Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Secs. 4-5:
Anama v. Phil. Savings Bank, G.R. No. 187021, January 25, 2012
(1) where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, especially if a party
successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not
apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein;
Elementary is the rule that every motion must contain the mandatory requirements of
notice and hearing and that there must be proof of service thereof. The Court has
consistently held that a motion that fails to comply with the above requirements is
considered a worthless piece of paper which should not be acted upon. The rule, however,
is not absolute. There are motions that can be acted upon by the court ex parte if these
would not cause prejudice to the other party. They are not strictly covered by the rigid
requirement of the rules on notice and hearing of motions.
Absence of such advance notice to the judgment debtor does not constitute
an infringement of the constitutional guarantee of due process.
However, the established rules of our system of jurisprudence do not require
that a defendant who has been granted an opportunity to be heard and has had his
day in court should, after a judgment has been rendered against him, have a further
notice and hearing before supplemental proceedings are taken to reach his property in
satisfaction of the judgment. Thus, in the absence of a statutory requirement, it is not
essential that he be given notice before the issuance of an execution against his
tangible property; after the rendition of the judgment he must take "notice of what
will follow," no further notice being "necessary to advance justice."
The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to
study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon
which it is based.
We have consistently held that a motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule
15 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper, which the Clerk of Court has no right to
receive and the trial court has no authority to act upon. Service of a copy of a motion containing a notice of
the time and the place of hearing of that motion is a mandatory requirement, and the failure of movants to
comply with these requirements renders their motions fatally defective. However, there are
exceptions to the strict application of this rule. These exceptions are: (1) where a rigid
application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows
that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from
the recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where the
resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; and (4)
where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed.
Sec. 8:
Tung Ho Steel v. Ting Guan, G.R. No. 182153, April 7, 2014
As a basic principle, courts look with disfavor on piecemeal arguments in motions filed by the parties.
Under the omnibus motion rule, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall
include all objections then available.25 The purpose of this rule is to obviate multiplicity of motions and to
discourage dilatory motions and pleadings. Party litigants should not be allowed to reiterate identical
motions, speculating on the possible change of opinion of the courts or of the judges thereof.
(4) discovery during trial of evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal.
Except for lack of cause of action or lack of jurisdiction, the grounds under Section 1 of
Rule 16 may be waived. If a particular ground for dismissal is not raised or if no motion to
dismiss is filed at all within the reglementary period, it is generally considered waived
under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules.
action. Thus, an action, although filed later, shall not be dismissed if it is the more
appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties.
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(1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions;
(2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and
(3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that
may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other case.
Quito v. Stop & Save Corp., G.R. No. 186657, June 11, 2014
Res Judicata
Heirs of Sotto v. Palicte, G.R. No. 159691, June 13, 2013
In other words, the issue of physical possession in the action for unlawful detainer cannot be
identical with the issues of ownership and validity of contract in the action for annulment. From these
essential differences, the lack of required identity in the causes of action for litis pendentia to exist
Res judicata exists when as between the action sought to be dismissed and the other action
these elements are present, namely;
(1) the former judgment must be final;
(2) the former judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject
matter and the parties;
cannot be denied.
(ii)
identity of subject matter, or of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and,
(iii)
identity of causes of action in both actions such that any judgment that may
be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
endeavored to lay down certain criteria to guide lower courts faced with this legal
dilemma. As a rule, preference is given to the first action filed to be retained. This is in
accordance with the maxim Qui prior est tempore, potior est jure. There are, however,
limitations to this rule. Hence, the first action may be abated if it was filed merely to preempt the later action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal. Thus,
the bona fides or good faith of the parties is a crucial element. A later case shall not be
abated if not brought to harass or vex; and the first case can be abated if it is merely an
anticipatory action or, more appropriately, an anticipatory defense against an expected suit
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Another exception to the priority in time rule is the criterion of the more appropriate
The principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1) bar by prior judgment and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment. This Court had occasion to explain the difference between these two aspects of res judicata as follows:
There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment
was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes
an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as
their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action
before the same or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of
causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept
of res judicata known as conclusiveness of judgment. Stated differently, any right, fact or
matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an
action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the
parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of
the two actions is the same.[9]
Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been squarely
put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction.
[10]
The fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that action (and persons in privity
with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them while the judgment or order remains
standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or petition; the conclusively-settled fact or
question cannot again be litigated in any future or other action between the same parties or their privies and
successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a
different cause of action.[11] Thus, only the identities of parties and issues are required for the operation of the
principle of conclusiveness of judgment.
7. Prescription/Statute of Limitations
Marquez v. Baldoz, G.R. No. 143779, April 4, 2003
As required by Section 3, Rule 16, the trial courts Order also explains at length the basis for its
finding that in his complaint, plaintiff has shown a sufficient cause of action. Corollary to its discussion
on this issue, the trial court also touched on the issue on prescription with a pronouncement that such
issue is better threshed after a full-blown trial on the merits. The trial courts reasoning, in our view,
sufficiently explained the reason for dismissing the motion to dismiss. It satisfactorily served the
purpose behind the new Rules of Court as earlier explained.
with an allegation that the subject property was a tenanted property, the contention of
petitioners in establishing an uninterrupted adverse possession for more than thirty (30)
years seems implausible. Besides, possession is not a definitive proof of ownership, nor is
non-possession inconsistent therewith.
action (as opposed to the failure to state a cause of action), the alleged estoppel on the part of petitioner, and the
Motion to Dismiss as enumerated in Section 1, Rule 16 [17] of the Rules of Court. Rather, such defenses raise
argument that respondent is in pari delicto in the execution of the challenged contracts, are not grounds in a
evidentiary issues closely related to the validity and/or existence of respondents alleged cause of action and should
therefore be threshed out during the trial.
As regards the allegation of failure to state a cause of action, while the same is usually available as a
ground in a Motion to Dismiss, said ground cannot be ruled upon in the present Petition without going into the
It is basic that [a] cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another.
[18]
Its elements are the following: (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff, (2) a duty on the part of the
defendant to respect the plaintiff's right, and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of such right.
[19]
We have held that to sustain a Motion to Dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the
claim for relief does not exist and not only that the claim was defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or
uncertain.
Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the rule that the trial courts denial of a motion to dismiss cannot
be questioned in a certiorari proceeding under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is because a certiorari writ is
a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. [18] The appropriate course of action
of the movant in such event is to file an answer [19] and interpose as affirmative defenses the objections raised in the
motion to dismiss.[20] If, later, the decision of the trial judge is adverse, the movant may then elevate on appeal the
same issues raised in the motion.[21]
The only exception to this rule is when the trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying the
motion.[22] This exception is, nevertheless, applied sparingly, and only in instances when there is a clear showing
that the trial court exercised its judicial power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility.[23] Further, the abuse of the courts discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by, or to act at all in contemplation of, law.
To elucidate, the grounds raised in the motion are: (1) bar by the statute of
limitations or by laches; and (2) waiver, abandonment or extinguishment of claim. These
grounds are, however, based on petitioners assertion that respondents cannot invoke
lack of jurisdiction over their persons as a ground in the petition for annulment of
judgment. This is a conclusion of law that cannot be used as the foundation of the motion
to dismiss. The assertion still needs to be proven or disproven by the parties and resolved
by the trial court. Indeed, petitioners allegations in the motion that respondents actually
received the summons and that one of them even voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction
of the MeTC, are matters of evidence that need to be threshed out in the trial. True or not,
respondents must be given ample opportunity to prove their claim, and the petitioner to
debunk the same.
Fernando v. Acuna, G.R. No. 161030, September 14, 2011
Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time to do that which, by observance of due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
the presumption that the party entitled to assert his right either has abandoned or
declined to assert it. Laches thus operates as a bar in equity. [38] The essential elements of
laches are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainants rights after
he had knowledge of defendants acts and after he has had the opportunity to sue; (c) lack
of knowledge or notice by defendant that the complainant will assert the right on which he
bases his suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is
accorded to the complainant.