Automated

National andLocal Elections

May10, 2010
 AUTOMATEDELECTIONSYSTEM
Forthefirsttimeinhistory, thePhilippineswill behaving
anAutomatedElectionsSystems(AES)foritsnational
andlocal elections.
R.A.8436, AnActAuthorizingthe COMELECtousean
AESintheMay11, 1998National andLocal Elections
andinSubsequentNational andLocal Electoral
Exercises, etc. (Dec. 1997)
R. A. 9369, AmendingRA8436 (Jan2007)
 R.A. 9369
Covers bothAutomatedandManual Elections
Coversvoting, counting, consolidating, canvassing, and
electronictransmission
AES -systemusingappropriatetechnologywhichhas
beendemonstrated inthevoting, counting,
consolidating, canvassingandtransmissionofelectoral
resultsandotherelectoral processes.
a. DirectRecordingElection(DRE);and
b. Optical MediaRecording(OMR).
 R.A. 9369
Benefits:
a. Therewill belesshumaninterventioninthevoting,
counting, canvassing andproclamationofwinning
candidates;
b. The electionresultswill beprocessmoreobjectively;
and
c.Fasterelectionresults.
 AESStandardsandFeatures
UnderRA9369
Mostsuitabletechnology
PaperBased or DirectRecordingElectronic
 Ballotsareeitherpaperorelectronicballot
OneBEImember– Technologycapable
ElectionReturns, printed(30cops)andelectronicform
CertificateofCanvass, printedandelectronicform
ElectronicTransmissionofResults
Continuity/Back-upPlan
 Statistics:
• 16Regions
• 80Provinces
• 120Cities
• 1514Municipalities
• 42,025Barangays
• 342,075EstablishedPrecincts
• 50,086,054registeredvoters
nationwideasofSept,2009
 ZambalesVotersProfile(01/03/10)
• 13municipalities+1City
• Total No. ofBrgys>247
• Total No. ofpollingcenters>227
• Total No. ofvoters>435,556
• Total No. ofestablishedprecincts>2,949
• Total No. ofClusteredPrecincts>595
CITY/ NO. OF NO. OF NO. OF NO. OF
ESTAB CLUSTERED VOTING REGISTERED
MUNICIPALITY PRCNT PRCNT CENTERS VOTERS
( as of 01.10.10)

OLONGAPOCITY 17 855 143 22 1 112,593

BOTOLAN 31 206 47 23 4 31,173

CABANGAN 22 102 25 17 13 13,428

CANDELARIA 16 103 25 15 10 18,353

CASTILLEJOS 14 165 33 16 7 25,483

IBA 14 184 36 10 5 28,477

MASINLOC 13 177 34 14 6 26,360

PALAUIG 19 136 35 20 8 21,633

SANANTONIO 14 113 24 11 11 17,957

SANFELIPE 11 91 19 8 14 12,796

SANMARCELINO 18 144 32 13 9 20,343

SANNARCISO 17 108 26 14 12 16,545

STA. CRUZ 25 183 45 26 3 31,237

SUBIC 16 382 71 18 2 59,178

 STATISTICS
• 80, 136ClusteredPrecincts
(estimate)
• 37, 884PollingCenters
(estimate)
• 82, 200PCOSMachines
• 80, 136PCOSMachinesfor
distributiontoclustered
precincts.
• Testing
• and
• Sealing
• of
•PCOS
 at least three days before election d
testing & sealing procedur
Publicshall accomplishtest ballots
Ballotsshall bemanuallycountedandelection
returnsaccomplished
Samesetof ballotsthat wasmanuallycounted
shall befedintothecountingmachine
 at least three days before election d
testing & sealing procedur Manual countshall becomparedwiththe
print-out of theelectionreturns
If publicissatisfiedthat themanual count is
thesameastheautomatedcount, theprint-out
andmanuallypreparedelectionreturnsshall
besigned-off bythewitnesses
 at least three days before election d
testing & sealing procedur Machinesshall besealedwithoutany
connectiontotransmissionlinks
Publicshall beallowedtosecurethepolling
placeswherethecountingmachinesare
installed
Theonlytimethat thecountingmachines
shall beopenedisonelectiondayinthe
presenceof watchers
 ClusteredPrecincts
Notmorethan7Precinctsinacluster
Notmorethan1,000voters

986
board of election inspecto
• One(1)BEI foreveryclusteredprecinct
• Threeregularmembers
–Chairman
– Deliversballot tovoter
–Poll Clerk
–ThirdMember
• Support Staff
–Dependsonnumberof precinctsclustered
–Toassist Poll ClerkandThirdMemberin
managing
– Listof VoterswithVotingRecords
– Bookof Voters
board of election inspecto No.ofPrecincts
Clustered
No.ofSupport
Staff
Totalno.ofpersonnel
(BEI+SupportStaff)
0 none 3
2 none 3
3 1 4
4 2 5
5to7 3 6
voting • Votingperiod
– 7:00a.m.to6:00p.m.
• Unlesstherearevoterswaitingfortheirturnto
voteor withintheschool premises
– Poll Clerklistsdownnamesvotersqueuing
– Poll Clerkcallsvotertocastballot
– Voterwhofailstoappearafterbeingcalledtwiceshall
not longerbeallowedtovote
– Precinct set up
• At least 10voterscancast ballot at anyonetime
voting
• Beforevotingstarts
– Showthat ballot
boxisempty
• Transparent plastic
– Turnonand
initializePCOS
– Print “ZeroReport”
• Toshowthat there
isnoentry/votein
machine’smemory
ParaanngPagboto

1
(VotingProcess)
MagpakilalasaBoardof
ElectionInspectors(BEI)sa
presintokungsaankayo
nakarehistro. Matapos
mapatunayananginyong
pagkakilanlan,bibigyankayong
balotanamaymgapangalanna
ngmgakandidato.
establishing identity of vot
• LISTOFVOTERSWITHVOTINGRECORDS
– Photograph
establishing identity of vot
establishing identity of vot
• If identitycannotbeestablishedthrough
photograph
– Comparesignatures
• UseBookofVoters
– Containsapplicationsforregistration
» Includesspecimensignatureofvoter
– Othermethodstochallengeidentity
 • Pre-printednames
official ballots ofcandidates
• 300candidatescan
beaccommodated
– 150namesperside
ofballot
ParaanngPagboto(VotingProcess)

2
Gamitangmarker,
itimano i-shadeng
buoangbilogna
nasatabi ng
pangalannginyong
mganapiling
kandidato.
• Ovalsoppositenamesof • Shadeoval opposite
candidate nameofchosen
candidate
Official Ballots
TamangParaanngPag-shadesabalota. (Correct wayofshadinga
ballot)

   |
   

  C Okay!
pcos(precinct count optical scan)
• Oneunitperclusteredprecinct
• Voterpersonallyfeedsballotintomachine
• Ballotcanbefedatanyorientation
• Ballotscannedbothsidessimultaneously
 CANFAKEBALLOTSBEFEDINTOTHEPCOS?
• No. The ballots contain several security features that
eliminate fraud. Ballots flagged by the machine as
invalidwillbereturnedandwillnotbecounted.

Note: As per COMELEC we won’t utilize the Ballot

DiversionSlot and theballot boxwon’t havedifferent
compartments.
 WHATARETHESECURITYFEATURESOFTHE
BALLOT?
• PositionIdentifiers/Markers: Onallsidesoftheballotareposition
identifiers,whoseintersectionpointswouldindicatetheplacement
ofanoval.Thisallowsthesystemtoaccuratelylocatethepositionof
amark,andevaluateitaccordingly.
• BarCode. Eachballot hasauniquebarcode. Thismakessurethat
each ballot is counted only once, and at the canvassing level, can
identify thedetails of theballot (theprecinct it was casted in, the
machinethatevaluatedtheballot,etc.
• UVInk: EachballotisalsomarkedwithaUVink,whichisnotreadily
apparent oncasual scrutiny. Thismark is visibletothespecial lens
and light of the Automated CountingMachine, which verifies first
thepresenceoftheUVinkbeforecastingavote.
 WHATSHALLVOTERSUSETOMARKTHEIR
BALLOTS?
• COMELEC / SMARTMATIC-TIMwould beprovidingspecial ballot
markers to each precinct, which will be used for the voting
process. The Automated Counting Machine can accommodate
pencil marks, but for reasons of securing theprocess (as pencil
markscanbeerasedandreplaced),blackmarkerswillbeused.

NOTE:Pencilmarksareeditable,andthereforenotrecommended.In
an extreme case where marks are maliciously edited after the
ballotshavebeencasted,countedandtransmitted,andanaudit
takesplace, thiscouldleadtoalotof suspicionandconfusionin
theprocess.
pcos (precinct count optical sca …andget droppedintotheballot boxthru
thischute…

Ballotsgoinhere…
pcos (precinct count optical sca

…andtheretheyare. :)
 • Atcloseofpolls
– Performclose
function
• Toprevent
additional ballots
counting

frombeinginserted
– Afterclosefunction,
PCOSautomatically
• Startscounting
process
• Printselection
returnsafter
completionof
automatedcount
– Eight(8)copies
canvassing/consolidati
• Electronicallytransmittedresults
– Usedasbasisforcanvassing/consolidationand
proclamationofwinningcandidatesfor
• City/municipal officials
• Provincial officials
• Members, HouseofRepresentatives
• SenatorsandParty-list
– Congresswill alsoreceiveelectronically
transmittedresults
• ConstitutionauthorizedtheCongresstopromulgate
rulesforcanvassingofresultsforPresidentandVice-
President
 • Inserttransmissioncable
– Afterprintingfirsteight(8)copiesofER
• ToeliminatedoubtsthatthePCOScanbemanipulated
counting
remotely
• Performelectronictransmissionfunction
• Printadditional twenty-two(22)copiesofER
– AutomaticallyperformedbyPCOSafter
completionoftransmission
 HOWWILLTHEELECTIONRETURNS BE
TRANSMITTED?
• TheBEIthenconnectstheTransmissiondevicetothePCOSviatheEthernetport.
TheAutomatedCountingMachines isonly “connected” onceattheendofthe
votingday,andthendisconnectedaftertransmission.

• Thetransmissionprocesstakeslessthan2minutes/designation.
• Asinthemanualprocess,theresultsfromtheprecinctswillbetransmittedtothe
MunicipalCanvassingServer/Station.
• The municipal canvassing server canvasses all the results from the precincts
under its jurisdiction. Onceall theresults arecanvassed, theMBOC (Municipal
Board of Canvassers) can generate and print out the Municipal Certificate of
Canvassaswell astheStatementofVotes.Thisprocessisrepeated,transmitting
the results and printing the necessary reports in the Provincial and National
CanvassingStations.
 HOWSUREAREWETHATRESULTSCANNOTBEINTERCEPTEDAND
ALTEREDDURINGTRANSMISSION?
• PriortotransmittingtheElectionReturns,thePCOSdigitallysigns
thefilesusingtheSHA256algorithmandencryptsthemusingthe
AES128algorithm.
• This encryption level is as good, if not better than most online
banking transactions, which are “connected” 24 hours a day,
sevendaysaweek.
• Bycontrast,theAutomatedCountingMachinesisconnectedonly
attheendof thevotingday, onlyfortheshortperiodneededto
send the information. This makes therisk of “hacking” virtually
impossible.
Congress COMELEC
National Board Manual Systemof
of Canvassers Physicaltransport
Canvassing
Prov. COC
Provincial SOVM/C
Boardof
Canvassers Physicaltransport

Mun./CityCOC
Municipal/City SOVP
Boardof
Canvassers
Physicaltransport

ElectionReturns
Precinct
Congress COMELEC
National Board Electronic
of Canvassers Physicaltransport
Transmission
Prov. COC
Provincial SOVM/C
Boardof ComelecCentral
Canvassers Back-upServer
Physicaltransport AdvanceResults/
Monitoring
Secured
Mun./CityCOC Public
Municipal/City SOVP Website
Boardof
Canvassers ServerforDominant
Physicaltransport
Majority/Minority
Parties, CitizensArm,
KBP
ElectionReturns AdvanceResults
Precinct
 • Securitymeasuresunderamanual election
systemstill applicable
• Strengthensecuritythroughautomation
security

– Password
– PIN
– Digital signatures
– Encryption
 -bit encryption
)
128
2
• 22 = 4 • 29 = 512 • 216= 65,536
• 23 = 8 • 210= 1024 • 217= 131,072
security (128

• 24 = 16 • 211= 2048 • 218= 262,144

• 25 = 32 • 212= 4096 • 219= 524,288
• 26 = 64 • 213= 8192 • 220= 1,048,576
• 27 =128 • 214= 16,384 • 221= 2,097,152
• 28 =256 • 215= 32,768 • 222= 4,194,304
 -bit encryption)
• 237= 137,438,953,472
• 238= 274,877,906,944
• 239= 549,755,813,888
• 240= overOneTrillioncombinations
• 2128= 340undecillion,282decillion, 366nonillion,
920octillion,938septillion,463sextillion,463
security (128

quintillion,374quadrillion,607trillion,431billion,
768million,211thousandand456

340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,
431,768,211,456
 • 128-bitencryption
– Samesecuritysystemusedbybanks
• RandomEncryption
security

– Temperatureofmachine
– Voltage
– Uniquemachineidentity
– Useridentity
• Nosingle/masterdecryptioncode
 • Timeneededtodecryptoneprecinctresult
will besameamountoftimeneededto
decryptnextprecinctresult
• Transmissiontakesatmost2minutes
security

• Copiesfordistribution
– 30copiesofelectionreturnsattheprecinctlevel
– 30copiesofcertificateofcanvassatmunicipal
level
– 14copiesofcertificateofcanvassatprovincial
level
 • AuditLog
– Activities
– Time
– Date
security
ISTHEREANYASSURANCETHATTHEHARDWAREANDSOFTWARETHATTHE
AESWILLUSEARESAFEANDSECURE?

• Yes.
• Security andsystemintegrityare overriding
concerns before, during, and after the
elections.
 A.PRE-ELECTIONS
• Source-CodeAudits–Thesystemwillundergothenecessarysource-codeaudits
(by an Independent International Source Code Auditor, political parties and
interestedparties)asprescribedbylaw.

• Testing – Before the Automated Counting Machines are deployed for the
elections, the technology will be tested and certified by the DOST and will
undergo2-3FieldTeststofine-tunethesystem,andaMockElectiontosimulate
theactualconditionsintheelections.

• Pre-SealingEvent–ThreedaysbeforetheElections,alltheAutomatedCounting
Machines will have been deployed to all the voting centers throughout the
country. DuringthePre-SealingEvent, theBEIs, witnessedbytheWatchersand
representatives of thepolitical parties involved, will test the systemandmake
surethatthetechnologywillfunctionasexpected.
 B.DURING
• Accessing the System– The BEIs access the administrative menu of the systemby
positioningtheSecurityKeyonthecontactpointfirmly.TheBEIwouldthenbeshowna
newpageintheTouchScreenpanel---theAdministrativeMenu.
– Openingof theElections– ToopentheElections, theBEI wouldpress the START
button on the touch screen. The systemwould then prompt the BEIs for two
passwords succcession. Upon opening, the systemwould automatically print the
ZEROVOTEDOCUMENT.
– ZEROVOTEDOCUMENT- ThisreportisbasicallyanERshowingzerovotesforeach
candidate ineachcontest. This is the automatedversionof publicly inverting the
ballot box in themanual process, showing that the box has not been previously
stuffedwithvotes.ThereportwouldthenbesignedbytheBEIsandthewatchers.
• The Automated Counting Machines captures an image of each of the ballot cast.
Furthermore,thatsameimagewouldbeappendedwithahuman-readablereportofhow
theAutomatedCountingMachines interpretedthemarks. Incasesof recounts,wecan
reviewtheballotimages,andseeataglancehowthemarkswereevaluated.
 WHATHAPPENSIFAVOTERSELECTS LESS
CANDIDATESTHANEXPECTED?
• It’s called an under-Vote. Under-votes are valid
votes, and will be interpreted by the system
accordingly. For example, for a contest where the
voter can select a maximum of 12 candidates,
choosing a number of candidates less than the
expected12isstillvalidandwillbecounted.
 WHATHAPPENSIFAVOTERSELECTMORE
CANDIDATESTHANEXPECTED?
• It’s called an over-vote. The systemwill not accept
over-votingforanycontest.Shouldtherebeaninstance
of over-vote for a particular contest (for example,
voting for 2 candidates in the President contest), that
contest will not be counted. However, the other
contestswouldstillbeevaluatedandcounted,provided
thatthosecontestswerenotover-votedin.
INCASEOFMASSIVEBLACKOUTS ONMAY10, COULDIT
LEADTOFAILUREOFELECTIONS?
• NO. TheDepartment of Energycanandshouldprioritize
May10,2010 NationalElections.

• Therearealwaysportablegenerators providedbythepoll
watchers,politicalparties,amongothersduringelections.

• Comelec's serviceprovider, Smartmatic-TIM, is requiredto

have12hourback-upbatteries. Sparesarealsoavailableat
strategiclocationsfromitstechnicalsupportstaff.
• The machines are essentially laptops which require low
powerconsumptionand whichcaneasilybeconnectedto
a variety of power sources including rechargeable
batteries,invertersandportablegenerators.
• Rechargeablebatteries are readily available incommercial
retailstoresnationwide.

• TELCOs have, as standard practice, 2 standby power

generatorsetsintheirstations/facilities.
• SO MANY ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF POWER. POWER
FAILUREWILLNEVERLEADTOELECTIONFAILURE.
 THEREMIGHTNOTBEENOUGHTIMETOACCOMMODATEALL
VOTERS.COULDTHISLEADTO MASSIVEDISENFRANCHISEMENT?

• NO. AES process is actually shorter. No ballot serial

numbers to log and perforate. No going through
several pages of candidate list. Candidates are listed
alphabetically,easytochoose.

Illiterates don’t havetowriteanything– they just shade

ovals.
 JUSTHOWLONGDOESITTAKETOCASTABALLOT? HOW
MANYBALLOTSCANTHEPCOSPROCESSIN11HOURS?
• Based on informal Comelec time-and-motion study, it takes an
averageof 8secondsforacompleteballotcastingcycle.
• Evenif wedoublethisnumberanduse15secondsasanestimate
forasingleballottobecast;
• 15secondsperballotcast =Fourballotscastperminute;
• At50%machineutilization, this is reducedtotwoballotscast per
minute;
• Twoballotscastperminute = 120ballotscastperhour;
• 120ballotscastperhourfor11hours = 1,320ballotscastforthe
entireElectionDay; and
• Assuming 100% voter turnout, the PCOS machine can cast on
ElectionDayis1,320ballots
WHEREWILLCOMELEC/SMARTMATIC-TIMFINDTHE50,000
ITTECHNICIANSITNEEDSFORELECTIONDAY?
• The ICT industry associations have volunteered to join efforts to assist
COMELECinthedeploymentofITtechniciansnationwide.
• Instituteof ElectronicsCommunicationsEngineersof thePhilippines (IECEP)
the Philippine Electronics and Telecommunications Federation (PETEF), the
PhilippineComputerSociety(PCS), theInformationSystemsSecuritySociety
of thePhilippines (ISSSP), theChief InformationOfficersForum(CIOForum)
fromallgovernmentITdepartments,andothers.
• Likewise, PPCRV, NAMFREL, CER, schools, universitiesarealsobeingtapped
to assist by providing their graduating students in the IT, science and
engineeringfield.
• THERE IS NOSHORTAGE OF FILIPINOS
WHO WOULD LIKE TO BE PART OF
HISTORY. THERE WILL BE ENOUGH IT
TECHNICIANS ON THE GROUND TO
ENSURESUCCESSOFTHE AUTOMATED
POLLS.
WHATIFTHEREISNO SIGNAL TOTRANSMIT
THERESULTS?
• COMELECenbanchadcreatedaTechnical WorkingGroup
for Transmission composed of representatives from the
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC),
Telecommunications Office (TELOF),
the telecommunications carriers PLDT/Smart,
Globe/Innove, Digitel/Sun including the provincial
telephonecompaniesandthecableTV internetproviders.

• Thisassures therewillbeinternetaccessfromatleast2to
3carriersperpollingprecinctnationwide.
• Intheremoteislandprecinctswherethecarriersmayfind
difficulty in extending their servicecoverageandas back-
up,mobilesatellitetechnologywillbeused.

• It isexpectedthattheseremoteislandprecinctswill cover
less than 1%of the 40k polling centers with an average
voting population of 200 to 400 per clustered precinct, a
totalofapproximately200kvotes.

• With the multiple redundancies and servers at the

municipal,provincialandnationallevelsincludingaserver
for media and the political parties and watchdogs, a
systemlossishighlyimprobable.
 CANDAGDAG-BAWASSTILLOCCUR?
• No. The counting, canvassing and proclamation
processforthe2010NationalandLocalElections
willbecompletelyautomated.Thereisabsolutely
NOHUMAN INTERVENTION. Nomore roomfor
mistakesandfraud.
 WHATABOUTTHEFLYING VOTERS?
• Asmentioned,registrationandauthenticationofvoters
is outside the scope of the Automation Project.
However, the technology can limit the instances of
flying voting, as each and every clustered precinct’s
corresponding number of voters is programmed into
thevotingmachinetobeused.Therefore,forexample,
aprecincthas453voters(includingtheBEIs),thevoting
machinedeployedtherewouldonlyaccept 453casted
votes.
 WHATHAPPENSIFAVOTERMAKESA
MISTAKE?
• Currently, the COMELEC is considering giving the BEIs
the authority to issue replacement ballots in certain
cases, under their discretion (if the voter makes an
honestmistake, forexample). Thefinalpolicywill be
determined by the COMELEC. However, we should
highlight the importance of conducting a very good
Voter Education Campaign. Voters should be
encouragedtoprepareacodigobeforehand.
WHATHAPPENSIFABEILOSESHISKEY?
• The technicians at the municipal level will encrypt a
newkeytoreplacethemissing one. Theoldkeywill
be disabled and can no longer be used for
any machine.
 HOWMANYSPAREKEYSWILLBE
PRODUCED?
• Thedistributionisdoneaccordingtothenumber
ofprecinctsinthemunicipality; thosewithmore
PCOSgetmoresparekeys. Thecomputationwill
be done when final POP (Project of Precincts)
becomesavailable.
 DOESTHEPCOSPRODUCERECEIPTSSHOWINGTHE
SELECTIONSTHEVOTERMADE, ASANAUDITTRAIL?
• No.ThethermalprinterisusedtoprintouttheElection
Returns andother reports. Theballots themselves are
thepaperaudittrail.Forpurposeofauditsorrecounts,
wecouldcomparetheballotsintheballotboxwiththe
results intheERandwiththeballot images storedin
the machine. The thermal paper to be used for the
elections will be manufacturer guaranteed to last at
least5yearsinoptimumconditions.
• NOTE: Receipts generated by the system
uponeachvote, to be kept by thevoter,
would be against some basic aspects of
Elections: voter-anonymity and vote-
secrecy.
• ATWHATLEVELWILLTHESERVERS
ASSIGNEDFORTHEWATCHDOGSAND
THEMEDIARECEIVETHEELECTION
RESULTS? WILLTHISBEFROMTHE
PRECINCTORFROMTHENATIONAL
LEVEL?
• Itwill bedoneattheprecinctlevel.TheBEIshallexecutea
commandto:

• -ElectronicallytransmittheER,togetherwiththeprecinct’s
statisticalreportandthePCOSunit’sauditlogreporttothe
followingdestinations:
-city/municipalBOC; provincialBOC;
-NBOCsofCOMELECandCongress;
-Dominantmajorityparty,Dominantminorityparty;
-Accreditedcitizens’arm,andKBP;and
-Centralserver.
 CANMALICIOUSENTITIESINSERTAVIRUS
INTOTHEPCOS?
• No.Firstofall,physical accesstothesystemislimitedto2
memory card slots, whichwill be secured using a serially
labeledlock.Theselockswouldprevent,ormakeitobvious
that the machine has been tamperedwith. Furthermore,
theOperatingSystemusedinthePCOSisLinux,whichasa
platformis verysecure, employingaccess controls tolimit
the activities of profiles. This Operating System
environment will not tolerate the presence of virus and
malware, or at the very least, prevent such malicious
programmingfromrunning.
 HOWSOONWILLTHEWINNERSBE
DETERMINED?
• Based on experience, 90% of results would arrive
between4 to6 hours after theclose of polls. Factors
that may delay the process are delays in transmission
duetonetworkunavailabilityandtheneedtoundergo
contingency procedures (contingency transmission
system).Furthermore,notallpollingplacesarereadyto
attheexactclosingtime,dependingonvoterpresence
andaccommodationofvotersbeyondtheclosingtime,
asprescribedbylaw.
 CANAFAILUREOFELECTIONSHAPPEN?
• NO. It isnot possible. Asthevoterswill still bevoting
usingpaper(it is still a“paper-based”elections),there
is nochanceof failureof elections. Shouldthevoting
machines, despiteall theprecautions andcontingency
procedures inplace, still fail intheprecinct, thevoters
can still resort to “manual” elections --- using the
ballots.Theholdingofelectionsarenotdependentand
“held hostage” by the performance of the voting
machines.
successful implementati
• Vigilanceofcitizenry
• Cooperation
• Coordination
• Support
Salamatpo!