Professional Documents
Culture Documents
the air, he allegedly received water bills from the Water District
without indication of the meter readings, the number of cubic meters
consumed and the amounts to be paid. So he refused to pay the
"blank bills." For such failure, petitioner's water service was cut on
February 6, 1978.
By reason of these acts of "harassment" of private respondents
resulting in his "humiliation" as well as unlawful deprivation of a life's
necessity, petitioner brought Special Civil Case No. OZ 686, an action
for damages with preliminary mandatory injunction, before respondent
Court. cdrep
Acting on the prayer incorporated therein for preliminary mandatory
injunction, respondent Court issued an order dated February 8, 1978
enjoining respondents from disconnecting the water service of
petitioner. Upon learning that the same was already cut, the Court
issued another order reconnect it immediately.
On February 15, 1978, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint on two grounds, namely: a lack of jurisdiction of
respondent Court allegedly because the "main thrust the subject and
nature of the action or suit appearing in the complaint is clearly within
the field of special civil action or suit action or special proceeding" 1
and (b) there is another action pending between the same parties for
the same cause, referring to Special Civil Case No. 0390.
On February 27, 1978, petitioner filed an opposition thereto stating
that the issues raised are justiciable and a court of general jurisdiction
has the authority to try the case. He further contended that Special
Civil Case No. 0390, which questioned the increased water rates
unilaterally imposed by the Misamis Occidental Water District, the
constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 198 and the selection of
the members of the Board of Directors, is entirely different from Civil
Case No. OZ-686, which is an action for damages due to the
harassment committed by private respondents on petitioner.
Surprisingly though, respondent Court, through Hon. Melecio A.
Genato, a temporary judge assigned thereat, issued an order dated
March 9, 1978 dismissing the case not on the basis of the grounds
alleged by private respondents in their motion to dismiss but on the
grounds that there was no malice or bad faith in the severance of the
water connection of petitioner and that private respondent had
already reconnected the same. The dispositive portion thereof states:
"WHEREFORE, the above entitled case is hereby
dismissed for being moot and academic without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED." 2
A motion for reconsideration was thus filed by petitioner where he
assailed the said order of dismissal for having been rendered in
violation of Section 1, Rule 36, Revised Rules of Court and for not
being correct because although his water service has been
reconnected, he has suffered damages which could be proved by him
in an impartial proceeding. He also assailed the said order,
of that he has no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, except this present petition.
Indeed, respondent Court acted with grave abuse of discretion if not in
excess of its jurisdiction in dismissing the case. Firstly, the said order
of dismissal dated March 9, 1978 is not premises on lack of jurisdiction
or on the pendency of another case between the same parties for the
same cause - the grounds alleged by private respondents in their
motion to dismiss. On this score, it has been held in the case of Malig,
et al. vs. Bush, 5 that dismissal of actions on grounds not alleged in
the motion to dismiss is improper for in so doing, a court in effect
dismisses an action motu proprio without giving the plaintiffs a chance
to argue the point and without receiving any arguments or evidence
on the question.
But while in the aforecited Malig case, the order of dismissal is based
on one of the grounds enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 16, Revised
Rules of Court, namely: prescription, the order herein brought to Us for
review is not based on any of them. In a rather summary fashion,
respondent Court made a finding on the basis merely of the pleadings
filed and without conducting any hearing, that there is no malice or
bad faith on the part of private respondents in their act of severing
petitioner's water supply. Respondent court also noted the fact that
private respondents bad reconnected the water pipes or water service
of petitioner and erroneously concluded that the case has become
moot and academic. LLpr
To all intents and purposes, respondent Court decreed the dismissal on
its own initiative as in the case of Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc.
vs. Ramos, et al. 6 where neither a motion to dismiss nor an answer
had been made when the decision was handed down. In granting the
writ of certiorari, this Court ruled therein that: "Section 1 of Rule 8
(now Section 1 of Rule 16) enumerates the grounds upon which an
action may be dismissed, and it specifically ordains that a motion to
this end be filed. In the light of this express requirement we do not
believe that the court had power to dismiss the case without the
requisite motion duly presented. . . . The only instance in which.
according to said Rules, the court may dismiss upon the court's own
motion on action is, when the "plaintiff fails to appear at the time of
the trial or to the prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of
time or to comply with the Rules or any order of the court."
The real cause for concern, though, is not so much the dismissal of the
case for lack of presentation of the requisite motion but rather the
dismissal thereof without affording petitioner an opportunity to be
heard despite the presence of factual issues that needed to be proved.
In the case at bar, respondents premised their right to cut off the
water service connection on the violation of petitioner's water service
contract 7 which is the contract signed by petitioner with the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority on September 16, 1958 to which
private respondent Misamis Occidental Water District claims it has
been subrogated. The said contract provides the following:
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 58986. April 17, 1989.]
DANTE Y. GO, petitioner, vs. HON. FERNANDO
CRUZ, Judge, etc., CITY SHERIFF OF CALOOCAN
CITY, and CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING CO.,
INC., respondents.
De Santos, Balgos & Perez for petitioner.
Francisco N. Carreon, Jr. for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS; ADDRESSED TO THE
SOUND JUDGMENT AND DISCRETION OF THE COURT; EXCEPTION.
The dismissal of civil actions is always addressed to the sound
judgment and discretion of the court, whether dismissal is sought after
a trial has been completed or otherwise, or whether it is prayed for by
a defending party, or by a plaintiff or claimant. There is one instance
however where the dismissal of an action rests exclusively on the will
of a plaintiff or claimant, to prevent which the defending party and
even the court itself is powerless, requiring in fact no action whatever
on the part of the court except the acceptance and recording of the
causative document. This is dealt with in Section 1, Rule 17 of the
Rules of Court, which reads as follows: "SECTION 1. Dismissal by the
plaintiff . An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order
of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the
answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Unless otherwise stated
in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice
operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff
who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or
including the same claim. A class suit shall not be dismissed or
compromised without approval of the court."
2.ID.; ACTIONS; PLAINTIFF'S ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO DISMISS LOST UPON
SERVICE OF DEFENDANT'S ANSWER OR OF A MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT. What marks the loss by a plaintiff of the right to cause
dismissal of the action by mere notice is not the filing of the
defendant's answer with the Court (either personally or by mail) but
the service on the plaintiff of said answer or of a motion for summary
judgment. This is the plain and explicit message of the Rules. "The
filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders and other
papers with the court," according to Section 1, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court, means the delivery thereof to the clerk of the court either
personally or by registered mail. Service, on the other hand, signifies
delivery of the pleading or other paper to the parties affected thereby
through their counsel of record, unless delivery to the party himself is
ordered by the court, by any of the modes set forth in the Rules, i.e.,
by personal service, service by mail, or substituted service.
DECISION
NARVASA, J p:
The dismissal of civil actions is always addressed to the sound
judgment and discretion of the court; this, whether the dismissal is
November 6, 1981, which had been filed with the Court on November
9, 1981. 7
On November 19, 1981 a fire broke out at the Manila City Hall
destroying among others the sala of Judge Tengco and the records of
cases therein kept, including that filed by California against Dante Go.
8
On December 1, 1981, California filed another complaint asserting the
same cause of action against Dante Go, this time with the Court of
First Instance at Caloocan City. 9 This second suit was docketed as
Civil Case No. C-9702 and was assigned to the branch presided over
by Judge Fernando A. Cruz. cdll
On December 3, 1981, Judge Cruz issued an ex parte restraining order
directing "the defendant . . . to immediately cease and desist from the
further manufacture, sale, promotion and distribution of spaghetti,
macaroni and other pasta products contained in packaging boxes and
labels under the name `GREAT ITALIAN,' which are similar to or copies
of those of the plaintiff, and . . . recall . . . all his spaghetti, macaroni
and other pasta products using the brand, `GREAT ITALIAN.'" 10
On the day following the rendition of the restraining order, Dante Go
filed the present petition for certiorari, etc. with this Court praying for
its nullification and perpetual inhibition. On December 11, 1981, this
Court, in turn, issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining
California, Judge Cruz and the City Sheriff from enforcing or
implementing the restraining order of December 3, 1981, and from
continuing with the hearing on the application for preliminary
injunction in said Civil Case No. C-9702. The scope of the injunction
was subsequently enlarged by this Court's Resolution of April 14, 1982
to include the City Fiscal of Manila, who was thereby restrained from
proceeding with the case of unfair competition filed in his office by
California against Dante Go. 11
Dante Go's thesis is that the case filed against him by California in the
Manila Court remained pending despite California's notice of dismissal.
According to him, since he had already filed his answer to the
complaint before California sought dismissal of the action three (3)
days afterwards, such dismissal was no longer a matter of right and
could no longer be effected by mere notice in accordance with Section
1, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, but only on plaintiff's motion, and by
order of the Court; hence, the Caloocan Court acted without
jurisdiction over the second action based on the same cause. He also
accused California of forum shopping, of selecting a sympathetic court
for a relief which it had failed to obtain from another. 12
The petitioner is in error. What marks the loss by a plaintiff of the right
to cause dismissal of the action by mere notice is not the filing of the
defendant's answer with the Court (either personally or by mail) but
the service on the plaintiff of said answer or of a motion for summary
judgment. This is the plain and explicit message of the Rules. 13 "The
filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders and other
papers with the court," according to Section 1, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court, means the delivery thereof to the clerk of the court either
personally or by registered mail. Service, on the other hand, signifies
delivery of the pleading or other paper to the parties affected thereby
through their counsel of record, unless delivery to the party himself is
ordered by the court, 14 by any of the modes set forth in the Rules,
i.e., by personal service, 15 service by mail, 16 or substituted service.
17
Here, California filed its notice of dismissal of its action in the Manila
Court after the filing of Dante Go's answer but before service thereof.
Thus having acted well within the letter and contemplation of the
afore-quoted Section 1 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, its notice ipso
facto brought about the dismissal of the action then pending in the
Manila Court, without need of any order or other action by the
Presiding Judge. The dismissal was effected without regard to
whatever reasons or motives California might have had for bringing it
about, and was, as the same Section 1, Rule 17 points out, "without
prejudice," the contrary not being otherwise "stated in the notice" and
it being the first time the action was being so dismissed. LLphil
There was therefore no legal obstacle to the institution of the second
action in the Caloocan Court of First Instance based on the same
claim. The filing of the complaint invested it with jurisdiction of the
subject matter or nature of the action. In truth, and contrary to what
petitioner Dante Go obviously believes, even if the first action were
still pending in the Manila Court, this circumstance would not affect
the jurisdiction of the Caloocan Court over the second suit. The
pendency of the first action would merely give the defendant the right
to move to dismiss the second action on the ground of auter action
pendant, or litis pendentia. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against petitioner.
The temporary restraining order of December 11, 1981, and the
amendatory Resolution of April 14, 1982 are SET ASIDE.
Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-43236. December 20, 1989.]
OLYMPIA INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALPHA INSURANCE
& SURETY CO., INC., and JUDGE JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR.,
respondents.
Gonzales & Chua Law Offices for petitioner.
L.L. Reyes for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; DISMISSAL OF ACTION WITHOUT
PREJUDICE; DOES NOT HAVE THE EFFECT OF AN ADJUDICATION ON
THE MERITS. It has been held that the dismissal of a case on motion
of both parties as in the case at bar is a dismissal contemplated under
Section 2, Rule 30 (now Rule 17) of the Rules of Court, which is a
dismissal without prejudice and not a dismissal governed by Section 4
thereof, which operates as an adjudication on the merits. Similarly, it
has been ruled that under certain attendant facts and circumstances,
and the added fact that the trial on the merits had not as yet
commenced, dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice and does
not have the effect of adjudication on the merits. Precisely, the
previous dismissal without prejudice was removed from the general
rule that it should have the effect of an adjudication on the merits,
since the lower court had provided otherwise and declared the
dismissal to be without prejudice.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; IF COMPLETE IN DETAILS, HAS THE EFFECT OF A FINAL
DISPOSITION OF THE COMPLAINT. The dismissal without prejudice of
a complaint does not however mean that said dismissal order was any
less final. Such Order of dismissal is complete in all details, and
though without prejudice, nonetheless finally disposed of the matter. It
was not merely an interlocutory order but a final disposition of the
complaint.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT LOST AFTER
DISMISSAL ORDER HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. Upon the
dismissal order attaining finality for failure of either party to appeal
therefrom, the jurisdiction which the court had acquired thereon was
finally discharged and terminated, and any subsequent action filed in
accordance with the reservation cannot be considered a continuation
of the first action which was dismissed. From the foregoing, it
becomes apparent that the lower court -acted in excess of its
jurisdiction when it granted the motion to revive the case filed by
petitioner as plaintiff therein. By then (December 7, 1973), the
dismissal order of December 15, 1972 had long become final and
executory, thereby beyond the power of the court to amend, modify,
reverse or set aside. And certainly, for the court to entertain and grant
said motion to revive the case would result in the setting aside of the
subject dismissal order.
4.ID.; ID.; JUDGMENTS; MAY BE EXECUTED ON MOTION WITHIN FIVE
(5) YEARS FROM THE DEATH OF ITS ENTRY OR DATE IT BECOME FINAL
In Civil Case No. 2757-P, which is the root case of the petition at bar,
Olympia alleged that of the total purchase price of P24,430.80 of the
typewriters involved therein, only P5,500.00 had been paid by Alpha.
It therefore prayed that the court issue an order for the seizure of the
typewriters and their delivery to Olympia to protect its interest
thereon and to confirm its ownership over said personal properties;
that should delivery thereof be unavailing, that Alpha be ordered to
pay Olympia the typewriters' actual value in the sum of P18,930.80;
that the amounts deposited by Alpha be forfeited and considered as
rents for the typewriters; and that Alpha be ordered to pay 12%
interest per annum commencing from the date of payment indicated
on each invoice until the unpaid amount is fully paid, plus attorney's
fees of P4,425.20 and damages of P4,000.00.
After Olympia had posted a bond in an amount twice the value of the
typewriters involved and its assistant manager for credit and
collection had filed an affidavit showing that Olympia was entitled to
the ownership of the said typewriters, the lower court ordered on July
15, 1966 the issuance of a writ of replevin and directed the deputy
sheriff of Pasay City to seize the personal properties involved and to
retain the same in his custody "to be dealt with as prescribed in Rule
60 of the Rules of Court until further orders" from the court. 2
Consequently, the typewriters enumerated in said order were seized
from Alpha and delivered to Olympia.
In its answer to the complaint, Alpha alleged that since the invoices
presented by Olympia in its application for a writ of replevin had not
been signed by its authorized corporate officers, they were not
reflective of the real terms and conditions of the sales. It prayed for
the redelivery of the 24 typewriters seized and in addition, asked for
the delivery of six (6) more units which Olympia had allegedly failed to
deliver to it pursuant to the sale agreement embodied in its
confirmatory letter dated October 29, 1965. As counterclaim, Alpha
prayed for moral damages of P75,000.00, actual damages of
P10,000.00 and attorney's fees of P5,000.00. Olympia thereafter filed
its reply to said answer and its answer to the counterclaim. cdll
Upon failure of the parties to reach an amicable settlement, the lower
court set the case for trial on the merits. Olympia began presenting its
evidence, and on May 17, 1971, it moved for the consolidation of Civil
Case No. 2757-P with Civil Case No. 15053 of the City Court of Manila.
The record is not clear as to whether the consolidation of said cases
materialized.
It appears on record, however, that on December 15, 1972, the lower
court issued the following order:
"On joint motion of both parties in the above-entitled
case, that they will settle the case amicably out of
court, this case is hereby dismissed without
prejudice." 3
BOTH
THE
RESPONDENT
JUDGE
AND
THE
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ERROR IN OVERESPOUSING LEGAL TECHNICALITIES TO
THE PREJUDICE AND IMPAIRMENT OF SUBSTANTIAL
JUSTICE AND EQUITY. 9
Undoubtedly, this impasse is the result of the unorthodox proceedings
in this case. The management by the military of the Fernando Jacinto
group of companies, including Alpha, during the martial law years,
deterred the lower court from judicially determining which of the
contending companies was entitled to the ownership or possession of
the typewriters. It allowed the military to take over the task of helping
the parties settle their controversy extrajudicially. However, belatedly
realizing that its military manager could not facilitate the redelivery of
the typewriters seized from it through the writ of replevin, Alpha went
back to court which issued the orders in question. Cdpr
The decisive factor in this controversy is the effect of the first
dismissal of Civil Case No. 2757-P on December 15, 1972.
Aside from the fact that the aforesaid dismissal was expressly
reserved by the trial court to be without prejudice, it has been held
that the dismissal of a case on motion of both parties as in the case at
bar is a dismissal contemplated under Section 2, Rule 30 (now Rule
17) of the Rules of Court, which is a dismissal without prejudice and
not a dismissal governed by Section 4 thereof, which operates as an
adjudication on the merits. 10 Similarly, it has been ruled that under
certain attendant facts and circumstances, and the added fact that
the trial on the merits had not as yet commenced, dismissal of the
complaint is without prejudice and does not have the effect of
adjudication on the merits. 11 Precisely, the previous dismissal
without prejudice was removed from the general rule that it should
have the effect of an adjudication on the merits, since the lower court
had provided otherwise and declared the dismissal to be without
prejudice. 12
The dismissal without prejudice of a complaint does not however
mean that said dismissal order was any less final. Such Order of
dismissal is complete in all details, and though without prejudice,
nonetheless finally disposed of the matter. 13 It was not merely an
interlocutory order but a final disposition of the complaint. 14
Thus, upon said dismissal order attaining finality for failure of either
party to appeal therefrom, the jurisdiction which the court had
acquired thereon was finally discharged and terminated, and any
subsequent action filed in accordance with the reservation cannot be
considered a continuation of the first action which was dismissed. 15
From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that the lower court -acted in
excess of its jurisdiction when it granted the motion to revive the case
filed by petitioner as plaintiff therein. By then (December 7, 1973), the
dismissal order of December 15, 1972 had long become final and
executory, thereby beyond the power of the court to amend, modify,
reverse or set aside. And certainly, for the court to entertain and grant
said motion to revive the case would result in the setting aside of the
subject dismissal order.
Under the circumstances, the step available to petitioner as plaintiff
therein if it wanted to pursue its claim against Alpha was to institute a
new action in accordance with the reservation contained in the order
of dismissal. It could not revive the dismissed case by motion or
otherwise, as said dismissal, although without prejudice, had attained
finality.
By the same token did the lower court act in excess of its jurisdiction
when it issued the Order of January 16, 1974 dismissing Civil Case No.
2757-P anew, but this time, with prejudice. The Order of January 16,
1974 had the same effect of reversing and setting aside the dismissal
order of December 15, 1972, which as above-stated could no longer
be done in view of its having become final and executory.
But while the Order of December 7, 1973 which granted petitioner's
motion to revive case and that of January 16, 1974 dismissing the
case with prejudice are null and void for having been issued in excess
of jurisdiction, the same cannot be said of the order dated January 22,
1976 which granted Alpha's motion to cancel the writ of replevin. The
crucial difference lies on the fact that while the first two orders of
December 7, 1973 and January 16, 1974 had the effect of reversing
and setting aside the long final dismissal order of December 15, 1972,
the Order of January 22, 1976 enforced and implemented it.
In other words, the motion of Alpha to cancel the writ of replevin was
in the nature and character of a motion for execution of the dismissal
order of December 15, 1972. That the lower court retained jurisdiction
to carry into effect its final and executory order of December 15, 1972
is beyond cavil for while Alpha's motion was filed three (3) years after
the issuance of said dismissal order, the same may still be taken
cognizance of by the lower court in accordance with Section 6, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court which states:
Sec. 6.Execution by motion or by independent action.
A judgment may be executed on motion within five
(5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it
becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such
time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.
Indeed, logic and equity demand that the writ of replevin be cancelled.
Being provisional and ancillary in character, its existence and efficacy
depended on the outcome of the case. The case having been
dismissed, so must the writ's existence and efficacy be dissolved. To
let the writ stand even after the dismissal of the case would be
adjudging Olympia as the prevailing party, when precisely, no decision
on the merits had been rendered. The case having been dismissed, it
is as if no case was filed at all and the parties must revert to their
status before the litigation. llcd
The allegation of Olympia that to cancel the writ of replevin would
result in Alpha's unjust enrichment does not persuade. Alpha has
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 101883. December 11, 1992.]
SPOUSES LYDIA and VIRGILIO MELITON, *
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NELIA A.
ZIGA, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact
RAMON A. AREJOLA, ** respondents.
Adan Marcelo B. Botor for petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL
LAW;
COMPULSORY
COUNTERCLAIM,
TEST
OF
"COMPULSORINESS". Considering Section 4 of Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court, a counterclaim is compulsory if (a) it arises out of, or is
necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence which is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (b) it does not require for
its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the
claim. It has been postulated that while a number of criteria have
been advanced for the determination of whether the counterclaim is
compulsory
or
permissive,
the
"one
compelling
test
of
compulsoriness" is the logical relationship between the claim alleged
in the complaint and that in the counterclaim, that is, where
conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties
would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time, as where they
involve many of the same factual and/or legal issues.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; PHRASE "LOGICAL RELATIONSHIP," CONSTRUED. The
phrase "logical relationship" is given meaning by the purpose of the
rule which it was designed to implement. Thus, a counterclaim is
logically related to the opposing party's claim where, as already
stated, separate trials of each of their respective claims would involve
a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the
courts. Where multiple claims involve many of the same factual
issues, or where they are offshoots of the same basic controversy
between the parties, fairness and considerations of convenience and
of economy require that the counterclaimant be permitted to maintain
his cause of action.
3.ID.; ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION OF REAL PROPERTY
SUBJECT MATTER OF COUNTERCLAIM IN CASE AT BAR. As we have
ruled, in actions for ejectment or for recovery of possession of real
property, it is well settled that the defendant's claims for the value of
the improvements on the property or necessary expenses for its
preservation are required to be interposed in the same action as
compulsory counterclaims. In such cases, it is the refusal of the
defendant to vacate or surrender possession of the premises that
serves as the vital link in the chain of facts and events, and which
constitutes the transaction upon which the plaintiff bases his cause of
action. It is likewise an "important part of the transaction constituting
the subject matter of the counterclaim" of defendant for the value of
the improvements or the necessary expenses incurred for the
preservation of the property. They are offshoots of the same basic
controversy between the parties, that is, the right of either to the
possession of the property.
4.ID.; ID.; INSTANCES WHEN COUNTERCLAIM NOT SET UP SHALL BE
BARRED UNDER SEC. 4, RULE 9, RULES OF COURT. It is indeed the
rule, embodied in Section 4, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, that a
counterclaim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of or is
necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for
its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction.
5.ID.; RES JUDICATA; REQUISITES. In order that a prior judgment will
constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the judgment must be final; (2) the judgment must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (3) the judgment must be on the merits; and (4) there
must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of
subject matter, and of causes of action.
6.ID.; DISMISSAL OF CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE; EXPLAINED. The
dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates the absence of a
decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the
matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissal action had not
been commenced. The discontinuance of a case not on the merits
does not bar another action on the same subject matter. Evidently,
therefore, the prior dismissal of herein petitioners' counterclaims is
not res judicata and will not bar the filing of another action based on
the same causes of action.
7.ID.; DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS AFTER FILING OF ANSWER; GOVERNING
RULE. As laid down in Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, which is
summarized as follows: An action shall not be dismissed at the
request of the plaintiff after the service of the answer, except by order
of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper. The trial court has the judicial discretion in ruling on a motion
to dismiss at the instance of the plaintiff. It has to decide whether the
dismissal of the case should be allowed, and if so, on what terms and
conditions.
8.CIVIL LAW; ACTION FOR DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF LEASE
AGREEMENT; CASE AT BAR. Specifically applicable in a lessor-lessee
relationship is authorized in Article 1659 of the Civil Code which
provides that: "Art. 1659. If the lessor or the lessee should not comply
with the obligations set forth in articles 1654 and 1657, the aggrieved
party may ask for the rescission of the contract and indemnification
for damages, or only the latter, allowing the contract to remain in
force." The act of private respondent in demolishing the structures
introduced by petitioners on the property leased and the
improvements therein during the existence of the lease contract is a
clear violation by her, as lessor, of her obligation mandated by
paragraph 3, Article 1654 of the Civil Code. The said violation gave
rise to a cause of action for damages in favor of herein petitioners.
controversy between the parties, that is, the right of either to the
possession of the property. 12
On the foregoing considerations, respondent Court of Appeals
correctly held that the counterclaims of petitioners are compulsory in
nature.
2.Petitioners having alleged compulsory counterclaims, the next point
of inquiry is whether or not petitioners are already barred from
asserting said claims in a separate suit, the same having being
dismissed in the preceding one. The answer is in the negative.
It is indeed the rule, embodied in Section 4, Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court, that a counterclaim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of
or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require
for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction. However, said rule is not applicable to the
case at bar.
Contrary to the claim of private respondent, it cannot be said that
herein petitioners failed to duly interpose their causes of action as
counterclaims in the previous action. Petitioners' claims were duly set
up as counterclaims in the prior case but the same were dismissed by
reason of non-payment of docket fees. The ruling of respondent Court
of Appeals to the effect that the failure of petitioners to appeal or to
move for reconsideration of the said order of dismissal bars them from
asserting their claims in another action cannot be upheld.
Firstly, where a compulsory counterclaim is made the subject of a
separate suit, it may be abated upon a plea of auter action pendant or
litis pendentia and/or dismissed on the ground of res judicata, 13
depending on the stage or status of the other suit.
Both defenses are unavailing to private respondents. The present
action cannot be dismissed either on the ground of litis pendentia
since there is no other pending action between the same parties and
for the same cause, nor on the ground of res judicata.
In order that a prior judgment will constitute a bar to a subsequent
case, the following requisites must concur: (1) the judgment must be
final; (2) the judgment must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment
must be on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and
second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action. 14
The first case, Civil Case No. RTC 88-1480, was dismissed upon motion
of private respondent, plaintiff therein, under Section 2 of Rule 17.
Dismissal thereunder is without prejudice, except when otherwise
stated in the motion to dismiss or when stated to be with prejudice in
the order of the court. 15 The order of dismissal of the first case was
unqualified, hence without prejudice and, therefore, does not have the
effect of an adjudication on the merits. On a parity of rationale, the
the petitioners was to file a separate action for their claims and to pay
the prescribed docket fees therein within the applicable and
reglementary period, which is what they did in the case at bar in
obedience and deference to the judicial mandate laid down in their
case. At any rate, the ambivalent positions adopted by the lower court
can be considered cured by what we have construed as effectively a
reservation in its order of dismissal for the filing of a complaint based
on the causes of action in the dismissed counterclaims. LLjur
This, then, is one case where it is necessary to heed the injunction
that the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a rigid and
technical sense. After all, rules of procedure are used only to help
secure substantial justice. They cannot be applied to prevent the
achievement of that goal. Form cannot and should not prevail over
substance. 26 Absent a specific requirement for stringent application,
the Rules of Court are to be liberally construed to the end that no
party shall be deprived of his day in court on technicalities. The courts
in our jurisdiction are tribunals both of law and equity. Hence, under
the antecedents of this case, we are persuaded that even if only to
approximate that desirable measure of justice we are sworn to
dispense, this controversy should be resolved on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. RTC 89-1942 is
hereby REINSTATED and the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch
27, or wherever the case has been assigned, is directed to proceed
with deliberate dispatch in the adjudication thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J . , Feliciano, Nocon, and Campos, JJ ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 105751. June 30, 1993.]
BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
RUFINO CO, HIGHLINE MERCANTILE, INC.,
LUCITA
VELOSO
YAP,
CLOVERLEAF
SUPERMARKET, INC., SAN ANDRES COMMERCIAL
and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Agbayani, Leal, Ebarle & Venturanza Law Office for petitioner.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz Law Office for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; COUNTERCLAIM; "COMPULSORY"
IN CASE AT BAR. The counterclaim of private respondents is not
merely permissive but compulsory in nature: it arises out of, or is
necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim; it does not require the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction; and, the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
The counterclaim of private respondents is denominated "compulsory"
and consists of claims for alleged overpayments and damages. They
assert that they are no longer indebted to petitioner and are in fact
entitled to reimbursement for overpayments. They ask for damages
than a month after the case was dismissed, i.e., they filed their motion
after the lapse of thirty-three (33) days. By then, the order of dismissal
had already become final. Thereafter, it was error for the appellate
court to set it aside, there being no ground to warrant it. Only error of
judgment, not error of jurisdiction, was involved.
However, we are not unaware of the seeming unfairness, if not
harshness, of the application of the Rule herein enunciated that
dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute automatically
carries with it dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim to a
defendant who may be compelled to hire counsel to protect him in a
frivolous complaint. Equity and justice dictate that he be accorded
adequate relief under the circumstances.
Henceforth, for the guidance of Bench and Bar, if any of the grounds
to dismiss under Sec. 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court arises, 8 the
proper recourse for a defendant who desires to pursue his compulsory
counterclaim in the same proceeding is not to move for the dismissal
of the complaint; instead, he should only move to have plaintiff
declared non-suited on the complaint so that the latter can no longer
present his evidence thereon, and simultaneously move that he be
declared as in default on the compulsory counterclaim, and reserve
the right to present evidence ex parte on his counterclaim. This will
enable defendant who was unjustly haled to court to prove his
compulsory counterclaim, which is intertwined with the complaint,
because the trial court retains jurisdiction over the complaint and of
the whole case. The non-dismissal of the complaint, the non-suit
notwithstanding, provides the basis for the compulsory counterclaim
to remain active and subsisting.
But the procedure above stated, unfortunately, was not adopted by
private respondents herein in the court below, hence, we reverse the
Court of Appeals and sustain the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals of 18 December 1991 in CA-G.R. No. CV-28420 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40, of 19
December 1989 dismissing Civil Case No. 84-26040 is REINSTATED
and REITERATED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Romero, Nocon and Melo, JJ., concur.
Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ., In the result.
Padilla, J ., On official leave.
Quiason, J., No part.
Separate Opinions
REGALADO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result, whereby the ponencia sustains the order of the
trial court dismissing herein petitioner's complaint and consequently
barring private respondents from introducing evidence on their
Thus, in Sta. Maria, Jr., et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 6 plaintiff
having been declared nonsuited for his failure to appear at the pretrial, his complaint was dismissed without prejudice and the deputy
clerk of court was commissioned to receive defendant's evidence on
their compulsory counterclaim. This action of the trial court was later
reconsidered and the case was reset for hearing but since neither
plaintiffs nor their counsel appeared despite due notice, they were
again nonsuited, the case was dismissed without prejudice, and
plaintiffs were declared in default on the counterclaim. Defendants
adopted the evidence they had earlier presented and the trial court
rendered judgment on their counterclaim.
Plaintiffs therein raised virtually the same objections and arguments
as those which herein petitioner now relies upon to impugn the order
of the trial court. That case eventually reached this Court which,
speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, disposed of plaintiffs'
contentions in this wise:
"Also pointed out as error is the hearing of the
counterclaim after the plaintiffs were non-suited, the
argument being that the issues in the counterclaim
are so inseparable with those in the complaint that the
former may not be heard unless the latter is also
heard. Petitioners misapply the doctrine; first, because
in the instant case, the adjudication of the
counterclaim does not depend upon the adjudication
of the claims made in the complaint, since they were
virtually abandoned by the non-appearance of the
plaintiffs themselves; and second, the doctrine
invoked is not available to plaintiffs like the
petitioners, who prevent or delay the hearing of their
own claims and allegations. LexLib
"The doctrine that the complaint may not be
dismissed
if
the
counterclaim
cannot
be
independently adjudicated is not available to, and was
not intended for the benefit of, a plaintiff who
prevents or delays the prosecution or hearing of his
own complaint. Otherwise, the trial of counterclaims
would be made to depend upon the maneuvers of the
plaintiff, and the rule would offer a premium to vexing
or delaying tactics to the prejudice of the counter
claimants. It is in the same spirit that we have ruled
that a complaint may not be withdrawn over the
opposition of the defendant where the counterclaim is
one that arises from, or is necessarily connected with,
the plaintiff's action and cannot remain pending for
independent adjudication [Ynotorio vs. Lira, L-16677,
27 November 1964]." (Emphasis mine.)
The cases of Dalman vs. The City Court of Dipolog, etc., et al. 7 and
International Container Terminal Services, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 8 relied upon in the main opinion, both involved the application of
the rule in Section 2, not Section 3, of Rule 17. In Dalman, the
dismissal of the complaint was at the instance of therein plaintiff,
which dismissal was ordered by the trial court despite defendant's
compulsory counterclaim therein since, as noted by this Court on
appeal, defendant did not object to such dismissal hence her
counterclaim was also dismissed. In International Container Terminal
Services, Inc., the complaint of private respondent Sharp, Inc. in the
court a quo was dismissed and petitioner itself, as defendant therein,
joined in moving for such dismissal which likewise resulted in the
dismissal of its compulsory counterclaim. In effect, petitioner
consented to or, at least, did not object to the dismissal of its
counterclaim for, as stated by the Court, "(i)f it wanted the
counterclaim to subsist, it should have objected to the dismissal of the
complaint or at least reserved its right to prosecute it, . . ." which it
could have done by invoking the provisions of Section 2, Rule 17. As
earlier explained, a different procedure obtains under Section 3 of said
Rule which is the provision applicable to the case at bar.
All told, my concurrence in the dispositive portion of the judgment in
this case is founded only upon the fact that the assailed order of the
trial court was already final and executory, hence petitioner's present
recourse is indisputably time-barred. However, it is my respectful
submission that in determining whether or not the dismissal of a
complaint ipso jure results in the dismissal likewise of a compulsory
counterclaim thereto, the distinctions between the situations
contemplated in and provided for by Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17
should be observed, with the difference in effects as explained in the
foregoing disquisition. Otherwise, we may be indulging in judicial
legislation although, ironically, it is within the power of the Court itself
to change or revise the aforesaid provisions should the same be
considered inadequate to meet its normative perceptions of what the
rules should be.
Narvasa, C . J., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-35989. October 28, 1977.]
FERMIN JALOVER, petitioner, vs. PORFERIO
YTORIAGA, CONSOLACION LOPEZ and HON.
VENICIO ESCOLIN, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Branch V, Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
respondents.
Lorenzo C. Coloso for petitioner.
Amado B. Atol for private respondents.
DECISION
CASTRO, J p:
This is an original action for certiorari, with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction, asking this Court to declare null and void the
Orders dated August 24, 1972 and November 10, 1972, issued by the
respondent Judge in civil case No. 5429 of the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo, Branch V. On December 27, 1972, a temporary restraining
order was issued by this Court.
Sometime in April, 1960, private respondents Porferio Ytoriaga and
Consolacion Lopez filed against Ana Hedriana and petitioner Fermin
Jalover a complaint dated April 6, 1960, in the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo (Civil Case No. 5429), alleging, inter alia, that they are owners
pro indiviso of Lot No. 2255 of the Cadastral Survey of Jaro, covered by
TCT No. 6738 and containing an area of 8,153 square meters; that the
said parcel of land is bounded on the southwest by the Salog River;
that as of January, 1958, by virtue of the effects of the current of the
river, there was a gradual increase of the land on its southwestern
portion of around 900 square meters; that since before the war, the
plaintiffs have been in continuous possession of the increased portion
of the land, which, under the principle of alluvion, automatically
belongs to them; that sometime in January, 1958, the defendants had
the land increase surveyed, placed concrete monuments thereon and
took possession thereof, without the knowledge and consent of the
plaintiffs; and that the defendants, who destroyed plants standing on
the land in question which belong to the plaintiffs, have remained in
possession of the land in spite of repeated demands made by the
latter for them to return the said possession. The plaintiffs prayed that
they be declared the owners of the increased portion of the land, and
that the defendants be ordered to vacate the premises and restore
their possession to the plaintiffs, to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P147.00 as actual damages, the sum of P300.00 as attorney's fees,
and the sum of P200.00 annually from the time the plaintiffs were
deprived of possession up to the time the said possession shall have
been restored, and to pay the costs of suit. prcd
In his answer dated April 21, 1960, petitioner Fermin Jalover, as a
defendant, alleged, inter alia, that his mother and co-defendant, Ana
Hedriana, died on July 21, 1959; that the land in question was formerly
a river bed, which, less than 10 years before, was abandoned through
the natural change in the course of the waters; that the said land
It is not disputed that Atty. Amado B. Atol, counsel for plaintiffs the
herein respondents was not served with notice of such order of
dismissal. Accordingly, when he filed his motion for reconsideration on
January 17, 1972, the running of the period for the finality of that
order had not yet started. This motion was denied on June 23, 1972.
As there is no showing when Atty. Atol received copy of the order of
denial, the least that can be said in his favor is that when he filed his
so called petition for relief on July 10, 1972, he still had not less than
thirteen (13) days within which to perfect an appeal. Now, assuming
that his petition for relief, not being the proper remedy as held in
the man opinion, which view I am also fully in accord with should be
deemed a second motion for reconsideration, the question that would
arise would be whether or not such a second motion for
reconsideration could be filed.
In this connection, it is to be noted that Atty. Atol's first motion for
reconsideration was based on the sole ground then apparent, namely,
that the order of dismissal was improper, since plaintiffs could not be
considered as having failed to prosecute their case, it appearing that
they had already closed their evidence and, therefore, their absence
of the resumption of the trial for the reception of the evidence of the
defendants could signify no more than they had waived their right to
contest the admissibility of the evidence presented by said
defendants. But the court, in its order of June 23, 1972, denied said
first motion on a ground which had nothing to do with the issue raised
in the motion. Such being the case, it was but fair and proper for the
plaintiffs to be allowed to move to reconsider the order of denial
before taking any remedy against it in a higher court with a view to
giving the trial court an opportunity to correct itself on the new matter
treated in its order. In a sense, therefore, respondents' petition for
relief which the Court is treating as a second motion for
reconsideration is allowable under the rules and had the effect of
suspending the respondents' period to appeal. Thus, at the time the
trial court gave due course to the petition for relief and granted the
same on August 24, 1972 it acted within its jurisdiction. LibLex
And inasmuch as, as I have stated at the outset, there can be no
doubt as to the right of respondents to the nullification of the
dismissal order of January 26, 1970 as well as the subsequent order of
June 23, 1972, it little matters that the trial court's order of August 24,
1972 is premised on the assumption that what was being acted upon
is a petition for relief instead of on a second motion for
reconsideration. What is important and decisive is that the reopening
was done within the period for finality of the order of dismissal and
before the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same. The mistake
of respondents in filing the wrong remedy is a matter of form which
under the circumstances of this particular case could not affect the
efficacy of the actual relief sought.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-17828. August 31, 1963.]
LIGAYA MINA, JAIME MINA, SILVINA MINA,
FAUSTA MINA, PABLO MINA and MIGUEL MINA,
the minors represented by PILAR LAZO as
guardian-ad-litem,
plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ANTONIO PACSON, CRISPINO MEDINA and
CRESENCIA MINA, defendants-appellees.
F. A. Pelmoka for plaintiffs-appellants.
Castelo Law Office for defendants-appellees.
SYLLABUS
1.DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS; FAILURE TO PROSECUTE; FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH ORDER TO IMPLEAD INDISPENSABLE PARTY.
Appellants' contention that the dismissal of the complaint in the
previous action was "at the indirect instance of the plaintiffs through
inaction or omission," is not supported by the facts of the case,
because the order of the court dismissing the complaint in the first
case contained the warning that should the plaintiffs fail to comply
with its order to implead the surviving widow of the deceased and
other necessary parties, the case would be dismissed, and it was
because of plaintiffs' refusal to comply with this express mandate that
the dismissal was ordered. The dismissal was, therefore, justified
under Rule 30, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. (Garchitorena, et al. vs.
De los Santos, et al., G. R. No. L-17045, June 20, 1962.)
2.ID.; ID.; NEGLIGENCE OF CLIENT AND COUNSEL. The argument of
appellants that the dismissal of the previous case was due to the
negligence of plaintiffs' lawyer for which the plaintiffs-appellants
should not be made to suffer, is not correct; it was not due to the
negligence of their counsel alone but that of themselves also that the
required amendment was not made. Besides, even if the failure was
due to the lawyer alone, such failure would not relieve them of the
responsibility resulting from the neglect of their lawyer, for the client
is bound by the action of his counsel. (Valerio vs. Sec. of Agriculture,
G. R. No. L-18587, April 23, 1963, and other cases cited.)
3.JUDGMENTS; RES JUDICATA; COMPLETE IDENTITY NECESSARY;
PARTIES NOT INCLUDED AND MATTERS NOT RAISED IN PREVIOUS CASE
NOT BARRED. The previous order of dismissal bars the present
complaint only as to matters already presented in the previous care,
like the action for annulment of the deeds of sale as regards the
defendants named therein, but matters not raised and parties not
included in the previous case are not barred, like the action for the
recognition of the filiation of the plaintiffs against the defendant
widow of the deceased alleged father.
DECISION
LABRADOR, J p:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, Hon. Felix Makasiar, presiding, in its Civil Case No. 3296, entitled
"Ligaya Mina, et al., plaintiffs vs. Crispino Medina, et al., defendants,"
dismissing the complaint filed in this case. The appellant also appeals
against the order denying the motion for reconsideration of the order
of dismissal.
The facts necessary to understand the nature of the issues presented
in this appeal, as gleaned from the pleadings, may be briefly stated as
follows: Plaintiffs Ligaya, Jaime, Silvina, Fausta, Pablo and Miguel, all
surnamed Mina, are alleged to be the illegitimate children of the
deceased Joaquin Mina with plaintiff Pilar Lazo from 1933-1958, while
married to Antonia Pacson. Joaquin Mina died in August, 1958, leaving
no descendants nor ascendants except his widow, the defendant
herein Antonia Pacson. On April 9, 1958, Joaquin Mina, then still living,
executed a deed of absolute sale (Annex "B" to Complaint) of three
parcels of land situated in the municipality of Muoz, Nueva Ecija, in
favor of the defendants Crispino Medina and Cresencia Mina for the
sum of P12,000. On April 15, 1958 again he executed another deed of
sale (Annex "C" to Complaint) of 13 parcels of land covered by 12
transfer certificates of title to the same spouses Crispino Medina and
Cresencia Mina. Both deeds of sale bear the conformity of his wife
Antonia Pacson.
In the complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in
the case which originated this appeal, it is alleged that plaintiffs are
illegitimate children of the deceased Joaquin Mina begotten by him
with Pilar Lazo during the period from 1933 to 1958 while Joaquin Mina
was lawfully married to Antonia Pacson; that the plaintiff Pablo Mina is
a recognized illegitimate child of the deceased Joaquin Mina; that
Joaquin Mina died intestate leaving no ascendants or descendants,
except his widow Antonio Pacson; that he left various parcels of land
enumerated in the complaint but that on April 9, 1950 the defendants
connived and secured from Joaquin Mina, who was ill and did not know
what he was doing, the execution of the two deeds of sale without
consideration, fictitiously and fraudulently, transferring his properties
to the spouses Crispino Medina and Cresencia Mina; and that by
reason of said acts, defendants have caused moral anguish, anxiety
and embarrassment to plaintiffs, causing them damages amounting to
P10,000; that plaintiffs pray that they be declared recognized
illegitimate children of the deceased Joaquin Mina, entitled to share in
the properties left by him as such illegitimate children; that the deeds
of sale, Annexes "B" and "C" be declared fictitious, fraudulent and,
therefore, null and void; and that defendants be required to deliver to
plaintiffs' possession one- fourth of said properties together with
P10,000 for moral damages.
Upon the filing of the complaint the defendants presented a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata, alleging that a
similar action had previously been presented as Civil Case No. 3015 in
the same court, and by the same parties against Crispino Medina and
Cresencia Mina, in which the same allegations of plaintiffs' status and
fraudulent conveyance of the properties to defendants are alleged,
together with a prayer for moral damages in the sum of P20,000. It
appears, however, that in the complaint filed in said Civil Case No.
3015, no prayer is made for the declaration of the filiation of the
plaintiffs in relation or with respect to the deceased Joaquin Mina.
The Motion to dismiss also copied an order of the court issued in said
Civil Case No. 3015 which reads as follows:
"Acting on the Motion filed by the defendants on
December 22, 1958 for the reconsideration of the
order dated December 8, 1958, and considering that
the present action is not only for annulment of deeds
of sale but also for partition (paragraphs 8 and 11 of
the complaint and paragraph 4 of the prayer thereof);
that to avoid multiplicity of suits, the complex action
to establish filiation and for partition or for recovery of
inheritance may be brought in the same case (Lopez
v. Lopez, 68 Phil. 227; Escoval v. Escoval, 48 O.G. 615;
Edades v. Edades, L-8964, July 31, 1956); and that
Antonia Pacson, the surviving widow and the other
intestate heirs of the deceased Joaquin Mina, or
necessary parties are not made a party in this case
(Briz v. Briz, 43 Phil. 763), the plaintiffs are hereby
directed to amend their complaint within fifteen (15)
days from receipt hereof by including as party
defendant the surviving widow of the deceased
Joaquin Mina and other necessary parties.
"Should the plaintiffs fail to comply with this order,
this case will be dismissed."
Lastly, another order of the same court dated February 9, 1959 was
quoted, the dispositive part of which reads:
"The fifteen-day period granted to the
plaintiffs having elapsed without said order
having been complied with, the Court hereby
dismisses this case, without pronouncement as
to costs."
Opposition to the motion to dismiss was presented on behalf of the
plaintiffs by their attorney to which a reply was filed on behalf of the
defendants. A rejoinder was also filed after which Judge Genaro Tan
Torres, then presiding over the court, sustained the motion to dismiss
in an order which reads as follows:
"After a careful consideration of the joint
motion to dismiss of defendants Antonia Pacson
and the spouses Crispino Medina and Cresencia
Mina, dated November 11, 1959, the opposition
thereto dated November 24, 1959, and the reply
of the defendants to the opposition, dated
December 7, 1959, the Court is of the opinion
that said motion to dismiss is well taken; hence
this case is hereby dismissed without costs.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 54287. September 28, 1988.]
REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK, petitioner, vs. HON.
CONRADO M. MOLINA, as Presiding Judge, Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch XX, SARMIENTO
EXPORT CORPORATION, SARMIENTO SECURITIES
CORPORATION and FELICIANO SARMIENTO, JR.,
respondents.
Paco, Gutierrez, Dorado, Asia & Associates for petitioner.
Benjamin M. Reyes for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTION; DISMISSAL DESPITE
LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANTS NOT
AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS. A judgment, to be considered
res judicata, must be binding, and must be rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction. Otherwise, the judgment is a nullity. The order
of dismissal in Civil Case No. 116820 does not have the effect of an
adjudication on the merits of the case because the court that rendered
the same did not have the requisite jurisdiction over the persons of
the defendants therein. This being so, it cannot be the basis of res
judicata and it cannot be a bar to a lawful claim. If at all, such a
dismissal may be considered as one without prejudice.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND DENIAL OF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Trial courts have the duty to dispose of controversies after trial on the
merits whenever possible. In this case, there are no indications that
petitioner intentionally failed to prosecute the case. The delay could
not be attributed to its fault. Petitioner pursued the case with diligence
but jurisdiction could not be acquired over defendants-private
respondents. The sheriff had not yet submitted his return of the alias
summons when the action was precipitately dismissed by the trial
court. These are proven circumstances that negate the action of
respondent judge that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 116028 has the
effect of an adjudication upon the merits and constitutes a bar to the
prosecution of Civil Case No. 129829. The court finds that the two
questioned orders of the trial court are irregular, improper, and were
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.
3.ID.; CERTIORARI; ADEQUATE REMEDY WHERE ISSUE INVOLVED ONE
OF JURISDICTION. petitioner correctly states that its appeal to the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 67288 pertaining to the questioned
orders of the trial court is not an adequate remedy, because petitioner
was not able to present evidence in the trial court. The sole issue
involved in this case is one of jurisdiction, which is appropriate for
resolution by the instant petition.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J p:
The principal issue raised in this case is whether the trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion when it ordered Civil Case No.
129829 dismissed on the ground of res judicata it appearing that Civil
Case No. 116028 was dismissed on May 21, 1979, for failure of
petitioner to prosecute within a reasonable length of time, although in
the said case, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of private respondents. llcd
It is not disputed that both complaints in Civil Case No. 116028
(Branch XXXVI, Manila, Judge Alfredo C. Florendo) and in Civil Case No.
129829 (Branch XX, Manila, Judge Conrado M. Molina) were filed by
petitioner Republic Planters Bank against private respondent, for the
collection of a sum of money based on a promissory note dated
January 26, 1970, in the amount of P100,000.00.
On May 21, 1979, Judge Alfredo C. Florendo dismissed Civil Case No.
116028 for failure of the petitioner "to prosecute its case within a
reasonable length of time." 1 A motion for reconsideration of that
order was denied on January 15, 1979. 2
When Civil Case No. 129829 was filed by petitioner, a motion to
dismiss was submitted by private respondents on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by a prior judgment (res judicata) in Civil
Case No. 116028. Private respondents opined that said order was an
adjudication upon the merits. Petitioner opposed the motion to
dismiss, claiming that res judicata does not apply because the
summons and complaint in Civil Case No. 116028 were never served
upon private respondents and, as such, the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over private respondents and, consequently, over the
case. Petitioner maintains that the order of dismissal in Civil Case No.
116028 never became final as against private respondents. Cdpr
The trial court (Branch XX), in its order dated May 8, 1980, dismissed
the complaint in Civil Case No. 129829 on the ground that the orders
dated May 21, 1979 and June 15, 1979 issued by Judge Alfredo C.
Florendo, dismissing Civil Case No. 116028, had become final. The
trial court ruled that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 116028 had the
effect of an adjudication upon the merits, that the dismissal was with
prejudice since the order was unconditional, and that the lack of
jurisdiction over defendants (private respondents) in Civil Case No.
116028 was of no moment. 3
In a motion for reconsideration of the order of May 8, 1980, petitioner
reiterated its allegation that in Civil Case No. 116028, the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over private respondents and that at the time the
court ordered its dismissal, a motion for an alias writ of summons was
pending resolution inasmuch as the sheriff had not acted on the same.
4 The motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on June
26, 1980 in Civil Case No. 129829. 5
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals both questioned orders of
respondent court in Civil Case No. 129829. 6 But then, petitioner
sought a more speedy remedy in questioning said orders by filing this
petition for certiorari before this Court.
Under the foregoing undisputed facts, the Court finds this petition to
be impressed with merit.
The questioned orders of the trial court in Civil Case No. 129829
supporting private respondent's motion to dismiss on the ground of
res judicata are without cogent basis. We sustain petitioner's claim
that respondent trial judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
when he issued said orders because he thereby traversed the
constitutional precept that "no person shall be deprived of property
without due process of law" and that jurisdiction is vitally essential for
any order or adjudication to be binding. Justice cannot be sacrificed for
technicality. Originally, the action for collection of the loan, evidenced
by a promissory note, was only for P100,000.00 but petitioner claims
that as of March 5, 1981, the obligation was already P429,219.74. It is
a cardinal rule that no one must be allowed to enrich himself at the
expense of another without just cause. cdrep
In the very order of dismissal of Civil Case No. 116028, the trial court
admitted that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of private
respondents and yet, it held that it was of no moment as to the
dismissal of the case. We disagree. For the court to have authority to
dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties. If it did not acquire jurisdiction over
the private respondents as parties to Civil Case No. 116028, it cannot
render any binding decision, favorable or adverse to them, or dismiss
the case with prejudice which, in effect, is an adjudication on the
merits. 7 The controverted orders in Civil Case No. 116028
disregarded the fundamental principles of remedial law and the
meaning and the effect of jurisdiction. A judgment, to be considered
res judicata, must be binding, and must be rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction. Otherwise, the judgment is a nullity.
The order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 116028 does not have the
effect of an adjudication on the merits of the case because the court
that rendered the same did not have the requisite jurisdiction over the
persons of the defendants therein. This being so, it cannot be the
basis of res judicata and it cannot be a bar to a lawful claim. If at all,
such a dismissal may be considered as one without prejudice. 8
Trial courts have the duty to dispose of controversies after trial on the
merits whenever possible. In this case, there are no indications that
petitioner intentionally failed to prosecute the case. The delay could
not be attributed to its fault. Petitioner pursued the case with
diligence, but jurisdiction could not be acquired over defendantsprivate respondents. The sheriff had not yet submitted his return of
the alias summons when the action was precipitately dismissed by the
trial court. These are proven circumstances that negate the action of
respondent judge that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 116028 has the
effect of an adjudication upon the merits and constitutes a bar to the
prosecution of Civil Case No. 129829. The court finds that the two
questioned orders of the trial court are irregular, improper, and, were
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 81835. December 20, 1990.]
ROMEO J. ORDOEZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON.
ALFREDO J. GUSTILO, in his capacity as
presiding judge of Regional Trial Court of
Cavite, Branch XVI, Cavite City, Municipality of
Rosario, Cavite, former Mayor Calixto D.
Enriquez of Rosario, Cavite, and Valeriano
Espiritu of Mabolo, Bacoor, Cavite, respondents.
Jose M. Ricafrente, Jr. for petitioner.
Ricardo C. Fernandez for respondents.
Allan E. Benusa for respondent C.D. Enriquez.
DECISION
PARAS, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to annul, on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion, the (1) Decision dated May 24, 1985; (2)
Order dated May 27, 1987 and (3) Order dated December 24, 1987, all
issued in Civil Case No. N-4367 of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
Branch XVI, Cavite City entitled "Valeriano Espiritu v. Municipality of
Rosario, Province of Cavite and Hon. Calixto D. Enriquez in his capacity
as Municipal Mayor of Rosario, Cavite.
The pertinent background facts are:
Valeriano Espiritu, herein private respondent filed on April 22, 1983, a
complaint for Specific Performance and Damages, against respondents
Municipality of Rosario, Cavite and Calixto Enriquez, the latter in his
capacity as Mayor of said municipality, to enforce their agreement
contained in a Reclamation Contract. In his complaint, Espiritu prayed
that the Municipality of Rosario, together with Enriquez, be ordered to
convey to him 323,996 square meters of the reclaimed portion of the
foreshore land of the town. Espiritu filed the action in his capacity as
the assignee of the Salinas Development Corporation (SADECO), the
entity which reclaimed the area in question by virtue of a Reclamation
Contract entered into between it and the Municipality of Rosario,
represented by Enriquez as Municipal Mayor. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 4367 of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Fourth
Judicial Region, Branch XVI, Cavite City.
In its answer, defendant municipality resisted plaintiff's claim stating
that it was barred by the statute of limitation; the contract has been
substantially amended, modified and supplemented; and plaintiff has
not performed his reciprocal obligation. llcd
The barangay captain of Tejeros Convention, Rosario, Cavite, herein
petitioner Romeo J. Ordoez, together with seven (7) other municipal
and barangay officials intervened, and in their Answer-in-Intervention,
they alleged that no actual reclamation was done by the plaintiff and
the area being claimed by the plaintiff came about by natural
accretion; the reclamation contract between the contractor and the
municipality is either void, voidable or disadvantageous to the
defendant municipality.
The issues having been joined the trial court set the case for the
mandatory pre-trial conference on November 15, 1984.
At this scheduled pre-trial conference, all the litigants including the
intervenors, with their respective counsel, were present. In said
conference, plaintiff Espiritu and defendant municipality, manifested
to the court that having arrived at a satisfactory settlement, they
would submit a compromise agreement at a latter date.
On the other hand, the intervenors asked the court that they be
allowed to present their evidence to prove their defense asserted in
their answer-in-intervention. For the said purpose, hearing was held on
December 13, 1984 wherein Ernesto Andico, vice-mayor testified.
Another hearing was also held on January 24, 1985 where ViceGovernor Jose M. Ricafrente, Jr. of the Province of Cavite, and
petitioner's counsel in the instant case, also testified.
On May 20, 1985, the principal litigants filed with respondent trial
court their promised compromise agreement. The parties agreed that
208,664 square meters of the reclaimed area were to be alloted to the
plaintiff and 211,311 square meters thereof were to be given to
defendant municipality.
On May 24, 1985, the trial court approved the compromise agreement
and rendered a decision in accordance therewith. The intervenors
received their copy of the decision on September 19, 1985 thru ViceMayor Ernesto Andico. The decision being already final, it was duly
executed to the satisfaction of the principal litigants.
On October 17, 1985 and July 2, 1987 additional hearings were held
where the intervenors presented three (3) additional witnesses.
On June 24, 1987, the intervenors filed a motion to set aside the
compromise agreement dated May 15, 1985. This was denied by the
trial court, thru respondent Judge Alfredo Gustilo (the former presiding
judge, Judge Alejandro Silapan having already retired) in its Order
dated November 27, 1987, the pertinent portion of which reads as
follows:
"It appears that on May 24, 1985, the former Presiding
Judge of this Court approved the said Compromise
Agreement and rendered a judgment on the basis
thereof. It is settled that a judgment approving a
compromise agreement is final and immediately
executory. (Samonte v. Samonte, 64 SCRA 524). The
motion in question therefore cannot be granted as it
has the effect of annulling the judgment of this Court
which has already become final and, according to the
plaintiff, already executed. dctai
"The Motion to Set Aside Compromise Agreement
cannot even be considered as a motion for
reconsideration because the Court can no longer set
aside, amend or modify its judgment which has
become final. Neither can the said motion be deemed
as a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 89909. September 21, 1990.]
METROPOLITAN
BANK
AND
TRUST
COMPANY,
petitioner, vs. THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, Manila Branch 39, RAYCOR AIRCONTROL
SYSTEM, INC. and COURT OF APPEALS * , respondent.
Balane, Barican, Cruz, Alampay Law Office for petitioner.
Bito, Lozada, Ortega & Castillo for private respondent.
DECISION
REGALADO, J p:
Before the Court for review on certiorari is the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 17341, dated July 19, 1989, 1
dismissing petitioner's original action for certiorari and mandamus
which seeks to set aside the order of the trial court dated June 2,
1988, allowing the intervention suit thereinto proceed, and its order of
January 11, 1989, admitting the amended complaint in intervention.
The proceedings in the court below from which this appeal arose, as
found by respondent Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"Petitioner
Metropolitan
Bank
and
Trust
Co.
(Metropolitan) in whose favor a deed of chattel
mortgage was executed by Good Earth Emporium, Inc.
(GEE) over certain air conditioning units installed in
the GEE building, filed a complaint for replevin against
Uniwide Sales, Inc. (Uniwide, for brevity) and the BPI
Investment Corporation and several other banks
collectively called BPI-Consortium, for the recovery of
the possession of the air-conditioning units or in the
event they may not be recovered, for the defendants
which acquired the GEE building in an auction sale,
(to) be required, jointly and severally, to pay the
plaintiff the unpaid obligations on the units.
"Per paragraph 3.11.3 of its complaint, plaintiff
Metrobank alleged that the air-conditioning units were
installed on a loan of P4,900,000.00 it extended to
Good Earth Emporium & Supermarket, Inc. in its
building located at Rizal Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila,
after the land and building had been foreclosed and
purchased on June 3, 1983 at public auction by the
defendants, except Uniwide, and in order to secure
repayment of the loan, a deed of chattel mortgage
was constituted over the personal properties listed in
the deed which included the airconditioning units.
"It also alleged in par. 3.11.2 of the complaint, that
'(T)he loan proceeds were used by GEE to finance the
acquisition of airconditioning equipment from Reycor
(sic) Air Control System, Inc. (amounting to
P4,250,000.00 and installation costs of P650,000.00)
alter the theory of the case or that it was made to delay the action. 18
Once exercised, that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal, except
in case of abuse thereof. 19
In the case at bar, a reading of the amended complaint in intervention
shows that it merely supplements an incomplete allegation of the
cause of action stated in the original complaint so as to submit the
real matter in dispute. Contrary to petitioner's contention, it does not
substantially change intervenor's cause of action or alter the theory of
the case, hence its allowance is in order.
As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals:
"In both the Intervention Complaint and the Amended
Complaint in Intervention, the private respondent
seeks the payment to it of the amount of P150,000.00
which should have been paid to it from out of the
P650,000.00 which the petitioner as plaintiff in CC 863618 had referred to in pars. 3.11.2 and 3.11.3 of its
complaint as cost of installation of the airconditioning
units under the agreement of sale (between plaintiff
Metrobank and GEE Inc). dated June 29, 1984 and so
basically, the Amended Complaint In Intervention did
not really detract or depart from that basic claim." 20
In determining whether a different cause of action is introduced by
amendments to the complaint, what is to be ascertained is whether
the defendant shall be required to answer for a liability or legal
obligation wholly different from that which was stated in the original
complaint. An amendment will not be considered as stating a new
cause of action if the facts alleged in the amended complaint show
substantially the same wrong with respect to the same transaction, or
if what are alleged refer to the same matter but are more fully and
differently stated, or where averments which were implied are made in
expressed terms, and the subject of the controversy or the liability
sought to be enforced remains the same. 21
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to
avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies
between the parties are presented, their rights determined and the
case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. 22 This
liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, 23 especially in
this case where the amendment to the complaint in intervention was
made before trial of the case thereby giving petitioner all the time
allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial. cdphil
On the issue regarding the propriety of the intervention, suffice it to
state that petitioner's failure to interpose a timely objection when the
motion for leave to intervene was filed by private respondent bars the
former from belatedly questioning the validity of the same on appeal.
In any event, the trial court duly considered the circumstances and
granted the motion, which order was not seasonably questioned by
petitioner thus evincing its approval of the court's action.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 99338-40. February 1, 1993.]
HEIRS OF NICOLAS Y. OROSA, (Represented
herein by their Attorney-in-Fact, RICARDO Q.
OROSA), petitioners, vs. THE HON. EUTROPIO
MIGRINO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, M.M. Branch 151 and GOLDENROD,
INC., respondents.
Romero, Lagman, Valdecantos & Arreza Law Offices for petitioner.
Eliseo M. Cruz for Heirs of F. Alma Sr.
Adoracion J. Mirandilla for Goldenrod, Inc.
SYLLABUS
1.CIVIL LAW; ACTIONS; INTERVENTION; MOVANT MUST HAVE DIRECT
AND ACTUAL LEGAL INTEREST ON THE DISPUTED PROPERTY; ABSENCE
THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR. Taking Goldenrod's own admissions at
their face value, it is quite apparent that whatever direct and actual
legal interest it may have had over the land had been disposed of by it
for value in favor of the consortium in 1989 and that whatever
residual legal interest in the property can be premised on Goldenrod's
contractual undertaking, actually an express warranty against
eviction, is expectant or contingent in nature. Presently, Goldenrod
has no legal interest in the property and its warranty can only be
enforced by the consortium if the latter is dispossessed of the land by
virtue of a proper action instituted by the Orosa heirs as registered
owners thereof. But, the legal interest which entitles a person to
intervene in a suit must be actual and material, direct and immediate.
A party seeking to intervene in a pending case must show that he will
either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of a
judgment. In the present case, Goldenrod has failed to meet this
criteria and the lower court gravely abused its discretion in permitting
intervention after having overlooked this matter.
2.ID.; ID.; REOPENING OF DECREE OF REGISTRATION WITHIN ONE
YEAR FROM ENTRY UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529; ACTUAL
INTEREST IN THE LAND, INDISPENSABLE; CASE AT BAR. It appears
that the lower court cited Section 32 of P.D. 1529, permitting the
reopening of a decree of registration within one year after its entry, if
the same was procured through actual fraud and a person is thereby
deprived of any interest over the affected land. The difficulty with this
view is that, as earlier noted, Goldenrod had not shown any actual
interest in the land of which it could have been deprived, on the basis
of an actual or extrinsic fraud perpetrated by petitioners in the course
of procuring their decree of confirmation. Goldenrod had merely
alleged, rather ambiguously, a cause of action against petitioners in
that they "suddenly breached and disregarded the 1977 Agreement"
(the sale between Nicolas Orosa and Delta). Even the public
respondent made no finding that Goldenrod was the apparent victim
of an actual fraud. Hence its invocation of the remedy provided in
Section 32 of P.D. 1529 was bereft of basis.
Even the public respondent made no finding that Goldenrod was the
apparent victim of an actual fraud. Hence its invocation of the remedy
provided in Section 32 of P.D. 1529 was bereft of basis.
The action of the lower court in permitting Goldenrod's intervention at
this late stage of the proceedings in LRC No. 2839 is also flawed by
another, more serious defect. It must be remembered that upon entry
of the Court's judgment in G.R. No. L-30859, the confirmation of a
registerable title, and the consequent adjudication of ownership over
Lot 9 Psu-11411 Amd-2, in favor of petitioners' predecessors-ininterest became a final and settled matter. 18 Such entry of judgment
operated ipso facto to divest the lower court of its general jurisdiction
to act in LRC No. 2839, save for the limited matter of supervising the
process of executing the Court's decision. The public respondent
simply cannot, as it appears to be trying to do in this case, interpret or
reverse the implication of this Court's ruling that petitioners are
entitled to a Torrens title over Lot 9 Psu-11411 Amd-2, just because
Goldenrod seeks to recall execution by making a supervening
allegation that petitioners are no longer the owners thereof. 19
Goldenrod attempted to broaden the jurisdiction of the lower court, so
as to enable the latter to take cognizance of its motion for
intervention, by invoking the Court's ruling in Suson v. Court of
Appeals: 20
"It cannot be overlooked that the hearing before the
respondent court on the motion for demolition
(underscoring supplied by the Court) was in
connection with the implementation or execution of a
final judgment in Civil Case No. R-14351. Petitioner
was precisely given an opportunity to intervene in
order to guide the court in disposing of private
respondent's motion for demolition in the light of
petitioner's claim that his house was erected on the
disputed lot (Italic supplied by the Court), and yet, he
was not an original party to the action. Petitioner was
thus given a chance to raise and prove his claim of
ownership over a part of the lot in question (Italic
supplied by the Court), but he ignored such
opportunity. He cannot now complain that he was
denied due process. `A case in which an execution
has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all
proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the
suit. There is no question that the court which
rendered the judgment has a general supervisory
control over its process of execution, and this power
carries with it the right to determine every question of
fact and law which may be involved in the execution.'"
(Italic supplied by Goldenrod).
But it is evident that Goldenrod's reliance upon the Suson case is
misplaced because the intervenor therein had a direct and actual legal