IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF FULTON COUNTY
GEORGIA
DEZSO BENEDEK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SAM OLENS the ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
GEORGIA, JANE GATEWOOD; JUDITH
SHAW; KASEE LASTER, and NOEL
FALLOWS

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CIVIL ACTION NO.

2014-CV-246185
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Defendants.


PLAINTIFFS REPLY TO DEFENDANTS RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

Comes now Plaintiff Dezso Benedek in reply to Defendants

Response to the Motion for Sanctions Against the Attorney General, and
shows the Court as follows:

1. The Court always has jurisdiction to address fraud related to

concealing evidence

Contrary to the spurious defenses the Attorney General raises to

the Motion, this Court does have jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs

Motion for Sanctions Against the Attorney General under OCGA 9-15-
14, and the Attorney General knows better than anyone in the State of

Georgia the legal basis for that jurisdiction. In fact, another Judge of this
Fulton Superior Court very recently awarded sanctions against the
Attorney General for similar misconduct, for making knowing
misrepresentations in connection with concealing evidenceas alleged
in the Motion and extensively documented in Plaintiffs Exhibits.
Kalberman v. Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance
Commission, 2012-CV-216247 (a true and correct copy of opinion by
Judge Ural Glanville is attached as Exhibit 1).

The jurisdiction to consider misrepresentations for the purpose of

concealing evidence does not expire. In Kalberman, sanctions were

imposed based upon a motion filed after the trial was over and after a
judgment had already been entered in favor of the plaintiffs (in spite of
the documents improperly withheld in that case by the Attorney
General). Judge Glanville made it clear, in his order sanctioning the
Attorney General for improperly withholding clearly relevant and
responsive evidence, that the Superior Courts always have jurisdiction
over such misconduct of the parties appearing before them. OCGA 15-
1-3.

Moreover, the conduct for which Judge Glanville fined Attorney

General Sam Olens $10,000 is not nearly as egregious as the evidence

tampering and subsequent misrepresentations by the Georgia Attorney

General that has been documented in this case. In this case, the
Attorney General concealed evidence in an action actually being
prosecuted by the Attorney Generals office. The Attorney General then
called witnesses, including Defendant Jane Gatewood, to give knowingly
false testimony under oath that was directly contradicted by the missing
evidence. The Attorney General then made misrepresentations
concerning this very misconduct, disclaiming all knowledge and
responsibility for its criminal nature, to help spirit Jane Gatewood out of
the state.

The delays thus caused by the Attorney General aided and abetted

Gatewood, a devastating witness to the Attorney Generals evidence

tampering and subornation of perjury, in evading service in this case. At
the same time, the Attorney General misrepresented Gatewoods status,
and the nature of the claims and parties in the previous case, to this
Court in order to seek a dismissal of this action. This is far, far worse
than the Attorney General misconduct in Kalberman.

2. The Attorney Generals out-of-court misrepresentations that the

criminal allegations need not be addressed are also sanctionable

This Court also has jurisdiction based on the Attorney Generals

knowing misrepresentations in out of court statements directly

concerning this action for criminal RICO predicate acts of evidence
tampering, knowingly false statements by state agencies, and perjury. At
the same time the Attorney General was turning a blind eye-- while Jane
Gatewood, a devastating witness to criminal evidence tampering in the
Attorney Generals office, evaded service and left the stateAttorney
General Sam Olens was making public statements intended to deter an
independent investigation of the allegations of criminal misconduct in
this case now before the Court.

In those public statements to the media, Olens personally and

professionally impugned Benedeks counsel, calling him an outlandish

conspiracy theorist who was wasting the Attorney Generals time by
engaging in attention-seeking gimmicks. And, though Olens was sitting
on a stack of documents supporting the allegationswhile at the same
time claiming the documentation of criminal misconduct by state
officials did not merit any investigation by his officeOlens made the
knowingly false statements that the allegations were frivolous and
nonsensical. Those knowingly false statements were contradicted by

documents in Olens possession at the time, some of which have since

been filed in support of the Motion for Sanctions.

Those knowingly false statements--intended to mislead the courts

and the public and interfere with the fair administration of justice
were also intentionally injurious to the professional reputation of
Benedeks counsel. As such, Olens statements, in addition to violating
the Criminal Code of Georgia, OCGA 16-10-20, were per se defamatory
and fall within the Georgia Constitutions provision regarding acts by
state officials intended to cause harm. See Exhibit 2, retraction demand
letter to Attorney General Sam Olens.

It is a serious matter for the Attorney General of Georgia to make

knowingly false and defamatory extrajudicial statements to cover for

misconduct by his own office. It is even worse to make these
misrepresentations to obstruct justice by deterring an independent
criminal investigation of the allegations in the Complaint, while at the
same time abetting evasion of service by a witness to the very criminal
RICO predicate acts alleged in this action.

3. The Attorney Generals misrepresentations occurred in and
directly affect his action

In his Response, the Attorney General claims that none of the

misrepresentations alleged in support of the Motion for Sanctions were

made in this case, Benedek II, but that the Attorney Generals
misrepresentations were confined to Benedek I.

First, it is funny how the Attorney Generals position on the

relationship between the two cases changes depending on the situation.

In Benedek I, the Attorney General claimed Jane Gatewood was not a
party in order to stall service on her, allowing her to evade service and
leave the state before she could be served in this case, Benedek II
which was filed in part for the express purpose of circumventing the
efforts to thwart service on Gatewood. Then, in this case, the Attorney
General claimed that Gatewood was a party in Benedek I, in order to
solicit the dismissal of Benedek II as merely duplicative of Benedek I.
Now that it suits his purposes in opposing the Motion for Sanctions, the
Attorney General is back to saying that the cases are not related and that
statements made in Benedek I have no bearing in Benedek II.

This is not merely lawyer pettifogging, and it is not just another

example of the duplicity by which the Attorney General allowed a

material witness to criminal conduct in his own office slip past the
process server. The claimed defense is, moreover, falsebecause the

duplicitous statement that Jane Gatewood was a party to Benedek I was

made in this case, Benedek II. That is part and parcel of the fraud, as the
Plaintiff has consistently described it, starting with his Rule 60 Motion
to set aside the dismissal order because of its fraudulent basis.1

4. The Court can exercise its discretion to consider the fraud for
purposes of Plaintiffs Rule 60 motion

This Court has the same grounds for jurisdiction over Plaintiffs

Rule 60 motion, based on the Courts inherent power to consider

1 The Attorney Generals attempt to accuse the Plaintiff of misrepresentations in this
regard, with his own outlandish conspiracy theory that Plaintiff deleted the dates
on emails to confuse the cases can only be described, in psychiatric terms, as
projection. Benedek has repeatedly included as an exhibit the Attorney Generals
statements in Benedek I that Jane Gatewood was not a party to that case, and
therefore the AG disclaimed any responsibility to cooperate in serving her with
processnotwithstanding that she was a material witness who already testified
under oath to criminal evidence tampering by the Attorney Generaland
contradicting the AG claim in Benedek II that Gatewood was a party to Benedek I.
Benedek has never stated otherwise, and the only reason the dates are not included
on the emails used as Exhibits is that the printer for some arcane IT reason did not
print them. No documents have been altered by Plaintiff for any reason and this is a
totally unsupported accusation made in bad faith. Likewise, the Attorney Generals
efforts to concoct some great mail conspiracy by which he does not receive service
of documents is equally meritless. The fact that the Attorney General received a
copy of the Motion for Sanctions with the Amended Motion for Sanctions does not
mean that the Motion was not independently mailed. Nor is it clear what would be
accomplished by such a scheme. In any case, because of the month-long continuance
of the hearing consented to by Plaintiff, there is no conceivable prejudice to the
Defendant. The Attorney General is merely avoiding the substance of the Exhibits
filed in support of the Motion for Sanctions, and the criminal fraud they document,
for which the Attorney General does not have an answer no matter how long he is
given to respond.

unusual circumstances and address the same fraud by the Attorney

General. Thus, notwithstanding the Courts denial of the motion,
apparently on grounds that it lacked jurisdiction because a conditional
Notice of Appeal was filed to preserve Plaintiffs appeal rights while the
Rule 60 motion was pending,2 the Court does have the authority to
consider those special circumstances and enter an appropriate order
allowing consideration of the Rule 60 motion to set aside the judgment.

5. The Attorney Generals Response ignores the criminal RICO

claims of Benedek II documented in the Motion for Sanctions

In his Response, the Attorney General completely avoids

addressing the criminal RICO predicate acts documented by the Exhibits

Plaintiff filed in support of the Motion for Sanctions.

These documented criminal RICO predicate acts include evidence

tampering, influencing witnesses, perjury, and subornation of perjury.3

2 Moreover, the Court had within its discretion the power to consider the expressly
conditional nature of that Notice and the Rule 60 Motion filed two days before the
appeal deadline expired, based on the delay in Plaintiff receiving notice of the
dismissal order. The Court had the inherent authority to recognize those
extenuating circumstances, acknowledge that the Notice was filed to prevent a
waiver of Plaintiffs appeal rights, and consider Plaintiffs request to extend the time
to file a Notice of Appeal while the Court considered the Motion to set aside the
dismissal order for fraud. OCGA 15-1-3.
3 The exclusively criminal nature of these claims in Benedek II, as opposed to the
tort claims and constitutional violations alleged in Benedek I, also shows why there

The Attorney Generals duplicitous statements in Benedek II,

contradicting his assertions in Benedek I, are made to conceal evidence
of that criminal conductwhich, in Benedek II, also include allegations
of mail fraud, wire fraud, computer fraud and, as documented in the
Exhibits filed in support of this Motion, even include identity fraud in
the form of impersonating UGA students, sending out phony
correspondence in the students names, and creating fake online IDs to
log onto computer databases in the names of the students in order to
manufacture false evidence.

These actions did not harm the Plaintiff only. They also harmed

the University of Georgia, University of Georgia students, and the

University System of Georgia. In effect, they harmed the entire state of
Georgia and all its citizens, and subverted its economy as contemplated
by the Legislature in OCGA 16-14-2. The Court should decline the
Attorney Generals many invitations to ignore the criminal misconduct
that harmed the State and that is documented in the Exhibits filed in
support of the Motion for Sanctions against the Attorney General.

is no claim preclusion. The legal claims of criminal violations in Benedek II by
definition have different elements than the claims based on civil law stated in
Benedek I. Moreover, the dismissal order shows no examination of the 100-plus
page complaints to determine that there are no claims and parties not shared by the
two actions. Such a sifting review would show that the claims and parties in the two
cases are not the same.


Wherefore, premises considered, Plaintiff requests the Court to enter
an order imposing sanctions on the Attorney General for the costs of
this action so far, vacating for fraud the order dismissing this action on
grounds of claim preclusion, and proceeding to consideration of the
merits of this action.

Respectfully submitted this 20th day of March, 2015.
STEPHEN F. HUMPHREYS, P.C.
/s/ Stephen F. Humphreys
___________________________
STEPHEN F. HUMPHREYS
Georgia Bar No. 378099

P.O. Box 192

Athens, GA 30603
1671 Meriweather Drive
Bogart, GA 30622
(706) 543-7777 p
(706) 543-1844 f
(706) 207-6982 m

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that all Defendants have been served
this Replyvia US mail, this 20th day of March, 2015, as follows:
Samuel S. Olens
Kathleen M. Pacious
Loretta L. Pinkston
McLaurin Sitton
Office of the Attorney General
40 Capitol Square, SW
Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1300

STEPHEN F. HUMPHREYS, P.C.

/s/ Stephen F. Humphreys
___________________________
STEPHEN F. HUMPHREYS
Georgia Bar No. 378099
P.O. Box 192
Athens, GA 30603
1671 Meriweather Drive
Bogart, GA 30622
(706) 543-7777 p
(706) 543-1844 f
(706) 207-6982 m

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