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PROJECT ON Criminal

law

CASE COMMENT ON

DPP v. Beard [1920] AC 479


2012-2017 BATCH

BY:Pragalbh Bhardwaj
2012/BBA/034

Table of Contents

Facts:.........................................................................................................................................3
Issues framed by the court:......................................................................................................4
Issues overlooked by the court:...............................................................................................4
Decision of the court:...............................................................................................................5
Whether the case was a departure from earlier precedents:................................................8
Analysis of the case:...............................................................................................................10

Facts:
The appellant or the accused, Arthur Beard, whilst intoxicated raped young, 13 year old, Ivy
Wood and in the process of doing so, he put his hand over her mouth and his thumb on her
throat to stop her from screaming. As a result of that, she died of suffocation. There was
evidence that he had been drinking. It was a case of death caused during rape. The sole
defence was a plea of drunkenness. Beard's position at trial was that he was only guilty of
manslaughter as his self-induced intoxication rendered him incapable of knowing that what he
was doing was likely to inflict serious injury. The case eventually found its way to Britain's
House of Lords.

Issues framed by the court:


In this case, the court looked into many issues either explicitly or impliedly. But the decision
of the court was basically dependent on the answers of these basic issues:
The first issue was to determine what amounts to the state of intoxication.
The second issue before the court concerned the manner in which a jury should be instructed on
the relationship between intoxication and intent and the meaning of specific intent.
The third major issue before the court was to find out whether the crime committed by Beard
was an act of murder or manslaughter.

Issues overlooked by the court:


This is one of the most important cases under Criminal Law and, according to me the court
has perfectly determined all the issues and hence came to the conclusion.
All relevant issues were taken in to consideration while deciding the case although all the
issues are not expressly mentioned in the judgment but all matters were taken care of in the
case.

Decision of the court:


The counsel for the defence in this case, the counsel from the side of Beard, did not in any
way dispute the prisoners criminal responsibility for the homicide of the girl.
The only defence that they intended to present was that in circumstances proved the decision
of the court should be of manslaughter and not of murder on the ground that there was no
intention on the part of Beard to cause the girls death and that he was in such a state or
condition because of his drinks that he was incapable of knowing that what he was doing was
likely to inflict serious injury within the rule laid down by the court of criminal appeal in Rex
v. Meade1.
At the trial court, Bailhache J. directed the jury that if they were satisfied by evidence that the
accused was so drunk that he did not know what he was doing or did not know that he was
doing wrong, the defence of drunkenness succeeded to the extent of reducing the crime to
manslaughter. The accused was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.
The court of criminal appeal quashed the conviction on the ground of misdirection.
According to them, the judge was, in this particular case, wrong in applying to a case of
drunkenness, the test which was supposed to be a test of insanity. The given test, which was
quite apparently, less favourable to the prisoner than the test imposed by Rex v. Meade, and
that the accused was entitled to have the law stated to the jury as laid down in Rex v. Meade,
which established that the presumption that a man intended the natural consequences of his
acts might be rebutted in the case of drunkenness by showing that his mind was so affected
by the drink he had taken that he was incapable of knowing that what he was doing was
dangerous i.e. likely to cause serious harm. The verdict therefore was reduced to that of
manslaughter.
The House of Lords, held that the rule laid down by the court in Rex v. Meade will not be of
application in this current case and that drunkenness was no defence in this case unless it
could be proved that the accused at the time of committing rape was so inebriated that he was
incapable of forming the intent to commit the crime, in so far as death resulted from
succession of acts, the rape and the act of violence causing suffocation, which could not be
regarded independently of each other; secondly, that the trial court judge was mistaken in
applying the test of insanity to a case of drunkenness not amounting to insanity, but that read
1 [1909] K.B 879

as a whole the summing up did not amount to a misdirection. It was therefore held by the
court that the conviction of murder should be restored. Decision of the Court of Criminal
Appeal reversed.
In the present the case, the death resulted from two acts the rape and the act of violence
causing suffocation, these acts cannot be regarded separately and independently of each other.
When the case moved to the House of Lords, Lord Birkenhead, who was the
judge in the case of DPP v. Beard, set out the three propositions which have
been so frequently referred to in cases involving intoxication and criminal
behaviour:
1. The first proposition as in this regard, as laid down by Lord Birkenhead, is
that any form of insanity, whether produced by inebriation or otherwise, is a
defence to the crime charged. The distinction between the defences of
insanity in the true sense caused by excessive drinking and the defence of
drunkenness which produces a condition such that the drunken man's mind
becomes incapable of forming a specific intention, has been preserved
throughout the cases.
The insane person cannot be convicted of a crime but, upon a verdict of
insanity, is ordered to be detained. In these cases, the cause of the insanity
is of no importance.
If, as the result of alcoholic excess, actual disorder of the mind in fact
supervenes, it renders as complete an answer to a criminal charge as
insanity induced by any other cause whatever that maybe.
2. According to the second proposition laid down by Lord Birkenhead, in
order to determine whether or not the person had the intent, evidence of
drunkenness which furnishes the person who has been accused incapable of
forming the specific intent essential to establish the crime should be taken
into consideration with the other facts proved.

3. Lord Birkenheads third proposition is that evidence of drunkenness falling


short of a proved incapacity in the accused to form the intent necessary to
constitute the crime, and merely establishing that his mind was affected so
much by drink that he, in the case, more promptly gave in to some violent
passion, does not rebut the given that a man intends only the natural
consequences of his acts.

Whether the case was a departure from earlier precedents:


The history of law as regards to the effect of drunkenness upon criminal responsibility:
There are three definitely marked periods in the development of the law upon this point.
The first period was from the time of Coke upon Littleton to 1800, the date of Emlyns
edition of Hales Pleas of the crown. Cokes conception was that Drunkenness aggravated
crime but Sir Hale said that drunkenness was neither an aggravation nor an excuse and thus
the drunken man was treated as having the same judgment as if he were in his right senses. 2
The second was from 1800 to 1835 when the doctrine that drink might be pleaded in
mitigation first crept into the reports and a controversy arose among the judges as to the
limits of that doctrine. The question whether a crime is murder or manslaughter depends upon
malice aforethought, and that is an issue of fact for the jury. The third was from 1835
onwards to Rex v. Meade in 1909, by which date the doctrine had hardened into the rule laid
down by Darling J.
In Meades case, the rule regarding whether the jury are justified in returning a verdict of
manslaughter was laid down. According to that case, the rule that a man is taken to intend the
natural consequences of his acts may be rebutted, in the case of a man who is drunk and
whose mind is so affected by the drink that he is incapable of knowing the consequences of
the act. If this is proved, the presumption that he intends to do bodily harm can be rebutted. In
the case of a man who is drunk and whose mind is so affected by the drink that he is
incapable of knowing the consequences of the act it is justified in such cases that the charged
be reduced from murder to manslaughter.
In Meades case it was essential to prove the specific intent; in Beards case it was only
required to prove that the violent act causing death was done in furtherance of the felony of
rape.
It was not until the House of Lords decision in Beards case in the first decades of the
twentieth century that the MNaghten test3 was rejected on the basis that it was inapplicable
to an assessment of the effect of intoxication on criminal responsibility.
2 Hales Pleas of the crown (1800 ed.), vol. i. , p. 32.
3 M'Naghten's Case 1843 10 C & F 200

In Beards case, Lord Birkenhead stated that there was a distinction between the defence of
insanity in its true sense caused by excessive drinking and the defence of drunkenness
which produces a condition such that a drunken mans mind becomes incapable of forming a
specific intention. Beards case also marked another step in the process of formalization of
the law on intoxicated offending. This step entailed the explication of the relationship
between intoxication and criminal fault via the elaboration of the meaning of the term
specific intent.
In Beards case, the court stated that, where a specific intent is an essential element in the
offence, evidence of a state of drunkenness rendering the accused incapable of forming such
an intention should be taken into consideration in determining whether he or she had in fact
formed intent.
The Beard approach to intoxication, fault, and specific intent was adopted in subsequent
appellate judgments, including by the House of Lords in DPP v. Majewski.4
The judges in the case said that it was only necessary to prove that the violent act causing
death was done in furtherance of the crime of rape; their decision was that drunkenness
could be no defence unless it could be established that Beard at the time of committing the
rape was so inebriated that he was incapable of forming the intent to commit it.

4 DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443

Analysis of the case:


According to me, the judgement delivered by the House of Lords is correct and it makes total
sense to me that Beard should be held liable for the charge of murder. And his crime must not
be reduced from murder to manslaughter. Reason being, according to the general rule, a man
is presumed to intend, the natural consequences of his acts. Here, Beard knew for a fact that
he was committing the crime of rape and when he put his hand on her throat to stop her from
screaming, he knew he was also committing an act of violence in furtherance of the act of
rape. It cannot be taken as a defence that a person be excused for the crime of murder just
because he claims that he was drunk and he would not have done so had he not been drunk.
Voluntary drunkenness can never be a defence for a criminal misconduct. In this case, it has
been already established that the prisoner killed the child by an act in furtherance of the crime
of rape, a felony involving violence. Rightly held by the House of Lords, the two acts: the
rape and the act of violence causing suffocation, these acts cannot be regarded separately and
independently of each other.

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