ERNEST JED S.

SIMEON

Melo vs. People [GR L-3580, 22 March 1950]

Facts:
Conrado Melo was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, on 27 December 1949, with
frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife
and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different parts of the body, requiring medical
attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing his
habitual labor for the same period of time. On 29 December 1949, at 8:00 a.m., Melo pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged, and at 10:15 p.m. of the same day Benjamin Obillo died from his
wounds. Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only on 3 January 1950, and on the
following day, 4 January 1950, an amended information was filed charging Melo with
consummated homicide. Melo filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double
jeopardy, motion that was denied by the court. Melo filed the petition for prohibition to enjoin
the court from further entertaining the amended information.
Issue:
Whether the second information, filed after the death of the victim, violates the accuseds right
against double jeopardy.
Held:
Rule 106, section 13, 2d paragraph, provides that "If it appears at any time before judgment that
a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original
complaint or information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided
the defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial." Under this provision, it was proper for the
court to dismiss the first information and order the filing of a new one for the reason that the
proper offense was not charged in the former and the latter did not place the accused in a second
jeopardy for the same or identical offense. There is identity between two offenses not only when
the second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when the second offense is an attempt
to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information. This rule of identity does not apply,
however, when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for
the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first
prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Further, when a person who
has already suffered his penalty for an offense, is charged with a new Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 2 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) and greater offense, said penalty may be credited to him in case
of conviction for the second offense.

ERNEST JED S. SIMEON

PSB v. Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912, September 26, 2005

FACTS: Based on a complaint filed by petitioner Philippine Savings Bank (petitioner),
respondents Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy (respondent spouses) were charged with estafa thru
falsification of a public document in the Regional Trial Court. Upon arraignment, respondent
spouses pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was set for trial. After the prosecution
rested its case, the defense filed, with leave of court, a demurrer to evidence on the ground that
the prosecution failed to identify respondent spouses as the accused. The trial court dismissed the
case.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA denied petition
holding that the trial court was correct in granting the demurrer to evidence for insufficiency of
evidence on account of lack of proper identification of the accused. But even assuming that the
trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no longer be reviewed either on appeal or on
petition for certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy.
Thus this petition. The Solicitor General contends that the trial courts dismissal of Criminal
Case No. 96-154193 was tainted with grave abuse of discretion thus, double jeopardy does not
apply in this case.
ISSUE:
W/N Double Jeopardy is applicable in the case at bar?

HELD:
YES. For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 requires the following elements in the first
criminal case:
(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction;
(b) The court had jurisdiction;
(c)

The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and

(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.[15]
On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the
accused does not result in double jeopardy. However, this rule is subject to two exceptions,

ERNEST JED S. SIMEON

namely, if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or on the denial of the right to
speedy trial.[16] A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence falls under the first exception. Since
such dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to an acquittal.
As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the elements required in Section 7 were all present in
Criminal Case No. 96-154193. Thus, the Information for estafa through falsification of a public
document against respondent spouses was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction. The trial court had jurisdiction over the case and the persons of respondent spouses.
Respondent spouses were arraigned during which they entered not guilty pleas. Finally,
Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the
right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense became vested on
respondent spouses.
Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that [a]ny party may appeal from a final
judgment or order, except if the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.
Here, petitioner seeks a review of the 21 April 1998 Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 96154193 for insufficiency of evidence. It is in effect appealing from a judgment of acquittal. By
mandate of the Constitution and Section 7, the courts are barred from entertaining such appeal as
it seeks an inquiry into the merits of the dismissal.

Heirs of Tito Rillorta vs. Firme [GR L-54904, 29 January 1988] First Division, Cruz (J): 4
concur
Facts:
Accused of killing Tito Rillorta, Andrew Costales, was held guilty only of less serious physical
injuries Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 7 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) and sentenced to 20 days
of arresto menor and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500.00. The trial
court said the defendant could not be held liable for homicide because the wound inflicted on the
victim was only superficial. The certified cause of death was pneumonia, and this was obviously
induced by the exploratory surgery which was needlessly performed upon him. In short, the
victim had succumbed not to the skin-deep wound that did not affect any vital organ but as a
result of the attending physician's gross incompetence. The heirs of the deceased did not agree.
Through their counsel acting under the direct control and supervision of the provincial fiscal,"

ERNEST JED S. SIMEON

they filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision notified to them on 23 January 1980. This
motion was sent by registered mail on 2 February 1980. It was denied on 28 February 1980, in an
order that was communicated to the private prosecutor on 18 March 1980. On 20 March 1980, a
notice of appeal was filed with the trial court under the signatures of the prosecuting fiscal and
the private prosecutor.After considering the opposition to the notice and the reply thereto, Judge
Romeo N. Firme (Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La
Union) dismissed the appeal on 14 April 1980, for tardiness. Both the fiscal and the private
prosecutor filed separate motions for reconsideration, but these were denied on 12 May 1980.
The heirs of Tito Rillorta filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether double jeopardy will attach to a judgment which is allegedly tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
Held:
Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "the People of the Philippines cannot
appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy." This provision is based on
the old case of Kepner v. United States, where the U.S. Supreme Court, reviewing a decision of
the Philippine Supreme Court in 1904, declared by a 5-4 vote that appeal of the prosecution from
a judgment of acquittal (or for the purpose of increasing the penalty imposed upon the convict)
would place him in double jeopardy. It has been consistently applied since then in this
jurisdiction. It need only be stressed that if the government itself cannot appeal, much less then
can the offended party or his heirs, who are mainly concerned only with the civil indemnity. The
prohibition operates as a "bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt
to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information." There is no
question that the crime of less serious physical injuries, of which the accused in this case was
convicted, is necessarily included in the offense of homicide. The petitioners argue that double
jeopardy will not attach because the judgment convicting the accused of less serious physical
injuries is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore null and void. This argument is
flawed because whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error
of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. This is
the kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how
obvious the error may be. Infine, thus, however erroneous the order of the respondent court is,
and although a miscarriage of justice resulted from said order, such error cannot now be righted
because of the timely plea of double jeopardy.

ERNEST JED S. SIMEON

People vs. Vergara [GR 101557-5, 28 April 1993]

Facts:
On 7 April 1988, 3rd Asst. Provincial Fiscal Luis E. Estiller of Puerto Princesa City filed
Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397 for frustrated murder against Leonardo Salde, Sr., Leonardo
Salde, Jr., Floresita Salde, Gloria Salde-Panaguiton and Jojeta Panaguiton for allegedly
conspiring together in attacking and taking turns in assaulting the spouses Teresa and Amado
Rubite, by throwing stones at Amado Rubite and hacking him with a bladed weapon, hitting him
on the left fronto-parietal area which would have caused his death in Crimianl Case 8572 (GR
101557), and by striking Teresa with wood and stones and hacking her with a bolo which would
have caused her death in Criminal Case 8573 (GR 101558). On 3 June 1988, Leonardo Salde,
Sr., Leonardo Salde, Jr., Floresita Salde and Gloria Salde-Panaguiton were arraigned. They all
pleaded "not guilty." On 2 August 1988, Jojeta Panaguiton was also arraigned and likewise
entered a plea of "not guilty." On 19 September 1988, when the cases were initially called for
trial, the Prosecuting Fiscal together with counsel for accused jointly moved for the suspension
of the hearing pending the outcome of the motion filed by the accused for reinvestigation of the
cases against them, which Provincial Fiscal Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr., later resolved in their favor.
On 12 December 1988, counsel for the offended parties gave, notice to the Provincial Fiscal of
their intention to appeal the latter's resolution to the Department of Justice. On 2 February 1989,
pending appeal to the Department of Justice, Provincial Fiscal Gacott, Jr., moved for the
dismissal of the cases on the ground that the reinvestigation disclosed that spouses Amado and
Teresa Rubite were the real aggressors and that the accused only acted in self-defense. On 9
February 1989, acting on the motion of the Provincial Fiscal, the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan, Br. 52, ordered the dismissal of Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397. Meanwhile, on 1
March 1990, the Secretary of Justice ordered the Provincial Prosecutor to refile
the Informations. Hence, on 6 April 1990, 2 new Informations for frustrated murder against the
same accused were filed by Acting Provincial Prosecutor Clarito A. Demaala (Criminal Cases
8572 and 8573). On 13 May 1991, after pleading "not guilty" to the new Informations, the
accused moved to quash on the ground of double jeopardy, which was opposed by the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor. On 10 July 1991, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed
Criminal Cases 8572 and 8573. The motion to reconsider the order of 10 July 1991 filed by
Acting Provincial Prosecutor Demaala was denied on 16 August 1991. Amado and Teresa Rubite
filed the petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether Salde, et. al. gave their express consent to the dismissal of the original Informations;
and, whether the first jeopardy was invalidly terminated.
Held:
The right against double jeopardy prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime
of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted. The objective is to set the effects of the
first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to
the peril and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense. It is undisputed that
valid Informations for frustrated murder, i.e., Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397 were filed against
Salde, et. al. before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, a court of competent jurisdiction. It is

ERNEST JED S. SIMEON

likewise admitted that Salde, et. al., after being properly arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty.
The only question then remaining is whether the cases against them were dismissed with their
express consent. This is hardly what Saldy, et. al. gave. What they did was merely
to move for reinvestigation of the case before the prosecutor. To equate this with express consent
of the accused to the dismissal of the case in the lower court is to strain the meaning of "express
consent" too far. Simply, there was no express consent of the accused when the prosecutor
moved for the dismissal of the original Informations. While it may be true that, as a general rule,
all motions should contain a notice of hearing under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, these cases
present an unusual situation where the motion to dismiss filed negates the necessity of a hearing.
Here, it was the public prosecutor himself who after instituting Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that after a reinvestigation it was found that "the
evidence in these cases clearly tilts in favor of both accused. The spouses Amado and Teresa
Rubite were the aggressors and the accused Salde, Sr. and his co-accused merely defended
themselves from the attack of the Rubites. Consequently, it would be unfair, arbitrary and
unjustified to prosecute the accused in the above-entitled case." Since it was the prosecuting
officer who instituted the cases, and who thereafter moved for their dismissal, a hearing on his
motion to dismiss was not necessary at all. It is axiomatic that a hearing is necessary only in
cases of contentious motions. The motion filed in this case has ceased to be contentious.
Definitely, it would be to his best interest if the accused did not oppose the motion. the Rubites,
on the other hand, are precluded from questioning the discretion of the fiscal in moving for the
dismissal of the criminal action. Hence, a hearing on the motion to dismiss would be useless and
futile. The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of
hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive
a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the
merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order
set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the complaint, or to
appeal from the dismissal order, and not certiorari. Hence, the conditions for a valid defense of
double jeopardy, i.e., (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (b) the first
jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and, (c) the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense as that of the first, all being present in these cases, the defense of double jeopardy must
prevail.
Tupaz vs. Ulep [GR 127777, 1 October 1999]
Facts:
On 8 June 1990, State Prosecutor (SP) Esteban A. Molon, Jr. filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City, Branch 33, an information against
Petronila C. Tupaz and her husband Jose J. Tupaz, Jr., as corporate officers of El Oro
Engravers Corporation, for nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the
year 1979, amounting to P2,369,085.46, in violation of Section 51 (b) in relation to
Section 73 of the Tax Code of 1977. On 11 September 1990, the MeTC dismissed the
information for lack of jurisdiction. On 16 November 1990, the trial court denied the
prosecutions motion for reconsideration. On 10 January 1991, SP Molon filed with the

Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, 2 informations (Criminal Cases Q-91-17321 and Q-9117322), against Jose and Petronila Tupaz for the same alleged nonpayment of deficiency

ERNEST JED S. SIMEON

corporate income tax for the year 1979. Criminal Case Q-91-17321 was raffled to Branch 105,
presided over by Judge Benedicto B. Ulep; Q-91-17322 was raffled to Branch 86, then presided
over by Judge Antonio P. Solano. On 25 September 991, both accused posted bail bond in the
sum of P1,000.00 each, for their provisional liberty. On 6 November 1991, the Tupazes filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, a motion to dismiss/quash information
(Q-91-17322) for the reason that it was exactly the same as the information against the Tupazes
pending before RTC, Quezon City, Branch 105 (Q-91-17321). However, on 11 November 1991,
Judge Solano denied the motion. In the meantime, on 25 July 1993, Jose J. Tupaz, Jr. died in
Quezon City. Subsequently, Petronila C. Tupaz filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 105, a petition for reinvestigation, which Judge Ulep granted in an order dated 30 August
1994. On 5 September 1994, Senior State Prosecutor Bernelito R. Fernandez stated that no new
issues were raised in the request for reinvestigation, and no cogent reasons existed to alter,
modify or reverse the findings of the investigating prosecutor. He considered the reinvestigation
as terminated, and recommended the prompt arraignment and trial of the accused. On 20
September 1994, the trial court (Branch 105) arraigned Petronila Tupaz in Criminal Case Q-9117321, and she pleaded not guilty to the information therein. On 17 October 1994, the
prosecution filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a motion for leave to
file amended information in Criminal Case Q91-17321 to allege expressly the date of the
commission of the offense, to wit: on or about August 1984 or subsequently thereafter. Despite
opposition of the accused, on 2 March 1995, the trial court granted the motion and admitted the
amended information. Petronilia was not re-arraigned on the amended information, as the
amendment was only on a matter of form. On 5 December 1995, Petronilia filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a motion for leave to file and admit motion for
reinvestigation. The trial court granted the motion in its order dated 13 December 1995. On 15
May 1996, Prosecutor Agcaoili filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, a
motion for consolidation of Criminal Case Q-91-17322 with Criminal Case Q-91-17321 pending
before the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105. On the same date, the court granted
the motion for consolidation. On 20 May 1996, Judge Ulep of Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, Branch 105, granted the motion for withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case Q-9117321 and dismissed the case, as prayed for by the prosecution. On 28 May 1996, Prosecutor
Agcaoili filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a motion to reinstate
information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321, stating that the motion to withdraw information was
made through palpable mistake, and was the result of excusable neglect. He thought that
Criminal Case Q-91- 17321 was identical to Criminal Case Q-90-12896, wherein Petronilia was
charged with nonpayment of deficiency contractors tax, amounting to P346,879.29. Over the
objections of Petronilia, on 6 August 1996, the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105,
granted the motion and ordered the information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321 reinstated. On 24
September 1996, Petronilia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration. On December
4, 1996, the trial court denied the motion. Petronilia filed the special civil action for certiorari
with the Supreme Court.

ERNEST JED S. SIMEON

Issue:
Whether the reinstatement of the information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321 exposes Petronilia
Tupaz to double jeopardy.
Held:
The reinstatement of the information would expose Petronilia Tupaz to double jeopardy. An
accused is placed in double jeopardy if he is again tried for an offense for which he has been
convicted, acquitted or in another manner in which the indictment against him was dismissed
without his consent. Herein, there was a valid complaint filed against her to which she pleaded
not guilty. The court dismissed the case at the instance of the prosecution, without asking for
Petronilias consent. This consent cannot be implied or presumed. Such consent must be
expressed as to have no doubt as to the accuseds conformity. As Petronilias consent was not
expressly given, the dismissal of the case must be regarded as final and with prejudice to the refiling of the case. Consequently, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating
the information against Petronilia in violation of her constitutionally protected right against
double jeopardy.
ARGEL V. JUDGE PASCUA
FACTS:
Petitioner who was charged with murder was previously acquitted by Judge Pascua.
After his acquittal, said Judge modified her decision on the account that she made a
mistake of rendering her previous judgment believing there was no witness against
the accused due to the fact that the testimony of the witness was not attached to
the records when she wrote her decision. After finding the accused guilty of murder
she ordered the arrest of the accused.

ISSUE:
WON a final judgment by the court can be susceptible for amendment or
modification.

RULING:
No. The final judgment becomes the law of the case and is immune from alteration
or modification regardless of claims of incorrectness or error. A judgment of
acquittal in criminal cases becomes immediately effective upon its promulgation. It
cannot be recalled for amendment only in case of any clerical error, clarify any
ambiguity caused by omission or mistake in the dispositive portion. The inherent
power of the court to modify its decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal
in a criminal case.

ERNEST JED S. SIMEON

People vs. Bocar [GR L-27935, 16 August 1985]

Facts:
On 28 March 1967, the assistant fiscal (Carlos Galman Cruz) for Manila filed before the Court of
First Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial Court) an information against Cesar S. Urbino, Jose
Gigante and Serapion Claudio of the crime of theft, committed as "That on or about October 1,
1965, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together
with three others whose true names, identities and whereabouts are still unknown, and helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away the
following property, to wit: Six (6) pieces of dao Veneer 1 Grade Exportable round logs, valued at
P7,104.62 all valued at P7,104.62 belonging to one JUAN B. BAEZ, JR. to the damage and
prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid sum of P7,104.62, Philippine currency. Contrary to
law." On 3 May 1967, the three accused, upon arraignment, pleaded "not guilty." Proceedings
were had on 7 July 1967. On said date, Judge Juan L. Bocar (Branch XVI) conducted a
"summary investigation" directing questions to the complainant as well as to the accused. At the
end of the "investigation, " the Judge issued the order dismissing the case, holding that the case is
more civil than criminal. On 12 July 1967, the City Fiscal's Office received a copy of the lower
court's order dated 7 July 1967. On 18 July 1967, the private prosecutors in the case filed a
"motion for reconsideration"; and on 8 August 1967, the City Fiscal's Office joined the private
prosecutors in their motion for reconsideration. On 9 August 1967, the Court issued an order
denying the motion for reconsideration. A copy of said order was received by the City Fiscal's
Office on 11 August 1967. Hence, the special civil action for certiorari seeking the annulment of
the CFI order of 7 July 1967.
Issue:
Whether the Judge's dismissal order dated 7 July 1967 constitute a proper basis for a claim of
double jeopardy.
Held:
The parties were not placed under oath before they answered the queries of the the Judge. Verily,
no evidence in law had as yet been entered into the records of the case before the Court. The
Court's issuance of the questioned dismissal order was arbitrary, whimsical and capricious, a
veritable abuse of discretion which the Supreme Court cannot permit. Thus, the Judge's dismissal
order dated 7 July 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute
a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. The constitutional guarantee is that no person shall
be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The Rules of Court clarifies the
guarantee as "Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy. When a defendant shall have
been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the
defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense

ERNEST JED S. SIMEON

charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information." Thus, apparently, to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be
present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must
have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that
in the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. The lower court was not
competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due
process. In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case
for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the
first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
Galman vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 72670, 12 September 1986]
Facts:
On 21 August 1983, Benigno S. Aquino Jr. was killed while being escorted by soldiers from his
plane at the Manila International Airport. The military investigators reported within a span of
three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and
was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman, although he was the personal friend of Col.
Arturo Custodio who picked him up from his house on 17 August 1983) was a communist-hired
gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. The military later filmed a reenactment of the killing scripted according to this version and continuously replayed it on all TV
channels as if it were taken live on the spot. President Marcos instantly accepted the military
version and repeated it in a nationally televised press conference that he gave late in the evening
of 22 August 1983. President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate the
killing of Aquino. After two false starts, he finally constituted the Board on 22 October 1983
which held 125 hearing days commencing 3 November 1983 (including 3 hearings in Tokyo and
8 hearings in Los Angeles, California) and heard the testimonies of 194 witnesses recorded in
20,377 pages of transcripts, until the submission of their minority and majority reports to the
President on October 23 and 24, 1984. Both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting
the military version as propounded by the chief investigator, Maj. Gen. Prospero A. Olivas, that
Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin. It opines that Ninoy's assassination was the
product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. The only difference between the two
reports is that the majority report found all the 26 respondents headed by then AFP Chief General
Fabian C. Ver involved in the military conspiracy and therefore "indictable for the premeditated
killing of Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at the MIA on August 21, 1983;"
while the chairman's minority report would exclude 19 of them and limit as plotters "the 6
persons who were on the service stairs while Senator Aquino was descending" and "General
Luther Custodio because the criminal plot could not have been planned and implemented without
his intervention." On 11 November 1985 Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman, mother and
son, respectively, of the late Rolando Galman, and 29 other petitioners, composed of 3 former
Justices of the Supreme Court, 5 incumbent and former university presidents, a former AFP
Chief of Staff, outstanding members of the Philippine Bar and solid citizens of the community,
filed the present action alleging that Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious
irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of

ERNEST JED S. SIMEON

the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due
process of law. They prayed for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
restraining the Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision on the merits in
the pending criminal cases which it had scheduled on 20 November 1985 and that judgment be
rendered declaring a mistrial and nullifying the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and
ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor. At the hearing on 18
November 1985 of Galman, et. al.'s prayer for issuance of a TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan
from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by 9-to-2 votes
to issue the restraining order prayed for. But 10 days later on 28 November 1985, the Court by
the same 9-to-2-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the temporary
restraining order issued 10 days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision.
On 29 November 1985, Galman, et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration. On 20 March 1986,
Galman, et. al. filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration attached
therewith. The thrust of the second motion for reconsideration was the startling and therefore
unknown revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera that President Marcos had ordered
the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez and the prosecution panel headed by
Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 accused and produce a verdict of
acquittal. On 3 April 1986, the Court granted the motion to admit the second motion for
reconsideration and ordered the respondents to comment thereon. The accused opposed the
second motion for reconsideration and prayed for its denial. As a whole, all the other respondents
raised the issue of double jeopardy, and invoked that the issues had become moot and academic
because of the rendition of the Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all accused on 2
December 1985, with counsels for Ver and Tigas, as well as Olivas, further arguing that
assuming that the judgment of acquittal is void for any reason, the remedy is a direct action to
annul the judgment where the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff to establish by clear,
competent and convincing evidence the cause of the nullity.
Issue:
Whether the acquittal of the 26 accused during Marcos time bars subsequent prosecution, on
account of new evidence that the proceedings leading to said acquittal was rigged.
Held:
President Marcos misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian
powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder
cases. As graphically depicted in the Report, and borne out by the happenings (res ipsa
loquitura), since the resolution prepared by his "Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his Presidential
Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases against all accused was
unpalatable (it would summon the demonstrators back to the streets) and at any rate was not
acceptable to the Herrera prosecution panel, the unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused
after the rigged trial as ordered at the Malacaang conference, would accomplish the two
principal objectives of satisfaction of the public clamor for the suspected killers to be charged in
court and of giving them through their acquittal the legal shield of double jeopardy.The Supreme
Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified; and
declared the sham trial a mock trial and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was
unlawful and void ab initio. It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against
this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the

ERNEST JED S. SIMEON

prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. The
cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted
of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void
for lack of jurisdiction. Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may
be regarded as a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever it exhibits its head. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before
a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. More so does
the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the present cases where the sham trial
was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered the Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the
predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as innocent of all the accused.
Manifestly, the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a
partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure
exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated,
coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the present case is a void judgment.
Therefore, no double jeopardy attaches. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all.
By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all
proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts
performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
People vs. Grospe [GRs L-74053-54, 20 January 1988]
Facts:
Manuel Parulan is an authorized wholesale dealer of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) in Bulacan.
On 13 June 1983, Parulan issued Planters Development Bank (Santa Maria, Bulacan Branch)
[PDB] Check 19040865 in the sum of P86,071.20 in favor of SMC, which was received by the
SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan. The check was forwarded to the SMC Regional Office
at San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was delivered to and received by the SMC Finance Officer,
who then deposited the check with the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), San Fernando
Branch, which is the SMC depository bank. On 8 July 1983, the SMC depository bank received a
notice of dishonor of the said check for "insufficiency of funds" from the PDB, the drawee bank
in Santa Maria, Bulacan. On 18 June 1983, Parulan likewise issued PDB Check 19040872 in the
amount of P11,918.80 in favor of SMC, which was received also by the SMC Supervisor at
Guiguinto, Bulacan, as direct payment for the spot sale of beer. That check was similarly
forwarded by the SMC Supervisor to the SMC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga,
where it was delivered to the Finance Officer thereat and who, in turn, deposited the check with
the SMC depository bank in San Fernando, Pampanga. On 8 July 1983, the SMC depository
bank received a notice of dishonor for "insufficiency of funds" from the drawee bank, the PDB,
in Santa Maria, Bulacan. In Criminal Case 2800 of the RTC Pampanga, he was charged with
Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22) for having issued a check on 13 June 1983 for
P86,071.20 in favor of SMC ([PDB] Check 19040865) but which was dishonored for having
been drawn against "insufficient funds" and, in spite of repeated demands, for having failed and

ERNEST JED S. SIMEON

refused to make good said check to the damage and prejudice of SMC. In Criminal Case 2813 of
the same Court, Parulan was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code for having made out a check on 18 June 1983 in the sum of P11,918.80 in
favor of SMC (PDB Check 19040872) in payment of beer he had purchased, but which check
was refused payment for "insufficient funds" and, in spite of repeated demands, for having failed
and refused to redeem said check to the damage and prejudice of SMC. The two cases were tried
jointly, the witnesses for both prosecution and defense being the same for the two suits. The trial
court, through the Hon Nathaniel M. Grospe (Presiding Judge, Branch 44, RTC
Pampanga) rendered judgment dismissing the cases for lack of jurisdiction, and ordered the
cancellation of the bail bond posted by the accused. Hence, the special civil action for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the present petition for certiorari places the accused in double jeopardy for the same
offense.
Held:
The dismissal of the subject criminal cases by the Judge, predicated on his lack of jurisdiction, is
correctible by Certiorari. The error committed is one of jurisdiction and not an error of judgment
on the merits. Well-settled is the rule that questions covering jurisdictional matters may be
averred in a petition for certiorari, inclusive of matters of grave abuse of discretion, which are
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction renders whatever order of the Trial
Court null and void. The present petition for Certiorari seeking to set aside the void Decision of
the Judge does not place the accused in double jeopardy for the same offense. It will be recalled
that the questioned judgment was not an adjudication on the merits. It was a dismissal upon the
Judge's erroneous conclusion that his Court had no "territorial jurisdiction" over the cases. Where
an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the merits, it cannot bar as res judicata a
subsequent case based on the same offense. The dismissal being null and void the proceedings
before the Trial Court may not be said to have been lawfully terminated. There is therefore, no
second proceeding which would subject the accused to double jeopardy.
People vs. Santiago [GR 80778, 20 June 1989]
Facts:
On 2 June 1987 an information for violation of PD 772 was filed by the Assistant City Fiscal of
Quezon City, with the approval of the city fiscal, in the RTC of the same city against Segundina
Rosario y Sembrano, which reads, among others, "That on or about 16th day of December, 1986,
and for sometime prior thereto and persisting up to the present, in Quezon City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused taking advantage of the absence
or tolerance of the University of the Philippines, the registered owner of a parcel of land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in occupying and/or possessing a portion of
the said property, by then and there constructing his/her house therein for residential purposes,
without the consent and against the will of the said offended party." Upon arraignment, Rosario
pleaded not guilty and a pretrial conference was held on 14 August 1987 wherein Rosario
informed the court that she has a title, a building permit and survey plan covering the subject
land. On 27 October 1978, the decision was rendered by Judge Pedro T. Santiago (Presiding

ERNEST JED S. SIMEON

Judge of Branch 101 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City) acquitting the accused of the
offense charged with costs de oficio. Hence, the counsel for the private offended party, the
University of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari, in behalf of the People of the
Philippines. The petition seeks to render null and void the decision for want of due process as the
acquittal of the accused was rendered without a trial on the merits.
Issue:
Whether double jeopardy has set in in this case.
Held:
The judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering the decision without affording the
prosecution the opportunity to have its day in court. The issue before the Court is whether or not
the accused built the structure on the land belonging to U.P. At the pretrial, U.P. presented its title
and plan showing that the accused built a structure within its property. The accused by her
proffer of exhibits and manifestation pretended to have a title to the questioned land. However,
as stressed by U.P., the titled property of accused is located in Marikina and not in Quezon City
and said title could not cover the very lot in question which is at Pook Amorsolo, U.P. Campus
where the structure of accused was built. This issue cannot be determined by a mere examination
of the titles and documents submitted by the parties. A trial on the merits should be undertaken to
determine once and for all whether the place where the structure was built by the accused
belongs to U.P. or to the accused. The conclusion of the trial court that the accused did not build
her structure illegally as she has a title to the property in question is without any factual or legal
basis. Indeed, the observation of respondent judge in the questioned decision as to "the
inadequacy in details of the state's evidence" simply demonstrates that a trial on the merits
should have been held to enable the prosecution to establish its case. No doubt, the acquittal of
the accused is a nullity for want of due process. The prosecution was not given the opportunity to
present its evidence or even to rebut the representations of the accused. The prosecution is as
much entitled to due process as the accused in a criminal case. Hence, double jeopardy cannot be
invoked as a bar to another prosecution in this case. There is double jeopardy only when: 1) there
is a valid complaint or information; 2) filed before a competent court; 3) to which defendant had
pleaded; and 4) of which he has previously been convicted or acquitted or which was dismissed
or terminated without his express consent. In fine, the prosecution was deprived of an
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case. The decision that was rendered in disregard of such
imperative is void for lack of jurisdiction. It was not a court of competent jurisdiction when it
precipitately rendered a decision of acquittal after a pre-trial. A trial should follow a pre-trial.
That is the mandate of the rules. Obviously, double jeopardy has not set in in this case.