BENJAMIN (KOKOY) T.

ROMUALDEZ,
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -

G.R. Nos. 165510-33

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman),

Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,

Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO,
in his official capacity as the Ombudsman,
and PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
ON GOOD GOVERNMENT,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
September 23, 2005
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari [1] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
assailing the resolutions dated July 12, 2004, [2] and September 6, 2004[3] of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP)/Ombudsman, recommending that informations be filed in the
Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Benjamin Kokoy T. Romualdez with violation of Section 7 of
R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for non-filing of Statement of Assets and
Liabilities (SAL).[4]
The antecedent facts show that on February 22, 1989, 24 informations docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429 were filed against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan for his
alleged failure to file the SAL from 1962 to 1985. [5]
A warrant of arrest was issued on February 28, 1989, [6] but this was not served because of
petitioners exile from the country. On October 21, 1991, he filed through counsel a Motion to
Recall Warrants of Arrest,[7] alleging that the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was invalid for lack of jurisdiction. He also
filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Hold in Abeyance Implementation of Warrants of Arrest and/or
to Recall the Same.[8] On November 4, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an order to defer the
enforcement of the arrest warrant on the condition:
(1)
that the cash deposit equivalent to the aggregate amount of the bond shall serve as a
provisional cash bond for the accuseds temporary liberty upon his personal appearance to the
court;
(2)
that the cash deposit shall be made within five (5) days from receipt hereof by movants
counsel, said act of deposit representing the conformity of the accused to the conditions hereof;
(3)
that the accused himself shall arrive in the Philippines within thirty (30) days from
counsels receipt hereof;
(4)
that accused shall personally present himself to this Court on the next succeeding
working day after his arrival for completion of the bailbond process. [9]
Due to his non-compliance with these terms, the Sandiganbayan denied on January 24,
1992[10] petitioners motion to recall the warrant of arrest. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
which the Sandiganbayan denied on April 24, 1992. It also declared that until petitioner submits

himself to the jurisdiction of the court, the issue regarding his compliance with the conditions
imposed in the resolution of November 4, 1991, will not be entertained. [11]
Hence, on May 27, 1992, he filed a petition [12] with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 105248,
assailing the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated January 24, 1992, April 24, 1992 and
November 4, 1991.
In a Decision dated May 16, 1995, this Court declared invalid the preliminary investigation
conducted by the PCGG for lack of jurisdiction. However, it held that the invalidity or absence of
a preliminary investigation did not affect the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or impair the
validity of the informations. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was ordered to suspend the proceedings
pending the holding of a proper preliminary investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. [13]
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged Resolutions of January 24, 1992
and April 24, 1992 are AFFIRMED; but the respondent Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to order the
Office of the Ombudsman to forthwith conduct a proper preliminary investigation of the charges
embodied in the informations filed against petitioner; to suspend the proceedings pending
termination thereof; and thereafter to take action on petitioners cases as may be warranted by
the results of said preliminary investigation.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[14]
Pursuant to the above Decision, the Sandiganbayan ordered [15] the petitioner to submit his
counter-affidavit, the PCGG its reply-affidavit, and the OSP its report on the reinvestigation.
Petitioner failed to file his counter-affidavit as directed. On April 27, 2000, he returned to the
Philippines and voluntarily surrendered.[16] He filed a Motion to Quash on June 2, 2000.[17] The
clarificatory hearing scheduled on the same date was reset to June 9, 2000.
On June 8, 2000, one day before the scheduled clarificatory hearing, the Sandiganbayan
denied in open court petitioners motion to quash [18] and the reconsideration thereof and also
terminated the preliminary investigation. [19] His arraignment scheduled on June 26, 2000 [20] was
reset to July 28, 2000.[21]
On July 27, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition [22] with this Court,
docketed as G.R. Nos. 143618-41. He assailed the orders of the Sandiganbayan (1) denying his
motion to quash and his oral motion for reconsideration; (2) ordering the termination of the
preliminary investigation; and (3) setting his arraignment on July 28, 2000. He claimed that the
criminal cases against him were based on void informations, hence, the Sandiganbayan must be
enjoined from arraigning him on July 28, 2000.
On July 30, 2002, we granted the petition holding that it is the prosecutor which is the
Ombudsman, and not the PCGG, which must subscribe and file the informations because the
crimes ascribed to petitioner do not relate to alleged ill-gotten wealth, and were therefore,
beyond the ambit of the PCGGs jurisdiction. The informations were filed by PCGG, an
unauthorized party and could not even be cured by conducting another preliminary
investigation. Since the informations were invalid, they cannot serve as basis for criminal
proceedings. We also found that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it
abruptly terminated the reinvestigation.[23]
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of
the Sandiganbayan dated June 8, 2000 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.[24]
Pursuant to the foregoing Decision, the Sandiganbayan in a resolution dated February 10,
2004, dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429. [25]
On March 3, 2004, the OSP directed petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit. He failed to
comply so another order dated April 14, 2004 was issued but this was returned because
petitioner was not found in the given address.
On April 26, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a counter-affidavit.[26] He
alleged that the order involved previously dismissed cases, hence, there was no legal justification
for the OSP and the Ombudsman to further conduct preliminary investigation.
On May 12, 2004, petitioner filed a counter-affidavit [27] adopting all the allegations in the
motion to dismiss. The PCGG filed its Opposition[28] insisting that the quashal of the informations
for lack of authority by the PCGG to file the same did not mean that petitioner is already exempt
from criminal prosecution. The Ombudsman can still file new informations should it find that
probable cause exists.
In a Memorandum dated July 12, 2004, [29] the OSP ordered the Motion to Dismiss filed by
petitioner expunged for being a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 3(c), Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and Section 4(d), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman. Considering that the motion to dismiss was grounded on the quashal
of the informations and not on lack of jurisdiction, the OSP declared the motion to dismiss as a
mere scrap of paper. Also, the petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to file a counteraffidavit. As such, his counter-affidavit was not given due course.
Consequently, based solely on complainants evidence, the OSP determined there was
probable cause that petitioner violated Section 7 of RA No. 3019 and accordingly recommended
the filing of 24 informations before the Sandiganbayan.
On September 6, 2004, the OSP denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. [30]
Thereafter, 19 informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 28031-28049 were filed with the
Sandiganbayan for failure of petitioner to file his SAL for the period 1967-1985 during his tenure
as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, [31] while 4 informations docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 04-231857-04-231860[32] were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila for
petitioners failure to file his SAL from 1963 to 1966 during his tenure as Technical Assistant in
the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Hence, this petition on the following grounds:
I.
RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION TO
DISMISS THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF CRIM. CASES NOS. 13406-13429
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE SAID CASES HAD ALREADY BEEN DISMISSED BY THE
SUPREME COURT AND BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN;
II.
RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN CONDUCTING A PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED OFFENSES THAT HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether or not the Ombudsman acted with
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss the preliminary investigation;
and (2) whether or not the offenses charged against petitioner have prescribed.

Petitioner argues that respondents act of proceeding with the preliminary investigation
constitutes patently reversible error. He claims that since Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429
have already been dismissed, the PCGG should have filed a new complaint with a new docket
number. He insists that the Ombudsman could not conduct another preliminary investigation
using the old docket numbers.
Petitioner also maintains that the offenses for which he was charged had already prescribed in
February 2001, hence the preliminary investigation conducted anew by the Ombudsman should
be terminated.
In their Comments,[33] respondents aver that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429
did not mean that the preliminary investigation was terminated, as this Court specifically
directed the Ombudsman to conduct the same. Besides, the Ombudsman is duly authorized to
investigate on its own or upon complaint the acts or omissions of public officials or employees.
Thus, it need not wait for the filing of another complaint before conducting a preliminary
investigation. Respondents also deny that the offenses have prescribed since the period was
tolled when the petitioner was out of the country.
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner came to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure imputing grave abuse of discretion on the Ombudsman in
denying his motion to dismiss the preliminary investigation.
A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. [34]
In Punzalan v. Dela Pea,[35] lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction were
distinguished. Respondent acts without jurisdiction if he does not have the legal power to
determine the case. Where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case,
oversteps his authority as determined by law, then he is performing a function in excess of his
jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In other words, the power of discretion is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. [36]
In denying the motion to dismiss the preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman resolved:
After a careful evaluation of the arguments/contentions of both parties, complainant
(PCGG) and respondent Romualdez, the undersigned finds the contentions of the PCGG more
credible.
The Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Benjamin Romualdez should be expunged, the
same being a prohibited pleading. Sec. 3 (c) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which provides that the respondents shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss
in lieu of a counter-affidavit. Thus, it is incumbent upon the accused to file a counter-affidavit,
and not a motion to dismiss. Moreover, Section 4 (d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman provides: No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent argued in his motion to dismiss that Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429 were already
dismissed by the Sandiganbayan by virtue of its Minute Resolution dated February 10, 2004, and

not lack of jurisdiction. Hence, such motion is a mere scrap of paper, without any legal force and
effect.
...
The authority of the Office of The Special Prosecutor/Ombudsman to conduct preliminary
investigation in these cases is pursuant to the Supreme Courts Decision dated July 20, 2002 in
G.R.F Nos. 143618-143641 entitled Benjamin Kokoy T. Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan.
The Honorable Supreme Court specifically stated in said Decision that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion when it prematurely terminated the preliminary
investigation being conducted by this Office on June 8, 2000, which the Supreme Court itself
ordered.
Hence, the quashal of the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429 before the
Sandiganbayan, First Division for lack of authority of the PCGG to file the same is without
prejudice to the filing of new informations by this Office should it find probable cause after the
conduct of preliminary investigation.
...
Respondent Romualdez failed to file his counter-affidavit and/or present his controverting
evidence despite the sending of notices and copies of the complaint with supporting evidence to
his known address and through his counsel on record. However, he opted to file a Motion to
Dismiss, through his counsel, which this Office cannot take cognizance for reasons cited hereof.
In view thereof, these cases must be resolved on the basis solely of the complainants evidence.
Thus, after a careful evaluation of the evidence on records, the undersigned finds that
respondent violated Section 7 of R.A. [3019] since the time he was appointed Technical Assistant,
with the rank of FAO, Class III in the Philippine Consulate, Ambassador and Provincial Governor of
Leyte from 1961 until February, 1986 he never filed his Statement of Assets and Liabilities. [37]
The ruling of the OSP/Ombudsman is consistent with the Decision of this Court in Velasco
v. Hon. Casaclang,[38] where we held that, the Deputy Ombudsman properly denied the motion to
quash and motion for reconsideration of petitioner therein, pursuant to the applicable provisions
of the Revised Rules of Court and Administrative Order (AO) No. 07 of the Ombudsman. Section
4 (d) of AO No. 07 disallows a motion to quash (or dismiss) except on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. In that case, as in this one, no absence of jurisdiction is perceived.
The Constitution vested the Office of the Ombudsman with powers and duties to investigate on
its own, or on complaint by any person, any illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient act or omission
of any public official or employee. [39] Section 15(1) of R.A. No. 6770 or The Ombudsman Act of
1989 delineated the investigatory and prosecutory functions of the Ombudsman, to wit:
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:
(1)
Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has the primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any
stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;
We held that the OSP/Ombudsman is the proper authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation of the alleged offenses committed by petitioner. Pursuant thereto, there is no need

for a new complaint to be filed by PCGG because the Ombudsman, on its own, may conduct a
preliminary investigation of offenses committed by public officers. Moreover, the denial of his
motion to dismiss was concomitant with Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman disallowing a motion to dismiss except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Besides, we held in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,[40] that:
The Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion when it abruptly terminated the
reinvestigation being conducted by Prosecutor Lucero. It should be recalled that our directive in
G.R. No. 105248 for the holding of a preliminary investigation was based on our ruling that the
right to a preliminary investigation is a substantive, rather than a procedural right. Petitioners
right was violated when the preliminary investigation of the charges against him were conducted
by an officer without jurisdiction over the said cases. It bears stressing that our directive should
be strictly complied with in order to achieve its objective of affording petitioner his right to due
process.
Petitioners claim that the preliminary investigation be dismissed because it referred to the same
docket numbers of the dismissed informations, is erroneous. The assignment of a docket number
is an internal matter designed for efficient record keeping. It is usually written in the Docket
Record in sequential order corresponding to the date and time of filing a case. [41]
This Court agrees that the use of the docket numbers of the dismissed cases was merely for
reference. In fact, after the new informations were filed, new docket numbers were
assigned, i.e., Criminal Cases Nos. 28031-28049. Plainly, these are entirely different cases from
those that have been dismissed given that Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429 were not
mentioned.
Petitioner also alleges that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing
the preliminary investigation on the ground of prescription of the offense. This allegation is a
matter of defense which must be settled in a full-blown trial. Evidence must be received to
resolve the case on its merits.
In Domingo v. Sandiganbayan,[42] we considered the following in resolving the issue of
prescription: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.
Petitioner is being charged under Section 7 of R.A. No. 3019, a special law. Section 11 of
the same statute provides for the period of prescription for the offense charged,i.e., 15 years.
However, the applicable rule on the time the period of prescription starts to run is Section 2 of
Act No. 3326, which provides:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution
of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.
This Court quotes the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno
in Presidential Ad Hoc Committee v. Hon. Desierto:[43]
The law on prescription of special crimes like violation of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) is
provided for in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, viz:

SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof ...
The application of this provision is not simple and each case must be decided according to its
facts. It involves a careful study and analysis of contentious facts: (a) when the commission of
the violation of the law happened; (b) whether or not the violation was known at the time of its
commission, and (c) if not known then, the time of its discovery. In addition, there is the
equally difficult problem of choice of legal and equitable doctrines to apply to the above elusive
facts. For the general rule is that the mere fact that a person entitled to an action has no
knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises, does not prevent the
running of the statute. This stringent rule, however, admits of an exception. Under the
blameless ignorance doctrine, the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of
the invasion of a right which will support a cause of action. In other words, courts decline to
apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff neither knew nor had reasonable means of
knowing the existence of a cause of action. Given all these factual and legal difficulties, the
public respondent should have ordered private respondents to answer the sworn complaint,
required a reply from the petitioners and conducted such hearings as may be necessary so he
could have all the vital facts at his front and, upon their basis, resolve whether the offense
charged has already prescribed. (Emphasis supplied)
It is noteworthy that petitioner did not raise the defense of prescription in his motion to
dismiss the preliminary investigation. It is only in this petition that he raised this issue. As this
case has never progressed beyond the filing of the informations against petitioner, it is only
prudent that evidence be gathered through trial on the merits to determine whether the offense
charged has already prescribed.
A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to
prepare the complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person
against whom it is taken in jeopardy. [44]
Consequently, the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners motion to dismiss the preliminary investigation. Not only did the Ombudsman have
the jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation under the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770,
but he also acted within the legal bounds of the authority conferred upon him when he denied
the motion to dismiss under Administrative Order No. 07.
As a rule, the Court shall not unduly interfere in the Ombudsmans exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers, as provided in the Constitution, without good and
compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.[45]
WHERFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The resolutions dated July 12, 2004 and
September 6, 2004 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Romualdez vs Marcelo
G.R. Nos. 166510-33
July 28, 2006
Facts:

Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in
recommending the filing of 24 information against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the
aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of
February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on
appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a
quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before
the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-23185704-231860 pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.
In its Comment, the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the information in Criminal Case
Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal
prosecution; that new information may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause
in the conduct of its preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information
with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the
petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based
on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and
RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman need not wait for a new complaint
with a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of
the petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish
Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to
Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin
to run when the offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers
the same in the negative, should be applied.
Issues:
(a) Whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos.
13406-13429 was a nullity?
(b) Whether the offenses for which petitioners are being charged with have already prescribed?
Held:
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in
recommending the filing of 24 information against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the
aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of
February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on
appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a
quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before
the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-23185704-231860 pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.
G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992
Lydia O. Chua
Vs.
The Civil Service Commission, the National Irrigation Administration and the
Department of Budget and Management.
Facts:
In line with the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, R.A.6683 was enacted to
provide for the early retirement and voluntary separation of government employees affected due

to reorganization, those who may avail were regular, casual, temporary and emergency
employees, with rendered service minimum of two years.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired by the National Irrigation Administration Authoruty (NIA) for over
15 years as a coterminous employee of 4 successive NIA projects. She availed of the above
mentioned law only to be denied as the CSC who deemed her unqualified, being a coterminous
employee. She was instead offered a severance of monthly basic pay for each year of service.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was entitled to avail of the early retirement benefit as a coterminous
employee.
Held:
It was stated that a coterminous employee is a non-career civil servant like casual and
emergency employees, because of that they are entitled to the same benefits as long as they
complied with the requirements of the law, which in this case, was done by Linda Chua. On that
note, the court believes that the denial of petitioners application for early retirement benefits by
the NIA and CSC is unreasonable, unjustified and oppressive due to the fact that she is entitled to
the benefits of the same law because she served the government not only for two (2) years
which is the minimum requirement under the law but for fifteen (15) years. In four (4)
governmental projects.
Wherefore, the petition is granted.
-Statutory ConstructionChua v. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)
FACTS:
RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for
involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers those who are qualified: Sec. 2.
Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National
Government. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two
(2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation Petitioner Lydia
Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an
application on January 30, 1989 with Respondent Administration, which, however, denied
the same. Recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the same result.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioners status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the benefits of RA 6683
(Early Retirement Law).
HELD:
The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of
the constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustain Respondents submission that the
benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly
situated as those covered by the said law. The court applied the doctrine of necessary
implication in deciding this case.
Chua v. Civil Service Commission
Case No. 60G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)Chapter IV, Page 164, Footnote No.146
Facts: In line with the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, R.A.6683 (2
December 1988) was enacted to provide for the early retirement and voluntary separation of
government employees as well as involuntary resignation to those affected due to
reorganization. Those who may avail were regular, casual, temporary and emergency employees,
with rendered service minimum of two years. Sec. 2.
Coverage
.

This
Act
shall
cover
all
appointive
offi cials
and
employees
of
the N a t i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t , i n c l u d i n g g o v e r n m e n t - o w n e d o r c o n t r o l l e d

corporations withoriginal charters, as well as the personnel of all local

g o v e r n m e n t u n i t s . T h e b e n e fi t s a u t h o r i z e d u n d e r t h i s A c t s h a l l a p p l y t o a l l
r e g u l a r , t e m p o r a r y , c a s u a l a n d e m e r g e n c y employees, regardless of age, who
have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive y e a r s o f g o v e r n m e n t s e r v i c e
a s o f t h e d a t e o f s e p a r a t i o n . U n i f o r m e d p e r s o n n e l o f t h e Armed Forces of the
Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired by the National Irrigation Administration Authority (NIA) for over
15years as a coterminous employee of 4 successive NIA projects. Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing
that
sheis qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 wi
th the NIA but was denied and later on with the CSC who was likewise denied. She was instead
offered a separation benefits of monthly basic pay for each year of service. a)
co-terminous with the project
When the appointment is co-existent with the duration of a particular project for which
purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the same;
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was entitled to avail of the early retirement benefit as a
coterminous employee.
Held:It was stated that a coterminous employee is a non-career civil servant like casual and
emergency employees, because of that they are entitled to the same benefits as long as they
complied with the requirements of the law, which in this case, was done by Linda Chua. On that
note, the court believes that the denial of petitioners application for early retirement benefits by
the NIA and CSC is unreasonable, unjustified and oppressive due to the fact that she is entitled to
the benefits of the same law because she served the government not only for two (2) years
which is the minimum requirement under the law but for fifteen (15) years. In four (4)
governmental projects. Wherefore, the petition is granted.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 146943. October 4, 2002]
SARIO MALINIAS, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TEOFILO CORPUZ,
ANACLETO TANGILAG and VICTOR DOMINGUEZ,respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari [1] of the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC for brevity) en banc[2] dated June 10, 1999 and October 26, 2000. The assailed
Resolutions dismissed the complaint[3] filed by petitioner Sario Malinias (Malinias for brevity)
and Roy S. Pilando (Pilando for brevity) for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause
for violation of Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6646 [4] and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881.[5]
The Facts
Petitioner Malinias was a candidate for governor whereas Pilando was a candidate for
congressional representative of Mountain Province in the May 11, 1998 elections. [6]
The Provincial Board of Canvassers held the canvassing of election returns at the second floor of
the Provincial Capitol Building in Bontoc, Mountain Province from May 11, 1998 to May 15, 1998.
[7]

On July 31, 1998, Malinias and Pilando filed a complaint with the COMELECs Law Department for
violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646, and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881, against
Victor Dominguez, Teofilo Corpuz, Anacleto Tangilag, Thomas Bayugan, Jose Bagwan who was
then Provincial Election Supervisor, and the members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
Victor Dominguez (Dominguez for brevity) was then the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion,
Sabangan, Mountain Province. Teofilo Corpuz (Corpuz for brevity) was then the Provincial
Director of the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province while Anacleto Tangilag (Tangilag
for brevity) was then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain Province.
Malinias and Pilando alleged that on May 15, 1998 a police checkpoint at Nacagang, Sabangan,
Mountain Province blocked their supporters who were on their way to Bontoc, and prevented
them from proceeding to the Provincial Capitol Building. Malinias and Pilando further alleged that

policemen, upon orders of private respondents, prevented their supporters, who nevertheless
eventually reached the Provincial Capitol Building, from entering the capitol grounds.
In their complaint, Malinias and Pilando requested the COMELEC and its Law Department to
investigate and prosecute private respondents for the following alleged unlawful acts.
3. That on May 15, 1998 at the site of the canvassing of election returns for congressional and
provincial returns located at the second floor of the Provincial Capitol Building the public and
particularly the designated representatives/watchers of both affiants were prevented from
attending the canvassing.
xxx
4. That the aforementioned Mass-affidavits support our allegations in this affidavit-complaint
that we and our supporters were prevented from attending the provincial canvassing because of
the illegal checkpoint/blockade set-up by policemen in Nakagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mt.
Province and as an evidence to these allegations, Certification of the Police Station is hereto
attached as Annex D and affidavits of supporters hereto attached as Annex E, both made an
integral part of this affidavit-complaint; and that said mass-affidavits show that the Provincial
canvassing were not made public or (sic) candidates and their representatives/watchers
prevented because of barricade, closure of canvassing rooms, blockade by armed policemen that
coerce or threaten the people, the candidates or their representatives from attending the
canvassing;[8]
In support of the complaint, several supporters of Malinias and Pilando executed so-called mass
affidavits uniformly asserting that private respondents, among others, (1) prevented them from
attending the provincial canvassing, (2) padlocked the canvassing area, and (3) threatened the
people who wanted to enter the canvassing room. They likewise alleged that the Provincial
Board of Canvassers never allowed the canvassing to be made public and consented to the
exclusion of the public or representatives of other candidates except those of Dominguez. [9]
Consequently, the COMELECs Law Department conducted a preliminary investigation during
which only Corpuz and Tangilag submitted their joint Counter-Affidavit.
In their Counter-Affidavit, Corpuz and Tangilag admitted ordering the setting up of a checkpoint
at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province and securing the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol
Building, to wit:
3. We admit having ordered the setting up of check points in Nakagang, Tambingan, Sabangan,
Mountain Province; as in fact, this is not the only checkpoint set up in the province. There are
other checkpoints established in other parts of the province, to enforce the COMELEC gun ban
and other pertinent rules issued by the Commission on Election during the election period.
4. Policemen were posted within the vicinity of the capitol grounds in response to earlier
information that some groups were out to disrupt the canvass proceedings which were being
conducted in the second floor of the Provincial Capitol Building. This is not remote considering
that this had happened in the past elections. In fact, during the canvass proceeding on May 15,
1998 a large group of individuals identified with no less than affiants-complainants Roy S. Pilando
and Sario Malinias was conducting a rally just in front of the capitol, shouting invectives at
certain candidates and their leaders. This group likewise were holding placards and posted some
in front of the capitol building.
x x x[10]
After the investigation, in a study dated May 26, 1999, the COMELECs Law Department
recommended to the COMELEC en banc the dismissal of the complaint for lack of probable cause.
[11]

In a Resolution dated June 10, 1999, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the complaint of Malinias
and Pilando for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause against private
respondents. On October 26, 2000, the COMELEC dismissed Malinias Motion for
Reconsideration.
Hence, Malinias filed the instant petition.
The Comelecs Ruling
In dismissing the complaint against private respondents, the COMELEC ruled as follows:
As appearing in the Minutes of Provincial Canvass, complainant Roy Pilando was present during
the May 15, 1998 Provincial Canvass. He even participated actively in a discussion with the
members of the Board and the counsel of Congressman Dominguez. The minutes also disclosed

that the lawyers of LAMMP, the watchers, supporters of other candidates and representatives of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines were present at one time or another during the canvass
proceedings. The minutes does not indicate any charges of irregularities inside and within the
vicinity of the canvassing room.
Pursuant to Comelec Res. No. 2968 promulgated on January 7, 1998, checkpoints were
established in the entire country to effectively implement the firearms ban during the election
period from January 11, 1998 to June 10, 1998. In Mountain Province, there were fourteen (14)
checkpoints established by the Philippine National Police way before the start of the campaign
period for the May 11, 1998 elections including the subject checkpoint at Nacagang, Tambingan,
Sabangan, Mountain Province. Thus, the checkpoint at Sabangan, Mountain Province was not
established as alleged only upon request of Congressman Dominguez on May 15, 1998 but way
before the commencement of the campaign period. Granting arguendo that the Congressman
did make a request for a checkpoint at Sitio Nacagang, it would be a mere surplusage as the
same was already existing.
Furthermore, an alleged text of a radio message requesting advice from the PNP Provincial
Director at Bontoc, Mt. Province was attached to complainants affidavit-complaint. However,
said person by the name of Mr. Palicos was never presented to affirm the truth of the contents
and the signature appearing therein.[12]
Finding that Malinias failed to adduce new evidence, the COMELEC dismissed Malinias Motion for
Reconsideration.[13]
The Courts Ruling
The sole issue for resolution is whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing
Malinias and Pilandos complaint for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for
alleged violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646 and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. 881.
We rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
For this Court to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the tribunal or administrative body
must have issued the assailed decision, order or resolution in a capricious and despotic manner.
There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility, amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. [14]
Such is not the situation in the instant case. The COMELEC dismissed properly the complaint of
Malinias and Pilando for insufficient evidence, and committed no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
First, Malinias charged private respondents with alleged violation of Section 25 of Republic Act
No. 6646, quoted, as follows:
Sec. 25. Right to be Present and to Counsel During the Canvass. Any registered political party,
coalition of parties, through their representatives, and any candidate has the right to be present
and to counsel during the canvass of the election returns; Provided, That only one counsel may
argue for each political party or candidate. They shall have the right to examine the returns
being canvassed without touching them, make their observations thereon, and file their
challenge in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Commission. No dilatory action
shall be allowed by the board of canvassers.
In the present case, Malinias miserably failed to substantiate his claim that private respondents
denied him his right to be present during the canvassing. There was even no showing that
Malinias was within the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol Building or that private respondents
prevented him from entering the canvassing room.
As found by the COMELEC and admitted by Malinias, Pilando was present and even participated
actively in the canvassing.[15] Malinias failed to show that his rights as a gubernatorial candidate
were prejudiced by the alleged failure of his supporters to attend the canvassing. Malinias
claimed that even though Pilando was present during the canvassing, the latter was only able to
enter the room after eluding the policemen and passing through the rear entrance of the
Provincial Capitol Building.[16] This allegation, however, is not supported by any clear and
convincing evidence. Pilando himself, who was purportedly prevented by policemen from

entering the canvassing room, failed to attest to the veracity of this statement rendering the
same self-serving and baseless.
In an analogous case where a political candidates watcher failed to attend the canvass
proceedings, this Court held:
Another matter which militates against the cause of petitioner is that he has not shown that he
suffered prejudice because of the failure of his watcher to attend the canvassing. Had the
watcher been present, what substantive issues would he have raised? Petitioner does not
disclose. Could it be that even if the watcher was present, the result of the canvassing would
have been the same?
There is therefore no merit in petitioners claim that respondent Commission on Elections gravely
abused its discretion in issuing its questioned decision. And, as emphatically stated in Sidro v.
Comelec, 102 SCRA 853, this Court has invariably followed the principle that in the absence of
any jurisdictional infirmity or an error of law of the utmost gravity, the conclusion reached by the
respondent Commission on a matter that falls within its competence is entitled to the utmost
respect, xxx. There is justification in this case to reiterate this principle. [17]
Assuming that Pilando in fact entered the canvassing room only after successfully evading the
policemen surrounding the Provincial Capitol grounds, Pilando could have easily complained of
this alleged unlawful act during the canvass proceedings. He could have immediately reported
the matter to the Provincial Board of Canvassers as a violation of Section 25 of R.A. No.
6646. However, Pilando opted simply to raise questions on alleged irregularities in the municipal
canvassing.[18] While he had the opportunity to protest the alleged intimidation committed by
policemen against his person, it is quite surprising that he never mentioned anything about it to
the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
Surprisingly, the COMELEC and private respondents apparently overlooked that R.A. No. 6646
does not punish a violation of Section 25 of the law as a criminal election offense. Section 25
merely highlights one of the recognized rights of a political party or candidate during elections,
aimed at providing an effective safeguard against fraud or irregularities in the canvassing of
election returns. Section 27[19] of R.A. No. 6646, which specifies the election offenses punishable
under this law, does not include Section 25.
Malinias further claims that, in violation of this right, his supporters were blocked by a checkpoint
set-up at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province. This allegation is devoid of any basis to merit
a reversal of the COMELECs ruling. Malinias supporters who were purportedly blocked by the
checkpoint did not confirm or corroborate this allegation of Malinias.
Moreover, the police established checkpoints in the entire country to implement the firearms ban
during the election period. Clearly, this is in consonance with the constitutionally ordained power
of the COMELEC to deputize government agencies and instrumentalities of the Government for
the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. [20]
Second, Malinias maintains that Corpuz and Tangilag entered the canvassing room in blatant
violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881. His sole basis for this allegation is the affidavit of his
supporters who expressly stated that they saw Dominguez and Corpuz (only) enter the
canvassing room.[21] Malinias likewise contends that Corpuz and Tangilag impliedly admitted that
they were inside or at least within the fifty (50) meter radius of the canvassing room as they
were able to mention the names of the persons who were inside the canvassing room in their
Counter-Affidavit.[22]
The provision of law which Corpuz and Tangilag allegedly violated is quoted as follows:
Sec. 232. Persons not allowed inside the canvassing room. It shall be unlawful for any officer
or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including the Philippine Constabulary, or the
Integrated National Police or any peace officer or any armed or unarmed persons belonging to an
extra-legal police agency, special forces, reaction forces, strike forces, home defense forces,
barangay self-defense units, barangay tanod, or of any member of the security or police
organizations
or
government
ministries,
commissions,
councils,
bureaus,
offices,
instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries or of any
member of a privately owned or operated security, investigative, protective or intelligence
agency performing identical or similar functions to enter the room where the canvassing of the
election returns are held by the board of canvassers and within a radius of fifty meters from such
room: Provided, however, That the board of canvassers by a majority vote, if it deems

necessary, may make a call in writing for the detail of policemen or any peace officers for their
protection or for the protection of the election documents and paraphernalia in the possession of
the board, or for the maintenance of peace and order, in which case said policemen or peace
officers, who shall be in proper uniform, shall stay outside the room within a radius of thirty
meters near enough to be easily called by the board of canvassers at any time.
Again, the COMELEC and private respondents overlooked that Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not
one of the election offenses explicitly enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg.
881. While Section 232 categorically states that it is unlawful for the persons referred therein to
enter the canvassing room, this act is not one of the election offenses criminally punishable
under Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. Thus, the act involved in Section 232 of B.P. Blg.
881 is not punishable as a criminal election offense. Section 264 of B.P. Blg. 881 provides that
the penalty for an election offense under Sections 261 and 262 is imprisonment of not less than
one year but not more than six years.
Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there is no
ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Section
232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because this is a non-criminal act.
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar
maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One variation
of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is
implied. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other
matters.
xxx
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are canons of restrictive
interpretation. They are based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human
mind. They are predicated upon ones own voluntary act and not upon that of others. They
proceed from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumeration in a
statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly
mentioned.[23]
Also, since private respondents are being charged with a criminal offense, a strict interpretation
in favor of private respondents is required in determining whether the acts mentioned in Section
232 are criminally punishable under Sections 261 [24] and 262[25] of B.P. Blg. 881. Since Sections
261 and 262, which lists the election offenses punishable as crimes, do not include Section 232,
a strict interpretation means that private respondents cannot be held criminally liable for
violation of Section 232.
This is not to say that a violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is without any sanction. Though
not a criminal election offense, a violation of Section 232 certainly warrants, after proper hearing,
the imposition of administrative penalties. Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the
COMELEC may recommend to the President the imposition of disciplinary action on any officer or
employee the COMELEC has deputized for violation of its directive, order or decision. [26] Also,
under the Revised Administrative Code, [27] the COMELEC may recommend to the proper authority
the suspension or removal of any government official or employee found guilty of violation of
election laws or failure to comply with COMELEC orders or rulings.
In addition, a careful examination of the evidence presented by Malinias shows that the same are
insufficient to justify a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC. Obviously, the evidence relied upon by Malinias to support his charges consisted
mainly of affidavits prepared by his own supporters. The affidavits of Malinias own supporters,
being self-serving, cannot be accepted at face value under the circumstances. As this Court has
often stated, reliance should not be placed on mere affidavits. [28]
Besides, if Corpuz really entered the canvassing room, then why did Pilando and the
representatives of other candidates, who were inside the room, fail to question this alleged
wrongful act during the canvassing? Malinias contention that Corpuz and Tangilag impliedly
admitted they were inside the canvassing room because they mentioned the names of the

persons present during the canvassing deserves scant consideration as the same is not
supported by any evidence.
Finally, Malinias asserts that private respondents should be held liable for allegedly violating
Section 261 (i) of B. P. Blg. 881 because the latter engaged in partisan political activity. This
provision states:
Sec. 261 (i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any officer or employee in the civil
service, except those holding political offices; any officer, employee, or member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, or any police force, special forces, home defense forces, barangay selfdefense units and all other para-military units that now exist or which may hereafter be
organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any
partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.
Section 79, Article X of B.P. Blg. 881 defines the term partisan political activity as an act
designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public
office.[29] Malinias asserts that, in setting up a checkpoint at Nacagang, Tambingan, Sabangan,
Mountain Province and in closing the canvassing room, Corpuz and Tangilag unduly interfered
with his right to be present and to counsel during the canvassing. This interference allegedly
favored the other candidate.
While Corpuz and Tangilag admitted ordering the setting up of the checkpoint, they did so to
enforce the COMELECs firearms ban, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2968, among others.
[30]
There was no clear indication that these police officers, in ordering the setting up of
checkpoint, intended to favor the other candidates. Neither was there proof to show that Corpuz
and Tangilag unreasonably exceeded their authority in implementing the COMELEC
rules. Further, there is no basis to rule that private respondents arbitrarily deprived Malinias of
his right to be present and to counsel during the canvassing.
The act of Corpuz and Tangilag in setting up the checkpoint was plainly in accordance with their
avowed duty to maintain effectively peace and order within the vicinity of the canvassing
site. Thus, the act is untainted with any color of political activity. There was also no showing that
the alleged closure of the provincial capitol grounds favored the election of the other candidates.
In summary, we find that there is no proof that the COMELEC issued the assailed resolutions with
grave abuse of discretion. We add that this Court has limited power to review findings of fact
made by the COMELEC pursuant to its constitutional authority to investigate and prosecute
actions for election offenses.[31] Thus, where there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, fraud or error of law, this Court may not review the factual findings of the
COMELEC, nor substitute its own findings on the sufficiency of evidence. [32]
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of public respondent
COMELEC are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Acting C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Mendoza, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., on official leave.
SARIO MALINIAS,
petitioner,vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TEOFILO CORPUZ,ANACLETO TANGILAG and
VICTOR DOMINGUEZ,
respondents.
G.R. No. 146943, October 4, 2002
FACTS:On July 31, 1998, Sario Malinias and Roy S. Pilando, who were candidates for governor
and congress representative positions, respectively, filed a complaint with the COMELEC's Law
Department against Victor Dominguez, Anacleto Tangilag andothers for their violation of the
following laws:1. Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646; and 2. Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg.
881.Dominguez was then the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain
Province. Corpuz was then the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police in Mountain
Province while Tangilag was then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain
Province. The petitioners said that due to said violations, their supporters were deprived from
participating in the canvassing of election returns as they were blocked by a police checkpoint in

the course of their way to the canvassing site at the Provincial Capitol Building in Bontoc,
Mountain
Province. Among the private respondents, only Corpuz and Tangilagsubmitted
their
joint Counter-Affidavit, wherein they admitted that they ordered the establishment of checkpoints
all over the province to enforce the COMELEC Gun Ban and its other pertinent rules pursuant to
COMELEC Res. No. 2968 purposive of the maintenance of peace and order around the vicinity of
the canvassing site. Also, they said that the presence of the policemen within the said area is to
prevent some groups who were reportedly had the intention to disrupt the canvass proceedings.
They claimed that such a response was not unwarranted as this has already happened in the
past, wherein, in fact, the petitioners were among them.
COMELEC s Ruling:
After investigating the allegations, COMELEC ruled to dismiss the petition against the
respondents for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause. Malinias filed an MR but
it was also denied for failure of adducing additional evidence thereon. Not satisfied with the
same, Malinias filed to SC a petition for reviewon certiorari on this case.
ISSUE: Did COMELEC abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause?
RATIO DECIDENDI OF SC: No. SC AFFIRMED the decision of COMELEC and found the conduct of its
investigation and ruling on the case to be in accord with its jurisdiction and duties under the law.
In this case, COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as there is nothing
capricious or despotic in the manner of their resolution of the said complaint, hence, SC cannot
issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

On the said violations, the only evidence that was successfully presented by the petitioner is
the mass-affidavits of his supporters, which were considered self-serving and cannot be admitted
by the court thus, the same are not enough to prove his claims. Also, the allege violation of the
respondents of Sec. 25 of R.A. 6646and Sec. 232 of B.P. Blg. No. 881 are not included in the acts
defined as punishable criminal election offenses under Sec. 27 of R.A. 6646 and Sec. 261
and 262 of B.P. Blg. No. 881, respectively. Here, Sec. 25 merely highlights one of the rights of a
political party or candidate during elections whereas, the violation of Sec. 232,which enumerates
the persons who are not allowed inside the canvassing site, can only be subjected to an
administrative disciplinary action and cannot be punished by imprisonment as provided for under
Sec. 264 of the same law. Moreover, it is clear in the defense of the respondents that they did
not violate Sec. 261 (i), a criminal offense, which prohibits any officer or employee of political
offices or police force from intervening in any election campaign or from engaging in any
partisan activity except to vote or maintain public order. In the said defense, the respondents
said that setting up the checkpoints was done to enforce the COMELEC's firearms ban, pursuant
to COMELEC Resolution No. 2968 and not to prejudice any candidate from participating in the
canvassing. As such, the actions of the respondents are deemed lawful and not in excess of their
authority.
Ruling related to Statutory Construction
Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius estexclusio alterius, there is no
ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Section
232of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because this is a non-criminal act." It is a settled rule of statutory
construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion
of allothers. The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio uniusest exclusio alterius. The
rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One variation
of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.
Expressium facitcessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to
certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters
EXPRESSIO
UNIUS
EST
EXCLUSION
ALTERIUS
The express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.
Variation: Expressium facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to what is implied.
Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to other matters. Canon of restrictive interpretation.

Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that
the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been
not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
Malinias v Comelec: An attempt to use an administrative charge for a criminal complaint against
police officers accused of violating the election code. The court ruled that not all violations of the
election code provided for criminal penalties and in this case, the violated provisions only
warrant the imposition of administrative, not criminal, penalties.
Centeno v Villalon-Pornillos: A group of old men charged with violating the solicitation permit law
was acquitted because the term religious purpose was not expressly included in the provisions of
the statute, and what the law does not include, it excludes. The law referred only to charitable
purposes, which phrase cannot be construed so as to include a religious purpose.
REDEENDO SINGULAR SINGULIS
Referring each to each; referring to each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let
each be put in its proper place, thatis, the words should be taken distributively. As a rule, it
requires that the antecedents and consequences should be readdistributively to the effect that
each word is to be applied to the subject to which it appears by context most appropriately
relatedand to which it is most applicable.
King vs Hernandez
. The employment of the three Chinese as salesmen and purchaser in the store of Macario King is
a violation of the Section 1 of the Retail Trade Act which provides that only citizens of the
Philippines can engage in retail trade, as well as of Section 2-A of the Anti-Dummy Law which
prohibits Chinese citizens to intervene in the management, operation, administration or control
of such business, whether as an officer, employee or laborer with or without remuneration. The
context of the law seems to be clear on what its extent and scope seem to prohibit but also
because the same is in full accord with the main objective that permeates both the Retail Trade
Law and the Anti-Dummy Law. The one advocates the complete nationalization of the retail trade
by denying its ownership to any alien, while the other limits its management, operation,
administration and control to Filipino citizens. The prevailing idea is to secure both ownership and
management of the retail business in Filipino hands. It prohibits a person not a Filipino from
engaging in retail trade directly or indirectly while it limits the management, operation,
administration and control to Filipino citizens. These words may be technically synonymous in the
sense that they all refer to the exercise of a directing, restraining or governing influence over an
affair or business to which they relate, but it cannot be denied that by reading them in
connection with the positions therein enumerated one cannot draw any other conclusion than
that they cover the entire range of employment regardless of whether they involve control
or non-control activities. When the law says that you cannot employ an alien in any position
pertaining to management, operation, administration and control, "whether as an officer,
employee, or laborer therein", it only means one thing: the employment of a person who is not a
Filipino citizen even in a minor or clerical or non-control position is prohibited. The reason is
obvious: to plug any loophole or close any avenue that a nunscrupulous alien may resort to flout
the law or defeat its purpose, for no one can deny that while one may be employed in a noncontrol position who apparently is harmless he may later turn out to be a mere tool to further the
evil designs of the employer. It is imperative that the law be interpreted in a manner that would
stave off any attempt at circumvention of this legislative purpose.
DISSIMILUM DISSIMILIS EST RATIO
The courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature
intended a distinction or qualification.
Doctrine of Necessary Implication
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is
always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is implied in a statute is as
much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to
contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make
effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and
subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.

Natu vs Torres
In applying the doctrine of necessary implication, we took into consideration the rationale behind
the disqualification of managerial employees expressed in Bulletin Publishing Corporation v.
Sanchez
, thus: ". . . if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the
latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests.
The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in
Union membership." Stated differently, in the collective bargaining process, managerial
employees are supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as its representatives, and to
see to it that its interests are well protected. The employer is not assured of such protection if
these employees themselves are union members. Collective bargaining in such a situation can
become one-sided.
It is the same reason that impelled this Court to consider the position of confidential employees
as included in the disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the disqualification of confidential
employees were written in the provision. If confidential employees could unionize in order
to bargain for advantages for themselves, then they could be governed by their own motives
rather than the interest of the employers. Moreover, unionization of confidential employees for
the purpose of collective bargaining would mean the extension of the law to persons or
individuals who are supposed to act "in the interest of" the employers.
It is not farfetched that in the course of collective bargaining, they might jeopardize that interest
which they are duty-bound to protect. Along the same line of reasoning we held in Golden Farms,
Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja
EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS
The express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.
Variation: Expressium facit cessaretacitum. What is expressed puts an end to what is implied.
Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to other matters. Canon of restrictive interpretation. Where a
statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation
or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature
would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict
its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
Centeno v Villalon-Pornillos
A group of old men charged with violating the solicitation permit law was acquitted because the
term religious purpose was not expressly included in the provisions of the statute, and what
the law does not include, it excludes. The law referred only to charitable purposes, which phrase
cannot be construed so as to include a religious purpose. The issue is whether the solicitation for
the religious purposes, (renovation of a church) without first securing a permit from Regional
Office of
Department of Social Services, constitutes a violation of PD 1564, making it a criminal offense for
any person to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes without
securing a permit. The resolution on the issue depends on whether the phrase charitable
purposes includes a religious purpose. The Court ruled in the negative, by applying the maxim
expression unius est exclusion alterius, thus: it will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as
well as several other statutes, treat the words charitable and religious separately and
independently of each other. Thus, the word charitable is only one of three descriptive words
used in Sec 28(3), Art VI of the Constitution which provides that charitable institutions, churches
and parsonages xxx and all lands, buildings and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively
used for religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxationxxx
That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out charitable and religious in
an enumeration, whereas PD 1564 merely stated charitable or public welfare purposes, only
goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations
for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so
stated expressly.

CASUS OMISSUS
Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration
in a statute must be held to have been omitted intentionally.
This needs two laws. In expressio unius, its just the enumeration you are looking at, not another
law.
People vs Manantan
: Manantan was charged with a violation of Sec54 of Revised Election Code. The defense moved
to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of peace , the defendant is not ione of
the officers enumerated in Sec 54 of Revised Election Code. Under the rule of casus omissus pro
omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to be
intentionally omitted. The maxim casus omissus can operate and apply only if and when the
omission has been clearly established. The application of the rule casus omissus does not
proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable
certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its most extensive sense the term
judge includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity,
including justice of peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. The intention of the
legislature did not exclude the justice of peace from its operation. In sec54 there is no necessity
to include the

LYDIA
O.
CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION and THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No. 6683 was
approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary
separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to
reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the
Act, as follows:
Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, as
well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall
apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have
rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of
separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PCINP are excluded from the coverage of this Act.
Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed
an application on 30 January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which,
however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half
(1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner
to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results. 1 Her letter for reconsideration dated 25
April 1989 pleaded thus:
xxx xxx xxx
With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable Commissioner of RA 6683 does not
conform with the beneficent purpose of the law. The law merely requires that a government
employee whether regular, temporary, emergency, or casual, should have two consecutive years
of government service in order to be entitled to its benefits. I more than meet the requirement.
Persons who are not entitled are consultants, experts and contractual(s). As to the budget
needed, the law provides that the Department of Budget and Management will shoulder a certain

portion of the benefits to be allotted to government corporations. Moreover, personnel of these

NIA special projects art entitled to the regular benefits, such (sic) leaves, compulsory retirement
and the like. There is no reason why we should not be entitled to RA 6683.
xxx xxx xxx 2
Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) emphasized:
xxx xxx xxx
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted. The provision of Section 3.1 of Joint
DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not only require an applicant to have two years of
satisfactory service on the date of separation/retirement but further requires said applicant to be
on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment status as of December 2, 1988, the
date of enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not contemplate contractual employees in the
coverage.
Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the date of your separation from the
service, is co-terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature, this Commission shall
sustain its original decision.
xxx xxx xxx 3
In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari,
insisting that she is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683. Her arguments:
It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1
requires an applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment status.
Likewise, the provisions of Section 23 (sic) of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1,
implementing guidelines of R.A. No. 6683, provides:
"2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the following:
a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform specific activities or
services with a definite expected output: i.e. membership in Task Force, Part-Time,
Consultant/Employees.
b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the Philippine
Constabulary and Integrated National Police (PC-INP).
c) Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be separated from the service for
optional retirement with gratuity under R.A. No. 1616, 4968 or with pension under R.A. No. 186,
as amended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No. 1146, an amended, or vice- versa.
d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the enactment of this law and have
received the corresponding benefits of that retirement/separation.
e) Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by mandatory separation from the
service under existing civil service laws, rules and regulations; provided that if such officials and
employees apply in writing within the prescriptive period for the availment of the benefits herein
authorized, shall be allowed only if acquitted or cleared of all charges and their application
accepted and approved by the head of office concerned."
Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not belong to any one of them. Ms. Chua
is a full time employee of NIA entitled to all the regular benefits provided for by the Civil Service
Commission. She held a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A, a position which belongs to
the Administrative Service. . . . If casuals and emergency employees were given the benefit of
R.A. 6683 with more reason that this petitioner who was holding a permanent status as Personnel
Assistant A and has rendered almost 15 years of faithful, continuous service in the government
should be similarly rewarded by the beneficient (sic) purpose of the law. 4
The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment petitioner's exclusion from
the benefits of Republic Act No. 6683, because:
1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per appointment papers kept by the
Administrative Service in the head office of NIA (the service record was issued by the Watershed
Management and Erosion Control Project (WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija). The project,
funded by the World Bank, was completed as of 31 December 1988, after which petitioner's
position became functus officio.
2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA her position is not included in its
regular plantilla. She belongs to the non-career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is inherently
short-lived, temporary and transient; on the other hand, retirement presupposes employment for

a long period. The most that a non-career personnel can expect upon the expiration of his
employment is financial assistance. Petitioner is not even qualified to retire under the GSIS law.
3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment is permanent, security of tenure is available
only for the term of office (i.e., duration of project).
4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation or retirement benefits
but reorganization5 to streamline government functions. The application of the law must be made
consistent with the purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, as the expressed purpose of the law
is to reorganize the government, it will not have any application to special projects such as the
WMECP which exists only for a short and definite period. This being the nature of special projects,
there is no necessity for offering its personnel early retirement benefits just to induce voluntary
separation as a step to reorganization. In fact, there is even no need of reorganizing the WMECP
considering its short and limited life-span. 6
5. The law applies only to employees of the national government, government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters and local government units.
Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the parties, the Court is
called upon to define the different classes of employees in the public sector (i.e. government civil
servants).
Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as amended) deems an
employment regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. No equivalent
definition can be found in P.D.No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October 1975, which superseded the
Civil Service Act of 1965 R.A. No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order
No. 292 promulgated on 25 July 1987). The Early Retirement Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683)
merely includes such class of employees (regular employees) in its coverage, unmindful that no
such specie is employed in the public sector.
The appointment status of government employees in the career service is classified as follows:
1. permanent one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which
appointment is made, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules
and Standards promulgated in pursuance thereof; 7
2. temporary In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public
interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment should be issued to a person who meets all
the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil
service eligibility: Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months,
but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available. 8
The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate
examination is required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the
faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical
positions in scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit
systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary,
Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief
of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career
Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President.
(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the
President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate
merit system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing
governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. 9
The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:
. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the
career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is

coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to
the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made.
Included in the non-career service are:
1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the
President and their personal confidential staff(s);
3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their
personal or confidential staff;
4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a
special contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not
available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case
shall exceed one year and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own
responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency.
5. emergency and seasonal personnel. 10
There is another type of non-career employee:
Casual where and when employment is not permanent but occasional, unpredictable, sporadic
and brief in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil.
945)
Consider petitioner's record of service:
Service with the government commenced on 2 December 1974 designated as a laborer
holdingemergency status with the NIA Upper Pampanga River Project, R & R Division. 11 From
24 March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she was a research aide with temporary status on the same
project. On 1 September 1975 to 31 December 1976, she was with the NIA-FES III; R & R Division,
then on 1 January 1977 to 31 May 1980, she was with NIA UPR IIS (Upper Pampanga River
Integrated Irrigation Systems) DRD. On 1 June 1980, she went to NIA W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed
Management & Erosion Control Project) retaining the status of temporary employee. While with
this project, her designation was changed to personnel assistant on 5 November 1981; starting 9
July 1982, the status became permanent until the completion of the project on 31 December
1988. The appointment paper 12 attached to the OSG's comment lists her status as co-terminus
with the Project.
The employment status of personnel hired under foreign assisted projects is considered coterminous, that is, they are considered employees for the duration of the project or until the
completion or cessation of said project (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June
1990).
Republic
Act
No.
6683
seeks
to
cover
and
benefits regular,
temporary,
casual and emergency employees who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive
years government service.
Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June 22, 1984, the Civil Service
Commission is charged with the function of determining creditable services for retiring officers
and employees of the national government;
WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966 provides that all previous services
by an officer/employee pursuant to a duly approved appointment to a position in the Civil Service
are considered creditable services, while Section 6 (a) thereof states that services rendered
oncontractual, emergency or casual status are non-creditable services;
WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions inasmuch as some contractual,
emergency or casual employment are covered by contracts or appointments duly approved by
the Commission.
NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on contractual, emergency or
casual status, irrespective of the mode or manner of payment therefor shall be considered as
creditable for retirement purposes subject to the following conditions: (emphasis provided)
1. These services are supported by approved appointments, official records and/or other
competent evidence. Parties/agencies concerned shall submit the necessary proof of said
services;
2. Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to June 22, 1984, the effectivity date of
Executive Order No. 966; and

3. The services for the three (3) years period prior to retirement are continuous and fulfill the
service requirement for retirement.
What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project, coterminous or contractual personnel? All are tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career,
and temporary. The 12 May 1989 CSC letter of denial 13 characterized herein petitioner's
employment as co-terminous with the NIA project which in turn was contractual in nature. The
OSG says petitioner's status is co-terminous with the Project. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11,
series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes the status of a co-terminous employee
(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose entrance in the service is
characterized by confidentiality by the appointing authority or that which is subject to his
pleasure or co-existent with his tenure.
The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the following:
a) co-terminous with the project When the appointment is co-existent with the duration of a
particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds
for the same;
b) co-terminous with the appointing authority when appointment is co-existent with the tenure
of the appointing authority.
c) co-terminous with the incumbent when appointment is co-existent with the appointee, in
that after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of the incumbent the position
shall be deemed automatically abolished; and
d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. "co-terminous for a period of 3 years" the
appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration thereof, the position is deemed
abolished.
It is stressed, however, that in the last two classifications (c) and (d), what is termed coterminous is the position, and not the appointee-employee. Further, in (c) the security of tenure
of the appointee is guaranteed during his incumbency; in (d) the security of tenure is limited to a
specific period.
A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees. We
see no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the
former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early
retirement to regular, temporary, casual andemergency employees. But specifically excluded
from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be
argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The legislature would not have made a specific
enumeration in a statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine its terms
and benefits to those expressly mentioned 14 or casus omissus pro omisso habendus est A
person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. 15 Yet adherence to these legal maxims can result in incongruities and in a violation
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 16 comes to mind where, workers belonging to a work
pool, hired and re-hired continuously from one project to another were considered non-projectregular and permanent employees.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects during a span of
fifteen (15) years. Although no proof of the existence of a work pool can be assumed, her service
record cannot be disregarded.
Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws."
. . . In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the equal protection clause applies
only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the
subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the
classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who
belong to the same class. 17
Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection
clause were we to sustain respondents' submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied

a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by said law. The
maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be the applicable maxim in this case
but the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is
always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of
enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding
events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of
statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine
states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.
Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction
which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and
logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or
privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the
greater includes the lesser, expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus. 18
During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early Retirement Law), in response
to Congressman Dimaporo's interpellation on coverage of state university employees who are
extended appointments for one (1) year, renewable for two (2) or three (3) years, 19 he
explained:
This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement and voluntary separation. It is
irrespective of the actual status or nature of the appointment one received, but if he opts to
retire under this, then he is covered.
It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a proposal to extend
the scope of the Early Retirement Law). Its wording supports the submission that Rep. Act No.
6683 indeed overlooked a qualified group of civil servants. Sec. 3 of said House bill, on coverage
of early retirement, would provide:
Sec. 3. Coverage. It will cover all employees of the national government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as the personnel of all local government
units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary,
casual, emergency and contractual employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a
total of two (2) consecutive years government service as of the date of separation. The term
"contractual employees" as used in this Act does not include experts and consultants hired by
agencies for a limited period to perform specific activities or services with definite expected
output.
Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including those of the PC-INP are
excluded from the coverage of this Act. (emphasis supplied)
The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim the bureaucracy,
hence, vacated positions are deemed abolished upon early/voluntary retirement of their
occupants. Will the inclusion of co-terminous personnel (like the petitioner) defeat such
objective? In their case, upon termination of the project and separation of the project personnel
from the service, the term of employment is considered expired, the officefunctus officio. Casual,
temporary and contractual personnel serve for shorter periods, and yet, they only have to
establish two (2) years of continuous service to qualify. This, incidentally, negates the OSG's
argument that co-terminous or project employment is inherently short-lived, temporary and
transient, whereas, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. Here, violation of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution becomes glaring because casuals are not even in the
plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the benefits of early retirement. How can the objective of
the Early Retirement Law of trimming the bureaucracy be achieved by granting early retirement
benefits to a group of employees (casual) without plantilla positions? There would, in such a
case, be no abolition of permanent positions or streamlining of functions; it would merely be a
removal of excess personnel; but the positions remain, and future appointments can be made
thereto.
Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of continuous
service should be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their
application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as they comply with CSC regulations
promulgated for such purpose. In this connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990

(5 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, 20 requires, as a condition to qualify for the
grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7) years of government service which need
not be continuous, in the career or non-career service, whether appointive, elective, casual,
emergency, seasonal, contractual or co-terminous including military and police service, as
evaluated and confirmed by the Civil Service Commission. 21 A similar regulation should be
promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-terminous personnel who survive the
test of time. This would be in keeping with the coverage of "all social legislations enacted to
promote the physical and mental well-being of public servants" 22 After all, co-terminous
personnel, are also obligated to the government for GSIS contributions, medicare and income tax
payments, with the general disadvantage of transience.
In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of
petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable,
unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within
a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. While the application was filed
after expiration of her term, we can give allowance for the fact that she originally filed the
application on her own without the assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice,
her application must be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years
the minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4)
successive governmental projects.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of petitioner's application
for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683, in accordance with the pronouncements in
this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.