
such languages (see the discussion in Section 2) or whether it can be extended to systems where this category is more prominently and consistently grammaticalized.2
The data analyzed in the present article comprise the Italian modal
dovere innitive and the inectional future, which will be presented
here as grammatical expressions of inferentiality (Section 3). In Sections
4 and 5 they will be compared to lexical items (the Italian adverb evidentemente evidently and the adverbial construction a quanto pare apparently) also expressing inferentiality. The comparison with the functional
behavior of a quanto pare will be particularly interesting, as it requires a
classicational model in which the mode of knowing interplays with the
source of evidence. The same interactional model will also be proved in
Evidentiality in French and Italian
919
Section 6 as relevant in accounting for the functional distinctive distribution of the French as opposed to the Italian conditional.
2.
Preliminaries on grammatical evidentiality and evidentiality strategies
Grammatical evidentiality, intended in Boas (1938) sense as an independent functional domain separated from modality, has been traditionally considered as typologically restricted to certain given languages and
linguistic areas, especially in indigenous languages of the Americas and
in the Central Eurasian area (Comrie 2000: 11), thus postulating an
areal coverage certainly less widespread with respect to the virtually universal status of other semantic categories such as modality, tense and
aspect. This is also because, as already noticed in Section 1, the coexistence of evidential meanings in grammatical markers described as mainly
expressing other functional notions has never been considered as a proper
occurrence of grammatical evidentiality, being rather slotted as a marginal use (a pragmatic strategy). In this respect it must be overtly spelled
out from the outset that in this article the notion of grammatical evidentiality will be used in a rather unorthodox way with respect to this
traditionally settled paradigm. In particular, it will not be restricted to
obligatory grammatical markers dedicated to evidential meaning, also
including evidential extensions of other grammatical markers. Obviously,
this is not merely a terminological question and requires further justication. First of all such a choice has an argument-internal justication
with respect to the analysis put forward in this article, which focuses on
a comparison between the semantic import of grammatical vs. lexical evidentiality. Given such a binary distinction, evidentiality strategies, intended as extensions of the core meaning of grammatical markers, clearly
belong to what a language can express by means of the grammar. It
would make no sense to consider them as expressions of lexical meaning,
if one aims to discuss possible convergences and divergences between the
semantics of grammatical vs. lexical evidentiality, as is the case in this
article.
But, a more compelling and theoretical reason for subsuming evidentiality strategies under the general realm of grammatical evidentiality is
that the very distinction between grammatical evidentiality and evidentiality strategies is less clear-cut than has been assumed up to this
point. Recognizing the status of grammatical forms as proper evidential
markers, as opposed to evidentiality strategies, crucially elaborates on
the notion of primary, as opposed to secondary meaning. Nonetheless,
as discussed in Dahl (1985: 2425), identifying what is basic and what is
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M. Squartini
derived is not always a straightforward task, the most crucial point being
that in several cases the basic meaning encompasses dierent domains
such as tense and aspect, tense and modality, making it impossible to disentangle them. The solution adopted in Dahl (1985) and pursued in Dahl
(2000: 7) is based on providing denitions of the semantic content of single grammatical markers in a way that includes the interplay of dierent
semantic domains. This is not tantamount to denying the existence of a
primary meaning and the possibility of distinguishing it from a secondary
and derived one, but requires transcategorial denitions of the grammatical meaning, admitting that a primary meaning can also be formed of elements derived from dierent semantic domains. Pursuing this methodology further, it should not be surprising that evidentiality can be conceived
as a part of the primary meaning of a form that also encompasses other
semantic domains, especially epistemic modality. As already noted in Mithun (1986: 90), the evidential source and the epistemic probability
coexist in one and the same marker in dierent languages (in English as
well in Iroquoioan languages), which might be much more widespread
than so far assumed. In fact, the distinction between evidentiality and
epistemic modality, although in principle possible and desirable (Comrie
2000: 2), can be dicult to apply (De Haan 1997: 6). In this perspective
the typology of evidentiality cannot be reduced to a confrontation between languages having grammatical expression of evidentiality and languages lacking it. It seems more reasonable to imagine a set of intermediate possibilities in which evidentiality blends in dierent ways with
epistemic modality (Plungian 2001: 354; Pietrandrea 2004: 200203,
2005), on a parallel with what occurs with past tense and perfective aspect
(Dahl 1985: 23) that are lumped together in the semantics of a form such
as the French passe simple.
The case of the French and Italian modals devoir/dovere is particularly
interesting in this perspective since their evidential meaning as inferential
markers and their epistemic meaning as means of downgrading the speakers commitment with regard to the factuality of the situation coexist in
most cases, making it dicult to ascertain which is a pragmatic extension
and which is part of the basic meaning. This makes a transcategorial solution admitting both evidentiality and epistemic modality as part of the
basic meaning especially viable (on the interplay of evidentiality and epistemic modality in the semantics of modals see De Haan 1999a, 1999b,
2001a; Mortelmans 2000; Cornillie 2004; and Squartini 2004).
The present article can thus be considered as an attempt to interpret
evidentiality as part of the basic meaning of the modals devoir/dovere
innitive, which elaborates on previous research on French (especially
Dendale 1994) and Italian (Squartini 2004). Such a treatment of modals
921
raises an additional preliminary question concerning their status as part

of the grammatical system as opposed to their interpretation as independent lexical items. In fact, modals are mentioned in Aikhenvald (2003a: 2;
see also Aikhenvald 2004: 150) as lexical expressions of evidentiality, but
this is not an issue that can be theoretically solved once and for all, for it
crucially depends on the morphosyntactic behavior of modals in a given
language (De Haan 1997: 151). In this respect Italian modals show some
morphosyntactic peculiarities, including (optional) clitic climbing and
auxiliary switch (Cordin and Calabrese 1988: 572575), demonstrating
that they can form a monoclausal structure with the dependent innitive
(Rizzi 1982). Apart from the structural interpretation of monoclausality
(see the discussion in Cinque 2004), the inheritance of morphosyntactic
features of the innitival verb demonstrates the reduced autonomy of the
modal as main verb (Giacalone Ramat 2001: 123124), which is prima
facie evidence of an auxiliation process (Ramat 1987: 16) and has in fact
been interpreted as signaling the auxiliary status of Romance modals
(Ledgeway 2000: 155184; see also Cinque 2004: 142, 170, Fn. 24). The
corresponding French modal devoir, even if showing the opposite behavior as far as clitic climbing and auxiliary selection are concerned (Kayne
1980), also has specic morphosyntactic features common to proper
French auxiliaries (Pollock 1989: 386391). It is also signicant that Old
French modals have morphosyntactic properties, including auxiliary
switch (Pearce 1990: 1825) as well as clitic climbing and also prex
climbing (Benucci 2001: 6568), which permit a monoclausal interpretation comparable to the structural interpretation of contemporary Italian
modals. Such a diachronic discrepancy, apart from suggesting a nonstrictly unidirectional grammaticalization process, also conrms the intrinsic scalar nature of the very notion of auxiliarity (Heine 1993; Kuteva
2001). In this scalar perspective, modals, although not proper grammatical markers, are undoubtedly more grammatical than pure lexical
items. This makes signicant a comparison between the modals described
in Section 3 and the adverbs in Section 4, considering them as representatives of grammatical and lexical evidentiality, respectively.
3.
The inferential gradient
While inferences correspond to a major semantic function in most classications of evidentiality (from Willett 1988: 57 to Aikhenvald 2003a),
their role and status is still a much debated point aecting the boundaries
between evidentiality and epistemic modality. Even those who stress
the epistemic interpretation of inferences (van der Auwera and Plungian
922
M. Squartini
1998: 8586), admit their intermediate status as a case of interaction with

evidentiality. Their mixed nature is also recognized by Palmer (1986: 57
60, 6970), who treats inferentials under the heading of judgments if languages such as English or German are concerned (as in English John must
be at home), while including them in the section devoted to evidentials in
a language such as Tuyuca. Whatever the ultimate interpretation might
be, it cannot be denied that by marking information as inferential the
speaker provides information on the source of the information, which is
undoubtedly connected with evidentiality.
As for Romance languages, an evidential interpretation has been proposed for the French modal devoir must innitive by Dendale (1994),
who insists on its function as evidential (inferential) marker in contrast to
more current interpretations in which devoir innitive is considered an
epistemic marker, marginally admitting evidentiality as a secondary feature (Kronning 1996, 2003, 2004). The inferential function is also productive in other Romance languages, as the Italian modal dovere innitive
(1) demonstrates.
(1)
[Indicando un ragno] Attento, deve essere ancora vivo, perche ho

visto che si muove
[Pointing to a spider] Be careful! It must still be alive, for I saw it
moving
The context in (1) is a type of reasoning which, acknowledging Anderson

(1986: 274), can be dened as a circumstantial inference, i.e., a mental
process based on external sensory evidence (for I saw it moving). As
has been repeatedly pointed out (Dendale 1994; Dendale and De Mulder
1996: 312, 316317) not all inferential processes are strictly abductive
as is the case in (1), where the inference derives a given consequence
from an antecedent (in (1) the external sensory evidence). In particular,
the Italian modal dovere, its French counterpart as well as the corresponding English modal must (Plungian 2001: 354), can also convey inferential processes in which any external observable evidence is lacking
and the speaker only bases his/her reasoning process on previous personal experience or general world knowledge. In (2), a canonical example
of similar mental processes, the speaker knows that the postman regularly
rings the bell around the same time and presumes that this is also the case
on that occasion.
(2)
[Suonano alla porta] Deve essere il postino

[The doorbell rings] It must be the postman
The distinction between the two dierent inferential processes, the circumstantial inference in (1) and the inference lacking any external sensory
923
evidence in (2), is mentioned in typological descriptions of evidential

systems, being referred to as the opposition between apparent (inferred)
vs. assumed knowledge (Barnes 1984: 257258 on Tuyuca), as well as
inferential vs. expectational (Schlichter 1986: 5152 on Wintu). A comparable distinction between inference inferred from direct physical evidence and information from general knowledge is also morphologically marked in Tsaki (Dickinson 2000: 407408, see also Aikhenvald
2004: 5457). Signicantly, these two are dubbed as Inferred (1) and
Inferred (2) in Aikhenvald (2003a: 5), suggesting their semantic connection under the general umbrella of inferentiality. Consistently with this
assumption, Aikhenvald (2003a, 2004: 174176) uses the label inferences as a cover term for dierent semantic nuances of the category.
This is apparent when considering Aikhenvalds (2003b: 139) description
of Tariana markers of inferred knowledge, which cover generic inferences (based on world knowledge) as well as specic inferences (based
on results).
In Romance a distinction between generic and specic (circumstantial
in Andersons 1986 terms) inferences, even if neutralized by the modal
dovere, has to be maintained in comparing dovere with the inectional
future, which shows a dierent functional pattern. Unlike dovere
innitive the future only expresses generic (3) and not circumstantial (4)
inferences:
(3)
(4)
[Suonano alla porta] Sara` il postino

[The bell rings] It must be (be:fut) the postman3
??[Indicando un ragno] Attento, sara` ancora vivo, perche ho visto
che si muove
[Pointing to a spider] Be careful! It must be (be:fut) still alive, for I
saw it moving
A similar contrast has been pointed out in French (5), where the future is
not grammatical in circumstantial inferences based on external sensory
evidence (for he is tottering with every step), the modal devoir
innitive being instead current in such contexts:
(5)
Au loin on voit apparatre un homme. Il doit etre (*sera) a` bout,

car il chancelle a` chaque pas
A man appears far away. He must be (*be:fut) exhausted, for he
is tottering with every step
(Tasmowski and Dendale 1998: 330)
Tasmowski (2001: 339) has also shown that when external evidence is explicitly missing the opposite distribution can be found, as in (6) and (7),
where only the future (6) is grammatical:
924
(6)
(7)
M. Squartini
On sonne. Je nattendais personne pourtant. C
a sera Jean peut-etre.
[The bell rings] I was not expecting anybody though. Its (be:fut)
J., perhaps
??On sonne. Je nattendais personne pourtant. C
a doit etre Jean.
[The bell rings] I was not expecting anybody though. It must be J.
Nonetheless, reference to external evidence is not obligatory for devoir

innitive, which, like its Italian counterpart, is also grammatical (8) in generic inferential contexts (see also Stage 2003: 207). Also comparable to
Italian is the possibility of interchanging a future in the same context (9):
(8)
(9)
Tiens on sonne a` la porte. C

a doit etre le facteur.
[The bell rings] It must be the postman
(Dendale 1994: 38)
On sonne, ce sera le facteur (Sundell 2003: 224)
[The bell rings] It must be (be:fut) the postman
What Tasmowski (2001: 339) notices with respect to the French inferential markers can also be extended to Italian, for the modal dovere
innitive and the future show the same complementary distribution. As
in French, the Italian future (10), unlike dovere innitive (11), is grammatical in contexts that can be dened as purely conjectural, their basic
feature being that any evidence, both external and based on general world
knowledge, is lacking.
(10)
(11)
[Suonano alla porta] Non aspettavo nessuno; sara` Gianni.

[The bell rings] I was not expecting anybody. It might be (be:fut)
G.
??[Suonano alla porta] Non aspettavo nessuno; deve essere Gianni.
[The bell rings] I was not expecting anybody. It must be G.
The set of Romance data presented so far demonstrates that the general
domain of inferentiality not only includes the distinction between inferred
and assumed knowledge, here labeled as circumstantial and generic inferences, but also comprises pure conjectures, lacking any sensory evidential
basis. With respect to these three semantic functions the modal dovere
innitive and the future show a complex distributional pattern that can be
diagrammed as in Table 1.
As shown in Table 1, the functional distribution of the two grammatical markers considered here is only partially overlapping in expressing generic inferences, while a complementary distribution can be observed as
far as circumstantial inferences and conjectures are concerned. The intermediate position of generic inferences is also derivable from Andersons
(1986: 284) semantic map of evidentiality positing weak inferences
925
Table 1. Form/function correlations in the inferential domain
Future
DOVERE
Circumstantial
inferences
Generic
inferences
Conjectures
(i.e., generic inferences) in the same column between circumstantial inferential and conjectures.
The coexistence of an overlapping area and two functionally divergent
values suggests the interpretation of the relevant functional domain as a
gradient, whose opposite poles are represented by the nonoverlapping
functions, i.e., circumstantial inferences on the one hand and conjectures
on the other. The overlapping area represented by generic inferences can
be conceived as an intermediate functional domain between the two opposite poles:4
Diagram (a)
circumstantial inferences generic inferences conjectures
What is common to the whole gradient is the mode of knowing or type
of evidence (Willett 1988), i.e., the path by which the information was
obtained (Botne 1997: 24). Circumstantial, generic inferences as well as
conjectures are all based on the same mode of knowing, the three of them
being products of the speakers reasoning process and therefore inferential processes. However, the three are dierentiated along a parameter
that is connected to the balance between the speakers involvement as opposed to the import of external evidence. While in one of the two poles
(circumstantial inferences), the speakers own reasoning is heavily supplemented by external sensory evidence, in the opposite pole, all external evidence is missing, the speaker being solely responsible for the reasoning
process. In between, the intermediate area of generic inferences can be
found with a balanced proportion of the speakers own reasoning and external information deriving from general world knowledge.
The distinction between generic and specic (circumstantial in Andersons 1986 terms) inferences permits us to return to the issue raised at
the outset of this section, namely the interpretation of the inferential
markers either as epistemic (expressing the commitment of the speaker
on the factuality of the situation), or as evidential (referring to the source
of the information). In this respect it is important to underline that the
inferential gradient charted in (a) cannot be interpreted as an epistemic
scale directly derived from the factuality of the situation, as proposed in
Frawleys (1992: 413) interpretation of a similar gradient in terms of
926
M. Squartini
strength of knowledge. Obviously, an inferential process based on external sensory evidence corresponds to a stronger epistemic commitment,
while the speakers conjectures, lacking any sensory support, are intrinsically weaker if evaluated on the epistemic scale (Givon 1982). This is
the reason why Dendale (2001: 12), as well as Tasmowski and Dendale
(1998) and Tasmowski (2001: 338339), insist on the noninferential
(therefore nonevidential and exclusively modal) nature of the French future as opposed to the modal devoir. Nevertheless, such a categorial separation does not appear to be borne out by the very fact that the modal
devoir and the inectional future share the same functional domain, as is
demonstrated by their functional overlapping with respect to generic inferences. In the perspective adopted in the present article, the epistemic
scale and the inferential gradient can therefore be considered as two independent dimensions, as already recognized by Anderson (1986: 284), who
presents them as two parallel columns of his semantic map. Given their
parallel distribution, some connections between the two can be admitted,
as is most prominently the case with conjectures, linked to epistemic possibility, while circumstantial inferentials are linked to epistemic certainty
or strong probability. In this perspective French and Italian do not substantially dier from languages with a more consistent evidential system
such as Tariana, in which specic (circumstantial) inferences are considered as more reliable than generic inferences (Aikhenvald 2003b: 140),
due to the intrinsic reliability of sensory evidence. Moreover, the preferential connections between dierent kinds of inferential processes and degrees of epistemic commitment should not be represented as categorial.
As noted by Dendale (2001: 1516) with respect to the French inferential
forms, the interpretation of the epistemic balance between the future and
the modal devoir is not straightforward, so opposite views can be found in
the literature. In principle, the speaker can be totally condent about the
epistemic status of his/her conjectures, as is demonstrated by the fact that
the Italian future can be combined with epistemic adverbs expressing different degrees of factual commitment that span from higher (12) to lower
degrees of certainty (13):
(12)
(13)
[Suonano alla porta] Sara` sicuramente il postino.

[The bell rings] It is (be:fut) certainly the postman
[Suonano alla porta] Forse sara` il postino.
[The bell rings] Perhaps it is (be:fut) the postman
The interaction with the epistemic scale is more cogent if one considers
that the modal dovere, similarly to the French devoir (Tasmowski and
Dendale 1998: 330), is not compatible with the weaker epistemic adverb
forse (14), and only admits a stronger epistemic commitment (15):5

(14)
(15)
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[Suonano alla porta] ??Forse deve essere il postino.

[The bell rings] Perhaps it must be the postman
[Suonano alla porta] Deve essere sicuramente il postino.
[The bell rings] It must certainly be the postman
Nonetheless, data such as (14) and (15) only demonstrate that the inferential gradient is biased by the epistemic scale, particularly aecting the opposite poles of the gradient, but this is not tantamount to interpreting the
whole inferential gradient as epistemic. Otherwise one could not explain
why the Italian future, while being compatible with adverbs denoting a
strong epistemic commitment such as sicuramente in (12), is still incompatible with circumstantial inferential contexts (see [4] above).6 The contrast between (12) and (4) can only be explained assuming that the latter
has a dierent evidential basis (sensory evidence) with respect to the
former.7
The data presented in this section show that Italian makes a categorial distinction between the two opposite poles of what has been called
the inferential gradient. This gradient can be represented as a tension
eld between the speakers most subjective reasoning, where conjectures
originate, and a more objective kind of reasoning based on external evidence.8 An intermediate stage is represented by generic inferences that
are less subjective than conjectures, for they are based on (possibly intersubjective) world knowledge, even though they lack the external validation provided by sensory evidence. Signicantly, the intermediate
status of this kind of inference is conrmed by the behavior of the Italian verb forms under scrutiny that can more freely interchange in such
cases.
In Sections 4 and 5 these results on the grammatical expression of inferentiality will be compared to the lexical means used with the same function, focusing on dierences with respect to form/function correlations.
4.
Lexical expressions of inferentiality
In this section the functional distribution of two lexical items, the adverb
evidentemente evidently and the adverbial construction a quanto pare
apparently, will be presented elaborating on their inferential meaning.
What is most signicant in the spirit of the present article is that the distributional patterns of these lexical items correspond to none of the cases
discussed above, neither to the modal dovere nor to the inectional future.
This raises new issues in the classication of inferentiality that will be discussed at the end of this section as well as in Section 5.
928
M. Squartini
The main dierence with respect to the grammatical markers analyzed

above is that evidentemente and a quanto pare are restricted to the more
objective pole of the inferential gradient. Both lexical forms are grammatical in circumstantial inferential contexts, where external sensory evidence is explicitly available:
(16)
(17)
[Indicando un ragno] Attento, evidentemente e` ancora vivo, perche

ho visto che si muove
[Pointing to a spider] Be careful! Evidently it is still alive, for I
saw it moving
[Indicando un ragno] Attento, a quanto pare e` ancora vivo, perche
ho visto che si muove
[Pointing to a spider] Be careful! Apparently it is still alive, for I
saw it moving
But, unlike the modal dovere, they are not compatible with generic
inferences:
(18)
(19)
[Suonano alla porta] ??Evidentemente e` il postino

[The bell rings] Evidently it is the postman
[Suonano alla porta] ??A quanto pare e` il postino
[The bell rings] Apparently it is the postman
First of all, the functional behavior of the two adverbials provides an independent empirical test of the inferential gradient, whose gradual nature
implies that only uninterrupted stretches of the continuum can be covered
by one form. Thus, if the intermediate area is not covered, as is the case
with the adverbials considered here (18)(19), the implication may be derived that the opposite pole is also barred for these forms (otherwise, the
functional distribution would cover interrupted stretches of the continuum). Such an implicational interpretation of the gradient is conrmed
by the two adverbials, which are only acceptable in the circumstantial inferential (16)(17), but not in the conjectural pole (20)(21):
(20)
(21)
[Suonano alla porta] ??Non aspettavo nessuno; evidentemente e`

Gianni
[The bell rings] I was not awaiting anybody; evidently it is J.
[Suonano alla porta] ??Non aspettavo nessuno; a quanto pare e`
Gianni
[The bell rings] I was not awaiting anybody; apparently it is J.
These data show that the two adverbials partially share the functional domain of dovere innitive, which is conrmed by the possible collocation
of evidentemente (22) and a quanto pare (23) with the modal dovere when
expressing circumstantial inferences:
929
Table 2. Form/function distribution in the inferential domain
future
dovere
evidentemente
a quanto pare
(22)
(23)
Circumstantial
inferences
Generic
inferences
Conjectures

[Indicando un ragno] Attento, evidentemente deve essere ancora

vivo, perche ho visto che si muove
[Pointing to a spider] Be careful! Evidently it must be still alive,
for I saw it moving
[Indicando un ragno] Attento, a quanto pare deve essere ancora
vivo, perche ho visto che si muove
[Pointing to a spider] Be careful! Apparently it must be still alive,
for I saw it moving
In Table 2 the results of this section are summarized showing the dierential behavior of grammatical and lexical means of expressing inferentiality. As mentioned above, the basic result of this comparison is that the
lexical means show a more restricted functional domain concentrating
on the one end of the inferential gradient.
The results charted in Table 2 can be interpreted in dierent ways, but
one point that should be stressed is the non-neutralizing behavior of the
lexical markers vs. the tendency of the grammatical markers to span
over wider stretches of the inferential gradient with neutralizing eects.
Such a distinction can be interpreted both diachronically and synchronically. From a diachronic point of view it is compatible with more general
conclusions on the grammaticalization process of grammatical markers.
A well-known tenet of grammaticalization studies derives from the empirical observation that in most cases the more the grammaticalization proceeds, the more the meaning of the grams involved becomes general (Bybee et al. 1994: 510). Obviously, lexical items are less grammaticalized
than grammatical expressions. Therefore, it is not surprising that the inferential adverbs here presented have a more restrictive meaning than
grammatical markers. These results are also compatible with Traugotts
(1989) account of the grammaticalization of epistemic modality as a process of gradual subjectication, since the adverbials, representing the nongrammaticalized members of the set, also correlate with the most objective pole of the continuum. On the contrary, the most grammaticalized
member of the set, the inectional future, spans over the most subjective
side.
930
M. Squartini
From a synchronic perspective the most interesting point is the dierent behavior of circumstantial inferences with respect to the other semantic functions. It is apparent from Table 2 that circumstantial inferences
are the only kind of inferential processes showing a biunivocal mapping
with a given evidential marker. On the contrary, generic inferences and
conjectures have no biunivocal means of expression, since they are always
combined with other semantic functions: generic inferences can be lumped
together either with circumstantial inferences (dovere innitive) or with
conjectures (future), so that they do not appear separately. Similarly, conjectures only appear combined with generic inferences and never alone.
As far as the semantics of inferences is concerned, this raises a basic question about the nature of circumstantial inferences: What makes them so
semantically distinct, that they can be expressed by dedicated means of
expression?
In the endeavor to nd an answer to this question, a signicant element
can be found in the role of external sensory evidence. As also noted in
Plungian (2001: 352353), the existence of visible traces or signs makes
inferences radically dierent from other reasoning processes, suggesting
a distinction between reasoning-motivated vs. observation-motivated
knowledge. This is a basic dierence if one considers the evidential
meaning of inferentiality: as also suggested by De Haan (2001b: 217
218) circumstantial inferences, being based on sensory evidence, turn out
to be doubly marked as far as evidentiality is concerned. According to De
Haans (2001b) analysis, they are at the same time marked as [ direct],
which refers to their sensory circumstantial basis, and [ firsthand], due
to their nontestimonial nature. Nevertheless, circumstantial inferences
can also be described as doubly marked for they elaborate on a double
source: not only the speaker as initiator of the reasoning process, but
also the external source of evidence from which the reasoning process
derives. This is radically dierent from the evidential mechanism of the
other kinds of reected evidence (Plungian 2001: 353), for generic inferences and conjectures are only based on the speakers own reasoning excluding external evidence. My suggestion in order to make sense out of
this distinction is to capitalize on the interaction between the mode of
knowing and the source of evidence, as already suggested in Botne
(1997) and Squartini (2001).9 What all the members of the inferential gradient have in common is the cognitive process on which the utterance is
based, in all cases being some form of the speakers inferential reasoning.
This means that they share the same mode of knowing, even if they dier
as far as the source of the evidence is concerned, with circumstantial inferences crucially involving an external source.10 Elaborating on Frawleys (1992: 413) distinction between the two basic sources, self and
931
other, it is possible to conclude that circumstantial inferences are marked

both by the feature [ other], representing the external sensory evidence,
and by the feature [ self], representing the role of the speakers own reasoning. On the contrary, generic inferences and conjectures, being only
the product of the speakers own reasoning, can be described as simply
[ self]. The dierence is represented in Diagram (b), which is a modied
version of the inferential gradient presented in Diagram (a) above.
Diagram (b)
circumstantial inferences
[ other]/[ self]
generic inferences conjectures

[ self]
[ self]
The representation given in Diagram (b) corresponds to an unorthodox

use of Frawleys (1992) categorization, for in his model any inferential
process is conated into the category self, but the data presented in Sections 34 demonstrate the peculiarities of circumstantial inferences urging
a revised interpretation of the distinction between self and other. Focusing on the dierent source of evidence of circumstantial inferences as opposed to generic inferences and conjectures is not tantamount to neglecting what they have in common, for, unlike Frawley, the notion of source
of evidence is supplemented by another evidential category, the mode of
knowing, since the three kinds of mental processes considered here are ultimately all conceivable as inferences.
Even if a distinction between the mode of knowing or type of evidence
and source of evidence has been proposed in Botne (1997) most classications tend to implicitly or explicitly neglect it. Instead of considering the
two as dierent interacting dimensions, classicational models have been
generally preferred in which one of the two dimensions is considered as
the basic organizational principle. This has also led to divergent structures depending on whichever dimension has been considered as prevalent. Thus, Frawleys (1992: 413) account, which is based on the preliminary distinction between internal (self) and external (other) sources of
evidence, diers from Willetts (1988: 57) model, which elaborates on the
primary branching of direct and indirect type of evidence (see also Squartini 2001 for a comparative appraisal of the two classicational models).
The crucial point is that none of these models can adequately represent
the special nature of circumstantial inferences, empirically demonstrated
by the data presented in Sections 34. Circumstantial inferences challenge
Willetts (1988) model since they are at the same time denable as a case
of direct evidence (the sensory evidence directly perceived by the speaker)
and indirect (as inferences they are indirectly produced by the speakers
own reasoning). As mentioned above, Frawleys classication also proves
inadequate, for circumstantial inferences are simultaneously expression of
932
M. Squartini
the category self (as inferential processes produced by the speaker) and
the other (as based on external sensory evidence). In such a deadlock,
the solution here proposed envisages a combination of Willetts type of
evidence and Frawleys source of evidence, which can account for the peculiarities of circumstantial inferences marked as [ other] and at the
same time expressing an indirect mode of knowing. In Section 5 additional empirical arguments will be provided conrming the role of the
feature [ other] in the functional distribution of one of the lexical items
here considered (a quanto pare) and corroborating the hypothesis of a
multifarious account in which the source of evidence and the mode of
knowing can be conceived as two interacting dimensions.
5.
Inferences, reports, and the feature [B other]
The data presented in Section 4 demonstrate that the two lexical items
considered here, a quanto pare and evidentemente, cover the same functional stretch of the inferential gradient, being both restricted to circumstantial inferences. However, if the whole evidential domain is taken into
account, the functional distribution of the two adverbs turns out to be
distinct. In particular, a quanto pare is also compatible with reports (24),
while evidentemente disallows them (25).11 This property is tested in (24
25) using the collocation of the two adverbs with the inectional form of
the conditional, whose evidential reportative function has been repeatedly
pointed out in Romance (see Dendale 1993 among others and the discussion in Section 6 below):
(24)
(25)
A quanto pare il presidente sarebbe scomparso: lo dicono i giornali

Apparently the president has disappeared (be:cond disappeared):
that is what the newspapers say
??Evidentemente il presidente sarebbe scomparso: lo dicono i
giornali
Evidently the president has disappeared (be:cond disappeared):
that is what the newspapers say
The behavior of a quanto pare, neutralizing the distinction between inferences and reports, is not surprising, if one considers that some of the
corresponding adverbials in other languages show the same neutralization pattern. The French adverb apparemment, mentioned by Lazard
(2000: 214) in his list of French evidential lexemes, has been proved in
Ramat (1996: 293) as occurring as a reportative (corresponding to English allegedly) as well as an inferential marker (English evidently), and
the same neutralization is also demonstrated in Ramats data by the Irish
933
construction is cosuil. However, apart from Dendale (1994: 37), who incidentally notes the dierent behavior of the French adverb apparemment
as opposed to the modal devoir, what has not been focused on is that the
distributional patterns of a quanto pare and similar adverbs in other languages do not cover the whole domain of inferentiality, being restricted
to circumstantial inferences. Now, the distributional pattern of a quanto
pare can be connected to the conclusions reached in Section 4 with respect
to the interaction of the source of evidence and the mode of knowing.
Being restricted to circumstantial inferences, a quanto pare can be considered as marked with the feature [ other]. Thus, it is not surprising
that it also expresses reports, which, being based on external evidence,
can also be dened as [ other]. Such a characterization of reports as
[ other] is obviously compatible with Frawleys (1992: 413) original account, in which they are primary representatives of his category other.
What Frawley does not recognize is the role of the category other as a
way of connecting reports and circumstantial inferences, provided that in
his model the latter depend on the category self. Although a dierent terminology and a dierent model are used, such a connection is recognized
in Plungian (2001: 352), who suggests treating reports as a special case of
inferences, which he describes as synchronic inference: instead of having access to sensory evidence, as is the case in retrospective inferences,
the speaker reports a synchronic indication gathered from other people.
While in Plungian (2001) this is only a working hypothesis, his nal
model preferring a solution in which reports are separated from inferences (Plungian 2001: 353), the solution proposed here maintains the connection throughout, considering it as another instance of the interaction
between the mode of knowing and the source of evidence. In this perspective the neutralization pattern shown by a quanto pare can be described
as a spread of the feature [ other] across dierent modes of knowing,
including all cases based on an external source of evidence, i.e., circumstantial inferences and reports, and excluding those lacking it, i.e., generic inferences and conjectures. If compared to a quanto pare, the nonneutralizing behavior of evidentemente can be deemed as conrming
the independence of the source of evidence and the mode of knowing.
While a quanto pare can be described exclusively by means of the feature
[ other], irrespective of the mode of knowing, evidentemente requires a
double descriptive label, including reference to the mode of knowing (inference) and the source (other).
The neutralization of inferences and reports characterizing a quanto
pare also conrms the internal aws of most current classicational models of evidentiality, making their deciencies even more apparent than
in the conclusions of Section 4. The problems noted in Section 4 with
934
M. Squartini
respect to Willetts (1988) and Frawleys (1992) models basically derive

from the inaccurate account of the special nature of circumstantial inferences, which makes it impossible to single them out from the rest of the
inferential gradient. The additional problem made apparent by the data
presented in this section is that a quanto pare also requires a model that
accounts for the neutralization of circumstantial inferences and reports.
Deriving such a neutralization pattern from Willetts and Frawleys accounts is made impossible by the same structural reasons that hinder the
singling out of circumstantial inferences. Since all kinds of inferences are
dominated by the same hierarchical node, the node labeled inferring in
Willett (1988: 57) and the node self in Frawley (1992: 413), any neutralization pattern including other modes of knowing necessarily comprises
the whole inferential gradient, which is not desirable since the neutralization pattern demonstrated by a quanto pare only aects circumstantial inferences, excluding other kinds of inferential reasoning.
To sum up, the data presented here can be considered a challenge to the
hierarchical structure that characterizes the current classicational models
of evidentiality, urging revisions that could allow us to disentangle the
role of circumstantial inferences. In a sense, Plungians (2001: 353) classication can be considered a revision of the unidirectional hierarchical
models represented by Willetts (1988) and Frawleys (1992). The main
novelty in Plungians (2001: 353) classication is that it can be interpreted
both top down and bottom up: in the former case the main hierarchical
distinction is between direct vs. indirect evidence, while in the latter there
is the basic opposition of personal (speakers own) evidence vs. mediated
evidence. Nonetheless, Plungians (2001) model, although less rigid than
Willetts and Frawleys in its bidimensional orientation, is still incompatible with the behavior of the adverbial a quanto pare, for Plungians reected evidence comprises the whole inferential gradient (inferentials and
presumptives), so that circumstantial inferences cannot be singled out and
connected to mediated evidence (reports).12
The disadvantages of the hierarchical models presented so far could be
avoided radically, i.e., by dismissing any hierarchical layering and treating all evidential types as an unlayered set of meanings which can be organized and neutralized without restrictions. In a sense, this is the path
taken by Aikhenvald (2003a: 35), who distinguishes dierent language
types according to the neutralizations empirically attested in her sample
without proposing any principled and unitary model. Thus, Aikhenvalds
(2003a) model does not exclude a priori the possibility of an evidential
marker covering reports and circumstantial inferences, which in fact
corresponds to her denition of nonrsthand that typically covers inference based on visible traces and reported information (Aikhenvald
935
2003a: 4). Nonetheless, the totally nonhierarchical model proposed by Aikhenvald (2003a) has the disadvantage of not providing any principled
account of preferable form/function correlations, making any neutralization pattern equally possible. On the contrary, the solution proposed here
is based on the assumption that a hierarchical model such as Willetts or
Frawleys can be maintained, provided that it is conceived as covering
only one dimension of evidentiality (either the mode of knowing or the
source of evidence), while the other dimension is considered to be independently interacting.
The above discussion was intended to demonstrate the empirical adequacy of a system based on the distinction between the source of evidence
and the mode of knowing. Actually, the whole argument can be considered as awed by one of its major prerequisites, i.e., the assumption that
lexical and grammatical markers of evidentiality should be accounted for
by one and the same model. Nonetheless, the basic empirical result remains that the major classicational models proposed for grammatical
markings of evidentiality cannot account for the functional distribution
of a lexical item such as the Italian a quanto pare. Moreover, as is apparent from the denition of Aikhenvalds (2003a: 4) nonrsthand mentioned above, the neutralization of reports and circumstantial inferences
is also a typical feature of grammatical markings of evidentiality, which
makes a revision of the current classicational models even more urgent.
Further research is needed in order to verify the wider typological coverage of the interactional model proposed here. In the meantime, the discussion in the next section will demonstrate that the interaction of the
mode of knowing and the source of evidence not only accounts for the
behavior of a quanto pare, but is also more adequate in accounting for
some peculiarities of the Romance grammatical system.
6.
Inference, reports and the feature [C self]
The basic result of the discussion on a quanto pare is that the source of
evidence and the mode of knowing are two independent dimensions, possibly interacting one with the other. This implies that none of the recognized modes of knowing (inferences and reports) is totally equivalent to
one given source of evidence, as postulated in Frawleys (1992: 413) classication, where all inferential processes are derived from the self source,
while all reports are derived from the category other. This result has
been made apparent considering an evidential lexical marker crosscutting
the distinction between inferences and reports. In order to demonstrate
that similar conclusions can also be extended to grammatical markers,
936
M. Squartini
the analysis will now focus on a form that also shows a neutralization
pattern of inferences and reports. This is the case of the French conditional (26) whose reportative evidential function has often been pointed
out, either as a proper evidential marker (Dendale 1993) or as a mixed
marker expressing both evidential and modal meaning (Kronning 2003).
(26)
Aux dernie`res informations, les concurrents auraient franchi le Cap

Horn (Charaudeau 1992: 464)
According to the latest information, the competitors have rounded
(have:cond rounded) Cape Horn
The French conditional also has an inferential function, whose evidential

meaning has been explicitly noted in Tasmowski (2001). A signicant
point is that the inferential conditional is restricted to questions (27),
which makes its distribution dierent from other French inferential
markers mentioned above:
(27)
On sonne; serait-ce Geraldine?

[The bell rings] Is (be:cond) it G.?
(Melis 2001: 75)
Interestingly this neutralizes the distinction between inferences and reports in questions, given that the conditional also occurs in questions
with the speaker reporting an opinion attributed to the addressee, who is
asked for conrmation:
(28)
Ce que vous dites est terrible: langoisse serait le prix a` payer

pour lemancipation de lindividu?
What you are saying is terrible: is (be:cond) anguish the price to
pay for the individuals emancipation?
(Le Nouvel Observateur 1634, 1996: 14, Haillet 2001: 319)
The dierent function of the conditional in (27) and (28) is demonstrated

by a comparison with Italian in which the two contexts are not neutralized by the same form, a conditional being required in the reportative
question (30), while a dierent inferential marker (the future) occurs in
(29). As shown in (2930), the two forms have a complementary distribution in these contexts (see also Jensen 2000: 1279), which makes them
uninterchangeable.
(29)
(30)
Suonano. Sara` (*sarebbe) G.?

[The bell rings] Is (be:fut/*be:cond) it G.?
Cio` che lei dice e` terribile: langoscia sarebbe (*sara`) il prezzo
da pagare per lemancipazione dellindividuo?
What you are saying is terrible: is (be:cond/*be:fut)13 anguish
the price to pay for the individuals emancipation?
937
The comparative appraisal of French and Italian requires a classicational model of evidentiality allowing for the divergent behavior of the
two languages. Since in French the two functions (reports and inferences)
are neutralized, they need to have something in common, but, at the same
time, since they are expressed by dierent forms in Italian, the classication should also account for the divergences between the context in (29)
and the one in (30). Drawing a lesson from the results of Sections 4 and
5 it could be noted that the dierence between French and Italian cannot
be grasped using only Willetts (1988) category of indirect (type of ) evidence. Proceeding from Willett one could conclude that the French conditional neutralizes the distinction between inferences and reports, being
denable as a general marker of indirectivity. In a sense this is correct
and permits us to highlight the dierent behavior of the Italian conditional, which, unlike its French counterpart is restricted to one single
function (report) not extending to the whole domain of indirectivity.
Nonetheless, this cannot comprehensively account for the behavior of
the French conditional, which, as noticed above, does not neutralize the
whole set of functions connected to inferentiality. Indeed, the French conditional is only admitted in direct and indirect (Korzen and Nlke 2001:
142) questions, but not in declarative sentences (32), where other inferential markers are required (31).
(31)
(32)
Max doit etre la`: je vois sa voiture

M. must be there: I see his car
(Leeman 2001: 226227)
??Max serait la`: je vois sa voiture
M. is (be:cond) there: I see his car
(Leeman 2001: 226227)
Due to these restrictions, the French conditional cannot be simply dened

as a general marker of indirect evidence covering all kinds of reports and
inferences. In this respect, a parallelism can be found with the behavior of
a quanto pare, that shows a neutralization pattern covering reports and
only a subset of the inferential domain. As shown above, this makes it impossible to account for it in a hierarchical model such as Willetts (1988)
and Frawleys (1992), in which the whole inferential domain is totally
contained under the general category of indirect evidence (Willett 1988)
or self (Frawley 1992). Similarly, the French conditional covers reports
and only some inferences (those embedded in a question), which makes
it equally incompatible with a hierarchical model including all inferences
under the same overarching category. The puzzle concerning the behavior
of a quanto pare was solved above by disentangling the notion of source
of evidence from the mode of knowing. The same procedure will now be
938
M. Squartini
followed in an attempt to nd a solution that may account for the distribution of the French conditional.
It must be admitted that the results reached on the behavior of a quanto
pare cannot be extended as such to the French conditional, the way the
latter crosscuts the inferential gradient being dierent from the former.
As shown in Section 4, the adverbial a quanto pare is restricted to circumstantial inferences, which are distinguished by the feature [ other]. On
the contrary, the French conditional occurs in generic inferential (33)
and purely conjectural contexts (34):
(33)
(34)
On sonne; serait-ce Geraldine?

[The bell rings] Is (be:cond) it G.?
(Melis 2001: 75)
On sonne. Je nattendais personne pourtant. Serait-ce Jean
peut-etre?
[The bell rings] I was not expecting anybody. Is (be:cond) it J,
perhaps?
(Tasmowski 2001: 339)
However, as repeatedly pointed out (Diller 1977; Haillet 2001) the conditional is also compatible with inferential processes based on sensory evidence, thus spanning the whole inferential gradient.
(35)
Aurait-il froid, que je le vois si transi?

Is (have:cond) he cold, for I see him so numbed
(Tasmowski 2001: 338)
Due to the absence of restrictions, it would make no sense to use the feature [ other], which in connection with inferences accounts for the restriction to external sensory evidence, as is the case with a quanto pare.
However, what the French conditional has in common with a quanto
pare is the connection with the source of evidence. As noted by Aikhenvald (2003b: 144145), The use of an evidential in a question presupposes the questioners assumption about the answerers source of information. Therefore, if an inferential marker occurs in a question, the
questioner assumes that the answerer will be able to produce an inferential statement. More generally speaking, a question involves a switch of
the evidential responsibility from the questioner to the answerer, the former explicitly negating its role as the source of the information. This is a
marked conguration in which the speaker ceases to be the source of the
information, as is the default case, attributing it to the addressee. Using
Frawleys features [other]/[self] such a conguration can be described
as [ self], indicating that the speaker has given up his/her role as the
source of the information. In this perspective, the divergent behavior of
939
French and Italian could be explained as follows: the French conditional

is a marker of the source of evidence sensitive to the feature [ self],
while the Italian conditional as reportative marker is sensitive to the other
dimension of evidentiality, the mode of knowing. This explains why the
Italian conditional is restricted to one given mode of knowing (reports),
while the French conditional is more generally compatible with any functions characterized by the feature [ self], irrespective of the mode of
knowing (either inferences or reports).
One consequence of this analysis is that reports can be described either as [ other] or as [ self] depending on what source of evidence is
concerned. This forces us to consider the category report as internally
structured in order to admit dierent reportative submodes, which is
not surprising if one considers that most classications distinguish dierent kinds of reports (see among others Frawley 1992: 413 distinguishing
quote, report, hearsay, etc.). Particularly interesting from my point of
view is Aikhenvalds (2003a: 15, 2004: 5051, 177178) subdistinction
between reported or hearsay and quotative, distinctive elements being
the degree of accuracy of the speaker in reporting anothers utterances
and, what is mostly relevant, in stating the exact authorship of the report. Unlike quotatives, proper reports do not necessarily indicate the
exact source, thus admitting a lower degree of accuracy and frequently
acquiring an overtone of information the speaker does not vouch for
(Aikhenvald 2003a: 15, 2004: 179186).14 In my interpretation this overtone is not an epistemic extension, but rather a dierent evidential
function: the speaker explicitly distances him/herself from the informational content of the utterance by stressing his/her role as the nonsource
[ self]. On the contrary, the feature [ other] could cover the case described by Aikhenvald (2003a: 15) as quotative, in which the speaker
accurately reports other utterances, without overmarking any evidential
distance.15
The interpretation of the French conditional as a way of marking some
form of distance with respect to the informational content of the utterance is current in most analyses of the evidential status of this form: Vetters (2001: 198199) particularly insists on the refusal of the prise en
charge enonciative as the main semantic element of the French reportative conditional and, even more explicitly, Tasmoswki (2001: 342) considers the non-prise en charge enonciative as the common element linking
the reportative conditional and the inferential conditional in questions.
From this point of view the analysis proposed here is totally compatible
with Tasmowskis (2001) conclusions on the common evidential status of
these two uses of the French conditional. Still, my analysis diers from
Tasmowskis with respect to the semantic interpretation of what she calls
940
M. Squartini
the non-prise en charge enonciative, since Tasmowski (2001: 340) considers the speaker to be the source of the information in the inferential use
of the French conditional in (27), which is obviously in contrast with the
idea of labeling this use as [ self]. Actually, Tasmowskis assumption is
totally compatible with some occurrences of the French inferential conditional, such as (36), in which the speaker uses the conditional in order to
express his/her own inference. In this particular case it would make no
sense to consider the addressee as the source of the information, for he
actually knows whether his wife is out of town or not and cannot be expected to produce an inference on a piece of information that he knows as
a fact.
(36)
X: Ta femme serait-elle absente?

Y: Quest-ce qui te fait croire ca?
X: Eh bien! Il manque un bouton a` ta chemise et tu as une tache
de jaune doeuf sur ta cravate
X: Is (be:cond) your wife out of town?
Y: What makes you think that?
X: Well, one of your shirt buttons is missing and you have an egg
yolk stain on your tie
(from Diller 1977: 5)
Interestingly, the comparison with Italian provides additional clues in

order to detect the peculiar nature of a context such as (36) as opposed
to more canonical uses of the conditional in (27). The signicant comparative point is that Italian does not admit any inferential verb form in a
context such as (36). Obviously the conditional cannot occur in (36), this
being due to the nonexistence of inferential conditional in Italian as opposed to French (see [29] and [30] above). What is more relevant is that,
unlike (29), where the French conditional can be translated by an Italian
conjectural future, in (36) the future (Sara` via tua moglie? Is (be:fut)
your wife out of town?) is barred. The Italian conjectural future becomes
grammatical only if a canonical inferential context is restored, i.e., if the
context makes it clear that the speaker attributes to the addressee the
role of source in the inferential process (Che pensi, sara` via tua moglie?
What do you think? Is (be:fut) your wife out of town?). The comparison
of French and Italian makes it apparent that (36) is not a canonical context of questioned inferences. It can be regarded rather as a pragmatic
extension of the inferential conditional towards the direction of a mirative usage expressing surprise with respect to new or unexpected information (DeLancey 1997, 2001; Lazard 1999). The point made here is that,
apart from noncanonical extension, the French conditional occurring in
proper inferential questions, can be interpreted as shifting the evidential
941
source from the speaker to the addressee, thus making the label [ self]
reasonable.
7.
Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that the study of the lexical expression of
evidentiality is not only signicant from a diachronic point of view, i.e.,
with respect to the grammaticalization path of evidential markers (Aikhenvald 2003a: 26), but it is also synchronically relevant in determining
a consistent classicational model of evidentiality as a linguistic category.
Crucially elaborating on the unitary treatment of lexical and grammatical
markings, the above discussion has focused mainly on the inferential subdomain of evidentiality, investigating its internal structure. The data presented have demonstrated the internal partition of the inferential gradient
ranging from circumstantial inferences to conjectures and including generic inferences as an intermediate step. More signicantly, a preferential
connection between circumstantial inferences and reports was demonstrated, challenging most current classications of evidentiality and providing further evidence in favor of a distinction between the mode of
knowing and the source of evidence. More research is now needed in order to test the explanatory adequacy of such a bidimensional model with
respect to the internal structure of reports. The behavior of the Romance
conditional suggests that some subdistinctions in the reportative area, including preferential neutralization patterns with other evidential domains,
can also be accounted for by postulating an interaction between the
source of evidence and the mode of knowing.
Received 30 July 2004
Revised version received
23 January 2006
University of Turin
Notes
*
I am indebted to two anonymous referees for their most valuable comments. This research was funded by the FIRB 20032005 grant Litaliano nella varieta` dei testi
directed by Carla Marello (Universita` di Torino). Correspondence address: Mario
Squartini, Dipartimento di Scienze del Linguaggio e Letterature moderne e comparate, Universita` di Torino, Via S. Ottavio 20, I-10124 Torino, Italy. E-mail: mario.
squartini@unito.it.
1. Although in this article attention will be paid mainly to French and Italian, some
generalizations on the grammatical expression of evidentiality can also be extended to
942
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
M. Squartini
Ibero-Romance languages (see Squartini 2001). As for Ibero-Romance, see also Costa
Campos (2003), Cornillie (2004), Haler (2002, 2003).
See Squartini (2005) for a comparison of French and Italian with Rumanian, the only
Romance language with clear grammatical markers dedicated to evidentiality (Friedman 2003: 212213).
Abbreviations used: fut Future, cond Conditional.
This inferential gradient expands on the current typological distinction between generic
and circumstantial inferences, adding conjectures as an opposite pole with respect to
circumstantial inferences. Nonetheless, this does not exclude that a wider typological
application of the gradient might require subtler distinctions in the inferential domain
(see the case of Kashaya in Oswalt 1986: 3839, 4142), especially in languages that
mark the type of sensory evidence (visual, auditory, etc.) for directly perceived situations (see the discussion in Anderson 1986: 279280).
Pietrandrea (2004: 188) mentions some marginal cases showing collocations of dovere
with forse perhaps, which require further research.
Elaborating on similar French data Tasmowski and Dendale (1998: 330) suggest that
the epistemic notion of certainty can be interpreted either with respect to the speakers
condence or to the communicated message, the French future expressing the former
kind of certainty and devoir innitive the latter. However, referring to the speaker
as the locus where the condence expressed by the future is formed is equivalent to admitting a dierent source as opposed to the external, and potentially objective, sensory
evidence on which the judgment expressed by devoir innitive is based.
Other evidence showing that the distribution of the epistemic adverb sicuramente is
independent from the evidential interpretation of the future can be found in (iii),
which demonstrate that sicuramente, unlike the future, is not sensitive to the evidential
source available, being compatible both with circumstantial (i) and generic inferences
(ii):
[Indicando un ragno] Attento, e` sicuramente ancora vivo, perche ho visto che si
muove
[Pointing to a spider] Be careful! It is certainly still alive, for I saw it moving
(ii) [Suonano alla porta] E` sicuramente il postino.
[The doorbell rings] It is certainly the postman.
(i)
8. Recognizing a sort of objectivity ranking of evidential sources is not tantamount to interpreting them as epistemic: dierent sources can be ranked on an evidential scale that
is independent from the epistemic scale of certainty (see Oswalt 1986: 3839). See also
Nuyts (2001a: 3435, 2001b), introducing the notion of intersubjective evidentiality.
9. As noted by an anonymous referee the distinction between mode of knowing and
source of evidence is dicult to apply to the grammatical expression of direct evidence,
due to the intrinsic connection between the source itself (visual, auditory, etc.) and the
way it is acquired (vision, audition, etc.). Nonetheless, the distinction can be more
safely applied to the speakers internal cognitive processes such as inferences, which,
being based on indirect sources of evidence (Willet 1988), involve two dierent dimensions: the inferential process itself (corresponding to the mode of knowing) and the
source on which the speaker bases the cognitive process (external sensory source, logical expectations, etc.).
10. Actually, any inferential process involves some form of external input internally elaborated by the speaker. However, circumstantial inferences still dier from other types of
inferential reasoning, due to the necessary requirement of an additional external source
based on a posteriori evidence (retrospective evidence in Plungian 2001: 352353).
943
11. Apart from the adverb asseritamente, which only occurs in juristic specialized texts
(Venier 1991: 34), in standard colloquial Italian there is no adverb restricted to reportative contexts such as English allegedly, reportedly or French pretendument (Njgaard
19921995: 235236).
12. As noted above, a way of singling out sensory evidence inferences connecting them to
reports (described as synchronic inferences) is tentatively proposed in Plungian (2001:
353), but the suggestion is ultimately dropped in favor of his alternative nal model.
13. The future becomes grammatical in Italian if temporal reference is shifted to the deictic
future, while the conditional in (30) can also refer to the deictic present.
14. Note, however, that this is only a possible extension of the distinction: as also noted by
Aikhenvald (2003a: 6, 2004: 5859) subtypes of reportivity can be distinguished on a
dierent basis (see also Anderson 1986: 289), as is the case of the opposition between
reported (1) and reported (2) in Uto-Aztecan (previously known to the hearer vs.
previously unknown to the hearer, Willett 1991: 161166). This presupposes a pragmatic interpretation (old vs. new information) of reportative evidentials, on which see
also Blass (1989). Furthermore, two dierent reportative markers in one language may
also be distinguished on a textual and genre-sensitive basis, one of the two forms only
occurring in narratives (myths or stories), as is the case in Tonkawa (Aikhenvald 2004:
51).
15. Palmers (1986: 70, 73) distinction between quotative and report, based on data from
Hidatsa, partially overlaps Aikhenvalds (2003a: 15) opposition, even though in Palmer
the main focus is on the intersubjective nature of quotatives (the speaker regards
what he has said to be something that everyone knows, i.e., including the speaker) as
opposed to the totally external character of reports (information given by someone
else, i.e., originally not shared by the speaker). For a distinction between subjective
and intersubjective evidentiality see Nuyts (2001a: 3435, 2001b).
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Lexical vs.

The evidential vogue

2003a: 2, 1820). Lazard (2000: 214, 2001), as well as Aikhenvald (2003a:

Evidentiality in French and Italian

Preliminaries on grammatical evidentiality and evidentiality strategies

Evidentiality in French and Italian

raises an additional preliminary question concerning their status as part

The inferential gradient

1998: 8586), admit their intermediate status as a case of interaction with

[Indicando un ragno] Attento, deve essere ancora vivo, perche ho

The context in (1) is a type of reasoning which, acknowledging Anderson

[Suonano alla porta] Deve essere il postino

Evidentiality in French and Italian

evidence in (2), is mentioned in typological descriptions of evidential

[Suonano alla porta] Sara` il postino

Au loin on voit apparatre un homme. Il doit etre (*sera) a` bout,

Nonetheless, reference to external evidence is not obligatory for devoir

Tiens on sonne a` la porte. C

[Suonano alla porta] Non aspettavo nessuno; sara` Gianni.

Evidentiality in French and Italian

Table 1. Form/function correlations in the inferential domain

[Suonano alla porta] Sara` sicuramente il postino.

Evidentiality in French and Italian

[Suonano alla porta] ??Forse deve essere il postino.

Lexical expressions of inferentiality

The main dierence with respect to the grammatical markers analyzed

[Indicando un ragno] Attento, evidentemente e` ancora vivo, perche

[Suonano alla porta] ??Evidentemente e` il postino

[Suonano alla porta] ??Non aspettavo nessuno; evidentemente e`

Evidentiality in French and Italian

Table 2. Form/function distribution in the inferential domain

[Indicando un ragno] Attento, evidentemente deve essere ancora

Evidentiality in French and Italian

other, it is possible to conclude that circumstantial inferences are marked

generic inferences conjectures

The representation given in Diagram (b) corresponds to an unorthodox

Inferences, reports, and the feature [B other]

A quanto pare il presidente sarebbe scomparso: lo dicono i giornali

Evidentiality in French and Italian

respect to Willetts (1988) and Frawleys (1992) models basically derive

Evidentiality in French and Italian

Inference, reports and the feature [C self]

Aux dernie`res informations, les concurrents auraient franchi le Cap

The French conditional also has an inferential function, whose evidential

On sonne; serait-ce Geraldine?

Ce que vous dites est terrible: langoisse serait le prix a` payer

The dierent function of the conditional in (27) and (28) is demonstrated

Suonano. Sara` (*sarebbe) G.?

Evidentiality in French and Italian

Max doit etre la`: je vois sa voiture

Due to these restrictions, the French conditional cannot be simply dened

On sonne; serait-ce Geraldine?

Aurait-il froid, que je le vois si transi?

Evidentiality in French and Italian

French and Italian could be explained as follows: the French conditional

X: Ta femme serait-elle absente?

Interestingly, the comparison with Italian provides additional clues in

Evidentiality in French and Italian

Evidentiality in French and Italian

Evidentiality in French and Italian

Dickinson, Connie (2000). Mirativity in Tsaki. Studies in Language 24, 379421.

Evidentiality in French and Italian

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