Socit qubcoise de science politique

Gramsci and Democracy

Author(s): Esteve Morera
Source: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 23,
No. 1 (Mar., 1990), pp. 23-37
Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Socit qubcoise de science
politique
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Gramsci and Democracy

ESTEVE MORERA

York University

Introduction
It is widely accepted that Antonio Gramsci's Quaderni del Carcere
contains a novel theory of politics whose central concept is that of
hegemony. The importance of this concept for political activity lies in its
having placed on the agenda the concept of democracy and the
possibility of a democratic road to socialism.l Although the political
importance of Gramsci as a critic of economism and a precursor of
democratic socialism is generally accepted, the theoretical approach to
his thought is by no means clear.
There are many different approaches to the way in which Gramsci
should be interpreted or appropriated. On the one hand, his remarks on
historicism have given rise to an idealist interpretation of the Quaderni
del Carcere, following either Hegelian or Crocean versions, although
some have also seen Husserlian themes in them.2 Laclau and Mouffe, on
the other hand, have emphasized the possibility of a non-essentialist
discourse deriving from the concept of hegemony.3 I believe that many
of these approaches have misconstrued Gramsci's conception of
historicism and have often, and rather simplistically, based their
analyses on the principle that similarity of terms means similarity of
concepts.4 I shall not discuss these issues here; my purpose in this article
1 Frank Cunningham, Democratic Theory and Socialism (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987), 8-9.
2 See, for instance, Thomas Nemeth, Gramsci's Philosophy: A Critical Study (Atlantic
City: Humanities Press, 1980); Jose Nun, "Elementos para una Teoria de la
Democracia: Gramsci y el Sentido Comun," Revista Mexicana de Sociologia 49
(1987), 21-54.
3 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, trans. by
Winston Moore and Paul Cammack (London: Verso, 1985).
4 See Esteve Morera, Gramzsci's Historicism (London: Routledge, 1990), especially
chaps. 1 and 2, for a discussion of the relevant literature and an interpretation of
Gramsci's thought in the Qliade-rni.
Esteve Morera, Department of Political Science. York University, North York, Ontario
M3J 1P3
Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, XXIII:1 (March/mars
1990). Printed in Canada / Imprime au Canada

24

ESTEVE

MORERA

is merely to offer a general outline of the main elements in Gramsci's

prison work that are indicative of a theory of democracy which Gramsci
did not make explicit, but which seems to be implicit in some of his social
and political theories.
The Pedagogical Relationship of Intellectuals and Masses
In a well-known passage on philosophy, Gramsci claims that "Everyone
is a philosopher, although in his own way, unconsciously, because even
in the slightest manifestation of any intellectual activity, in language,
there is contained a determined conception of the world."5 The mere
existence of a philosophy which is manifested in such shared attributes
as language, taste and common sense is not sufficient for a politics of
consensus, much less for progressive political activity. That is,
Gramsci's conception of hegemony, or of moral and intellectual leadership, is not to be reduced to a liberal view of the consensual basis of the
state; for Gramsci, the meaning of consensus is not to be found in the
apparent willingness of an individual to accept certain views and to
engage in certain activities, but rather in the conditions for that
willingness to be present.
The problem of the creation of a new hegemony is that of
elaborating a critical and self-conscious conception of the world and
thus confronting the prevalent world view," 'mechanically' imposed by
the external environment."6 This critical distance, however, is not
easily gained; it necessitates a process of learning and, inevitably, it
brings into focus the question of the control over this process, of the
relation between intellectuals and the masses. From the point of view of
liberal democracy, of course, there is no problem; at least it is not one in
real terms given the emphasis on free speech and the availability of
information, although little concern is shown for the ideological basis of
the existing information. For non-liberal democrats, in particular for
socialists, there are two ways of approaching this problem: one may
attempt to illuminate the masses or, according to the alternative
suggested by Gramsci, engage the masses in a process of critical
development that will result in a more coherent, deeper, and realist
conception of the world. The first alternative requires the existence of
organizations and a cadre of intellectuals whose role it is to educate, to
Antonio Gramsci, Qiladerli del Carcere, ed. by Valentino Gerratana, 3 vols. (Turin:
Einaudi Editore, 1975), Vol. 2, 1375. For an English translation, see Antonio
Gramsci, Selections fiom the Prison Notebooks, trans. and ed. by Quintin Hoare and
Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 323. In
subsequent references to the Quaderni the corresponding page references in this
English translation will be given in parentheses.
6 Ibid., 1375-76 (323).

Abstract. In the Quaderni del Carcere, Antonio Gramsci provided the foundations for a
socialist theory of democracy. This theory can be drawn from some of Gramsci's most
important concepts: his views of intellectual activity on the one hand, and the conceptions
of hegemony and civil society on the other. The former provides a general conception
of a non-bureaucratic relationship between leaders and the led, the latter points to a
participatory model of political activity. This thesis, however, is formulated within the
framework of a realist epistemology in which the class structure is conceived as the
long-term determinant of the general historical process. Hence, although Gramsci's
thought sheds new light on a non-class domain of political activity, it is constrained by both
socio-economic conditions and the realism of available knowledge.
Resume. Dans les Quaderni del Carcere, Antonio Gramsci apporte, fondement, pour
une theorie socialiste de la democratie. Cette theorie peut se deduire de certains concepts
les plus importants de Gramsci: celui, d'une part, de l'activite intellectuelle, et, de l'autre,
ceux de l'hegemonie et de la societe civile. Le premier offre une conception generale des
rapports non-bureaucratiques entre les dirigeants et la base; les derniers prefigurent un
modele de participation a l'activite politique. Cette these pourtant se formule dans le cadre
d'une epistemologie realiste dans laquelle la structure de classes est consid6ere comme
determinant h long terme le processus historique gen6ral. Par consequent, bien que la
pensee de Gramsci jette une lumiere nouvelle sur un domaine d'activite politique sans
caractere de classe, ce domaine est circonscrit a la fois par les conditions socioeconomiques, et le realisme des donnees disponibles.

impart the truth to the masses. This leads easily to elitism and to the
familiar situation where the so-called truth does not matter at all; it is not
regarded as relevant by anyone except the few converted intellectuals.
The second alternative engages both masses and intellectuals in a
process of learning.
According to Gramsci, if the relations between intellectuals and
masses are not to be, as they would be in the first alternative, "relations
of purely bureaucratic order" in which intellectuals become a "caste or
a priesthood," there must be the possibility of a dialogue; that is, the
masses must contribute significantly to the elaboration of a new world
view. "The popular element 'feels' but does not always understand or
know." In contrast, "the intellectual element 'knows' but does not
always understand or in particular 'feel.'" Separated, these two
extremes are blind passion and sectarianism, on the one hand, or
pedantry and philistinism, on the other. It is only by bringing these two
elements together, that is, by realizing that one cannot know without
understanding and especially without feeling, that the elaboration of a
coherent, critical, and above all relevant world view is possible.7
Introducing science into the life of people from the outside often
leads to scepticism, sectarianism and, what is worse, tragedy. Charles
Mills, for instance, has attempted to show that part of the failure of the
New Jewel Movement in Grenada was due to this ill-conceived attempt
to introduce science from above without any regard for the local
specificities, or for the "feelings" of the people who were supposed to
learn a foreign science. As a member of the party put it, "[f]rom my own
7

Ibid., 1505 (418).

26

ESTEVE MORERA

street sense, I knew they was doin' shit. But you couldn't tell them
anything. They say they have the science."8
In short, the elaboration of any new conception of the world cannot
be imported into a people from outside. It must, on the contrary, be
produced out of the existing values, thought and feelings of the masses
themselves. As Gramsci puts it:
A philosophy of praxis cannot but present itself initially in a polemical and
critical manner, as supersedingthe preceding mode of thinking and of the
existingconcretethought(or existingculturalworld).Therefore,first of all as a
critique of "common sense" (after using common sense to demonstratethat
"everyone" is a philosopherand that it is not a question of introducingfrom
scratch a science into "everyone's" individual life, but of renovating and
making"critical" an alreadyexisting activity).9
Gramsci's points merit repetition. The elaboration of a critical
conception of the world must find its starting point in the problems,
beliefs, culture and mode of thought of the masses; it must emerge from
the depths of history. Intellectuals, to the extent that they are better
equipped to articulate ideas or to connect the feelings and thinking of the
masses "dialectically to the laws of history,"10 will have a major
responsibility to facilitate, but not dictate, the emergence of a new
hegemony. They will act as equal participants, not as the makers of
history.
In conclusion, on the vital question of the elaboration of a socialist
conception of the world, Gramsci calls for active and equal participation
of the masses and clearly dismisses any elitist model of intellectual
work. For these reasons he contends that
[t]he position of the philosophyof praxis is the antithesisof the Catholic:the
philosophyof praxis does not tend to maintainthe "simple" in their primitive
philosophyof commonsense, but insteadto lead themto a superiorconception
of life. If it affirmsthe need for contactbetweenintellectualsandthe simpleit is
not to limitscientificactivityandto maintainunityat the low level of the masses,
but precisely to build an intellectual-moralbloc which can make politically
possible an intellectualprogressof the masses and not only of small groups of
intellectuals.1

The relation between intellectuals and masses, then, must be a

pedagogical relation, that is, "an active, reciprocal relation in which
every teacher is always a pupil and every pupil is always a teacher."12
8

9
10
11
12

Charles Mills, "Getting out of the Cave: Tensions between Democracy and Elitism in
Marx's Theory of Cognitive Liberation," paper delivered at the thirteenth annual
conference of the Caribbean Studies Association, Guadeloupe, May 25-27, 1988.
Gramsci, Quaderni, Vol. 2, 1382 (330-31).
Ibid., 1505 (418).
Ibid., 1384-85 (332).
Ibid., 1331 (315). For a valuable interpretation of Gramsci's educational theory, see
Harold Entwistle, Antonio Gramsci: Conservative Schooling for Radical Politics
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), especially the section on "Education and
the problem of the intellectuals," 113-29.

Gramsci and Democracy

27

This conception of intellectual development presents some

questions of deep philosophical interest. If a conception of the world is
to be elaborated in a democratic fashion, then there can be no objective
truth, truth is nothing but the consensus of a group. If that is so, then all
truth is relative, relative, that is, to a historically determined group, class
or other social formation. This is indeed the conclusion that many have
reached after reading the Quaderni del Carcere.13 Yet, it is a conclusion
that I believe to be wrong. Gramsci is by no means clear or consistent on
this point, but on the whole the Quaderni seem to defend a realist position
on the question of knowledge and reality, a position that does not deny a
correspondence theory of truth and for which truth is not identical with
the historical conditions of the production of knowledge. If this
interpretation of Gramsci's prison work is valid, his theory of the
relation between intellectuals and masses requires further elaboration,
for it would mean that some positions, some world views would be
superior to others simply because they are closer to the truth or offer a
more adequate paradigm for thinking about reality. This does not mean
that intellectuals' views are necessarily truer, or more realist than those
of the masses. It does mean, however, that some views would be more
adequate than others. And this is certainly not necessarily undemocratic
or regressive, for after all even in a democratically developed Nazi
society we would still wish to claim that the dominant, or historically
produced world view, is not adequate for both moral and epistemological reasons.
The Organizational Basis of Civil Society
We must now turn to a second set of considerations regarding a
Gramscian conception of democracy, considerations that are drawn
from the concepts of civil society and hegemony. According to some
commentators, these considerations have important implications for
democratic theory and practice because they refer to the organizational
aspects of society rather than to the specifically pedagogical relationship
between intellectuals and masses.
Gramsci offers two basic concepts for the analysis of modern
societies: first, political society, or the repressive apparatus of the state;
13 Cain, for instance, has argued that Gramsci's historicismn"transcends the distinction
between absolutism and relativism" with the consequence, which she thinks to be a
sound position, that the "verifying claims of reason" are rejected, for, "if there is no
absolute knowledge there can be no truth." In short, "Gramsci regards correct
knowledge as historically specific and class specific." See Maureen Cain, "Gramsci,
the State and the Place of Law," in David Sugarman (ed.), Legality, Ideology and the
State (London: Academic Press, 1983), 105. In spite of some seemingly corroborating
statements in the Quaderni, this is not Gramsci's epistemology, though it is an
extremely popular interpretation of his prison work, one that is mainly based on
simplistic assumptions and careless reading of his prison work.

28

ESTEVE MORERA

and second, civil society or the " 'private' apparatus of hegemony."14

The latter includes all types of private organizations, such as cultural
clubs, churches, newspapers and political parties. These two basic
elements of a superstructure have a definite function and two distinct
ways to carry it out. Political society, no less than civil society, is the
institutional embodiment of the power of a class whose unity is realized
in the state.15However, whereas the supremacy of the class is preserved
by political society through the use of force, civil society accomplishes
the same end by means that can be called ethical, that is, by means of
hegemony or organized consensus. In short, political society organizes
force, civil society is the organizer of consensus.
The distinctive feature of modern societies is not that in them
hegemony has replaced force to a large extent, but rather that civil
society has grown to an unprecedented degree and has acquired
enormous importance. Today, Gramsci argues, civil society takes the
place that the Church took in earlier times: "in the political conception
of the Renaissance, religion was the consensus and the Church was civil
society, the apparatus of hegemony of the leading group which did not
have its own apparatus, that is, it did not have its own cultural and
intellectual organization.'16
During earlier historical periods, or even in Russia at the time of the
October Revolution, the amorphous and chaotic nature of civil society
made possible state domination.17 Once civil society develops, however,
the state can no longer dominate it. Yet the potential for conflict from the
independent emergence of well-organized, national, private institutions
requires that the dominant class should nevertheless intervene and
control them, and that the state should expand its functions and acquire
an educative role. With this, the relation between state and civil society
changes considerably. The transformation of the state requires, Gramsci
suggests, that its repressive character should diminish and its ethicopolitical character, its hegemonic function, should grow in importance.
The political importance of civil society lies in the fact that the
leading class, through the state, must deal with it so as to contain any
conflicts that might emerge in such a way as to minimize its possible
disruptive effects. Hence, concessions to the demands that emerge from
the private institutions of civil society must be accomplished without
ever making any sacrifices that would affect the foundations of the
power of the leading class; this ability to make concessions and to win
allies through them is one of the main characteristics of the hegemonic
function of a class.18 The horizons of political activity, the domain of the
14
15
16
17
18

Gramsci, Qutaderni, Vol. 2, 801 (261). See also, Vol. 1, 56.

Ibid., Vol. 1, 372 and Vol. 3, 2287 (52).
Ibid., Vol. 2, 763.
Ibid., Vol. 1, 117; Vol. 3, 2057 (238); and Vol. 2, 866.
Ibid., Vol. 1, 461, and Vol. 3, 1591 (161).

Gramsci and Democracy

29

political itself, is considerably broadened with the growth in complexity

of modern civil society. This has far-reaching political consequences.
We find in Gramsci a realization that political activity is not
restricted to political society, that is, to the traditional area of the
exercise of state power. Indeed, he claims that everything is politics.19
Although his formulation of the problem is not always clear, he seems to
suggest that with the growth of civil society, all institutions that are
called private tend to reproduce the existing power relations or adapt
them to the needs of the economic structure.
This conceptualization of class rule has two important consequences. First, class rule is based on the interests of a socio-economic
class and seeks to preserve those interests, but it is not exclusively and
narrowly determined by them. Class rule, if it is to channel the
conflicts that may emerge in civil society, must always be based on a
programme of leadership that has, within limits, truly civilizing effects;
it must promote values that have some universal appeal. A leading class
must either convince the great majority that the values it promotes are
universal (for instance, profit on investment is a reward for risk taking,
which is morally good), or it must make partial, limited concessions on
universal values (for instance, recent legislative efforts to deal with
equal pay for work of equal value in Ontario). In general, human rights
legislation is both universally significant, and limited so as to preserve
the existing structural power relations.
Because we all belong to some private organization of civil
society-a club, or the readership of a newspaper, a school, religious
association, or a family-we are all engaged, passively or actively, in the
organization of hegemony in our society. We all belong in this way to a
party.20Hence, in the same way that we are all philosophers, that we are
all intellectuals, we are also all engaged in political activity. The issue,
then, is clearly the same as in the case of developing a coherent world
view; we are faced with the task of transforming the inherent political
significance of the organizations of civil society into well-organized,
coherent and progressive activity. Political participation, then, must
begin with the task of transforming an already existing activity, of
rendering critical and active the passive consensus imposed by the
environment.
Before I discuss the democratic implications of the concept of civil
society, a few words on the class basis of civil society and hegemony are
necessary. It is today common to read about the crisis or even the death
of Marxism, a crisis that has been prompted by the demise of classes in
modern social theory. Often, Gramsci is presented as a precursor of
these recent developments in the social sciences. However, Gramsci's
19 Ibid., Vol. 3, 1766 (244).
20 Ibid., Vol. 2, 800 (264).

30

ESTEVE

MORERA

analysis of hegemony, for instance, clearly indicates that the concept of

class continues to play a crucial role in his social and political theory.
There are, nevertheless, complexities in Gramsci's conception of class
that depend on his conception of historicism, and therefore the latter
must be made fully explicit before the former can be analyzed with any
completeness. Since it is not possible in a short space to develop
Gramsci's conception of historicism fully, only a few remarks on his
notion of class will be possible here.
As a first approximation to this fundamental concept, it is
interesting to note that for Gramsci "class" is a historical concept. E. P.
Thompson has perhaps characterized this idea in the clearest form.
Class, he writes, is "a historical category: that is, it is derived from the
observation of the social process over time."21 This means that the
object to which "class" refers is not to be found in any short period of
time, in a single slice of time. Rather, it is a concept that ranges over a
long-term process, not unlike what Braudel meant by structure.
Although at any given point in time classes may be invisible, so to speak,
just as the motion of tectonic plates is imperceptible, they are
nevertheless present as prisons, in Braudel's sense,22 in which the social
process must develop. At decisive points in historical development, the
presence and long-term motion can become decisive, as earthquakes
remind us of the great drama played in the netherworld. Thus the
movement of tectonic plates determines the general shape of continents
and contributes to the creation of a more or less suitable habitat for life
forms, but does not directly intervene to create the flora and fauna in
each of them. Similarly, Gramsci's theory does not affirm that classes
determine every single historical event at any time, in any society; it
asserts that over the long haul they determine the general trend of
historical development.
The relations among classes, then, constitute the generative
mechanism of history which, as Femia asserts with respect to the
productive forces, explains "the basic trajectory of human history"
although it does not explain the "specific course of any given society"
insofar as it "may vary in accordance with the dynamics of its own
individual situation."23 The specific development of any society
depends not only on the existence of a given class structure, but also on
the complexity of civil society, its organizations, their demands and the
ability of the leading classes to satisfy these demands. In short,
Gramsci's theory is a theory of civil society and the ability of
21 E. P. Thompsom, "Eighteenth-Century English Society: Class Struggle without
Classes?" Social History 3 (1978), 147.
22 Fernand Braudel, Ecrits sur I'histoire (Paris: Flammarion, 1969), 50 and 51.
23 Joseph Femia, Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the
Revolutionary Process (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 116; emphasis in the
original.

Gramsci and Democracy

31

socio-economic classes to exert a civilizing influence, to exercise

leadership as well as to preserve their status.24 Classes must present
alternative hegemonic principles, for class conflict is no longer decided
by the outcome of a frontal attack on the state, but on the success of the
hegemonic struggle in civil society.25
The civilizing activity of a dominant class implies a relative
autonomy of political life from the economic structure, and this is
perhaps the first condition for a non-reductionist theory of democracy.
It means that it is possible to engage in forms of activity which are
political, but which are focussed on demands that originate in private
groups defending specific issues. Today, civil society has expanded
considerably with the emergence of the so-called new social
movements; it is evident that political initiative is often in the hands of
these movements rather than in those of the traditional parties. This has
had the effect of expanding the constituencies of some parties to include
the voices of specific groups or organizations. Thus, in reflecting on the
New Democratic party and the 1988 Canadian federal election, Gerald
Caplan recognizes the existence of "a world out there to speak for and
to become part of-native peoples, the poor, exploited women,
vulnerable immigrants, visible minorities, environmentalists: the list is
long indeed."26 There are, of course, some ambiguities in this
formulation, for Caplan writes of being part of those various groups, but
also of speaking "for them." The role of the party is not very clear.
Nevertheless, the recognition is in itself significant, that to survive as a
party the NDP must deal with the diverse organizations of civil society,
and not restrict itself simply and exclusively to appeals to the rather
vague constituency of the inhabitants of Main Street. A similar
recognition is to be found in the constitution of Nicaragua that was
proposed in 1984. There the Sandinistas held that strong participatory
democracy required the direct participation of mass organizations in the
National Assembly. However, strong opposition from more conservative parties was successful in denying this important constitutional
guarantee to the organizations of civil society.27
24 Sassoon has argued that Gramsci "emphasized the unity between transformations in
the economy and the rest of society. This unity was conceived in terms not of a
redlction of different levels to changes in the economy, but rather in terms of the need
to pose the possibility of a transformation of society within the context of the potential
given by changes in the organization of production." See Anne Showstack Sassoon,
"Gramsci: A New Concept of Politics and the Expansion of Democracy," in Alan
Hunt (ed.), Marxism and Democracy (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1980), 85;
emphasis in the original.
25 Gramsci, Qutaderni, Vol. 2, 859-60, and Vol. 3, 1615-16 (235).
26 Gerald Caplan, "Soul-searching Begins on NDP Political Role," The Sunday Star
(Toronto), December 11, 1988.
27 Jules Lobel, "The New Nicaraguan Constitution: Uniting Participatory and
Representative Democracy," Monthly Reviet- 38 (1987), 11-12.

32

ESTEVE MORERA

Whereas the first set of considerations of this article emphasized

the relationship between leaders and the led, or intellectuals and masses,
my analysis of Gramsci's conception of civil society puts the question of
democracy on a different and more complex terrain. Here, we begin to
see the historical conditions that make an expansion of democracy
possible, conditions that have not always existed. These conditions
depend on the emergence of private organizations, their role and
influence, and their ability to participate fully in the political process.
Gramsci, unfortunately, does not develop these issues, although he
clearly perceives that the most difficult and important struggle for
radical social change will take place on the terrain of civil society.28 That
is, the first task for radical social transformation is transforming the
private institutions of civil society from within according to a socialist
world view. Many of these organizations, however, are no longer
private. Today, the school system, for instance, is evidently dominated
by the state. As Gramsci argues, however, the state must expand its role
beyond the monopoly of force, and not only in the economic sphere, so
as to act as an educator and adapt civil society to the economic structure
of society.29Thus, one of the conditions for the radical transformation of
society, for the passage to a classless society, is already developing
within capitalism itself. Gramsci argues that the "regulated society,"
the end of the state, is one in which the state as political society is
reabsorbed into civil society.30 Hence, the growing complexity of civil
society, the very possibility of mass movements that effectively put new
demands on the agenda, prefigures the advent of the regulated society.
The possibility of democracy, then, is not simply premised on the
success of democratic theory, but on the existence of historical
conditions appropriately reflected in the theories. As Gramsci argues,
philosophy itself does not pose any problems; "philosophy is the
continuous solution of problems proposed by historical development."31
Gramsci's Conception of Hegemony and Democracy
The basic question that ought to be asked is, "What kind of democracy
does Gramsci's conception of civil society imply?" It would seem that a
tentative answer must be that his theory implies an equal participation of
all progressive groups in a general coalition. This coalition, however,
finds its limits in the long-term determining role of the class structure,
limits that cannot be transcended without changing that class structure
28
29
30
31

Gramsci, Qlladerni, Vol. 2, 802 (239).

Ibid., Vol. 2, 1254; Vol. 3, 1565-66 and 1570 (242, 239).
Ibid., Vol. 1, 662 (253).
Ibid., Vol. 2, 1273.

Gramsci and Democracy

33

itself through the creation of a new historical bloc. This, of course,

presents some difficulties, not only in terms of defining what a
progressive group is, but also in terms of the possible conflict between
the interests of progressive groups and those of the dominant class.
However, this is a problem that no amount of theorizing can solve;
problems of this sort are bound to surface whenever any kind of
concerted, radical political action is undertaken. Still, one's approach to
solving problems of this kind can make a great difference to the outcome
of such activity, and therefore one's attitude, theoretical and other, is of
crucial importance. The greatest difficulty for a theory of democracy is
that the split between the dominant class, interested in preserving the
status quo, and the progressive coalition, bent on changing it, presents a
limit to consensus. It is not to be expected that those with power will
relinquish it voluntarily, and hence methods other than consensual ones,
what Gramsci refers to as force, may become necessary at some point.
Gramsci's definition of "progressive" is given not by the
short-term interests of a class, but rather by the historical or long-term
process to eliminate power relations in society. Granted, Gramsci is
concerned mainly with those relations that are based on the class
structure of society, and hence his definition of "progressive" is given
by the long-term process of eliminating class relations and their resulting
form of political society. Nevertheless, care must be taken of the
civilizing function of any hegemonic class, for its progressive character
will certainly be measured not only in terms of economic justice and
equality, but by its ability to lead society to a higher form of civilization.
Hence, as Gramsci argues, "any innovative historical movement is
mature to the extent that the elderly, the young and women can
participate in it."32 This brief remark is, of course, not sufficient to
clarify the issue of the relation between class and other groups.
Nevertheless, it suggests that a movement for radical social change must
encompass broader interests than those of the working class; this may
indeed require participation on equal terms, both to define the role of
each group and to elaborate the general principles of the new hegemonic
force.
This, of course, will not satisfy those who have argued against any
form of essentialism. In particular, it will not satisfy Ernesto Laclau and
Chantal Mouffe, who think that Gramsci's concept of hegemony implies
a non-essentialist political discourse, though he was unable fully to
realize and develop the implications of his theory.33This is, according to
Laclau, Gramsci's great limitation, namely, that in his theory "only the
fundamental classes of society can be hegemonic subjects."34 The
32 Ibid., 903.
33 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 69.
34 Ernesto Laclau, "Transformations of Advanced Industrial Societies and the Theory

34

ESTEVE MORERA

centrality of classes, however, is a historical principle. Only historical

evidence, not the immediate sort of empirical evidence based on
short-term developments, can validate this principle. At any point in
time the immediate evidence of the role of classes may be lacking and
other forms of political activity may be more evident and more
important. The question is whether this mere conjuncture of political
forces is sufficient evidence for the kind of conclusions reached by
Laclau and others.
To illustrate further Gramsci's conception of the participation of
various groups in a historical movement for social transformation, some
remarks on sex and gender relations may prove valuable. Gramsci did
not write extensively on this issue, nor are his statements on it
particularly enlightening. However, they shed some oblique light on our
concerns.
Among the items in the list of problems that Gramsci thinks are of
some importance in the analysis of United States society in the 1920s and
1930s, he lists the sexual question.35 Gramsci in fact provides some
interesting suggestions on how this question should be treated, hints
that, while scant and little developed, provide evidence of his originality.
Furthermore, they show that even though he regarded the economic
structure as the motor of history, he did not reduce all problems to
economic ones.
Gramsci affirms that "the 'economic' function of reproduction is
not only tied to the productive economic world, but it is also an internal
one."36 In a second draft of this note, he writes that the economic
function of reproduction "is not only a general fact that is of interest to
the entire society... but it is also a 'molecular' fact, internal to the
smaller economic aggregates such as the family."37 The exact meaning
of these two passages is not clear, although it is reasonably safe to assert
that Gramsci thought of the sexual question as being simultaneously part
of the economic structure at the same time that it is independent of it. It
is a general economic question to the extent that the reproduction of the
population, and hence of the labour force, depends on it. Furthermore,
sexual morality inherited from the past, such as is the case with
puritanism in the American case, can be adapted to emerging conditions
in order to forge a new attitude towards work. It is an independent
aspect of the economic structure which poses complex superstructural
problems: that is, it is an "ethico-civil" question.38

35
36
37
38

of the Subject," in Sackari Hanninen and Leena Paldan (eds.), Rethinking Ideology:
A Marxist Debate (Berlin: Argument Verlag, 1984), 42.
Gramsci, Quaderni, Vol. 3, 2139-40 (279).
Ibid., Vol. 1, 73.
Ibid., Vol. 3, 2148 (295).
Ibid., 2149 (296).

Gramsci and Democracy

35

Gramsci considers the issue of the "formation of a new feminine

personality" to be "the most important ethico-civil question tied to the
sexual question."39 This question, however, cannot be solved by the
party or by any group of legislators. It can only be solved, he writes,
"when women have attained independence vis-a-vis men" and have
developed "a new conception of themselves and of their role in sexual
relations." Any attempt to legislate on sexual questions before this new
feminine self-image is achieved, he warns, must proceed with great
caution, for "the sexual question will be rich with morbid characteristics."40

One can conclude that any social reform is faced with problems that
are set within a specific class framework but their scope and history
transcend current socio-economic relations. It is his attempt to include
these problems in a study of historical blocs that led Gramsci to develop
the concept of hegemony. The hegemony of a group depends not only on
its ability to organize consensus on problems related to the economic
structure, but also on those problems of an extra-economic, or mixed
nature. Gramsci regarded the sexual question as one of a mixed nature,
since it emerged under new circumstances or originated in the very
distant past to be later faced by society.
These brief comments suggest that Gramsci saw the need for
addressing sex and gender relations as a fundamental condition for the
development of a higher form of civilization. He also realized that
although some aspects of this issue are intrinsically economic, others
are independent of the economic structure and require solutions that
cannot simply be linked to the needs or interests of any single class.
Participation in a historical movement for social transformation, we
must conclude, can only mean equal participation in this civilizing
labour of the movement in which all forms of liberation will be equally
promoted. Although not explicitly stated, Gramsci seems to suggest that
those various interests cannot be really incompatible, although immature attitudes may view them as such.
Conclusion
The above considerations permit us to draw some general conclusions
about a possible theory of democracy to be found in Gramsci's prison
work. It must be noted, however, that Gramsci did not often write
directly about democracy; in fact, there are fewer than 15 references to
the concept of democracy in the 2,351 pages of notes that he penned
while he was in prison. In them, he offers no more than a general
definition of democracy as the degree of mass participation in the
39 Ibid. See also Vol. 1, 73.
40 Ibid., Vol. 3, 2149-50 (296). See also Vol. 1, 73.

36

ESTEVE MORERA

decisions and programme of an organization.41 He contends that the

"most realist and concrete" definition of the concept of democracy is to
be drawn from the concept of hegemony; "in a hegemonic group there is
democracy between the leading group and the group that is led," to the
extent that the passage from the latter to the former is fostered.42
Clearly, he is thinking of two conditions for the existence of democracy:
on the one hand, there must be participation of all individuals in
formulating programmes and making decisions; on the other hand, there
must be an open organizational structure such that no bureaucracy can
become entrenched in the leadership positions. These two conditions
seem to be best analyzed in terms of the relation between leaders and
led, that is, the pedagogical nature of such relations, elucidated in the
first part of this article. This is, however, a conception of democracy
that pertains to the internal structure of given organizations, not one that
would apply to the general organization of an entire society.
The second set of considerations for a possible theory of
democracy, namely, those concerning civil society and hegemony,
pertain to the overall organization of a society, and hence to the
multiplicity of groups and interests that are present in any social
organization. However, even in this larger and more complex situation,
the concept of hegemony is of great importance. In the passage cited
above, Gramsci indicates that hegemony and democracy are connected.
He traces the connection within the limited context of specific
organizations; nevertheless, the concept of hegemony was developed in
order to conceptualize intellectual and moral leadership within social
blocs. It is therefore proper to apply this concept to the question of
democracy at the macro level. This would justify our conclusions
regarding the participation of the organizations of civil society in
movements for social change and the inherently democratic character of
such participation. However, in Gramsci's theory, there are definite
limits to the scope of democracy, for he does not think that intellectual
and moral leadership is sufficient for social change. Adapting civil
society to a new economic structure may require more than persuasion
and propaganda. To expect "that the old homo oeconomicus will
disappear without being buried with all the honours it deserves is a form
of economic rhetoric, a new form of vacuous and inconclusive economic
moralism.' 43

Gramsci recognizes that society is divided in ways, which he claims

to be along class lines, that cannot allow for a democratic resolution to
all its conflicts. At the present time the conditions for the maximum
extension of democracy do not exist; they must be created by what is for
41 Ibid., Vol. 1, 29, and Vol. 3, 2084.
42 Ibid., Vol. 2, 1056.
43 Ibid., 1254.

Gramsci and Democracy

37

him the long-term process of the disappearance of political society and

its absorption into civil society, a process which is ultimately defined by
the power relation between socio-economic classes. This, of course, is
not to deny that this process involves to a large extent the expansion of
democracy itself, for the creation of a new hegemonic group precisely
requires that the already existing organizations of civil society
participate directly in the project of social reconstruction. Nevertheless,
Gramsci is aware of the great dangers lying ahead, dangers that stem
from the resistance of those who most profit from the status quo. It is
for this reason that he warns that hegemonic struggle, or "war of
position" as he sometimes refers to it, "demands enormous sacrifices
by immense masses of the population." It is, as siege warfare is wont to
be, "difficult, and demands exceptional qualities of patience and
inventiveness."44
Gramsci's conception of hegemony does not imply that modern
societies are homogeneous wholes cemented by consensus. He
explicitly states that societies are always divided, that there is always
struggle between incompatible hegemonic principles. He views this
incompatibility as stemming from the existence of socio-economic
classes. Hegemonic struggle, then, is always faced with the dilemma of
the limits of hegemony, the limits of tolerance. Ultimately we are faced
with the difficult question of the limits of democracy, with the moral
dilemmas of ascertaining that which we can honestly accept and that
which must be rejected. These questions, however, are far more
difficult, and far more pressing, for those who would see more, not less,
democracy.
44

Ibid., 802 (239).