Professional Documents
Culture Documents
I
I would rule that the pieces of evidence are inadmissible.
Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution provides that no torture,
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against [the accused] and any
confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. Also, the
Exclusionary Rule Principle states that evidence obtained from an
illegal arrest, unreasonable search or coercive investigation, or in
violation of a particular law, must be excluded from the trial and
will not be admitted as evidence.
There being no showing that A voluntarily admitted the
crime, then the evidence obtained is a fruit of a poisonous tree
and cannot be admitted as evidence in trial.
II
The Constitution authorizes the Supreme Court to assume
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition in relation
to the constitutionality of a law or executive action. Section 5, Art.
VIII of the Constitution provides clearly:
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
III
The preliminary injunction order issued by the COMELEC 1 st
Division is an interlocutory order.
The remedy of A is to seek the review of the interlocutory
order during the appeal of the decision of the Division in due
course.
Or, exceptionally, the Supreme Court may take cognizance
of a certiorari action directed against an interlocutory order issued
by a Division of the COMELEC when the following circumstances
are present: first, the order was issued without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and second, under
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the subject of the controversy is
a matter which (1) the COMELEC en banc may not sit and
consider or (2) a Division is not authorized to act or (3) the
offense
not
punishable
by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary. The application
for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court
despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has
not transmitted the original record to the appellate
court. However, if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for
bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate
court.
Should the court grant the application, the
accused may be allowed to continue on provisional
liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the
same bail subject to the consent of thebondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be
cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution,
with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:
(a)
That he is a recidivist, quasirecidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b)
That he has previously escaped from
legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without a
valid justification;
(c)
That he committed the offense while
under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
(d)
That the circumstances of his case
indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or
(e)
That there is undue risk that he may
commit another crime during the pendency
of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on
motion of any party, review the resolution of the
b.
No. The proper remedy is appeal. Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court states:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
In the given case, there is clearly an appeal available to the
prosecution, because the modification by the RTC of its judgment
is tantamount to a final order. It is then appealable to the Court of
Appeals. It is not an interlocutory order against which a Rule 65
petition may be filed.
X
Insular Savings Bank v. Far East Bank and Trust Company G.R. No.
141818, 22 June 2006 definitively outlined several judicial
remedies an aggrieved party to an arbitral award may undertake:
(1)a petition in the proper RTC to issue an order to vacate the
award on the grounds provided for in Section 24 of RA 876;
(2) a petition for review in the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and
law; and
(3)a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
should the arbitrator have acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Section 24 of RA 876 provides for the specific grounds for a
petition to vacate an award made by an arbitrator:
Sec. 24. Grounds for vacating award. - In any one of the
following cases, the court must make an order vacating the award
upon the petition of any party to the controversy when such party
proves affirmatively that in the arbitration proceedings:
(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other
undue means; or
(b) That there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators or any of them; or
(c) That the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or
in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the