Populism and the

Revival of
Reform:
Competing
Political
Narratives in the
Philippines1
MARK R. THOMPSON

The strong showing in opinion polls by Senator

Benigno Simeon Noynoy
Cojuangco-Aquino III since he entered the
Philippine presidential election
campaign in the autumn of 2009 suggests that
the long dominant richversuspoor political narrative has been challenged by
renewed appeals
for good governance. While reformism was the
major narrative in the
opposition struggle against the Marcos
dictatorship, it was eroded by
clientelism and anemic social reforms after the
restoration of democracy.
Populism emerged as the most effective electoral
discourse in the early
post-Marcos period, with Joseph Ejercito Estrada
coming to dominate
Philippine politics by the late 1990s. His friend
and fellow actor-politician
Fernando Poe Jr. then launched a major campaign
for the presidency
in 2004 after Estrada had been deposed by an
elitist uprising. The
incumbent President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
ruthlesslessly broke this
actor-politician-based populist electoral
connection. Yet she reaped no
upper class praise for this neo-traditionalist
success. On the contrary,
the widespread corruption and human rights
violations (including the
notorious Maguindanao massacre) that inevitably
results from such
a strategy unintendedly set the stage for the
revival of reformism. In
the face of Arroyos assault on it, the populist
narrative had to be
reconstituted. Instead of relying on movie star
populism with few
command votes, Manuel Manny Bamba Villar
Jr. has built perhaps
the strongest political machinery in the current
presidential campaign
using his own wealth while employing an
innovative form of applied

populism involving generous gifts to poor

contestants on widely viewed
television shows. But despite the metamorphosis
of populism and the revival of reformism, deepseated structural problems in the Philippines
remain. Without major economic redistribution,
the plight of the poor
is likely to undermine the success of either a new
reformist or
populist president.
Keywords: Philippines, populism, reform,
clientelism, narratives.

The announcement by actor-politician

Joseph Ejercito Estrada in
October 2009 that he would run again for
the presidency in the May
2010 election (dubbed his take two
candidacy) sent a collective
shiver through the Philippine political elite
and business oligarchy.
Estrada had been deposed as President by
an elite-led people
power coup in 2001. Accused of massive
malfeasance in office,
Estrada was placed under house arrest,
convicted and sentenced to
a long-term jail term for plunder in 2007.
Following the granting
of an amnesty by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo a month later,
he quickly let it be known that he had no
intention of abiding by
his promise not to seek the countrys
highest office again.2 Yet with
Estrada trailing far behind the front
runners at the time of this
writing, it appears his movie star
populism does not have the
same electoral appeal it once did.
Instead, another presidential candidate,
Senator Manuel Manny
Bamba Villar Jr., has adapted populism to a
changing political
environment. Drawing on his own
staggering wealth to finance
what is probably the campaigns most
extensive political machinery,
he has developed what can be termed
applied populism which
employs his rags-to-riches story as a
metaphor for his vision of a
wealthy Philippines. Instead of appealing
to voters based primarily
on his screen personality like Estrada, he
offers immediate financial
assistance to poor contestants on
televisions shows hosted by his

actor allies.3
As a political narrative, populism had
long proved so
powerful in the Philippine context that it
could only be defeated
by hook or by crook. With his direct
appeals to the poor (known
in the Philippines as the masa), Estrada
was the only opposition
Senator elected in 1987. In 1992, he easily
won the Vice-Presidency
(elected separately in the Philippines). He
was elected President
in 1998 by the widest margin of any
candidate since the fall of
dictator Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1986.
Estradas fellow actor and
close friend, Fernando Poe Jr. (Ronald Allen
Kelley Poe, best
known as FPJ or simply as Da King)
took up the populist fight after Estrada
was ousted by contesting the presidential
election of
2004. Although outspent, out-organized
and out-muscled (Arroyo has
proved to be a consummate master at
guns, goons, and gold) as
well as maligned by the mainstream
media and loathed by the middle
and upper classes, Poe nearly won the
election. The Hello Garci
scandal of 2005 revealed that Arroyo had
been directly involved in
manipulation of the presidential polls a
year earlier. This suggested
Poe had been cheated as had earlier
challengers to the entrenched
elite order, such as the elected
congressional representatives of the
Democratic Alliance closely linked to
the communist-influenced
Hukbalahap rebels who were unseated
in a powerplay by the
allies of President Manuel Roxas in 1946.4
Philippine populism
was so strong that it could only be
stopped, like the Huks, by
administration crooks.
By 2009, there were signs that the
dominant political narrative
was shifting, however. The respected
columnist and political scientist
Amando Doronila has recently suggested
that:

there is no sign that masa [poor masses]

politics is going to figure
decisively in the next few months before the
election This is
2009, not 1998, and the dynamics of the 2010
election are vastly
different from those of 1998. Masa politics, or
the rich-versus-poor
theme, is not the name of the game in 2010.5

The sudden entry of the reformist

Benigno Simeon Noynoy
Cojuangco-Aquino III into the presidential
race after the (politically
fortuitous) death of his mother Corazon C.
Aquino in August 2009
seemed to confirm this prediction. With his
mothers mourners
becoming his supporters, Aquino took a
clear lead in the presidential
opinion surveys when he entered the race
in late 2009. His
candidacy which stressed the
restoration of good governance in
the country was characterized as a
political game changer.6
Doronila appears to have exaggerated his
point somewhat, however.
At the time of writing (based on preelection surveys from January
2010), Villar has caught up with Aquino in
the election polls.
These two leading candidates use
competing populist and
reformist narratives in their presidential
race which is to be
decided on 10 May 2010.
Changes in the character of populist
appeals to the poor and
the return of elitist reformism in the
Philippines may not seem
very surprising given the forces
marshalled against populism. But
a brief look at Thailand after Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra
shows that this decline of populism in the
Philippines was not inevitable. If anything,
the attack launched by the royalist-backed
elite group in Thailand against Thaksin
was even fiercer than what
Philippine high society had hurled at
Estrada and Poe. After upper
class-led people power protests against
Thaksin, the Thai military
launched an overt coup against the
populist leader in 2006. Despite

some clumsy attempts by the military at

electoral manipulation,
support for Thaksin remained so solid that
a newly created party
supporting him won a majority in an
elected parliament.7 A
re-mobilized uncivil society unseated
two pro-Thaksin Prime
Ministers in 2008 in a series of unlawful
protests that included the
seizure of the countrys international
airport. A weakly legitimized
government led by Abhisit Vejjajiva hangs
on through a fragile
coalition, fearing the day when it will have
to face pro-Thaksin
forces in elections again. The populist
pathology of Thai politics
remains unhealed.8
The continued dominance of populism in
Thailand raises
the question of why there are competing
political narratives in
the Philippines. The first part of this article
offers a distinction
between populism and reformism as
well as exploring their
relationship to traditional politics in the
Philippines (which
includes bossist warlord violence). While
reformism was the major
narrative in the opposition struggle
against the Marcos dictatorship,
it was eroded by traditionalism which
allowed populism to emerge
as the most electorally effective discourse
in the early postMarcos period. The following section
examines how Arroyo was
able to tether movie star populism
through clientelism, armed
intimidation, a clever media strategy and
vote stealing. But charged
with corruption and coddling warlords,
Arroyos dramatic loss
of popularity was a foil used by reformists
who rallied around
the son of Corazon C. Aquino after
Corys death had sparked
widespread mourning. Despite economic
growth, consistently high
poverty rates (and growing levels of
reported hunger) have provided
a strong basis for continued (though
evolving) populist appeals. The

importance of these two major political

narratives in the upcoming
election raises the question considered in
the conclusion: whether
either reformists or populists are likely
to do much to help the
vast majority of Filipinos who remain poor.
Competing Political Narratives
Narratives are an ancient literary genre.
The Old Testament,
Chinese chronicles and Greek epics are
but a few examples of a phenomenon that
have described civilizations over millennia.
As a
recent addition to the methodology of the
social sciences, however,
narrative analysis has engendered
disputes typical of the discipline
about exactly what such an application
should involve. Narratives
examined can be biographical or those
told by a group, openly
expressed or hidden, personal or overtly
political, contemporary
or historicized, with the story telling
involved analysed from a
psychological, policy, ideological, or
subaltern perspective, among
others.9 It is beyond the scope of this
article to enter into these
debates. Rather, the analysis here is
limited to a focus on narratives
used by politicians in the context of
electoral democracy in the
Philippines. The major claim is that
politicians offer competing
populist, rich-versus-poor and
reformist, good governance
narratives in the struggle for voter
support.
Such a notion of political narratives does
not fit easily into the
patron-client/elite-politics paradigm in the
Philippines.10 According
to this long dominant view, elite politics in
the Philippines is said
to be characterized primarily by patronclient ties and patronage, but
also by outright vote buying and electoral
violence (bossism). In
this context, Julio Teehankee has adopted
the useful term command
votes blocks of votes in a candidates
bailiwick (baluarte) that

are gathered and delivered through

traditional networks such as
political machines.11 Usually this is done
by traditional politicians
offering material rewards and other
favours, but sometimes it involves
warlords intimidating or even killing
opponents. The November
2009 massacre of a group of fifty-seven
politicians relatives, NonGovernment Organization (NGO) activists,
lawyers and journalists
by a rival clan for the crime of trying to
register an opposition
candidate for an upcoming election in
Maguindanao province
in Mindanao is but an extreme example of
this phenomenon of
command voting.12
Teehankee argues that there is another
kind of electoral appeal
available to politicians in the Philippines
which, following the
literature on political marketing, he terms
market votes.13 These
votes are sought through media-based
national appeals to voters, rather
than dyadic local ties. The key to
candidates winning support in
this electoral market is constructing an
effective image. This is
best accomplished through favourable
media reports and advertising
offensives (primarily in television and
radio). The argument here is
that two such images are the result of
key narratives frequently
used by candidates in recent Philippine
politics, populism and
reformism Despite being an inexact,
slippery and impressionistic political
narrative, one common feature of
populism is that the people
simple but good are contrasted with
the elite privileged
and greedy.15 This does not mean,
however, that populism actually
involves the rule of the people. Leading
populist politicians in
the Philippines have been elites, albeit
black sheep in terms of
social habitus in the Bourdieuian sense.
Like neo- or business
populists in Peru (Fujimori) or Thailand
(Thaksin), but unlike

leftist populists such as in Venezuela

(Chavez) or Bolivia (Morales),
Philippine populists have been procapitalist.16 Estrada and Poe
made perfunctory alliances with the
leading left-wing activists, but
their more important allies were their
business cronies. Estrada did
not undertake any significant economic
redistribution policies, but
rather carried forward much of the neoliberal programme of his
predecessor, Fidel Ramos. Estrada and Poe
did not rely on organized
labour for support, but on the large
informal sector of the urban
poor and marginalized rural population.
Populism involves media-carried appeals
by leaders in the form
of promises to help the common tao
(people) at the expense of the
elite. As discussed above, populism can be
usefully distinguished
from clientelism which involves ties
between national leaders
and voters via local leaders who harvest
votes through material
incentives or violent threats in their
bailiwicks. In practice, populism
and clientelism overlap, with a successful
politician mixing image
politics with some political machinery. 17
However, politicians
employing a populist narrative rely
primarily on their mediatransported
image while clientelist ones will depend
more on
dyadic networks.
Eva-Lotta E. Hedman has demonstrated
how movie star populism
emerged in the Philippines. She argues
that the visualized lingua
franca of Tagalog films underwent a
dramatic transformation towards
social realism in the 1960s.18 Proletarian
potboilers starring Estrada
or his friend (and even more famous actor)
FPJ as downtrodden
heroes fighting for their rights against
corrupt elites drew a vast
masa (the masses of the poor) audience
that could later be
solicited for votes. The familiar stories
portrayed in these films

were already known, whether as social

condition or as individual
destiny.19 They drew on a familiar trope
in Philippine society and
cinema that of the
outlaw/criminal/rebel.20 Through a
dialectic
of recognition and appropriation, Estrada
or Erap, thus appears as if
he knows, or could know, the real people
who lived, labored, and
suffered nearby, round the corner.21
Estrada effortlessly transferred his image
as an outsider and fighter for the poor in
his movies to
the political stage. His nickname, Erap,
the 1960s slang inversion
of pare (friend), was the basis of his
campaign slogan (Erap
para sa mahirap, Erap for the poor) as
he claimed to befriend
the friendless poor.
Like populism, reformist appeals are
media/image-based; but
the character of its narrative is different. If
populists ask for the
votes of the poor based on the promise I
will help you, reformists
seek support because I am (morally)
good. Populists claim to
champion the poor; reformists promise to
govern honestly in their
name. Both decry corruption that
characterizes clientelist politics,
but for different reasons. The populist
narrative portrays corruption
as maintaining an unjust elite rule that
oppresses the poor. For
reformists, corruption undermines
government efficiency and thus
economic development that would benefit
all, particularly the poor.
Populists make class appeals, while
reformists appeal to voters
across class lines with calls for good
governance. While populists
fight against long odds to defeat
entrenched elites, reformists show
through personal sacrifice at the hands of
corrupt officials that they
are worthy of public trust.
Like urban reformers in the United States
in the early twentieth
century, Philippine reformists have
claimed to act in the interest

of the nation, disregarding class

differences.22 They also stress the
importance of education in uplifting the
poor.23 These similarities
are not coincidental, as nearly fifty years
of US colonial rule in
the Philippines led not only to the
imposition of an American-style
system of government, but also to the
development of a political
culture in a colonial democracy that in
many ways mirrored
that of the imperialist power.24 One side of
Philippine politics was
modelled on the most immoral aspects of
American machine politics
(the famous pre-martial law, nationalist
Senator Claro M. Recto
spoke of finding our models, which we
have already surpassed,
in those American political machines, with
their Tweed, Hagues,
Pendergasts, and Huey Longs).25 Yet
another side drew of the
tradition of US urban reformism,
denouncing corruption and calling
for good governance. In so doing, the
opposition could appeal to
deep-seated Philippine cultural traditions
as well to the awa (pity)
and damay (empathy) of the electorate.
Such emotions are socially
and culturally encoded and associated
with the pasyon (Christs
passion) in Philippine folk religion as well
as with the death of
national hero Jose Rizal as a martyr of
Spanish colonial rule, as
historian Reynaldo Ileto has shown.26 If
anti-government candidates were
imprisoned or even murdered by the
ruling party or clan (as
for example Benigno S. Aquino Jr. was in
1983), the opposition
could point to such sacrifices as part of a
narrative dramatizing the
need for political redemption.
Moralist appeals for reform were at the
centre of Ramon
Magsaysays successful presidential
campaign in 1953 and of the
opposition Liberal Partys electoral effort in
the senatorial polls of
1971.27 Corazon C. Aquinos campaign
script in the snap presidential

election campaign in 1986 against the

authoritarian incumbent Marcos
was paradigmatically reformist. Her
husbands martyrdom at the
hands of the Marcos regime had aroused
strong popular emotions
and led to nearly two-and-a-half years of
mass-based urban protest.
Besides standing accused of murdering its
leading opponent, the
Marcos regime was charged with pushing
corruption to levels
censurable even by the lax standards of
pre-martial law politics.
Framed as the Filipina Maria (after the
Marian celebration
commemorating the 2,000th anniversary
of the birth of the Virgin
Mary in 1985), Aquinos campaign drew
huge crowds around the
country and was covered by the
alternative media. She promised
little more than honesty, sincerity,
simplicity and religious faith
and asked Filipinos to join her in a
crusade for truth, justice
and freedom.28 Marcos understood the
damage Aquinos moral
attacks were causing, and complained she
had portrayed him as a
combination of Darth Vader, Machiavelli,
Nero, Stalin, Pol Pot, and
maybe even Satan himself.29
Despite his overwhelming advantage in
guns, goons and gold,
Marcos had to steal the election outright
by rigging the actual
vote count as his attempt to manipulate
the polls in advance had
failed, sparking the people power
uprising that overthrew him
in February 1986.30 Once in power,
however, Aquino found reform
easier to promise than implement. Several
corruption scandals
and a massacre of farmers protesting for
land reform eroded her
administrations credibility. It was also
rocked by nine coup attempts
launched by dissatisfied factions in the
military (one of which she
had earlier protected through the people
power uprising she
inspired). The return of clientelist politics
badly damaged the

credibility of the reformist narrative.

Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet
suggested that the ballooning hopes
inflated by the heady peoplepower
atmosphere of 1986 have since been
punctured by political
machines, personalistic factionalism,
patron-client ties, old-elite
family prominence, vote buying, ballot
tampering, and violence in
the 1988, 1990, and 1992 elections.31
Though the presidency of Fidel V. Ramos is
generally credited with making greater
progress
in implementing reforms than Aquinos,
particularly in the economic
sphere, the narrative was wearing thin.
Corruption scandals
reoccurred with depressing regularity and
the initial impact of
economic liberalization did little to
improve the lot of 90 per cent
of Filipino households which opinion
surveys in the post-Marcos
era have consistently classified as
belonging to the lower classes
(see below). Sensing this, opponents of
Joseph Estrada, by then
the rising star of Philippine politics, turned
to clientelism to try
to block his ascent.
All the patron-client networks, bosses
bailiwicks, and the
oligarchs wealth were not enough to stop
the Estrada juggernaut
in the 1998 presidential elections,
however. His leading opponent,
a classic clientelist, command-vote
politician, the Speaker
of the House, Jose de Venecia Jr., was
soundly defeated. Estrada
circumvented clientelist networks. Vote
canvassers found themselves
outflanked by a popular film star who
had direct appeal to the
voters as the defender of the poor.
Although the Estrada camp did
have some political machinery, media
appeals to the voters were the
dominant elements in the campaign.32
Increasing urbanization and
the spread of the popular media made it
easier to appeal directly
to voters. Political advertising had become
the most important form

of campaigning.33
Given Estradas mass appeal in 1998,
what has changed just a little
over a decade later? Socio-economically
very little. Populism cannot
be read off the social map of a country,
but without favourable
terrain populists have little chance of
electoral success. Despite a
decade of relatively high growth under the
Arroyo administration (a
point which will be taken up at the end of
this article), by some
accounts socio-economic inequality
actually worsened between the
beginning of the Estrada and the end of
the Arroyo administrations
while self-rated poverty only improved
marginally. Market/opinion
researchers use a proxy measure, based
on housing, to estimate
income. Housing is a very useful indirect
measure, with the luxurious
villas of the rich contrasting sharply with
the dilapidated shanties
of the poor. Based on two studies by
different survey organizations,
the A, B, C categories of upper and
middle class Filipinos shrank
to below 10 per cent of the population
between 1998 and 2007,
while the percentage of the poorer D
and E categories increased
to over 90 per cent.34 In terms of self-rated
poverty (Filipinos who
consider themselves poor), quarterly
Social Weather Station surveys
show it worsened during Arroyos first
three years in office to 66 per cent (up
from 56 per cent at the end of Estradas
presidency).
It then improved to 46 per cent of the
population who considered
themselves poor. But by 2007 even
before the impact of the
worldwide economic crisis was felt it
had worsened again (to 53 per
cent), raising it back up nearly to the
levels under the Estrada
administration. More worryingly still,
reports of hunger in the
population have risen from a low of 7.7
per cent under Estrada to a
high of 19 per cent under Arroyo, with
nearly 5 per cent reporting

extreme hunger.35 In short, the

materialist basis in the Marxist
sense for populist appeals remains strong
in the Philippines.
Defeating Movie Star Populism
If the economic conditions for the rise of
populism remain ripe in
the Philippines, why could movie star
populism (as embodied by
Estrada and Poes presidential campaigns)
be defeated? One argument
will be discounted here, although it
remains widespread in the
Philippine media and fills the coffee-table
book literature about
the overthrow of Estrada. It is the claim
that Estrada discredited
himself and populist politics generally
through his immoral
behaviour. Estradas excesses are well
known (and reasonably
well documented) but not unusual in
Philippine politics (with, for
example, the Arroyo administration
matching Estrada peso for peso
in the huge illegal gambling industry
which was the ostensible
reason for Estradas downfall). Estrada
may have discredited himself
in the eyes of the upper and middle
classes, but he did not lose
his base of support among the poor.36
Arroyo was nearly overthrown
in a kind of poor peoples people power
revenge in May 2001
(known as Edsa Tres). Claims that these
pro-Estrada crowds were
manipulated by unscrupulous
politicians ring hollow given
the degree of manipulation behind the
elitist Edsa Dos.37 Despite
Estradas corruption conviction, his ratings
among the poor long
remained solid.38
Viewed in terms of image politics, Arroyo
was at sea during
much of her first (truncated) term in office.
At first she tried to act
like a reformist, in the tradition of Tita
Cory (Corazon Aquino as
the nations caring aunt).39 As part of this
effort, she also tried to
have herself dubbed Ate Glo (the doting
elder sister) or Ina ng

Bayan (mother of the nation) by the

media.40 Yet none of these
image makeovers worked because popular
belief in her commitment
to reform was undermined through
scandal. Arroyos educational
credentials and technocratic style were an
additional hindrance to her attempt to
establish a convincing narrative. Focus
interviews with
poor Filipino voters have shown that while
they value educational
qualifications, they are also suspicious
about those with superior
education as they fear such politicians
are more likely to be able
to manipulate them.41 Such image
problems as a reformist appear
to have contributed to Arroyos initial
decision in late 2002 not to
seek re-election.
When Arroyo changed her mind and
decided in October 2003 to
run for re-election as President, she threw
off all reformist trappings
and focused on the advantages of
incumbency. She was the first
sitting President to seek a second term
since 1969 (when Marcos
won by cheating, spending and
violence). Arroyos electoral strategy
could not rely on clientelism alone,
however, as the weakness of
machine politics in the post-Marcos
Philippines vis--vis populists
suggests. She again faced an actorpolitician as an opponent for the
Presidency. Her rival was the cinematic
Pinoy cowboy, Fernando
Poe, Jr. As with Estrada, his (even more
numerous) fans became
his voters.42 Not surprisingly, Poe led
Arroyo decisively in early
opinion polls.
Arroyo refused to surrender to the realm of
star appeal. One
of her cleverest campaign moves was
choosing Noli de Castro,
a famous television news announcer, as
her Vice-Presidential
candidate. With popularity ratings that
matched Poes, de Castros
folksy stump speeches helped
compensate for her overly intellectual

campaign rhetoric. While de Castro did not

provide Arroyo with a
compelling populist narrative, it at least
helped deflect Poes own
movie star-based appeals to the poor. She
also launched a blizzard
of nationwide television and radio public
service advertisements
during the campaign by public agencies
effusively thanking the
President. She also made sure that FPJs
image suffered in the
media, though her opponent managed to
antagonize many a middle
class journalist on his own.
An Arroyo administration insider
(anonymity requested) told this
author of another clever stratagem that
many of her opponents long
suspected. The Arroyo administration
encouraged former police
chief Panfilo Lacson, to run for President
as well, although he had
once been a close ally of Estrada. Lacson
had won the gratitude
of wealthy Chinese for breaking up
kidnapping gangs that were
preying on this ethnic minority in the
Philippines.43 Thus Lacson
(who had once been a leading opponent of
Arroyo) not only split
the opposition vote with Poe but also cut
into what might have
been a helpful source of funding. Like
Marcos in his controversial re-election
campaign in 1969,
Arroyo cut out the political middle men,
funnelling government
patronage funds directly to barangay
captains and mayors. With
Poe strong in Luzon, she concentrated her
patronage on the Visayas,
where she claimed a local connection
based on her mothers side
of the family. As Carl Lande has shown,
clientelism works best
when directed at regions thought to be
favoured by a candidate who
comes from that area or is seen to have
special ties to it.44 Besides
allocating state patronage, she also drew
heavily on contributions by
wealthy ethnic Chinese (taipans). It was
apparent that Arroyo did

not just have a decisive advantage in

traditional politics, guns, goons
and gold; she had also mastered the
three Cs of neo-traditional
politics, cinema, Chinese and
corruption.45
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
performed miserably
during the election: failing in an effort to
automate voting that
was dogged by allegations of corruption,
leaving countless eligible
voters names off voting lists and
engaging in dagdag-bawas (votepadding
and vote-shaving). In a devastating
critique, a former Aquino
administration official, whose husband had
played a major part in the
pollwatching effort against Marcos, argued
that if Gloria MacapagalArroyo is deluged with complaints about
the Comelec leadership
and suspicions of their incompetence or
their partisanship, she
only has herself to blame. She appointed
them in the first place.46
The 140 plus election deaths was higher
than in the previous two
Presidential elections combined (and
greater than that during the
notorious 1969 election).47 Dubbed the
worlds slowest election, it
took over six weeks for Arroyo to finally be
proclaimed the winner
over the objections of an opposition
outraged at being repeatedly
blocked from scrutinizing dubious ballots. 48
Although Arroyo soon became an
embarrassment to the Philippine
elite, she had done their dirty work. She
had broken the electoral
connection between populist politicians
and poor voters. She did this
by amassing patronage from public and
private sources, recentralizing
clientelist networks, and directing funds to
regions seen favourable
to her. She also countered Poes mediabased populist appeals and
managed to leave scratches on his iconic
image. When this was
not enough, she tolerated armed
intimidation and directed electoral
manipulation, allowing her to trounce
Poe in the election by over

a million votes. Although by 2007 her

popularity had plunged, her
clientelist networks, warlord allies and
electoral manipulators were
still strong enough to win a majority of
seats in the lower house
of Congress a victory of command
over market votes. Arroyo practised
(neo-) traditional politics more effectively
than any Filipino
leader since Marcos.
Reformist Revival
The Filipino urban elite had largely turned
a blind eye to Arroyos
electoral excesses in 2004 fearing the
return of Estrada-style
populism if Poe had won. The National
Movement for Free Elections
(NAMFREL), an NGO once well-respected
for its election monitoring,
seemed more interested in Arroyos reelection than safeguarding
the ballot.49 But when wiretapped
conversations between Arroyo
and COMELEC commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano (Garci) about
committing election fraud in Mindanao
surfaced in the media in
2005, this elite support evaporated. 50
Although Arroyo apologized on
television for a lapse in judgement, she
was unable to defuse the
anger generated by the Hello Garci
scandal. The mass resignation
of ten cabinet level officials and many of
her top advisors left her
looking very vulnerable.
Yet Arroyo was able to rebuff attempts to
impeach her (with her
safe majorities in Congress) and crush
several feeble people power
coup efforts (the biggest of which was in
February 2006 on the
20th anniversary of the original people
power uprising). She not
only generously rewarded her loyal
generals, but allowed them to
hunt down legal Leftists (including
journalists) through extrajudicial
killings, with reportedly more than 900
left-wing activists killed
since she came to power in 2001.51
Matters seemed to grow graver,
however, as she was engulfed by ever
worsening scandals (one,

embarrassingly, involving her husband,

son, and brother-in-law who
were accused of having links to illegal
gambling lords, the same
offence used to justify Estradas ouster).
Polls show Arroyo to be
the most unpopular post-Marcos
President.52 Yet Arroyos enemies
seemed powerless against her.
Some observers have suggested that
Filipinos suffered from
people power fatigue.53 Yet in the
Philippines, protestors alone,
of whom there have been plenty during
the Arroyo administration,
have never been enough for people
power to succeed. Rather,
people power has also required some form
of military intervention
and the Catholic Church hierarchies moral
guardianship backed by
big business to bring down a government.
With the top military
brass bought off by Arroyo, the Catholic
Church on the defensive
after the death of Manila Archbishop Jaime
Cardinal Sin and a major sex scandal, and
business opposition restrained by
economic growth,
potential allies for an opposition
insurrection were absent.
The failure of insurrectionism meant that
the opposition to
Arroyo began to focus on the May 2010
election. The problem, as
has been the case in all post-Marcos
elections, was the plethora of
candidates. With Estrada back in the
political arena (thanks to a
clever divide-and-conquer pardon by
Arroyo) and several Senators
maneouvering over presidential bids,
there was no clear frontrunner
and certainly no candidate who could
capture the still widespread
anti-Arroyo sentiment.
That appeared to change with the death of
Cory Aquino in
August 2009. The outpouring of grief for
Aquino surprised many
observers and even, it is claimed, the
Aquino family itself.54 This
mourning was soon transformed into
political capital for Cory

Aquinos son Noynoy. As one observer

has written:

Since that great outpouring during Corys

funeral, people have
been insisting that Sen. Noynoy Cojuangco
Aquino step into
the shoes of his illustrious parents. There are
persistent voices
saying he should run for the presidency
These calls may be
just passing sentimentalism, fallout from the
revivalist frenzy
that exploded after Cory died Or the calls we
now hear
intermittently could as well snowball. There is
something
about the Aquino franchise that evokes magic.
In a season
that sees our people craving for a leader they
could fully
trust, the revivalism could take hold We
have, once again,
fallen into another emotional episode where
our people
distrust those seen as too sophisticated or too
shrewd. They
yearn for a leadership whose simplicity is
anchored on strong
morality.55

By becoming a foil for the moral Aquino

family, Arroyo had set
the stage for the revival of reformism.
Though still early days in
the presidential campaign as of this
writing, the high level support
registered for his candidacy in the first
polls after his declaration of
candidacy for the presidency on 9
September 2009 suggests that such
a revivalist frenzy centred around his
sincerity and promises of
honest government has indeed taken hold
of the Philippine body
politic. Conrado de Quiros captured this
Arroyo-as-foil-for-Aquino
sentiment well:

But the Noynoy phenomenon is not just

about euphoria. It is
also about tyrannyphobia. Or a newfound
unwillingness to tolerate
tyranny that burst its banks with the death of
Corazon Aquino.
The outpouring of love for Corazon Aquino is
matched only by the outpouring of hate for
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Why has
Noynoy become phenomenal? Simple: Because
he is the opposite
of Gloria. Or is seen as so. In the same way
that Cory was the

opposite of Marcos and Obama was the

opposite of Bush.56

It is perhaps surprising that in a country

that has one of the
worlds most developed, and critical,
discourse on political nepotism
undermining democratic norms, it turns
out that Filipinos also
appear to believe that there are such
things as good dynasties.
Amando Doronila argues that the
groundswell of support for Aquino
following the death of his mother,
President Cory Aquino, flows from
the public service record of his mother and
his father, the martyred
former Sen. Benigno Aquino whose
honesty and transparency appear
to have been accepted by the Filipino
public.57 One can easily
raise objections to this view, particularly
about Benigno Aquino,
Nonoys father, whose political record
included charges of murder
and other grave misdeeds.58 Even (saint)
Corys administration was
tainted by corruption charges. This was
perhaps most embarrassing in
regards to the Philippine Commission on
Good Government (PCGG)
which was meant to go after Marcoss illgotten wealth but was
instead accused of making illicit gains of
its own.59 Most menacing
were the accusations that dogged
Aquinos brother, Jose (Peping)
Cojuangco Jr., who may again be poised to
play a major role in
Noynoys campaign. The accusations have
done nothing to dampen
enthusiasm for Noynoys presidential
ambitions, who convincingly
plays the role of the loyal and honest son,
solicitous brother, with a
beautiful but quiet, well mannered and
self-effacing girlfriend.60 Like
his mother, his lack of impressive political
accomplishments his
blank-slatedness is seen as an asset
rather than a drawback.
Aquino and his running mate another
famous dynast, Manuel
Mar Araneta-Roxas II, who abandoned
his own presidential bid

as an act of sacrifice to the reformist

cause seem to set to
run a classic reformist campaign. It will
be based around the
Liberal Party which is an old, famous, but
relatively small party
that has claimed a certain progressive
ideological orientation while
providing political shelter for plenty of
unsavoury politicians in the
post-Marcos era.61 Several major NGOs
and Peoples Organizations
(POs) have affiliated with the campaign
under the auspices of the
Left (but non-communist) Akbayan party,
which has entered into an
official alliance with the Liberal Party of
Aquino and Roxas. Several
prominent progressive politicians have
become closely involved
in this campaign.
The question remains though whether
progressives with a
pro-poor agenda will have much impact
on the campaign, much
less policies adopted should Noynoy win
the election. In a recent
conversation, one high ranking member of
the campaign (anonymity
requested) admitted to the author that
neither Aquino nor Roxas
supported asset redistribution (be it land
or other forms). Another
high ranking campaign staff member who
spoke to this writer
disagreed, however, asserting Aquinos
openness to social reform
was demonstrated by the candidates
efforts to encourage his family
to divest itself of the notorious Hacienda
Luisita and have its lands
redistributed as part of the countrys longrunning (but only modestly
successful) land reform programme. In this
regard, a thoughtful
article by Ben Reid based on the recent
experience of activist
alliances with governments is of particular
interest. Reid argues that
NGOs and POs which crossed over to
work in government in the
post-Marcos Philippines were often
double crossed by politicians
with other aims. Reid argues that wellintentioned NGO personnel

who previously adopted a critical stance

toward neo-clientelism
ultimately become absorbed by these
relations.62 In a survey of
the non-communist Lefts political activism
since the fall of Marcos,
Nathan Gilbert Quimpo speaks of only
initial, albeit very modest,
gains and of civil societys limited
usefulness in deepening of
democracy in post-authoritarian
developing states. Based on these
difficulties, he calls for a more judicious
alliance policy by the
Left in the future.63
The Metamorphosis of Populism
The two most recent polls available as this
article was being
completed (from January 2010) showed
Aquino in a statistical tie for
the upcoming May 2010 presidential race
with Manny Villar. As
noted earlier, the latter has used a ragsto-riches narrative to try
to counter Aquinos reformist appeals.64 As
reportedly the countrys
richest politician, over the last three years
he has poured massive
resources into building what is probably
the countrys strongest
political machine.65 Villar has apparently
absorbed two key lessons
about recent political developments in the
Philippines. The first is
that traditional political machinery alone is
not sufficient to win
elections. In 1998, Estrada could not be
stopped by politicians
seen as too traditional in their emphasis
on gathering votes
through clientelist ties. The other extreme
to avoid is to rely
almost exclusively on movie star-based
populist appeals as the Poe campaign did
in 2004, leaving it vulnerable in terms of a
sufficient number of command votes
needed to offset the Arroyo
administrations neo-traditional strategy,
as discussed above. This
led Villar to adopt a hybrid campaign
strategy which combines a
strong political machine flanked by
populist appeals. He has won
the endorsement of some of the
Philippines leading trapos (short

for traditional politicians but also the

Tagalog for dirty rag),
including the De Venecia political
dynasty.66 One political analyst
has claimed Villar is currently outspending
Aquino by a margin of
ten to one.67 In addition, however, Villar
has adapted populism to a
changing political environment. Instead of
literally relying on star
appeals as Estrada and Poe did who
mobilized their fan base
for political ends Villar has developed a
new narrative style that
can be termed applied populism. It
involves sponsoring noontime
television shows watched daily by millions
of poor Filipinos. Nikko
Dizon of the Philippine Daily Inquirer has
written about the impact
of this novel campaign technique:

Among Villars celebrity endorsers are hosts of

noontime shows
Michael V. from Eat Bulaga aired on GMA 7
and Willie
Revillame of ABS-CBNs Wowowee Hinged
on Villars
antipoverty advocacy, Stop My Hirap
[poverty] aimed right at
the gut of the hungry masses The mechanics
of the contest
[aired in Eat Bulaga!], which ends its twoand-a-half-week run
today, or two days before the formal election
campaign begins,
are simple: Audience members write on orange
sheets of paper
what they would do if they win P25,000 At
the end of the
segment, the story of a poor, struggling citizen
is aired, recalling
Villars own rags-to-riches tale. The candidates
image and slogan,
Sipag at Tiyaga [industriousness and
perseverance] is flashed on
screen. An industry insider told the Inquirer
that depending on a
segments concept, a portion buy such as
Stop My Hirap could
cost from P700,000 to P1 million per episode
[$15,000 to $21,500].
The amount did not include the prizes given
away and the
talent fees of hosts Villar, whose net worth
reportedly totals
P25 billion according to Forbes Magazine, has
changed the political
landscape 68

In this sense Villar has virtually merged

traditional politics and
populist appeals. Material incentives are
offered in medial form,
symbolizing his populist project of helping
the poor. Poor contestants
on television shows represent the poor
majority of voters whom
Villar promises to help. His televised
generosity as a candidate is
a foretaste of his promised benevolence as
the next President. Villar a one-time
shrimp vendor who grew up in modest
circumstances to become a real estate
billionaire has used his
humble origins to develop an anti-elitist
discourse typical of populism.
He has directed such attacks at Aquino
who he has also tried to
tie to Arroyo in terms of (in)competence
and dynasticism. As two
Philippine journalists report:
Villar scoffed at what he described as selfrighteous and elitist
groups that have recently gathered around
Aquino to impose anew
their will on the Filipino people. These elitist
groups think
they are the only ones who can run this
country. They had their
chance; its time somebody from the masses
took the lead, Villar,
the countrys richest lawmaker said He
described the arrogance
of the rich assuming the role of the countrys
moral guardians
Villar noted that the Aquino and Arroyo
administrations were
both installed by people power revolutions.
We have never
used competence as a basis for voting for our
president; its
always about popularity and pedigree. Does
one have to be the
son of Cory (Aquino) or the daughter of Dadong
(Macapagal) to
be the president of this country? What about
the son of a shrimp
vendor? he asked. As far as I know, we are a
democracy and
not a monarchy.69

Conclusion: Political Narratives and

Socio-economic Realities
With their competing reformist and
populist narratives, Aquino and
Villar will probably be the two leading
candidates in the May 2010

presidential election. Recent surveys of

reasons Filipinos gave for
choosing a candidate suggest that
reformism and populism both
run deep in the veins of public opinion. 70
But will either candidate
actually be able to change the lives of
Filipinos, the vast majority
of whom remain poor (many of them
desperately so)?
To turn to Aquino first, it is legitimate to
ask whether an
Aquino administration II will bring real
reform to the Philippines
that, it is promised, will foster economic
development and thus
improve the lives of the poor. Given the
recent political history of
the Philippines, the question itself seems
misplaced. No Philippine
presidency, even Corazon Aquinos, was
notably free of corruption.
There is little reason to believe that one
led by her son will be
any different, given the major role his
relatives and other traditional
political allies are likely to play from
behind the scenes. But even
if his administration proves somewhat
cleaner than usual, it is
unclear whether this would lead to
substantially higher economic
growth.
Unlike in Thailand, populism in the
Philippines has not involved
much actual economic redistribution.
Interestingly, the experience
of Thailand under Thaksin shows that
some measures aimed at
poverty reduction, such as low cost health
care, actually do help
relieve the suffering of the poor. 71 Given
that the pro-poor rhetoric
of the previous populist Estrada
government was largely window
dressing, a certain amount of skepticism is
justified in regards to its
current incarnation. In particular, the
strong traditional political
orientation of Villars campaign, his
reliance on noontime television
celebrities to spread his appeal as well as
charges linking him with
a major scandal (the so-called C-5 affair)
hint that Villars pro-poor

orientation may also prove to be largely

for show.72
Arroyos presidency has, at least from a
macroeconomic standpoint,
been a success, however loath her
opponents are to admit it.73
Despite corruption in her administration
and of course there are
only perceptions not actual measures of
its extent this apparently
did little harm to the country economically.
The real failure of the
Arroyo administration was its inability to
reduce income inequality, as
discussed above. Given the apparent lack
of genuine social reformist
commitment of either the Aquino or Villar
campaigns, there is only
a limited chance of improvement on this
front either.
Without a major industrialization drive,
such as that happened
in South Korea in the 1960s, there seems
little prospect of creating
a large middle class and thus raising the
incomes of most Filipinos.
A discussion of the current troubles of the
Thai economy which
is much more industrialized than the
Philippines and about
twice as rich from a per capita standpoint
is enlightening. 74
Thailand and, to a lesser extent, the
Philippines have successfully
diversified economically, no longer relying
on agriculture as their
chief base of output. In the Philippines,
one can point to the past
success of the electronics assembly sector
and the current success
of Business Process Outsourcing (which in
the Philippines primarily
revolves around call centres) as examples
of such successful
diversification. Of course, the Philippines
has also benefited from
massive remittances by its Overseas
Foreign Workers (OFWs). But
Thailand, and more so the Philippines,
have failed to deepen their
industrialization drive. They are not strong
in major capital goods/
high technology sectors, with no world
beating companies in

these categories that use local inputs and

technological capacities.
The chief obstacle to progress in this
regard is the lack of innovation
by major domestic companies. This in turn
is hampered by
problems with human capital formation,
particularly in regard to education (which
most observers agree is in a disastrous
state in
the Philippines).
Given the limited prospects for moving up
the developmental
ladder quickly, the appropriate question
seems not whether reform
can succeed in the Philippines but rather
what its inevitable
failure will mean from the standpoint of
the vast majority of poor
Filipinos. However clean government
becomes, they will remain
impoverished.
Another populist President who fails to
undertake significant
social policies (which Villar has not even
promised in his platform
as Thaksin once had) is unlikely to do
much for the 90 per cent
of Filipinos in the lower class D and E
categories discussed
above who will continue to suffer from
chronic problems of housing,
employment, health care, education, etc.
Clientelism or command voting suffers
from the problem
of corruption (the Arroyo administrations
multiple scandals) and
political violence (epitomized by the
Maguindanao massacre), which
is part and parcel of such a system.
Plunging national popularity of
the incumbent due to malfeasance-inoffice charges is a pattern that
Arthur Alan Shantz had already noted in
late pre-martial law politics.75
This in turn sets the stage for the
resurrection of reformism, which
makes direct moral appeals to the poor
based not on the claim I
will help you but rather that I will be
good once in office. Such
cross-class appeals can overcome massive
clientelist disadvantages,
as Cory Aquinos 1986 presidential
campaign demonstrated. Her son,

Benigno Aquino III, is likely to face a much

more even political
playing field in terms of patronage
resources. His campaign will
thus be more hybridic, consisting of local
clientelist networks and
moralizing reformist rhetoric.
Similarly, Villar has combined applied
populism (on noontime
television shows) with even stronger
political machinery. This enables
him to avoid being labelled a traditional
politician while at the
same time evade the danger of being
destroyed by neo-traditional
politics as happened to Poes 2004
presidential campaign at the
hands of a ruthless incumbent.
Whichever narrative combination proves
to be the winner in
the 2010 Philippine presidential elections,
the appeal of either a
new reformist or populist President
may prove short lived. If
past experience is any guide, neither
narrative can be expected to
be the basis for a sustained effort to
improve the lot of the poor
who will long represent the overwhelming
majority of voters in the Philippines.