G.R. Nos.

78813-14 November 8, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FARHAD HATANI y ABOLHASSAN, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Nestor I. Madlansacay, counsel de parte for accused-appellant.
Nasser A. Marohomsalic, collaborating counsel for accused-appellant.

QUIASON, J.:
This is an appeal from the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City,
convicting appellant in Criminal Cases No. Q-11867 and No. Q-11868.
The dispositive portion of the decision in Criminal Case No. Q-11867 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Farhad Hatani
y Abolhassan, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal practice of medicine in
violation of R.A. 2382 otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959 (Secs. 8, 10)
penalized by Section 28 thereof with "a fine of not less than one thousand pesos
nor more than ten thousand pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, or by imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than five
years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court; and
considering the circumstances of the case and the ignominy caused by him to his
two teen-aged, female, then unmarried victims, this Court exercising its discretion
granted under said Section 28 of the law, hereby SENTENCES said accused
FARHAD HATANI Y ABOLHASSAN to pay a fine of ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency AND to suffer
imprisonment of five (5) years; and to pay the costs.
This Court further recommends that after service of his sentence the accused be
deported as undesirable alien (Rollo, p. 35).
The dispositive portion of the decision in Criminal Case No. Q-11868 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, FARHAD
HATANI y ABOLHASSAN, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
punishable under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
SENTENCES said accused to suffer life imprisonment orreclusion perpetua; and
to indemnify the complainant, Precila Borja, in the sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) and to pay costs (Rollo, p. 41).
The information in Criminal Case No. Q-11867 charged appellant with illegal practice of
medicine, in violation of R.A. No. 2382, otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959, committed
as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of July, 1979, in Quezon City, Philippines the above
named accused, knowing fully well that he has not satisfactorily passed the
corresponding Board Examination, neither is he a holder of a valid Certificate of
Registration duly issued by the Board of Medical Examiners, as in fact he does
not even appear to have taken or completed the course leading to a medical
degree, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously for compensation,
fee and salary, paid to him directly, physically examined Priscila (sic) Borja Y
Loquero and Wilma Borja Y Loquero, diagnosed, treated and administer
injections on the persons of Prescila (sic) Borja Y Loquero and Wilma Borja Y
Loquero, in Violation of Section 10, in relation to Section 28, Republic Act No.
2382 (Records, Vol. I, p. 1).
The information in Criminal Case No. Q-11868, charged appellant with Rape, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 6th day of July, 1979, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, with lewd designs, and while she was deprived of reason
or unconscious after having been drugged or administered medicine, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the
undersigned PRECILA BORJA Y LOQUERO without her consent and against her
will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded under the
provisions of the Civil Code (Records, Vol. II, p. 1).
It appears that in the morning of July 6, 1979, Agustina Borja visited her comadre, Maura
Fontreras, and requested malunggay leaves as medication for her 16-year old daughter, Precila,
who had high fever and loose bowel movement. Upon learning that Precila was sick, Marita,
Maura's daughter, introduced Agustina to her husband, appellant herein, whom she said was a
medical doctor. Marita suggested that her husband treat Precila and Agustina agreed.
Appellant and Marita went to the Borja residence, where he examined Precila. He gave her
tablets to take and administered two injections (to her), one in the morning and the second at
noon. After each injection, Precila would feel dizzy and fall asleep.
It was appellant's diagnosis that Precila was a drug addict and required further observation and
treatment. Appellant offered to attend to Precila at his house and again, Agustina agreed in the
belief that her daughter was a drug addict.
In the evening of the same day, Precila was fetched by appellant and Marita and was brought to
appellant's house. Again, Precila was given an injection which caused her to sleep. When she
awoke, she realized that she was naked and her entire body was in pain. Appellant was seated
on the bed and was fondling her private parts. Shocked, Precila called for her mother and tried to
get up. Appellant, however, punched her on the chest and forced her to lie down. He pressed a
pillow on her face and injected her again, causing her to fall asleep.
When Precila awoke the second time, she found appellant in bed with her. He was naked and
fondling her private parts. The pain all over her body lingered. When Precila touched her private
parts, she saw blood stains on her hand. She tried to stand up but she was too weak. Appellant
gave her another injection rendering her unconscious.
The following morning, Agustina went to fetch Precila. Upon reaching the Fontreras' residence,
she went straight to the bedroom, where, to her great dismay, she found Precila and appellant
both asleep and naked. She hurriedly dressed up Precila and brought her home.

When Precila woke up, she noticed she was already home and her mother was crying. Precila
remained dizzy, with throbbing pains all over her body. When talked to, she was incoherent.
That evening, Precila's oldest sister, Josefina, a nurse by profession, came home and saw
Precila looking very weak. Her mother, who was crying narrated what she had witnessed that
morning. She also told Josefina that appellant was in the other bedroom, treating another sister,
Wilma whom he also diagnosed as a drug addict. Josefina immediately proceeded to the
bedroom and saw appellant about to inject Wilma.
Josefina saw the open bag of appellant, which contained empty capsules of dalmane and empty
vials of valium. She inquired on the need of the injection and appellant replied that a second shot
of plain distilled water was required to cure Wilma of her drug addiction. Josefina told appellant to
stop but he persisted. Only upon threat that she would call the police did appellant stop.
Appellant and his wife then left the Borja residence.
The following day, Agustina and Josefina brought Precila and Wilma to the Philippine
Constabulary Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, where Josefina and Wilma gave their
statements (Exhs. "D" and "F"). Precila was physically examined by a doctor, whose medical
report stated that Precila's hymen and "deep, healing lacerations" and that "subject is in nonvirgin state physically" (Exh. A). Several needle puncture marks were also found on Precila's
arms and buttocks.
A physical examination was likewise done on Wilma, which showed that she too had a needle
puncture, as shown in the Medico-Legal Report (Exh. "L").
Acting on the complaint filed before the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), a surveillance
of appellant's residence was conducted. Subsequently, a search warrant was secured from
Judge Jose P. Castro of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. Armed with the warrant,
CANU agents raided appellant's residence on July 15, 1979.
Assorted drugs, such as dalmane, valium and mogadon, as well as prescription pads in the
name of Dr. Jesus Yap (Exhs. "H" "H-4") and other medical instruments, such as a "thermometer,
a "hygomonometer (sic), stethoscope, syringes and needles, were seized.
The Handwriting Identification Report (Exh. "I") on the prescription slips showed that these were
written by the appellant himself. The report on the chemistry examination of the seized tablets
and capsules (Exhs. "J" "J-1") confirmed the presence of mogadon, dalmane and valium.
After the preliminary investigation, separate informations for rape and violation of R.A. No. 2382
were filed. Appellant pleaded not guilty to both crimes.
The defense's version is that in the evening of July 6, 1976, Agustina and Precila Borja visited
the mother-in-law of the appellant, Maura Fontreras. In the course of the conversation, Agustina
asked Marita if she could help Precila. Marita obliged and agreed to take care of Precila for the
night and allow her to sleep in her bedroom.
Precila and Marita chatted the whole night. Accordingly, Precila confessed that she was not really
sick. She merely related her personal problems, involving her parents. She also admitted her
vice, such as drinking, smoking and taking drugs.
Their talk lasted until the wee hours of the morning and during their conversation, appellant
would occasionally enter the room but he never joined their discussion.

Precila and Marita shared the same bed. Appellant; who was wearing only his pajama pants,
slept on the floor at the opposite end of the room.
The following morning Agustina arrived and Marita related some of Precila's problems. Nothing
untoward happened that day and Agustina headed for home while Precila and Marita followed
later.
At past midnight of July 15, 1979, a raid was conducted by CANU agents in the house of the
appellant under the supervision of C1C Agustin Timbol, Jr. The raid was made upon Josefina's
complaint for illegal possession of drugs.
Appellant and his wife were driven out of their bedroom, while three-men remained. Later,
appellant was called to join them in the bedroom and he was shocked to see assorted drugs
scattered around. Appellant denied owning them. Photographs were taken of him with the drugs.
A barangay official was called to attest to the list of the confiscated drugs. Appellant, however,
refused to sign the said list.
C1C Timbol offered to fur the case in exchange of money. Instead of acceding, appellant
demanded to see the search warrant. C1C Timbol failed to show a warrant on the pretext that
they were military men without need of any identification or search warrant. Appellant, his wife
and brother-in-law were forced to join C1C Timbol for questioning in Camp Crame. Upon
boarding the van, appellant saw Josefina aboard kissing C1C Timbol and both exchanged victory
signs.
The trial court rendered two separate decisions and convicted the appellant of both crimes. In
finding appellant guilty of illegal purchase of medicine, considerable weight was given to the
prosecution's exhibits.
The Professional Regulation Commission certified that appellant is not among the list of
registered physicians nor among those with special permit to practice medicine in a limited scope
(Exh. "K").
Appellant failed to refute the Handwriting Identification Report (Exh. "I") released by the PC
Crime Laboratory showing that the signature of Dr. Jesus D. Yap (Exhs. "H" "H-4") prescribing
medicine belonged to him. The pictures also taken during the raid (Exhs. "G" - "G-8'" undeniably
reveal several medical equipment used by practicing physicians.
Notwithstanding the trial court's finding that there was no direct evidence of rape, it concluded
that circumstantial evidence indicate that rape was consummated by appellant considering the
following:
1. The medico-legal examination of victim Precila, taken on July 8, 1979 at 10:25
in the morning or less than 48 hours from the evening of July 6, 1979 found
"hymen with deep, healing lacerations at 4, 6 and 9 o'clock position"; thus
indicating that the lacerations were recent as they are in the process of healing;
(Exh. "A-1")
2. The above undeniable findings of the expert confirms the statement of the
victim, a young girl of 16 or 17 years of age, that when she held private parts
which were painful then, she noticed blood. (tsn. Alma, Feb. 9, 1984, pp. 4-5).

The fresh laceration of the hymen further confirms the carnal assault. (People vs. Ocampo, L47335, Aug. 13, 1986)
3. In the two short waking moments of the victim she noticed she was naked and
beside her on the same bed was the accused, also naked. (tsn. Alma, Feb. 9,
1984, pp. 3-5)
4. The accused, then 21 years of age was in the prime of youth, and the
unconscious girl beside him was just 16 or 17 years of age, thus in the full bloom
of womanhood. The sexual excitement on the part of the accused was therefore
exceedingly great.
5. When the mother, Agustina, came into the room of the accused that early
morning of July 7, 1979 she saw her daughter and the accused on the same bed
and both naked. (tsn., Rogato, Jan. 27, 1981, p. 9)
6. The medico-legal found several needle puncture marks on the arms and
buttocks of Precila (Exh. "A"); thus confirming Precila's testimony that she had
been injected by the accused, rendering her unconscious (tsn. Alma, Feb. 9,
1984, pp. 4-5; tsn., Nenita, May 21, 1984, pp. 3-6; also pp. 29-30).
7. The medico-legal found the victim "in non-virgin state physically." (Exh; "A-i")
8. At the time of the medico-legal examination, i.e. morning of July 8, 1979, the
victim was found to be "incoherent." (Exh. A) after effect of the injections or
drugs.
9. At the time of the incident (July 6, 1979) the Borjas and Frontreras ( sic) were
"comadres" and neighbors. There is no enmity between and among them.
10. Between accused and Marita on one hand, and the victim, her mother, and
sisters, on the other hand, there was no misunderstanding before the incident.
There is absolutely absence of any ulterior motive for the teen-aged victim or her
family to file the serious charge of rape which would expose her to
embarrassment of examination of her private parts and public trial (Rollo, pp. 3839).
In his first assignment of error, appellant questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
Appellant faults complainant for recounting her ordeal only after four years when she took the
witness stand. This argument is misleading. The record shows that the day after the rape,
Josefina and Wilma Borja, accompanied by their mother, Agustina, issued their statements at
Camp Crame. Agustina gave her statement twice on separate days. Precila did not give any
statement due to her weak condition but it cannot be denied that she was instead physically
examined. Suffice it to say, the Medico Legal Report (Exh. "A") indicates swellings and
lacerations and concludes that Precila was no longer a virgin. Although the records fail to show
any sworn statement by Precila, such is not fatal where the sworn affidavits of her mother, her
two sisters and the medico-legal report are sufficient to show probable cause of rape (People v.
Yambao, 193 SGRA 571 [1991]).
Precila was either dizzy or unconscious at the time she was sexually abused. We find her
testimony consistent and credible. While her testimony is limited to the times when she would

gain her consciousness, it is not unlikely that such traumatic incidents would still be engraved on
her mind even four years after.
Appellant's assertion that Precila failed to inform her family of his misdeeds is explainable. As
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Precila was still dizzy and incoherent as a
consequence of the injections administered by appellant. In fact, when Precila was physically
examined by the doctor the day after, she was still sleepy and groggy (TSN, March 31, 1980, pp.
7-8).
Appellant also finds it strange that considering the acts allegedly committed by him against
Precila, the medico-legal report fails to specify any injuries on the body of Precila. Appellant need
not inflict heavy blows on Precila for the simple reason that she was under sedation. The
absence of the injuries does not negate the commission of rape (People v. Torrevillas, 203 SCRA
576 [1991]; People v. Arenas, 198 172 [1991]) for rape may be committed after rendering a
woman unconscious (Art. 335, Revised Penal Code; People v. Gerones, 193 SCRA 263 [1991]).
Appellant alleges that Precila was no longer a virgin on that fateful day and that her bleeding was
actually the start of her menstrual cycle. It is settled jurisprudence that virginity is not an essential
element of rape (People v. Corro, 197 SCRA 121 [1991]; People v. Banayo, 195 SCRA 543
[1991]). To claim that Precila's menstrual cycle began on that day is highly speculative.
Appellant claims that the sworn statements of the Borjas (Exhs. "D", "E" and "F") were antedated
and were prepared after the illegal search was conducted in his residence. He also cites some
inconsistencies in said statements. We find the claim to be devoid of merit. It is only now on
appeal that appellant disputes the execution of these affidavits. When they were presented and
offered as evidence, appellant failed to raise such objections and to refute them.
The alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses merely refer to minor
details, which cannot destroy their credibility (People v. Doctolero, 193 SCRA 632 [1991]). This is
also true where statements made while on the witness stand are claimed to be inconsistent with
the affidavit, which are generally incomplete (People v. Lagota, 194 SCRA 92 [1991]; People v.
Avanzado, 158 SCRA 427 [1988]).
With regard to the second assignment of error, appellant insists that his conviction arose from
insufficient evidence and his failure to prove his innocence.
Indeed, the circumstantial evidence established at the trial are more than sufficient to prove the
guilt of appellant. The Medico-Legal Report on Precila, taken within 48 hours from the
commission of rape confirmed that her hymen had "deep, healing lacerations at 4, 6 and 9
o'clock position" and Precila was "in non-virgin state physically" (Exh. "A"). Furthermore, the
report confirms that Precila had at least six needle puncture marks and swellings, which confirm
that appellant had injected her several times.
On the two occasions that Precila woke up, she positively stated that appellant was with her on
the bed and that they were both naked. She also tried to free herself on both attempts from
accused, but, he made her unconscious through injections (TSN, February 9, 1984, pp. 3-5).
This is corroborated by the testimony of Agustina, who saw her daughter and accused together
naked on bed (TSN, January 27, 1981, p. 9). These unbroken chain of events leads one to a fair
and reasonable conclusion that accused actually raped Precila.

As held in People v. Yambao, supra, credence is given to the findings of the trial court where the
rape victim's testimony is buttressed by the corroborative testimony of the mother and the
medico-legal report, as well as the report of the police investigator.
It must also be borne in mind that at the time of the commission of the crime, Precila was just
sixteen years old. No young lady at the prime of her youth would concoct a story of defloration,
allow an examination of her intimate parts and later bare herself to the disgrace brought to her
honor in a public trial unless she was motivated solely by a desire to have the culprit
apprehended and brought to justice (People v. Patilan, 197 SCRA 354 [1991]; People v. Yambao,
193 SCRA 571 [1991]).
Appellant claims that his right to be presumed innocent was violated. He cites the trial court's
decision holding that it.
. . . finds that with these circumstantial evidences (sic) pieced together the
prosecution has proved the crime of rape, and the burden shifted on the defense
to show the contrary (Rollo, p. 40).
Appellant was afforded a fair trial and in fact he availed of surrebuttal evidence. The statement of
the trial court, as correctly argued by the Solicitor General, implies that the circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction unless the defense is able to provide
evidence to the contrary.
With respect to his conviction of illegal practice of medicine, appellant presented inconsistent
claims. On one hand, he claims that the drugs and other paraphernalia were planted by the
raiding team; while on the other hand, he claims that these were seized without any warrant.
If indeed the evidence were all planted, how can appellant explain his handwriting on the
prescription pads in the name of Dr. Jesus Yap? A perusal of the photographs showing accused
during the raid, fails to indicate any protestation by him. In fact, the other photographs (Exhs. "Gl", "G-2", "G-4" "G-8") do not bear any sign of disorder, in contrast to appellant's testimony that
his room was made into a mess during the raid.
The records fail to disclose a copy of a search warrant. However, the prosecution was able to
present its return (Exh. "ZZ") and we are satisfied that indeed a lawful search warrant was
obtained. Besides, the judge who granted the search warrant was the same judge who initially
heard both criminal cases. It can therefore be presumed, that the search was made with a search
warrant and absent of any showing that it was procured maliciously, the items seized are
admissible in evidence (People v. Umali, 193 SCRA 493 [1991]).
The evidence is overwhelming that appellant actually treated and diagnosed Precila and Wilma
Borja. The positive testimony of Agustina, Precila, Wilma and Josefina Borja; the medico-legal
reports (Exhs. "A", "A-7", "C", "L" and "L-1") which attest to the needle marks; the Handwriting
Identification Report (Exh. I); the photographs (Exhs. "G-l "G-8") showing assorted drugs and
medical equipment in appellant's room; and the chemistry reports (Exhs. "J" "J-1") prove that
appellant was engaged in the practice of medicine. And as to his allegation that there was no
proof of payment, the law specifically punishes said act whether or not done for a fee.
Appellant claims that Precila admitted in her cross-examination that she was in school the whole
day of July 6, 1979 and it was therefore impossible for him to have treated and diagnosed her on
that date. An accurate reading of the transcript, however, will show that Precila's testimony was
in response to a question regarding her school schedule for that day.

Finally, appellant claims that the ponente of both decisions was not the trial judge, ergo said
judge was thus deprived of the opportunity to assess the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
Admittedly, the ponente's participation was limited to the resolution of the cases. The fact that the
judge who heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment, and for that reason the
latter did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial but
merely relied on the records of the case, does not render the judgment erroneous (People v.
Ramos, Jr., 203 SCRA 237 [1991]; People v. Villamayor, 199 SCRA 472 [1991]), especially
where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion.
WHEREFORE, the judgments appealed from are AFFIRMED in toto. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION
THE PEOPLE OF
THEPHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

G.R. No. 186387

Present:
VELASCO, JR., J.,Chairperson,
PERALTA,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

- versus -

JUAN MENDOZA y VICENTE,

Accused-Appellant.

Promulgated:
August 31, 2011

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal assailing the June 5, 2008 Decision[1]of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. HC-No. 02734 which affirmed with modification
the February 6, 2007Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Baguio City,
Branch 61 (RTC). The RTC found accused Juan Mendoza y Vicente guilty of
having violated Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Version of the Prosecution

The evidence for the prosecution shows that Senior Police Officer 4
Edelfonso Sison (SPO4 Sison) received information from a long-serving
unidentified informant of the Baguio City Police Offices (BCPO) Drug
Enforcement Section (DES) that the accused contacted him and offered to
sell shabu worth P1,000.00 to any interested buyer. The accused then suggested
that they meet at the stairs of the Cresencia Barangay Hall along Bokawkan
Road.
After interviewing the informant, Police Senior Inspector Myles Pascual
(PSI Pascual) decided to conduct a buy-bust operation to entrap the
accused. PSI Pascual made arrangements for the informant, the accused, and
the poseur buyer officer to meet on April 14, 2005 around 2:30 oclock in the
afternoon at the stairs below the Cresencia Barangay Hall along Bokawkan
Road. He planned for an entrapment operation and put together a team, with
SPO4 Sison, as team leader; Police Officer 3 Ricky Calamiong (PO3
Calamiong) and PO3 Roy Mateo (PO3 Mateo), as back-up officers; and Police
Officer 2 Edgar Antolin (PO2 Antolin), as the poseur buyer.
In coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA),
the entrapment team proceeded to the area at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, half
an hour before the scheduled time. The team parked their vehicle 20 to 30
meters away from the designated transaction area. PO2 Antolin and the
informant alighted and proceeded to the stairway to wait for the accused.
Twenty minutes later, the accused arrived and approached the informant.
The latter introduced PO2 Antolin as the buyer. After the accused asked if the
buyer had the money, PO2 Antolin handed over P1,000.00. The accused then
gave him two (2) sachets containing white crystalline substance. PO2 Antolin
raised his right hand, the pre-arranged signal, signifying to the other team
members that the transaction had been consummated. The team rushed to assist
PO2 Antolin, who arrested the accused and recovered the buy-bust-money. PO2
Antolin frisked the accused and recovered five (5) more small transparent
sachets with white crystalline substance from the pants pocket of the accused.
He turned over the same to the team leader, SPO4 Sison.
SPO4 Sison informed the accused in Tagalog the reason why he was
being arrested and apprised him of his constitutional rights. The accused merely
nodded but otherwise kept silent.[3] The buy-bust team then took the accused to
the BCPO, where PO2 Antolin identified him as Juan Mendoza, alias Ampi.
In a preliminary test, the white crystalline substance recovered from the
accused tested positive for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
or shabu, a dangerous drug.[4] The case records state that after the conduct of

such preliminary test, the items confiscated from the accused were turned over
to the Philippine National Police (PNP)Crime Laboratory Service at Camp
Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further analysis and disposition.[5]

A confirmatory test conducted on the same day by Police Inspector and

Forensic Chemical Officer Cecile Akiangan Bullong yielded the same result.[6]
Version of the Accused
The accused alleges that in the afternoon of April 14, 2005, he was
walking down Sepic Road, Baguio City, on his way home from his brothers
house in Guisad, where he had just finished washing diapers and clothes. A
vehicle stopped beside him and SPO4 Sison alighted. The accused knew SPO4
Sison because the latter arrested him for a drug offense way back in 1997, for
which he was convicted and incarcerated in Camp Sampaguita for five years.
SPO4 Sison showed him a photograph and demanded information about
the person in the photo. When he insisted that he did not know who it was,
SPO4 Sison invited him to the BCPO-DES. As he could not decline, he went
along with him.
At the DES, the police again asked him if he knew the person in the photo
and a certain Gary Chua, but he replied in the negative. He was also questioned
whether he knew someone who was selling drugs, and he again replied in the
negative. He told the police that since his release from prison, he no longer
dabbled in the drug trade, as he already had a family. When he told SPO4 Sison
that he did not know anyone who was selling drugs, SPO4 Sison got angry.
After an hour, he was informed that he would be subjected to a drug test.
Again, unable to refuse, he was subjected to a drug test at the BCPO Station 7
laboratory, in front of the DES. He was then brought to the Baguio General
Hospital (BGH) for a medical examination, and later back to the police station.
During the interrogation at the police office, he did not have a counsel
present.[7] SPO4 Sison did not inform him that he was being arrested for the
possession of the 5 heat-sealed plastic sachets containing shabu.[8]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision dated February 6, 2007, the RTC found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt in both Criminal Case No. 24384-R and Criminal Case
No. 24385-R. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 24384-R, judgment is
rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond any reasonable doubt
and he is hereby sentenced to suffer Life Imprisonment and to pay a
fine of 500,000.00 and in Criminal Case No. 24385-R, judgment is
rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond any reasonable doubt
and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of
Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day to Fourteen (14) Years, and to pay
the costs.
SO ORDERED.[9]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision[10] dated June 5, 2008, the CA affirmed with modification
the RTC decision. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED for
lack of merit. The Decision dated 06 February 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61 finding the accused-appellant
JUAN MENDOZA Y VICENTE guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 in
Criminal Case Nos. 24384-R and 24385-R and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of 500,00[0].00,
and the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
fourteen
(14)
years,
respectively,
is AFFIRMED
with
MODIFICATION in that said accused-appellant is hereby ordered to
pay a fine of300,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 24385-R.
SO ORDERED.[11]

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
In his Supplemental Brief for the Accused-Appellant,[12] the accused
submits that the court a quo erred:
In not finding that the procedures for the custody and
disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs in Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 were not complied with, rendering the evidence
compromised.

In convicting the accused-appellant notwithstanding the

fact that his guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
[13]

Ruling of the Court

The Court finds the arguments of the accused bereft of merit.
In crimes involving the sale of illegal drugs, two essential elements must
be satisfied: (1) identities of the buyer, the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it.[14]
In the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, on the other
hand, it must be shown that: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or an
object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) such possession is
not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
said drug.[15] In this case, all these elements were satisfactorily proven by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt through testimonial, documentary and
object evidence presented during the trial. PO2 Antolin, the designated poseurbuyer, testified as to the circumstances surrounding the apprehension of the
accused, and the seizure and marking of the illegal drugs recovered from the
accused. [16] Then, SPO4 Sison corroborated PO2 Antolins testimony and
confirmed that all the confiscated items recovered from the accused were turned
over to him as team leader.[17]

The accused also argues that the procedure in the custody and disposition
of the dangerous drugs was not observed. The Court finds, however, that the
compliance with the chain of custody rule was sufficiently established in this
case.
In the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation, the following links must
be established: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of
the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the
court.[18]

Regarding the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to

the forensic chemist for laboratory examination, the parties admitted the
following facts during pre-trial:
1.

The fact that the forensic chemist examined the drugs and prepared
the report thereon but qualified that it did not come from the
accused;

2. Medico-legal Report;
3. The witnesses to the inventory witnessed the inventory taking, signed
the inventory but they have no knowledge that the drugs came from
the accused.
4. Order of detention, booking sheet and preliminary test;
5. Existence of the pre-operation report and the request for drug test.
[19]
[Emphases supplied]

The prosecution also presented several documents that traced how the
evidence changed hands.
The Inventory in the Presence of Witnesses[20] (Exhibit D) listed six
small transparent heat-sealed plastic sachets, each weighing approximately 0.3g
and containing white crystalline substance suspected to be Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or shabu, previously marked as ECA 04/14/05[21], and showed
the corresponding photos taken during the inventory (Exhibit N).[22]
The Certificate of Preliminary Test[23] (Exhibit F) prepared under the
signature of Marites Vizcara Tamio of the BCPO DES and addressed to the
Baguio City Prosecutor, certified that on April 14, 2005, at 3:00 oclock in the
afternoon, she conducted a preliminary test on the same marked items [24] by
using Simons reagent on the white crystalline substance contained in the
individually heat-sealed plastic sachets. All the items yielded a dark blue
color, indicating the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug. The same certificate stated that the alleged confiscated pieces
of evidence were turned over the to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp
Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for chemistry analysis and disposition.
Finally, Chemistry Report No. D-044-2005[25] (Exhibit G)[26] issued by
the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office at Camp Bado Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguetstated that following a qualitative examination conducted on
the same marked items,[27] it was found that the specimens produced a positive
result for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

The illegal drugs subject of the buy-bust transaction and those recovered
from the person of the accused were positively identified by PO2 Antolin,
marked and presented as evidence during trial:
Q

x x x I am showing you two sachets marked as Exhibit A

ECA. 04/14/05 BB and a signature. Now tell us the relation of
these sachets which the accused gave to you in exchange of
the 1,000.00?

WITNESS:
A

These are the buy bust item, sir.

PROS. CATRAL:
Q
A

Now what does ECA stands (sic) for again?

Edgar Cortes Antolin, sir.

Q
A

And that will be you

Yes, sir.

Q
A

And 04/14/05 would be the date of the transaction?

Yes, sir.

Q
A

And BB. What would those letters mean?

buy bust, sir.

Q
A

How about this signature, whose signature would that be?

My signature, sir.

xxx
Q

I am presenting to you five sachets which your office marked as

Exhibit CDEF and G with the marking ECA, 04/14/05 signature
and a letter R. Are these the same items which you referred a
while back?
Yes, sir.

And for the record, what does ECA stands (sic) for?

WITNESS:
A

Edgar Cortes Antolin, sir.

PROS. CATRAL:
Q
A

And what does 04/14/05 means (sic)?

The date, sir.

Q
A

The date of what?

The date of the transaction, sir.

Q
A

And what does R in the five sachets represents (sic)?

Recovered, sir.

PROS. CATRAL:
For purposes of identification, may we have the two sachets
marked as BB be marked as Exhibit M-1 and M-2 which are the
subject for sale and the other five other sachets with marking R
be marked as M-3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 to constitute the charge for
possession.
COURT:
Mark it. [28]

From the foregoing circumstances, it is unmistakable that there is no

break in the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs from the time that it
came to the possession of PO2 Antolin to the point when such items were
presented and identified during trial. Clearly, there is no doubt that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized dangerous drug were properly preserved, in
compliance with what the law requires.
WHEREFORE, the June 5, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. HC-No. 02734 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 132135

May 21, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
DOMINGO SABARDAN, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal,
Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. 1590-B convicting appellant Domingo Sabardan of serious
illegal detention with rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and
ordering the appellant to indemnify the private complainant, Richelle Banluta, the sum
of P50,000.00.
The Information2 against the appellant reads:
That about and during the period beginning the 15th day of September 1991, to the 30th
day of September 1991, in the Municipality of Binangonan, Rizal, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and by force and intimidation, detain and keep lock one
Richelle Banluta, a girl twelve (12) years of age in his rented apartment at No. 5 Linaluz
St., SCH-Subdivision-Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal, from September 15 to September 30,
1991, or a period of fifteen (15) days, under restraint and against the will of said Richelle
Banluta, and said accused during said period of detention did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have a carnal knowledge of the complainant Richelle Banluta
while she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious by reason of a drug which he
administered to her, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned on June 9, 1992, the appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.
The Case for the Prosecution
Richelle Banluta was born on August 10, 1979. When she was about four (4) years old, Nimfa
Banluta, a beach resort owner, allowed Richelle to stay in their house and considered her as a
natural daughter. Nimfa had Richelle enrolled in the elementary school using her surname,
"Banluta."
Sometime in 1990, the Banluta family transferred their residence to No. 5, Linaluz Street, San
Carlos Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal. Opposite their house was that of Elizabeth de
Luna. Another neighbor of the Banluta family was the appellant, then fifty-year-old Domingo
Sabardan, a cathecist who resided in a two-storey apartment about fifteen meters away from the

Banluta residence. The appellant came to meet Richelle as he frequented the Banluta house and
befriended Rico Banluta, Nimfas twenty- one-year-old son.
At about 10:00 p.m. on September 15, 1991, Nimfa berated Richelle for playing with the diaper of
her niece. Richelle, who was then a little more than twelve years old, placed some underwear,
shorts, long pants, and four shirts in her school bag and surreptitiously left the house. She
passed by the appellants apartment while the latter was on his way out to throw garbage. The
appellant inquired where she was going, and Richelle replied that she was earlier berated by her
mother and was leaving the house. The appellant invited Richelle to his apartment, and to spend
the night therein. Richelle agreed. She felt happy, thinking that she was in good hands. 3 Besides,
she had nowhere to go.4
The appellant led Richelle to a room on the second floor of the apartment, where she slept
without removing her pants and underwear. The following morning, the appellant served
breakfast to Richelle in her room. He told Richelle that Ella, who stayed in the house, had left
earlier at 5:00 a.m. The room where Richelle slept had three padlocked windows with jalousies. 5
Later that day, the appellant served lunch and dinner to Richelle in her room. That night, the
appellant entered the room completely naked. Surprised, Richelle asked what he was doing in
the room, but the appellant did not respond. Richelle kicked him and pulled his hair, and told him
to get out. The appellant left the room.
The next morning, Richelle told the appellant that she wanted to go home already. The appellant
dissuaded her from leaving and told Richelle that her mother might get angry if she found out
that she had slept in his apartment.
The appellant later left the house. When Richelle tried to open the door, she found out that it was
locked from the outside.6
In the evening of the fourth day of her detention, or on September 18, 1991, Richelle was seated
on a coach in the sala on the ground floor of the apartment.7 The appellant forced her to drink a
glass of ice cold beer. When she refused, the appellant threatened to kill her. Afraid for her life,
she drank the beer from a glass. The appellant then embraced her, kissed her and touched her
breasts. Richelle resisted. Momentarily, she felt dizzy and fell unconscious.
Early the next morning, Richelle woke up and found herself lying in bed completely naked. She
felt severe pains in her vagina. She saw the appellant beside her, also completely naked. 8 She
noticed that her vagina was bleeding profusely. She asked Sabardan what he did to her and he
told her nothing.9 Richelle washed her vagina with water.10
In the evening of the fifth day of her detention, or on September 19, 1991, while Richelle was
sitting on the sofa on the ground floor, the appellant again forced her to drink beer. She resisted
but the appellant threatened to kill her anew. She drank the beer, but consumed only about onehalf of the contents of the glass. She felt dizzy and lost consciousness. When she woke up in the
morning, she again felt severe pains in her vagina and saw blood in it. 11
The appellant forced Richelle to drink either beer or juice on four other occasions. Richelle felt
dizzy afterwards, and would wake up completely naked, feeling pains in her vagina.
On September 30, 1991, the appellant left the house, but closed the door outside with three
padlocks. At about 5:00 a.m. on that same day, Elizabeth de Luna, a housewife who lived about
thirty meters away from the appellant, heard someone hysterically shouting,

"Mang Domeng!"12 Elizabeth sensed that the voice was that of Richelles. She looked out of the
window of her house and saw the appellant in the upper floor of his apartment, walking to and
fro.13
Elizabeth waited for daybreak, and at 6:00 a.m. reported the incident to Val Banluta, Richelles
brother. Elizabeth and Val went to the appellants house and knocked on the door. No one
responded. The two left and kept the incident to themselves.14 At about 11:00 a.m., Elizabeth
sensed that someone in the appellants house was watching television. She related the incident
to Richelles other brother, Rico Banluta, who climbed the wall of the appellants house which
abutted a vacant lot, and through the window saw Richelle inside the apartment. Rico informed
Val of his discovery. They proceeded to the police station where they reported the incident. Three
policemen arrived, and along with Rico and Val, they proceeded to the appellants apartment.
They saw that it was locked from the outside with three padlocks. Instead of destroying the
padlocks, the policemen asked Rico and the latters friends to climb over the wall. Toto and
Binoy, who were friends of Rico, climbed the wall, and managed to extricate Richelle from the
second floor of the apartment through the window, after removing the jalousies. 15 The appellant
was not in the house at that time.
Richelle was, thereafter, brought to the police station for investigation. There, she executed a
written sworn statement dated October 2, 1991. She also signed a criminal complaint charging
the appellant of serious illegal detention with rape. 16
Dr. Jesusa O. Nieves, a medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, conducted a
physical and medical examination on the private complainant on October 3, 1991. She prepared
a Medico-Legal Report,17 with the following findings:

General and Extragenital:

Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are hemispherical with light brown areola and nipples from which no secretions could be
pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft.
Genital:
There is lanugo-type growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and
slightly gaping with the pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On
separating, the same is disclosed an elastic, fleshly-type hymen with deep,
healed laceration at 7 oclock. External vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance
to the introduction of examining index finger and the virgin-sized vaginal
speculum. Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent rugosities. Cervix is normal in
size, color and consistency.

CONCLUSION:
Subject is in non-virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of recent application of any form of violence.

REMARKS:
Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for gram-negative diplococci and
for spermatozoa.
The Defense of the Appellant
The appellant denied having raped Richelle. He testified that he was single, 56 years of age, and
was residing at No. 11 Luz Street, San Carlos Heights Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan,
Rizal.18 He alleged that he taught catechism in front of the Central School of Angono and the
school in Barangay Pag-asa.19 He was a person of good moral character and could not have
perpetrated the crime charged.
According to the appellant, he never saw Richelle during the period of September 15, 1991 to
September 30, 1991, nor did he invite her to stay in his apartment.20 He further asserted that he
had nothing to do with the offense charged and that Richelle was merely trying to exact money
from him.21
Prosperidad Sabardan Soriano, the appellants sister, testified that she customarily paid a visit to
her brothers apartment. During the period of September 15, 1991 up to September 30, 1991,
she visited her brother on four different occasions. The first was on September 17, 1991, which
was the appellants birthday; the second was on September 25, 1991, the witness natal day. The
third was on September 29, 1991; and finally, on September 30, 1991. She never saw Richelle in
her brothers apartment.22
After due trial, the court rendered judgment on October 25, 1997, the decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Serious Illegal Detention with Rape, and therefore sentence (sic) him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the private complainant the sum
of P50,000.00 and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.23
The appellant now appeals the decision, contending that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED SINCE THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED DID NOT CONFORM TO THE CRIME CHARGED.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD
SUFFERED DETENTION OR THAT SHE HAD BEEN RAPED.
III. THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE AWARD OF
DAMAGES.24
The Courts Ruling
Anent the first and second assigned errors, the appellant contends that he was deprived of his
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him because he was
charged of detaining and raping the private complainant in his apartment at No. 5 Linaluz Street,
San Carlos Heights Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal. However, the prosecutions

evidence shows that she was detained and raped at No. 11-C Luz Street, San Carlos Heights
Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal. Furthermore, the appellant asserts that under the
allegations of the Information, the private complainant was raped when she was "deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious by reason of a drug" which the appellant supposedly
administered to her. The prosecution, however, failed to adduce evidence that he administered
any drug to the private complainant before she was raped. 25 If this were true, Richelle could not
have known that she was raped by the appellant since she testified that she felt dizzy and lost
consciousness after drinking beer and juice.
The appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that Richelle was illegally detained by
the appellant in his apartment, and that he forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. The
evidence on record, the appellant insists, shows that Richelle agreed to stay with him in his
apartment after leaving their house and consented to having sexual intercourse with him. From
the time Richelle arrived at his apartment in the evening of September 15, 1991 up to September
30, 1991, she never tried to escape, nor shouted for help, despite the proximity of the appellants
apartment to their house and that of Elizabeth de Luna.
The contention of the appellant does not persuade.
The verisimilitude and probative weight of the testimony of Richelle, that the appellant detained
her against her will and raped her in his apartment, were not debilitated by her mistake in
declaring that the apartment of the appellant was at No. 5-C Linaluz Street, when, in fact, it was
at No. 11-C Luz Street, San Carlos Heights Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal. It must be
stressed that the situs criminis is not an essential element in rape. The gravamen of the felony is
the carnal knowledge by the accused of the private complainant under any of the circumstances
provided in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Richelles mistake was only
minor and collateral to the gravamen of the crime charged. She consistently testified that the
appellant detained and raped her in his apartment, only about thirty meters away from their
house in San Carlos Heights Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal. The appellant admitted
that he resided in the said apartment, and that Richelle and her family were his neighbors.
In People vs. Monieva,26 we stressed that where the inconsistency is not an essential element of
the crime, such inconsistency is insignificant and cannot have any bearing on the essential fact
testified to. It has been held that inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony, referring to
minor details and not upon the basic aspect of the crime, do not diminish the witnesses
credibility.
The case for the prosecution was not enfeebled by its failure to adduce in evidence the
substance or drug which the appellant forced Richelle to drink and which made her dizzy and
unconscious, or its failure to present an expert witness to testify on the presence of any sedative
in the beer and juice which Richelle was made to drink.
First. The drug or substance in question is only corroborative to Richelles testimony that she
became dizzy and unconscious when the appellant forced her to drink beer and juice. There can
be no other conclusion than that the appellant mixed a sedative in the beverage which he forced
Richelle to drink. It must be stressed that Richelle was then barely twelve years old. The
alcoholic content of the beer must have caused her to feel dizzy and lose consciousness. She
was rendered to such stupor, weakness of body and mind as to prevent effectual resistance and
preclude the possibility of consent.
Second. In People vs. Del Rosario,27 we held that a test to determine the presence of any
sedative or drug in the drinks given to a victim is not an indispensable element in the prosecution
for rape:

True, there was no test conducted to determine the presence of any sedative or drug in the
drinks given to the victims which caused them to lose momentary control of their faculties. But
this is of little consequence as the same is not an indispensable element in the prosecution for
rape. Under the circumstances, it suffices that the victim was found to have been unconscious at
the time the offender had carnal knowledge of her.28
Richelle testified that during the fourth and fifth days of her captivity, before she was rescued on
September 30, 1991, the appellant forced her to drink beer or juice, threatening to kill her if she
refused. Despite her resistance, the appellant succeeded in forcing her to drink the beverage.
Richelle felt dizzy and unconscious as a consequence, and when she came to, found herself
completely naked with the appellant beside her who was also completely nude. 29
Richelle testified, thus:
Q Question No. 22, Madam Witness, Bukod sa ginawa niyang paghahalik at paghimas
niya sa iyong dede na una mong binanggit, mayroon pa ba siyang ginawa sa iyo?
Sagot: Noon pong ikatlong araw, meaning on the 17th, sa bahay ni Mang Domeng
pagdating niya galing sa pagtuturo ng religion ay pilit niya akong pinainom ng beer at
matapos kong mainom ang halos kalahati ng isang boteng beer sa kapipilit niya ay
nawalan na ako ng malay at nang magising ako ng madaling araw ay naramdaman ko
na masakit ang aking katawan pati na ang aking kike at katabi ko na si Mang Domeng na
hubot hubad kung kaya tinanong ko siya kung ano ang nangyari at bakit ko siya katabi at
sinabi sa akin na wala at umalis na siya sa aking kwarto, at halos hindi na siya umaalis
ng bahay at kung umalis man ay sandali lang at bumabalik agad ito at kung ilang gabi
niya akong pilit na pinaiinom ng beer o kaya ay juice at tuwing nakakainom ako ng mga
ito ay nawawalan ako ng malay tao at tuwing magigising ako ay katabi ko na si Mang
Domeng na palaging hubot hubad at wala ang aking panty. Do you confirm this?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many times did the accused ask you to drink juice?
A Seven (7) times, sir.
Q The equal number of times you were asked to drink beer, is it not?
A Yes, sir. Sometimes beer, sometimes juice, but I was asked to drink for seven (7) times.
COURT:
Q So that, it is a fact that you were made to drink beer for seven (7) times?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How about juice, how many times did he made (sic) you [to] drink juice?
A Sometimes he asked me to drink juice and sometimes beer for seven (7) times, Your
Honor.
Q So that, what you want to tell us on those seven (7) occasions that you were made to
drink it was either beer or juice?

A Yes, Your Honor.

ATTY. MENDOZA:
Q Do you recall how many times you were asked to drink beer?
A I dont know, sir. I just know juice and beer.
Q Do you recall how many times you were asked to drink juice?
A No, sir.
Q Was there any instance that the accused asked you to drink beer and juice at the same
time?
A None, sir.
Q When you were asked by the accused to drink juice, is it not a fact that you were asked
to drink juice while you were in the sofa or downstairs?
A Sometimes in the sofa, sometimes in the room, sir.30
Understandably, Richelle could not have seen the appellant insert his penis into her vagina since
she lost consciousness after drinking the beer and juice. However, in rape cases, carnal
knowledge of the victim by the accused may be proven not only by direct evidence but also by
circumstantial evidence, provided that there is more than one circumstance; the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 31
In the case at bar, the evidence on record shows that, on the fourth and fifth day of Richelles
captivity, and while seated on the sofa in the sala of the ground floor of the appellants apartment,
the appellant forced her to drink beer. She felt dizzy and lost consciousness, and when she came
to, found herself in the room on the second floor of the apartment, completely naked, with the
appellant beside her. Richelle felt severe pains in her vagina and was petrified when she saw
plenty of blood on it. She washed her bloodied vagina with water. To quote the testimony of
Richelle:
Q Madam witness, lets go back to the 4th day that you were inside the room and that the
following day you wake (sic) up early in the morning nude where the accused was
nowhere in that place, when you wake (sic) up in that morning, what did you feel in your
body?
A My vagina is (sic) painful, sir.
Q That is (sic) all that you felt, your vagina is (sic) painful, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q As a matter of fact, there was no blood in your vagina, is it not?
A There was, sir.

Q Small quantity or big quantity?

A Big quantity, sir.
Q What did you do with your vagina with full of blood as you testified?
A I was afraid, sir.32

Q On the 5th day when you wake (sic) up in the sofa was your vagina bleeding?
A Yes, sir.
Q On the 4th, on the 5th day that your vagina was bleeding, Madame witness, is it not a
fact that you washed your vagina?
A I washed it, sir.
Q What did you use in washing your vagina?
A Water, sir.
Q With a soap?
A No, sir.33
The testimony of Richelle, that the appellant succeeded in raping her, is corroborated by Dr.
Jesusa Nieves medical findings that Richelle was no longer in a virgin state physically and that
her hymen had a deep laceration at seven oclock when she was examined on October 3, 1991.
Q Can you please tell us your findings with regard to the genital of the victim?
A Upon the examination of the genie layer, the sex organ of the victim, the only pertinent
findings Ive got was the laceration, a deep healed laceration at the hymen, sir.
Q What does that signifies (sic)?
A That a hard blunt object was forcefully inserted to the genie layer of the victim, sir.
Q I notice in this findings (sic) of yours there is a laceration at 7:00 oclock, can you
please clarify this?
A The laceration at the 7 oclock only means that since the hymen is circular in
appearance, it is being correlated to the face of the watch so when we say that the
laceration is located at 7 oclock then it only means the same that the laceration or the
tear is located in the same position as the number 7 of the clock, sir.
Q Now, you claimed that upon your examination, one of your findings that [there]is a
laceration of (sic) 7 oclock, what could have cause (sic) the laceration of (sic) 7 oclock?
Atty. Mendoza:

Already answered, Your Honor, the forceful insertion by blunt instrument.

Fiscal Tacla:
Q Would you consider the penis or a male organ as the blunt instrument which to have
put (sic) into her organ?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was the state of the virginity of the lady when you conducted an examination
upon her person?
A She is no longer a virgin, sir.
Q What made you conclude that thing?
A That is based on my findings at the hymen, sir.34
We reject the appellants submission that he could not have raped Richelle during the period of
September 17, 1991 to September 30, 1991 because when she was examined by Dr. Nieves on
October 3, 1991, the lacerations in her hymen had already healed. The appellants reliance on
the testimony of Dr. Nieves, that the healing period of the lacerations on the hymen was seven
(7) days from the infliction of such lacerations, is misplaced. The doctor did not testify that the
laceration in the hymen of Richelle could not have been healed in less than seven days. Indeed,
the healing of wounds is dependent on several factors: (a) vascularity; (b) age of the person; (c)
degree of rest or immobilization; and (d) nature of injury.35
In fine, although the lacerations were already healed by the time Richelle was examined by Dr.
Nieves on October 3, 1991, it is not impossible that Richelle was raped by the appellant for the
first time on the fourth day of her captivity. It is well settled that healed lacerations do not
necessarily negate rape.36
The appellant asserted that Richelle consented to having sex with him, because she shouted,
"Mang Domeng, tama na, ayaw ko na!," when he kissed and embraced her, and mashed her
breasts. The appellant asserts that, in saying, "ayaw ko na," twelve-year-old Richelle was
consenting to his prior sexual assaults. Richelles testimony reads:
Q Throughout these days that the accused embraced you, kissed you and got hold of
your breast, you did not shout?
A I shouted everyday, sir.
Q Will you tell this Court what words you used when you shouted?
A I shouted, "Mang Domeng, tama na, ayaw ko na."
Q Why, Madame witness, when you said "ayaw ko na," was there any instance that you
agreed to Mang Domeng?
FISCAL TACLA:
What is that agreement all about, Your Honor?

ATTY. MENDOZA:
Well, "ayaw ko na" Your Honor, she presumed that ayaw na niya iyong nagaganap sa
kanya. My question is on what was happening to her that she is now testifying, was there
any occasion that she agreed.
COURT:
Answer.
Witness:
A Ayaw ko na po iyong ginagawa niya sa akin. Gusto ko nang umuwi sa amin.
ATTY. MENDOZA:
Q In all that occasions you did not box nor kick the accused, is it not?
A I tried to fight back and I even pulled his hair, sir.37
The appellants contention deserves scant consideration. As gleaned from Richelles testimony,
she had been shouting and pleading to the appellant everyday to stop the lascivious acts and the
sexual advances on her. She resolutely fought back and even pulled the appellants hair. In fine,
when the appellant subjected Richelle to his bestial desires, Richelle resisted, to no avail. If, as
claimed by the appellant, Richelle had consented to having sexual intercourse with him from
September 16, 1991 to September 30, 1991, there would no longer have been a need for him to
force her to drink beer and juice to render her dizzy and unconscious.
The testimony of Richelle should not be considered in its truncated parts but in its entirety. The
meaning of the words in a portion of the testimony of a witness should be considered, taking into
account the entirety of the latters testimony. Besides, bearing in mind the chastity and
bashfulness of a typical Filipina, especially one in her tender years, it is highly inconceivable for
Richelle, a young girl, to consent to sexual acts with the appellant. Richelle was barely in her
teens when the harrowing experience took place. We find it deviant for a twelve-year-old nave
and unsophisticated grade school student to be consenting to sexual intercourse with the
appellant. Richelles unwaivering sincerity and candor while testifying in court convinces us that
she was constrained by her desire to seek justice for the bestial act committed upon her
person.38 In fact, Richelle cried while recalling the sexual assaults on her.
The appellant harped on his being a catechist of good moral character to escape conviction. This
hardly justifies the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Indeed, religiosity is not
always a badge of good conduct and faith is no guarantee against any sexual perversion. In the
case of People vs. Diopita,39 this Court pronounced that an accused is not entitled to an acquittal
simply because he is of good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal
of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged
its duty of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the
instant case is more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of the appellants good moral
character cannot prevail.
The appellant contends that Richelle consented to stay in his apartment; hence, he cannot be
convicted of serious illegal detention. We agree with the appellants assertion that he is not guilty
of serious illegal detention, but we do not agree that Richelle consented to stay in his apartment

from September 17, 1991 until she was rescued on September 30, 1991. Understandably,
Richelle did not leave the appellants apartment on September 30, 1991. She had just
surreptitiously left their house in a rebellious mood and had nowhere to go. She believed, at that
time, that she was safe with the appellant, who was their neighbor and her brothers friend.
However, when the appellant sat on her bed in the evening of the same day, completely naked,
Richelle decided to leave the next day. She balked at leaving only when the appellant warned her
that her mother, Nimfa, would berate her for sleeping at his apartment. Obviously, in warning
Richelle of what to expect from her mother, the appellant wanted to instill fear in her mind to force
her to remain in his apartment. Richelle should have left the apartment and returned home that
day, and contend with her mothers anger for leaving their house and sleeping in the appellants
apartment. However, Richelle, then barely twelve years old and a mere grade six pupil, cannot
be expected to react and decide like an adult would. She could not have foreseen the appellants
evil intent of raping her. Moreover, even if she wanted to leave the appellants apartment, she
could not do so because the appellant did not allow her to leave. Frustrated in his first attempt,
the appellant was determined to deflower Richelle. And the appellant succeeded, because on the
fourth day of Richelles stay in the appellants apartment, the appellant forced her to drink beer
which caused her to feel dizzy and rendered her unconscious. The appellant forthwith raped her.
In light of the evidence on record, the original and primordial intention of the appellant in keeping
Richelle in his apartment was to rape her and not to deprive her of her liberty. Hence, the
appellant is guilty only of rape under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, and
not of the complex crime of serious illegal detention with rape under Article 267, in relation to
Articles 335 and 48 of the Code.40 Hence, the trial court correctly sentenced the appellant
to reclusion perpetua.
Richelle could not have escaped from the appellants apartment during her stay therein from
September 17, 1991 until September 30, 1991, because the appellant locked the door from the
outside whenever he would go out. Richelle could move around the house, but the windows on
the ground and second floors had grills with smoked glass.41 Richelle tried to open the windows,
but she could not.
We, likewise, find it incredible for Richelle to contrive a story of rape which would expose herself
to a lifetime of shame, allow an examination of her private parts and face public trial. 42 A rape
victim who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and remains
consistent, is a credible witness. The bare denial of the appellant cannot prevail over the positive
testimony of Richelle. Well-settled is the rule that testimonies of young victims of rape deserve
full credence and should not be so easily dismissed as a mere fabrication. 43 In the case at bar,
the trial court found the testimony of the victim to be trustworthy and convincing. It has been held
in a long line of cases that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are afforded great respect, since it is the trial judge who observes and monitors the
behavior and demeanor of the witnesses.
Finally, the assertion of the appellant that the charge against him was motivated by Richelles
desire to extort money from him is preposterous. The appellants testimony to prove his claim is
hearsay because he was merely told by his counsel of Richelles desire for money. The appellant
failed to present his counsel to prove his claim. Besides, the appellant was merely a catechist
and had no apparent sustainable means of livelihood, and only survived through the support
given to him by his siblings. We agree with the findings of the trial court, viz:
The accused tried to insinuate ulterior or improper motive on the part of the complainant
by alleging that complainant Richelle charge[d] him with this offense because they are
asking money as told [to] him by Atty. Mendoza.

This allegation is patently unmeritorious and cannot be given any value by the court, as it
was hearsay, and Atty. Mendoza was not presented to pursue or give light on this
allegation. At any rate, the mother of the offended party, Nimfa Banluta, testified that she
got the insinuation that the sister of the accused was willing to settle the case through her
friend living near the street of the accused.44
It is rudimentary that where there is no showing that the private complainant was impelled by any
improper motive in making the accusation against the appellant, her complaint is entitled to full
faith and credit. Hence, when the appellant could not present any sensible justification as to why
the private complainant had accused him, such fact logically proves that no improper motive
propelled the latter to charge the former of such a serious offense as rape. 45
The trial court correctly awarded Richelle civil indemnity of P50,000. This is in the nature of
actual and compensatory damages, and is obligatory upon conviction for rape. 46 In addition, she
is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000. Moral damages are automatically
awarded to rape victims without the necessity of proof, for it is assumed that she suffered moral
injuries entitling her to such award. Such award is separate and distinct from civil indemnity.47
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan,
Rizal, Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. 1590-B, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of serious illegal detention with rape is MODIFIED. Appellant DOMINGO
SABARDAN is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellant
is ORDERED to pay the victim, Richelle Banluta, P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as
moral damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 205227

April 7, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MARCO P. ALEJANDRO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision dated November 11, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 03483 which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa
City, Branch 204 convicting appellant of illegal sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu)
under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002). In its Resolution dated March 14, 2012, the CA denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by appellant.
1

The Facts

Marco P. Alejandro (appellant), along with Imelda G. Solema and Jenny V. del Rosario, were
charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9 l 65 under the following Information:
That on or about the 12th day of July, 2006, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping and aiding one another, not being authorized by law did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade deliver and give away to another,
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug weighing 98.51 grams contained in one (1)
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, in violation of the above-cited law.
Contrary to law.

When arraigned, all three accused pleaded not guilty. Upon demurrer to evidence filed by
accused Jenny del Rosario, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting her of the crime charged
considering that her mere presence in the car used by appellant is not indicative of conspiracy in
the sale of illegal drugs.
5

At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following:

1. The identity of the accused as the persons charged;
2. The jurisdiction of this Court over the persons of the accused;
3. Police Inspector Ruben Mamaril Apostol Jr. is a member of a PNP Crime Laboratory
Office as of July 12, 2006 and he is an expert in Forensic Chemistry;
4. That a request for laboratory examination was made for the specimens allegedly
confiscated from the accused;
5. The existence and authenticity of the request for examination of the seized items and
Request for a drug test on the persons of the accused;
6. That pursuant to the requests for the drug test and examination of the specimens, the
corresponding Regional Crime Laboratory Office, Calabarzon issued two (2) chemistry
reports, D-267-06 and CRIM[D]T-286-06 that subject specimens submitted are positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride; and
7. That only a representative sample of the specimens submitted were examined by the
Forensic Chemist which consist of one (1) transparent sachet containing white crystalline
substance in black and red markings.
6

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented the following factual milieu based on the testimonies of SPO1 Jaime
A. Cariaso (poseur-buyer), SPO1 Norman Jesus P. Platon and Police Inspector Ruben M.
Apostol, Jr. (Forensic Chemical Officer):
In the morning of July 11, 2006, a Confidential Informant (CI) went to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Regional Office 4-A (CALABARZON) at Camp Vicente Lim in
Calamba City, Laguna. The CI informed Regional Director P/Supt. Raul L. Bargamento that he
was able to set up a deal with a certain "Aida" who directed him to look for a buyer of 100 grams
of shabu for the price of P360,000.00.
7

Immediately, P/Supt. Bargamento instructed Police Chief Inspector Julius Ceasar V. Ablang to
form a team who will conduct a buy-bust operation. PCI Ablang organized the team composed of
eleven police officers and made the proper coordination with PDEA. Since the target area is
situated in Barangay Bayanan, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila, the team likewise obtained the
requisite "Authority to Operate Outside AOR". During the briefing, SPO1 Cariaso was designated
as poseur-buyer while SPO1 Platon will be his back-up arresting officer. Four pieces of five
hundred peso (P500) bills were then prepared and marked by SPO1 Cariaso. The said bills
stacked on the boodle money were placed inside SPO1 Cariasos belt bag. On the same day,
SPO1 Cariaso and SPO1 Platon, along with the CI, conducted a surveillance of the house of
"Aida" and vicinity. Prior to these preparations, the CI had contacted "Aida" through her cellphone
and arranged the 2:00 p.m. meeting/sale transaction the following day.
8

The next day, July 12, 2006, at around 12:00 noon, the team accompanied by the CI boarded
two service vehicles and proceeded to the target area. They arrived at Barangay Bayanan at
1:45 p.m. SPO1 Cariaso and the CI parked the Toyota Revo infront of the house of "Aida" while
SPO1 Platon and the rest of the team, who rode on another vehicle (Isuzu Crosswind), waited at
a distance. As agreed during the briefing, SPO1 Platon positioned himself in a spot where he
could see SPO1 Cariaso. The other police officers posted themselves where they could see
SPO1 Platon as the latter will wait for a "missed call" from SPO1 Cariaso.
10

SPO1 Cariaso and the CI alighted from the Revo and went to the gate of the house of "Aida".
They called the attention of a woman whom the CI identified as "Aida". The woman came out of
the house and the CI introduced SPO1 Cariaso to her as the buyer of shabu. After the
introduction, the CI left. The woman asked SPO1 Cariaso where the money is and he opened his
belt bag to show her the money. SPO1 Cariaso in turn asked her where the shabu is and she
replied that he should wait for Marco (appellant). SPO1 Cariaso and the woman then went inside
the Revo and waited for appellant. After about five minutes, a Toyota Vios arrived and parked
infront of the Revo. The woman told SPO1 Cariaso that the driver of the Vios was appellant.
11

Appellant alighted from the Vios and went inside the Revo. The woman introduced appellant to
SPO1 Cariaso as the buyer. After appellant ascertained that SPO1 Cariaso had the money with
him, he went down and got something from the Vios. When appellant returned, he was carrying
an item wrapped in newspaper. Inside the Revo, appellant uncovered the item and SPO1
Cariaso saw a transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which appellant
handed to him. Appellant then demanded for the money. SPO1 Cariaso gave appellant the belt
bag containing the marked bills and boodle money and quickly pressed the call key of his
cellphone, the pre-arranged signal for the team that the sale had been consummated.
12

Within fifteen seconds, SPO1 Platon rushed towards the Revo and the rest of the team followed.
The team introduced themselves as PDEA agents. SPO1 Cariaso arrested appellant and the
woman ("Aida") who was later identified as Imelda G. Solema. Meanwhile, SPO1 Platon arrested
the woman passenger in the Vios who was later identified as Jenny del Rosario.
The seized plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance was marked by SPO1 Cariaso
with his initials "EXH. A J.A.C. July 12, 2006" and signed it at the bottom. SPO1 Cariaso also
recovered the marked P500 bills and boodle money from appellant. The three accused and the
confiscated items were brought to the PDEA Regional Office in Camp Vicente Lim.
13

At the PDEA regional office, appellant and his co-accused were booked and the confiscated
items were inventoried by the investigator in the presence of SPO1 Cariaso, a media
representative and a barangay councilor. A request for laboratory examination of the seized
transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, weighing 98.51 grams, was
prepared and signed by P/Supt. Bargamento. There were also requests made for the physical

examination and drug test of the arrested persons. The request for laboratory examination and
the specimen marked "EXH. A J.A.C. July 12, 2006" were brought by SPO1 Cariaso to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Crime Laboratory Office 4A. Result of the chemical
analysis performed by Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. showed that the said specimen is positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Appellant and his co-accused likewise were found
positive for methamphetamine based on screening and confirmatory test done on their urine
samples.
14

The prosecution presented and offered the following evidence: (1) Pre-Operation Report dated
July 12, 2006 submitted by PCI Ablang (Team Leader) and noted by P/Supt. Bargamento; (2)
Authority to Operate Outside AOR dated July 12, 2006 granted by PDEA Police Chief Inspector
Emmanuel Salvador L. Enriquez; (3) Certificate of Coordination dated July 12, 2006 from PDEA;
(4) Request for Laboratory Examination dated July 12, 2006 of specimen marked "EXH A J.A.C.
July 12, 2006" with signature of poseur-buyer; (5) Request for Drug Test of arrested persons
dated July 12, 2006 signed by P/Supt. Bargamento; (6) Request for Physical/Medical
Examination of arrested persons signed by P/Supt. Bargamento; (7) Chemistry Report No. D267-06 dated July 13, 2006 submitted by Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. showing positive findings on
specimen marked "EXH A J.A.C. July 12, 2006"; (8) Chemistry Report No. CRIMDT-268-06 to
270-06 submitted by Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. showing positive findings on the urine samples taken
from appellant and his co-accused; (9) Certification dated July 12, 2006 issued by Medico-Legal
Officer Dr. Roy A. Camarillo of the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory 4A stating that "there are no
external signs of recent application of any form of trauma noted during the time of examination"
on the persons of appellant and his co-accused; (10) Certificate of Inventory prepared by PCI
Ablang and signed/witnessed by a media representative (Lyka Manalo) and Barangay Councilor
(Jerusalem Jordan); (11) One transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
with markings "EXH A J.A.C. July 12, 2006" and signed by poseur-buyer SPO1 Cariaso; (12)
Affidavit of Poseur-Buyer dated July 13, 2006 executed by SPO1 Cariaso; (13) Affidavit of BackUp/Arresting Officer dated July 13, 2006 executed by SPO1 Platon; (14) Booking Sheet and
Arrest Reports of appellant and his co-accused containing their fingerprints, but which only
Imelda Solema signed while appellant and Jenny del Rosario refused to sign; and (15) four
pieces P500 bills marked money with serial numbers CM180235, YA867249, ZS853938 and
ZW337843.
15

Version of the Defense

Appellants defense is anchored on the claim that no buy-bust took place. He testified that on
July 12, 2006, at around 1:30 p.m., he went to the house of his co-accused Imelda Solema
whom he knows is called "Im". The purpose of his visit to Im was to rent her apartment because
his girlfriend is arriving from Japan. Along the way, he saw Jenny del Rosario with her baby and
let them rode on his car (Vios) as they were going the same way. Upon reaching Ims house at
1:45 p.m., he parked his vehicle infront of said house but a barangay tanod told him not to park
there as it was a towing area. And so he parked his Vios inside the garage of Ims house which
has a steel gate and knocked at its door. Meanwhile, Jenny del Rosario was left inside the Vios.

16

Upon entering the house of Im, appellant claimed he was immediately grabbed by a man who
made him lie down. He would later learn at PDEA that the mans name is "Toto" and his female
companion is Maam Carla. These PDEA agents took his belt bag containing cash (P48,000) and
his jewelry. He was also handcuffed and brought inside his car where Toto, Ablang and a driver
also boarded. He saw SPO1 Cariaso for the first time at the PDEA office. He likewise does not
know SPO1 Platon. At the PDEA office, appellant and his co-accused were photographed after
they were made to change clothes. Appellant further claimed that PCI Ablang demanded money
(P1 million) from him in exchange for his release. When he was unable to give such amount, they

just detained him and his co-accused. Their urine samples were taken and submitted for drug
testing.
17

As to the shabu allegedly seized from him in a buy-bust operation, appellant vehemently denied
having such drug in his possession at the time. They have already been detained for two days
when they were photographed with the said item. The taking of photographs was done in the
presence of PDEA personnel, barangay officials from Canlubang and the media.
18

On cross-examination, appellant explained that he had talked to his lawyer regarding the filing of
a case against the PDEA officers who tried to extort money from him but his lawyer suggested
they should first do something about this case. He added that he does not know of any reason
why SPO1 Cariaso is accusing him of selling an illegal drug.
19

Imelda G. Solema testified that on July 12, 2006 between 1:00 to 2:00 in the afternoon, she was
inside her house watching TV together with her seven-year-old son when some persons carrying
long firearms arrived asking if she is "Aida". She shouted to them that she is not "Aida" but "Im."
These armed persons searched her house for shabu and when she shouted she was pushed
into a chair. After ten minutes of searching, nothing was found in her house. When somebody
knocked on the door, one of the armed men opened it and they saw appellant. They pulled
appellant inside, poked a gun at him, made him lie down and handcuffed him. She and appellant
were brought outside the house and boarded into the Revo. They waited for the other car for the
armed men to board appellant there. Thereafter, they were brought to the PDEA office in
Canlubang where they were detained.
20

On cross-examination, Imelda Solema admitted that appellant was her friend even prior to their
arrest because he was the "kumpare" of her sister. Appellant went to her house at the time as
they had an agreement that he will rent one of the units of her apartment.
21

The defense presented another witness, Rowena S. Gutierrez, a siomai/sago vendor who
allegedly saw what transpired at the house of Imelda Solema from a distance of 6-8 meters. She
testified that on July 12, 2006 at past 2:00 p.m., a red car immediately parked infront of the
house of Imelda Solema, whom they call "Im." A man and a woman (whom she later learned
were police officers) alighted from said car and entered the house of Im. Not too long after, a
silver car also arrived which was supposed to park in the area but there were barangay tanods
and so it parked instead in the garage of the mother of Im. She later learned that the driver of the
silver car was appellant. Appellant went out of his car and proceeded to Ims house. When
appellant was already inside Ims house, two vehicles (Revo and Crosswind) suddenly arrived
and there were armed men who alighted from said vehicles and entered Ims house. Thereafter,
she heard Im crying as she was being held by a woman and a man. The armed men forced Im
and appellant into the Revo. The persons left were a female and a child who eventually drove the
silver car.
22

On cross-examination, the witness admitted that the relatives of her friend Im asked her to testify
because the others who also saw the incident were afraid to do so.
23

Ruling of the RTC

The RTC found that the police officers complied with all the requirements in conducting a buybust operation, and that their testimonies were spontaneous, straightforward and consistent on
all material points. On the other hand, the RTC observed that the testimonies of defense
witnesses do not jibe or are inconsistent with each other. It held that appellants denial of the
crime charged is a negative self-serving evidence and cannot prevail over the positive and

straightforward testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution who, being police officers, are
presumed to have performed their duties in accordance with law, and who have no reason to
fabricate the charges against the accused.
Convinced that appellant and his co-accused Imelda Solema had conspired in selling shabu, the
RTC noted that it was the latter who called up the former about the offer of the poseur-buyer
SPO1 Cariaso to buy shabu. Appellant thus brought the pack of shabu to be sold to SPO1
Cariaso, unaware of the entrapment plan of the police officers. As to their warrantless arrest, the
RTC held that such arrest was legal since the accused were caught in flagrante delicto selling
shabu, a dangerous drug, to a poseur-buyer who turned out to be a police officer, in a legitimate
buy-bust operation.
Accordingly, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the accused MARCO ALEJANDRO y PINEDA
and IMELDA SOLEMA y GUTIERREZ GUILTY of violating Sec. 5 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 beyond reasonable doubt, they are sentenced to LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and to suffer all the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay a fine of
ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00) each with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
The Acting Branch Clerk of Court is directed to transmit the subject "shabu" contained in a
transparent plastic sachet which was marked as Exhibit "J" to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency for proper disposition.
Accused MARCO ALEJANDRO y PINEDA is ordered committed to the National Bilibid Prisons
and accused IMELDA SOLEMA y GUTIERREZ is ordered committed to the Philippine
Correctional for Women until further orders.
The preventive imprisonment undergone by the accused shall be credited in their favor.
SO ORDERED.

24

Ruling of the CA
By Decision dated November 11, 2011, the CA affirmed appellants conviction. The CA rejected
appellants argument that there is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that a sale transaction of
illegal drugs took place as there appeared to be no prior meeting or conversation between him
and appellant, and hence they could not have agreed on a price certain for a specified weight of
drugs to be sold. It stressed that from the prosecutions narration of facts, the basis of the
meeting between the poseur-buyer and "Aida" was the arrangement made by the CI for the sale
of shabu; hence there was already an agreement for the sale of 100 grams of shabu for the
amount of P360,000.00.
The CA was likewise convinced that the corpus delicti of the crime has been established. It held
that the failure to strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
does not necessarily render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.

Firmly established in our jurisprudence is the rule that in the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, the following essential elements must be proven: (1) that the transaction or
sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that
the buyer and seller were identified. Implicit in all these is the need for proof that the transaction
or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the confiscated prohibited or
regulated drug as evidence.
25

What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof
of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.
26

The above elements were satisfactorily established by the prosecution. Poseur-buyer SPO1
Cariaso identified appellant as the seller of shabu. While the police officers were initially unaware
of the identity of appellant, as their CI had only informed them about appellants co-accused,
"Aida" (Imelda Solema) with whom the CI had set up a drug deal for 100 grams of shabu for the
price of P360,000.00, appellants presence at the buy-bust scene, and his act of delivering the
shabu directly to SPO1 Cariaso clearly identified him as the seller who himself demanded and
received the payment from SPO1 Cariaso after giving the shabu to the latter.
Appellants arrival at the house of Imelda Solema at the appointed time of the sale transaction
arranged the previous day by the CI, and with Imelda Solema informing SPO1 Cariaso that they
should wait for appellant after SPO1 Cariaso asked for the shabu, were clear indications that
they acted in coordination and conspiracy to effect the sale of shabu to a buyer brought by the CI
and who turned out to be a police officer detailed with the PDEA. SPO1 Cariaso placed his
initials and date of buy-bust on the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance sold to
him by appellant. After Forensic Chemical Officer Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. conducted a chemical
analysis of the said specimen, the result yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a dangerous drug. The same specimen was presented in court as evidence after it was
properly identified by SPO1 Cariaso and Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. to be the same substance handed
by appellant to SPO1 Cariaso and examined by Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr.
SPO1 Platon corroborated the testimony of SPO1 Cariaso that they conducted a buy-bust
operation as he positioned himself across the street 15 meters from the house of Imelda Solema.
From his vantage, SPO1 Platon saw the following transpired: SPOI Cariaso accompanied by the
CI in front of the house of Imelda Solema; SPO1 Cariaso conversing with Imelda Solema; the
subsequent arrival of appellant on board the Vios; appellant going inside the Revo where SPO1
Cariaso and Imelda Solema waited for him; appellant getting something from the Vios and
returning to the Revo carrying the said item. Upon hearing the call from SPO1 Cariasos
cellphone, SPO1 Platon immediately proceeded to the scene and arrested Jenny del Rosario
who was still inside the Vios. At that moment, SPO1 Cariaso had already arrested appellant and
Imelda Solema, confiscated the transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
and recovered the marked money from appellant.
Clearly, all the elements of the crime were established by both the oral and object evidence
presented in court. It is settled that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they enjoy the presumption
of having performed their duties in a regular manner, unless, of course, there is evidence to the
contrary suggesting ill-motive on their part or deviation from the regular performance of their
duties. Since no proof of such ill-motive on the part of the PDEA buy-bust team was adduced by
appellant, the RTC and CA did not err in giving full faith and credence to the prosecutions
account of the buy-bust operation. This Court has repeatedly stressed that a buy-bust operation
(which is a form of entrapment) is a valid means of arresting violators of R.A. No. 9165.
27

28

Appellant assails the CA in not correctly interpreting the requirements set forth in Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations. He harps on the failure to
immediately mark the seized shabu at the scene of the incident and photograph the same, and
the inventory of the confiscated items which was not shown to have been done in the presence
of the accused. As to the absence of testimony by the investigator and the receiving employee of
the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory, appellant argues this is fatal to the case of the prosecution.
He thus contends that the chain of custody was broken in this case.
We sustain the CAs ruling on the chain of custody issue.
Under Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which
implements R.A. No. 9165, "chain of custody" is defined as the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous
drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in
the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who
held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were
made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 laid down the procedure for the custody and disposition of
confiscated, seized or surrendered dangerous drugs.
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to
the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done
under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24)
hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and
essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a
partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the
quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided,
however, That a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory
examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours;
xxxx

On the other hand, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
9165 reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or
at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, while SPO1 Cariaso testified that he immediately marked the transparent plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance sold to him by appellant, there was no statement
as to whether such marking was made at the place of arrest. From the records it is clear that
such marking was done upon reaching the PDEA office before its turnover to the investigator on
duty. What is important is that the seized specimen never left the custody of SPO1 Cariaso as he
was present throughout the physical inventory being conducted by the said investigator.
This Court has already ruled in several cases that the failure of the prosecution to show that the
police officers conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence
confiscated pursuant to the guidelines, is not fatal. It does not automatically render accusedappellants arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt of the accused.
29

Records reveal that only the marked money was photographed at the PDEA office. The
Certificate of Inventory, though not signed by the accused, was duly signed by team leader PCI
Ablang, a representative from the media and a barangay councilor. We thus find substantial
compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and IRR.
Time and again, jurisprudence is consistent in stating that substantial compliance with the
procedural aspect of the chain of custody rule does not necessarily render the seized drug items
inadmissible. In the instant case, although the police officers did not strictly comply with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, their noncompliance did not affect the
evidentiary weight of the drugs seized from appellant as the chain of custody of the evidence
was shown to be unbroken under the circumstances of the case.
30

In the case of People v. Kamad, the Court enumerated the links that the prosecution must
establish in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation to be as follows: first, the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
31

32

The first link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the transparent plastic sachet
containing shabu during the buy-bust operation. Records show that from the time appellant
handed to SPO1 Cariaso the said item, only SPO1 Cariaso was in possession of the same until it

was brought to the PDEA office. SPO1 Cariaso himself marked the said sachet of shabu with his
initials and date of buy-bust: "EXH A J.A.C. July 12, 2006." While the marking was not
immediately made at the crime scene, it does not automatically impair the integrity of the chain of
custody as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved.
33

The second link is the turnover of the shabu at the PDEA office. SPO1 Cariaso testified that he
turned over the seized plastic sachet containing shabu with his markings "EXH A J.A.C. July 12,
2006" to the investigator who proceeded with the inventory thereof, along with the marked money
also confiscated from appellant. He was present next to the investigator while the latter was
conducting the inventory.
The third link constitutes the delivery of the request for laboratory examination and the specimen
to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory. It was likewise SPO1 Cariaso who brought the said
request and the specimen to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory on the same day. He
personally turned over the specimen marked "EXH A J.A.C. July 12, 2006" to the receiving clerk
as evidenced by the stamp receipt on the said request bearing the time and date received as
"10:25 PM July 12, 2006."
34

The fourth link seeks to establish that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination is the
one presented in court. Forensic Chemical Officer Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. testified that the
transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which was marked "EXH A
J.A.C. July 12, 2006", was given to him by the receiving clerk. Within twenty-four hours, he
conducted the chemical analysis by taking a representative sample from the specimen, even
explaining in detail the process of testing the specimen for shabu. He identified the specimen
with markings "EXH. A J.A.C. July 12, 2006" presented as evidence in court (Exhibit "J") as the
same specimen he examined and which he found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.
1wphi1

The non-presentation as witnesses of other persons such as the investigator and the receiving
clerk of the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory is not a crucial point against the prosecution. The
matter of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution is not for the court to decide. The
prosecution has the discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right to choose whom
it wishes to present as witnesses. Further, there is nothing in R.A. No. 9165 or in its
implementing rules, which requires each and every one who came into contact with the seized
drugs to testify in court. "As long as the chain of custody of the seized drug was clearly
established to have not been broken and the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs
seized, it is not indispensable that each and every person who came into possession of the
drugs should take the witness stand."
35

36

With the unbroken chain of custody duly established by the prosecution evidence, the CA did not
err in giving the same full credence in contrast to the denial by appellant who failed to
substantiate his allegation of frame-up and extortion. Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed
with caution by the Court because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. It is a common
and standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. To
substantiate such defense, the evidence must be clear and convincing and should show that the
members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly
performing their duty. Otherwise, the police officers' testimonies on the operation deserve full
faith and credit. No such evidence was presented by appellant in this case. The CA even quoted
in part the decision of the RTC which highlighted the irreconcilable inconsistencies in the
testimonies of defense witnesses on what transpired during the buy-bust operation.
37

38

Under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and fine,
ranging fromP500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless

authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy
regardless of the quantity and purity involved. Hence, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly
imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine ofP1,000,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated November 11, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 03483 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.