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What is Politics?
Robinson Crusoe,
Deep Ecology and
Immanuel Kant
Tony Burns
This article considers the nature of politics.
Robinson Crusoe is used to show that even
the broadest understanding of politics found
in the literature is inadequate, for the
situation of Crusoe on his island is a political
situation even though he is completely alone.
An analogy is drawn between the deep
ecological understanding of politics and the
moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. For
Kantian ethics, also, is built on the idea of a
solitary individual who is at least existentially
isolated. It is concluded that what makes any
situation political is the fact that in it some
policy is required.

Introduction
What is politics? Most introductory textbooks
for students of politics begin with this question. There is, however, considerable disagreement regarding how it should be answered.
One view is that politics has to do solely and
uniquely with the activities of the state (see
Crick, 1971, pp. 1718, 2021 and 2930;
Laski, 1931; Pickles, 1964, ch. 2; Miller, 1962,
part I; Heywood, 1997, pp. 56). There are,

however, those who have challenged this

view because they consider it to be too
narrow. They have, in their different ways,
sought to broaden our understanding of the
nature of politics. For example, one alternative account is that politics has to do with
the resolution, or at least the regulation, of
conflict between individuals or groups
(see Crick, 1971, p. 18; Miller, 1962, p. 14).
Another similar (though not identical) view
is that politics has to do with the preservation of order within a particular society or
group (Crick, 1971, p. 18). There is also the
view that politics involves processes of
collective decision-making in societies and
or groups (Hague et al., 1992 [1982], p. 3).
A fourth alternative is that politics has to do
with the exercise of power (Duverger, 1974,
p. 1118; Leftwich, 1984, p. 64; Lukes, 1981
[1974]). As such, politics is an integral aspect
of all social life. This is the understanding of
politics that one finds in much of the current
literature produced by post-structuralist
writers such as, for example, Chantal Mouffe
(Mouffe, 1993; Finlayson and Martin, 1997).
Andrew Heywood has claimed recently that
this last view is both the broadest and the

Tony Burns, Nottingham Trent University

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and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

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most radical definition of politics available in

the current literature (Heywood, 1997, p. 10).
It is clear that these alternative accounts
of the nature of politics are indeed much
broader than the view that politics has to do
simply with the activities of the state. There
is, moreover, something to be said for each
of them. At the same time, however, they
are also open to criticism. For example, one
common assumption that all of these approaches make is that politics is necessarily
a social activity. It is an activity that requires
at least two people. It is this assumption that
I propose to subject to a critical examination.
I shall do so by considering a situation taken
from the history of English literature the
case of Robinson Crusoe marooned on a
desert island. This has been used many times
by students of the social sciences. It has,
for example, been employed recently by
R. Hague et al. and Andrew Heywood within
the discipline of politics, and by Mary
Midgley in her discussion of environmental
ethics (Hague et al., 1992 [1982], p. 21;
Midgley, 1995).

Robinson Crusoe and politics

from the standpoint of deep
ecology
There is one line of reasoning, associated
with the notion of deep ecology,1 that
suggests that the claim that politics requires
at least two people is false. For the purposes
of the present discussion I shall characterise
this deep ecological standpoint as being the
view that nature possesses intrinsic worth or
value (Attfield, 1981; Brennan, 1995; Mathews,
1995; Rolston, 1994). In Kants terminology it
is an end-in-itself. It is deserving of ethical
consideration by human beings in its own
right. Hence, the rightness or wrongness of
those actions undertaken by human beings
that have an impact on their natural environment has nothing to do with any consequences which these actions may have for
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human beings themselves (Attfield, 1991;

Attfield and Belsey, 1994; Elliot, 1995;
Taylor, 1992).
Now all of the accounts of the nature of
politics referred to above would suggest that
there is and could be no politics at all on
Crusoes island at least until the arrival of
Man Friday. The reason for this is that, in a
situation in which there is only one person,
it is evident that there is no state, no conflict,
no collective decision-making and no
relationships of power. In short, there is no
social life. Consequently, as Heywood maintains, so far as any of the above-mentioned
senses of the term is concerned, there can be
no politics either. It is Heywoods contention
that solitary individuals such as Robinson
Crusoe just cannot engage in politics.
Heywood insists that in this situation politics,
properly speaking, only emerges with the
arrival of a Man (or Woman) Friday
(Heywood, 1997, p. 3). This is also the view
of Hague et al. One of the discussion points
at the end of the first, introductory chapter in
their Comparative Government and Politics
relates to the following two questions: Can
Robinson Crusoe engage in politics on his
desert island? and Why not? (Hague et al.,
1992 [1982], p. 21). The first of these questions might legitimately be said to be an
open one. The second question, however, is
evidently closed. It is clear from the wording
here that the authors do not really take
seriously the possibility that someone might
answer the first question in the affirmative.
From the standpoint of deep ecology, it
might be argued that all of the alternative
approaches to politics referred to above are
inadequate. This is so even in the case of
the one which Heywood considers to be
the broadest and most radical approach, that
subscribed to by post-structuralists. For even
this view of politics focuses entirely on
human beings and their relationships with
one another. Consequently, it excludes from
consideration by students of politics the
relationships in which human beings enter
into with other types of being (whether
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inanimate or non-human animate) in their

natural environment. According to this line
of reasoning, what these alternative accounts
all fail to do is to consider the possibility that
even a solitary, isolated individual like
Crusoe on his island might be thought of as
standing in some sort of ethical relationship
with another, namely his natural environment. Even for Robinson Crusoe, therefore,
there are questions to be asked and choices
to be made so far as everyday practical life
is concerned. In particular, the question arises
for Crusoe of what ought to be done? in relation to the island that he inhabits. It is this
issue which is addressed by Mary Midgley
in her paper on Duties Concerning Islands.
Midgleys essay begins with the question
Had Robinson Crusoe any duties? Her final
conclusion is that Crusoe did indeed have
duties concerning his island and that we
can reasonably call them duties to it (Midgley,
1995, pp. 89 and 102).
From the standpoint of this particular
version of deep ecology, there is no good
reason at all for excluding discussion of such
issues from consideration by students of
politics. It is argued here that whether a
situation is or is not a social one is irrelevant
so far as its status as a political situation is
concerned. On this view, the fundamental
question of all politics, and what characterises a situation as a political situation, is precisely this practical question of what policy
ought to be adopted? in the situation in
question. It is clear, however, that this question can be asked by an individual human
being living in complete isolation from
others. In the case of a latter-day Crusoe, for
example, such a situation evidently does
arise if it is accepted that human beings can
be morally obligated to something that is
itself not human.
This deep ecological approach to politics
is critical of all preceding approaches because
of what it considers to be their anthropocentrism (Callicott, 1984; Dobson, 1990,
pp. 6372; Goodpaster, 1978; Midgley, 1994).
It seems clear, however, that even when
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considered from this alternative standpoint

(provided we accept that there are no other
life-forms that are rational agents capable of
making policy choices), it nevertheless
remains the case that politics must always
have at least something to do with at least
one human being. This understanding of
the nature of politics is itself based on the
assumption that what makes the situation
characterised by Defoe in Robinson Crusoe a
political one is precisely the fact that Crusoe
himself comes at some point to be shipwrecked on the island. From this point of
view, and contrary to Heywoods suggestion
referred to earlier, it is at this juncture, and
not with the later appearance of Man Friday,
that desert island politics begins.
From the standpoint of this particular
version of deep ecology, therefore (which
is clearly not as deeply green as some of
its possible competitors), it would be inappropriate to talk about politics in connection
with a world that consisted entirely of
inanimate objects, or which contained only
non-human (or non-rational) life-forms. It
would not be possible for us to talk here
about the politics of a situation in which
there were no human beings at all and
hence, ex hypothesi, no being that is capable
of asking the question of what ought to be
done?, or of making or sustaining policies
in relation to its own practical conduct.
Consequently, even for this deep ecological
account of the nature of politics, our understanding of politics remains (and must
inevitably remain), to some extent at least,
an anthropocentric one.

Robinson Crusoe, politics

and Immanuel Kant
Surprisingly, perhaps, there is an analogy
that might be drawn here between this deep
ecological understanding of the nature
of politics and the moral philosophy of
Immanuel Kant (Kant, 1972). Kant thinks of
moral conduct as being the final outcome
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of a process of moral decision-making on

the part of what is in effect, existentially
speaking, an isolated individual, even
though that individual is living together with
others in society although of course, unlike
Crusoe before the arrival of Man Friday, this
individual is not actually physically isolated
from other human beings.
Kants employment of legislative metaphors in his account of the nature of morality
is really quite striking. The process of moral
decision-making, as Kant understands it, has
a number of features in common with the
legislative process within the sphere of
politics. For example, in the first place it is a
process in which the individual in question
proposes a particular maxim or policy as a
possible guide for his or her own future
conduct as an answer to the question of
what ought to be done? interpreted in an
ethical sense (Kant, 1972, pp. 6668 and
8485). In the second place, this process also
involves reasoned argument. The reasoning
in question appeals to all of the relevant information available and recognises that some
ethically significant other, with interests and
rights that are deserving of moral consideration, is going to be affected by the policy in
question should it be implemented. Moreover, the intention, here, is that the final
decision which is made with respect to the
proposed policy should not be based on the
casual, subjective, arbitrary or private interests
and desires of any one individual, but should
be the appropriate or right thing to do in the
situation in question. Finally, the proposed
maxim or policy is, in a manner of speaking,
voted on by the individual who is doing the
deliberating. If it is considered to be a policy
that is appropriate then it becomes a practical law for the individual concerned. From
this point of view, then, the situation of
Crusoe on his island is one in which there is
quite literally just one isolated individual
who is autonomous, self-legislating or selfgoverning, in Kants sense (Kant, 1972,
pp. 9397). Crusoe is someone who legislates
or makes policy decisions for himself and
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then recognises an obligation to implement

these policies in practice afterwards. He
is someone who, in the manner of Kant,
transforms maxims into practical laws by an
autonomous act of legislative will.
It has been suggested that Kants moral
philosophy is itself anthropocentric, and
hence of little value for those interested in
environmental ethics and politics (Broadie
and Pybus, 1974; Hayward, 1994; Hoff, 1983;
Taylor, 1986). There is at least something
to be said for this view. For example, Kant
explicitly states, at one point, that humanity
so far as it is capable of morality is the only
thing which has dignity (Kant, 1972, pp. 96
97). Nevertheless, from the standpoint of
deep ecology, there is no good reason why
we should not extend Kants idea of certain
types of entity as being ends in themselves
beyond the category of the human, even
though Kant himself is unwilling to do so. If,
unlike Kant (and indeed Daniel Defoe), we
take this idea to include inanimate nature as
well as non-human animate beings, then the
situation of Crusoe on his island might then
be thought of as being precisely that of a
law making member in a kingdom of ends
(Kant, 1972, p. 96). Admittedly, however
(and paradoxically), this would be a political
community in which there is only one
human being.
The similarities between this situation and
a more conventional legislative situation
involving more than one person of the sort
usually envisaged by students of politics are
evidently very close. From the present point
of view, there are only two differences here
(neither of which, it is claimed, are of any
great importance). The first is that Kants
principal concern is with a particular class of
policies, namely those which relate specifically to ethical issues. It is clear, however,
that not all policies fall into this class.2 Thus,
in the more conventional situation, not all
laws and obligations are moral or ethical laws
and obligations in Kants sense. The second
is that in the kingdom of ends that is
Crusoes island the ruler and the subject, or
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the legislator who makes the law and the

citizen who obeys it, happen to be one and
the same person. According to the deep
ecological line of reasoning we are currently
considering, therefore, why should a
policy-making situation of this sort be
thought of as having nothing at all to do
with politics? Why should this situation not
be thought of as being a genuinely political
situation?

Conclusion
This alternative understanding of the nature
of politics, which we have associated both
with the standpoint of deep ecology, on the
one hand, and that of Kant on the other, is
of course an extreme one. However, if this
line of reasoning has anything at all to be
said for it then Andrew Heywood is clearly
wrong when he says that politics is above
all a social activity. It is always a dialogue
and never a monologue (Heywood, 1997,
p. 3) unless, of course, one were to maintain, with Freud (and perhaps also Defoe),
that the monologues of isolated human
beings always amount, in effect, to dialogues
with themselves. Heywoods own definition
of politics is that it has to do with the
making, preserving and amending of general
social rules. In his opinion this definition is
sufficiently broad to encompass most, if not
all, of the competing definitions of politics
that one finds offered in the current literature
(Heywood, 1997, pp. 34). It is clear, however, that this definition is not able to deal
satisfactorily with the situation of Crusoe on
his island. Consequently, it would be argued
by deep ecologists that even Heywoods
definition of politics is still not yet broad
enough.
In the end, of course, the point of
considering the example of Crusoe on his
island is to shed light on our understanding
of politics in more conventional (social)
situations. It is assumed that what we have
said about Crusoe is relevant to such an
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understanding. For example, in the light of

our discussion, it could be argued that
politics has to do not so much with general
social rules, but simply with general rules or
policies, whether these be social or not.
From this perspective the discipline of
politics is more or less identical with that of
policy studies, understood in such a broad
sense. For here man is thought of as a policyfollowing animal. On this view, the existence
of a state is not a necessary precondition for
the existence of politics. Nor is the presence
of conflict. Nor is the presence of power (if
by power one means what post-structuralists
mean by it for that is a relational view
of power, which requires the presence of at
least two human beings). Nor is the presence
of collective decision-making. Indeed, this
view of politics goes so far as to suggest that
even the idea that politics is necessarily a
social activity might be brought into question.
Rather, from this standpoint, what characterises a situation as a political situation is
the fact that it is a situation in which, for
whatever reason, a policy is required. The
fundamental question of all politics, therefore, is always what ought that policy to
be? The principal reason why the situation
of Crusoe on his island might, properly
speaking, be said to be a political situation
is precisely because even in his solitary
isolation Crusoe remains a policy-following
being. In short, he remains a human being.
In so far as Crusoes policy-making activity
relates (and even accords priority) to ethical
issues (for example the duties that, according to Midgley, Crusoe has to the island that
he inhabits) then this is an understanding of
the nature of politics of which even Aristotle
would have approved.

Notes
1
2

For the idea of deep ecology, see: Dobson,

1990; Fox, 1986; Naess, 1984; Sylvan, 1984a;
Sylvan, 1984b.
This amounts to recognising, as Kant himself does, that not all imperatives are ethical
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or categorical imperatives some are

hypothetical imperatives. See Kant, 1972,
pp. 7683.

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