PREJUDICAIL QUESTION

Donato vs Luna
TITLE: Donato vs. Luna
CITATION: GR No. 53642, April 15, 1988
FACTS:
An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was filed on January 23,
1979 with the lower court in Manila. This was based on the complaint of private
respondent Paz Abayan. Before the petitioners arraignment on September 28, 1979,
Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26,
1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz consented to entering into the
marriage which was Donatos second since she had no previous knowledge that
Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978.
Donato defensed that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a
marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were
employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior
to the solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint
affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978 for which reason, the requisite
marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato
continued to live with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home upon
learning that Donato already previously married.
ISSUE:Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court be
suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the
juvenile and domestic relations court on the ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial
question.
HELD:
Petitioner Leonilo Donato cant apply rule on prejudicial question since a case for
annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy
case against the accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and
was obtained by means of duress violence and intimidation to show that his act in the
second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the

crime of bigamy.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial
issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.

QUIAMBAO v. OSORIO GR No. L-48157

March 16, 1988
QUIAMBAO v. OSORIO
GR No. L-48157 March 16, 1988
FACTS:
Ejectment Case. Private Respondent claims to own the land and Petitioner through
force, intimidation, strategy and stealth entered their property. Petitioner raised in his
affirmative defense and as a ground for dismissing the case that an administrative case
is pending before the Office of Land Authority between the same parties and involving
the same piece of land.
In the administrative case Petitioner dispute the right of the Private Respondent over
the property for default in payments for the purchase of the lot. Petitioner argue that
the administrative case was determinative of private respondents right toe eject
petitioner from the from the lot in question; hence a prejudicial question which bars a
judicial action until after its termination.
The Municipal Court denied the Motion to Dismiss contained in the Petitioners
affirmative defenses. Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance. Private
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing there is no Prejudicial Question.
The Land Authority filed and Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene in the CFI praying
that the Petition for Certiorari be granted and the ejectment case be dismissed and the
Office of the Land Authority be allowed to decide the matter exclusively.
The Petition was denied by the CFI finding the issue involved in the ejectment case to be
one of prior possession and Motion to Intervene was denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner and Intervenor raised the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BETWEEN THE PRIVATE

PARTIES INVOLVING THE LOT SUBJECT MATTER OF THE EJECTMENT CASE
CONSTITUTES A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION WHICH WOULD OPERATE AS A BAR
TO SAID EJECTMENT CASE.
DECISION: PETITION IS GRANTED. CIVIL CASE No. 2526 of the then MUNICIPAL
COURT OF MALABON RIZAL IS HEREBY ORDERED DISMISSED. No Costs.
Technically, No prejudicial question.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. (Zapata v. Montessa 4 SCRA 510
(1962); Pp v. Aragon, 500 G. No. 10, 4863) The Doctrine of Prejudicial Question comes
into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the
issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must be preemptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can proceed. Thus, the
existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in the criminal case to cause
the suspension of the latter pending final determination of the former.
The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of
the Revised Rules of Court are:
the Civil Action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the
criminal action
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
However because of intimate correlation of the two proceedings and the
possibility of the Land Authority in deciding in favor of Petitioner which
will terminate or suspend Private Respondents Right to Eject Petitioner,
the SC gave the lower court and advise. This advise became the which
became the basis for deciding the case.
Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course for the trial court to
have taken is to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a determination
of the administrative case. Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not jurisprudence dictate
such move. To allow the parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the possibility of
petitioners right of possession being upheld in the pending administrative case is to
needlessly require not only the parties but the court as well to expend time, effort and
money in what may turn out to be a sheer exercise of futility. Thus, 1 AM Jur 2d tells us:
The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon
proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide the
outcome of another pending in another court, especially where the parties and the
issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition
of cases on its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for
litigants. Where the rights parties to the second action cannot be properly determined
until the questions raised in the first action are settled the second action should be

stayed. (at page 622)

While the rule is properly applicable for instances involving two [2] court actions, the
existence in the instant case of the same consideration of identity of parties and issues,
economy of time and effort for the court, the counsels and the parties as well as the
need to resolve the parties right of possession before the ejectment case may be
properly determined, justifies the rules analogous application to the case at bar.
Fortich-Celdran, et al vs. Caldran, et al, 19 SCRA 502, provides another analogous
situation. In sustaining the assailed order of the then CFI of Misamis Oriental ordering
the suspension of the criminal case for falsification of public document against several
persons, among them the subscribing officer Santiago Catane until the civil case
involving the issue of the genuineness of the alleged forged document shall have been
decided, this Court cited as a reason therefor its own action on administrative charges
against said Santiago Catane, as follows:
It should be mentioned here also that an administrative case filed in this Court against
Santiago Catane upon the same charge was held by Us in Abeyance, thus:
As it appears that the genuineness of the document allegedly forged by respondent
attorneys in Administrative Case No. 77 (Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago Catane,
etc, et al.) is necessarily involved in Civil Case No. R-3397 of the Cebu CFI, action on the
herein complaint is withheld until that litigation has finally been decided. Complainant
Celdran shall inform the Court about such decision.(SC minute resolution April 27,
1962 in Adm Case No. 77, Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago Catane, etc. et. al)
If a pending civil case may be considered to be in the nature of a prejudicial question to
an administrative case. We see no reason why the reverse may bot be so considered in
the proper case, such as in the petition at bar.
The SC even noted the Wisdom of Its advice.
Finally, events occurring during the pendency of the petition attest to the wisdom of the
conclusion herein reached. For in the Manifestation filed by counsel for petitioner, it
was stated that he intervenor Land Authority which later became the Department of
Agrarian REform had promulgated a decision in the administrative case affirming the
cancellation of Agreement to Sell issued in favor of the private respondent. Wit this
development, the folly of allowing the ejectment case to proceed is too evident to need
further elaboration.

BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE

FACTS: In 1973, Beltran and Charmaine Felix married each other. Theyve had 4 children
since then but after 24 years of marriage Beltran filed an action for the declaration of the
nullity of their marriage due to Felixs PI. Felix countered that Beltran left the conjugal home
to cohabit with a certain Milagros and that she filed a case of concubinage against Beltran.
In 1997, the lower court found probable cause against Beltran and Milagros. In order to

forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him, Beltran raised the issue that the
civil case he filed is a prejudicial question to the criminal case filed by Milagros. He said that
the courts hearing the cases may issue conflicting rulings if the criminal case will not be
suspended until the civil case gets resolved. The lower court denied Beltrans petition and
so did Judge Tuazon of the RTC upon appeal. Beltran then elevated the case to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a prejudicial
question in the case at bar.
HELD: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case
for declaration of nullity of Beltrans marriage is not a prejudicial question to the
concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to
cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must
appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in
the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only
legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than
remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
In a case for concubinage, the accused (Beltran) need not present a final judgment declaring
his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his
marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to Beltrans argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage
should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent
pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.

CIVIL PERSONALITY
Geluz vs CA

TITLE: Geluz vs CA
CITATION: 2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the
petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some
time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and
to conceal it from her parents, she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her
pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was
employed at COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again became
pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latters daughter
Lucida at Geluz clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time was in the
province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesnt
have any idea nor given his consent on the abortion.
ISSUE:Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could
recover damages from the physician who caused the same.
HELD:
The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of
a person does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality
which trial court and Court of Appeals predicated.
Both trial court and CA wasnt able to find any basis for an award of moral damages
evidently because Oscars indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly
indicates he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental affections. Instead
of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he turned his wifes
indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only he
but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It shows that hes after obtaining a
large money payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000
attorneys fees that serves as indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was
clearly exaggerated.
GELUZ v COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first

time in 1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became
pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. Desiring
to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her
aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the
plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the
Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she
had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two
years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955,
accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she
again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in
Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again
aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty
pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of
Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not
know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this
action and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we
granted certiorari.
ISSUE:
Did the Plaintiff have the right for damages in behalf of his unborn child?
RATIO:
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or
death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action
for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on
account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on
behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal
death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked
juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to
act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived
child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code,
because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by
imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive:
"provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following
article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead
when separated from its mother's womb.

Geluz v CA G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961

J. J. B.L. Reyes

Facts:
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by
respondent Oscar Lazo, the husband of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner
Antonio Geluz, a physician. Lazos cuase of action was the third and last
abortion of his wife to the said doctor.
The wife aborted the first baby before they were legally married. She had
herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years
later, she again became pregnant and was aborted when the husband was
campaigning in the province. He did not give his consent.
The trial court granted the petition and order the doctor to pay Php 3,000.
The CA sustained. The doctor appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON the husband can recover damages from the death of a fetus
Held: No. Petition granted.
Ratio:
Fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not
cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or
death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action
for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on
account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on
behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal
death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked
juridical personality.
Under Article 40 of the Civil Code, the child should be subsequently born
alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the
following article". (Read Art 41 of the Civil Code) In the present case, there
is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's
womb.
As to the reward of moral damages to Lazo: The court ruled that evidently
because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife,
also caused by the appellant, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with
the frustration of his parental hopes and affections.
He appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes
thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even
after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have

taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the

appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining
from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00
damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under
the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.

CITIZENSHIP
MERCADO vs. MANZANO
FACTS:
Ernesto S. Mercado and Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City
of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. In the
results of the elections, Manzano obtained the highest number of votes, however his
was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain
Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines
but of the United States.
COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate
of candidacy of Manzano on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of
the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running
for any elective position.
Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration
under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino
citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was
born in the United States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is
considered in American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as
an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Manzano filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending even until
after the election held on May 11, 1998. Pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 3044,
the BOC tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the
proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, Mercado sought to intervene in the case for disqualification (case filed

by Mamaril) it was however opposed by Manzano. Aug. 31, 1998, COMELEC en banc
rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, it declared
Manzano qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age
of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as
travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau
of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not
result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States. It is an
undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered
himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively
renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer
had U.S. citizenship.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the BOC, Manzano as vice mayor
of the City of Makati. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. WON Mercado has the right to bring suit?
2. WON dual citizenship a ground for disqualification?
3. WON there was a valid election of citizenship?
HELD:
I. Right to bring suit.
At the time Mercado filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention" on May 20, 1998,
there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was precisely to
have private respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective local position"
under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the
disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring
the action, so was Marcado since the he was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati
City.
Mercado had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification
against private respondent is clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reform Law of 1987.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted

for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion
of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is
strong.
II. Dual citizenship as ground for disqualification
The disqualification of Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 those with dual citizenship. It is contended that through 40(d) of the
Local Government Code, Congress has "command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of
persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office."
Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different
laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are
citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act
on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.
The phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must
be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Persons with mere dual citizenship do
not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting
laws of different states.
III. Election of Philippine Citizenship
Mercado argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence
of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when
private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been
made when he reached the age of majority.
COMELEC, pursuant to 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United
States, which provided that "A person who is a national of the United States, whether
by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by:(e) Voting in a political election
in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the

sovereignty over foreign territory." To be sure this provision was declared

unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as beyond the power
given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate
of candidacy when he ran for his present post, Manzano elected Philippine citizenship
and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Manzanos certificate of candidacy, filed
on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-BORN" OR "NATURALIZED")
NATURAL-BORN
xxx xxx xxx
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support
the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he
does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything
which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
Petition is DISMISSED.

1. REPUBLIC VS LIM
Facts:
Chule Y. Lim, respondent, was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother.
She filed a petition to the court for correction of four erroneous entries in her birth certificate
to wit: 1) her surname Yu was misspelled as Yo 2) her fathers name was written as Yo
Diu To (Co Tian) when it should have been Yu Dio To 3) her nationality was entered as
Chinese when it should have been Filipino 4) that she was a legitimate child when she should
have been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married. After the
trial court conducted the appropriate proceeding, it granted the petition sought by respondent
to set the records straight and in their proper perspective. However, petitioner herein filed an
appeal specifically on the correction of her citizenship (from Chinese to Filipino) not having
complied with the legal requirements for election of citizenship. It cited Article IV, Sec 1(3)
of the 1935 Constitution and Sec 1, CA No. 625 which provides the election of citizenship of a
legitimate child of a Filipino mother and alien father upon reaching the age of maturity.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent needs to elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority?

Holding:
The constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to
legitimate children. The case at bar clearly states that respondent is an illegitimate child of a
Filipino mother and alien father. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,
respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth.