20. Republic vs Iyoy (G.R. No.

152577)
Facts:
The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General on certiorari praying for the reversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001
affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy (respondent)
and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article 36.
On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5
children. In 1984, Fely went to the US, and in the same year she sent letters to Crasus
asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an American
and had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one she
attended the marriage of one of her children in which she used her husbands last name as
hers in the invitation.
March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Felys
acts brought danger and dishonor to the family and were manifestations of her
psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording
of their marriage contract, and the invitation where Fely used her new husbands last name
as evidences.
Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job,
and that since 1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The
RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted the decree; it was affirmed in the CA.
Issue:
Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?
Held:
The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
Irreconcilable
differences,
conflicting
personalities,
emotional
immaturity
and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under the said Article.
Finally, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

24. Emerald Garment vs CA

GR 100098
Facts:
HD Lee Co., a foreign corpo, seeks the
cancellation of a patent in favor of
Emerald
Garment
Manufacturing
(domiciled in the Phil) for the trademark
Stylistic Mr. Lee, which according to HD
Lee Co. closely resembled its own
trademark Lee and thus would cause
confusion, mistake and deception to the
purchasing public. The Director of Patents
granted the cancellation on the ground
that petitioners
trademark
was
confusingly
similar
to
private
respondents mark because it is the word
Lee which draws the attention of the
buyer and leads him to conclude that the
goods
originated
from
the
same
manufacturer. It is undeniably the
dominant feature of the mark. The CA
affirmed.
Issue: WON the trademark Stylistic Mr.
Lee tends to mislead or confuse the
public and constitutes an infringement of
the trademark Lee.
Held: Negative for lack of adequate proof
of actual use of its trademark in the
Philippines prior to Emeralds use of its
own mark and for failure to establish
confusing similarity between said
trademarks, HD Lee Cos action for
infringement must necessarily fail.
Ratio:
Emeralds
Stylistic
Mr.
Lee
is
not confusingly
similar
to
private
respondents LEE trademark.

the light of the following variables that

must be factored in, among others:
a. Expensive and valuable items are
normally
bought
only
after
deliberate,
comparative
and
analytical investigation; and
b. The average Filipino consumer
generally buys his jeans by brand.
2. LEE is primarily a surname. Private
respondent cannot, therefore, acquire
exclusive ownership over and singular use
of said term.
3. After a meticulous study of the records,
the SC observes that the Director of
Patents and the Court of Appeals relied
mainly on the registration certificates as
proof of use by HD Lee Co of the
trademark LEE which are not sufficient.
***********************
Colorable imitation defined: "such a
close or ingenious imitation as to be
calculated to deceive ordinary purchasers,
or such resemblance of the infringing
mark to the original as to deceive an
ordinary purchaser giving such attention
as a purchaser usually gives, and to cause
him to purchase the one supposing it to
be the other.
EMERALD
GARMENT
MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS,
BUREAU OF PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS
AND
TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER and H.D. LEE COMPANY,
INC.
G.R. No. 100098, December 29, 1995
FACTS:

Colorable imitation DOES NOT APPLY

because:
1. Petitioners trademark is the whole
STYLISTIC MR. LEE. Although on its label
the word LEE is prominent, the
trademark should be considered as a
whole
and
not
piecemeal.
The
dissimilarities between the two marks
become conspicuous, noticeable and
substantial enough to matter especially in

On 18 September 1981, private

respondent H.D. Lee Co., Inc. filed with
the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks &
Technology Transfer (BPTTT) a Petition for
Cancellation of Registration No. SR 5054
for the trademark "STYLISTIC MR. LEE"
used on skirts, jeans, blouses, socks,
briefs, jackets, jogging suits, dresses,
shorts, shirts and lingerie under Class 25,
issued on 27 October 1980 in the name of

petitioner Emerald Garment

Manufacturing Corporation.
Private respondent averred that
petitioner's trademark "so closely
resembled its own trademark, 'LEE' as
previously registered and used in
thePhilippines cause confusion, mistake
and deception on the part of the
purchasing public as to the origin of the
goods.
On 19 July 1988, the Director of Patents
rendered a decision granting private
respondent's petition for cancellation and
opposition to registration. The Director of
Patents, using the test of dominancy,
declared that petitioner's trademark was
confusingly similar to private respondent's
mark because "it is the word 'Lee' which
draws the attention of the buyer and
leads him to conclude that the goods
originated from the same manufacturer. It
is undeniably the dominant feature of the
mark.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a trademark
causes confusion and is likely to deceive
the public is a question of fact which is to
be resolved by applying the "test of
dominancy", meaning, if the competing
trademark contains the main or essential
or dominant features of another by reason
of which confusion and deception are
likely to result.
HELD:
The word "LEE" is the most
prominent and distinctive feature of the
appellant's trademark and all of the
appellee's "LEE" trademarks. It is the
mark which draws the attention of the
buyer and leads him to conclude that the
goods originated from the same
manufacturer. The alleged difference is
too insubstantial to be noticeable. The
likelihood of confusion is further made
more probable by the fact that both
parties are engaged in the same line of
business.
Although the Court decided in favor of the
respondent, the appellee has sufficiently
established its right to prior use and
registration of the trademark "LEE" in

the Philippines and is thus entitled to

protection from any infringement upon
the same. The dissenting opinion of
Justice Padilla is more acceptable.
25. Mirpuri vs. CA
GR 114508
Facts:
Barbizon Corp (foreign corp) has adopted
the trademark Barbizon. Thus, upon
finding that Mirpuri (domiciled in the Phil)
seeks to register the same trademark in
the Philippines, Barbizon Corp filed its
opposition. Barbizon Corp alleges its
trademark is qualified as well-known and
is therefore protected by the Convention
of Paris for the Protection of Intellectual
Property which the Philippines has bound
to enforce. The Director of Patents
rendered a decision giving due course to
the patent application of Mirpuri. The CA,
however, reversed this decision.
Issue: Whether or not the Convention of
Paris for the Protection of Intellectual
Property affords protection to a foreign
corporation against a Philippine applicant
for the registration of a similar trademark.
Held: Affirmative. The Philippines and the
United States of America have acceded to
the WTO Agreement x x x Conformably,
the State must reaffirm its commitment to
the global community and take part in
evolving a new international economic
order at the dawn of the new millennium.
Thus, the first paragraph of Article 6bis of
the Paris Convention is applicable in the
instant case:
This Article governs protection of wellknown trademarks. Under the first
paragraph, each country of the Union
bound itself to undertake to refuse or
cancel the registration, and prohibit the
use of a trademark which is a
reproduction, imitation or translation, or
any essential part of which trademark
constitutes a reproduction, liable to create
confusion, of a mark considered by the
competent authority of the country where
protection is sought, to be well-known in
the country as being already the mark of
a person entitled to the benefits of the
Convention, and used for identical or
similar goods.

It is a self-executing provision and does

not require legislative enactment to give
it effect in the member country.
*****************
Trademark in R.A. No. 8293, the
Intellectual
Property
Code
of
the
Philippines: defines as any visible sign
capable of distinguishing goods. In
Philippine jurisprudence, the function of a
trademark is to point out distinctly the
origin or ownership of the goods to which
it is affixed; to secure to him, who has
been instrumental in bringing into the
market a superior article of merchandise,
the fruit of his industry and skill; to assure
the public that they are procuring the
genuine article; to prevent fraud and
imposition;
and
to
protect
the
manufacturer against substitution and
sale of an inferior and different article as
his product.

over the maximum weight allowance of

70
kg.
per
bag.
A United
Airlines employee rebuked him and in a
loud voice, in front of the milling crowd,
ordered him to repack his things
accordingly. Wishing not to create a
scene, Willie did as asked. Unfortunately,
his luggage was still overweight so the
airline billed him overweight charges.
Willie offered to pay the charges with a
Miscellaneous Charge Order (MCO) or an
airline
pre-paid
credit
but
the
same employee, and an airline supervisor,
refused to honor it, contending that there
were discrepancies in the figures. Thus,
Willie was forced to pay the charges with
his American Express credit card. Upon
arrival in Manila, Willie discovered that
one of his bags had been slashed and its
contents, amounting to US$5,310.00,
stolen.

26. United Airlines vs. Uy

G.R. No. 127768, Nov. 19, 1999

October 16, 1989 he sent his first letter

of demand to United Airlines. The airline
did not refute Willies allegations and
mailed a check representing payment of
his loss based on the maximum liability of
US$9.70 per pound. Willie, thinking the
amount to be grossly inadequate to
compensate him for his losses as well as
for the indignities he was subjected to,
sent two more letters to petitioner airline,
one dated January 4, 1990 and the other
dated October 28, 1991, demanding outof-court settlement of P1,000,000.00.

INTERNATIONAL LAW: Applicability of

the
Warsaw
Convention: the
Convention's provisions do not regulate or
exclude liability for other breaches of
contract by the carrier or misconduct of
its officers and employees, or for some
particular
or
exceptional
type
of
damage. Neither may the Convention be
invoked to justify the disregard of some
extraordinary sort of damage resulting to
a
passenger
and
preclude recovery therefor beyond the
limits set by said Convention. Likewise,
we have held that the Convention does
not preclude the operation of the Civil
Code and other pertinent laws. It does not
regulate, much less exempt, the carrier
from liability for damages for violating the
rights of its passengers under the
contract of carriage, especially if willful
misconduct
on
the
part
of
the
carrier's employees is
found
or
established
FACTS:
October 13, 1989 Respondent Willie Uy
is a passenger of petitioner United
Airlines, bound from San Francisco to
Manila. While in San Francisco, it was
found that one piece of his luggage was

June 9, 1992 Willie filed a complaint for

damages before the Philippine courts. He
had two causes of action: (1) the shabby
and humiliating treatment he received
from petitioners employees at the San
Francisco Airport which caused him
extreme
embarrassment
and
social
humiliation; and (2) the slashing of his
luggage and the loss of personal effects
amounting to US$5,310.00.
For its part, United Airlines moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that
it was filed out of time. Under Art. 29 of
the Warsaw Convention, the right to
damages shall be extinguished if an
action is not brought within 2 years.
However, the second paragraph of the
said provision stated that the method of
calculating the period of limitation shall

be determined by the law of the court to

which the case is submitted. It is Willies
position that our rules on interruption of
prescriptive period should apply. When he
sent his letters of demand, the 2-year
period was tolled, giving him ample time
to file his complaint.
The trial court ordered the dismissal of
the case, holding that Art. 29(2) refers not
to the local forums rules in interrupting
the prescriptive period but only to the
rules of determining the time in which the
action was deemed commenced (meaning
filed). Willie filed his motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal
only on the 14th day. The trial court
denied his motion and 2 days later Willie
filed
his
notice
of
appeal. United
Airlines this time contended that the
notice of appeal was filed beyond the 15day reglementary period and should
therefore be dismissed. The CA, however,
took cognizance of the case in the interest
of justice and ruled in favour of
respondent. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action for
damages is barred by the lapse of
the 2-year prescriptive period under
Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention
HELD:
Supreme Court held that although the 2year prescriptive period under the
Warsaw Convention has lapsed, it did not
preclude
the application of
other
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code.
Thus, the action for damages could still be
filed based on tort which can be filed
within 4 years from the time cause of
action accrued. As for the action
pertaining to the loss of the contents of
the luggage, while it was well within the
bounds of the Warsaw Convention, the
Supreme Court found that there was an
exception to the applicability of the 2-year
prescriptive period that is when the
airline employed delaying tactics and
gave the passenger the run-around.
Applicability of the Warsaw Convention:
Courts have discretion whether to apply
them or not

Within our jurisdiction we have held that

the Warsaw Convention can be applied, or
ignored, depending on the peculiar facts
presented by each case. Thus, we have
ruled that the Convention's provisions do
not regulate or exclude liability for other
breaches of contract by the carrier or
misconduct of its officers and employees,
or for some particular or exceptional type
of damage. Neither may the Convention
be invoked to justify the disregard of
some extraordinary sort of damage
resulting
to
a
passenger
and
preclude recovery therefor beyond the
limits set by said Convention. Likewise,
we have held that the Convention does
not preclude the operation of the Civil
Code and other pertinent laws. It does not
regulate, much less exempt, the carrier
from liability for damages for violating the
rights of its passengers under the
contract of carriage, especially if willful
misconduct
on
the
part
of
the
carrier's employees is
found
or
established.
Respondent's complaint reveals that he is
suing on two (2) causes of action: (a) the
shabby and humiliating treatment he
received from petitioner's employees at
the San Francisco Airport which caused
him extreme embarrassment and social
humiliation; and, (b) the slashing of his
luggage and the loss of his personal
effects amounting to US $5,310.00.
While his second cause of action - an
action for damages arising from theft or
damage to property or goods - is well
within the bounds of the Warsaw
Convention, his first cause of action -an
action for damages arising from the
misconduct of the airline employees and
the violation of respondent's rights as
passenger - clearly is not.
Action for damages arising from the
misconduct of the airline employees and
the violation of the respondents rights as
passengers is covered under the Civil
Code
Consequently, insofar as the first cause of
action is concerned, respondent's failure
to file his complaint within the two (2)year limitation of the Warsaw Convention

does not bar his action since petitioner

airline may still be held liable for breach
of other provisions of the Civil Code which
prescribe a different period or procedure
for instituting the action, specifically, Art.
1146 thereof which prescribes four (4)
years for filing an action based on torts.
Exception to the Application of the 2-year
prescriptive
period:
When
airline
employed delaying tactics
As for respondent's second cause of
action, indeed the travaux preparatories
of the Warsaw Convention reveal that the
delegates thereto intended the two (2)year limitation incorporated in Art. 29 as
an absolute bar to suit and not to be
made
subject
to
the
various
tolling provisions of the laws of the
forum.
This
therefore
forecloses
the application of our own rules on
interruption of prescriptive periods.
Article 29, par. (2), was intended only to
let local laws determine whether an action
had been commenced within the two (2)year period, and within our jurisdiction an
action shall be deemed commenced upon
the filing of a complaint. Since it is
indisputable that respondent filed the
present action beyond the two (2)-year
time frame his second cause of action
must be barred. Nonetheless, it cannot
be doubted that respondent exerted
efforts to immediately convey his loss to
petitioner, even employed the services of
two (2) lawyers to follow up his claims,
and that the filing of the action itself was
delayed because of petitioner's evasion.
Verily, respondent filed his complaint
more than two (2) years later, beyond the
period of limitation prescribed by the
Warsaw Convention for filing a claim for
damages. However, it is obvious that
respondent
was
forestalled
from
immediately filing an action because
petitioner airline gave him the runaround,
answering his letters but not giving in to
his demands. True, respondent should
have already filed an action at the first
instance when his claims were denied by
petitioner but the same could only be due
to his desire to make an out-of-court
settlement for which he cannot be
faulted. Hence, despite the express

mandate of Art. 29 of the Warsaw

Convention that an action for damages
should be filed within two (2) years from
the arrival at the place of destination,
such rule shall not be applied in the
instant case because of the delaying
tactics employed by petitioner airline
itself. Thus, private respondent's second
cause of action cannot be considered as
time-barred under Art. 29 of the Warsaw
Convention.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals reversing and setting
aside the appealed order of the trial court
granting the motion to dismiss the
complaint, as well as its Resolution
denying reconsideration, is AFFIRMED.
Let the records of the case be remanded
to the court of origin for further
proceedings taking its bearings from this
disquisition.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 127768. November 19,
1999]
UNITED
AIRLINES, petitioner,
vs.
WILLIE J. UY, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
UNITED AIRLINES assails in this petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 the
29 August 1995 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39761 which
reversed the 7 August 1992 order issued
by the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-9212410[1] granting petitioner's motion to
dismiss based on prescription of cause of
action. The issues sought to be resolved
are whether the notice of appeal to the
appellate court was timely filed, and
whether
Art.
29
of
the
Warsaw
[2]
Convention should apply to the case at
bar.
On 13 October 1989 respondent Willie J.
Uy, a revenue passenger on United
Airlines Flight No. 819 for the San
Francisco - Manila route, checked in
together with his luggage one piece of
which was found to be overweight at the
airline counter. To his utter humiliation,
an employee of petitioner rebuked him
saying that he should have known the
maximum weight allowance to be 70 kgs.
per bag and that he should have packed

his things accordingly. Then, in a loud

voice in front of the milling crowd, she
told respondent to repack his things and
transfer some of them from the
overweight luggage to the lighter
ones. Not wishing to create further scene,
respondent acceded only to find his
luggage still overweight. The airline then
billed him overweight charges which he
offered to pay with a miscellaneous
charge order (MCO) or an airline pre-paid
credit. However, the airlines employee,
and later its airport supervisor, adamantly
refused to honor the MCO pointing out
that there were conflicting figures listed
on it. Despite the explanation from
respondent that the last figure written on
the MCO represented his balance,
petitioners
employees
did
not
accommodate
him. Faced
with
the
prospect of leaving without his luggage,
respondent paid the overweight charges
with his American Express credit card.
Respondents troubles did not end
there. Upon
arrival
in
Manila,
he
discovered that one of his bags had been
slashed and its contents stolen. He
particularized his losses to be around US
$5,310.00. In a letter dated 16 October
1989 respondent bewailed the insult,
embarrassment
and
humiliating
treatment he suffered in the hands of
United
Airlines
employees,
notified
petitioner of his loss and requested
reimbursement thereof. Petitioner United
Airlines,
through
Central
Baggage
Specialist Joan Kroll, did not refute any of
respondents allegations and mailed a
check representing the payment of his
loss based on the maximum liability of US
$9.70 per pound. Respondent, thinking
the amount to be grossly inadequate to
compensate him for his losses, as well as
for the indignities he was subjected to,
sent two (2) more letters to petitioner
airline, one dated 4 January 1990 through
a certain Atty. Pesigan, and another dated
28 October 1991 through Atty. Ramon U.
Ampil
demanding
an
out-of-court
settlement
ofP1,000,000.00. Petitioner
United Airlines did not accede to his
demands.
Consequently, on 9 June 1992 respondent
filed a complaint for damages against
United Airlines alleging that he was a
person of good station, sitting in the

board of directors of several top 500

corporations and holding senior executive
positions for such similar firms;[3] that
petitioner airline accorded him ill and
shabby
treatment
to
his
extreme
embarrassment and humiliation; and, as
such he should be paid moral damages of
at
least P1,000,000.00,
exemplary
damages of at least P500,000.00, plus
attorney's
fees
of
at
least P50,000.00. Similarly, he alleged
that the damage to his luggage and its
stolen contents amounted to around
$5,310.00, and requested reimbursement
therefor.
United Airlines moved to dismiss the
complaint
on
the
ground
that
respondents cause
of
action
had
prescribed, invoking Art. 29 of the Warsaw
Convention which provides Art. 29 (1) The right to damages shall be
extinguished if an action is not brought
within two (2) years, reckoned from the
date of arrival at the destination, or from
the date on which the aircraft ought to
have arrived, or from the date on which
the transportation stopped.
(2) The method of calculating the period
of limitation shall be determined by the
law of the court to which the case is
submitted.
Respondent countered that par. (1) of Art.
29 of the Warsaw Convention must be
reconciled with par. (2) thereof which
states that "the method of calculating the
period of limitation shall be determined
by the law of the court to which the case
is
submitted."
Interpreting
thus,
respondent noted that according to
Philippine laws the prescription of actions
is interrupted "when they are filed before
the court, when there is a written
extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and
when
there
is
any
written
acknowledgment of the debt by the
debtor."[4] Since
he
made
several
demands upon United Airlines: first,
through his personal letter dated 16
October 1989; second, through a letter
dated 4 January 1990 from Atty. Pesigan;
and, finally, through a letter dated 28
October 1991 written for him by Atty.
Ampil, the two (2)-year period of
limitation had not yet been exhausted.
On 2 August 1992 the trial court ordered
the dismissal of the action holding that

the language of Art. 29 is clear that the

action must be brought within two (2)
years from the date of arrival at the
destination. It held that although the
second paragraph of Art. 29 speaks of
deference to the law of the local court in
"calculating the period of limitation," the
same does not refer to the local forums
rules in interrupting the prescriptive
period but only to the rules of determining
the time in which the action may be
deemed commenced, and within our
jurisdiction the action shall be deemed
"brought" or commenced by the filing of a
complaint. Hence,
the
trial
court
concluded that Art. 29 excludes the
application of our interruption rules.
Respondent received a copy of the
dismissal order on 17 August 1992. On
31 August 1992, or fourteen (14) days
later, he moved for the reconsideration of
the trial courts order. The trial court
denied the motion and respondent
received copy of the denial order on 28
September 1992. Two (2) days later, on 1
October 1992 respondent filed his notice
of appeal.
United Airlines once again moved for the
dismissal of the case this time pointing
out that respondents fifteen (15)-day
period
to
appeal
had
already
elapsed. Petitioner argued that having
used
fourteen
(14)
days
of
the
reglementary
period
for
appeal,
respondent Uy had only one (1) day
remaining to perfect his appeal, and since
he filed his notice of appeal two (2) days
later, he failed to meet the deadline.
In its questioned Decision dated 29
August 1995[5] the appellate court gave
due course to the appeal holding that
respondents delay of two (2) days in
filing his notice of appeal did not hinder it
from reviewing the appealed order of
dismissal since jurisprudence dictates
that an appeal may be entertained
despite procedural lapses anchored on
equity and justice.
On the applicability of the Warsaw
Convention, the appellate court ruled that
the Warsaw Convention did not preclude
the operation of the Civil Code and other
pertinent laws. Respondents failure to
file his complaint within the two (2)-year
limitation provided in the Warsaw
Convention did not bar his action since he

could still hold petitioner liable for breach

of other provisions of the Civil Code which
prescribe a different period or procedure
for instituting an action. Further, under
Philippine laws, prescription of actions is
interrupted where, among others, there is
a written extrajudicial demand by the
creditors, and since respondent Uy sent
several demand letters to petitioner
United Airlines, the running of the two (2)year prescriptive period was in effect
suspended. Hence, the appellate court
ruled that respondents cause of action
had not yet prescribed and ordered the
records remanded to the Quezon City trial
court for further proceedings.
Petitioner
now
contends
that
the
appellate court erred in assuming
jurisdiction over respondent's appeal
since it is clear that the notice of appeal
was filed out of time. It argues that the
courts relax the stringent rule on
perfection of appeals only when there are
extraordinary circumstances, e.g., when
the Republic stands to lose hundreds of
hectares of land already titled and used
for educational purposes; when the
counsel of record was already dead; and
wherein appellant was the owner of the
trademark for more than thirty (30) years,
and the circumstances of the present case
do not compare to the above exceptional
cases.[6]
Section 1 of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that "a party may
appeal by certiorari, from a judgment of
the Court of Appeals, by filing with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari,
within fifteen (15) days from notice of
judgment or of the denial of his motion for
reconsideration filed in due time x x x x"
This Rule however should not be
interpreted as "to sacrifice the substantial
right of the appellant in the sophisticated
altar of technicalities with impairment of
the sacred principles of justice." [7] It
should be borne in mind that the real
purpose behind the limitation of the
period of appeal is to forestall or avoid an
unreasonable delay in the administration
of justice. Thus, we have ruled that delay
in the filing of a notice of appeal does not
justify the dismissal of the appeal where
the circumstances of the case show that
there is no intent to delay the
administration of justice on the part of

appellant's counsel,[8] or when there are

no substantial rights affected, [9] or when
appellant's counsel committed a mistake
in the computation of the period of
appeal, an error not attributable to
negligence or bad faith.[10]
In the instant case, respondent filed his
notice of appeal two (2) days later than
the prescribed period. Although his
counsel failed to give the reason for the
delay, we are inclined to give due course
to his appeal due to the unique and
peculiar facts of the case and the serious
question of law it poses. In the now
almost trite but still good principle,
technicality, when it deserts its proper
office as an aid to justice and becomes its
great hindrance and chief enemy,
deserves scant consideration.[11]
Petitioner likewise contends that the
appellate court erred in ruling that
respondent's cause of action has not
prescribed since delegates to the Warsaw
Convention clearly intended the two (2)year limitation incorporated in Art. 29 as
an absolute bar to suit and not to be
made subject to the various tolling
provisions
of
the
laws
of
the
forum. Petitioner
argues
that
in
construing the second paragraph of Art.
29 private respondent cannot read into it
Philippine rules on interruption of
prescriptive periods and state that his
extrajudicial demand has interrupted the
period
of
prescription.[12] American
jurisprudence has declared that "Art. 29
(2) was not intended to permit forums to
consider local limitation tolling provisions
but only to let local law determine
whether an action had been commenced
within the two-year period, since the
method of commencing a suit varies from
country to country."[13]
Within our jurisdiction we have held that
the Warsaw Convention can be applied, or
ignored, depending on the peculiar facts
presented by each case.[14] Thus, we have
ruled that the Convention's provisions do
not regulate or exclude liability for other
breaches of contract by the carrier or
misconduct of its officers and employees,
or for some particular or exceptional type
of damage.[15] Neither may the Convention
be invoked to justify the disregard of
some extraordinary sort of damage
resulting to a passenger and preclude

recovery therefor beyond the limits set by

said Convention.[16] Likewise, we have
held that the Convention does not
preclude the operation of the Civil Code
and other pertinent laws.[17] It does not
regulate, much less exempt, the carrier
from liability for damages for violating the
rights of its passengers under the
contract of carriage, especially if willful
misconduct on the part of the carrier's
employees is found or established.[18]
Respondent's complaint reveals that he is
suing on two (2) causes of action: (a) the
shabby and humiliating treatment he
received from petitioner's employees at
the San Francisco Airport which caused
him extreme embarrassment and social
humiliation; and, (b) the slashing of his
luggage and the loss of his personal
effects amounting to US $5,310.00.
While his second cause of action - an
action for damages arising from theft or
damage to property or goods - is well
within the bounds of the Warsaw
Convention, his first cause of action -an
action for damages arising from the
misconduct of the airline employees and
the violation of respondent's rights as
passenger - clearly is not.
Consequently, insofar as the first cause of
action is concerned, respondent's failure
to file his complaint within the two (2)year limitation of the Warsaw Convention
does not bar his action since petitioner
airline may still be held liable for breach
of other provisions of the Civil Code which
prescribe a different period or procedure
for instituting the action, specifically, Art.
1146 thereof which prescribes four (4)
years for filing an action based on torts.
As for respondent's second cause of
action,
indeed
the travaux
preparatories of the Warsaw Convention
reveal
that
the
delegates
thereto
intended the two (2)-year limitation
incorporated in Art. 29 as an absolute bar
to suit and not to be made subject to the
various tolling provisions of the laws of
the forum. This therefore forecloses the
application of our own rules on
interruption of prescriptive periods. Article
29, par. (2), was intended only to let local
laws determine whether an action had
been commenced within the two (2)-year
period, and within our jurisdiction an
action shall be deemed commenced upon

the filing of a complaint. Since it is

indisputable that respondent filed the
present action beyond the two (2)-year
time frame his second cause of action
must be barred. Nonetheless, it cannot
be doubted that respondent exerted
efforts to immediately convey his loss to
petitioner, even employed the services of
two (2) lawyers to follow up his claims,
and that the filing of the action itself was
delayed because of petitioner's evasion.
In this regard, Philippine Airlines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals[19] is instructive. In this
case of PAL, private respondent filed an
action for damages against petitioner
airline for the breakage of the front glass
of the microwave oven which she shipped
under PAL Air Waybill No. 0-79-10130083. Petitioner averred that, the action
having been filed seven (7) months after
her arrival at her port of destination, she
failed to comply with par. 12, subpar. (a)
(1), of the Air Waybill which expressly
provided that the person entitled to
delivery must make a complaint to the
carrier in writing in case of visible damage
to the goods, immediately after discovery
of the damage and at the latest within 14
days from receipt of the goods. Despite
non-compliance therewith the Court held
that by private respondent's immediate
submission of a formal claim to petitioner,
which however was not immediately
entertained as it was referred from one
employee to another, she was deemed to
have substantially complied with the
requirement. The Court noted that with
private respondent's own zealous efforts
in pursuing her claim it was clearly not
her fault that the letter of demand for
damages could only be filed, after months
of exasperating follow-up of the claim, on
13 August 1990, and that if there was any
failure at all to file the formal claim within
the prescriptive period contemplated in
the Air Waybill, this was largely because

of
the
carrier's
own
doing,
the
consequences of which could not in all
fairness
be
attributed
to
private
respondent.
In the same vein must we rule upon the
circumstances brought before us. Verily,
respondent filed his complaint more than
two (2) years later, beyond the period of
limitation prescribed by the Warsaw
Convention for filing a claim for
damages. However, it is obvious that
respondent
was
forestalled
from
immediately filing an action because
petitioner airline gave him the runaround,
answering his letters but not giving in to
his demands. True, respondent should
have already filed an action at the first
instance when his claims were denied by
petitioner but the same could only be due
to his desire to make an out-of-court
settlement for which he cannot be
faulted. Hence, despite the express
mandate of Art. 29 of the Warsaw
Convention that an action for damages
should be filed within two (2) years from
the arrival at the place of destination,
such rule shall not be applied in the
instant case because of the delaying
tactics employed by petitioner airline
itself. Thus, private respondent's second
cause of action cannot be considered as
time-barred under Art. 29 of the Warsaw
Convention.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals reversing and setting
aside the appealed order of the trial court
granting the motion to dismiss the
complaint, as well as its Resolution
denying
reconsideration,
is
AFFIRMED. Let the records of the case be
remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings taking its bearings from this
disquisition.
SO ORDERED.