Civil Procedure Doctrines Roco 2015

Remedial Law Review Doctrines (Civil Procedure)
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I.
Atty. Tranquil Salvador III
FILING FEES
Rule 141, Sections 1, 2 , 3, 4, 7, 8 and 19
1.
Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation V. Formaran, G.R. No. 175914, February 10,
2009
DOCTRINE:
In Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court explicitly pronounced that [t]he court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. Hence, the payment of docket fees is not only
mandatory, but also jurisdictional. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, the Court laid down guidelines for the
implementation of its previous pronouncement in Manchester under particular circumstances, to wit:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings,
which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The
court may also allow payment of szamorazamoraaid fee within a reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified
in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of
the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional
fee.
No matter how fastidiously petitioner attempts to conceal them, the allegations and reliefs it sought in its Complaint in Civil
Case No. 2006-0030 appears to be ultimately a real action, involving as they do the recovery by petitioner of its title to
and possession of the five parcels of land from respondents Tan and Obiedo.
Under these circumstances, the case before the RTC was actually a real action, affecting as it did title to or possession of
real property. Consequently, the basis for determining the correct docket fees shall be the assessed value of the
property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged in the complaint. But since Mercedes Gochan failed to allege in their
complaint the value of the real properties, the Court found that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the same for
nonpayment of the correct docket fees.
In computing the docket fees for cases involving real properties, the courts, instead of relying on the assessed or
estimated value, would now be using the fair market value of the real properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration or the
Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of the
same.
The Court finds that the true nature of the action instituted by petitioner against respondents is the recovery of title to
and possession of real property. It is a real action necessarily involving real property, the docket fees for which must be
computed in accordance with Section 7(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The Court of Appeals, therefore,
did not commit any error in affirming the RTC Orders requiring petitioner to pay additional docket fees for its Complaint in
Civil Case No. 2006-0030.
2.
Do-All Metals Industries, Inc. v. Security Bank Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 176339, January 10, 2011
DOCTRINE:
What the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees for their Supplemental Complaint. The RTC acquired jurisdiction
over plaintiffs action from the moment they filed their original complaint accompanied by the payment of the filing
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fees due on the same. The plaintiffs non-payment of the additional filing fees due on their additional claims did not
divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over the case .
Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the actual damages that the plaintiffs sought against the Bank.
Still plaintiffs paid no filing fees on the same. And, while petitioners claim that they were willing to pay the additional fees,
they gave no reason for their omission nor offered to pay the same. They merely said that they did not yet pay the fees because
the RTC had not assessed them for it. But a supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing
fees due on a complaint need to be paid upon its filing. The rules do not require the court to make special assessments in
cases of supplemental complaints.
3.
Philippine First Insurance v. First Logistics, G.R. No. 165147, July 9, 2008
DOCTRINE:
Petitioners invoke the doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals that a pleading which does
not specify in the prayer the amount sought shall not be admitted or shall otherwise be expunged, and that the court acquires
jurisdiction only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.
Pyramid, on the other hand, insists on the application of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion and subsequent
rulings relaxing the Manchester ruling by allowing payment of the docket fee within a reasonable time, in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of
the prescribed docket fee.
In Tacay v. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte , the Court clarified the effect of the Sun Insurance ruling on
the Manchester ruling as follows:
As will be noted, the requirement in Circular No. 7 [of this Court which was issued based on the Manchester
ruling] that complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, has not been
altered. What has been revised is the rule that subsequent amendment of the complaint or similar pleading
will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount
sought in the amended pleading, the trial court now being authorized to allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive period or reglementary period. Moreover, a new rule has been added,
governing the awards of claims not specified in the pleading i.e., damages arising after the filing
of the complaint or similar pleading as to which the additional filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien on the
judgment.
Now, under the Rules of Court, docket or filing fees are assessed on the basis of the sum claimed, on the
one hand, or the value of the property in litigation or the value of the estate, on the other.
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of
the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs. In this case, the complaint or similar
pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of this Court, specify the amount of damages being prayed for
not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of filing fees in any case.
Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely for
money and damages and there is no statement of the amounts being claimed. In this event the rule is
that the pleading will not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the
record. In other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or the claims as to which amounts are
unspecified may be expunged, although as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit amendment of
the complaint and payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the meantime become timebarred.

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The other is where the pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the fees paid are
insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for the payment
of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such payment, the defect is cured and the court
may properly take cognizance of the action, unless in the meantime prescription has set in and
consequently barred the right of action.
Indeed, Pyramid captioned its complaint as one for specific performance and damages even if it was, as the allegations in its
body showed, seeking in the main the collection of its claims-sums of money representing losses the amount of which it, by its
own admission, knew. And, indeed, it failed to specify in its prayer in the complaint the amount of its
claims/damages.
As the salient allegations of Pyramids complaint show and as priorly stated, they constitute, in the main, an action for
collection of its claims it admittedly knew. Assuming arguendo that Pyramid has other claims the amounts of which are
yet to be determined by the trial court, the rule established in Manchester which was embodied in this Courts Circular No.
7-88 issued on March 24, 1988, as modified by the Sun Insurance ruling, still applies.
While it is true that the determination of certain damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the
parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper
determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims
not specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages that may
arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor
speculate as to the amount thereof.
4.
Benjamin Bautista v. Shirley Unangst, G.R. No. 173002, July 4, 2008
DOCTRINE:
Their failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees was due to a justifiable reason.
The right to appeal is a purely statutory right. Not being a natural right or a part of due process, the right to appeal may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the rules provided therefor. For this reason, payment of the full
amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period is mandatory and
jurisdictional.
Nevertheless, as this Court ruled in Aranas v. Endona, the strict application of the jurisdictional nature of the above rule
on payment of appellate docket fees may be mitigated under exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest
of justice. It is always within the power of this Court to suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case from their
operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it.
As early as 1946, in Segovia v. Barrios, the Court ruled that where an appellant in good faith paid less than the correct
amount for the docket fee because that was the amount he was required to pay by the clerk of court , and he
promptly paid the balance, it is error to dismiss his appeal because (e)very citizen has the right to assume and trust that a
public officer charged by law with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law. To penalize such
citizen for relying upon said officer in all good faith is repugnant to justice.
5.
Chua v. Executive Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, 706 SCRA 698 (2013)
DOCTRINE:
In proposing to pay filing fees on a per case basis, petitioner was not trying to evade or deny his obligation to pay for
the filing fees for all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 filed before the MeTC. He, in fact, acknowledges such
obligation. He, in fact, admits that he is incapable of fulfilling such obligation in its entirety. Rather, what petitioner is
asking is that he at least be allowed to pursue some of the cases, the filing fees of which he is capable of financing.
Petitioner manifests that, given his current financial status, he simply cannot afford the filing fees for all the forty (40) BP Blg.
22 cases. We see nothing wrong or illegal in granting petitioner request.

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The Executive Judge erred when she treated the entire P540,668.00 as one indivisible obligation, when that figure was
nothing but the sum of individual filing fees due for each count of violation of BP Blg. 22 filed before the MeTC.
Granting petitioners request would not constitute a deferment in the payment of filing fees, for the latter clearly intends to pay
in full the filing fees of some, albeit not all, of the cases filed.
Filing fees, when required, are assessed and become due for each initiatory pleading filed. In criminal actions, these
pleadings refer to the information filed in court.
In the instant case, there are a total of forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 that was filed before the MeTC. And each
of the forty (40) was, in fact, assessed its filing fees, individually, based on the amount of check one covers. Under the rules of
criminal procedure, the filing of the forty (40) counts is equivalent to the filing of forty (40) different informations, as
each count represents an independent violation of BP Blg. 22 .
That all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 all emanated from a single complaint filed in the OCP is
irrelevant. The fact remains that there are still forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 that were filed before the MeTC
and, as a consequence, forty (40) individual filing fees to be paid.
Neither would the consolidation of all forty (40) counts make any difference. Consolidation unifies criminal cases
involving related offenses only for purposes of trial. Consolidation does not transform the filing fees due for each case
consolidated into one indivisible fee.
6.
IN RE: EXEMPTION OF THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION FROM PAYMENT OF

FILING/ DOCKET FEES, [ A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, March 10, 2010 ]
DOCTRINE:
The subject letter of NPC for clarification as to its exemption from the payment of filing fees and court fees. Section 22 of
Rule 141 reads:
Sec. 22. Government exempt. The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt
from paying the legal fees provided in this rule. Local government units and government-owned or
controlled corporations with or without independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees.
Section 70 of Republic Act No. 9136 (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001), on privatization of NPC assets,
expressly states that the NPC shall remain as a national government-owned and -controlled corporation.
Thus, NPC is not exempt from payment of filing fees.
The non-exemption of NPC is further fortified by the promulgation on February 11, 2010 of A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, In re:
Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees. In said case, the
Court, citing Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, stressed that the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal,
alter or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure; and that the power to promulgate these rules
is no longer shared by the Court with Congress and the Executive .
With the foregoing categorical pronouncement of the Court, it is clear that NPC can no longer invoke Republic Act No.
6395 (NPC Charter), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 938, as its basis for exemption from the payment of
legal fees.
7.
Unicapital v. Consing, 705 SCRA 511 (2013)
DOCTRINE:
Neither should Consing, Jr.s failure to pay the required docket fees lead to the dismissal of his complaint. It has long been
settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees,
its non-payment at the time of the filing of the complaint does not automatically cause the dismissal of the complaint
provided that the fees are paid within a reasonable period. Consequently, Unicapital, et al.s insistence that the stringent
rule on non-payment of docket fees enunciated in the case of Manchester Development Corporation v. CA should be
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applied in this case cannot be sustained in the absence of proof that Consing, Jr. intended to defraud the government
by his failure to pay the correct amount of filing fees.
As pronounced in the case of Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Melicor:
Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at
the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case , as long as the fee is paid within the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved demonstrates a
willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were
initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule
does not apply.
8.
Proton Pilipinas v. Banque Nacional de Paris, G.R. No. 151242, June 15, 2005
DOCTRINE:
FILING FEES ARE INCLUSIVE OF INTEREST, DAMAGES, ATTORNEYS FEES, LITIGATION EXPENSES, AND COSTS
The clerk of court should thus have assessed the filing fee by taking into consideration the total sum claimed,
inclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs, or the stated value of
the property in litigation.
APPLICATION OF EXCHANGE RATE
Respecting the Court of Appeals conclusion that the clerk of court did not err when he applied the exchange rate of US $1 =
P43.00 [i]n the absence of any office guide of the rate of exchange which said court functionary was duty bound to
follow,[hence,] the rate he applied is presumptively correct, the same does not lie.
The presumption of regularity of the clerk of courts application of the exchange rate is not conclusive. It is
disputable. As such, the presumption may be overturned by the requisite rebutting evidence. In the case at bar,
petitioners have adequately proven with documentary evidence that the exchange rate when the complaint was filed on
September 7, 1998 was US $1 = P43.21. In fine, the docket fees paid by respondent were insufficient.
MERELY RELIED ON ASSESSMENT MADE BY CLERK OF COURT
The ruling in Manchester was clarified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion when this Court held that in the former
there was clearly an effort to defraud the government in avoiding to pay the correct docket fees, whereas in the latter
the plaintiff demonstrated his willingness to abide by paying the additional fees as required.
In the case at bar, respondent merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk of court which turned out to be
incorrect. Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has the responsibility of reassessing what respondent must pay
within the prescriptive period, failing which the complaint merits dismissal.
INTEREST ACCRUING UNTIL FILING OF COMPLAINT
Parenthetically, in the complaint, respondent prayed for accrued interest subsequent to August 15, 1998 until fully paid.
The complaint having been filed on September 7, 1998, respondents claim includes the interest from August 16, 1998
until such date of filing.
Respondent did not, however, pay the filing fee corresponding to its claim for interest from August 16, 1998 until the
filing of the complaint on September 7, 1998. As priorly discussed, this is required under Rule 141, as amended by
Administrative Circular No. 11-94, which was the rule applicable at the time. Thus, as the complaint currently stands,
respondent cannot claim the interest from August 16, 1998 until September 7, 1998 , unless respondent is allowed by
motion to amend its complaint within a reasonable time and specify the precise amount of interest petitioners owe
from August 16, 1998 to September 7, 1998 and pay the corresponding docket fee therefor.
INTEREST ACCRUING AFTER FILING THE COMPLAINT
With respect to the interest accruing after the filing of the complaint, the same can only be determined after a final
judgment has been handed down. Respondent cannot thus be made to pay the corresponding docket fee therefor .
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Pursuant, however, to Section 2, Rule 141, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94, respondent should be made
to pay additional fees which shall constitute a lien in the event the trial court adjudges that it is entitled to interest
accruing after the filing of the complaint.
In Ayala Corporation v. Madayag, in interpreting the third rule laid down in Sun Insurance regarding awards of claims not specified
in the pleading, this Court held that the same refers only to damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
9.
Request of National Committee on Legal Aid to Exempt Legal Aid Clients from Paying Filing and Docket
Fees, A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC, August 28, 2009
DOCTRINE:
The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to the courts and to adequate legal assistance. The legal aid
service rendered by the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters nationwide addresses only the right to adequate
legal assistance. Recipients of the service of the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters may enjoy free access to
courts by exempting them from the payment of fees assessed in connection with the filing of a complaint or action
in court. With these twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section 11, Article III of Constitution is advanced and access to justice is
increased by bridging a significant gap and removing a major roadblock.
10.
Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi re exemption form legal and filing fees of the Good Shepherd Foundation,
Inc., A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC
DOCTRINE:
To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Courts cannot grant to foundations like the Good Shepherd Foundation,
Inc. the same exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants even if the foundations are
working for indigent and underprivileged people . The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access
clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to
any person by reason of poverty.
The clear intent and precise language of the provisions of the Rules of Court on indigent litigants indicate that only a natural
party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested
by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical person. Among others, it
has the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in
conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the
exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants. That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working
for indigent and underprivileged people is of no moment.
Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a persons poverty, a condition that only a
natural person can suffer.
Extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground that it works for indigent and underprivileged people
may be prone to abuse (even with the imposition of rigid documentation requirements), particularly by corporations and
entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the fees. Also, the scrutiny of compliance with the documentation
requirements may prove too time-consuming and wasteful for the courts.
II.
JURISDICTION
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129

Republic Act 7691
1991 Rules on Summary Procedure as amended
Rules on Small Claims
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1.
Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, August 16, 2004
DOCTRINE:
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to
issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
We disagree with the CAs reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitioner
without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors
they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in
their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the
case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been
the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997.
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not
divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the
custody of minors.
In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word exclusive will result in grave injustice and negate the policy to
protect the rights and promote the welfare of children under the Constitution and the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the
provisions of RA 8369.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody
of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.
2.
Bernabe L. Navida, et al. v. Hon. Teodoro A. Dizon et al., G.R. No. 125078, May 30, 2011
DOCTRINE:
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT-MATTER
The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled
to all or some of the claims asserted therein. Once vested by law, on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the enactment of a
law.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: xxxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees,
litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned
items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
Corollary thereto, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 0994, states: 2. The exclusion of the term damages of
whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended
by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action.
However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such
claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
It is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action and that the total amount sought in the complaints is
approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants . The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases
filed in General Santos City and Davao City, as both claims by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., fall within the purview of
the definition of the jurisdiction of the RTC under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
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Moreover, the allegations in both Amended Joint-Complaints narrate that the defendants were at fault or were
negligent in that they manufactured, produced, sold, and/or used DBCP and/or otherwise, put the same into the stream
of commerce, without informing the users of its hazardous effects on health and/or health and/or without
instructions on its proper use and application.
As specifically enumerated in the amended complaints, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., point to the acts and/or
omissions of the defendant companies in manufacturing, producing, selling, using, and/or otherwise putting into the stream of
commerce, nematocides which contain DBCP, without informing the users of its hazardous effects on health and/or without
instructions on its proper use and application. Thus, these allegations in the complaints constitute the cause of action of
plaintiff claimants a quasi-delict, which under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code is defined as an act, or omission which causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence.
JURISDICTION DETERMINED BY ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The
jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to
dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendants. What
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint.
The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict which is the
basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with individual claims of approximately P2.7
million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously falls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the
RTCs.
Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., allegedly suffered resulted from their
exposure to DBCP while they were employed in the banana plantations located in the Philippines or while they were residing
within the agricultural areas also located in the Philippines. The factual allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints all
point to their cause of action, which undeniably occurred in the Philippines.
It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., took
place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., the manufacture
of the pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming
part of the stream of commerce, and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs. The cases are not criminal cases where
territoriality, or the situs of the act complained of, would be determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases.
In personal civil actions, such as claims for payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to be commenced and
tried in the appropriate court, where any of the plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant,
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
CONVENIENT FORUM
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are
available only in the Philippines:
1. Plaintiff claimants are all residents of the Philippines, either in General Santos City or in Davao City
2. The specific areas where they were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within the territorial
jurisdiction of the courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., initially filed their claims for damages
3. The testimonial and documentary evidence from important witnesses, such as doctors, co-workers, family
members and other members of the community, would be easier to gather in the Philippines

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Thus, these additional factors, coupled with the fact that the alleged cause of action of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
against the defendant companies for damages occurred in the Philippines, demonstrate that, apart from the RTC of General
Santos City and the RTC of Davao City having jurisdiction over the subject matter in the instant civil cases, they are, indeed,
the convenient fora for trying these cases.
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the
defendant companies. All parties voluntarily, unconditionally and knowingly appeared and submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of the courts a quo. All the defendant companies designated and authorized representatives to receive
summons and to represent them in the proceedings before the courts a quo. All the defendant companies submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo by making several voluntary appearances, by praying for various affirmative
reliefs, and by actively participating during the course of the proceedings below.
Rule 14, Section 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that [t]he defendants voluntary appearance in the action
shall be equivalent to service of summons.
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his
submission to its authority or by service of summons.
Furthermore, the active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the courts
jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the court
or bodys jurisdiction.
JURISDICTION V. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is different from the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is authority to decide a case, not the orders or the
decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants and the
subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the decision on all questions arising therefrom is but an exercise of
such jurisdiction.
Any error that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does not
affect its authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.
Anent the insinuation by DOLE that the plaintiff claimants filed their cases in bad faith merely to procure a dismissal of the
same and to allow them to return to the forum of their choice, this Court finds such argument much too speculative to
deserve any merit.
3.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Corazon M. Villegas, G.R. No. 180384, March 26, 2010
DOCTRINE:
The law is clear. A branch of an RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court for a province has the original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation in that province.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 758 (1996) the Supreme Court ruled that Special Agrarian Courts have original
and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases:
(1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners; and
(2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under R.A. 6657.
By special jurisdiction, Special Agrarian Courts exercise power in addition to or over and above the ordinary
jurisdiction of the RTC, such as taking cognizance of suits involving agricultural lands located outside their regular
territorial jurisdiction, so long as they are within the province where they sit as Special Agrarian Courts.
R.A. 6657 requires the designation by the Supreme Court before an RTC Branch can function as a Special Agrarian
Court. The Supreme Court has not designated the single sala courts of RTC, Branch 64 of Guihulngan City and RTC, Branch
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63 of Bayawan City as Special Agrarian Courts. Consequently, they cannot hear just compensation cases just because the
lands subject of such cases happen to be within their territorial jurisdiction.
Since RTC, Branch 32 of Dumaguete City is the designated Special Agrarian Court for the province of Negros Oriental, it has
jurisdiction over all cases for determination of just compensation involving agricultural lands within that province, regardless
of whether or not those properties are outside its regular territorial jurisdiction.
4.
Celia S. Vda. De Herrera v. Emelita Bernardo, et al., G.R. No. 170251, June 01, 2011.
DOCTRINE:
The Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) was created by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 561,
issued on September 21, 1979 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. It is an administrative body established as a means of
providing a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems among small settlers, landowners and members of the
cultural minorities to avoid social unrest.
Section 3 of E.O. No. 561 specifically enumerates the instances when the COSLAP can exercise its adjudicatory functions:
Section 3. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
2. Refer and follow up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land
problem or dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following cases,
assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature
considering, for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social
tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires;

Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;
Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;
Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain; and
Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude
Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers which are
specifically granted to it by its enabling statute. Under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options in
acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, to wit:
(a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or
(b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law, if such
case is critical and explosive in nature, taking into account the large number of parties involved, the
presence or emergence of social unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action.
In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP
has to consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and
the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to property. The
law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem.
In the instant case, the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondents complaint. The present case
does not fall under any of the cases enumerated under Section 3, paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561. The dispute between
the parties is not critical and explosive in nature, nor does it involve a large number of parties, nor is there a presence or
emergence of social tension or unrest. It can also hardly be characterized as involving a critical situation that requires
immediate action.
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the
nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the
character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs.
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Respondents cause of action before the COSLAP pertains to their claim of ownership over the subject property ,
which is an action involving title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein, the jurisdiction of which is vested
with the Regional Trial Courts or the Municipal Trial Courts depending on the assessed value of the subject property.
Since the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including the decision rendered, are
null and void. A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void. It cannot be the source of any
right or create any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Having
no legal effect, the situation is the same as it would be as if there was no judgment at all. It leaves the parties in the position
they were before the
proceedings.
QUESTION OF JURISDICTION MAY BE RAISED AT ANY TIME
Respondents allegation that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP by reason of
laches does not hold water. Petitioner is not estopped from raising the jurisdictional issue, because it may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
The fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter
challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of
the parties.
In Regalado v. Go, the Court held that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to apply, thus:
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed
by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several stages of the
proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the
said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only
when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question
of jurisdiction.
The factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar that would justify the application of
estoppel by laches against the petitioner. Here, petitioner assailed the jurisdiction of the COSLAP when she appealed the case
to the CA and at that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. Therefore, petitioner is not estopped
from assailing the jurisdiction of the COSLAP. Additionally, no laches will even attach because the judgment is null and
void for want of jurisdiction.
5.
Herald Black Dacasin v. Sharon del Mundo Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 05, 2010
DOCTRINE:
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time Herald filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on
Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.
An action for specific performance, such as petitioners suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to
this species of actions. Thus, jurisdiction-wise, Herald went to the right court.
What the Illinois court retained was jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of its
Judgment for Dissolution. Heralds suit seeks the enforcement not of the various provisions of the divorce decree but
of the post-divorce agreement on child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois courts retained
jurisdiction.
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While the trial court had jurisdiction, the agreement cannot be enforced because it is void for being contrary to law (daughter
was below 7 years old and, by law, she must stay with the mother). Also, the agreement was repudiated by the mother when
she refused to allow joint custody.
6.
Far East Bank v. Shemberg, G.R. No.163878, December 12, 2006
DOCTRINE:
A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed fees. The importance of filing fees cannot
be gainsaid for these are intended to take care of court expenses in the handling of cases in terms of costs of
supplies, use of equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, and others, computed as to man-hours used in the
handling of each case. Hence, the non-payment or insufficient payment of docket fees can entail tremendous losses to the
government in general and to the judiciary in particular.
Is an action for cancellation of mortgage incapable of pecuniary estimation?
Under Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 180, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, Regional Trial Courts have sole,
exclusive, and original jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
In Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill, this Court laid the test for determining whether the subject matter of an action is incapable
of pecuniary estimation, thus:
(a) Ascertain the nature of the principal action or remedy sought.
(b) If the action is primarily for recovery of a sum of money , the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction would depend upon the amount of the claim.
(c) However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where
the money claim is only incidental or a consequence of the principal relief sought, the action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Here, the primary reliefs prayed for by respondents in Civil Case No. MAN-4045 is the cancellation of the real estate
and chattel mortgages for want of consideration. In Bumayog v. Tumas, this Court ruled that where the issue involves the
validity of a mortgage, the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation. In the more recent case of Russell v. Vestil,
this Court, citing Bumayog, held that an action questioning the validity of a mortgage is one incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Petitioner has not shown adequate reasons for this Court to revisit Bumayog and Russell. Hence, petitioners
contention cannot be sustained. Since respondents paid the docket fees, as computed by the clerk of court, consequently, the
trial court acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case No. MAN4045.
7.
Arriola v. Nabor Arriola, G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008
DOCTRINE:
The contempt proceeding initiated by respondent was one for indirect contempt. Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
prescribes the procedure for the institution of proceedings for indirect contempt, viz.:
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the
court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the
respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars
and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for
filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of
or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but
said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the
consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
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Under the aforecited second paragraph of the Rules, the mandatory requirements for initiating an indirect contempt
proceeding are:
(a) that it be initiated by way of a verified petition; and
(b) that it should fully comply with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions.
The RTC erred in taking jurisdiction over the indirect contempt proceeding initiated by respondent. The latter did
not comply with any of the mandatory requirements of Section 4, Rule 71.
He filed a mere Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court, and not a verified petition. He likewise did
not conform with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleadings such as the submission of a certification
against forum shopping and the payment of docket fees. Thus, his unverified motion should have been dismissed
outright by the RTC.
8.
Spouses Manila v. Spouses Manza, G.R. No. 163602, September 07, 2011
DOCTRINE:
A petition for annulment of judgments or final orders of a Regional Trial Court in civil actions can only be availed of
where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner. It is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances and such action is never
resorted to as a substitute for a partys own neglect in not promptly availing of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies.
The only grounds provided in Sec. 2, Rule 47 are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
The petition for annulment was based not on fraudulent assurances or negligent acts of their counsel , but on lack of
jurisdiction.
Petitioners assail the CA in holding that the RTC decision is void because it granted a relief inconsistent with the nature of
an ejectment suit and not even prayed for by the respondents in their answer. They contend that whatever maybe
questionable in the decision is a ground for assignment of errors on appeal or in certain cases, as ground for a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 and not as ground for its annulment.
Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of
jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction.
Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the
petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the
action or subject matter is conferred by law.
A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and establishes only who has
the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of
ownership. We have held that although it was proper for the RTC, on appeal in the ejectment suit, to delve on the issue of
ownership and receive evidence on possession de jure, it cannot adjudicate with semblance of finality the ownership of
the property to either party by ordering the cancellation of the TCT.
In this case, the RTC acted in excess of its jurisdiction in deciding the appeal of respondents when, instead of simply
dismissing the complaint and awarding any counterclaim for costs due to the defendants (petitioners), it ordered the
respondents-lessors to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioners-lessees, on the basis of its own
interpretation of the Contract of Lease which granted petitioners the option to buy the leased premises within a certain period
(two years from date of execution) and for a fixed price (P150,000.00). This cannot be done in an ejectment case where the
only issue for resolution is who between the parties is entitled to the physical possession of the property .
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JURISDICTION V. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION

Such erroneous grant of relief to the defendants on appeal, however, is but an exercise of jurisdiction by the RTC.
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction.
As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision
rendered therein. The ground for annulment of the decision is absence of, or no jurisdiction; that is, the court should
not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter .
Thus, while respondents assailed the content of the RTC decision, they failed to show that the RTC did not have the
authority to decide the case on appeal. As we held in Ybaez v. Court of Appeals:
Clearly then, when the RTC took cognizance of petitioners appeal from the adverse decision of the
MTC in the ejectment suit, it (RTC) was unquestionably exercising its appellate jurisdiction as mandated
by law. Perforce, its decision may not be annulled on the basis of lack of jurisdiction as it has, beyond
cavil, jurisdiction to decide the appeal.
The CA therefore erred in annulling the November 18, 1994 RTC decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as said
court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners appeal.
9.
EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER, PETITIONER, VS. BRITISH AIRWAYS, G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010
DOCTRINE:
It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country. When the place of departure and the
place of destination in a contract of carriage are situated within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, said
carriage is deemed an international carriage. The High Contracting Parties referred to herein were the signatories to the
Warsaw Convention and those which subsequently adhered to it.
In the case at bench, petitioners place of departure was London, United Kingdom while her place of destination was
Rome, Italy. Both the United Kingdom and Italy signed and ratified the Warsaw Convention. As such, the transport of the
petitioner is deemed to be an international carriage within the contemplation of the Warsaw Convention.
JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER GOVERNED MY WARSAW CONVENTION
Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before
1.
2.
3.
4.
the court where the carrier is domiciled;

the court where the carrier has its principal place of business;
the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or
the court of the place of destination.
In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British corporation domiciled in London, United Kingdom with
London as its principal place of business. Hence, under the first and second jurisdictional rules, the petitioner may bring
her case before the courts of London in the United Kingdom. In the passenger ticket and baggage check presented by both
the petitioner and respondent, it appears that the ticket was issued in Rome, Italy. Consequently, under the third
jurisdictional rule, the petitioner has the option to bring her case before the courts of Rome in Italy. Finally, both the
petitioner and respondent aver that the place of destination is Rome, Italy, which is properly designated given the routing
presented in the said passenger ticket and baggage check. Accordingly, petitioner may bring her action before the courts of
Rome, Italy.
We thus find that the RTC of Makati correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over the case filed by the
petitioner.
TORTIOUS CONDUCT WITHIN PURVIEW OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
Allegations of tortious conduct committed against an airline passenger during the course of the international
carriage do not bring the case outside the ambit of the Warsaw Convention.
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NO VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION TO JURISDICTION

The special appearance of the counsel of respondent in filing the Motion to Dismiss and other pleadings before the
trial court cannot be deemed to be voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the said trial court. We hence disagree
with the contention of the petitioner and rule that there was no voluntary appearance before the trial court that could
constitute estoppel or a waiver of respondents objection to jurisdiction over its person.
10.
Heirs of Santiago Nisperos v. Nisperos-Ducusin, 702 SCRA 721 (2013)
DOCTRINE:
The complaint should have been lodged with the Office of the DAR Secretary and not with the DARAB. It is not
enough that the controversy involves the cancellation of a CLOA registered with the Land Registration Authority for the
DARAB to have jurisdiction. What is of primordial consideration is the existence of an agrarian dispute between the
parties.
Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an AGRARIAN DISPUTE as any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements and includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands
acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants
and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
Thus, in Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, this Court held that there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties for the
DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case. It is essential to establish all of the following indispensable elements, to wit:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
that there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
In the instant case, petitioners, as supposed owners of the subject property, did not allege in their complaint that a
tenancy relationship exists between them and respondent.
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature
and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of
the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the
consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject
matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel
does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. The failure of the parties to
challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court from addressing the issue , especially where the
DARABs lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint or petition.
Considering that the allegations in the complaint negate the existence of an agrarian dispute among the parties, the DARAB is
bereft of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same as it is the DAR Secretary who has authority to resolve the dispute
raised by petitioners.
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11.
Dy v. Bibat-Palamos, 705 SCRA 613 (2013) (HIERARCHY OF COURTS)
DOCTRINE:
Under the PRINCIPLE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS, direct recourse to this Court is improper because the Supreme
Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional
functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time and attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the
overcrowding of its docket.
Nonetheless, the invocation of this Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain
instances on the ground of special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition, such as:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
when dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public policy;
when demanded by the broader interest of justice;
when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or
when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified the immediate and direct
handling of the case.
This case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Justice demands that this Court take
cognizance of this case to put an end to the controversy and resolve the matter which has been dragging on for more
than twenty (20) years. Moreover, in light of the fact that what is involved is a final judgment promulgated by this
Court, it is but proper for petitioner to call upon its original jurisdiction and seek final clarification.
III.
CAUSE OF ACTION (RULE 2)
1.
Mindanao Terminal v. Phoenix Assurance, G.R. No. 162467, May 8, 2009
DOCTRINE:
The complaint filed by Phoenix and McGee against Mindanao Terminal, from which the present case has arisen, states a
cause of action. The present action is based on quasi-delict, arising from the negligent and careless loading and
stowing of the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce.
Even assuming that both Phoenix and McGee have only been subrogated in the rights of Del Monte Produce, who is not a
party to the contract of service between Mindanao Terminal and Del Monte, still the insurance carriers may have a cause
of action in light of the Courts consistent ruling that the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort.
In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. In the
present case, Phoenix and McGee are not suing for damages for injuries arising from the breach of the contract of
service but from the alleged negligent manner by which Mindanao Terminal handled the cargoes belonging to Del
Monte Produce.
Despite the absence of contractual relationship between Del Monte Produce and Mindanao Terminal, the allegation
of negligence on the part of the defendant should be sufficient to establish a cause of action arising from quasi-delict.
2.
Dolores Macaslang v. Renato Zamora, G.R. No. 156375, May 30, 2011
DOCTRINE:
The RTC opined that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because the evidence showed that there was no
demand to vacate made upon the petitioner. The CA disagreed. We agree with the CA.
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following:
(a) Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(b) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant about the termination of
the latters right of possession;
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(c) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of its enjoyment;
and
(d) Within one year from the making of the last demand to vacate the property on the defendant, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
In resolving whether the complaint states a cause of action or not, only the facts alleged in the complaint are
considered. The test is whether the court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based on the facts alleged and
the prayer asked for. Only ultimate facts, not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts, are considered for purposes of applying
the test.
Based on its allegations, the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for unlawful detainer. Firstly, it averred that
the petitioner possessed the property by the mere tolerance of the respondents. Secondly, the respondents demanded that the
petitioner vacate the property, thereby rendering her possession illegal. Thirdly, she remained in possession of the property
despite the demand to vacate. And, fourthly, the respondents instituted the complaint on March 10, 1999, which was well within
a year after the demand to vacate was made around September of 1998 or later.
FAILURE TO STATE CAUSE OF ACTION V. LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION
Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from each other. On the one hand, failure to
state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading , and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause action refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause
of action alleged in the pleading.
Justice Regalado, a recognized commentator on remedial law, has explained the distinction:
Failure to state a cause of action is different from failure to prove a cause of action. The remedy in the
first is to move for dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is to demur to the
evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been eliminated in this section. The procedure would
consequently be to require the pleading to state a cause of action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or, at
the trial, to file a demurrer to evidence, if such motion is warranted.
A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a cause of action,
namely:
(1) The legal right of the plaintiff;
(2) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(3) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
If the allegations of the complaint do not aver the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a
motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Evidently, it is not the lack or absence of a cause
of action that is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint but the fact that the complaint states no cause of action.
Failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of an action through a motion to dismiss, but
lack of cause of action may be raised at any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of the
stipulations, admissions, or evidence presented.
3.
Philip Turner, et al. v. Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, G.R. No. 157479, November 24, 2010
DOCTRINE:
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. The essential elements of a cause
of action are:
(a) the existence of a legal right in favor of the plaintiff;
(b) a correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect such right; and
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(c) an act or omission by such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff with a resulting injury or damage
to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for the recovery of relief from the defendant.
Although the first two elements may exist, a cause of action arises only upon the occurrence of the last element, giving
the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
In order to give rise to any obligation to pay on the part of the respondent, the petitioners should first make a valid
demand that the respondent refused to pay despite having unrestricted retained earnings. Otherwise, the respondent
could not be said to be guilty of any actionable omission that could sustain their action to collect.
Neither did the subsequent existence of unrestricted retained earnings after the filing of the complaint cure the lack
of cause of action in Civil Case No. 01-086. The petitioners right of action could only spring from an existing cause of action.
Thus, a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured by an amended or supplemental
pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of the action. For, only when there
is an invasion of primary rights, not before, does the adjective or remedial law become operative. Verily, a premature
invocation of the courts intervention renders the complaint without a cause of action and dismissible on such
ground. In short, Civil Case No. 01-086, being a groundless suit, should be dismissed.
Even the fact that the respondent already had unrestricted retained earnings more than sufficient to cover the petitioners
claims on June 26, 2002 did not rectify the absence of the cause of action at the time of the commencement of Civil Case No.
01-086. The motion for partial summary judgment, being a mere application for relief other than by a pleading, was not the same as
the complaint in Civil Case No. 01-086.
4.
Chua v. Metrobank, et al., G. R. No.182311, August 19, 2009
DOCTRINE:
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways:
(1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having
been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia);
(2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been
finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and
(3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action,
where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).
In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioners failed to state in the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping, attached to
their Verified Complaint in Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 before RTC-Branch 195, the existence of Civil Case No. CV-01-0207
pending before RTC-Branch 258. Nevertheless, petitioners insist that they are not guilty of forum shopping, since the
two cases do not have the same ultimate objective
(1) Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 seeks the annulment of the 8 November 2001 public auction and certificate of sale
issued therein; while
(2) Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 prays for the award of actual and compensatory damages for respondents tortuous
act of making it appear that an auction sale actually took place on 8 November 2001.
Petitioners committed forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, although with different
prayers. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court proscribe the splitting of a single cause of action:
Section 3. A party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action.
Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same
cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the
dismissal of the others.
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Forum shopping occurs although the actions seem to be different, when it can be seen that there is a splitting of a
cause of action. A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in
violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or omission can violate various rights at the same
time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. However, where there
is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have
been violated belonging to one person.
Petitioners would like to make it appear that Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 was solely concerned with the nullification of
the auction sale and certification of sale, while Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 was a totally separate claim for damages. Yet, a
review of the records reveals that petitioners also included an explicit claim for damages in their Amended Complaint
in Civil Case No. CV-01-0207, to wit:
20-A. The abovementioned acts of [herein respondents] Metrobank and Atty. Celestra are in gross violation
of the injunction made under Article 19 of the Civil Code, thereby entitling the [herein petitioners] to recover
damages from the said [respondents] in such amount as may be awarded by the Court.
The Court observes that the damages being claimed by petitioners in their Complaint in Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 were
also occasioned by the supposedly fictitious 8 November 2001 foreclosure sale. There is no question that the claims of
petitioners for damages in Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 and Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 are premised on the same cause of
action, i.e., the purportedly wrongful conduct of respondents in connection with the foreclosure sale of the subject properties.
5.
Catalina Chu, et al. v. Spouses Fernando and Trinidad Cunanan, G.R. No. 156185, September 12, 2011
DOCTRINE:
Apparently, the petitioners were guilty of splitting their single cause of action to enforce or rescind the deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage. Splitting a single cause of action is the act of dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into
several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions upon them. A single cause of action or entire claim or demand
cannot be split up or divided in order to be made the subject of two or more different actions.
The petitioners were not at liberty to split their demand to enforce or rescind the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and to
prosecute piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief was sought under the deed of
sale with assumption of mortgage, and then to leave the rest to be presented in another suit; otherwise, there would be no end to
litigation. Their splitting violated the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective was to avoid unduly
burdening the dockets of the courts. Their contravention of the policy merited the dismissal of Civil Case No. 12251 on
the ground of bar by res judicata.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the
previous suit. The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be permitted to
litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.
Yet, in order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
the former judgment must be final;

it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties;
it must be a judgment on the merits; and
there must be between the first and second actions
a. identity of parties,
b. identity of the subject matter, and
c. identity of cause of action.
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There is identity of parties when the parties in both actions are the same , or there is privity between them, or they are
successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action litigating for the same thing and under
the same title and in the same capacity.
As to identity of the subject matter, both actions dealt with the properties involved in the deed of sale with assumption
of mortgage.
Identity of the causes of action was also met, because Case No. G-1936 and Civil Case No. 12251 were rooted in one and
the same cause of action the failure of Cunanan to pay in full the purchase price of the five lots subject of the deed
of sale with assumption of mortgage. In other words, Civil Case No. 12251 reprised Civil Case No. G-1936, the only difference
between them being that the petitioners alleged in the former that Benelda Estate was not also a purchaser for value and in
good faith.
In fine, the rights and obligations of the parties vis--vis the five lots were all defined and governed by the deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage, the only contract between them. That contract was single and indivisible, as far as they were
concerned. Consequently, the Chus could not properly proceed against the respondents in Civil Case No. 12251, despite the
silence of the compromise agreement as to the Carloses and Benelda Estate, because there can only be one action where the
contract is entire, and the breach total, and the petitioners must therein recover all their claims and damages. The
Chus could not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make that single cause of action the basis of several suits.
6.
NM Rothschild & Sons (AUSTRALIA) Limited, v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, G.R. No.
175799, November 28, 2011
DOCTRINE:
As previously stated, petitioner seeks the dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-782 on the following grounds: (a) lack of jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner due to the defective and improper service of summons; (b) failure of the Complaint to state a
cause of action and absence of a cause of action; (c) the action is barred by estoppel; and (d) respondent did not come to
court with clean hands.
ABSENCE OF CAUSE OF ACTION V. FAILURE TO STATE CAUSE OF ACTION
As correctly ruled by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the alleged ABSENCE OF A CAUSE OF ACTION (as
opposed to the failure to state a cause of action), the alleged estoppel on the part of petitioner, and the argument that
respondent is in pari delicto in the execution of the challenged contracts, are not grounds in a Motion to Dismiss as
enumerated in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. Rather, such defenses raise evidentiary issues closely related to
the validity and/or existence of respondents alleged cause of action and should therefore be threshed out during the
trial.
As regards the allegation of FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION, while the same is usually available as a ground in a
Motion to Dismiss, said ground cannot be ruled upon in the present Petition without going into the very merits of the
main case.
It is basic that [a] cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. Its elements are the
following: (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff, (2) a duty on the part of the defendant to respect the plaintiff's right, and
(3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of such right.
We have held that to sustain a Motion to Dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim
for relief does not exist and not only that the claim was defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain .
The trial court held that the Complaint in the case at bar contains all the three elements of a cause of action, i.e., it alleges
that:
(1) plaintiff has the right to ask for the declaration of nullity of the Hedging Contracts for being null and void and
contrary to Article 2018 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
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(2) defendant has the corresponding obligation not to enforce the Hedging Contracts because they are in the nature
of wagering or gambling agreements and therefore the transactions implementing those contracts are null and void
under Philippine laws; and
(3) defendant ignored the advice and intends to enforce the Hedging Contracts by demanding financial payments
due therefrom.
The rule is that in a Motion to Dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material allegations of the
ultimate facts contained in the plaintiff's complaint. However, this principle of hypothetical admission admits of exceptions.
Thus, in Tan v. Court of Appeals, we held:
The flaw in this conclusion is that, while conveniently echoing the general rule that averments in the
complaint are deemed hypothetically admitted upon the filing of a motion to dismiss grounded on the
failure to state a cause of action, it did not take into account the equally established limitations to such
rule, i.e., that a motion to dismiss does not admit the truth of mere epithets of fraud; nor allegations of
legal conclusions; nor an erroneous statement of law; nor mere inferences or conclusions from facts
not stated; nor mere conclusions of law; nor allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to
judicial notice; nor matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant matter; nor scandalous matter
inserted merely to insult the opposing party; nor to legally impossible facts; nor to facts which appear
unfounded by a record incorporated in the pleading , or by a document referred to; and, nor to general
averments contradicted by more specific averments.
A more judicious resolution of a motion to dismiss, therefore, necessitates that the court be not restricted to
the consideration of the facts alleged in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Courts may
consider other facts within the range of judicial notice as well as relevant laws and jurisprudence
which the courts are bound to take into account, and they are also fairly entitled to examine
records/documents duly incorporated into the complaint by the pleader himself in ruling on the demurrer to
the complaint.
In the case at bar, respondent asserts in the Complaint that the Hedging Contracts are void for being contrary to Article
2018 of the Civil Code. Respondent claims that under the Hedging Contracts, despite the express stipulation for deliveries of
gold, the intention of the parties was allegedly merely to compel each other to pay the difference between the value of the gold
at the forward price stated in the contract and its market price at the supposed time of delivery.
Whether such an agreement is void is a mere allegation of a conclusion of law, which therefore cannot be hypothetically
admitted. Quite properly, the relevant portions of the contracts sought to be nullified, as well as a copy of the contract itself,
are incorporated in the Complaint. The determination of whether or not the Complaint stated a cause of action would
therefore involve an inquiry into whether or not the assailed contracts are void under Philippine laws. This is,
precisely, the very issue to be determined in Civil Case No. 05-782. Indeed, petitioners defense against the charge of
nullity of the Hedging Contracts is the purported intent of the parties that actual deliveries of gold be made pursuant thereto.
Such a defense requires the presentation of evidence on the merits of the case. An issue that requires the contravention
of the allegations of the complaint, as well as the full ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of the case, should not be within
the province of a mere Motion to Dismiss. The trial court, therefore, correctly denied the Motion to Dismiss on this
ground.
7.
Pua v. Citibank, N.A., G.R. No. 180064, Sep. 16 2013 (SEC JURISDICTION)
DOCTRINE:
Records show that Puas complaint constitutes a civil suit for declaration of nullity of contract and sums of money with
damages, which stemmed from Citibanks alleged sale of unregistered securities, in violation of the various provisions of the
SRC.
Sections 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, and 63 of the SRC pertain to civil suits involving violations of the same law. Among these,
the applicable provisions to this case are Sections 57.1 and 63.1 of the SRC which provide:
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SEC. 57. Civil Liabilities Arising in Connection With Prospectus, Communications and Reports. 57.1. Any person
who: (a) Offers to sell or sells a security in violation of Chapter III;
Or
(b) Offers to sell or sells a security, whether or not exempted by the provisions of this Code, by the use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication, by means of a prospectus or other written or
oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall fail in the burden of
proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or
omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue to recover the
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
SEC. 63. Amount of Damages to be Awarded. 63.1. All suits to recover damages pursuant to Sections 56, 57,
58, 59, 60 and 61 shall be brought before the Regional Trial Court which shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide such suits. The Court is hereby authorized to award damages in an amount
not exceeding triple the amount of the transaction plus actual damages.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that cases falling under Section 57 of the SRC, which pertain to civil liabilities arising from
violations of the requirements for offers to sell or the sale of securities, as well as other civil suits under Sections 56, 58, 59, 60,
and 61 of the SRC shall be exclusively brought before the regional trial courts . It is a well-settled rule in statutory
construction that the term shall is a word of command, and one which has always or which must be given a compulsory
meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory. Likewise, it is equally revelatory that no SRC provision of similar import
is found in its sections governing criminal suits; quite the contrary, the SRC states that criminal cases arising from violations of
its provisions should be first referred to the SEC.
Therefore, based on these considerations, it stands to reason that civil suits falling under the SRC are under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the regional trial courts and hence, need not be first filed before the SEC, unlike criminal cases
wherein the latter body exercises primary jurisdiction.
IV.
PARTIES (RULE 3)
1.
Philip Go, et al. v. Distinction Properties Development, G.R. No. 194024, April 25, 2012
DOCTRINE:
As it is clear that the acts being assailed are those of PHHC, this case cannot prosper for failure to implead the proper
party, PHCC.
An INDISPENSABLE PARTY is defined as one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. In the recent case of
Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Keihin (NLMKOLALIA-KMU) v. Keihin Philippines Corporation, the Court had the occasion
to state that:
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, parties in interest without whom no final determination can
be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. If there is afailure to implead an
indispensable party, any judgment rendered would have no effectiveness. It is precisely when an
indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action should be dismissed. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to
act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present. The purpose of the rules on joinder of
indispensable parties is a complete determination of all issues not only between the parties themselves,
but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A decision valid on its face
cannot attain real finality where there is want of indispensable parties.
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Similarly, in the case of Plasabas v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that a final decree would necessarily affect the rights of
indispensable parties so that the Court could not proceed without their presence . In support thereof, the Court in
Plasabas cited the following authorities, thus:
When an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed. The burden of
procuring the presence of all indispensable parties is on the plaintiff. The evident purpose of the rule is
to prevent the multiplicity of suits by requiring the person arresting a right against the defendant to include
with him, either as co-plaintiffs or as co-defendants, all persons standing in the same position, so that the
whole matter in dispute may be determined once and for all in one litigation.
From all indications, PHCC is an indispensable party and should have been impleaded, either as a plaintiff or as a
defendant, in the complaint filed before the HLURB as it would be directly and adversely affected by any
determination therein. To belabor the point, the causes of action, or the acts complained of, were the acts of PHCC as a
corporate body. Note that in the judgment rendered by the HLURB, the dispositive portion in particular, DPDCI was ordered
(1) to pay P998,190.70, plus interests and surcharges, as condominium dues in arrears and turnover the administration office to
PHCC; and (2) to refund to PHCC P1,277,500.00, representing the cost of the deep well, with interests and surcharges. Also,
the HLURB declared as illegal the agreement regarding the conversion of the 22 storage units and Units GF4-A and BAS, to
which agreement PHCC was a party.
Evidently, the cause of action rightfully pertains to PHCC. Petitioners cannot exercise the same except through a
derivative suit. In the complaint, however, there was no allegation that the action was a derivative suit. In fact, in the petition,
petitioners claim that their complaint is not a derivative suit. In the cited case of Chua v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled:
For a derivative suit to prosper, it is required that the minority stockholder suing for and on behalf of the
corporation must allege in his complaint that he is suing on a derivative cause of action on behalf of
the corporation and all other stockholders similarly situated who may wish to join him in the suit. It is a
condition sine qua non that the corporation be impleaded as a party because not only is the corporation
an indispensable party, but it is also the present rule that it must be served with process. The judgment
must be made binding upon the corporation in order that the corporation may get the benefit of the
suit and may not bring subsequent suit against the same defendants for the same cause of action. In
other words, the corporation must be joined as party because it is its cause of action that is being
litigated and because judgment must be a res adjudicata against it.
Without PHCC as a party, there can be no final adjudication of the HLURBs judgment. The CA was, thus, correct in
ordering the dismissal of the case for failure to implead an indispensable party.
2.
Macawadib v. Philippine National Police Directorate, G.R. No. 186610, July 29, 2013
DOCTRINE:
The Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that it is the integrity and correctness of the public records in the custody of
the PNP, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and Civil Service Commission (CSC) which are involved and which
would be affected by any decision rendered in the petition for correction filed by herein petitioner .
The aforementioned government agencies are, thus, required to be made parties to the proceeding. They are
indispensable parties, without whom no final determination of the case can be had . An indispensable party is defined
as one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence,
without injuring or affecting that interest.
In the fairly recent case of Go v. Distinction Properties Development the Court had the occasion to reiterate the principle that:
It is precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action should be dismissed. The
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present. The purpose of the
rules on joinder of indispensable parties is a complete determination of all issues not only between the
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parties themselves, but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A decision
valid on its face cannot attain real finality where there is want of indispensable parties.
Citing previous authorities, the Court also held in the Go case that:
The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires the joinder of all
indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non of the
exercise of judicial power. For this reason, our Supreme Court has held that when it appears of record
that there are other persons interested in the subject matter of the litigation, who are not made
parties to the action, it is the duty of the court to suspend the trial until such parties are made either
plaintiffs or defendants. Where the petition failed to join as party defendant the person interested in
sustaining the proceeding in the court, the same should be dismissed. When an indispensable party is not
before the court, the action should be dismissed.
The burden of procuring the presence of all indispensable parties is on the plaintiff.
In the instant case, there is a necessity to implead the PNP, NAPOLCOM and CSC because they stand to be adversely
affected by petitioners petition which involves substantial and controversial alterations in petitioners service
records. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), if petitioners service is extended
by ten years, the government, through the PNP, shall be burdened by the additional salary and benefits that would
have to be given to petitioner during such extension. Thus, aside from the OSG, all other agencies which may be
affected by the change should be notified or represented as the truth is best ascertained under an adversary system
of justice.
As the above-mentioned agencies were not impleaded in this case much less given notice of the proceedings, the decision of
the trial court granting petitioners prayer for the correction of entries in his service records, is void. As mentioned
above, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to
act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
NO ESTOPPEL
On the question of whether or not respondent is estopped from assailing the decision of the RTC for failure of the OSG, as
government representative, to participate in the proceedings before the trial court or to file an opposition to petitioners
petition for correction of entries in his service records, this Court rules that such an apparent oversight has no bearing on the
validity of the appeal which the petitioner filed before the CA. Neither can the State, as represented by the government, be
considered in estoppel due to the petitioners seeming acquiescence to the judgment of the RTC when it initially
made corrections to some of petitioners records with the PNP.
This Court has reiterated time and again that the absence of opposition from government agencies is of no controlling
significance, because the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents . Nor is
the Republic barred from assailing the decision granting the petition for correction of entries if, on the basis of the law and the
evidence on record, such petition has no merit.
3.
Hacienda Luisita Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, July 05, 2011
DOCTRINE:
HLI would deny real party-in-interest status to the purported leaders of the Supervisory Group and AMBALA, i.e., Julio
Suniga, Windsor Andaya, and Rene Galang, who filed the revocatory petitions before the DAR. As HLI would have it,
Galang, the self-styled head of AMBALA, gained HLI employment in June 1990 and, thus, could not have been a party to the
SDOA executed a year earlier. As regards the Supervisory Group, HLI alleges that supervisors are not regular farmworkers,
but the company nonetheless considered them FWBs under the SDOA as a mere concession to enable them to enjoy the same
benefits given qualified regular farmworkers. However, if the SDOA would be canceled and land distribution effected, so HLI
claims, citing Fortich v. Corona, the supervisors would be excluded from receiving lands as farmworkers other than the regular
farmworkers who are merely entitled to the fruits of the land.
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The SDOA no less identifies the SDP qualified beneficiaries as the farmworkers who appear in the annual payroll ,
inclusive of the permanent and seasonal employees, who are regularly or periodically employed by [HLI]. Galang, per
HLIs own admission, is employed by HLI, and is, thus, a qualified beneficiary of the SDP; he comes within the
definition of a real party-in-interest under Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, meaning, one who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
The same holds true with respect to the Supervisory Group whose members were admittedly employed by HLI and
whose names and signatures even appeared in the annex of the SDOA . Being qualified beneficiaries of the SDP, Suniga
and the other 61 supervisors are certainly parties who would benefit or be prejudiced by the judgment recalling the
SDP or replacing it with some other modality to comply with RA 6657.
Even assuming that members of the Supervisory Group are not regular farmworkers, but are in the category of other
farmworkers mentioned in Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, thus only entitled to a share of the fruits of the land, as
indeed Fortich teaches, this does not detract from the fact that they are still identified as being among the SDP
qualified beneficiaries. As such, they are, thus, entitled to bring an action upon the SDP.
Further, under Sec. 50, paragraph 4 of RA 6657, farmer-leaders are expressly allowed to represent themselves, their
fellow farmers or their organizations in any proceedings before the DAR. Specifically:
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.
Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their fellow farmers or their
organizations in any proceedings before the DAR: Provided, however, that when there are two or more
representatives for any individual or group, the representatives should choose only one among themselves to
represent such party or group before any DAR proceedings.
Clearly, the respective leaders of the Supervisory Group and AMBALA are contextually real parties-in-interest allowed
by law to file a petition before the DAR or PARC. This is not necessarily to say, however, that Galang represents AMBALA,
for as records show and as HLI aptly noted, his petisyon filed with DAR did not carry the usual authorization of the
individuals in whose behalf it was supposed to have been instituted. To date, such authorization document, which would
logically include a list of the names of the authorizing FWBs, has yet to be submitted to be part of the records.
4.
Metrobank v. Rural Bank of Gerona, G.R. No. 159097, July 05, 2010
DOCTRINE:
A basic first step in resolving this case is to determine who the liable parties are on the IBRD loans that the Central Bank
extended. The Terms and Conditions of the IBRD 4th Rural Credit Project (Project Terms and Conditions) executed by the
Central Bank and the RBG shows that the farmers-borrowers to whom credits have been extended, are primarily liable
for the payment of the borrowed amounts. The loans were extended through the RBG which also took care of the
collection and of the remittance of the collection to the Central Bank. RBG, however, was not a mere conduit and collector.
While the farmers-borrowers were the principal debtors, RBG assumed liability under the Project Terms and
Conditions by solidarily binding itself with the principal debtors to fulfill the obligation .
Based on these arrangements, the Central Banks immediate recourse, therefore should have been against the farmersborrowers and the RBG; thus, it erred when it deducted the amounts covered by the debit advices from Metrobanks demand
deposit account. Under the Project Terms and Conditions, Metrobank had no responsibility over the proceeds of the
IBRD loans other than serving as a conduit for their transfer from the Central Bank to the RBG once credit advice
has been issued.
Thus, we agree with the CAs conclusion that the agreement governed only the parties involved the Central Bank
and the RBG. Metrobank was simply an outsider to the agreement.
Our disagreement with the CA is in its conclusion that no legal subrogation took place ; the present case, in fact,
exemplifies the circumstance contemplated under paragraph 2, of Article 1302 of the Civil Code which provides:
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Art. 1302. It is presumed that there is legal subrogation:

(1) When a creditor pays another creditor who is preferred, even without the debtors knowledge;
(2) When a third person, not interested in the obligation, pays with the express or tacit approval of
the debtor;
(3) When, even without the knowledge of the debtor, a person interested in the fulfillment of the obligation
pays, without prejudice to the effects of confusion as to the latters share.
As discussed, Metrobank was a third party to the Central Bank-RBG agreement, had no interest except as a conduit,
and was not legally answerable for the IBRD loans. Despite this, it was Metrobanks demand deposit account, instead
of RBGs, which the Central Bank proceeded against, on the assumption perhaps that this was the most convenient
means of recovering the cancelled loans. That Metrobanks payment was involuntarily made does not change the reality
that it was Metrobank which effectively answered for RBGs obligations.
Was there express or tacit approval by RBG of the payment enforced against Metrobank? After Metrobank received the
Central Banks debit advices in November 1978, it (Metrobank) accordingly debited the amounts it could from RBGs
special savings account without any objection from RBG . RBGs President and Manager, Dr. Aquiles Abellar, even wrote
Metrobank, on August 14, 1979, with proposals regarding possible means of settling the amounts debited by Central Bank
from Metrobanks demand deposit account. These instances are all indicative of RBGs approval of Metrobanks
payment of the IBRD loans. That RBGs tacit approval came after payment had been made does not completely negate the
legal subrogation that had taken place.
Article 1303 of the Civil Code states that subrogation transfers to the person subrogated the credit with all the rights
thereto appertaining, either against the debtor or against third persons. As the entity against which the collection was
enforced, Metrobank was subrogated to the rights of Central Bank and has a cause of action to recover from RBG
the amounts it paid to the Central Bank, plus 14% per annum interest.
Under this situation, impleading the Central Bank as a party is completely unnecessary. We note that the CA
erroneously believed that the Central Banks presence is necessary in order x x x to shed light on the matter of reversals made
by it concerning the loan applications of the end users and to have a complete determination or settlement of the claim. In so
far as Metrobank is concerned, however, the Central Banks presence and the reasons for its reversals of the IBRD
loans are immaterial after subrogation has taken place.
5.
Constantino v. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, 706 SCRA 580 (2013)
DOCTRINE:
We agree with the trial court that respondents are privies to Maria Laquindanum. By the term PRIVIES is meant those
between whom an action is deemed binding although they are not literally parties to the said action. This Court, in
Correa v. Pascual, had occasion to explain that privity in estate denotes the privity between assignor and assignee, donor and
donee, grantor and grantee, joint tenant for life and remainderman or reversioner and their respective assignees,
vendor by deed of warranty and a remote vendee or assignee. A privy in estate is one, it has been said, who derives his title to the
property in question by purchase; one who takes by conveyance.
In fine, respondents, as successors-in-interest, derive their right from and are in the same position as their
predecessor in whose shoes they now stand. As such successors, respondents situation is analogous to that of a
transferee pendente lite illustrated in Santiago Land Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, reiterating Fetalino v. Sanz where
this Court held:
As such, he stands exactly in the shoes of his predecessor in interest, the original defendant, and is
bound by the proceedings had in the case before the property was transferred to him . He is a proper,
but not an indispensable, party as he would, in any event, have been bound by the judgment against his
predecessor.
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Thus, any condition attached to the property or any agreement precipitating the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver which was binding upon Maria Laquindanum is applicable to respondents who merely
succeeded Maria.
6.
Cagato v. Almonte, 707 SCRA 172 (2013)
DOCTRINE:
From the arguments of Cagatao, it is clear that he is assailing the validity of the title of Carlos over the land in
question. Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529 clearly states that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law . An attack on the validity
of the title is considered to be a collateral attack when, in an action to obtain a different relief and as an incident of the
said action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the title.
Cagataos original complaint before the RTC was for the cancellation of TCT No. T-249437 in the name of the
Fernandez Siblings and the nullification of the deeds of sale between the Fernandez Siblings and Spouses
Fernandez, and the earlier one between the latter and Almonte and Aguilar. Nowhere in his complaint did Cagatao
mention that he sought to invalidate TCT No. 12159-A. It was only during the course of the proceedings, when
Spouses Fernandez disclosed that they had purchased the property from Carlos, that Cagatao thought of questioning the
validity of TCT No. 12159-A.
Although the CA correctly ruled that the transfer from Gatchalian to Manzulin was invalid, the existence of a valid Torrens
title in the name of Carlos which has remained unchallenged before the proper courts has made irrelevant the issue of
whether Gatchalian and his successors-in-interest should have retained ownership over the property. This is pursuant
to the principle that a Torrens title is irrevocable and its validity can only be challenged in a direct proceeding. Hence, a
Torrens certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world unless it is nullified by a court of
competent jurisdiction in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title .
Moreover, Carlos, as the registered owner of the lot whose title Cagatao seeks to nullify, should have been impleaded as an
INDISPENSABLE PARTY. It is clear in this case that Cagatao failed to include Carlos in his action for the annulment of
TCT No. 12159-A. Basic is the rule in procedural law that no man can be affected by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger and strangers to a case cannot be bound by a judgment rendered by the court.
It would be the height of injustice to entertain an action for the annulment of Carlos title without giving her the
opportunity to present evidence to support her claim of ownership through title . In addition, it is without question a
violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.
Thus, should Cagatao wish to question the ownership of the subject lot of Carlos and Spouses Fernandez, he should institute
a direct action before the proper courts for the cancellation or modification of the titles in the name of the latter two.
He cannot do so now because it is tantamount to a collateral attack on Carlos title , which is expressly prohibited by law
and jurisprudence.
7.
Legaspi Towers 300 v. Amelia Muer, et al., G.R. No. 170783, June 18, 2012
DOCTRINE:
The Court notes that in the Amended Complaint, PETITIONERS as plaintiffs stated that they are the incumbent
reconstituted Board of Directors of Legaspi Towers 300, Inc., and that defendants, herein RESPONDENTS, are the newlyelected members of the Board of Directors; while in the Second Amended Complaint, the PLAINTIFF is Legaspi
Towers 300, Inc., represented by petitioners as the allegedly incumbent reconstituted Board of Directors of Legaspi Towers
300, Inc.
The Second Amended Complaint states who the plaintiffs are, thus:
That the plaintiffs are: LEGASPI TOWERS 300, INC., non-stock corporation xxx duly represented by the
incumbent reconstituted Board of Directors of Legaspi Towers 300, Inc., namely: ELIADORA FE BOTE
VERA xxx, as President; BRUNO C. HAMAN xxx, as Director; LILY MARQUINEZ PALANCA xxx, as
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Secretary; ROSANNA DAVID IMAI xxx, as Treasurer; and members of the Board of Directors, namely:
ELIZABETH GUERRERO xxx, GLORIA DOMINGO xxx, and RAY VINCENT.
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the Second Amended Complaint is meant to be a derivative suit filed by
petitioners in behalf of the corporation.
INDIVIDUAL SUIT V. CLASS SUIT V. DERIVATIVE SUIT
Cua, Jr. v. Tan differentiates a derivative suit and an individual/class suit as follows:
A derivative suit must be differentiated from individual and representative or class suits, thus:
Suits by stockholders or members of a corporation based on wrongful or fraudulent acts of directors
or other persons may be classified into individual suits, class suits, and derivative suits. Where a
stockholder or member is denied the right of inspection, his suit would be individual because the wrong
is done to him personally and not to the other stockholders or the corporation. Where the wrong is done to
a group of stockholders, as where preferred stockholders rights are violated, a class or representative suit
will be proper for the protection of all stockholders belonging to the same group. But where the acts
complained of constitute a wrong to the corporation itself, the cause of action belongs to the
corporation and not to the individual stockholder or member. Although in most every case of wrong to
the corporation, each stockholder is necessarily affected because the value of his interest therein would be
impaired, this fact of itself is not sufficient to give him an individual cause of action since the corporation is a
person distinct and separate from him, and can and should itself sue the wrongdoer. Otherwise, not only
would the theory of separate entity be violated, but there would be multiplicity of suits as well as a
violation of the priority rights of creditors. Furthermore, there is the difficulty of determining the amount
of damages that should be paid to each individual stockholder.
However, in cases of mismanagement where the wrongful acts are committed by the directors or
trustees themselves, a stockholder or member may find that he has no redress because the former are
vested by law with the right to decide whether or not the corporation should sue, and they will never
be willing to sue themselves. The corporation would thus be helpless to seek remedy. Because of the
frequent occurrence of such a situation, the common law gradually recognized the right of a
stockholder to sue on behalf of a corporation in what eventually became known as a derivative
suit. It has been proven to be an effective remedy of the minority against the abuses of management. Thus,
an individual stockholder is permitted to institute a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation
wherein he holds stock in order to protect or vindicate corporate rights, whenever officials of the
corporation refuse to sue or are the ones to be sued or hold the control of the corporation. In such
actions, the suing stockholder is regarded as the nominal party, with the corporation as the party-ininterest.
RELIEFS IN A DERIVATIVE SUIT MUST PERTAIN TO THE CORPORATION
Since it is the corporation that is the real party-in-interest in a derivative suit, then the reliefs prayed for must be for the
benefit or interest of the corporation. When the reliefs prayed for do not pertain to the corporation, then it is an improper
derivative suit.
REQUISITES OF DERIVATIVE SUIT
The requisites for a derivative suit are as follows:
(1) the party bringing suit should be a shareholder as of the time of the act or transaction complained of , the
number of his shares not being material;
(2) he has tried to exhaust intra-corporate remedies, i.e., has made a demand on the board of directors for the
appropriate relief but the latter has failed or refused to heed his plea ; and
(3) the cause of action actually devolves on the corporation, the wrongdoing or harm having been, or being caused to
the corporation and not to the particular stockholder bringing the suit.
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In this case, petitioners, as members of the Board of Directors of the condominium corporation before the election in question,
filed a complaint against the newly-elected members of the Board of Directors for the years 2004-2005, questioning the
validity of the election held on April 2, 2004, as it was allegedly marred by lack of quorum, and praying for the
nullification of the said election.
As stated by the Court of Appeals, petitioners complaint seek to nullify the said election, and to protect and enforce
their individual right to vote. Petitioners seek the nullification of the election of the Board of Directors for the years 20042005, composed of herein respondents, who pushed through with the election even if petitioners had adjourned the meeting
allegedly due to lack of quorum. Petitioners are the injured party, whose rights to vote and to be voted upon were
directly affected by the election of the new set of board of directors .
The party-in-interest are the petitioners as stockholders, who wield such right to vote. The cause of action devolves on
petitioners, not the condominium corporation, which did not have the right to vote. Hence, the complaint for
nullification of the election is a DIRECT ACTION by petitioners, who were the members of the Board of Directors of the
corporation before the election, against respondents, who are the newly-elected Board of Directors. Under the circumstances,
the derivative suit filed by petitioners in behalf of the condominium corporation in the Second Amended Complaint
is improper.
The stockholders right to file a derivative suit is not based on any express provision of The Corporation Code, but is
impliedly recognized when the law makes corporate directors or officers liable for damages suffered by the
corporation and its stockholders for violation of their fiduciary duties, which is not the issue in this case.
8.
Republic of the Philippines v. Agunoy, G.R. No. 155394. February 17, 2005.
DOCTRINE:
To begin with, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner Republic is not the real party-in-interest in this case.
Basic it is in the law of procedure that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-ininterest, meaning the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit, a procedural rule reechoed in a long line of cases decided by this Court. For sure, not too long ago, in
Shipside, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, citing earlier cases, we wrote:
Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and it may not institute the instant action. Nor may it
raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in cases where the government is a party
in interest. Under Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party in interest. To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in
whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right
sought to enforced. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. And by REAL INTEREST is meant a
present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest.
The very complaint in this case, filed by petitioner Republic before the trial court unmistakably alleges that at the time Free
Patent No. 31445 and its corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-45222 were issued to Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., the
property in question was already adjudicated as private property of the heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano
Espiritu, and that at that time, the property in question was no longer a disposable public land.
With the very admissions by the petitioner itself in its basic pleading that Lots No. 1341 and 1342 are already private
properties of the heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, and are, therefore, no longer disposable public land over
which the then Bureau of Lands, now Lands Management Bureau, no longer had any jurisdiction and control, we are
simply at a loss to understand how petitioner Republic can still profess to be the real party-in-interest in this case,
and insists that the disputed properties are still part of the public domain. If ever, the real party-in-interest could be
none other than the heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, but certainly not the petitioner.
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9.
Juana Complex I Homeowners Association v. Fil-Estate Land, Inc. G.R. No. 152272, March 05, 2012
DOCTRINE:
With respect to the issue that the case was improperly instituted as a class suit, the Court finds the opposition without merit.
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:
Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to
many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court
finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue
or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual
interest.
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are:
(1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons;
(2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and
(3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect
the interests of all concerned.
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road. As succinctly stated
by the CA:
The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially
shown to be of common or general interest to many persons. The records reveal that numerous
individuals have filed manifestations with the lower court, conveying their intention to join private
respondents in the suit and claiming that they are similarly situated with private respondents for they were
also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in closing and excavating the La Paz Road. Moreover, the
individuals sought to be represented by private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is
impracticable to join them all as parties and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint.
These individuals claim to be residents of various barangays in Bian, Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro,
Laguna.
10.
Sylvia Banda v. Eduardo R. Ermita G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010
DOCTRINE:
Since petitioners instituted this case as a class suit, the Court, thus, must first determine if the petition indeed qualifies as one.
In Board of Optometry v. Colet, we held that [c]ourts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is the
exception to the requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. For while no difficulty may arise if the decision
secured is favorable to the plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision were otherwise as those who were deemed
impleaded by their self-appointed representatives would certainly claim denial of due process.
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:
Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to
many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court
finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue
or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual
interest.
From the foregoing definition, the requisites of a class suit are:
(1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons;
(2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and
(3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect
the interests of all concerned.
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In Mathay v. The Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, the Court held that:
An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings.
Whether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or other
pleading initiating the class action should allege the existence of the necessary facts, to wit, the existence
of a subject matter of common interest, and the existence of a class and the number of persons in the
alleged class, in order that the court might be enabled to determine whether the members of the
class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, to contrast the
number appearing on the record with the number in the class and to determine whether claimants on record
adequately represent the class and the subject matter of general or common interest.
Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who would be affected by the assailed Executive Order
and who were allegedly represented by petitioners. It was the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, who pointed out
that there were about 549 employees in the NPO. The 67 petitioners undeniably comprised a small fraction of the NPO
employees whom they claimed to represent. Subsequently, 32 of the original petitioners executed an Affidavit of
Desistance, while one signed a letter denying ever signing the petition, ostensibly reducing the number of petitioners to 34.
Still, even if we were to disregard the affidavit of desistance filed by some of the petitioners, it is highly doubtful that a
sufficient, representative number of NPO employees have instituted this purported class suit. A perusal of the petition
itself would show that of the 67 petitioners who signed the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, only 20
petitioners were in fact mentioned in the jurat as having duly subscribed the petition before the notary public. Inother
words, only 20 petitioners effectively instituted the present case.
ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION
Indeed, in MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc., we observed that an element of a class suit or
representative suit is the adequacy of representation. In determining the question of fair and adequate representation of
members of a class, the court must consider
(1) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class ;
(2) the proportion of those made a party, as it so bears, to the total membership of the class; and
(3) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class.
OPPOSING INTERESTS BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS AND MEMBERS OF THE CLASS
Previously, we held in Ibaes v. Roman Catholic Church that where the interests of the plaintiffs and the other members of
the class they seek to represent are diametrically opposed, the class suit will not prosper.
It is worth mentioning that a Manifestation of Desistance, to which the previously mentioned Affidavit of Desistance was
attached, was filed by the President of the National Printing Office Workers Association (NAPOWA). The said
manifestation expressed NAPOWAs opposition to the filing of the instant petition in any court. Even if we take into
account the contention of petitioners counsel that the NAPOWA President had no legal standing to file such manifestation,
the said pleading is a clear indication that there is a divergence of opinions and views among the members of the
class sought to be represented, and not all are in favor of filing the present suit. There is here an apparent conflict between
petitioners interests and those of the persons whom they claim to represent.
11.
Napere v. Barbarona, G.R. No. 160426, January 31, 2008.
DOCTRINE:
When a party to a pending case dies and the claim is not extinguished by such death, the Rules require the
substitution of the deceased party by his legal representative or heirs. In such case, counsel is obliged to inform the
court of the death of his client and give the name and address of the latters legal representative.
The complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and damages is an action that survives the death of the
defendant. Notably, the counsel of Juan Napere complied with his duty to inform the court of his clients death and the
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names and addresses of the heirs. The trial court, however, failed to order the substitution of the heirs. Nonetheless,
despite this oversight, we hold that the proceedings conducted and the judgment rendered by the trial court are valid.
The Court has repeatedly declared that failure of the counsel to comply with his duty to inform the court of the death of
his client, such that no substitution is effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment rendered thereon if
the action survives the death of such party. The trial courts jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the death of the
party.
Mere failure to substitute a deceased party is not sufficient ground to nullify a trial courts decision. The party alleging
nullity must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.
Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. The
rule on substitution was crafted to protect every partys right to due process. It was designed to ensure that the deceased
party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly appointed legal
representative of his estate.
Moreover, non-compliance with the Rules results in the denial of the right to due process for the heirs who, though
not duly notified of the proceedings, would be substantially affected by the decision rendered therein. Thus, it is only
when there is a denial of due process, as when the deceased is not represented by any legal representative or heir, that the
court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment therein.
Formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and
present evidence in defense of the deceased. In such case, there is really no violation of the right to due process. The
essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence available in support of ones
defense. When due process is not violated, as when the right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected,
noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision.
In light of these pronouncements, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court and the judgment rendered
therein because the petitioner, who was, in fact, a codefendant of the deceased, actively participated in the case. The
records show that the counsel of Juan Napere and petitioner continued to represent them even after Juans death.
Hence, through counsel, petitioner was able to adequately defend herself and the deceased in the proceedings below.
Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard and this opportunity was not denied petitioner.
12.
Sumaljap v. Spouses Literato, G.R. No. 149787, June 18, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
Josefa Maglasang filed a complaint for the Nullity of a Deed of Sale of Real Property executed between her as vendor and the
Sps. Literato as vendee in the RTC. Literato filed a Counterclaim alleging that Sumaljag occupied said land at the instance of
Maglasang without authority. However, RTC dismissed the Counterclaim. After dismissing the Counterclaim, Literato declared
a Complaint for Declaration of the Inexistence of Lease Contract, Recovery of Possession of Land and Damages against
Sumaljag and Maglasang.
Pending trial, Maglasang died. Atty. Suray, common counsel of Sumaljag and Maglasang, filed a notice of death and
substitution praying that Maglasang be substituted by Sumaljag. RTC denied the Motion for Substitution. MR denied. CA
affirmed.
DOCTRINE:
The rule on substitution in case of death of a party is governed by Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, which provides:
Section 16. Death of a party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such
death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives.
Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
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The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs[.]
The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party to the litigation who may be
affected by the intervening death. The deceased litigant is herself or himself protected as he/she continues to be properly
represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate.
DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT PENDING ACTION SURVIVES
A question preliminary to the application of the above provision is whether Civil Case Nos. B-1239 and B-1281 are actions
that survive the death of Josefa. We said in Gonzalez v. Pagcor:
The criteria for determining whether an action survives the death of a plaintiff or petitioner was elucidated
upon in Bonilla v. Barcena as follows:
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage
sued for. In the causes of action which SURVIVE, the wrong complained [of] affects PRIMARILY and
PRINCIPALLY property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in
the causes of action which DO NOT SURVIVE, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and
rights of property affected being incidental.
Since the question involved in these cases relate to property and property rights, then we are dealing with actions that
survive so that Section 16, Rule 3 must necessarily apply.
DUTY OF COUNSEL; TIMELINESS NOT AN ISSUE
The duty of counsel under the aforecited provision is to inform the court within thirty (30) days after the death of his
client of the fact of death, and to give the name and address of the deceaseds legal representative or representatives.
Incidentally, this is the only representation that counsel can undertake after the death of a client as the fact of death
terminated any further lawyer-client relationship.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the counsel for Josefa did in fact notify the lower court, although belatedly, of
the fact of her death. However, he did as well inform the lower court that
2. That before she died she executed a QUITCLAIM DEED in favor of REMISMUNDO D.
MAGLASANG over the land in question (Lot No. 1220-D of Benolho, Albuera, Leyte), evidenced by a
QUITCLAIM DEED, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex B who in turn sold it in favor of JUDGE
ANTONIO SUMALJAG, evidenced by a DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE, copy of which is hereto attached
as Annex C.
Further, counsel asked that the deceased Josefa Maglasang in her capacity as plaintiff and as Third Party Counterclaim Defendant be
substituted in the case at bar by JUDGE ANTONIO SUMALJAG whose address is 38 Osmea Street, Ormoc City pursuant
to Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
This notification, although filed late, effectively informed the lower court of the death of litigant Josefa Maglasang so
as to free her counsel of any liability for failure to make a report of death under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. In
our view, counsel satisfactorily explained to the lower court the circumstances of the late reporting, and the latter in fact
granted counsel an extended period. The timeliness of the report is therefore a non-issue.
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE IMPROPER
The legal representatives that the provision speaks of, refer to those authorized by law the administrator, executor or
guardian who, under the rule on settlement of estate of deceased persons, is constituted to take over the estate of the
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deceased. Section 16, Rule 3 likewise expressly provides that the heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator.
Significantly, the person now the present petitioner that counsel gave as substitute was not one of those
mentioned under Section 16, Rule 3. Rather, he is a COUNTERCLAIM CO-DEFENDANT of the deceased whose proferred
justification for the requested substitution is the transfer to him of the interests of the deceased in the litigation prior to her
death.Under the circumstances, both the lower court and the CA were legally correct in not giving effect to counsels
suggested substitute.
HEIRS AS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES
The CA correctly harked back to the plain terms of Section 16, Rule 3 in determining who the appropriate legal
representative/s should be in the absence of an executor or administrator. The second paragraph of the Section 16, Rule 3 of
the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, is clear the heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator. Our decisions on this matter have been clear and
unequivocal. In San Juan, Jr. v. Cruz, this Court held:
The pronouncement of this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals that priority is given to the legal
representative of the deceased (the executor or administrator) and that it is only in case of unreasonable
delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate that the court may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be
substituted for the deceased, is no longer true.
We likewise said in Gochan v. Young:
For the protection of the interests of the decedent, this Court has in previous instances recognized the heirs
as proper representatives of the decedent, even when there is already an administrator appointed by
the court. When no administrator has been appointed, as in this case, there is all the more reason to
recognize the heirs as the proper representatives of the deceased.
13.
Memoracion Cruz v. Oswaldo Z. Cruz, G.R. No. 173292, September 01, 2010
QUICKIE FACTS:
Memoracion filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance, and Damages in the RTC of Manila against her son
Oswaldo. Allegedly, the Deed of Sale was executed through fraud. After presenting evidence, Memoracion died. Her lawyer
notified the court and informed the same that her son Edgardo would substitute her. Oswaldo moved to dismiss on the
ground that the Action for Reconveyance is a personal action which does not survive the death of Memoracion. RTC
dismissed the case. CA upheld.
DOCTRINE:
PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF SALE, RECONVEYANCE AND DAMAGES SURVIVED THE DEATH OF PETITIONER
The criterion for determining whether an action survives the death of a petitioner was elucidated in Bonilla v. Barcena, to wit:
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage
sued for. In the causes of ACTION WHICH SURVIVE, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and
principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the
causes of action which DO NOT SURVIVE, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and
rights of property affected being incidental.
If the case affects primarily and principally property and property rights, then it survives the death of the plaintiff or petitioner.
In Sumaljag v. Literato, we held that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale of Real Property is one relating to
property and property rights, and therefore, survives the death of the petitioner. Accordingly, the instant case for
annulment of sale of real property merits survival despite the death of petitioner Memoracion Z. Cruz.
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DUTY OF COUNSEL IN CASE OF SURVIVAL OF PENDING CASE

If the action survives despite death of a party, it is the duty of the deceaseds counsel to inform the court of such death, and
to give the names and addresses of the deceaseds legal representatives. The deceased may be substituted by his
heirs in the pending action.
If NO LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE is named by the counsel of the deceased, or the legal representative FAILS TO APPEAR
within a specified period, it is the duty of the court where the case is pending to order the OPPOSING PARTY to procure
the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased. The reason for this rule is to protect all
concerned who may be affected by the intervening death, particularly the deceased and his estate .
IMPROPER TO DISMISS THE INSTANT CASE; IMPROPER TO SUBSTITUTE HEIR WHO IS AN ADVERSE PARTY
It was error for the RTC to dismiss the case. As mentioned earlier, the petition for annulment of deed of sale involves
property and property rights, and hence, survives the death of petitioner Memoracion. The RTC was informed, albeit
belatedly, of the death of Memoracion, and was supplied with the name and address of her legal representative,
Edgardo Cruz.
What the RTC could have done was to require Edgardo Cruz to appear in court and substitute Memoracion as party
to the pending case, pursuant to Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, and established
jurisprudence. Consistent with our ruling in Heirs of Haberer v. Court of Appeals, we consider such Manifestation, signed by
Memoracions heir, Edgardo Cruz, and retaining Atty. Neris services as counsel, a formal substitution of deceased
Memoracion by her heir, Edgardo Cruz.
It also needs mention that Oswaldo Cruz (respondent), although also an heir of Memoracion, should be excluded as a
legal representative in the case for being an adverse party therein.
14.
Heritage Park Management v. CIAC, G.R. No. 148133, October 8, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
In developing into a memorial park a piece of land in Fort Bonifacio, PEA engaged the services of EDC (Elpidio Uy) under a
Lanscaping and Construction Agreement wherein EDC would undertake to develop and do landscaping works on 105 hectare
Heritage Park. However, due to PEAs inability to evict the squatters, it was delayed. Aggrieved, EDC filed a complaint
befCore the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission seeking to collect damages from PEA. Thereafter, PEA executed
a Dead of Assignment in favor of Heritage Park Management Corporation which assigns all of PEAs rights and contracts to
the Hertige. As a result, Heritage, as assignee, filed a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction in the CA to enjoin the CIAC
from ruling on the complaint. Heritage claims that CIAC has no jurisdiction because it was not impleaded as an indispensible
party.
DOCTRINE:
Petitioner (Heritage) claims that it is an indispensable party to the proceedings before the CIAC as the assignee of the PEA of
the latters rights, interests, and obligations in the Heritage Park Project. Thus, its non-inclusion in the proceedings before the
CIAC deprived the latter of jurisdiction over the case. Heritage argues that it is in possession and control over the funds of the
Heritage Park Project which EDC is targeting with its complaint before the CIAC.
Such contention is bereft of merit. It must be remembered that when the case was originally filed by EDC before the
CIAC on January 12, 2000, PEA had not yet transferred its rights and obligations over the Project to Heritage , as
evidenced by the Deed of Assignment dated March 2000. Thus, by impleading PEA as respondent, the CIAC had
jurisdiction over the case at that time.
Heritage, however, claims that when PEA transferred its rights and obligations over the Project to Heritage, the CIAC lost its
jurisdiction. In other words, Heritage alleges that a court may lose jurisdiction over a case based on the subsequent actions of
the parties. This is unacceptable.
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The settled rule is that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the
case is terminated. Certainly, it would be the height of injustice to allow parties that disagree with the decision of a judicial
tribunal to annul the same through the expedient of transferring their interests or rights involved in the case.
HERITAGE NOT AN INDISPENSIBLE PARTY; TRANSFEREE PENDENTE LITE
Moreover, Heritage is mistaken when it claims that it is an indispensible party to the case and that it was not included in the
case before the CIAC. Being a transferee of the interests of PEA over the Project during the pendency of the case
before the CIAC, it is bound by the proceedings in like manner as PEA. In Jocson v. Court of Appeals, this Court held the
Bank of the Philippine Islands is bound by the decision of the trial court being the transferee pendent lite of the
original defendant therein, despite the fact that it had not been substituted for the original defendant and had not
been notified of the proceedings against it.
CASE IS BINDING UPON THE TRANSFEREE PENDENTE LITE
Rule 3 of Section 20 (now Section 19, Rule 3) of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 20. Transfer of Interest. In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against
the original party unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be
substituted in the action or joined with the original party.
This Court has declared in a number of decisions that a transferee pendente lite stands in exactly the same position as its
predecessor-in-interest, the original defendant, and is bound by the proceedings had in the case before the property
was transferred to it. It is a proper but not an indispensible party as it would in any event be bound by the judgment
against his predecessor. This would follow even if it is not formally included as a defendant through an amendment of
the complaint.
Verily, the non-inclusion of Heritage in the proceedings before the CIAC is of no moment as the Rules of Court
specifically allows the proceedings to proceed with the original parties while binding the transferee.
15.
William Genato v. Benjamin Bayhon, G.R. No. 171035, August 24, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
Bayhon contracted a loan with Genato. Thereafter, Bayhon et al filed an Action for the Declaration of Nullity of a Dacion en
Pago executed by Bayhon in favor of Genato. Likewise, Genato filed an Action for Specific Performance against Bayhon
compelling the latter to pay the loan and execute a dacion en pago in his favor. Upon consolidation of the 2 cases, RTC ruled
in favor of Genato and held Bayhon liable for the loan. During Bayhons appeal, he died. CA reversed the RTC and ruled that
Bayhons liability was extinguished by his death.
DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, obligations derived from a contract are transmissible. In Estate of Hemady v. Luzon Surety Co., Inc., the
Court, through Justice JBL Reyes, held:
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed
the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs succeed
not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations.
The Court proceeded further to state the GENERAL RULE: Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a partys
contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.
The loan in this case was contracted by Bayhon. He died while the case was pending before the Court of Appeals. While
he may no longer be compelled to pay the loan, the debt subsists against his estate. No property or portion of the
inheritance may be transmitted to his heirs UNLESS the debt has first been satisfied.
The procedure in VINDICATING MONETARY CLAIMS involving a DEFENDANT WHO DIES BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT is
governed by Rule 3, Section 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit:
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When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies
before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall
not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable
judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these
Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.
Pursuant to this provision, petitioners remedy lies in filing a claim against the estate of the deceased respondent.
16.
Algura v. LGU of the City of Naga, G.R. No. 150135, October 30, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
Sps Algura filed a Complaint for Damages against Naga City for the illegal demolition of their residence and boarding house.
Also, Algura filed an Ex Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigents. They claim that they have a gross monthly income of 10K and a
net pay of 3K. They also showed that they had no property. In Nagas Motion to Disqualify Plaintiffs for Nonpayment of
Filing Fees, it was shown that the Sps Algura exceeded the gross income requirement. Thus they were disqualified as indigent
litigants.
DOCTRINE:
In the case at bar, petitioners Alguras submitted the Affidavits of petitioner Lorencita Algura and neighbor Erlinda Bangate,
the pay slip of petitioner Antonio F. Algura showing a gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00, and a Certification of the
Naga City assessor stating that petitioners do not have property declared in their names for taxation. Undoubtedly,
petitioners do not own real property as shown by the Certification of the Naga City assessor and so the property
requirement is met.
However with respect to the income requirement, it is clear that the gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00 of
petitioner Antonio F. Algura and the PhP 3,000.00 income of Lorencita Algura when combined, were above the PhP
1,500.00 monthly income threshold prescribed by then Rule 141 , Section 16 and therefore, the income requirement was
not satisfied.
The trial court was therefore correct in disqualifying petitioners Alguras as indigent litigants although the court should
have applied Rule 141, Section 16 which was in effect at the time of the filing of the application on September 1, 1999. Even
if Rule 141, Section 18 (which superseded Rule 141, Section 16 on March 1, 2000) were applied, still the application could
not have been granted as the combined PhP 13,474.00 income of petitioners was beyond the PhP 3,000.00 monthly
income threshold.
RULE 141 19 & RULE 3 21 ON INDIGENT LITIGANTS CAN BE APPLIED TOGETHER
Unrelenting, petitioners however argue in their Motion for Reconsideration of the April 14, 2000 Order disqualifying
them as indigent litigants that the rules have been relaxed by relying on Rule 3, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
procedure which authorizes parties to litigate their action as indigents if the court is satisfied that the party is one
who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his
family. The trial court did not give credence to this view of petitioners and simply applied Rule 141 but ignored Rule 3,
Section 21 on Indigent Party.
The position of petitioners on the need to use Rule 3, Section 21 on their application to litigate as indigent litigants brings to
the fore the issue on whether a trial court has to apply both Rule 141, Section 16 and Rule 3, Section 21 on such
applications or should the court apply only Rule 141, Section 16 and discard Rule 3, Section 21 as having been superseded by
Rule 141, Section 16 on Legal Fees.
The Court rules that Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 16 (later amended as Rule 141, Section 18 on March 1, 2000
and subsequently amended by Rule 141, Section 19 on August 16, 2003, which is now the present rule) are still valid and
enforceable rules on indigent litigants. Instead of declaring that Rule 3, Section 21 has been superseded and impliedly
amended by Section 18 and later Section 19 of Rule 141, the Court finds that the two rules can and should be harmonized.
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The Court opts to reconcile Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 19 because it is a settled principle that when conflicts are
seen between two provisions, all efforts must be made to harmonize them.
APPLICATION OF THE RULES ON INDIGENT LITIGANTS
When an application to litigate as an indigent litigant is filed, the court shall scrutinize the affidavits and supporting documents
submitted by the applicant to determine if the applicant complies with the income and property standards prescribed in
the present Section 19 of Rule 141 that is, the applicants gross income and that of the applicants immediate family do not
exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the applicant does not own real property with a
fair market value of more than PhP 300,000.00. If the trial court finds that the applicant meets the income and property
requirements, the authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted and the grant is a MATTER OF RIGHT.
However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, then it would set a hearing to
enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter
and basic necessities for himself and his family. In that hearing, the adverse party may adduce countervailing evidence to
disprove the evidence presented by the applicant; after which the trial court will rule on the application depending on the
evidence adduced. In addition, Section 21 of Rule 3 also provides that the adverse party may later still contest the grant of
such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court, possibly based on newly discovered
evidence not obtained at the time the application was heard. If the court determines after hearing, that the party declared
as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed
and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the
payment of prescribed fees shall be made, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.
Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption meets the salary and property
requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On the other hand, when the
application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the application should not be denied outright; instead, the court
should apply the indigency test under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the
prayer for an exemption.
V
VENUE (RULE 4)
1.
Spouses Ochoa v. Chinabank, G.R. No. 192877, March 23, 2011
QUICKIE FACTS:
Ochoa owns land in Paranaque. Such land was under a Real Estate Mortgage with Chinabank which was granted power to
foreclose extrajudicially. Chinabank sought to extrajudicially foreclose the REM.
Ochoa insists that the stipulated venue of Makati applies only to his complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and
Damages filed before the RTC of Paranaque but not to Chinabanks Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage filed in
the same court.
DOCTRINE:
The exclusive venue of Makati City, as stipulated by the parties and sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court, cannot be made to apply to the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure filed by respondent bank because the
provisions of Rule 4 pertain to venue of ACTIONS, which an extrajudicial foreclosure is not.
Under the Rules, an action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Verily then, with respect to the venue of
extrajudicial foreclosure sales, Act No. 3135, as amended, applies, it being a special law dealing particularly with
extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate mortgages, and not the general provisions of the Rules of Court on Venue of
Actions. Act 3135, as amended provides that
Section 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted in or attached to any real-estate mortgage
hereafter made as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of any other obligation, the provisions of
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the following sections shall govern as to the manner in which the sale and redemption shall be effected, whether or not provision for
the same is made in the power.
Sec. 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province in which the property sold is situated; and in case the place
within said province in which the sale is to be made is the subject of stipulation, such sale shall be made in said place or in the
municipal building of the municipality in which the property or part thereof is situated.
2.
San Miguel Corporation v. Monasterio, G.R. No. 151037, June 23, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
An Exclusive Warehouse Agreement (EWA) was executed between SMC and SMB Warehousing (Monasterio). The
Agreement contained a stipulation on venue stating that actions should be in the courts of Makati or Pasig, to the exclusin of
other courts. Later, being a resident of Naga, Monasterio filed a complaint for collection of Money against SMC for unpaid
cashiering fees. Likewise, he demanded warehousing fees. SMC filed a MTD due to improper venue claiming that the EWA
should be followed. MTD dismissed. MR filed. Pending MR, Monasterio Amended his complaint and deleted his claim for
unpaid warehousing fees.
DOCTRINE
The venue stipulation in the EWA should be construed as mandatory. Nothing therein being contrary to law, morals, good
custom or public policy, this provision is binding upon the parties. The EWA stipulation on venue is clear and unequivocal,
thus it ought to be respected.
However, we note that the cause of action in the complaint filed by the Monasterio before the RTC of Naga was not
based on the EWA, but concern services not enumerated in the EWA. Moreover, in the amended complaint,
Monasterios cause of action was specifically limited to the collection of the sum owing to him for his cashiering service
in favor of SMC. He already omitted SMCs non-payment of warehousing fees. As previously ruled, allegations in the
complaint determines the cause of action or the nature of the case. Thus, given the circumstances of this case now before
us, we are constrained to hold that it would be erroneous to rule, as the CA did, that the collection suit of Monasterio
did not pertain solely to the unpaid cashiering services but pertain likewise to the warehousing services.
Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a contract restricts or confines parties thereto when the suit relates to
breach of the said contract. But where the exclusivity clause does not make it necessarily all encompassing, such that
even those not related to the enforcement of the contract should be subject to the exclusive venue, the stipulation
designating exclusive venues should be strictly confined to the specific undertaking or agreement. Otherwise, the
basic principles of freedom to contract might work to the great disadvantage of a weak party-suitor who ought to be allowed
free access to courts of justice.
RESTRICTIVE STIPULATIONS are in derogation of the general policy of making it more convenient for the parties to
institute actions arising from or in relation to their agreements. Thus, the restriction should be strictly construed as
relating solely to the agreement for which the exclusive venue stipulation is embodied. Expanding the scope of such
limitation on a contracting party will create unwarranted restrictions which the parties might find unintended or worse,
arbitrary and oppressive.
Moreover, since convenience is the raison dtre of the rules on venue, venue stipulation should be deemed merely
permissive, and that interpretation should be adopted which most serves the parties convenience.
Accordingly, since the present case for the collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent is a personal action, we
find no compelling reason why it could not be instituted in the RTC of Naga City, the place where plaintiff resides.
3.
URC v. Albert Lim, G.R. NO. 154338, October 05, 2007
QUICKIE FACTS:
Despite repeated demands, Albert Lim failed to settle its obligation with URC whom he bought grocery products from. Thus,
URC filed complaint for a sum of money in the RTC of QC. Later, the RTC dismissed the complaint motu proprio for improper
venue.
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DOCTRINE:
In personal actions, the plaintiff may commence an action either in the place of his or her residence or the place where the
defendant resides. However, the parties may agree to a specific venue which could be in a place where neither of them
resides.
Corollarily, Section 1, Rule 9 of the same Rules provides for the instances when the trial court may motu proprio dismiss
a claim, thus:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence
on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Implicit from the above provision is that improper venue not impleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the answer is
deemed waived. Thus, a court may not dismiss an action motu proprio on the ground of improper venue as it is not
one of the grounds wherein the court may dismiss an action motu proprio on the basis of the pleadings.
In Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held that a trial court may not motu proprio dismiss a complaint on
the ground of improper venue. In Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. v. Registry of Deeds of Paraaque, the Court likewise held that a trial
court may not motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue.
4.
Irene Marcos Araneta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154096, August 22, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
Irene Marcos-Araneta with other co-plaintiffs filed an action for conveyance of shares of stock against Benedicto before the
RTC of Batac, Ilocos Norte. Benedicto sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue considering that
Irene is not a resident of Batac but of Makati City. On the other hand, Irene asserts that her co-plaintiffs are residents of
Batac. RTC dismissed case. CA reverses and holds that venue is proper.
DOCTRINE:
Irene cannot, in a personal action, contextually opt for Batac as venue of her reconveyance complaint. As to her, Batac,
Ilocos Norte is not what Sec. 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court adverts to as the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides at the time she filed her amended complaint.
Petitioners, in an attempt to establish that the RTC in Batac, Ilocos Norte is the proper court venue, asseverate that Batac,
Ilocos Norte is where the principal parties reside. Pivotal to the resolution of the venue issue is a determination of the status
of Irenes co-plaintiffs in the context of Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3 in relation to Sec. 2 of Rule 4.
IRENE IS THE PRINCIPAL PARTY; HER RESIDENCE IS CONTROLLING
There can be no serious dispute that the real party-in-interest plaintiff is Irene. As self-styled beneficiary of the disputed
trust, she stands to be benefited or entitled to the avails of the present suit. It is undisputed too that petitioners Daniel
Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin, all from Ilocos Norte, were included as co-plaintiffs in the amended
complaint as Irenes new designated trustees. As trustees, they can only serve as mere representatives of Irene.
Upon the foregoing consideration, the resolution of the crucial issue of whether or not venue had properly been laid should
not be difficult.
Sec. 2 of Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is more than one plaintiff in a personal action case, the residences of
the PRINCIPAL PARTIES should be the basis for determining proper venue. According to the late Justice Jose Y. Feria,
the word principal has been added [in the uniform procedure rule] in order to prevent the plaintiff from choosing the
residence of a minor plaintiff or defendant as the venue . Eliminate the qualifying term principal and the purpose
of the Rule would, to borrow from Justice Regalado, be defeated where a nominal or formal party is impleaded in the
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action since the latter would not have the degree of interest in the subject of the action which would warrant and entail the
desirably active participation expected of litigants in a case.
Before the RTC in Batac, in Civil Case Nos. 3341-17 and 3342-17, Irene stands undisputedly as the principal plaintiff,
the real party-in-interest. Following Sec. 2 of Rule 4, the subject civil cases ought to be commenced and prosecuted at
the place where Irene resides.
5.
Heirs of the Late Flaviano Maglasang v. Manila Banking Corporation, 2013
DOCTRINE:
In this case, respondent sought to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage of the properties previously belonging to Sps.
Maglasang (and now, their estates) and, therefore, availed of the third option. Lest it be misunderstood, it did not exercise
the first option of directly filing a claim against the estate, as petitioners assert, since it merely notified the probate
court of the outstanding amount of its claim against the estate of Flaviano and that it was currently restructuring the
account. Thus, having unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extrajudicial foreclosure under Section 7, Rule
86, respondent is now precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount as earlier discussed .
STIPULATION ON VENUE (LEYTE)
As a final point, petitioners maintain that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject properties was null and void since
the same was conducted in violation of the stipulation in the real estate mortgage contract stating that the auction sale
should be held in the capital of the province where the properties are located, i.e., the Province of Leyte.
The Court disagrees. As may be gleaned from the records, the stipulation under the real estate mortgage executed by Sps.
Maglasang which fixed the place of the foreclosure sale at Tacloban City LACKS WORDS OF EXCLUSIVITY which would
bar any other acceptable fora wherein the said sale may be conducted, to wit:
It is hereby agreed that in case of foreclosure of this mortgage under Act 3135, the auction sale shall be held
at the capital of the province if the property is within the territorial jurisdiction of the province concerned,
or shall be held in the city if the property is within the territorial jurisdiction of the city concerned.
Case law states that absent such qualifying or restrictive words to indicate the exclusivity of the agreed forum, the
stipulated place should only be as an additional, not a limiting venue. As a consequence, the stipulated venue and that
provided under Act No. 3135 can be applied alternatively.
In particular, Section 2 of Act No. 3135 allows the foreclosure sale to be done within the province where the property to be
sold is situated, viz.:
SEC. 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province which the property sold is situated; and in case
the place within said province in which the sale is to be made is subject to stipulation, such sale shall be made
in said place or in the municipal building of the municipality in which the property or part thereof is situated.
In this regard, since the auction sale was conducted in Ormoc City, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Province of Leyte, then the Court finds sufficient compliance with the above-cited requirement.
VI.
SUMMARY PROCEDURE (RULE 5; 1991 RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE AS AMENDED)
1.
Macadangdang v. Gaviola, G.R. No. 156809, March 4, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
As administrator of the Estate of Filomena Macadangdang, Atty. Macdangdang filed an Action for Unlawful Detainer against
Gaviola et al who had occupied lands owned by the deceased by mere toleration. MTC of Davao ruled in favor of the Estate
and ordered for them to vacate, remove structures, and pay damages.
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RTC dismissed the appeal. As such, Gaviola et al filed an MR which the RTC denied. Undaunted, they went up to the CA on
certiorari. CA set aside the RTC decision denying the MR. Hence, this petition.
Macadangdang argues that the CA should not have allowed the filing of the MR in the RTC because, since Unlawful Detainer
is governed by RSP, MR is a prohibited pleading.
DOCTRINE:
Jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases falls on the MTC. Since the case before the MTCC was an unlawful
detainer case, it was governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure. The purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is
to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases and to achieve this, the filing of certain pleadings is prohibited,
including the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
HOWEVER, the motion for reconsideration that petitioners allege to be a prohibited pleading was filed before the
RTC acting as an appellate court. The appeal before the RTC is no longer covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure. The Rules on Summary Procedure apply before the appeal to the RTC. Hence, respondents motion for
reconsideration filed with the RTC is not a prohibited pleading.
2.
Republic v. Sunvar Reality Development Corporation, G.R. No. 194880, June 20, 2012
QUICKIE FACTS:
As owners of a parcel of land in Pasong Tamo, Republic & NPC leased said property to Technology Resource Center for 25
years ending Dec 31, 2002. They also allowed TRC to sublease it. As such, they subleased it to Sunvar. TRC was reorganized
as Philippine Development Alternatives Foundation (PDAF) in 1987.
With 6 months left before the expiration of the lease, NPC informed PDAF that the lease was not going to be renewed. In
turn, PDAF informed its sub-lessee Sunvar of this. Contract expired in Dec 2002. Years later, in Feb 2008, Republic asked
Sunvar to vacate. Then, on Feb 2009, Sunvar received a final notice from the OSG to vacate but Sunvar refused. As such, an
Action for Unlawful Detainer was filed against Sunvar on July 2009 before the MTC of Makati.
Sunvar moved to dismiss and argued that since the action was an accion publiciana, it fell within the RTC and not the MTC
because the action was filed more than 1 year after. MTC denied the motion to dismiss. As such, Sunvar went to the RTC on
Rule 65 to assail the denial of the motion. In reply, Republic claimed that under the RSP, filing of a Petition for Certiorari
against Interlocutory Orders of the MTC are prohibited.
DOCTRINE:
It was erroneous for the RTC to have taken cognizance of the Rule 65 Petition of Sunvar, since the Rules on Summary
Procedure expressly prohibit this relief for unfavorable interlocutory orders of the MeTC. Consequently, the assailed
RTC Decision is annulled.
Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule 65 against an interlocutory order issued by the
court in a summary proceeding is a prohibited pleading. The prohibition is plain enough, and its further exposition is
unnecessary verbiage. The RTC should have dismissed outright Sunvars Rule 65 Petition, considering that it is a
prohibited pleading. Petitioners have already alerted the RTC of this legal bar and immediately prayed for the dismissal of the
certiorari Petition. Yet, the RTC not only refused to dismiss the certiorari Petition, but even proceeded to hear the Rule 65
Petition on the merits.
RECKONING ONE-YEAR PERIOD FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES
The Court finds that petitioners correctly availed themselves of an action for unlawful detainer and, hence, reverses the
ruling of the RTC. Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after
the expiration of the right to hold possession may by virtue of any express or implied contract, and within one year
after the unlawful deprivation bring an action in the municipal trial court against the person unlawfully withholding
possession, for restitution of possession with damages and costs.
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Unless otherwise stipulated, the action of the lessor shall commence only
AFTER A DEMAND to pay or to comply with

the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee; or AFTER A WRITTEN NOTICE OF THAT DEMAND is
served upon the person found on the premises, and the lessee fails to comply therewith within 15 days in the case of
land or 5 days in the case of buildings.
3.
Banares v. Balising, G.R. No. 132624, March 13, 2000
QUICKIE FACTS:
Balising filed estafa complaints against Banares et al in the MTC. The complaints were dismissed because of non-compliance
with the conciliation proceedings in the Lupong Tagapamayapa pursuant to the RSP and the LGC. After 2 months, Balising
filed a Motion to Revive after having complied with the conciliation proceedings. MTC granted the Motion.
Banares argues that the Order by the MTC dismissing the cases had long become final and executor. As such, Balising should
have REFILED the cases and not through a Motion to Revive. On the other hand, Balising claimed that the rule on finality of
judgments does not apply to RSP cases and that the case was initially dismissed without prejudice of being revived.
DOCTRINE:
Banares contentions are meritorious.
A FINAL ORDER issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has
been determined by the court. As distinguished therefrom, an INTERLOCUTORY ORDER is one which does not dispose
of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon.
This Court has previously held that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order if no motion for
reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed. In Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals, we stated, thus:
The dismissal without prejudice of a complaint does not however mean that said dismissal order was any less
final. Such Order of dismissal is complete in all details, and though without prejudice, nonetheless finally
disposed of the matter. It was not merely an interlocutory order but a final disposition of the complaint.
The law grants an aggrieved party a period of 15 days from his receipt of the courts decision or order disposing of the action
or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same.
After the lapse of the 15-day period, an order becomes final and executory and is beyond the power or jurisdiction of the
court which rendered it to further amend or revoke. A final judgment or order cannot be modified in any respect, even if
the modification sought is for the purpose of correcting an erroneous conclusion by the court which rendered the same.
There is nothing in the aforecited provision which supports private respondents view. Section 18 merely states that when a
case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is dismissed without prejudice for non-referral of the issues to
the Lupon, the same may be revived only after the dispute subject of the dismissed case is submitted to barangay conciliation as
required under the Local Government Code. There is no declaration to the effect that said case may be revived by mere
motion even after the 15-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration has lapsed.
The rationale behind the doctrine of finality of judgments and orders, likewise, supports our conclusion that said doctrine
applies to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
NON-REFERRAL TO LUPON IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL
It is well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law is not jurisdictional
in nature and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss . The Court notes that
although petitioners could have invoked the ground of prematurity of the causes of action against them due to the failure to
submit the dispute to Lupon prior to the filing of the cases as soon as they received the complaints, against them, petitioners
raised the said ground only after their arraignment.
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4.
Angelina Soriente v. Estate of Arsenio Concepcion, G.R. No. 160239, November 25, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
Soriente had been occupying a lot owned by Concepcion by mere toleration. When Concepcion initiated steps to develop the
land, a demand letter to vacate was sent to Soriente. She refused. Thus, an Action for Unlawful Detainer was filed by
Concepcion against Soriente in the MTC of Mandaluyong. Instead of filing her own Answer, Soriente just affixed her
signature in the Answer filed by Caballero, another occupant of the property whom an Action for Unlawful Detainer was filed
against by Concepcion. As such, the two cases were consolidated.
Thereafter, pursuant to the RSP, a Preliminary Conference was scheduled. In said conference, Soriente (or her representative)
did not show up. In view of said absence, Concepcion moved to submit the case for decision. Afterwards, the MTC ruled
against Soriente.
Soriente claims that the MTC erred in ruling against her because, considering that her case was consolidated with that of
Caballeros, her absence in the Preliminary Conference should not have been taken against her because her co-defendants were
present.
DOCTRINE:
Soriente contends that the lower court erred in deciding this case in accordance with Section 7 of the Rules on Summary
Procedure, thus:
SEC. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed,
a preliminary conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall be applicable to the
preliminary conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be a cause for the dismissal of his
complaint. The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his
counterclaim in accordance with Section 6 hereof. All cross-claims shall be dismissed.
If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with
Section 6 hereof. This Rule shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a
common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at the preliminary
conference.
Petitioner asserts that considering that the cases against her, defendants Caballero and Sadol were consolidated, and she and
defendant Caballero signed and filed one common Answer to the Complaint, thus, pleading a common defense, the trial court
should not have rendered judgment on her case based on Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure when
she failed to appear in the preliminary conference. The contention lacks merit.
The ejectment case filed by respondent against petitioner was docketed in the trial court as Civil Case No. 17973, the case
against Alfredo Caballero was docketed as Civil Case No. 17974, while the case against Severina Sadol was docketed as Civil
Case No. 17932. These cases were consolidated by the trial court.
Under Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, if a sole defendant shall fail to appear in the
preliminary conference, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 of the Rule , that is, the
court shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the Complaint and limited to what is prayed for
therein. However, [t]his Rule (Sec. 7) shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common
cause of action, who had pleaded a common defense, shall appear at the preliminary conference . Petitioner claims that
the preceding provision applies to her as a defendant, since the ejectment cases were consolidated by the trial court, and she
and Caballero filed the same Answer to the Complaint; hence, the trial court should not have rendered judgment against her
when she failed to appear in the preliminary conference.
The Court holds that the italicized provision above does not apply in the case of petitioner, since she and Caballero were
not co-defendants in the same case. The ejectment case filed against petitioner was distinct from that of Caballero,
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even if the trial court consolidated the cases and, in the interest of justice, considered the Answer filed by Caballero in Civil
Case No. 17974 as the Answer also of petitioner since she affixed her signature thereto.
Considering that petitioner was sued in a separate case for ejectment from that of Caballero and Sadol, petitioners
failure to appear in the preliminary conference entitled respondent to the rendition of judgment by the trial court on the
ejectment case filed against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 17973, in accordance with Section 7 of the 1991 Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure.
VII.
PLEADINGS (RULES 6 TO 8)
1.
Cosco Philippines Shipping v. Kemper Insurance Company, G.R. No. 179488, April 23, 2012
QUICKIE FACTS:
Insurer, Kemper, a corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, filed a claim in the RTC against Cosco to
recover what it paid in favor its Insured, Genosi. During Pre-Trial, Cosco filed a Motion to Dismiss because the Complaint
was signed by one Atty. Lat but failed to show his authority to sue. Moreover, Atty. Lat was the one who signed the
Certification Against Forum Shopping. RTC granted and dismissed the case without prejudice. MR denied. On appeal, CA
reversed RTC and held that the Rules must be applied liberally.
DOCTRINE:
We have consistently held that the certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties. If, for any
reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized.
With respect to a CORPORATION, the certification against forum shopping may be signed for and on its behalf , by a
specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document.
A corporation has no power, except those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied or
incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through its board of directors and/or its duly
authorized officers and agents.
Thus, it has been observed that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of
directors that exercises its corporate powers. In turn, physical acts of the corporation, like the signing of documents,
can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act
of the board of directors.
In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), we ruled that only individuals
vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping on behalf of a
corporation. We also required proof of such authority to be presented. The petition is subject to dismissal if a
certification was submitted unaccompanied by proof of the signatorys authority .
In the present case, since Kemper is a corporation, the certification must be executed by an officer or member of the
board of directors or by one who is duly authorized by a resolution of the board of directors; otherwise, the complaint
will have to be dismissed.
The lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by mere amendment of the complaint, but
shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice. The same rule applies to certifications against forum
shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is
authorized to file the complaint on behalf of the corporation.
There is no proof that Kemper, a private corporation, authorized Atty. Lat, through a board resolution, to sign the
verification and certification against forum shopping on its behalf. Accordingly, the certification against forum shopping
appended to the complaint is fatally defective, and warrants the dismissal of Kempers complaint for Insurance Loss and
Damages against Cosco.
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INSTANCES WHEN RULE WAS RELAXED

In Republic v. Coalbrine International Philippines, Inc., the Court cited instances wherein the lack of authority of the person making
the certification of non-forum shopping was remedied through subsequent compliance by the parties therein. Thus,
[w]hile there were instances where we have allowed the filing of a certification against non-forum shopping
by someone on behalf of a corporation without the accompanying proof of authority at the time of its filing,
we did so on the basis of a special circumstance or compelling reason. Moreover, there was a
subsequent compliance by the submission of the proof of authority attesting to the fact that the
person who signed the certification was duly authorized.
In China Banking Corporation v. Mondragon International Philippines, Inc., the CA dismissed the petition filed by
China Bank, since the latter failed to show that its bank manager who signed the certification against nonforum shopping was authorized to do so. We reversed the CA and said that the case be decided on the
merits despite the failure to attach the required proof of authority, since the board resolution which was
subsequently attached recognized the pre-existing status of the bank manager as an authorized
signatory.
In Abaya Investments Corporation v. Merit Philippines, where the complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila was instituted by petitioners Chairman and President, Ofelia Abaya, who signed the verification and
certification against non-forum shopping without proof of authority to sign for the corporation, we also
relaxed the rule. We did so taking into consideration the merits of the case and to avoid a re-litigation
of the issues and further delay the administration of justice, since the case had already been decided
by the lower courts on the merits. Moreover, Abayas authority to sign the certification was ratified by
the Board.
NO RELAXATION
Contrary to the CAs finding, the Court finds that the circumstances of this case do not necessitate the relaxation of the
rules. There was no proof of authority submitted, even belatedly, to show subsequent compliance with the
requirement of the law. Neither was there a copy of the board resolution or secretarys certificate subsequently submitted to
the trial court that would attest to the fact that Atty. Lat was indeed authorized to file said complaint and sign the verification
and certification against forum shopping, nor did respondent satisfactorily explain why it failed to comply with the
rules. Thus, there exists no cogent reason for the relaxation of the rule on this matter. Obedience to the requirements of
procedural rules is needed if we are to expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
Moreover, the SPA dated May 11, 2000, submitted by respondent allegedly authorizing Atty. Lat to appear on behalf of the
corporation, in the pre-trial and all stages of the proceedings, signed by Brent Healy, was fatally defective and had no
evidentiary value. It failed to establish Healys authority to act in behalf of respondent, in view of the absence of a
resolution from respondents board of directors or secretarys certificate proving the same. Like any other corporate act, the
power of Healy to name, constitute, and appoint Atty. Lat as respondents attorney-in-fact, with full powers to
represent respondent in the proceedings, should have been evidenced by a board resolution or secretarys certificate .
AMOUNTS TO LACK OF JURISDICTION

Accordingly, since Atty. Lat was not duly authorized by respondent to file the complaint and sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping, the complaint is considered not filed and ineffectual, and, as a necessary
consequence, is dismissable due to lack of jurisdiction.
Since the court has no jurisdiction over the complaint and respondent, petitioner is not estopped from challenging the trial
courts jurisdiction, even at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. This is so because the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
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2.
Iglesia ni Kristo v. Ponferrada, G.R. No. 168943, October 27, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
Heirs of Enrique Santos filed an Action to Quiet Title over a parcel of land in QC against INC who was depriving them of the
enjoyment thereof. The Heirs were represented by Enrique G. Santos. The latter was also the only person who signed the
Certification Against Forum Shopping. Thus, INC moved to dismiss on the ground that since there were more than 1
plaintiff, all of them should have signed the Certification Against Forum Shopping. In this case, Enrique did not have the
required authorization by all the other plaintiffs. In their Comment on the Motion, the Heirs averred that as pro indiviso coowner of the land with other plaintiff-co owners, anyone of them could act for the other for the benefit of the property
without need of authorization.
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss holding that signature of one of the heirs constitutes substantial compliance. On appeal,
CA affirmed. Hence, this petition asking whether or not substantial compliance rule can apply.
DOCTRINE:
The PURPOSE OF VERIFICATION is simply to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition (or complaint)
have been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative. This requirement is simply a condition
affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render it fatally defective.
Indeed, verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional requirement. The issue in the present case is not the lack of
verification but the sufficiency of one executed by only one of plaintiffs. This Court held in Ateneo de Naga University v.
Manalo, that the verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when , as in the present case, only one
of the heirs-plaintiffs, who has sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition
(complaint), signed the verification attached to it. Such verification is deemed sufficient assurance that the matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, not merely speculative.
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE OF CERTIFICATION AGAINST NON-FORUM SHOPPING
The same liberality should likewise be applied to the certification against forum shopping. The general rule is that the
certification must be signed by all plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court
has also stressed in a number of cases that the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its
own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the
contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions merely
underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements
completely disregarded.
The SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE RULE has been applied by this Court in a number of cases: Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, where
the Court sustained the validity of the certification signed by only one of petitioners because he is a relative of the other
petitioners and co-owner of the properties in dispute; Heirs of Agapito T. Olarte v. Office of the President of the Philippines, where
the Court allowed a certification signed by only two petitioners because the case involved a family home in which all the
petitioners shared a common interest; Gudoy v. Guadalquiver, where the Court considered as valid the certification signed by
only 4 of the 9 petitioners because all petitioners filed as co-owners pro indiviso a complaint against respondents for
quieting of title and damages, as such, they all have joint interest in the undivided whole; and Dar v. Alonzo-Legasto, where the
Court sustained the certification signed by only one of the spouses as they were sued jointly involving a property in which
they had a common interest.
In all of the above cases, the Court applied the rule on substantial compliance because of the COMMONALITY OF INTEREST
OF ALL THE PARTIES with respect to the subject of the controversy.
Applying the doctrines laid down in the above cases, we find and so hold that the CA did not err in affirming the
application of the rule on substantial compliance. In the instant case, the property involved is a 936-square-meter real
property. Both parties have their respective TCTs over the property. Respondents herein who are plaintiffs in the case
below have a common interest over the property being the heirs of the late Enrique Santos, the alleged registered
owner of the subject property as shown in one of the TCTs. As such heirs, they are considered co-owners pro indiviso of
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the whole property since no specific portion yet has been adjudicated to any of the heirs. Consequently, as one of the
heirs and principal party, the lone signature of Enrique G. Santos in the verification and certification is sufficient for
the RTC to take cognizance of the case. The commonality of their interest gave Enrique G. Santos the authority to inform
the RTC on behalf of the other plaintiffs therein that they have not commenced any action or claim involving the same issues
in another court or tribunal, and that there is no other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same
issues.
3.
Vallacar Transit, Inc. v. Jocelyn Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011
QUICKIE FACTS:
Cabanilla was driving a bus owned by Vallacar Transit. Cabanilla figured in an accident wherein Jocelyn Catubigs husband
died as a result. Jocelyn initially charged Cabanilla with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide which was dismissed on
the ground that there was no negligence. Subsequently, Jocelyn filed an Action for Damages against the bus company Vallacar.
Aside from filing an Answer with Counterclaim which imputed negligence on Jocelyns husband, Vallacar also moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was not verified. Vallacar alleges that, under the Rules, a pleading lacking proper
verification is treated as an unsigned pleading which has no legal effect.
DOCTRINE:
We find no procedural defect that would have warranted the outright dismissal of Catubigs complaint. A pleading
required to be verified which contains a verification based on information and belief or upon knowledge, information
and belief, or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
The 1997 Rules of Court, even prior to its amendment by A.M. No. 00-2-10, clearly provides that a pleading lacking proper
verification is to be treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect. HOWEVER, it also just as clearly
states that [e]xcept when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
accompanied by affidavit. No such law or rule specifically requires that Catubigs complaint for damages should
have been verified.
CERTIFICATION V. VERIFICATION
In Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, we already pointed out that:
A partys failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is different from the partys failure to sign
personally the verification. The CERTIFICATE of non-forum shopping must be signed by the party, and
not by counsel. The certification of counsel renders the petition defective.
On the other hand, the requirement on VERIFICATION of a pleading is a formal and not a jurisdictional
requisite. It is intended simply to secure an assurance that what are alleged in the pleading are true
and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is
filed in good faith. The party need not sign the verification. A partys representative, lawyer or any
person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.
GENERAL RULE: PLEADING NEED NOT BE VERIFIED
In the case before us, we stress that as a general rule, a pleading need not be verified, unless there is a law or rule
specifically requiring the same. Examples of pleadings that require verification are:
(1) all pleadings filed in civil cases under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure;
(2) petition for review from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court raising only questions of law under Rule 41,
Section 2;
(3) petition for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals under Rule 42, Section 1;
(4) petition for review from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, Section 5;
(5) petition for review before the Supreme Court under Rule 45, Section 1;
(6) petition for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions under Rule 47, Section 4;
(7) complaint for injunction under Rule 58, Section 4;
(8) application for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 58, Section 4;
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(9) application for appointment of a receiver under Rule 59, Section 1;

(10) application for support pendente lite under Rule 61, Section 1;
(11) petition for certiorari against the judgments, final orders or resolutions of constitutional commissions under Rule 64,
Section 2;
(12) petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65, Sections 1 to 3;
(13) petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 1;
(14) complaint for expropriation under Rule 67, Section 1;
(15) petition for indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 4, all from the 1997 Rules of Court;
(16) all complaints or petitions involving intra-corporate controversies under the Interim Rules of Procedure on IntraCorporate Controversies;
(17) complaint or petition for rehabilitation and suspension of payment under the Interim Rules on Corporate
Rehabilitation; and
(18) petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages as well as petition
for summary proceedings under the Family Code.
In addition, verification, like in most cases required by the rules of procedure, is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement,
and mainly intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are done in good faith or are true and correct and
not of mere speculation. When circumstances warrant, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings
or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.
GENERAL RULE: CERTIFICATION REQUIRED IN INITIATORY PLEADINGS
In contrast, all complaints, petitions, applications, and other initiatory pleadings must be accompanied by a certificate
against forum shopping, first prescribed by Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which took effect on April 1, 1994, then later
on by Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Court. It is not disputed herein that Catubigs complaint for damages was
accompanied by such a certificate.
4.
Korean Technologies v. Alberto Lerma, G.R. No. 143581, January 7, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
Korean Technologies and Pacific General Steel executed a contract concerning the installation and operation of an LPG
Cylinder Manufacturing Plant in Cavite. They had problems implementing said contract. As such, Korean filed a Complaint
for Specific Performance before the RTC of Muntinlupa to put back the machineries ad equipment it dismantled. Pacific filed
an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim claiming that it had a right to dismantle and transfer such machinery and
equipment and also sought a claim for damages. However, Pacific did not pay any docket fees nor filed a Certification Against
Forum Shopping.
DOCTRINE:
STARTING AUGUST 16, 2004, DOCKET FEES REQUIRED IN COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS
The counterclaims of Pacific were incorporated in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim dated July 17, 1998 in
accordance with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that was effective at the time the
Answer with Counterclaim was filed. Sec. 8 on existing counterclaim or cross-claim states, A compulsory counterclaim or a
crossclaim that a defending party has at the time he files his answer shall be contained therein.
On July 17, 1998, at the time Pacific filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims against Korean, it was not liable to
pay filing fees for said counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We stress, HOWEVER, that effective August 16, 2004
under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid in COMPULSORY
COUNTERCLAIM or CROSS-CLAIMS.
CERTIFICATION NOT REQUIRED; ANSWER NOT AN INITIATORY PLEADING
As to the failure to submit a certificate of forum shopping, Pacifics Answer is not an initiatory pleading which requires a
certification against forum shopping under Sec. 5 of Rule 7, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. It is a responsive
pleading, hence, the courts a quo did not commit reversible error in denying Korean motion to dismiss Pacifics compulsory
counterclaims.
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5.
Filipinas Textile v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119800, November 12, 2003
QUICKIE FACTS:
Filipinas Textile (Filtex) issued trust receipts to State Investment House (SIHI) whereby Filtex to hold merchandise in trust for
SIHI with liberty to sell the same for SIHIs account. However, Filtex failed to pay SIHI. Thus, the SIHI filed a Complaint for
Collection. In its defense, Filtex alleged that the trust receipts in which the Complaint for Collection was based was null and
void because SIHI allegedly altered it and there was absence of documentary stamps as required by the NIRC. However, Filtex
failed to specifically deny under oath the genuiness and due execution of said trust receipts in their Answer. Thus, SIHI argued
that Filtex admitted the due execution of the trust receipts and, as such, they could no longer question its admimissiblity. RTC
ruled against Filtex. CA affirmed because Filtex admitted the genuiness and due execution of said trust receipts.
DOCTRINE:
As correctly noted by the respondent, the Answer with Counterclaim and Answer, of Filtex and Villanueva, respectively, did not
contain any specific denial under oath of the letters of credit, sight drafts, trust receipts and comprehensive surety
agreement upon which SIHIs Complaint was based, thus giving rise to the implied admission of the genuineness and
due execution of these documents.
Under Sec. 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, when an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or
attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the
instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under OATH, SPECIFICALLY DENIES them, and sets
forth what he claims to be the facts.
In Benguet Exploration, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the ADMISSION OF THE GENUINENESS AND DUE
EXECUTION of a document means that the party whosesignature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the
document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and
figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any
formalities required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.
Hence, the petitioners can no longer dispute the admissibility of the letters of credit, sight drafts, trust receipts and
comprehensive surety agreement. HOWEVER, this does not preclude the petitioners from impugning these documents
by evidence of:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
fraud;
mistake;
compromise;
payment;
statute of limitations;
estoppel; and
want of consideration.
6.
Sy Tiong v. Sy Chim, G.R. No. 174168, March 30, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
Sy Siy Ho & Sons charged Sps. Sy with Robbery after failing to report to work and for failing to respond to a demand letter
for accounting of misappropriated money in the amount of P67M which the Spouses failed to deposit to the corporations
banks. Meanwhile, the Corporate VP, Sy Tiong, and his wife, Juanita, were elected as new President and VP of the
corporation, respectively. Then, another Complaint for Accounting and Damages was filed by the corporation against the Sps.
Sy. In their Answer, Sps. Sy claimed that the newly elected officers had no authority and that they were the ones authorized by
the By-laws to administer the corporation.
Later, the Sps. Sy filed a Motion for Leave to filed a Third-Party Complaint against Sy Tiong and Juanita (in their personal
capacity) alleging that the latter are the ones directly liable for the misappropriation. RTC granted the Motion for Leave. On
appeal, CA reversed and held that a Third-Party Complaint is prohibited under the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing
Intra-Corporate Controversies.
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DOCTRINE:
The Third-Party Complaint should be allowed.
There are conflicting provisions of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Inter-Corporate Controversies. There is a conflict, for
while a Third-Party Complaint is not included in the allowed pleadings, neither is it among the prohibited ones.
Nevertheless, this conflict may be resolved by following the well-entrenched rule in statutory construction, that every
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. This spirit and
intent can be gleaned from Sec. 3, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules, which reads:
Sec. 3. Construction. These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing
a just, summary, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding.
Now, a THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not
a party to the action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in
respect of his opponents claim. It is actually a complaint independent of, and separate and distinct from the plaintiffs
complaint. In fact, were it not for Rule 6, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, such third-party complaint would have to be filed
independently and separately from the original complaint by the defendant against the third-party defendant. Jurisprudence is
consistent in declaring that the PURPOSE of a third-party complaint is to avoid circuitry of action and unnecessary
proliferation of law suits and of disposing expeditiously in one litigation all the matters arising from one particular
set of facts.
It thus appears that the summary nature of the proceedings governed by the Interim Rules, and the allowance of the filing of
third-party complaints is premised on one objective the expeditious disposition of cases. Moreover, following the rule
of liberal interpretation found in the Interim Rules, and taking into consideration the suppletory application of the Rules of
Court under Rule 1, Sec. 2 of the Interim Rules, the Court finds that a third-party complaint is not, and should not be
prohibited in controversies governed by the Interim Rules. The logic and justness of this conclusion are rendered beyond
question when it is considered that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan are not complete strangers to the litigation as in
fact they are the moving spirit behind the filing of the principal complaint for accounting and damages against the
Spouses Sy.
REQUISITES FOR IMPLEADING THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT
A prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that some substantive basis for a third-party claim be found to exist,
whether the basis be one of indemnity, subrogation, contribution or other substantive right. The bringing of a THIRDPARTY DEFENDANT is proper if he would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant or both for all or part of the
plaintiffs claim against the original defendant, although the third-party defendants liability arises out of another
transaction.
The defendant may implead another as third-party defendant:
(1) on an allegation of liability of the Third-Party Defendant to the defendant for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief;
(2) on the ground of direct liability of the third-party defendant to the plaintiff; or
(3) the liability of the third-party defendant to both the plaintiff and the defendant.
SUFFICIENCY OF THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
In determining the sufficiency of the third-party complaint, the allegations in the original complaint and the third-party
complaint must be examined. A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT must allege facts which prima facie show that the defendant
is entitled to contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief from the third-party defendant.
In the third-party complaint, the Spouses Sy claim that it is Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan who had full and complete
control of the day-to day operations and complete control and custody of the funds of the corporation, and hence they
are the ones liable for any shortfall or unaccounted difference of the corporations cash account . Thus, Sy Tiong Shiou
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and Juanita Tan should render a full, complete and true accounting of all the amounts, proceeds, funds paid to, received and
earned by the corporation since 1993, including the amount attributed to the Spouses Sy in the complaint for accounting and
damages.
The allegations in the third-party complaint impute direct liability on the part of Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan to the
corporation for the very same claims which the corporation interposed against the Spouses Sy. It is clear therefore that the
Spouses Sys third-party complaint is in respect of the plaintiff corporations claims, and thus the allowance of the
third-party complaint is warranted.
7.
PTA of St. Matthew Academy v. Metrobank, G.R.No. 176518, March 2, 2010
QUICKIE FACTS:
For failure to pay their loan with Metrobank, Sps. Ilagans properties were extrajudicially foreclosed. In the public sale,
Metrobank as the highest bidder. During the period of redemption, Metrobank filed an Ex Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ
of Possession. Thereafter, St. Matthew filed a Petition for Injunction against Metrobank. The judge issued a joint resolution
for the 2 cases and ruled that Metrobank is entitled to the Writ of Possession. MR was filed by St. Matthew. Pending
resolution of the MR, PTA of St. Matthew filed a Motion for Leave to File Petition in Intervention in the Injunction case
against Metrobank.. RTC granted said Motion for Leave. However, it later reversed its ruling and held that PTA of St.
Matthew would have no bearing on the issuance and implementation of the Writ of Possession. CA dismissed appeal. In this
petition, PTA of St. Matthew claim that Metrobank Branch Head lacked authority to sign the Certification Against Forum
Shopping attached to the Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Possession and, thus, it was rendered worthless.
DOCTRINE:
PTA of St. Matthews contention lacks basis. In Green Asia Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, where
the issue of validity of the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping was questioned in an application for the issuance of a Writ of
Possession, we held that:
It bears stressing that a CERTIFICATION ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING is required only in a complaint or a
petition which is an initiatory pleading. In this case, the subject petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession filed by private respondent is not an initiatory pleading. Although private respondent
denominated its pleading as a petition, it is more properly a motion. What distinguishes a motion from a
petition or other pleading is not its form or the title given by the party executing it, but its purpose. The
PURPOSE OF A MOTION is not to initiate litigation, but to bring up a matter arising in the progress of
the case where the motion is filed.
It is not necessary to initiate an original action in order for the purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure of real
property to acquire possession. Even if the application for the writ of possession was denominated as a petition, it was in
substance merely a motion. Indeed, any insignificant lapse in the certification on non-forum shopping filed by the
MBTC did not render the writ irregular . After all, no verification and certification on non-forum shopping need be
attached to the motion.
Hence, it is immaterial that the certification on non-forum shopping in the MBTCs petition was signed by its branch
head. Such inconsequential oversight did not render the said petition defective in form.
8.
Abbot Laboratories v. Alcaraz, 701 SCRA 682 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Alcaraz was hired by Abbot as Medical and Regulatory Affairs Manager in a Probationary capacity. Thereafter, she was
informed that she failed to meet the regularization standards for the position and requester her to tender her resignation.
While on leave, HR Managers announced that Alcaraz had already resigned due to health reasons. Aggrieved, she filed a
Complaint for Illegal Dismissal and Damages against Abbot and its officers. She claimed that she should have already been
considered as a regular employee because Abbot failed to inform her of reasonable standards for regularization upon
engagement.
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LA dismissed Complaint. NLRC reversed holding that there was illegal dismissal and ordered Alcarazs reinstatement. As such,
Abbot filed its FIRST Certiorari questioning the NLRC. Pending resolution of the FIRST, Alcaraz moved for Execution of
the NLRCs Decision. Motion for Execution was granted. As such, Abbot filed a SECOND Certiorari assailing the Propriety
of the Execution. Both the FIRST and SECOND Certiorari petitions filed by Abbot were denied by the CA. Thus, Abbot
filed an MR. Pending resolution of the MR, Alcaraz again moved for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the LA.
LA granted. Abbot then appealed to the NLRC via Memorandum of Appeal. Alcaraz alleged that Abbot was guilty of Forum
Shopping in filing the SECOND Certiorari petition while the MRs were pending resolution. Additionally, Alcaraz contends
that Abbot did not comply with the Certification requirement when it failed to disclose the filing of the Memorandum of
Appeal with the NLRC.
DOCTRINE:
PROHIBITION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING V. VIOLATION OF CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT
In Sps. Ong v. CA, the Court explained that:
The distinction between the prohibition against forum shopping and the certification requirement should by
now be too elementary to be misunderstood. To reiterate, compliance with the certification against forum
shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself. There is a
difference in the treatment between failure to comply with the certification requirement and violation of
the prohibition against forum shopping not only in terms of imposable sanctions but also in the manner of
enforcing them.
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT constitutes sufficient cause for the
dismissal without prejudice [to the filing] of the complaint or initiatory pleading upon motion and after
hearing, while VIOLATION OF THE PROHIBITION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING is a ground for
summary dismissal thereof and for direct contempt.
As to the first, FORUM SHOPPING takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving the same parties, either
simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
present, namely:
(1) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions;
(2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(3) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any judgment that
may be rendered in the pending case , regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in
the other case.
NO FORUM SHOPPING
In this case, records show that, except for the element of identity of parties, the elements of forum shopping do not
exist. Evidently, the First CA Petition was instituted to question the ruling of the NLRC that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed.
On the other hand, the Second CA Petition pertains to the propriety of the enforcement of the judgment award pending the
resolution of the First CA Petition and the finality of the decision in the labor dispute between Alcaraz and the petitioners.
Based on the foregoing, a judgment in the Second CA Petition will not constitute res judicata insofar as the First CA
Petition is concerned. Thus, considering that the two petitions clearly cover different subject matters and causes of
action, there exists no forum shopping.
NO VIOLATION OF CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT
Section 5(b), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court requires that a plaintiff who files a case should provide a complete statement
of the present status of any pending case if the latter involves the SAME ISSUES as the one that was filed. If there is no
such similar pending case, Section 5(a) of the same rule provides that the plaintiff is obliged to declare under oath that to
the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending.
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Records show that the issues raised in the instant petition and those in the June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal filed
with the NLRC likewise cover different subject matters and causes of action.
In this case, the validity of Alcarazs dismissal is at issue whereas in the said memorandum of Appeal, the propriety of the
issuance of a writ of execution was in question. Thus, given the dissimilar issues, petitioners did not have to disclose
in the present petition the filing of their June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal with the NLRC. In any event,
considering that the issue on the propriety of the issuance of a writ of execution had been resolved in the Second CA Petition
which in fact had already attained finality the matter of disclosing the June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal is now
moot and academic.
9.
Permanent Savings Bank v. Velarde, G.R. No. 140608, September 23, 2004
QUICKIE FACTS:
For failing to settle his loan obligation evidenced by a Promissory Note, PSB filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of
Money against Velarde in the RTC of Manila. In his Answer, Velarde denied having received the proceeds of the loan and also
claimed that the Promissory Note did not express the true intention of the parties. After PSB rested its case, Velarde filed a
Demurrer to Evidence instead of presenting evidence. He alleged that PSB failed to prove its case and that the cause of action
is barred by prescription. RTC granted the demurrer and dismissed PSBs complaint. It ruled that merely presenting
documents evidencing the loan without testimony of a competent witness did not meet the required quantum of evidence. CA
affirmed.
DOCTRINE:
A reading of Velardes Answer, however, shows that he DID NOT SPECIFICALLY DENY that he signed the loan
documents. What he merely stated in his Answer was that the signature appearing at the back of the promissory note seems
to be his. Velarde also denied any liability on the promissory note as he allegedly did not receive the amount stated therein, and
the loan documents do not express the true intention of the parties. Respondent reiterated these allegations in his denial
under oath, stating that the promissory note sued upon, assuming that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein
defendant, the same does not bind him and that it did not truly express the real intention of the parties as stated in the
defenses.
Velardes denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by law. In the early case of Songco vs. Sellner,
the Court expounded on HOW TO DENY THE GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION of AN ACTIONABLE DOCUMENt, viz.:
This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he DID NOT SIGN the document or that it is
otherwise FALSE or FABRICATED. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the
instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution.
On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks
to avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either.
In fact, Velardes allegations amount to an implied admission of the due execution and genuineness of the
promissory note. The admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document means that the party whose
signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his
authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party
relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.
Also, it effectively eliminated any defense relating to the authenticity and due execution of the document, e.g., that the
document was spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face as the one executed by the parties; or that the signatures
appearing thereon were forgeries; or that the signatures were unauthorized.
Clearly, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Velarde specifically denied PSBs allegations
regarding the loan documents, as Velardes Answer shows that he failed to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and
due execution of the promissory note and its concomitant documents. Therefore, Velarde is deemed to have admitted the
loan documents and acknowledged his obligation with PSB; and with Velardes implied admission, it was not
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necessary for PSB to present further evidence to establish the due execution and authenticity of the loan documents
sued upon.
10.
S.C. Megaworld Construction v. Parada, 705 SCRA 584 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
S.C. Megaworld bought electrical lighting materials from Gentile Industries, a sole proprietorship owned by Engr. Parada.
However, S.C. Megaworld was unable to pay for the purchase price on the due date. It blamed its failure to pay on its failure
to collect from EnviroKleen Technologies money under its sub-contract. S.C. Megaworld was able to convince EnviroKleen
to pay Parada P250K. However, there is still an outstanding balance of P800K in favor of Parada. After unheeded demands,
Parada filed an Action for Collection in the RTC. RTC ruled for Parada. On appeal, CA affirmed. In its MR, S.C. Megaworld
alleged for the first time that the Verification and the Certification Against Forum Shopping attached was invalid. Nonetheless,
CA still denied the MR.
Apparently, while the case was pending, Engr. Parada died and his heirs were substituted on his behalf. The heirs executed an
SPA authorizing Leonardo, one of Engr. Paradas sons to represent them in this petition.
DOCTRINE:
In this petition, the S.C. Megaworld reiterates its argument before the CA that the above verification is invalid, since the SPA
executed by the Parada did not specifically include an authority for Leonardo to sign the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, thus rendering the complaint defective for violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7.
The S.C. Megaworlds argument is untenable. It failed to reckon that any objection as to compliance with the
requirement of verification in the complaint should have been raised in the proceedings below , and not in the CA for
the first time.
In KILUSAN-OLALIA v. CA, it was held that verification is a FORMAL, not a jurisdictional requisite:
VERIFICATION is a formal, not a jurisdictional requisite, as it is mainly intended to secure an assurance
that the allegations therein made are done in good faith or are true and correct and not mere
speculation. The Court may order the correction of the pleading, if not verified, or act on the unverified
pleading if the attending circumstances are such that a strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with
in order that the ends of justice may be served.
In Young v. John Keng Seng, it was also held that the question of forum shopping cannot be raised in the CA and in the
Supreme Court, since such an issue must be raised at the EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY in a motion to dismiss or a similar
pleading. The high court even warned that [i]nvoking it in the later stages of the proceedings or on appeal may result in the
dismissal of the action.
VERIFICATION NOT BASED ON PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE MUST BE BASED ON AUTHENTIC RECORDS
Moreover, granting that Leonardo has no personal knowledge of the transaction subject of the complaint below, Section 4
of Rule 7 provides that the verification need not be based on the verifiers personal knowledge but even only on
authentic records. Sales invoices, statements of accounts, receipts and collection letters for the balance of the amount still
due to the respondent from the petitioner are such records. There is clearly substantial compliance by the Paradas
attorney-in-fact with the requirement of verification.
VIII. DEFAULT (RULE 9)
1.
Anuncacion v. Bocanegra, G.R. No. 152496, July 30, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
Anuncacion filed an Action for Queting of Title against Bocanegra. Summons were the served to Atty. Pizaro. Later,
Bocanegra filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state no cause of action. After Anuncacion filed his Comment, Bocanegra
again filed a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss alleging an additional ground of failure to file filing fees. After Anuncacion filed
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their respective responses, Bocanegra again filed a Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss alleging that theres no jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, no jurisdiction over the subject matter, and no cause of action. Anuncacion filed their
repsonses again. RTC dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. MR denied. On appeal, CA dismissed the
petition. MR denied.
DOCTRINE:
Bocanegras failure to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction over their persons in their very first motion to dismiss was fatal to
their cause. They are already deemed to have waived that particular ground for dismissal of the complaint. The trial court
plainly abused its discretion when it dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendants. Under the Rules, the only grounds the court could take cognizance of, even if NOT PLEADED in the motion
to dismiss or answer, are:
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(2) existence of another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; and
(3) bar by prior judgment or by statute of limitations.
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTIONS TO DISMISS SHOULD NOT BE ENTERTAINED
We likewise cannot approve the trial courts act of entertaining supplemental motions to dismiss which raise grounds
that are already deemed waived. To do so would encourage lawyers and litigants to file piecemeal objections to a
complaint in order to delay or frustrate the prosecution of the plaintiffs cause of action.
2.
Martinez v. Republic, G.R. No. 160895, October 30, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
Martinez filed a Petition for Registration of 3 parcels of land wherein he alleged that he has claimed it through acquisitive
prescription. OSG opposed arguing that the possession was not in accordance with CA 141. Despite the Opposition filed by
the OSG, RTC issued an Order of General Default against the Republic (via OSG) because no party appeared during the
hearing to oppose Martinezs Petition. Thus, RTC proceeded to receive evidence and ruled in favor of Martinez. OSG filed a
Notice of Appeal. CA reversed the RTC and ordered the dismissal of the Petition for Registration. On Petition for Review to
the SC, Martinez contends that OSG no longer had personality to appeal following the Order of General Default.
DOCTRINE:
The RTC appears to have issued the order of general default simply on the premise that no oppositor appeared before it on
the hearing of 29 March 2000. But it cannot be denied that the OSG had already duly filed its Opposition to Martinezs
petition long before the said hearing. As we held in Director of Lands v. Santiago:
[The] opposition or answer, which is based on substantial grounds, having been formally filed, it was
improper for the respondent Judge taking cognizance of such registration case to declare the
oppositor in default simply because he failed to appear on the day set for the initial healing . The
pertinent provision of law which states: If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court
may at once upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default to be
recorded, cannot be interpreted to mean that the court can just disregard the answer before it, which has
long been filed, for such an interpretation would be nothing less than illogical, unwarranted, and unjust. Had
the law intended that failure of the oppositor to appear on the date of the initial hearing would be a
ground for default despite his having filed an answer , it would have been so stated in unmistakable
terms, considering the serious consequences of an order of default. Especially in this case where the
greater public interest is involved as the land sought to be registered is alleged to be public land, the
respondent Judge should have received the applicants evidence and set another date for the reception of the
oppositors evidence. The oppositor in the Court below and petitioner herein should have been accorded
ample opportunity to establish the governments claim.
The juridical utility of a declaration of default cannot be disputed. By forgoing the need for adversarial proceedings, it
affords the opportunity for the speedy resolution of cases even as it penalizes parties who fail to give regard or
obedience to the judicial processes.
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The extent to which a party in default loses standing in court has been the subject of considerable jurisprudential debate. Way
back in 1920, in Velez v. Ramas, we declared that the defaulting defendant loses his standing in court, he not being
entitled to the service of notices in the case , nor to appear in the suit in any way. He cannot adduce evidence; nor
can he be heard at the final hearing.
These restrictions were controversially expanded in Lim Toco v. Go Fay, decided in 1948, where a divided Court pronounced
that a defendant in default had no right to appeal the judgment rendered by the trial court, except where a motion to
set aside the order of default had been filed. This, despite the point raised by Justice Perfecto in dissent that there was no
provision in the then Rules of Court or any law depriving a defaulted defendant of the right to be heard on appeal.
In Tanhu v. Ramolete, the Court cited with approval the commentaries of Chief Justice Moran, expressing the reformulated
doctrine that following Lim Toco, a defaulted defendant cannot adduce evidence; nor can he be heard at the final
hearing, although [under Section 2, Rule 41,] he may appeal the judgment rendered against him on the merits.
Thus, for around 30-odd years, there was no cause to doubt that a defaulted defendant had the right to appeal the adverse
decision of the trial court even without seeking to set aside the order of default. Then, in 1997, the Rules of Civil Procedure
were amended, providing for a new Section 2, Rule 41.
Evidently, the prior warrant that a defaulted defendant had the right to appeal was REMOVED from Section 2, Rule 41.
On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules incorporated the particular effects on the parties of an order of
default.
It cannot be escaped that the old provision expressly guaranteeing the right of a defendant declared in default to appeal the
adverse decision was not replicated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Should this be taken as a sign that under the
1997 Rules a defaulted defendant no longer has the right to appeal the trial court decision, or that the Lim Toco doctrine
has been reinstated?
RIGHT TO APPEAL BY DEFENDANT IN DEFAULT STILL EXISTS UNDER THE LINA DOCTRINE
By 1997, the doctrinal rule concerning the REMEDIES OF A PARTY DECLARED IN DEFAULT had evolved into a fairly
comprehensive restatement as offered in Lina v. Court of Appeals:
(1) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion, under oath,
to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (SEC. 3, RULE 18)
(2) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before the same has
become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under SECTION 1(A) OF RULE 37;
(3) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition
for relief under SECTION 2 OF RULE 38; and
(4) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no
petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (SEC. 2, RULE 41)
The FOURTH REMEDY, that of appeal, is anchored on Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules. Yet even after that provisions
deletion under the 1997 Rules, the Court did not hesitate to expressly rely again on the Lina doctrine, including the
pronouncement that a defaulted defendant may appeal from the judgment rendered against him.
Yet even if it were to assume the doubtful proposition that this contested right of appeal finds no anchor in the 1997 Rules,
THE DOCTRINE STILL EXISTS, applying the principle of stare decisis. Jurisprudence applying the 1997 Rules has continued
to acknowledge the Lina doctrine which embodies this right to appeal as among the remedies of a defendant, and no
argument in this petition persuades the Court to rule otherwise.
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3.
Dico v. Vizcaya Management Corporation, 701 SCRA 367 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Celso Dico resides on and owns a lot in Negros Occidental covered by a TCT. It adjoined 2 more lots. In 1964, he and his
wife filed a Free Patent Application for the 2 adjoining lots with the Bureau of Lands but were not acted upon. As it turns out,
VMC had TCTs covering both adjoining lands. As a result, in 1981, VMC filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against
Dico. MTC ordered the demolition of the Dicos sluice gate. Decision became final.
In 1986, the Dicos filed an Action for Annulment and Cancellation of Titles of VMC. In 1987, Dicos amended the complaint
alleging that they are possessors-by-succession of the 2 other lots. During the pendency of the case, Celso Dico died and was
substituted. Thereafter, RTC ruled in their favor and ordered VMC to vacate. On appeal, CA reversed and ruled VMC as
absolute owner. Moreover, CA declared that prescription/laches already barred Dico from asserting their right. MR denied.
DOCTRINE:
The action of the Dicos for reconveyance was properly dismissed. The insistence of the Dicos that prescription could not
be used by the CA to bar their claim for reconveyance by virtue of VMCs failure to aver them in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer was unwarranted.
We agree with VMCs contention to the contrary. Although defenses and objections not pleaded in a motion to dismiss
or in an answer are deemed waived, it was really incorrect for the Dicos to insist that prescription could not be
appreciated against them for that reason. Their insistence was contrary to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
Under the rule, the defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and
prescription of action may be raised AT ANY STAGE of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal, EXCEPT that the
objection to the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be barred by laches .
4.
Heirs of Medrano v. Estanislao De Vera, G.R. No. 165770, August 09, 2010
QUICKIE FACTS:
Medrano obtained ownership over a parcel of land after the heirs (Hilaria and Elena) of the original owner (Flaviana) waived
all their hereditary rights in favor of Medrano in consideration for the expenses incurred by the latte for Flavianas medication
and burial. After Hilaria and Elena died, Medrano filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against the other relatives. Some of
these relatives named as defendants renounced their rights in favor De Vera (transferee pendente lite). As such, De Vera filed an
Answer to the Medranos complaint.
Some of the defandants were declared in default for failing to file an Answer on time. As for De Vera, the RTC admitted his
Answer but required him to file an Motion in Intervention to be able to participate in the case. Thereafter, Medrano was
allowed to present evidence ex parte. CA reversed and held that RTC should not have required De Vera to file a Motion in
Intervention.
DOCTRINE:
The trial courts approach is seriously flawed because De Veras interest is not independent of or severable from the interest of
the named defendants. De Vera is a transferee pendente lite of the named defendants by virtue of the Deed of Renunciation of
Rights. His rights were derived from the named defendants and, as transferee pendente lite, he would be bound by any judgment
against his transferors under the rules of res judicata. Thus, De Veras interest cannot be considered and tried separately from
the interest of the named defendants.
EFFECT OF PARTIAL DEFAULT
While the rule allows for discretion, the paramount consideration for the exercise thereof should be the protection of the
parties interests and their rights to due process. In the instant case, the circumstances demanded that the trial court had
already admitted De Veras Answer when it declared the original defendants in default. As there was a transferee
pendente lite whose Answer had already been admitted, the trial court should have tried the case on the basis of that
Answer, based on Rule 9, Section 3(c):
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Effect of partial default. When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against several
defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against
all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented.
Thus, the default of the original defendants should not result in the ex parte presentation of evidence because De Vera
(a transferee pendente lite who may thus be joined as defendant under Rule 3, Section 19) filed the Answer. The trial court
should have tried the case based on De Veras Answer , which Answer is deemed to have been adopted by nonanswering defendants.
To proceed with the ex parte presentation of evidence against the named defendants after De Veras answer had been admitted
would not only be a violation of Rule 9, Section 3(c), but would also be a gross disregard of De Veras right to due
process. This is because the ex parte presentation of evidence would not result in a default judgment which would bind not
just the defaulting defendants, but also De Vera, precisely because he is a transferee pendente lite. This would result in an
anomaly wherein De Vera would by a default judgment even if he filed an answer and expressed a desire to participate in the
case.
5.
Aquino v. Aure, G.R. No. 153567, February 18, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
By virtue of a Deed of Sale, Aure purchased a parcel of land from Aquino. Despite the sale, Aquino refused to vacate the
property. As such, Aure filed an Action for Ejectment against Aquino. In his defense, Aquino contends that the sale was
invalid because Aquino did not receive any consideration. Nevertheless, MTC dismissed the complaint for Aures failure to
undergo barangay conciliation proceedings. RTC affirmed. On appeal to the CA, RTC and MTC were reversed and the case to
the MTC for further proceedings. Additionally, CA stated that failure to comply with barangay conciliation is not a
jurisdictional flaw and will not affect the cause of action considering that Aquino failed to raise said issue in his Answer.
DOCTRINE:
There is no dispute herein that the present case was never referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation before Aure
and Aure Lending instituted Civil Case No. 17450. In fact, no allegation of such barangay conciliation proceedings was made in
Aure and Aure Lendings Complaint before the MeTC. The only issue to be resolved is whether non-recourse to the
barangay conciliation process is a jurisdictional flaw that warrants the dismissal of the ejectment suit filed with the
MeTC.
Aquino posits that failure to resort to barangay conciliation makes the action for ejectment premature and, hence, dismissible.
She likewise avers that this objection was timely raised during the pre-trial and even subsequently in her Position Paper
submitted to the MeTC. We do not agree.
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH BARANGAY CONCILIATION :VULNERABLE TO A MOTION TO DISMISS; EXCEPTIONS
It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of Section 412 of the LGC on barangay
conciliation is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of administrative remedies the complaint becomes
afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; and the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.
NEVERTHELESS, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non-compliance therewith cannot
affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.
As enunciated in the landmark case of Royales v. Intermediate Appellate Court:
Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency
of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of
action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its
power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to object to such
exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo. [P]etitioners cannot now
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be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they
had submitted themselves voluntarily.
In the case at bar, we similarly find that Aquino cannot be allowed to attack the jurisdiction of the MeTC over Civil Case
No. 17450 after having submitted herself voluntarily thereto. We have scrupulously examined Aquinos Answer before the
MeTC in Civil Case No. 17450 and there is utter lack of any objection on her part to any deficiency in the complaint
which could oust the MeTC of its jurisdiction.
By Aquinos failure to seasonably object to the deficiency in the Complaint, she is deemed to have already acquiesced or
waived any defect attendant thereto. Consequently, Aquino cannot thereafter move for the dismissal of the ejectment suit
for Aure and Aure Lendings failure to resort to the barangay conciliation process, since she is already precluded from doing so.
The fact that Aquino raised such objection during the pre-trial and in her Position Paper is of no moment, for the issue
of non-recourse to barangay mediation proceedings should be impleaded in her Answer.
6.
Republic v. Hidalgo, G.R. No. 161657, October 04, 2007
QUICKIE FACTS:
Mendoza filed an Action for the Annulment or Declaration of Nullity of Title, Deed of Sale and Reconveyance of Ownership
and Possession of a piece of property known as the Arlegui Residence against the Republic. Mendoza contends that she owns
said property which the Republic forcibly dispossessed her of. The case was re-raffled to RTC of Manila under Judge Hidalgo.
Mendoza filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File a Third Amended Complaint which the RTC granted. Republic was
ordered to file an Answer. Republic filed an Motion for Extension. However, no Answer was filed thereafter. Thus, Judge
Hidalgo declared the Republic in default. Thus, Mendoza was allowed to present evidence ex parte. RTC rendered judgment in
default in favor of Mendoza and awarded her almost P2B. Republic moved for New Trial but was denied.
DOCTRINE:
Deprivation of procedural due process is obviously the petitioners threshold theme. Due process, in its procedural aspect,
guarantees in the minimum the opportunity to be heard. Grave abuse of discretion, however, cannot plausibly be laid at
the doorstep of the respondent judge on account of his having issued the default order against the petitioner, then
proceeding with the hearing and eventually rendering a default judgment. For, what the respondent judge did hew with what
Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court prescribes and allows in the event the defending party fails to seasonably file a
responsive pleading.
While the ideal lies in avoiding orders of default, the policy of the law being to have every litigated case tried on its full merits,
the act of the respondent judge in rendering the default judgment after an order of default was properly issued
cannot be struck down as a case of grave abuse of discretion.
IX.
Amendment and Supplement (Rule 10)
1.
PAGCOR v. Lopez, A.M. RTJ-04-1848, October 25, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
PAGCOR filed an administrative case against Judge Lopez for gross ignorance of the law. The complaint arose when
PAGCOR, who was given funds (P1.5B) by FILGAME and BELLE JAI-ALAI CORP for the Jai-Alai operations in the
Philippines, was ordered by the Office of the President and the DILG to close down Jai-Alai operations. Aggrieved, on Nov.
6, 2000, FILGAME and BELLE filed an Action for Specific Performance against PAGCOR, etc which was raffled to Judge
Lopez. Weeks later, Del Mar v. PAGCOR was promulgated enjoining BELLE and FILGAME from operating Jai-Alai games.
As a result, they filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint to change their cause of action from Specific Performance to
Recovery of Sum of Money amounting to 1.5B considering that they can no longer ask for Specific Performance anymore.
Judge Lopez admitted the Amended Complaint over PAGCORs opposition. Thus, PAGCOR filed a Motion to Dismiss for
failure of FILGAME and BELLE to pay the correct docket fees based on the Amended Complaint which now amounted to
15.8M. Judge Lopez denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that jurisdiction was not lost by the amendment.
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As such, PAGCOR filed its Answer. BELLE and FILGAME filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Then, without
conducting hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, Judge Lopez ruled in favor of BELLE and FILGAME ordering
PAGCOR to return the 1.5B. PAGCOR filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA and an Administrative Case against Lopez.
When the Administrative Case was allowed to continue, CA Justice Tijam recommended the dismissal of the Complaint.
Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
The Court finds no gross ignorance of law committed by Lopez when he admitted the Amended Complaint
notwithstanding that it substantially altered the cause of action of FILGAME and BELLE. Section 3, Rule 10 of the
Rules of Court, provides:
SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial
amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court
that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section
shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be
heard.
As held in Valenzuela vs. CA,
Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such
manner that the phrase or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered was stricken-off and not
retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new
rules, the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense. This should only
be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the
amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent
delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a just, speedy an
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
The original complaint filed by the plaintiffs was for Specific Performance and injunction with prayer for damages and for
TRO and writ of preliminary injunction against complainant while the Amended Complaint was for Recovery of Sum of
Money. Such amendment to the original complaint was filed by plaintiffs FILGAME and BELLE after the Supreme
Court decision declared that complainant could not enter into a joint agreement with other corporations to operate
the Jai-Alai, and that the Agreement dated June 17, 1999 entered into between complainant and the plaintiffs is null
and void. However, since plaintiffs had provided funds for complainants preoperating expenses and working capital,
plaintiffs had to file an amended complaint which seeks the recovery of their expenses .
Although the amended complaint substantially changed the cause of action of plaintiffs FILGAME and BELLE, the
admission thereof by Judge Lopez is allowed under Section 3, Rule 10 and jurisprudence.
SUN INSURANCE DOCTRINE APPLIED TO NON-PAYMENT OF FILING FEES
The Court also finds that respondent was not guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he admitted the amended
complaint despite the non-payment by plaintiffs FILGAME and BELLE of additional docket fees on the amended complaint.
In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. vs. Asuncion, the Court laid down the rules on the payment of docket fees as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action.
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court
may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall
not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow
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payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment
of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
Lopez is correct in ruling in his Order dated June 19, 2002 that the court had jurisdiction over the amended complaint as
it had acquired jurisdiction over the case when the original complaint was filed and the corresponding docket fee
was paid thereon. Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its nonpayment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Also, the unpaid additional docket fees should be considered as a lien on the judgment even though plaintiffs had
specified the amount of P1,562,145,661.87 in the prayer of the amended complaint.
Moreover, the issue of jurisdiction for non-payment of additional docket fees is deemed abandoned as there was neither a
motion for reconsideration nor a petition questioning such Order filed by complainant. In fact, when the amended
complaint was admitted and respondent directed complainant to file its answer, the latter filed its Answer with compulsory
counterclaim and without questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground of insufficient payment of
docket fees. Complainant even invoked the courts authority when it asked for affirmative relief on its counterclaim, thus it is
estopped from challenging the courts jurisdiction.
2.
Asean Pacific v. City of Urdaneta, G.R. No. 162525, September 23, 2008
FACTS:
Waldo Del Castillo, as taxpayer, filed an Action for Annulment of Contracts against Urdaneta City, Capalad (JJEFWA
Builders) and petitioners Asean Pacific Planners (APP) represented by Goco. It was alleged that Urdaneta Mayor entered into
5 contracts for the design, construction, and management of a commercial center and hotel amounting to 250M. The
contractor was paid 95M. Del Castillo claims that the contract is void because the object, being public domain, is outside the
commerce of man.
In their Answer, APP claimed that the contracts were valid. Urdaneta also joined and claimed that the contracts were properly
executed with prior authority from the Sanggunian. It also claimed that Del Castillo has no capacity to sue and states no cause
of action. Capalad also filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Motion to Dismiss against Del Castillo.
After pre-trial, Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance as counsel for Urdaneta and filed an Omnibus Motion with prayer to
withdraw its Answer, drop Urdaneta as defendant and be joined as plaintiff, admit its Complaint, and conduct new pre-trial.
Urdaneta allegedly wanted to rectify its position and claimed that inadequate legal representation caused its inability to file
necessary pleadings in representation of its interests.
RTC admitted the entry of appearance of Lazaro Law Firm and withdrew appearance of the City Prosecutor. Urdanetas
Complaint was likewise admitted and was consolidated with Del Castillos. Thereafter, Defendants were directed to Answer
Urdanetas complaint. This was also done to Calapads.
Thus, APP filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. CA dismissed. MR denied. Hence, this Petition. It is claimed that
Urdaneta is estopped to reverse admissions in its Answer that the contracts are valid and, in its pre-trail brief, that the
execution of the contracts was in good faith.
DOCTRINE:
The court may allow amendment of pleadings. Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues raised by the pleadings, the court
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may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action
and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby .
Objections need not even arise in this case since the Pre-trial Order dated April 1, 2002 already defined as an issue whether the
contracts are valid. Thus, what is needed is presentation of the parties evidence on the issue. Any evidence of the city for or
against the validity of the contracts will be relevant and admissible. Note also that under Section 5, Rule 10, necessary
amendments to pleadings may be made to cause them to conform to the evidence.
In addition, despite Urdaneta Citys judicial admissions, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence
to be presented for said admissions may not necessarily prevail over documentary evidence, e.g., the contracts assailed.
A partys testimony in open court may also override admissions in the Answer.
As regards the RTCs order admitting Capalads complaint and dropping him as defendant, we find the same in order. Capalad
insists that Atty. Sahagun has no authority to represent him. Atty. Sahagun claims otherwise. We note, however, that Atty.
Sahagun represents petitioners who claim that the contracts are valid. On the other hand, Capalad filed a complaint for
annulment of the contracts. Certainly, Atty. Sahagun cannot represent totally conflicting interests. Thus, we should
expunge all pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in behalf of Capalad.
3.
Tiu v. PBCOM, G.R. No. 151932, August 19, 2009
FACTS:
Asian Water Resources Inc, represented by Tiu, was granted a loan by PBCOM which was guaranteed by a parcel of land.
Wanting to apply for a bigger loan, PBCOM required all members of the Board to become sureties through a Surety
Agreement which was executed by its Directors and acknowledged by a notary public. One copy was kept by the notary public
while the other was sent to the Records Management and Archives Office through the RTC Clerk of Court.
PBCOM denied the request to pay the existing loan via dacion en pago. Thereafter, PBCOM demanded payment which remain
unheeded. Thus, PBCOM filed a Collection Case against Tiu. In their Answer, they claim that the Surety Agreements were
falsified because, based on the copy of the Surety Agreement from the Records Management and Archive Office, there was
nothing that said they were liable in their personal capacity.
Upon investigation, PBCOM discovered that the insertion was ordered by the bank auditor. It alleged that when the Surety
Agreement was inspected by the bank auditor, he called the attention of the loans clerk as to why the words In his personal
capacity did not appear under the signature of each party. As such, the loans clerk was ordered to insert such words.
PBCOM then filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim with Motion for Leave of Court to Substitute the current annex in
the Complaint. It likewise admitted its mistake in making the insertion without the knowledge of the notary public. It
maintained that it was not a falsification but was made only to speak the truth of the parties intentions. Moreover, PBCOM
asserted that Tiu et al were already primarily liable even without the insertion.
RTC allowed the substitution of the altered document with the original. MR denied. At the CA, Tiu et als petition was
likewise dismissed.
DOCTRINE:
As to the substitution of the earlier surety agreement that was annexed to the complaint with the original thereof, this Court
finds that the RTC did not err in allowing the substitution.
The pertinent rule on actionable documents is found in Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which provides that when the
cause of action is anchored on a document, its substance must be set forth, and the original or a copy thereof shall be
attached to the pleading as an exhibit and deemed a part thereof, to wit:
Section 7. Action or defense based on document.Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written
instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and
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the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a
part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading.
With respect to PBCOMs right to amend its complaint, including the documents annexed thereto, after petitioners
have filed their answer, Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically allows amendment by leave of court. The said
Section states:
SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court.Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial
amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court
that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section
shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be
heard.
This Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court of
Appeals, thus:
manner that the phrase or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered was stricken-off and not
retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new
rules, the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense. This should only
be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the
amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and
equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a just, speedy andinexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.
The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the amendments should not substantially
change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or that it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as
enunciated in Valenzuela, even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such amendment
could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of substantial justice ; prevent delay; and secure a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings.
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suits and in order that the
real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined, and the case decided on the merits
without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the
amendment was made before the trial of the case , thereby giving the petitioners all the time allowed by law to answer
and to prepare for trial.
Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in
order that every case, may so far as possible, be determined on its real facts and in order to speed up the trial of the case or
prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense. That is, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay
or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to amend.
In the present case, there was no fraudulent intent on the part of PBCOM in submitting the altered surety agreement.
In fact, the bank admitted that it was a mistake on their part to have submitted it in the first place instead of the original
agreement. It also admitted that, through inadvertence, the copy that was attached to the complaint was the copy wherein the
words IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY were inserted to conform to the banks standard practice. This alteration was
made without the knowledge of the notary public. PBCOMs counsel had no idea that what it submitted was the altered
document, thereby necessitating the substitution of the surety agreement with the original thereof , in order that the
case would be judiciously resolved.
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4.
Biglang Awa v. Philippine Trust Company, G.R. NO. 158998, March 28, 2008
FACTS:
Ligaya, Charito, Paraluman, and Efren Biglang-awa, with their mother Encarnacion, filed a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Deeds, Cancellation of Titles, Reconveyance, and Recovery with Damages in the RTC of QC against Roberth
Tolentino and PhilTrust Company.
Biglag-awa and Encarnacion alleged that they owned 8 parcels of land in Novaliches. In 1997, without the knowledge and
consent of Encarnacion and through the use of falsified documents, Tolentino was able to have 4 parcels mortgaged with
PhilTrust. Later one he was able to secure Torrens title in his name over all 8 parcels.
Tolentino filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Ligaya had no capacity to sue on behalf of the others and that she had
no cause of action considering that the parcels were already sold to him. Then, Encarnacion filed a Notice of Dismissal and
claimed that the Complaint was filed without her permission and that the 4 parcels were hers and that she sold them to
Tolentino. PhilTrust also filed its Answer praying that the Complaint be dismissed for failure to state cause of action and
that Encarnacion failed to verify and certify.
RTC confirmed the Notice of Dismissal and dismissed the case with prejudice as to Encarnacion and the other defendants.
Tolentino filed a Motion for Issuance of a Certificate of Finality. Then, Biglang-awa filed an MR. Subsequently, Biglang-awa
filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and Admit Attached Amended Complaint. Said amendment sought to
implead Encarnacion and Liwayway Biglang-awa as defendants. They claimed that as co-owners with Encarnacion and
Liwayway, they secured a partition of the titles over the properties in favor of Tolentino.
Tolentinos Motion to Dismiss was granted. As such, the Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint was likewise denied because
the cause of action had changed. Biglang-Awa filed MR which was denied. At the CA, the denial of the MR as well as the
denial of the Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint were assailed. Both were denied. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
With respect to Biglang-awas right to amend their Complaint after PhilTrust had filed its Answer, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments as a matter of right.A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time
before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is
served.
Sec. 3. Amendments by leave of court.Except as provided in the next preceding Section, substantial amendments
may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the
motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the Court upon the matters provided in this Section shall
be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Africa, this Court held that where some but not all of the defendants have answered,
plaintiffs may amend their complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the nonanswering defendants, but not as to claims asserted against the other defendants.
In the present case, prior to petitioners filing of their Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and to Admit Attached
Amended Complaint, respondent already filed its
Answer with Counterclaim. Hence, since respondent had already filed its answer, it follows that petitioners may no
longer amend their complaint against the former as a matter of right . They may do so only upon leave of court, as
provided under Section 3, Rule 10 of the same Rules, which they did by filing their Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint.
In Philippine Ports Authority v. William Gothong & Aboitiz (WG&A), Inc., this Court, in discussing the import of Section 3, Rule
10 of the Rules of Court, as amended, held that:
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manner that the phrase or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered was stricken-off and not retained
in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, the
amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense. This should only be true,
however when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments
sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice , and prevent delay and equally
promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition
of every action and proceeding.
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT CORRECTLY DISMISSED
On the basis of the foregoing ruling, the denial of petitioners Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint on the ground that
the amendment drastically altered the causes of action of the parties plaintiffs and parties defendants between and among
themselves is erroneous. The RTC did not make any finding that the motion was filed with intent to delay .
Nonetheless, the Court finds that the RTC correctly denied petitioners Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, although
for a different reason.
In their original complaint, petitioners claim that the properties covered by TCT Nos. N-198629 to N-198632 were owned
exclusively by Encarnacion. There was no mention whatsoever that Encarnacions titles over these parcels of land were
obtained through fraud or any other illegal means. However, in their Amended Complaint, in which petitioners sought
to make Encarnacion and Liwayway as defendants, they subsequently seek the nullification of Encarnacions titles over
the abovementioned parcels of land by alleging that petitioners, together with Encarnacion and Liwayway, are coowners of all the subject lots, and the titles thereto were obtained on the basis of falsified subdivision agreements
and subdivision plans.
It should be noted, however, that the basis of the February 2, 2001 Order and April 16, 2001 Resolution of the trial court,
both of which had already become final and executory, is its finding that the four parcels of land covered by TCT Nos.
N-198629 to N-198632 were exclusively owned by Encarnacion. Since the February 2, 2001 Order and the April 16, 2001
Resolution of the RTC have already become final and executory, petitioners are already precluded from claiming otherwise.
X.
BILL OF PARTICULARS (RULE 12)
1.
Baritua v. Mercader, G.R. No. 136048, January 23, 2001
QUICKIE FACTS:
Dominador Mercader is a businessman who boarded the bus of JB Lines driven by one Jose Baritua. However, Mercader was
not able to reach his destination because the bus fell into a river somewhere in Northern Samar. As a result, he died.
Consequently, Mercaders wife filed a Complaint for Damages against JB Lines alleging that its driver was negligent and
reckless in operating the bus which caused said bus to fall into the river. JB Lines filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or for Bill of
Particulars on the ground that Mercader failed to implead Jose Baritua as an indispensable party. Mercader filed an
Opposition.
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and admitted the Amended Complaint which now impleaded Baritua. In its Answer,
Baritua and JB Lines contend that Mercader did not board said bus because no ticket was issued to him. Nonetheless, RTC
ruled in favor of Mercader. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition claiming that their procedural rights were violated because CA
did not pass upon the issue about the RTCs failure to rule on their Motion for Bill of Particulars.
DOCTRINE:
It must be noted that Barituas counsel manifested in open court his desire to file a motion for a bill of particulars. The RTC
gave him 10 days from March 12, 1985 within which to do so. He, however, filed the aforesaid motion only on April 2,
1985 or 11 days past the deadline set by the trial court. Moreover, such motion was already moot and academic
because, prior to its filing, petitioners had already filed their Answer and several other pleadings to the amended
Complaint. Section 1, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, provides:
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Section 1. When applied for; purpose.Before responding to a pleading, a party may move for a more definite
statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading. If the pleading is a reply, the motion
must be filed within ten (10) days from service thereof. Such motion shall point out the defects complained
of, the paragraphs wherein they are contained, and the details desired.
We therefore believe that there is no reason to overturn the assailed CA Decision, which affirmed that of the RTC. It is a
well-settled rule that the trial courts factual findings, when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive and binding, if they
are not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance and influence. As clearly discussed
above, petitioners have not presented sufficient ground to warrant a deviation from this rule.
2.
Reyes v. RTC of Makati, G.R. No. 165744, August 11, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
Oscar and respondent Rodrigo Reyes are children of Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. They owned shares of Zenith Insurance, a
domestic corporation established by their family. Pedro died in 1964 while Anastacia died in 1993. While Pedros estate had
already been partitioned, Anastacias was not.
Thereafter, Rodrigo and Zenith filed a complaint with the SEC denominated as a derivative suit against Oscar to obtain
accounting of the funds and assets of Zenith. Allegedly, Oscar fraudulently appropriated for himself shares which should have
been distributed to the other heirs.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, Oscar denied the allegations and asserted that the requisites for a derivative suit were not
complied with. Later on, RA 8799 took effect which transferred to the RTC exclusive and original jurisdiction over
commercial cases. As such, the SEC case was transferred to the RTC of Makati. Oscar also filed a Motion to Declare
Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit pursuant to the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra Corporate Controversies.
RTC ruled that while it had jurisdiction over the derivative suit, the other cause of action should be for the settlement of the
estate. On appeal, CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
Allegations of deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats are largely conclusions of law that, without
supporting statements of the facts to which the allegations of fraud refer, do not sufficiently state an effective cause of action.
The late Justice Jose Feria, a noted authority in Remedial Law, declared that fraud and mistake are required to be averred
with particularity in order to enable the opposing party to controvert the particular facts allegedly constituting such
fraud or mistake.
Tested against these standards, we find that the charges of fraud against Oscar were not properly supported by the
required factual allegations. While the complaint contained allegations of fraud purportedly committed by him, these
allegations are not particular enough to bring the controversy within the special commercial courts jurisdiction; they are not
statements of ultimate facts, but are mere conclusions of law: how and why the alleged appropriation of shares can be
characterized as illegal and fraudulent were not explained nor elaborated on.
BILL OF PARTICULARS IS A PROHIBITED PLEADING IN INTRA-CORPORATE CONTROVERSIES
In ordinary cases, the failure to specifically allege the fraudulent acts does not constitute a ground for dismissal since such
defect can be cured by a bill of particulars. In cases governed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate
Controversies, however, a bill of particulars is a prohibited pleading. It is essential, therefore, for the complaint to show
on its face what are claimed to be the fraudulent corporate acts if the complainant wishes to invoke the courts special
commercial jurisdiction.
3.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148154, December 17, 2007
QUICKIE FACTS:
Marcos had been declared in default for failure to respond to alias summons when he was in exile in Hawaii. After Marcos
died, Imelda moved to set aside the order of default which was granted by the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, as executor of
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Marcos estate, Bong Bong filed a Motion for Leave to File Responsive Pleading which was also granted. He even asked for 3
extensions totaling 35 days to file an Answer. However, instead of filing an Answer, Bong Bong filed a Motion for Bill of
Particulars and prayed for clearer statements of the allegations which he claimed were mere conclusions of law and thus too
vague and general to enable them to intelligently answer. This motion was likewise granted by the Sandiganbayan.
In opposition, Republic argued that since Motions for Extension to File Answer were filed, the Sandiganbayan should not
have granted the Motion for Bill of Particulars.
DOCTRINE:
PROPRIETY OF MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS
As to the propriety of the granting of the motion for a bill of particulars, we find for respondent as the allegations against
former President Marcos appear obviously couched in general terms. They do not cite the ultimate facts to show how the
Marcoses acted in unlawful concert with Cruz in illegally amassing assets, property and funds in amounts disproportionate
to Cruzs lawful income, except that the former President Marcos was the president at the time.
In his motion for a bill of particulars, respondent wanted clarification on the specific nature, manner and extent of
participation of his father in the acquisition of the assets cited above under Cruz; particularly whether former
President Marcos was a beneficial owner of these properties ; and the specific manner in which he acquired such
beneficial control.
The 1991 Virata-Mapa Doctrine prescribes a motion for a bill of particulars, not a motion to dismiss, as the remedy for
perceived ambiguity or vagueness of a complaint for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, which was similarly worded as
the complaint in this case. That doctrine provided protective precedent in favor of respondent when he filed his motion for a
bill of particulars. While the allegations as to the alleged specific acts of Cruz were clear, they were vague and unclear
as to the acts of the Marcos couple who were allegedly in unlawful concert with the former. There was no factual
allegation in the original and expanded complaints on the collaboration of or on the kind of support extended by former
President Marcos to Cruz in the commission of the alleged unlawful acts constituting the alleged plunder. All the allegations
against the Marcoses, aside from being maladroitly laid, were couched in general terms. The alleged acts, conditions and
circumstances that could show the conspiracy among the defendants were not particularized and sufficiently set forth by
petitioner.
That the late presidents co-defendants were able to file their respective answers to the complaint does not necessarily mean
that his estates executor will be able to file an equally intelligent answer, since the answering defendants defense might
be personal to them.
Phrases like in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers with grave and scandalous abuse of right and
power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws, unjust enrichment, embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten
wealth, arrogated unto himself all powers of government, are easy and easy to read; they have potential media quotability and they
evoke passion with literary flair, not to mention that it was populist to flaunt those statements in the late 1980s. But they are
just that, accusations by generalization. Motherhood statements they are, although now they might be a politically
incorrect expression and an affront to mothers everywhere, although they best describe the accusations against the Marcoses
in the case at bar.
The facile verbosity with which the legal counsel for the government flaunted the accusation of excesses against the
Marcoses in general terms must be soonest refurbished by a bill of particulars, so that respondent can properly
prepare an intelligent responsive pleading and so that trial in this case will proceed as expeditiously as possible . To
avoid a situation where its pleadings may be found defective, thereby amounting to a failure to state a cause of action,
petitioner for its part must be given the opportunity to file a bill of particulars. Thus, we are hereby allowing it to
supplement its pleadings now, considering that amendments to pleadings are favored and liberally allowed especially before
trial.
Lastly, the allowance of the motion for a more definite statement rests with the sound discretion of the court. As usual
in matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling of the trial court will not be reversed unless there has been a palpable
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abuse of discretion or a clearly erroneous order. This Court has been liberal in giving the lower courts the widest latitude
of discretion in setting aside default orders justified under the right to due process principle. Plain justice demands and the law
requires no less that defendants must know what the complaint against them is all about.
4.
Estardante v. People, G.R. Nos. 156851-55, February 18, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
Heide Estandarte was the principal of Ramon Torres National High School (RTNHS). Sometime in 1998, a group of RTNHS
teachers sent a letter to the School Division of Bago City with a list of 15 irregularities allegedly committed by Estandarte. The
letter requested that said irregularities be investigated. The same group eventually filed complaints against Estandarte with the
Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas. The latter forwarded to the City Prosecutor for Preliminary Investigation. The Prosector
served a subpoena on Estandarte which required him to submit a counter-affidavit.
Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, she filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars alleging that there were no specific criminal
charges that were stated in the subpoenas thereby not giving her the opportunity to intelligently prepare her counter-affidavit.
In response, the Prosecutor issued an Order attaching the complainants Bill of Particulars which state that Estandarte was
being charged with 68 and 69 of PD 1445 (Government Auditing Code). Then, she filed her counter-affidavit limiting
herself to charges specified in the Bill of Particulars.
When the Prosecutor referred the case back to the Ombudsman-Visayas, the latter found her liable under 3 (e) of RA 3019.
As a result, 5 Informations were filed before the RTC. These were all consolidated.
As such, Estandarte filed for a Motion for Reinvestigation on the ground that she cannot be charged with violations of PD
1445 since she was not a collecting officer. Also, she contends that she cannot be liable RA 3019 since the acts did not
constitute manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence. RTC denied said motion. In her MR, she
contends that her right to due process was violated because the Ombudsman-Visayas went beyond the Bill of Particulars filed
by the complainants. MR denied.
Hence, this petition. She claims that the Ombudsman should have limited the charges filed to those mentioned in the Bill of
Particulars.
DOCTRINE:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that a bill of particulars is not allowed by Administrative Order No.
7, entitled Rules of Procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman (A.O. No. 7); and that therefore the
Ombudsman cannot be bound by the Bill of Particulars submitted by private complainants.
The Court agrees with the OSG. Clearly, the act of the prosecutor in granting the petitioners Motion for Bill of
Particulars is an act contrary to the express mandate of A.O. No. 7, to wit:
Section 4. Procedure. The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112
of the Rules of Court, subject to the following provisions:
d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction. Neither may a motion for a bill of
particulars be entertained. If the respondent desires any matter in the complainants affidavit to be clarified,
the particularization thereof may be done at the time of clarificatory questioning in the manner
provided in paragraph (f) of this section.
The Court finds the argument of Estandarte that when the City Prosecutor was deputized by the Ombudsman-Visayas to
conduct the preliminary investigation, any action taken therein is, in effect, an action of the Ombudsman, who is bound by the
act of the City Prosecutor in granting the Motion for Bill of Particulars, and is not tenable.
Section 31 of R.A. No. 6770 or The Ombudsman Act of 1989 expressly provides that those designated or deputized to
assist the Ombudsman shall be under his supervision and control. Indubitably, when the City Prosecutor is deputized by
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the Office of the Ombudsman, he comes under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman which means that he is
subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify the prosecutors decision.
Consequently, in the present case, Estandarte has no valid basis for insisting that the Ombudsman-Visayas must be
bound by the erroneous act of the City Prosecutor in granting petitioners Motion for Bill of Particulars. Laws and
jurisprudence grant the Office of the Ombudsman the authority to reverse or nullify the acts of the prosecutor pursuant to its
power of control and supervision over deputized prosecutors. Hence, it was within the prerogative of the OmbudsmanVisayas not to consider the Bill of Particulars submitted by the private complainants.
CANNOT BE DETERMINED IF PETITIONER WAS FULLY APPRISED OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HER
While the Bill of Particulars is not allowed under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman and therefore
should not be the basis for determining what specific criminal charges should be filed against herein petitioner, it
behooves the Ombudsman to accord the petitioner her basic rights to due process in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation.
In a preliminary investigation, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the petitioners basic due process
rights, such as the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents, and
the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents in her defense.
Likewise, Section 4 of A.O. No. 7 provides:
Section 4. Procedure.The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following provisions:
b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a
copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with proof of service thereof
on the complainant. The complainant may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service of the
counter-affidavits.
In the pleadings submitted before this Court, petitioner complained that the subpoenas served on her did not state the law
allegedly violated by her.
In the Motion for Bill of Particulars she filed before the City Prosecutor, she declared that she was served with subpoena
together with the documents attached therein.
However, after a thorough examination of the records, the Court does not find the subpoenas and the alleged
documents served on her. Absent the subpoenas and the documents attached to the subpoenas, how could it be intelligently
determined whether she was fully apprised of the acts complained of and imputed to her; whether she was given the
opportunity to submit an appropriate counter-affidavit to the charges; and whether the charges in the 5 Informations filed
against petitioner were based on the same acts complained of and stated in the subpoena and the documents attached thereto?
It is a basic elementary rule that the complaint should specifically allege the criminal acts complained of, so as to enable the
accused to prepare his answer or counter-affidavit accurately and intelligently. The RTC should have required the
petitioner to submit the subpoenas and the attached documents served on her to enable it to examine the same and
resolve whether the petitioners right to be informed was violated. It was only upon ascertaining this fact that the RTC
could have validly determined whether petitioner was denied due process.
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XI.
SERVICE AND FILING (RULE 13)
1.
Domingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169122, February 2, 2010
QUICKIE FACTS:
The RTC of Sto Domingo declared as null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale of a parcel of land between Marcelino
Domingo & his wife (buyer) and Julio Domingo (seller) due to the forged signature of the seller. Marcelino was thus ordered
to deliver possession of said property to the Domingos. After the appeal was denied, the decision became final and executory.
As such, a Writ of Execution was issued in favor of the Domingos.
Then, Marcelino filed with the DAR a Petition that he be declared as a tenant-beneficiary of the property.
While the DAR case as pending, Marcelino reentered and retook possession of the property. As such, the Domingos filed in
the RTC a Motion to cite Marcelino in contempt for not complying with the judgment. RTC found him in contempt. Later
on, Marcelino employed 6 men to reenter the same property. Thus, they were arrested. They were eventually released after
they declared in writing that they would no longer interfere with the Domingos. RTC also warned Marcelino that a warrant of
arrest will be issued if he reenters the property again.
Afterwards, DAR granted Marcelinos petition and declared him as tenant-beneficiary. Consequently, Marcelino reentered and
retook the possession of the same property. Then, the Domingos filed another motion in the RTC to cite him in contempt
and for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. MR denied. CA also denied Marcelinos Petition for Certiorari on the Petition was
deemed not filed because there was no written explanation to justify service by mail in lieu of personal service. MR denied.
DOCTRINE:
Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing.Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and
other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to
other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally.
A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.
Section 11 is mandatory. In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge Ricafort, the Court held that:
Pursuant to Section 11 of Rule 13, service and filing of pleadings and other papers must, whenever
practicable, be done personally; and if made through other modes, the party concerned must provide a
written explanation as to why the service or filing was not done personally .
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or
resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays
likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of postal service.
Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who , wanting to appear
clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch
opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive
pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered parcel
containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating
before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of
such pleading or other papers.
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring
personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to
consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were resorted to and
no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place. The
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exercise of discretion must, necessarily, consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself
begins with the clause whenever practicable.
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the
exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of
time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is
not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written
explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the
plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case
or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of
Section 11. This Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation introduced by
the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the administration of justice. For the guidance of the Bench
and Bar, strictest compliance with Section 11 of Rule 13 is mandated.
2.
Romulo v. Peralta, G.R. No. 165665, January 31, 2007
QUICKIE FACTS:
PGMA issued EO 253 which provided for an open skies policy in the aviation industry. In said EO, several airports were
opened to international air cargo transportation providers and foreign airlines. As a result, PALEA and other labor unions
filed a Petition in the RTC of Manila assailing the constitutionality of said EO.
OSG, representing the Government, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition for lack of cause of action. On Apr 6, 2004, OSG
served by registered mail a copy of its Motion to Dismiss upon Atty. Bacungan, counsel for the unions. On Apr 16, RTC
denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that there was absence of proof of transmittal by registered mail of a copy of sai
motion.
In OSGs MR, it attached a photocopy of the Registry Receipt. Nonetheless, RTC denied it. OSG filed a Second MR attaching
the following tems: (a) certified copy of the OSGs; (b) certified copy of the Official Records Book; and (c) affidavit of one
Masangkay-Bayongan, Records Officer, stating that the mail matter sent by the OSG to Atty. Bacungan was actually a copy of
the Motion to Dismiss. Second MR denied. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
In the instant case, there is no dispute that Atty. Bacungan, counsel for the labor unions, received a copy of the OSGs
motion to dismiss dated April 5, 2004 on April 20, 2004, or 4 days after it was set for hearing. Petitioners insist though
that they sent a copy of their motion to him by registered mail on April 6, 2004.
Sections 7, 10 and 13 of Rule 13, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provide:
SEC. 7. Service by mail.Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the post office, in a
sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his
residence, if known, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to
sender after ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry service is available in the locality of either the sender or
the addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail.
SEC. 10. Completeness of service.Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is
complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by
registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after five (5) days from the date
he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier.
SEC. 13. Proof of service.Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party served, or
the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date,
place, and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of
the person mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by registered
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mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The
registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender or in lieu thereof, the unclaimed
letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
It is clear that where service of a pleading is by REGISTERED MAIL, proof of such service consists of the following:
(1) an affidavit of the person mailing the pleading containing a full statement of the date, place, and manner of
service; and
(2) the registry receipt issued by the mailing office.
We recall that in their first motion for reconsideration, OSG attached thereto only a photocopy of registry return receipt
No. 4096. The trial court declared it could not determine on its face whether the registered matter was actually a copy of the
motion to dismiss.
In Cayetano v. Ceguerra, we held that actual knowledge of a decision cannot be attributed to the addressee of a registered
matter where there is no showing that the registry notice itself contains any indication that the registered matter is a
copy of the decision or that the registry notice refers to the case being ventilated. Then, in Sapida v. Villanueva citing
Cayetano, we ruled that we could not justly attribute to respondents actual knowledge of the order of denial of their
motion for new trial through registered mail because there is no showing that the registry notice itself or the envelope or
the return card for that matter contained any indication or annotation that the registered matter was indeed and in
fact a copy of the said order.
Anent the affidavit of Josephine S. Masangkay-Bayongan, she stated that On April 6, 2004, I caused to be served by registered mail a
copy of a Motion to Dismiss dated April 5, 2004 in Civil Case No. 04-109021. Clearly, she merely directed that the motion be
served by registered mail. She did not actually post the motion by registered mail. The rule requires that the affidavit
must be executed by the person mailing the motion.
In sum, registry return receipt No. 4096 does not indicate that what was mailed to Atty. Bacugan, counsel for the labor
unions, was a copy of petitioners motion to dismiss; and that Bayongans affidavit shows she was not the one who
mailed such copy. It follows that in dismissing the motion to dismiss on the ground that a copy thereof was not validly
served upon private respondents counsel, respondent judge acted pursuant to the Rules.
3.
Spouses Topacio v. Banco Filipino, G.R. No. 157644, November 17, 2010
QUICKIE FACTS:
After Banco Filipino extrajudicially foreclosed on the REM of Sps. Topacio, it was able to purchase said property at an auction
sale. After getting the Certificate of Sale, RTC issued a Writ of Possession in favor of BF. However, said writ was not
implemented because Sps. Topacio filed a Petition to Set Aside the Auction Sale and Writ of Possession to which the RTC
issued a TRO. BF filed its Answer. Then, Sps. Topacio filed a Reply.
The proceedings were postponed due to the instance of both parties. N Dec 1986 or 2 years later, the RTC dismissed the
Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession for failure to prosecute. However, BF was not served a copy of the Order of
Dismissal as it closed operations in Jan 1985.
When BF was reorganized 6 years later, it filed a Motion to Clarify the Order and moved for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of
Possession. The Alias Writ of Possession was granted. As such, Sps Topacio filed an MR which was denied. On appeal, CA
affirmed and held that the previous dismissal was not a dismissal on the merits having been based on purely technical grounds.
Moreover, BF was not served a copy of the Order of Dismissal. Sps. Topacio now contend that RTC was already barred by res
judicata.
DOCTRINE:
Under the rule of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive
of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous
suit. The term literally means a matter adjudged, judicially acted upon, or settled by judgment. The principle bars a
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subsequent suit involving the same parties, subject matter, and cause of action. The rationale for the rule is that public policy
requires that controversies must be settled with finality at a given point in time.
The doctrine of res judicata embraces 2 concepts: the first is BAR BY PRIOR JUDGMENT under paragraph (b) of Rule 39,
Section 47 of the Rules of Court, and the second is CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT under paragraph (c) thereof. Res
judicata applies in the concept of BAR BY PRIOR JUDGMENT if the following requisites concur:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
the former judgment or order must be final;

the judgment or order must be on the merits;
the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action.
The Sps. Topacio claim that res judicata under the first concept applies in the present case because all of the elements thereof
are present. In response, the BF argues that res judicata did not set in as the first element is lacking. We agree with the BF.
DEC. 1986 DISMISSAL NEVER ATTAINED FINALITY AS IT WAS NOT PROPERLY SERVED
The Sections 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, & 9 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court define the proper modes of service of judgments.
As a rule, judgments are sufficiently served when they are delivered personally, or through registered mail to the counsel of
record, or by leaving them in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. After service, a judgment
or order which is not appealed nor made subject of a motion for reconsideration within the prescribed 15-day period
attains finality.
In Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. v. Rodriguez, the Court ruled that the Resolution of the NLRC, denying the respondents
MR, cannot be deemed to have become final and executory as there is no conclusive proof of service of the said
resolution. In the words of the Court, there was no proof of actual receipt of the notice of the registered mail by the
respondents counsel. Based on these findings, the Court concluded that the CA properly acquired jurisdiction over the
respondents petition for certiorari filed before it; in the absence of a reckoning date of the period provided by law for the filing
of the petition, the Court could not assume that it was improperly or belatedly filed.
Similarly, in Tomawis v. Tabao-Cudang, the Court held that the decision of the RTC did not become final and executory
where, from the records, the respondent had not received a copy of the resolution denying her motion for
reconsideration. The Court also noted that there was no sufficient proof that the respondent actually received a copy of
the said Order or that she indeed received a first notice . Thus, the Court concluded that there could be no valid basis for
the issuance of the writ of execution as the decision never attained finality.
In the present case, we note that the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order cannot be deemed to have become final and
executory in view of the absence of a valid service, whether personally or via registered mail, on the BFs counsel.
4.
Atlantic Erectors v. Herbal Cove, G.R. No. 148568, March 20, 2003
QUICKIE FACTS:
Based on a Construction Contract, Atlantic Erectors undertook to construct townhouses on Herbal Coves parcel of land in
Tagaytay. However, AE claimed the 180-day period of completion was not complied with due to reasons attributable to HC.
Thus, AE filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages in the RTC of Makati. Additionally, AE filed a Notice of Lis
Pendens for the annotation of the pendency of the case on the TCTs thereof.
HC then filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction for non-compliance with the Contacts arbitration clause. Thus,
RTC dismissed the case. AEs MR was denied. HC also filed a Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens because the Complaint
is a personal action to collect a sum of money and does not directly affect title to or possession real property. RTC granted the
motion. On MR, RTC reinstated the Notice of Lis Pendens. On appeal, CA granted HCs petition and reinstated the
cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens.
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DOCTRINE:
PROPER BASIS FOR NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS
As a general rule, the only instances in which a notice of lis pendens may be availed of are as follows:
(a) an action to recover possession of real estate;
(b) an action for partition; and
(c) any other court proceedings that directly affect the title to the land or the building thereon or the use or the
occupation thereof.
Additionally, this Court has held that resorting to lis pendens is not necessarily confined to cases that involve title to or
possession of real property. This annotation also applies to suits seeking to establish a right to, or an equitable estate
or interest in, a specific real property; or to enforce a lien, a charge or an encumbrance against it.
Apparently, AE proceeds on the premise that its money claim involves the enforcement of a lien. Since the money claim is for
the nonpayment of materials and labor used in the construction of townhouses, the lien referred to would have to be that
provided under Article 2242 of the Civil Code (Contractors Lien).
However, a careful examination of AEs Complaint, as well as the reliefs it seeks, reveals that no such lien or interest over
the property was ever alleged. The Complaint merely asked for the payment of construction services and materials
plus damages, without mentioning much less asserting a lien or an encumbrance over the property. Verily, it was
a purely personal action and a simple collection case. It did not contain any material averment of any enforceable right,
interest or lien in connection with the subject property.
As it is, AEs money claim cannot be characterized as an action that involves the enforcement of a lien or an
encumbrance, one that would thus warrant the annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens. Indeed, the nature of an action is
determined by the allegations of the complaint.
COLLECTION CASE WITH DAMAGES NOT PROPER TO ENFORCE CONTRACTORS LIEN
Even assuming that AE had sufficiently alleged such lien or encumbrance in its Complaint, the annotation of the
Notice of Lis Pendens would still be unjustified, because a complaint for collection and damages is not the proper mode
for the enforcement of a contractors lien.
In J.L. Bernardo Construction v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained the concept of a contractors lien under Article 2242 of the
Civil Code and the proper mode for its enforcement as follows:
Specifically, the contractors lien claimed by the petitioners is granted under the third paragraph of Article
2242 which provides that the claims of contractors engaged in the construction, reconstruction or repair of
buildings or other works shall be preferred with respect to the specific building or other immovable property
constructed.
However, Article 2242 finds application when there is a concurrence of credits, i.e., when the same
specific property of the debtor is subjected to the claims of several creditors and the value of such
property of the debtor is insufficient to pay in full all the creditors . In such a situation, the question of
preference will arise, that is, there will be a need to determine which of the creditors will be paid ahead of the
others. Fundamental tenets of due process will dictate that this statutory lien should then only be
enforced in the context of some kind of a proceeding where the claims of all the preferred creditors
may be bindingly adjudicated, such as insolvency proceedings.
Clearly then, neither Article 2242 of the Civil Code nor the enforcement of the lien thereunder is applicable here,
because AEs Complaint failed to satisfy the foregoing requirements. Nowhere does it show that HCs property was
subject to the claims of other creditors or was insufficient to pay for all concurring debts. Moreover, the Complaint did
not pertain to insolvency proceedings or to any other action in which the adjudication of claims of preferred creditors could be
ascertained.
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5.
St. Mary of the Woods School v. Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati, G.R.No. 174290, January 20, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
Tomas Soriano, father of petitioner Marcial Soriano and respondent Hilario Soriano, owned a few parcels of land in Makati.
Tomas and his wife executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of Oro Development Corp (ODC) which covered said parcels of
land. By virtue of said Deed, ownership and title of the properties were transferred to ODC. Thereafter, ODC executed a
Deed of Sale in favor of St Mary involving the property.Tomas died intestate.
Later on, Hilario discovered that Tomas signature in the Deed of Assignment had been forged. So he filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Assignment and Deed of Sale and Cancellation of the TCTs in ODCs and St. Marys
name. By reason of this, a Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated on the titles of ODC.
Marcial Soriano, however, recognized the validity of the transfer of property. Thus, he sought to dismiss the case. RTC
dismissed the case. RTC denied the MR. So, Marcial filed a Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens which was granted. Hilario
appealed to the CA. Pending appeal, St. Mary mortgaged the property for 8M. Eventually, Hilarios appeal was granted and
Reinstated the Notice of Lis Pendens.
Aggrieved, Marcial filed this petition. They claim that the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens was valid and proper
because they were issued on the basis of Hilarios lack of interest/right over the properties.
DOCTRINE:
Granting arguendo that the present special civil action for certiorari can be given due course, the Court still finds that the CA did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion in granting Hilarios Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate Notice of Lis
Pendens.
Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over
property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy and
necessity, lis pendens is intended:
(1) to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated and to prevent
the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation; and
(2) to announce to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who
acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation
over said property.
A trial court has, however, the inherent POWER TO CANCEL a notice of lis pendens, under the express provisions of law.
As provided for by Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled on 2
grounds:
(1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party; or
(2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.
Considering that the dismissal of Hilarios Complaint by the RTC was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which Complaint
refers to the properties covered by TCTs No. 175209, No. 220977, and No. 220978 that bear the annotations of lis pendens, and
such properties therefore are irrefragably still the subject matter of litigation, the CA rightly saw the need for giving
notice to the public of such a fact. The necessity becomes even more compelling considering that St. Mary had
already entered into transactions with third parties involving the subject properties.
6.
Vicente v. Avera, G.R. No. 169970, January 20, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
Jovencio Rebuquiao was the registered owner of a parcel of land. In Oct 1 1987, the latter executed a Deed of Sale in favor of
Sps. Vicente over said land. On the other hand, Delia Avera alleged that on Oct 9 1987, sold the same land to her husband
Roberto Domingo. In 1991, Avera filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage wherein she asserted her exclusive
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ownership over said property. As such, a Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated. In 1997, Sps. Vicente possessed the property
and a new TCT was issued to them which carried over the Notice of Lis Pendens.
RTC finally declared the marriage of Avera and Domingo null and void and ordered their conjugal properties to be in Averas
custody. The same RTC also issued an Alias Writ of Execution ordering Sps. Vicente to vacate since the transfer was made
despite the annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens. Sps. Vicente sought to enjoin the implementation of the Alias Writ of
Execution and a TRO was issued. CA set this aside. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
Petitioners title to the property in dispute is not subject to the outcome of the litigation covered by the notice of lis
pendens. Section 24, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a purchaser of the property affected by the
notice of lis pendens is deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action only from the time of filing
such notice. Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reiterates this rule.
Thus, a notice of lis pendens affects a transferee pendente lite, who by virtue of the notice, is bound by any judgment,
which may be rendered for or against the transferor, and his title is subject to the results of the pending litigation.
A notice of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a right or a lien. It serves to protect the real rights
of the registrant while the case involving such rights is pending resolution. While the notice of lis pendens remains on a
certificate of title, the registrant could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it during the
litigation. Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any subsequent transaction affecting the land
involved would have to be subject to the outcome of the litigation. For this reason, the Court has pronounced that a
purchaser who buys registered land with full notice of the fact that it is in litigation between the vendor and a third
party stands in the shoes of his vendor and his title is subject to the incidents and result of the pending litigation.
In the case at bar, the notice of lis pendens does not affect petitioners title to the property in dispute. A notice of lis
pendens concerns litigation between a transferor and a third party, where the transferee who acquires land with a notice of
lis pendens annotated on the corresponding certificate of title stands in the shoes of his predecessor and in which case the
transferees title is subject to the results of the pending litigation. The notice of lis pendens does not concern litigation
involving Rebuquiao, who transferred his title to the property in dispute to petitioners , and his title. The notice of lis
pendens pertains to the Nullity case between Avera and Domingo. Since Rebuquiaos title to the property in dispute is
not subject to the results of the Nullity case , petitioners title to the same property is also not subject to the results of
the Nullity case.
7.
Aberca et al. v. Ver, et al., G.R. No. 166216, March 14, 2012
QUICKIE FACTS:
The case started when Aberca et al, as suspected subversives, were arrested, detained, and allegely tortured by Fabian Vers
forces. A Complaint for Damages were filed by Aberca et al but was eventually dismissed on motion of Ver et al through then
SolGen Estelito Mendoza. However, pending appeal, EDSA Revolution broke out.
In 1988, the SC declared to annul the Dismissal of the case and remanded the case to trial. However, the trial could not
proceed immediately because the records of the case were burned when the QC City Hall burned down. Thus, in 1989, Abera
et al sought to reconstitute the record of the case. When the Petition for Reconstitution was set for hearing, Ver et al were not
notified. Thus, it was granted.
Aberca was directed to report to the RTC the addresses and whereabouts of Ver et al. However, Aberca could not comply.
Instead, it sought to declare them in default. RTC denied the Motion to Declare in Default becauase Ver et al were not duly
notified by the SC decisin. RTC granted the request to serve Notice to File Answer by Publication After the Notices were
published in BALITA, no answer was still filed. Thus, RTC declared them in default. CA reversed. Hence, this petitition.
Aberca et al claims that the RTC did not err in declaring Ver et al in default and in allowing them to present evidence ex parte.
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DOCTRINE:
Procedural due process is that which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after
trial. It contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered affecting ones person or property.
Moreover, pursuant to the provisions of Section 5(5) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court adopted and
promulgated Sections 5, 6, 7, & 8 of Rule 13 concerning, among others, the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.
The above rules, thus, prescribe the modes of service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other
papers, namely:
(1) personal service;
(2) service by mail; and
(3) substituted service, in case service cannot be effected either personally or by mail.
The Rules of Court has been laid down to insure the orderly conduct of litigation and to protect the substantive rights of
all party litigants. It is for this reason that the basic rules on the modes of service provided under Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court have been made MANDATORY and, hence, should be STRICTLY FOLLOWED.
In the case at bench, the Ver et al were completely deprived of due process when they were declared in default based
on a defective mode of service service of notice to file answer by publication. The rules on service of pleadings,
motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other papers were not strictly followed in declaring the respondents in default. The
Court agrees with the CA that the RTC committed procedural lapses in declaring the respondents in default and in
allowing the petitioners to present evidence ex-parte.
As correctly observed by the CA, the RTCs August 17, 1990 Order was an attempt to serve a notice to file answer on the
respondents by personal service and/or by mail. These proper and preferred modes of service, however, were never
resorted to because the OSG abandoned them when the petitioners failed to comply with the August 17, 1990 RTC order
requiring them to report the addresses and whereabouts of the respondents. Nevertheless, there was still another less
preferred but proper mode of service available substituted service which is service made by delivering the copy to
the clerk of court, with proof of failure of both personal service and service by mail. Unfortunately, this substitute mode of
service was not resorted to by the RTC after it failed to effect personal service and service by mail. Instead, the RTC
authorized an unrecognized mode of service under the Rules , which was service of notice to file answer by
publication.
In view of the peculiar circumstances surrounding the case, the RTC should have instead directed the petitioners to exert
diligent efforts to notify the respondents either personally or by registered mail. In case the preferred modes were
impractical, the Court should have required the petitioners to at least report in writing why efforts exerted towards
personal service or service by mail failed. In other words, a convincing proof of an impossibility of personal service or
service by mail to the respondents should have been shown first. The RTC, thus, erred when it ruled that the publication
of a notice to file answer to the respondents substantially cured the procedural defect equivalent to lack of due
process. The RTC cannot just abandon the basic requirement of personal service and/or service by mail .
At any rate, the Court is of the view that personal service to the respondents was practicable under the circumstances
considering that they were well-known persons who used to occupy high government positions.
To stress, the ONLY MODES OF SERVICE of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers allowed by
the rules are personal service, service by mail and substituted service if either personal service or service by mail cannot be
made, as stated in Sections 6, 7 and 8 of Rule 13 of the Rules. Nowhere under this rule is service of notice to file answer
by publication is mentioned, much less recognized.
SERVICE BY PUBLICATION
Furthermore, the Court would like to point out that service by publication only applies to service of SUMMONS stated under
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court where the methods of service of summons in civil cases are:
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(1) personal service;

(2) substituted service;and
(3) service by publication.
Similarly, service by publication can apply to judgments, final orders and resolutions as provided under Section 9, Rule 13
of the Rules of Court, as follows:
SEC. 9. Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions. Judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served
either personally or by registered mail. When a party summoned by publication has failed to appear in
the action, judgments, final orders or resolutions against him shall be served upon him also by
publication at the expense of the prevailing party .
8.
FEU-NRMF v. FEU-NRMF AFW, G.R. No. 168362, October 16, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
As a result of the failure in negotiations between FEU and its workers unin, the unin filed a notice to strike. Thereafter,
FEU filed a Petition for the Assumption of Jurisdiction with the NLRC. The Secretary of Labor granted the Petition and
issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute which would effectively prohibit any strike or lockout.
However, in his certification, the NLRC process server claimed that at 4PM of Sep 5 1996, he attempted to serve a copy of the
Assumption of Jurisdiction Order to the unin officers but no one was around at the strike area. As such, he just posted
copies of the order at several conspicuous places within the premises of the hospital.
Claiming that they had no knowledge, the striking employees continued to hold the strike. Sec of Labor issued another order
directing all employees to return to work and for FEU to accept them under the same terms and conditions. Later FEU filed a
case before the NLRC contending that the unin staged a strike in defience of the Assumptio Order. LA declared the strike
ilegal and dismissed the unin officers. NLRC affirmed. CA reversed on the ground that no personal service was validly
effected by the process.
DOCTRINE:
The process server resorted to posting the Order when personal service was rendered impossible since the striking employees
were not present at the strike area. This mode of service, however, is not sanctioned by either the NLRC Revised Rules of
Procedure or the Revised Rules of Court. The pertinent provisions of the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure read:
Section 6. Service of Notices and Resolutions.
(a) Notices or summons and copies of orders, shall be served on the parties to the case personally by the
Bailiff or duly authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof or by registered mail;
Provided, That in special circumstances, service of summons may be effected in accordance with
the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court; Provided further, that in cases of decisions and final
awards, copies thereof shall be served on both parties and their counsel or representative by
registered mail; Provided further, that in cases where a party to a case or his counsel on record personally
seeks service of the decision upon inquiry thereon, service to said party shall be deemed effected upon
actual receipt thereof; Provided finally, that where parties are so numerous, service shall be made on counsel
and upon such number of complainants, as may be practicable, which shall be considered substantial
compliance with Article 224(a) of the Labor Code, as amended.
An Order issued by the Secretary of Labor assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute is NOT A FINAL JUDGMENT for
it does not dispose of the labor dispute with finality . Consequently, the rule on service of summons and orders, and
not the proviso on service of decisions and final awards, governs the service of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order.
Under the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure, service of copies of ORDERS should be made by the process server either
personally or through registered mail. However, due to the urgent nature of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order and
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the public policy underlying the injunction carried by the issuance of the said Order, service of copies of the same should
be made in the most expeditious and effective manner, without any delay, ensuring its immediate receipt by the intended
parties as may be warranted under the circumstances. Accordingly, in this case, personal service is the proper mode of
serving the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order.
It is also provided under the same rules that in special circumstances, service of summons may be effected in accordance
with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.
Let it be recalled that the process server merely posted copies of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order in conspicuous
places in the hospital. Such posting is not prescribed by the rules, nor is it even referred to when the said rules
enumerated the different modes of effecting substituted service , in case personal service is impossible by the absence of
the party concerned.
Clearly, personal service effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional requirement of due
process is accomplished. If, however, efforts to find the party concerned personally would make prompt service impossible,
service may be completed by substituted service, that is, by leaving a copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and
six in the evening, at the partys or counsels residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing
therein.
Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is therefore required that statutory restrictions for
effecting substituted service must be strictly, faithfully and fully observed. Failure to comply with this rule renders
absolutely void the substituted service along with the proceedings taken thereafter. The underlying principle of this rigid
requirement is that the person, to whom the orders, notices or summons are addressed, is made to answer for the
consequences of the suit even though notice of such action is made, not upon the party concerned, but upon another whom
the law could only presume would notify such party of the pending proceedings. Applying this principle in the case at bar ,
presumption of receipt of the copies of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order could not be lightly inferred from the
circumstances considering the adverse effect in case the parties failed to heed to the injunction directed by such
Order.
Merely posting copies of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order does not satisfy the rigid requirement for proper
service outlined by the above stated rules. Needless to say, the manner of service made by the process server was
invalid and irregular. Respondent union could not therefore be adjudged to have defied the said Order since it was not
properly apprised thereof. Accordingly, the strike conducted by the respondent union was valid under the circumstances.
9.
Republic v. BPI, 705 SCRA 650 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
DPWH filed an Expropriation case against portions of properties owned by BPI and Bayani Villanueva for the construction of
the Zapote-Alabang Flyover. On 25 Nov. 1998, the RTC set the FMV at 40K psm. On Dec. 15, 1998, the branch clerk issued
a Certification that the decision has become final, executory, and unappealable. Meanwhile, on Dec 16, 1998, BPI filed a
Motion for Partial New Trial to determine just compensation of the building which was not included in the determination of
just compensation. BPI claimed that the motion was timely filed since it only received a copy of the Decision on Dec 1, 1998.
RTC granted said Motion for Partial New Trial.
For failure of DPWH to appear in the hearing, BPI was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. On Sep 10, 1999, RTC set just
compensation for the building at 2.6M. DPWH filed MR which was granted. Thereafter, RTC set a new amount of just
compensation at 1.9M. DPWH appealed claiming that the Nov 1998 decision already attained finality. However, CA dismissed
the appeal stating when BPI filed the Motion, the Decision has not yet attained finality due to the absenceof any Return or
Affidavit of the party serving the Decision was attached.
DOCTRINE:
A perusal of the Certification reveals that it certifies that the 25 November 1998 Decision had already become final, executory
and unappealable as to petitioner:
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The Decision in this case dated November 25, 1998 has become FINAL, EXECUTORY and
UNAPPEALABLE as of December 11, 1998 considering that the Office of the Solicitor General failed
to file any Notice of Appeal or Motion for Reconsideration despite receipt of a copy thereof on
November 26, 1998.
There can be no other reading of this certificate that would be supported by the record. Section 9 of Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court states that judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail. Section 13
of the same Rule provides what consists PROOF OF SERVICE:
Proof of PERSONAL SERVICE shall consist of a written admission of the party served, or the official
return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and
manner of service. x x x If service is made by REGISTERED MAIL, proof shall be made by such affidavit
and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately
upon its receipt by the sender.
A careful review of the record shows the absence of any proof that the Decision of 25 November 1998 was served upon
BPI. Hence, the CA correctly held that absent any proof of service to BPI of the Decision, the period of 15 days within
which to file its motion for partial new trial did not begin to run against BPI. However, BPIs admission that it
received a copy of the Decision on 01 December 1998 is binding on it , and was correctly considered by the CA as the
reckoning date to count the 15-day period.
XII.
SUMMONS (RULE 14)
1.
Cada v. Time Saver, G.R. No. 181480, January 30, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
Josefina Cada worked as a Presser at Time Saver Laundry, a single proprietorship owned by Leslie Perez. For allegedly failing
top pay her overtime pay and other employment benefits, she filed a case for illegal dismissal and underpayment of salary with
against Time Saver in the NLRC.
The bailiff sought to serve summons on Leslie Perez personally. However, since she was out of town, it was served upon one
of Cadas co-workers Alfredo Perez.
Time Saver/Perez failed to appear so the LA heard the case ex parte. Based on Cadas position papers, the LA ruled in her
favor. Time Saver/Perez appealed to the NLRC on the ground of improper service of summons. Nonetheless, NLRC
affirmed the LA stating that they were given opportunity to be heard. In the CA, NLRC was reversed stating that considering
that the summons were not personally served upon Leslie Perez, no jurisdiction was properly acquired over her person.
DOCTRINE:
Based on the NLRC Rules, notices or summonses shall be served on the parties to the case personally . The same rule
allows under special circumstances, that service of summons may be effected in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court.
Following the explicit language of the NLRC Rules, service of summons on respondent Perez should be made personally. But
was personal service of summons practicable? Conversely, was substituted service of summons justified? Obviously, in this
case, personal service of summons was not practicable. By Leslie Perezs own admission, she was out of town
during the entire proceedings before the Labor Arbiter . Given this admission, she would be unable to personally
receive the summons and later the notices from the Labor Arbiter.
Thus, even if the bailiff would return at some other time to personally serve the summons on respondent Perez, it
would still yield the same result. To proceed with personal service of summons on respondent Perez who
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unequivocally admits that she was out of town during the entire proceedings before the Labor Arbiter would not
only be impractical and futile - it would be absurd.
While we are not unmindful of the NLRC rules which state that service of summons should be made personally,
considering the circumstances in the instant case, we find that service of summons at TSL, Leslie Perezs place of
business, amounts to SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE with the Rules.
In the fairly recent case of Scenarios v. Vinluan, service of summons by registered mail at therein petitioners place of
business was considered valid. This Court declared in the said case that technical rules of procedure are not strictly
applied in quasi-judicial proceedings; only substantial compliance is required. That the summons was served in the
premises of therein petitioners office was enough to convince the court that the service of said processes was completed and
resultantly, the requirement of notice has been served.
In QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE NLRC and its ARBITRATION BRANCH, procedural rules governing
service of summons are not strictly construed. Substantial compliance thereof is sufficient. The constitutional
requirement of due process with respect to service of summons only exacts that the service of summons be such as may
reasonably be expected to give the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes that
end, the requirement of justice is answered, the traditional notion of fair play is satisfied, due process is served.
To apply the technical rules on service of summons would be to overturn the bias of the Constitution and the laws in
favor of labor. In labor cases, punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules maybe relaxed in the interest of the working
man; it should not defeat the complete and equitable resolution of the rights and obligations of the parties.
Moreover, it is a legal presumption, based on wisdom and experience, that official duty has been regularly performed;
that the proceedings of a judicial (and quasijudicial) tribunal are regular and valid, and that judicial (quasi-judicial) acts and
duties have been and will be duly and properly performed. The burden of proving the irregularity in official conduct, if any, is
on the part of respondents who, in this case, clearly failed to discharge the same.
2.
Pascual v. Pascual, G.R. No. 171916, December 4, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
Constantino Pascual filed an Action for Specific Performance in RTC of Malolos against Lourdes Pascual. In the Process
Servers Return, it indicated that:
May 20, 2002: He went to Lourdes house in QC but the latter was not home and her maid refused to receive summons. He
then requested the Barangay for a certifcation that he exerted efforts to effect service. The next day, Lourdes was still not at
her house. On May 29, 2002, an Alias Summons was issued. Still, the maid said she was not at her house even though her car
was there and neighbors verified that she was just inside. As such, the Alias Summons was returned unserved. On August 14,
2002, the Process Server reported that he effected Substituted Service by leaving a copy to the maid who is of age and of
reason but refused to sign.
For failure of Lourdes to file an Answer, Constantino moved to declare her in default. RTC granted said motion and allowed
Constantino to present evidence ex parte. RTC ruled in Constantinos favor ordering Lourdes not to interfere in the corporate
affairs of Rosemoor Mining. On appeal, CA reversed the RTC decisin. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
In a case where the ACTION IS IN PERSONAM and the DEFENDANT IS IN THE PHILIPPINES, the service of summons may
be done by personal or substituted service as laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. A plain
and simple reading of the provisions indicates that personal service of summons should and always be the first option,
and it is only when the said summons cannot be served within a reasonable time can the process server resort to
substituted service.
This Court gave an in-depth discussion as to the NATURE and REQUISITES of substituted service in Manotoc v. Court of
Appeals, et al.:
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(1) IMPOSSIBILITY OF PROMPT PERSONAL SERVICE: The party relying on substituted service or the
sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt
service.
(2) SPECIFIC DETAILS IN THE RETURN: The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts
and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the
defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return.
(3) A PERSON OF SUITABLE AGE AND DISCRETION: If the substituted service will be effected at
defendants house or residence, it should be left with a person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein.
(4) A COMPETENT PERSON IN CHARGE: If the substituted service will be done at defendants office or
regular place of business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the place. Thus,
the person on whom the substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or
business of defendant, such as the president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient
knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the
prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons.
Constantino contends that there was a valid substituted service of summons as shown in not one, but three Officers Return.
He points out that the absence in the officers return of a statement about the impossibility of personal service does not
conclusively prove that the service was invalid. He adds that proof of prior attempts to serve personally can be deduced from
the other returns when there are several in a series of officers returns all tending to establish the impossibility of personal
service upon the respondent. However, the said argument of the petitioner is merely a plain deduction that veers away
from the well-established requisite that the officer must show that the defendant cannot be served promptly , or that
there was an impossibility of prompt service .
The above Return of Summons does not show or indicate the actual exertion or any POSITIVE STEPS taken by the
officer or process server in serving the summons personally to the defendant. As in Jose v. Boyon, this Court ruled that:
The Return of Summons shows no effort was actually exerted and no positive step taken by either the
process server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on respondents. At best, the
Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such
information was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof . Certainly, without specifying the
details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general
statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of
substituted service of summons.
The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the
proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service
cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of
service. It is a method extraordinary in character and, hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute.
Petitioner further states that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions must be applied to the
present case. The said argument, however, is only meritorious, provided that there was a strict compliance with the
procedure for serving a summons. In the absence of even the barest compliance with the procedure for a substituted
service of summons outlined in the Rules of Court, the presumption of regularity in the performance of public
functions does not apply.
Applying the above disquisitions, the jurisdiction over the person of the respondent was never vested with the RTC,
because the manner of substituted service by the process server was apparently invalid and ineffective. As such, there
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was a violation of due process. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or
the defendants voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the courts
jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is null and void.
3.
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130974, August 16, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
Trajano sought to enforce a foreign judgment against Imee Marcos-Manotoc by the US District Court of Hawaii. As such,
Summons was served to Manotocs representative, Macky dela Cruz (caretaker) at Alexandria Condo in Pasig. For her failure
to file an Answer, the RTC ordered her to be in default. By special appearance of her counsel, she filed a Motion to Dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction over her person due to invalid service of summons because she was a resident of Singapore,
Alexandria was not her dwelling, residence, or place of business, Dela Cruz was not her representative, and that the Rule on
Summons was not complied with.
During the hearing for the Motion to Dismiss, she presented a resident of Alexandria who testified that she he only saw Imee
twice. She also presented her Passport showing that she was in Singapore at that time. On the other hand, Trajano presented a
lawyer in the Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation who said that Bong Bong confirmed Imees residence in Alexandria
in his deposition.
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. CA affirmed and stated that there was valid substituted service. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendants voluntary
appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the courts jurisdiction or when there is no valid
service of summons, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.
In an ACTION STRICTLY IN PERSONAM, personal service on the defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by
handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be served with
the summons within a reasonable period, then substituted service can be resorted to . While substituted service of
summons is permitted, it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual method of service. Hence, it must
faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules. Indeed,
compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much important as the issue of due process as of
jurisdiction.
REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBSTITUTED SERVICE, see previous case
INVALID SUBSTITUTED SERVICE
A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the absence of material data on the serious efforts to
serve the Summons on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in the Return why those
efforts proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal service has become impossible or unattainable
outside the generally couched phrases of on many occasions several attempts were made to serve the summons personally, at reasonable
hours during the day, and to no avail for the reason that the said defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence or premises. Wanting in
detailed information, the Return deviates from the ruling in Domagas v. Jensen and other related cases that the pertinent
facts and circumstances on the efforts exerted to serve the summons personally must be narrated in the Return. It
cannot be determined how many times, on what specific dates, and at what hours of the day the attempts were
made. Given the fact that the substituted service of summons may be assailed, as in the present case, by a Motion to Dismiss,
it is imperative that the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the service of summons be described with
more particularity in the Return or Certificate of Service.
Besides, apart from the allegation of petitioners address in the Complaint, it has not been shown that respondent Trajano
or Sheriff Caelas, who served such summons, exerted extraordinary efforts to locate petitioner. Certainly, the second
paragraph of the Complaint only states that respondents were informed, and so [they] allege about the address and
whereabouts of petitioner. Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an effort in good faith
to locate the defendant through more direct means. More so, in the case in hand, when the alleged petitioners residence
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or house is doubtful or has not been clearly ascertained, it would have been better for personal service to have been pursued
persistently.
Moreover, to allow sheriffs to describe the facts and circumstances in inexact terms would encourage routine
performance of their precise duties relating to substituted service for it would be quite easy to shroud or conceal
carelessness or laxity in such broad terms. Lastly, considering that monies and properties worth millions may be lost by a
defendant because of an irregular or void substituted service, it is but only fair that the Sheriffs Return should clearly and
convincingly show the impracticability or hopelessness of personal service.
PERSON OF SUITABLE AGE AND DISCRETION
Granting that such a general description be considered adequate, there is still a serious nonconformity from the
requirement that the summons must be left with a person of suitable age and discretion residing in defendants
house or residence. Thus, there are 2 requirements under the Rules:
(1) recipient must be a person of suitable age and discretion; and
(2) recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant.
Both requirements were not met. In this case, the Sheriffs Return lacks information as to residence, age, and discretion
of Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside from the sheriffs general assertion that de la Cruz is the resident caretaker of petitioner as
pointed out by a certain Ms. Lyn Jacinto, alleged receptionist and telephone operator of Alexandra Homes. It is doubtful if
Mr. de la Cruz is residing with Manotoc in the condominium unit considering that a married woman of her stature
in society would unlikely hire a male caretaker to reside in her dwelling . With the petitioners allegation that Macky de la
Cruz is not her employee, servant, or representative, it is necessary to have additional information in the Return of Summons.
Besides, Mr. Macky de la Cruzs refusal to sign the Receipt for the summons is a strong indication that he did not
have the necessary relation of confidence with petitioner. To protect petitioners right to due process by being
accorded proper notice of a case against her, the substituted service of summons must be shown to clearly comply with the
rules.
Based on the above principles, Trajano failed to demonstrate that there was strict compliance with the requirements of
the then Section 8, Rule 14 (now Section 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). Due to non-compliance with the
prerequisites for valid substituted service, the proceedings held before the trial court perforce must be annulled.
4.
Sansio v. Mogol, G.R. No. 177007, July 14, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
Sps. Mogol purchased aircon units and fans from Sansio Philippines and paid with postdated checks. However, some of them
bounced. So Sansio filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages against Sps Mogol in the MTC of Manila. In the
Complaint, it stated that service of process to the Sps will be made at their residence in Lucena City.
When the case was filed, the Process Server of MTC Manila served the Summons and the Copy of the Complaint to the Sps.
Mogol at the courtroom in Branch 24 since they were already in the premises while waiting for their hearing in a violation of
BP22 case filed by Sansio. Upon being informed of said summons, Sps. Mogol referred it to their lawyer. Said lawyer then
informed the process server that summons can only be served on the address indicated in the Complaint. So, he gave the
summons back to the Process Server.
A Return of Service was given to MTC which reported what had happened. For failure to file any responsive pleading, Sansio
moved to declare the Sps. Mogol in default despite valid personal service of summons. They also prayed that judgment be
rendered in their favor. Sps. Mogol opposed contending that there was no valid service of summons.
DOCTRINE:
A summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him or her. In a CIVIL ACTION,
jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendants voluntary appearance in
court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the courts jurisdiction, or when there is no valid service of
summons, any judgment of the court, which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, is null and void. Where the
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action is in personam, i.e., one that seeks to impose some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant
through the judgment of a court, and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be made through
personal or substituted service in the manner provided for in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to
him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. PERSONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS most effectively
ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished . The essence of
personal service is the handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself, wherever he may be
found; that is, wherever he may be, provided he is in the Philippines.
In the instant case, the Court finds that there was already a valid service of summons in the persons of spouses Mogol.
To recapitulate, the process server presented the summons and the copy of the complaint to respondent spouses at
the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24. The latter immediately referred the matter to their counsel, who was
present with them in the aforesaid courtroom. At the express direction of his clients, the counsel took the summons and the
copy of the complaint, read the same, and thereby informed himself of the contents of the said documents. Ineluctably, at
that point, the act of the counsel of respondent spouses Mogol of receiving the summons and the copy of the
complaint already constituted receipt on the part of his clients, for the same was done with the latters behest and
consent. Already accomplished was the operative act of handing a copy of the summons to respondent spouses in person.
Thus, jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol was already acquired by the MeTC of Manila,
Branch 25. That being said, the subsequent act of the counsel of respondent spouses of returning the summons and
the copy of the complaint to the process server was no longer material .
Furthermore, the instruction of the counsel for respondent spouses not to obtain a copy of the summons and the
copy of the complaint, under the lame excuse that the same must be served only in the address stated therein, was a gross
mistake.
Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court does not require that the service of summons on the defendant in person must
be effected only at the latters residence as stated in the summons. On the contrary, said provision is crystal clear that,
whenever practicable, summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant; or if he refuses to receive
and sign for it, by tendering it to him. Nothing more is required. As correctly held by the RTC of Manila, Branch 50, the
service of the copy of the summons and the complaint inside the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24 was
the most practicable act under the circumstances, and the process server need not wait for respondent spouses
Mogol to reach their given address, i.e., at 1218 Daisy St., Employee Village, Lucena City, before he could serve on the
latter the summons and the copy of the complaint. Due to the distance of the said address, service therein would have
been more costly and would have entailed a longer delay on the part of the process server in effecting the service of
the summons.
PERSONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS IS PREFERRED OVER SUBSTITUTED SERVICE

Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court cannot be construed to apply simultaneously. Said provisions do not
provide for alternative modes of service of summons, which can either be resorted to on the mere basis of convenience to
the parties. Under our procedural rules, service of summons in the persons of the defendants is generally preferred over
substituted service.
Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is an extraordinary method, since it seeks to
bind the respondent or the defendant to the consequences of a suit, even though notice of such action is served not upon him
but upon another whom the law could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings. For substituted service
to be justified, the following circumstances must be clearly established:
(a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible;
(b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and
(c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the partys residence or
upon a competent person in charge of the partys office or place of business.
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Relevantly, in Lazaro v. Rural Bank of Francisco Balagtas (Bulacan), Inc., very categorical was our statement that the service of
summons to be done personally does not mean that service is possible only at the defendants actual residence. It is
enough that the defendant is handed a copy of the summons in person by anyone authorized by law .
5.
Republic v. Glasgow, G.R. No. 170281, January 18, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
Republic filed a Complaint for Civil Forefeiture of Assets (with Urgent Plea for Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injuction) against the bank deposits of Glasgow in Citystate Savings Bank Inc (CSBI) pursuant to the Anti-Money Laundering
Act. After being raffled, its hearing for its application of WPI was set. After the hearing, WPI was granted.
Meanwhile, summons to Glasgow was returned unserved since it could not be found in its last known address. As such,
Republic filed an mnibus motion for issuance of Alias Summons and Leave of Court to Serve Summons by Publication.
However the RTC only directed the issuance of Alias Summons.
For not being able to serve the Alias Summons, the RTC archived the case. Upon motion of Republic, the case was reinstated
and directed again the Republic to serve the Alias Summons o Glasgow & CSBI. However, it still did not resolve on the
motion regarding Summons by Publication. The Alias Summons on Glasgow was again returned unserved for the same
reason.
Thereafter, Glasgow filed a Motion to Dimiss (By Way of Special Appearance) on the ground of Failure to Prosecute which
was received by the OSG. RTC dismissed the case over the Republics objections. Hence, this Petition.
DOCTRINE:
There was no failure to prosecute. Given these circumstances, how could the Republic be faulted for failure to prosecute
the complaint for civil forfeiture? While there was admittedly a delay in the proceeding , it could not be entirely or
primarily ascribed to the Republic . That Glasgows whereabouts could not be ascertained was not only beyond the
Republics control, it was also attributable to Glasgow which left its principal office address without informing the
Securities and Exchange Commission or any official regulatory body (like the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the
Department of Trade and Industry) of its new address. Moreover, as early as October 8, 2003, the Republic was already
seeking leave of court to serve summons by publication.
In Marahay v. Melicor, this Court ruled:
While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such power is
whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with
reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a
wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the
case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority to dismiss.
We see no pattern or scheme on the part of the Republic to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the
mandatory requirement of the rules. The trial court should not have so eagerly wielded its power to dismiss the Republics
complaint.
SERVICE OF SUMMONS MAY BE BY PUBLICATION
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, this Court declared that the rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem. While
that case involved forfeiture proceedings under
RA 1379, the same principle applies in cases for civil forfeiture under RA 9160, as amended, since both cases do not terminate
in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the properties either acquired illegally or related to unlawful
activities in favor of the State.
As an action in rem, it is a proceeding against the thing itself instead of against the person. In actions in rem or quasi in
rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to conferring jurisdiction on the court ,
provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant
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in order to satisfy the requirements of due process.For this purpose, service may be made by publication as such
mode of service is allowed in actions in rem and quasi in rem.
In this connection, Section 8, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:
Sec. 8. Notice and manner of service. (a) The respondent shall be given notice of the petition in the same
manner as service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and the following rules:
(1) The notice shall be served on respondent personally, or by any other means prescribed in Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court;
(2) The notice shall contain: (i) the title of the case; (ii) the docket number; (iii) the cause of action; and (iv)
the relief prayed for; and
(3) The notice shall likewise contain a proviso that, if no comment or opposition is filed within the
reglementary period, the court shall hear the case ex parte and render such judgment as may be warranted
by the facts alleged in the petition and its supporting evidence.
(b) Where the respondent is designated as an unknown owner or whenever his whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected
upon him by publication of the notice of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation in such
places and for such time as the court may order. In the event that the cost of publication exceeds the
value or amount of the property to be forfeited by ten percent, publication shall not be required.
6.
Palma v. Galvez, G.R.No. 165273, March 10, 2010
QUICKIE FACTS:
Leah Palma filed an Action for Damages against Phil. Heart Center, Dr. Giron, and Dr. Cruz for medical malpractice in
negligently removing her right ovary. Answers were thereafter filed. Subsequently, however, Palma filed a Motion for Leave to
Admit Amended Complaint praying for the inclusin of the nurses at PHC including prvate repsondent Agudo. After the
RTC granted the Motion, summons were issued to them.
RTCs process server submitted his return stating that the alias summons and copies of the complaint were served upon
Agudo thru her husband who received and signed the same since Agudo was temporarily out of the country (Ireland).
Thereafter, Agudos lawyer filed a Notice of Appearance and Motion for the Extension of Time to File Answer. Days later,
another Motion for Extension was filed stating that the draft Answer would still be coursed through the Phil. Consulate in
Ireland for the clarification of Agudo.
Thereafter, Agudo filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure of the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over her person as she was not
served with summons properly. According to the RTC, considering she was a resident temporarily out of the country, she can
only be served summons by publication. Over Palmas objections, RTC dismissed the Complaint for invalid service of
summons. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
In CIVIL CASES, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by the service of summons
or by the latters voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of the former. Agudo was a Filipino resident who
was temporarily out of the Philippines at the time of the service of summons; thus, service of summons on her is
governed by Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. When an action is commenced against a defendant who
ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court,
be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section.
The preceding section referred to in the above provision is Section 15, which speaks of extraterritorial service, thus:
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SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service. When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and
the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within
the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the
relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the
property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be
effected out of the Philippines by PERSONAL SERVICE as under section 6; or BY PUBLICATION in a
newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which
case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known
address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting
such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within
which the defendant must answer.
In Montefalcon v. Vasquez, we said that because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words may and also, it is not mandatory.
Other methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a
defendant-resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines. Thus, if a RESIDENT DEFENDANT is TEMPORARILY OUT
OF THE COUNTRY, any
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
of the following modes of service may be resorted to:
substituted service set forth in section 7 (formerly Section 8), Rule 14;
personal service outside the country, with leave of court;
service by publication, also with leave of court; or
in any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Considering that Agudo was temporarily out of the country, the summons and complaint may be validly served on her
through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 which reads:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time
as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein , or (b) by
leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.
We have held that a dwelling, house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the summons is living
at the time when the service is made , even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. It is, thus, the
service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left with the person of suitable age and discretion
residing in the house of the defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as important as the
issue of due process as that of jurisdiction.
Section 7 also designates the persons with whom copies of the process may be left. The rule presupposes that such a
relation of confidence exists between the person with whom the copy is left and the defendant and, therefore, assumes that
such person will deliver the process to defendant or in some way give him notice thereof.
In this case, the Sheriffs Return stated that Augdo was out of the country; thus, the service of summons was made at her
residence with her husband, Alfredo P. Agudo, acknowledging receipt thereof. Alfredo was presumably of suitable age and
discretion, who was residing in that place and, therefore, was competent to receive the summons on private
respondents behalf.
Notably, Agudo makes no issue as to the fact that the place where the summons was served was her residence,
though she was temporarily out of the country at that time , and that Alfredo is her husband. In fact, in the notice of
appearance and motion for extension of time to file answer submitted by private respondents counsel, he confirmed
the Sheriffs Return by stating that private respondent was out of the country and that his service was ngaged by respondents
husband.
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These statements establish the fact that Agudo had knowledge of the case filed against her, and that her husband had
told her about the case as Alfredo even engaged the services of her counsel.
In addition, we agree with petitioner that the RTC had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the person of Agudo when the
latters counsel entered his appearance on Agudos behalf , without qualification and without questioning the
propriety of the service of summons, and even filed 2 Motions for Extension of Time to File Answer.
7.
Acance v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159699, March 16, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
Angela Paglicawan was first married to one Vernier Quijano. They bore 3 children (Yolanda, Epifania, Napoleon, respondents
herein). The spouses thereafter bcame estranged causing their separation. Vernier lived in Mindoro while Angela worked and
lived in Muntinlupa. While working thereat, she met Jesus Asance and lived together as as common law spouses and bore
Jesulito, Manuel, and Nestor (petitioners herein).
In 1966, Angela worked as a nurse in the US. With her earnings, she bought a parcel of land in Muntinlupa. When Vernier
Quiano died, Angela married Jesus. Thereafter Jesus died. The Acance siblings with Angela sought an extrajudicial settlement
of the estate which includes the Muntinlupa property. As a result, TCTs were issued in the name of the Asance siblings.
As such, the Quijanos filed in the RTC of Muntinlupa an Action to Annul the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of JEsus
Asance and Waiver of Rights executed by Acance. They claim that they have a valid right to succeed over the Muntinlupa
property especially considering that it was acquired during the subsistence of Angelas marriage with Vernier.
Upon motion of the Quijanos were able to ask the RTC to declare Asance in default for failure to file an Answer. A Motion to
Lift Order of Default was thereafter filed which was denied. The RTC said that being residents of the US and the subject of
the complaint being situated in Muntinlupa, they were deemed served with summons through publication thereof in a
newspaper of general circulation. Despite said publicaiton, no Answer was filed.
In certiorari, the Asance went to the CA but were denied. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
In this case, the court a quo acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the Acance spouses in default without
showing that there was full compliance with the requirements for extraterritorial service of summons under Section
15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The said provision reads:
Sec. 15. Extraterritorial service. When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines,
and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property
within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in
which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or
the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be
effected out of the Philippines by PERSONAL SERVICE as under Section 6; or BY PUBLICATION in a
newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which
case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address
of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall
specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant
must answer.
The Acance spouses are citizens of the United States and residents thereof. Further, the suit against them involves
real property wherein they have an interest. These facts clearly warranted extraterritorial service of summons in accordance
with Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The rationale for service of summons on a nonresident defendant is
explained, thus:
We repeat, service of summons on a nonresident defendant who is not found in the country is
required, not for purposes of physically acquiring jurisdiction over his person but simply in pursuance of
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the requirements of fair play, so that he may be informed of the pendency of the action against him
and the possibility that the property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an
interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of a resident , and that he may thereby be accorded an
opportunity to defend in the action, if he be so minded. The only relief that may be granted in such an
action against such a nonresident defendant, who does not choose to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the
Philippine court, is limited to the res.
In its Order dated April 26, 2002, the court a quo declared the petitioners in default. However, as will be shown shortly, the
service of summons in this case is defective. There was no showing that copies of the summons and the amended
complaint were duly served at the petitioners last known correct address by registered mail , as a complement to the
publication pursuant to Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and in compliance with the court a quos Order dated July 1,
2001 granting the respondents motion for leave to serve summons by publication.
The respondents alleged that they had caused copies of the Amended Complaint and Summons and the 1 July 2001 Order to
be sent on November 13, 2001 by registered mail to the Acances known addresses in the United States. However, except
for this bare allegation, the corresponding registry receipts or copies thereof were not presented to show compliance
with the rules.
NO PROOF OF SERVICE BY PUBLICATION
Further, there was likewise non-compliance with Section 19, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court relating to the proof of service
by publication. The said provision reads:
Sec. 19. Proof of service by publication. If the service has been made by publication, service may be proved by the
affidavit of the printer, his foreman, or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager, to
which affidavit a copy of the publication shall be attached, and by an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the
summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by
registered mail to his last known address.
While the respondents claimed that they had complied with the service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation, it does not appear that they had presented the court a quo the affidavit of the printer, his foreman, or
principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the Remate, where the publication was allegedly
made, to prove such service by publication.
Neither did they present an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order of publication in the
post office, postage prepaid, directed to the petitioners by registered mail to their last known addresses.
The failure to strictly comply correctly with the requirements of the rules regarding the mailing of copies of the summons
and the order for its publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons.
Under the circumstances, the setting aside of the order of default is in order. The petitioners should be afforded the
opportunity to present evidence on their behalf in order that substantial justice is achieved .
8.
Cabigao v. Nery, 707 SCRA 424 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Atty. Cabigao represented Vision Automotive Technology in a case before the MTC of Manila. Sheriff Nery called his client
and asked for Money to cover the transportation expenses in serving summons to the defendant in New Manila. Accordingly,
his client deposited P1,000 in Nerys account in Land Bank. However, despite receipt of said money, Nery still failed to serve
summons. As a result, Atty. Cabiga filed an administrative complaint against Nery.
Nery denied and said it was a representative of Vision Automotive who insiste don depositing the money after Nery told them
that it was burdensome to withdraw the amount from the Sheriffs Trust Fund. Likewise, he avered that he never meant to
tarnish the image of the judiciary when he accepted the money. Also, he said he already served summons on March 2012 and
then returned the remaining balance of what was deposited.
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OCA recommended that he was liable for simple neglect and less serious dishonesty
DOCTRINE:
Summons to the defendant in a case shall forthwith be issued by the clerk of court upon the filing of the complaint and the
payment of the requisite legal fees. Once issued by the clerk of court, it is the duty of the sheriff, process server or any other
person serving court processes to serve the summons to the defendant efficiently and expeditiously. Failure to do so
constitutes simple neglect of duty, which is the failure of an employee to give ones attention to a task expected of him, and
signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.
It took Nery more than two months to serve the summons to the defendant in Civil Case No. 01785-SC from the time the
same was raffled to their branch. Civil Case No. 01785-SC was raffled to the MeTC of Manila, Branch 30, on January 13, 2012;
Nery was only able to serve the summons on the defendant therein only on March 16, 2012. Explaining the delay in the
service of the summons, Nery claims that Vision Automotive, from the time it deposited the P1,000.00 in his bank account,
no longer coordinated with him as regards the service of the summons. Nerys reasoning is flawed. The supposed lack of
coordination on the part of Vision Automotive would not hinder the service of the summons to the defendant in Civil Case
No. 01785-SC. To stress, once issued by the clerk of court, it becomes the duty of the sheriff, process server or any
other person serving court processes to promptly serve the summons on the defendant in a case.
There being no sufficient justification for his delay in serving the summons on the defendant in the said case, Nery
clearly disregarded his duty to promptly serve the Summons on the defendant in Civil Case No. 01785-SC and should
thus be held liable for simple neglect of duty.
SHERIFFS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO RECEIVE PAYMENTS FROM PARTIES
It is likewise improper for Nery to ask and actually receive money from Vision Automotive, even if the money would be used
to defray the expenses in serving the summons to the defendant in Civil Case No. 01785-SC. Sheriffs are not allowed to
receive any payments from the parties in the course of the performance of their duties. They cannot just unilaterally
demand sums of money from the parties without observing the proper procedural steps .
Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, outlines the procedure to be observed in
defraying the actual travel expenses in serving summons. Accordingly, the plaintiff in a case is required to deposit the
amount of P1,000.00 with the clerk of court, which would be used to defray the actual travel expenses in serving the
summons. The sheriff, process server or any other person authorized to serve court processes would then submit to the
court a statement of estimated travel expenses for the service of the summons. Once the court approves the statement
of estimated travel expenses, the clerk of court shall release the money to the sheriff, process server or any other person
authorized to serve court processes.
Nery failed to follow the foregoing procedure and, instead, opted to ask Vision Automotive to defray the actual travel
expenses that would be incurred in serving the summons to the defendant.
WHEREFORE, respondent Neptali Angelo V. Nery, Sheriff III of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 30, is
found GUlLTY of less serious dishonesty, and is hereby ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of P20,000.00. Neptali Angelo
V. Nery is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record.
XIII.
Motions (Rule 15)
1.
Republic v. Peralta, G.R. No. 150327, June 18, 2003
QUICKIE FACTS:
Peralta et al are the heirs of one Benedicto Alonday. The latter was granted a Homestead Patent by the DENR over a lot in
Davao. Title was thereafter issued in his name. In 1969, Bureau of Forest Development sought permission to use a portion of
said property. Instead, BFD constructed a building on it. Benedictos lawyer demanded for the BFD to vacate.
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Failing this, Peralta filed a Complaint for Recovery and Ownership of Real Property in the RTC of Davao. RTC ruled in favor
of Peralta and orded the Republic to vacate the property and remove all improvements thereon.
Days before the expiration of the period to appeal, on May 30, 1997, Republic filed through registered mail a Motion for
Reconsideration of the RTC decison. However, the RTC expunged the MR on the ground that it failed to incorporate any
notice of hearing as required by the Rules. From this decisin, Republic filed a Notice of Appeal. In opposition, Peralta et al
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the MR was a mere scap of paper and thus did not toll the running of the
Pending all this, the RTC judge retired. The new judge issued an order giving due course to Republics Appeal but was again
reversed in light of jurisprudence brought to its attention. Peralta et al then moved for the execution which was granted.
Republic filed an MR assailing the dismissal of it Appeal as well as the granting of the Writ of Execution. MR denied.
On certiorari in the CA, Republics petition was again dismissed. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
The Court agrees with the CA that the OSG was negligent when it filed on May 30, 1997 the defective motion for
reconsideration. Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for reconsideration or a motion for a new
trial shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefor, a written notice of which shall be served by the movant
on the adverse party. Such written notice is that prescribed in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Under
Section 4, paragraph 2 of said rule , a notice of hearing on a motion shall be served by the movant to all the parties
concerned at least 3 days before the date of hearing. Section 5 of the same rule requires that the notice of hearing shall
be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and place of the hearing of the motion. The requirements,
far from being merely technical and procedural as claimed by the petitioners, are vital elements of procedural due process.
Since the Rules of Court do not fix any period within which the said party may file his reply or opposition, the trial court
would have no way of determining whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion and, if he objects, to hear him on
his objection. Hence, the need for the movant to set the time and place of hearing of its motion. The requirements
entombed in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are mandatory and noncompliance therewith is fatal
and renders the motion pro forma;a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which
the court has no authority to act upon. In cases of motions for a new trial or for the reconsideration of a judgment, the
running of the period for appeal is not tolled by the mere filing or pendency of said motion.
In this case, the petitioners, through the OSG, received on May 20, 1997 the decision of the RTC; hence, they had until June
4, 1997 within which to file their motion for reconsideration or for a new trial or to perfect their appeal from said
adverse decision. Although the petitioners filed the motion for reconsideration dated May 30, 1997 within the
reglementary period, said motion failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15. The records show that there is no
proof that Peralta et al were actually served with a copy of said motion, as required by Section 10, Rule 13 of the Rules
of Court. The OSG did not bother to file an amended motion for reconsideration containing the requirements of
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
2.
Preysler v. Manila Southcoast, G.R. No. 171872, June 28, 2010
QUICKIE FACTS:
Preysler Jr. filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against MS. It alleged that Preyslers property in Nasugbu covered by TCT
overlapped with MS TCT. MTC ruled in favor of Preysler and ordered MS to vacate. On appeal, RTC reversed and dismissed
Preyslers Complaint.
Preysler received the RTC Decision on Feb 9, 2004 and then filed an MR which was set for hearing on Feb 26, 2004. Preysler
sent a copy of the MR to MS through registrered mail on Feb. 23, 2004. However, it was only on March 3, 2004, or 6 days
after the scheduled hearing that MS received a copy of the MR.
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During the scheduled hearing, the judge reset the hearing to April 2. Thereafter, it was again rescheduled to April 7. Finally,
said hearing was reset to August 6. After the hearing, MS filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the 3-Day Notice Rule
was not complied with and thus did not stop the running of the period thereby causing the RTC Decision to become final and
executory. RTC declared that the decision had become final and executory because Preyslers MR was fatally flawed. CA
likewise dismissed the petition for certiorari and stated the the 3-Day Notice Rule was mandatory.
DOCTRINE:
The 3-Day Notice Rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where the lapse in the
literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court of its
authority.
Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid application which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.
In Somera Vda. De Navarro v. Navarro, the Court held that there was substantial compliance of the rule on notice of
motions even if the first notice was irregular because no prejudice was caused the adverse party since the motion was
not considered and resolved until after several postponements of which the parties were duly notified.
Likewise, in Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, the Court held that despite the lack of notice of hearing in a
Motion for Reconsideration, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process where the adverse
party actually had the opportunity to be heard and had filed pleadings in opposition to the motion. The Court held:
As an integral component of the procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is
not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding
surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the
arguments in the motion before a resolution of the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the right
of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.
The TEST is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and
meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based.
In this case, the CA ruled that Preysler failed to comply with the three-day notice rule. However, the CA overlooked the
fact that although MS received Preyslers MR six days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004 , the said
hearing was reset three (3) times with due notice to the parties. Thus, it was only on 6 August 2004, or more than 5
months after MS received a copy of Preyslers Motion for Reconsideration, that the motion was heard by the RTC. Clearly,
MS had more than sufficient time to oppose Preyslers Motion for Reconsideration. In fact, respondent did oppose the
motion when it filed its Motion to Dismiss dated 9 August 2004. In view of the circumstances of this case, we find that there
was substantial compliance with procedural due process. Instead of dismissing petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration based merely on the alleged procedural lapses, the RTC should have resolved the motion based on the merits.
OMNIBUS MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED
Furthermore, the RTC likewise erred in dismissing petitioners Omnibus Motion for allegedly failing to comply with the 3-day
notice requirement. The RTC found that the notice of hearing of petitioners Omnibus Motion which was set to be heard on
12 November 2004 was received by respondent on 9 November 2004. The RTC held that the service of the notice of hearing
was one day short of the prescribed minimum three days notice.
We disagree. Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that [e]very written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing
thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of the
hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. Thus, the date of the hearing should be at least
three days after receipt of the notice of hearing by the other parties . In this case, the petitioners Omnibus Motion was
set for hearing on 12 November 2004. Thus, to comply with the notice requirement, respondent should have received the
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notice of the hearing at least three days before 12 November 2004, which is 9 November 2004. Clearly, respondents receipt
on 9 November 2004 (Tuesday) of the notice of hearing of the Omnibus Motion which was set to be heard on 12
November 2004 (Friday), was within the required minimum three-days notice.
As explained by Retired Justice Jose Y. Feria in his book, Civil Procedure Annotated, when the notice of hearing should be
given:
The ordinary motion day is Friday. Hence, the notice should be SERVED BY TUESDAY at the latest, in
order that the requirement of the three days may be complied with. If notice be given by ordinary mail, it
should be actually received by Tuesday, or if not claimed from the post office, the date of the first notice
of the postmaster should be at least (5) days before Tuesday.
3.
Bacelonia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143440, February 11, 143440
QUICKIE FACTS:
Jemelee Bolos, a student of St. Bridget, died in a vehicular accident involving her School Service Vehicle and an Isuzu Truck.
Initially, the owners of the School Service Vehicle (Bacelonia) sued the owner (Roxas-Cu) and driver (Carino) of the Isuzu
Truck for damages. However, the case was dismissed after the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement.
Subsequently, the parents of Jemelee Bolos filed a Complaint for Damages against Bacelonias, Roxas-Cu, and Carino. As a
result, Bacelonia filed a Motion to be Dropped as Defendants on the ground of the Compromise Agreement entered into by
the co-defendants previously wherein it was alleged that Roxas-Cu admitted sole responsibility. Roxas-Cu opposed and denied
having admitted anything and that res judicate does not apply in the present case.
RTC denied the Bacelonias Motion to be Dropped and scheduled the reception of evidence of the defense on Feb. 3, 2000.
As such, on Jan 31, 2000, Bacelonias filed an MR and set the hearing on Feb. 15, 2000. On the same day, they also filed
another motion to Cancel the Hearing for Presentation of Evidence on Feb 3. Sps Bolos opposed both motions.
During the hearing on Feb 3, RTC denied the MR. On certiorari, CA dismissed Bacelonias petition. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
The CA correctly dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 57455 for the reason that the RTC did not abuse its
discretion in denying the Bacelonias MR on February 3, 2000.
It should be noted that the MR of the RTCs resolution on January 10, 2000 was filed by Bacelonia on January 31, 2000. The
date and time of hearing thereof was set by the petitioners on February 15, 2000 at 8:30 oclock in the morning. In this
connection, Rule 15, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court on motions provides:
Section 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall
specify the time and date of the hearing which must NOT BE LATER than ten (10) days after the filing
of the motion.
It is clear then that the scheduled hearing of the said MR was BEYOND THE PERIOD specified by the Revised Rules of
Court which was not later than 10 days after the filing of the motion, or no later than February 10, 2000. Significantly, the
above provision of Rule 15, Section 5 uses the mandatory term must in fixing the period within which the motion shall
be scheduled for hearing. A motion that fails to religiously comply with the mandatory provision of Rule 15, Section 5
is pro forma and presents no question which merits the attention and consideration of the court.
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XIV.
MOTION TO DISMISS (RULE 16)
1.
Heirs of Loreto Maramag v.Maramag, G.R. No. 181132, June 5, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
The Legitimate Heirs of Loreto seek the reduction and revocation of insurance proceeds of the lllegitimate Heirs. They claim
that Eva De Guzman was a concubine of Loreto and is suspected of having killed the latter and thus disqualified to receive
proceeds from Loretos insurance policies with Insural Life and Grepalife. Moreover, it is claimed the illegitimate children of
Loreto are entitled to only of the legitime of the legitimate children.
In their Answer, Insular and Grepalife averred that since Eva was disqualified as beneficiary, the Insurance proceeds should go
to the illegitimate children. A Motion to Dismiss was likewise incorporated alleging that the Complaint failed to state a cause
of action considering that the Insurance Code provides that once a beneficiary has been revoked and disqualified, the proceeds
must go to the remaining beneficiaries (illegimate children).
DOCTRINE:
The grant of the motion to dismiss was based on the trial courts finding that the petition failed to state a cause of action,
as provided in Rule 16, Section 1(g), of the Rules of Court, which reads
SECTION 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A complaint states a cause of action
when it contains the 3 elements of a cause of action:
(1) the legal right of the plaintiff;
(2) the correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right.
If any of these elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure
to state a cause of action.
When a motion to dismiss is premised on this ground, the ruling thereon should be based only on the FACTS ALLEGED in
the complaint. The court must resolve the issue on the strength of such allegations, assuming them to be true. The test of
sufficiency of a cause of action rests on whether, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the
court can render a valid judgment upon the same, in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. This is the general rule.
However, this rule is SUBJECT TO WELL-RECOGNIZED EXCEPTIONS, such that there is no hypothetical admission of the
veracity of the allegations if:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
the falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial notice;

such allegations are legally impossible;
the allegations refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence;
by the record or document in the pleading, the allegations appear unfounded; or
there is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties or in the course of the
hearings related to the case.
In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although petitioners are the legitimate heirs of
Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by Insular and Grepalife . The basis of
petitioners claim is that Eva, being a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being designated as
beneficiary of the insurance policies, and that Evas children with Loreto, being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser
share of the proceeds of the policies. They also argued that pursuant to Section 12 of the Insurance Code, Evas share in the
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proceeds should be forfeited in their favor, the former having brought about the death of Loreto. Thus, they prayed that the
share of Eva and portions of the shares of Loretos illegitimate children should be awarded to them, being the legitimate heirs
of Loreto entitled to their respective legitimes.
It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a favorable judgment in light of Article
2011 of the Civil Code which expressly provides that insurance contracts shall be governed by special laws, i.e., the
Insurance Code.
Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if
still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy. The exception to this rule is
a situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of
favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer.
Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus, are not entitled to the
proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal obligation to turn over the insurance
proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in
another are of no moment considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loretos
insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit
relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the
prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance
contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is
only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to
receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.
2.
UCPB v. Beluso, G.R. No. 159912, August 17, 2007
QUICKIE FACTS:
UCPB granted Sps. Beluso a Credit Line so they could avail of loans. This was secured by a real estate mortgage over some
land in Roxas City. Years later, Beluso did not pay when the loans became due. As such, UCPB foreclosed on the Roxas City
properties subject to the mortgage. Consequently, Beluso filed a Petititon for Annulment, Accounting, and Damages against
UCPB in the RTC of Makati on the ground that the stipulation as to the interest rate was invalid.
UCPB filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the ground of forum shopping allegedly because the Sps. Beluso instituted
another case in the RTC of Roxas City involving the same parties and issues. However, Beluso contends that the Petition for
Injunction against Foreclosure (Roxas City) is about the propriety of the foreclosure while the case in Makati deals with the
validity of the interest rate provision.
RTC of Makati denied UCPBs Motion to Dismiss. In the CA, UCPBs petition was denied. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
Even if we assume for the sake of argument, however, that only one cause of action is involved in the 2 civil actions,
namely, the violation of the right of the spouses Beluso not to have their property foreclosed for an amount they do not owe,
the Rules of Court nevertheless allows the filing of the second action. Civil Case No. V-7227 was dismissed by the RTC of
Roxas City before the filing of Case No. 99-314 with the RTC of Makati City, since the venue of litigation as provided
for in the Credit Agreement is in Makati City .
Rule 16, Section 5 bars the refiling of an action previously dismissed only in the following instances:
SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal.Subject to the right of appeal, an order granting a motion to dismiss based on
paragraphs (f), (h) and (i) of section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same action or claim. (n)
IMPROPER VENUE as a ground for the dismissal of an action is found in paragraph (c) of Section 1, not in paragraphs
(f), (h) and (i).
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When an action is dismissed on the motion of the other party, it is only when the ground for the dismissal of an action is
found in paragraphs (f), (h) and (i) that the action CANNOT be refiled. As regards all the other grounds, the
complainant is allowed to file same action, but should take care that, this time, it is filed with the proper court or after the
accomplishment of the erstwhile absent condition precedent, as the case may be.
UCPB, however, brings to the attention of this Court a Motion for Reconsideration filed by the spouses Beluso on 15
January 1999 with the RTC of Roxas City, which Motion had not yet been ruled upon when the spouses Beluso filed
Civil Case No. 99-314 with the RTC of Makati. Hence, there were allegedly two pending actions between the same
parties on the same issue at the time of the filing of Civil Case No. 99-314 on 9 February 1999 with the RTC of Makati. This
will still not change our findings.
It is indeed the general rule that in cases where there are two pending actions between the same parties on the same
issue, it should be the later case that should be dismissed. However, this rule is not absolute. According to this Court in
Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals:
In these cases, it is evident that the first action was filed in anticipation of the filing of the later action
and the purpose is to preempt the later suit or provide a basis for seeking the dismissal of the second
action.
Even if this is not the purpose for the filing of the first action, it may nevertheless be dismissed if the later action is
the more appropriate vehicle for the ventilation of the issues between the parties .
In the case at bar, Civil Case No. V-7227 before the RTC of Roxas City was an action for injunction against a foreclosure
sale that has already been held, while Civil Case No. 99-314 before the RTC of Makati City includes an action for the
annulment of said foreclosure, an action certainly more proper in view of the execution of the foreclosure sale. The former
case was improperly filed in Roxas City, while the latter was filed in Makati City, the proper venue of the action as
mandated by the Credit Agreement. It is evident, therefore, that Civil Case No. 99-314 is the more appropriate vehicle
for litigating the issues between the parties, as compared to Civil Case No. V-7227. Thus, we rule that the RTC of
Makati City was not in error in not dismissing Civil Case No. 99-314.
3.
Manila Banking v. University of Baguio, G.R. No. 159189, February 21, 2007
QUICKIE FACTS:
MBC granted a 14M credit line to UB for the construction of buildings and the purchase of new equipment. Vice Chairman
Bautista signed in behalf of UB. However, the loan was not paid because Bautista diverted the net proceeds of the loan to
Group Developers Inc. (GDI).
Thus, MBC filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against UB, Bautista, and his wife before RTC of Makati. Later, MBC
amended the Complaint and impleaded GDI. In its Answer, UB claimed that the bank and GDI approved the diversion. By
way of cross-claim, UB prayed that GDI be ordered to pay UB the amount it owed to MBC.
So, MBC and GDI executed a Deed of Dacion en Pago where GDI ceded and transferred to MBC a parcel of land in full
settlement of the loan. Thereafter, UB filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint on the ground that there was
no more cause of action since the loan had already been settled by GDI and that MBC failed to prosecute for an
unreasonable length of time.
RTC denied. Likewise, RTC expunged from its record the Deed of Dacion en Pago because no compromise agreement was
submitted for approval. UB again filed a Manifestation regarding its previous Motion to Dismiss and claimed that it should not
have been denied. MBC opposed. Then, RTC granted the Motion and dismissed the case since MBC no longer had a
cause of action.
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DOCTRINE:
In Domondon v. Lopez, we distinguished a motion to dismiss for failure of the complaint to state a cause of action from a
motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action. The first is governed by Section 1 (g), Rule 16, while the second by Rule
33, of the Rules of Court, to wit:
The FIRST [situation where the complaint does not allege a sufficient cause of action] is raised in a motion
to dismiss under Rule 16 before a responsive pleading is filed and can be determined only from the
allegations in the initiatory pleading and not from evidentiary or other matters aliunde. The SECOND
[situation where the evidence does not sustain the cause of action alleged] is raised in a demurrer to
evidence under Rule 33 after the plaintiff has rested his case and can be resolved only on the basis of
the evidence he has presented in support of his claim. The first does not concern itself with the truth
and falsity of the allegations while the second arises precisely because the judge has determined the
truth and falsity of the allegations and has found the evidence wanting.
Hence, a motion to dismiss based on LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION is filed by the defendant after the plaintiff has
presented his evidence on the ground that the latter has shown no right to the relief sought. While a MOTION TO
DISMISS UNDER RULE 16 is based on preliminary objections which can be ventilated before the beginning of the trial,
a MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 33 is in the nature of a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence and is presented only after the plaintiff has rested his case.
In this case, UBs March 19, 1998 motion to dismiss the amended complaint was improper under Rule 16 because it was
filed after UB filed its responsive pleading, its Answer. Also, the motions merit could not be determined based solely
on the allegations of the initiatory pleading, the amended complaint, since the motion was based on the deed of
dacion en pago, which was not even alleged in the complaint. And since the deed of dacion en pago had been expunged
from the record, the trial court erred in its finding of payment and lack of cause of action based on the deed. In fact, on
January 11, 2002 or just three months before it dismissed the amended complaint, the trial court had even noted petitioner
counsels manifestation regarding the parties initial efforts to enter into a dacion en pago but not based on the previous offer
made but on a new proposal involving new propertiesand urged them to pursue further settlement discussions.
In addition, the motion alleged that petitioner had no more cause of action or lacked a cause of action against the
university. Following Domondon, that motion was a motion to dismiss under Rule 33 in the nature of demurrer to
evidence and would be proper only after petitioner had presented its evidence and rested its case. In the case at bar,
there had been no presentation of evidence yet and petitioner had not rested its case . Therefore, the August 17, 1999
Order properly denied the motion to dismiss for being improper under either Rule 16 or 33.
4.
Corales v. Republic, 703 SCRA 623 (2013).
QUICKIE FACTS:
Corales was elected Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna for 3 consecutive terms. In those 3 terms, he appointed Dr.
Angeles as Municipal Administrator. In his first term, the appointment was unanimously approved. However, in the last two
terms, the Sanggunian disapproved on the ground of nepotism and allegedly because of Dr. Angeles unsatisfactory
performance. Despite this, Dr. Angeles still discharged the duties of his office for which he received salary.
Thereafter Maximo Andal, as Provincial State Auditor, issued an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) to Corales and
asking the latter to comment/reply. Instead, Corales and Angeles filed a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus against Andal and
the Sanggunian before the RTC of San Pablo. In opposition, SolGen, representing Andal, filed a Motion to Dismiss based on
lack of cause of action, prematurity, and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss by SolGen. MR denied. Thus, the Republic went up the CA. CA granted the petition in
favor of the Republic. Hence, this petition. Essentially, the CA dismissed Corales action for Prohibition.
DOCTRINE:
PREMATURE
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As previously stated, petitioners action for prohibition was premature. The audit investigative process was still in its
initial phase. There was yet no Notice of Disallowance issued. And, even granting that the AOM issued to petitioner Corales
is already equivalent to an order, decision or resolution of the Auditor or that such AOM is already tantamount to a directive
for petitioner Corales to reimburse the salaries paid to petitioner Dr. Angeles, still, the action for prohibition is premature
since there are still many administrative remedies available to petitioners to contest the said AOM.
Section 1, Rule V of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, provides: [a]nvaggrieved party may appeal from an
order or decision orvruling rendered by the Auditor embodied in a report,vmemorandum, letter, notice of disallowances and
charges, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, to the Director whovhas jurisdiction over the agency under audit. From
thevfinal order or decision of the Director, an aggrieved partyvmay appeal to the Commission proper. It is the decisionvor
resolution of the Commission proper which can be appealed to this Court.
Clearly, petitioners have all the remedies available to them at the administrative level but they failed to exhaust the same
and instead, immediately sought judicial intervention. Otherwise stated, the auditing process has just begun but the
petitioners already thwarted the same by immediately filing a Petition for Prohibition.
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail himself of all the
means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should
not
be summarily taken from them and submitted to the court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to
dispose of the same after due deliberation.
Also, in The Special Audit Team, Commission on Audit v. Court of Appeals and Government Service Insurance System, this Court has
extensively pronounced that:
The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action. The
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES is based on practical and legal reasons. The
availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away
from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so
as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of
the case.
Moreover, courts have accorded respect for the specialized ability of other agencies of government to deal with the issues
within their respective specializations prior to any court intervention.
DENIAL OF MOTION TO DISMISS AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
In their futile attempt to convince this Court to rule in their favor, petitioners aver that by filing a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of cause of action, respondent Republic, in essence, admitted all the material averments and narration of facts
stated in the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus. As such, there is no longer any question of fact to speak of and what
remains is a pure question of law. The judgment, therefore, of the trial court denying the Motion to Dismiss is no longer
subject to any appeal or review by the Court of Appeals. Instead, it is already appealable and reviewable by this Court under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where only pure questions of law may be raised and dealt with. This is in line with the
pronouncement in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals (China Road Case).
Petitioners above argument is misplaced. China Road Case is not at all applicable in the case at bench. Therein, the Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint was granted. As the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final, as distinguished from an
interlocutory order, the proper remedy was an appeal in due course.
In the case at bench, however, the Motion to Dismiss was denied. It is well-entrenched that an order denying a motion
to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done
by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. Therefore, contrary to the claim of petitioners, the denial of a
Motion to Dismiss is not appealable, not even via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
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The only remedy for the denial of the Motion to Dismiss is a special civil action for certiorari (Rule 65) showing that
such denial was made with grave abuse of discretion.
5.
National Housing Authority v. Baello, 703 SCRA 333 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Pedro Baello and Nicanora Beallo-Rodriguez applied to register a parcel of land. CFI confirmed title in their favor. The
Republic, through the Director of Lands, did not appeal so it became final and executory. An OCT were then issued in their
names. Then, the property was later subdivided into 2 parcels of land with 2 TCTs.
During Martial Law, Marcos issued a PD expropriating land and authorizing the NHA to develop the land into a residential
area. It covered both the Baello and Rodriguez properties.Thereafter, a truckload of military personnel forcibly ejected Baello
and Rodriguez out of their properties. The NHA then took possession thereof.
After the EDSA Revolution, the Baellos executed a extrajudicial partition. On August 1987, NHA filed an Action for Eminent
Domain against Baello and Rodriguez at the RTC of Caloocan Branch 120 but was dismissed for res judicata and lack of
cause of action. CA affirmed. SC affirmed.
Then, in 1993, the NHA filed a Complaint for Nullity of the OCT issued in favor of Pedro & Nicanora in RTC of Caloocan
Branch 128. The same court, however, dismissed the complaint due to estoppel and res judicata. CA affirmed. SC
affirmed.
During the pendency of the case in Branch 128, Baello filed an Action for Recovery of Possession and Damages against NHA.
RTC ruled in favor of Baello. On appeal, CA denied NHAs appeal. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
The doctrine of res judicata has been explained as follows:
The rule is that when material facts or questions, which were in issue in a former action and were admitted or
judicially determined are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein, such facts or questions become
res judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies
regardless of the form of the latter.
Jurisprudence expounds that the concept of res judicata embraces two aspects. The first, known as BAR BY
PRIOR JUDGMENT, or estoppel by verdict, is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. The second, known as
CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT, otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendent, ordains that
issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case
between the same parties involving a different cause of action.
The Court explained further:
CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT does not require identity of the causes of action for it to work. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties will
be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in
the first suit; but the adjudication of an issue in the first case is not conclusive of an entirely different and
distinct issue arising in the second. Hence, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit
cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a
different claim or cause of action.
In this case, the NHAs petition is barred by conclusiveness of judgment which states that
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any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action
before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand,
purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
We sustain the CA in ruling that the main issue raised by the NHA, which it alleged in its Answer before the trial court, is
the validity of OCT No. (804) 53839. The validity of OCT No. (804) 53839 had long been settled by this Court in G.R.
No. 143230. In that case, the Court ruled that the action to annul OCT No. (804) 53839 was barred by the decision in LRC
Case No. 520. The Court noted that the Republic did not oppose Pedro and Nicanoras application for registration in LRC
Case No. 520, and neither did it appeal the decision. OCT No. (804) 53839 was issued by the Register of Deeds in 1959 and
the Republic did not file any action to nullify the CFIs decision until the NHA filed a complaint for nullity of OCT No. (804)
53839 on 5 November 1993, the case which was the origin of G.R. No. 143230. As pointed out by this Court in G.R. No.
143230, the NHA was already barred from assailing OCT No. (804) 53839 and its derivative titles.
6.
Unicapital v. Consing, 702 SCRA 511 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Consing and his mother (Dela Cruz) obtained a loan an 18M loan from Unicapital secured by PNs and a real estate mortgage
over a parcel of land in Imus, Cavite. Intrested in developing said property into a residential subdivision, Plus Builders (PBI),
through its real estate development arm, URI, negotiated with Dela Cruz and Unicapital to purchase the same. Thereafter,
Dela Cruz decided to sell to Unicapital and PBI. For said purpose, she appointed Consing as her attorney-in-fact.
After paying Consing but before the TCTs were transferred to PBI and URI, some Chinese dudes popped up and claimed to
be lawful owners. Upon investigation, it was found that Dela Cruzs title was dubious. Thus, PBI and Unicapital demanded
from Consing to return the money. As a result, the following cases were filed:
In May 1999, Consing filed a Complaint for Injunctive Relief against Unicapital and PBI. in the RTC of Pasig. They claimed
that due to incessant harassment from Unicapital, his professional and personal life was affected. On the other hand,
Unicapital filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of Failure to State a Cause of Action. PBI likewise filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of that the complaint Does Not Have a Cause of Action. RTC denied the motions. CA affirmed.
In August 1999, Unicapital filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against Consing and Dela Cruz before the
RTC of Makati. Likewise, PBI filed a Complaint for Damages and Attachment before the RTC of Manila.
The RTC Manila case was subsequently consolidated with the case in RTC Pasig. Then, Consing filed a Motion to Dismiss the
case in RTC Makati but was denied. Thereafter, he filed a Motion for Consolidation of the cases in Makati with the case in
Pasig. However, RTC of Makati dismissed said motion on the ground that said cases had no identity of rights or causes of
action and reliefs sought. MR denied. On certiorari, CA also refused to consolidate. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
PROPRIETY OF DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS
A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is well-settled that the
existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this relation, a complaint is said to
sufficiently assert a cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be
entitled to the relief prayed for. Thus, if the allegations furnish adequate basis by which the complaint can be maintained,
then the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.
As edified in the case of Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. v. Todaro, citing Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Limited v.
Catalan (HSBC):
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if
true would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the court render a valid judgment upon the
facts alleged therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations. If
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the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not
be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendants.
Stated otherwise, the resolution on this matter should stem from an analysis on whether or not the complaint is able
to convey a cause of action; and not that the complainant has no cause of action. Lest it be misunderstood, FAILURE
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION is properly a ground for a motion to dismiss under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court (Rules), while the latter (NO CAUSE OF ACTION) is not a ground for dismissal under the same rule.
In this case, the Court finds that Consing, Jr.s complaint in RTC Pasig properly states a cause of action since the
allegations therein sufficiently bear out a case for damages under Articles 19 (harassment) and 26 (libelous statements) of
the Civil Code. Records disclose that Consing, Jr.s complaint contains allegations which aim to demonstrate the
abusive manner in which Unicapital and PBI, et al. enforced their demands against him.
Accordingly, these specific allegations, if hypothetically admitted, may result into the recovery of damages pursuant to
Article 19 of the Civil Code which states that [e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Likewise, Consing, Jr.s complaint
states a cause of action for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code.
PROPRIETY OF DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION
In the present case, the Court observes that the subject cases, i.e., SCA No. 1759 and Civil Case No. 991418, although
involving the same parties and proceeding from a similar factual milieu, should remain unconsolidated since they proceed
from different sources of obligations and, hence, would not yield conflicting dispositions. SCA No. 1759 is an injunction and
damages case based on the Civil Code provisions on abuse of right and defamation, while Civil Case No. 991418 is a collection
and damages suit based on actionable documents, i.e., the subject promissory notes. In particular, SCA No. 1759 deals with
whether or not Unicapital and PBI, et al. abused the manner in which they demanded payment from Consing, Jr., while Civil
Case No. 991418 deals with whether or not Unicapital may demand payment from Consing, Jr. based on the subject
promissory notes. Clearly, a resolution in one case would have no practical effect as the core issues and reliefs sought in each
case are separate and distinct from the other.
7.
BrownAraneta v. Araneta, 707 SCRA 202 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Juan Ignacio Araneta and Michelle Brown-Araneta were married in Vegas. They bore 2 daughters namely Ara and Ava. The
spouses separated after 7 years. During the separation, the daughters remained in Michelles custody. In 2007, Juan filed a
Petition for Custody in the Makati RTC against Michelle and her mother claiming that they have completely barred him from
seeing his daughters.
Pending the Petition for Custody, Michelle filed a Petition for Protection Order in the RTC of Muntinlupa claiming that Juan
had committed sexual, psychological, and economic abuse on her and their daughters. In this petition, it was stated that there
was a pending case in the Makati RTC for the custody of the children. Muntinlupa thereafter granted the TPO.
Later, Juan filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition with Prayer to Lift TPO in the Makati RTC on the ground of litis pendentia and
forum shopping since the Makati RTC is competent to grant the very same reliefs sought by Michelle in the Petition for
Protection Order. Also, he alleged that Michelles filing in Muntinlupa amounts to forum shopping. RTC ruled partly in favor
of Michelle and partly in favor of Juan. So both parties appealed.
In the CA, Michelle was found guilty of forum shopping. MR denied. Hence, this petition. Michelle contends that there was
no forum shopping when she filed her Petition for Protection Order in Muntinlupa while the Petition for Custody was still
pending in Makati.
DOCTRINE:
A circumstance of forum shopping occurs when, as a result or in anticipation of an adverse decision in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal or certiorari by raising identical causes of action,
subject matter and issues. Stated a bit differently, FORUM SHOPPING is the institution of two or more actions involving
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the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or
the other court would come out with a favorable disposition. An indicium of the presence of, or the test for determining
whether a litigant violated the rule against, forum shopping is where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where
a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other case.
LITIS PENDENTIA, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil suit, refers to that situation wherein another action is pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes vexatious and
unnecessary. For the bar of litis pendentia to be invoked, the concurring requisites must be present:
(1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions;
(2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of
which party is successful would amount to res judicata in the other.
Thus, it has been held that there is forum shopping:
(1) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by
appeal or certiorari) in another; or
(2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files another before the CA since in such case said
party deliberately splits appeals in the hope that even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed,
another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open; or
(3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing to obtain it from the
original court.
The evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of two
separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals,
may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant confusion,
the Court adheres to the rules against forum shopping, and a breach of these rules results in the dismissal of the
case.
FORUM SHOPPING WAS COMMITTED; IN ANTICIPATION OF AN ADVERSE RULING IN MAKATI RTC, MUNTINLUPA RTC WAS
SOUGHT FOR A FAVORABLE OPINION
As discussed above, the presiding judge of the Makati RTC, in the custody case, made of record that she was not inclined to
issue a protection order in favor of Michelle because she did not bother to appear in Court and that the allegations against
Juan Ignacio cannot, per se, prevent him from exercising visitation rights over his children. After this adverse ruling, Michelle
sought the favorable opinion of the Muntinlupa RTC by filing an independent Petition for Protection Order.
IDENTICAL PARTIES
The Petition for Custody and the Petition for Protection Order have the same parties who represent the same
interests. The fact that Ava and Ara, who are parties in the Petition for Protection Order, are not impleaded in the Petition
for Custody is of no moment because they are precisely the very subjects of the Petition for Custody and their respective
rights are represented by their mother, Michelle.
In First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, it was held that forum shopping exists even in cases like this where
petitioners or plaintiffs in one case were impleaded as respondents or defendants in another. Moreover, this Court has
constantly held that the fact that the positions of the parties are reversed, i.e., the plaintiffs in the first case are the
defendants in the second case or vice versa, does not negate the identity of parties for purposes of determining whether
the case is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia.
IDENTITY IN RIGHTS ASSERTED AND RELIEFS PRAYED FOR
Further, the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in Petition for Protection Order are practically based on the same facts and
are so intertwined with that in Petition for Custody, such that any judgment rendered in the pending cases, regardless of which
party is successful, will amount to res judicata.
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ELEMENTS OF LITIS PENDENTIA ARE PRESENT

Any judgment rendered in the pending cases, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata.
Consider: If the Makati RTC were to grant Juan Ignacios Petition for Custody, this would necessarily mean that it would
be in the best interest of the children if he were allowed to visit and spend time with them and that granting Juan
Ignacio visitation rights would not pose any danger or threat to the children.
On the other hand, a grant by the Muntinlupa RTC of Michelles prayer for a permanent protection order would presuppose
at the minimum that it would be to the childrens best interest if Juan Ignacio is directed to keep away from them ,
necessary implying that he is unfit even to visit Ara and Ava. Conversely, if Juan Ignacios Petition for Custody were denied,
then it would mean that the Makati RTC gave weight and credence to Michelles allegations of abuse and found
them to be in the best interest of the children to bar Juan Ignacio from visiting them . Thus, the Muntinlupa RTC
should have no ground to deny Michelles Petition for Protection Order pending before it.
XV.
DISMISSALS BY THE PLAINTIFF (RULE 17)
1.
Limaco v. Shohan Gakuen Childrens House, G.R.No. 158245, June 30, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
Limaco owns 3 parcels of agricultural land in Laguna. They entered into a Contract of Sale with Shohan Gakuen over said
parcels of land in the amount of 12.5M. Parties agreed that a downpayment of 1.2M would be paid upon signing and the rest
would be paid in installments. Also, it was stipulated that should the vendors be unable to transfer the property, similar
properties would be substituted. Due to Limacos failure to get clearance and approval from the DAR, Shohan demanded the
Limaco solve the tenancy problem or substitute the lots with another acceptable, suitable, and untenanted land.
Thereafter, Limaco informed Shohan that, to solve the problem, the tenant farmers would first be donated to the municipality
and then to Shohan. However, the scheme was not accepted by Shohan because they dont want future municipal officials to
feel that Shohan is beholden to it. Thus, they insisted on the substitution. However, Limaco did not respond.
Shohan filed a Complaint for Recision with Damages in RTC of Makati. To counter, Limaco and the tenant farmers filed an
Action for Specific Performance in the RTC of Laguna. Because the Action for Specific Performance was served earlier than
the Complaint for Rescision, the latter was dismissed in lieu of the Action for Specific Performance.
In its Answer with Counterclaim in the Action for Specific Performance, it claimed that the remedy is not possible because
Shohan already bought another property for the purpose. During trial, the parties were able to compromise and agree that only
half (600K) of the downpayment would be returned. However, Limaco only remitted 487K leaving a balance of 113K. As
such, the case continued.
Then, Limaco filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint in light of Shohans contention that Specific Performance was no
longer possible and prayed that their Complaint as well as Shohans Counterclaim be ordered withdrawn. Shohan objected
saying that dismissal of the Counterclaim would be prejudicial to them. As such, RTC denied Limacos motion. Moreover, the
tenant farmers were also dropped from the case. Finally, RTC ordered Limaco to pay the 113K balance. On appeal, CA ruled
that the entire own payment (713K) should be paid because Limacos failure to non-compliance cancelled their Compromise
Agreement. In their MR, Limaco revived their argument that the Shohans Compulsory Counterclaim should have been
dismissed. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
The applicable provisions are Sections 1 and 2, Rule 17 of the old Rules:
Sec. 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff. An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing
a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment[.]
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Sec. 2. Dismissal by order of the court. Except as provided in the preceding section, an action shall not be
dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the
court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the
plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendants objection unless the
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the
order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice.
Thus, there are TWO WAYS by which an action may be dismissed upon the instance of the plaintiff.
First, dismissal is a matter of right when a notice of dismissal is filed by the plaintiff before an answer or a motion for
summary judgment has been served on him by the defendant.
Second, dismissal is discretionary on the court when the motion for the dismissal of the action is filed by the plaintiff at any
stage of the proceedings other than before service of an answer or a motion for summary judgment .
While the dismissal in the first mode takes effect upon the mere notice of plaintiff without need of a judicial order, the
second mode requires the authority of the court before dismissal of the case may be effected. This is so because in the
dismissal of an action, the effect of the dismissal upon the rights of the defendant should always be taken into
consideration.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Limaco filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint after Shohan already filed its
Answer with Counterclaim. In fact, the reason for their motion for withdrawal was the special defense of Shohan in its
answer that substitution was no longer possible as it already bought another property in lieu of the subject lots under the
contract. It is, therefore, inexplicable how petitioners could argue that their complaint was successfully withdrawn upon the
mere filing of a Motion to Withdraw Complaint when they themselves alleged in this petition that [p]rivate respondent
objected to [the] withdrawal and the Trial Court sustained the objection.
More important, the OLD RULES OF COURT provided that [i]f a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to
the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendants
objection unless the ounterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court .
What may invariably remain for independent adjudication are permissive counterclaims as compared to compulsory
counterclaims which generally necessitate a simultaneous adjudication with the complaint itself. In the case at bar, Shohans
counterclaim is compulsory in nature, hence, cannot remain for independent adjudication.
2.
Pinga v. Heirs of Santiago, G.R. No. 170354, June 30, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
In May 1998, the Heirs of Santiago filed a Complaint for Injunction against Pinga in the RTC of Zamboanga It alleged that
Pinga and Saavedra unlawfully entered the coco lands of Santiago and prayed that they be enjoined from doing such act. In
their Answer with Counterclaim, Pinga disputed Santiagos ownership claiming that, as early as 1968, the Santiagos had
already been ejected from the property.
By 2005, the trial had not yet finished. In fact, the Heirs of Santiago had failed to present their evidence. In the July 2005
hearing, Santiagos counsel failed to appear, sending instead a representative to postpone the hearing. Pingas counsel opposed
the motion for postponement and moved to dismiss the case. Thus, the Complaint for Injunction by the Heirs of Santiago
was dismissed but, at the same time, the RTC allowed Pinga to present their evidence ex parte.
In their MR, the Heirs prayed that the entire action be dismissed and that Pinga be not allowed to present evidence ex parte.
Essentially, they contend that the counterclaim could not stand. RTC granted the MR and dismissed the counterclaim. MR
denied. Hence, this Petition (R45) which raises the issue as to whether or not the dismissal of the complaint necessarily carries
the dismissal of the counterclaim.
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DOCTRINE:
We hold that under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the complaint due to the fault
of plaintiff DOES NOT necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the
dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute the counterclaim.
Accordingly, the RTC clearly erred when it ordered the dismissal of the counterclaim, since Section 3, Rule 17 mandates
that the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute the counterclaim in the same
or separate action. If the RTC were to dismiss the counterclaim, it should be on the merits of such counterclaim .
Reversal of the RTC is in order, and a remand is necessary for trial on the merits of the counterclaim.
Whatever the nature of the counterclaim, it bears the same integral characteristics as a complaint; namely a cause (or
causes) of action constituting an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. The main difference
lies in that the cause of action in the counterclaim is maintained by the defendant against the plaintiff, while the converse holds
true with the complaint. Yet, as with a complaint, a counterclaim without a cause of action cannot survive.
A COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the
subject matter of the opposing partys claim , does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties , and
stands within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount involved and the nature of the claim . The fact that
the culpable acts on which the counterclaim is based are founded within the same transaction or occurrence as the
complaint, is insufficient causation to negate the counterclaim together with the complaint.
Thus, the present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable disposition of the counterclaims
by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the
main complaint.
Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand independent of the
complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing it under the amended rules, provided that the judgment or
order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the
amended rules now unequivocally protect such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal
of the complaint.
XVI.
PRE-TRIAL (RULE 18)
1.
Diaz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149749, July 25, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
Diaz was an operator of a taxi business. Arman Retes drove one of her Tamaraw FX taxis. While driving at an excessive speed,
it hit the back of a Hino cargo truck owned by Lantoria and driven by Francisco. As a result, 9 passegers of the taxi died
including Sherly Moneno. Thus, Monenos heirs filed an Action for Breach of Contract of Carriage and Damages against Diaz
and Retes. In turn, Diaz impleaded Lantoria and Francisco in a Third-Party Complaint.
The pre-trial conference was set on July 11 1998 but was reset for July 30 because Diaz and counsel failed to appear despite
due notice. Again, Diaz and her lawyer failed to appear. Consequently, the RTC allowed Moneno to present evidence ex parte.
More than 7 months after the presentation of evidence, Diaz filed a Motion for Leave to Present Evidence on her defense but
was denied. Thereafter, RTC ruled that Diaz and her driver solidarily liable for the death of Moneno. CA affirmed. MR denied.
DOCTRINE:
First, Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court states that:
The notice of pre-trial shall be served on counsel, or on the party who has no counsel. The counsel served
with such notice is charged with the duty of notifying the party represented by him.
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Diaz was represented by Atty. Cipriano Lupeba to whom the notice was sent. It was incumbent on the latter to advise Diaz
accordingly. His failure to do so constituted negligence which bound Diaz .
Further, Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 18 read:
Sec. 4. Appearance of Parties. It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial.
The non-appearance of the party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefore or if a
representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or
admissions of facts and of documents.
Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear. The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the
next preceding section shall be cause for the dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with
prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the defendant shall be cause to
allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis
thereof.
Consequently, it was no error for the trial court to allow Moneno to present their evidence ex parte when Diaz and her
counsel failed to appear for the scheduled pre-trial conference.
2.
Alcaraz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152202, G.R. No. 152202, July 28, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
Equitable Card Network issued a credit card to Alcaraz. Through said credit card, the latter purchased goods and services on
credit. Alcaraz owed Equitable unpaid credit. Despite receipt of several demands, the latter failed to pay. As such, Equitable
sought payment of the balance including the interest, penalties, and surcharges as stipulated in the contract. It filed an action
for collection in the RTC of Makati.
In his defense, he argued that the case filed against him was premature because Alcaraz claimed that he was just an honorary
member and was not required to submit any application or sign any contract prior to the issuance of the card. He also claimed
that he was entitled to pay on installments without interest.
After several postponements of the pretrial conference, RTC declared Alcaraz in default upon Equitables motion and allowed
the latter to present evidence ex parte. Afterwards, RTC ruled in favor of Equitable. Alcaraz filed a Motion for New Trial
which was denied. On appeal, CA affirmed. Hence, this Petition alleging violation of his right to due process. He claims that
he suffered a stroke while his lawyer suffered from a gall bladder ailment.
DOCTRINE:
Under the Rules of Court, both the parties and their counsels are mandated to appear in the pre-trial conference. If
the parties opt not to be present, their counsel must be armed with a SPA specifically for the purpose. This must be so
as the pretrial conference is primarily for the purpose of exploring the possibility of a compromise, or on the failure
thereof, for the parties to make certain admissions and stipulations in order to facilitate a more efficient proceeding
at the trial proper.
In the case at bar, both Alcaraz and his counsel did not appear at the scheduled pre-trial. Instead, it was the Alcarazs
wife alone who made the verbal manifestation on behalf of her husband and his counsel while presenting an
unverified medical certificate on the latters behalf . As correctly observed by the CA, the records are bereft of any
medical certificate, verified or unverified, in the name of Alcaraz to establish the cause of his absence at the pre-trial
conference. Even assuming arguendo that Alcaraz and Atty. Ibuyans absence on the February 23, 1999 pre-trial
conference is due to justifiable causes, Alcaraz is represented by a law firm and not by Atty. Ibuyan alone. As such, any
of the latters partners or associates could have appeared before the court and participate in the pretrial or at least make
the proper motion for postponement if necessary.
The disallowance of a motion for postponement is not sufficient to show arbitrariness and partiality of the trial court.
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3.
Macasaet v.Macasaet, G.R. No. 154391, September 30, 2004
QUICKIE FACTS:
Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet had a son named Ismael. Ismael married Teresita. The parents filed an Ejectment Suit
in the MTC of Lipa against Ismael and Teresita alleging that, as owners of 2 parcels of land in question, they executed a Verbal
Lease Agreement in favor of Ismael and Teresita for them to occupy the lots and use them as their residence. They also claim
that despite repeated demands, Ismael and Teresita failed to pay P500 monthly rent.
Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of such agreement and claime that his parents invited them on the said property so
they could leave near each other. Moreover, they claim that it was actually an advance grant of inheritance in favor of their
children.
MTC ordered Ismael and Teresita to vacate since they were merely being tolerated. RTC affirmed but allowed the parents to
appropriate the improvements built in accordance with the Civil Code. CA sustained. Hence, this petition.
Ismael and Teresita claims that the MTC should have dismissed the case upon failure of his Parents to attent the preliminary
conference pursuant to Sec. 8 of Rule 70. However, they do not dispute that an Attorney-in-Fact with a written authorization
from his Parents appeared during such conference.
Thus, they question whether the rules on ejectment allow a representative to substitute for a partys personal appearance.
DOCTRINE:
Unless inconsistent with Rule 70, the provisions of Rule 18 on pretrial applies to the preliminary conference. Under
Section 4 of this Rule, the nonappearance of a party may be excused by the showing of a valid cause; or by the
appearance of a representative, who has been fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to
alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.
Section 4 of Rule 18 may supplement Section 8 of Rule 70. Thus, the spirit behind the exception to personal
appearance under the rules on pretrial is applicable to the preliminary conference. If there are valid reasons or if a
representative has a special authority, a partys appearance may be waived. As petitioners are challenging only the
applicability of the rules on pretrial to the rule on preliminary conference, the written authorization from respondents can
indeed be readily considered as a special authorization.
4.
Chingkoe v. Republic, 702 SCRA 677 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
The Republic, through the Bureau of Customs, filed 2 Complaints for Collection of Money against Chiat Sing Carboard Inc,
Filstar Textile, and Chingkoe on account of the use of fake and spurious tax credit certificates. The cases were then
consolidated and were jointly heard in RTC of Manila.
The cases were referred to the Philippine Mediation Center for mandatory mediation. Likewise, pretrial for the consolidated
cases was set on January 9, 2006. On said date, the pretrial was again moved to Feb 15 because the mediation proceedings
were still on going. Again, it was moved to March 17 for the same reason. Afterwards, no settlement or compromise was
agreed upon. As such, on March 17, pretrial commenced.
Starting on the March 17 pretrial setting, the pretrial date was moved to 4 more dates (April 19, 2006, May 25, 2006, June 30,
2006, July 14, 2006). In all cases, the OSG failed to appear. In the June 30 pretrial setting, a certain Atty. Bautista Corpin
appearing on behalf of BOC appeared but was not prepared for pretrial. On the other hand, petitioners were all present during
said pretrial settings.
Because of this, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of the Republics failure to prosecute. In the last
pre-trial date (July 14), the petitioners moved anew and the RTC dismissed the case. MR denied. Republic went to the CA on
certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. CA granted the petition and remanded the case to the RTC. Petitoners
MR denied. Hence, this petition.
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DOCTRINE:
The RTC amply gave the Republic sufficient notice and opportunity to attend the pre-trial conference, but despite
this, it neglected its duty to prosecute its case and attend the scheduled pre-trial hearings. Hence, the RTC cannot be
faulted for dismissing the case.
This Court finds that the dismissal of the case by the RTC was due to the fault and negligence of the Republic. There
is clear negligence and laxity on the part of both the BOC and OSG in handling this case on behalf of the Republic. Despite
several re-settings of the hearing, either or both counsels failed to attend the pre-trial conference, without giving a
justifiably acceptable explanation of their absence .
This utter neglect of its duty to attend the scheduled hearings is what led the trial court to ultimately dismiss the cases.
In finding that the dismissal by the trial court is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the CA committed reversible error.
The records bear out that the pre-trial conference has been reset for 6 times, for various reasons. It is fairly obvious that
the trial court gave the Republic, through the OSG and the BOC, every opportunity to be present during the pre-trial
conference. The hearings had to be reset six times due to various reasons, but not once was the OSG and BOC properly
represented. Too, not once did the OSG and BOC offer a reasonable explanation for their absence during the
hearings. Despite the express warning by the trial court during the penultimate setting on June 30, 2006, the OSG and BOC
still failed to attend the next scheduled setting. Despite the leeway and opportunity given by the trial court, it seemed that the
OSG and BOC did not accord proper importance to the pre-trial conference.
PRE-TRIAL, to stress, is way more than simple marking of evidence. Hence, it should not be ignored or neglected, as the
counsels for respondent had. In Tolentino v. Laurel, this Court has this to say on the matter of importance of pre-trial:
In The Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Enario, the Court held that pre-trial cannot be
taken for granted. It is not a mere technicality in court proceedings for it serves a vital objective: the
simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. The Court said that:
The importance of pre-trial in civil actions cannot be overemphasized. In Balatico v. Rodriguez, the Court, citing
Tiu v. Middleton, delved on the significance of pre-trial, thus:
Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Although it was discretionary
under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent
amendments in 1997. Hailed as the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the
nineteenth century, pre-trial seeks to achieve the following:
(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of dispute
resolution;
(b) The simplification of the issues;
(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid
unnecessary proof;
(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;
(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;
(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the
action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist;
(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and
(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.
5.
LBL Industries v. City of Lapu-Lapu, 705 SCRA 688 (2013)
FACTS:
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LBL Industries owns 40K sqm of land in Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City. In 2006, the City filed a Complaint for Expropriation
before the RTC. It wanted to expropriate around 2.7K sqm for its road opening project. Upon deposit of 15% of the lands
FMV, the City took possession of the property.
LBL filed its Answer to the Complied with an attached Board Resolution and Sec Cert authoring one Elsie Marino to
commence any action or file any pleadings necessary for the case. Additionally, LBL filed a Motion to Conduct a Joint Survey
and Set Case for Pre-trial. RTC then issued 2 Orders dated July 2006 and March 2007 directing the Clerk of Court the
issuance of a Writ of Possession. However, the Clerk failed to comply.
In 2008, LBL moved to dismiss the case alleging that the City failed to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length
of time considering that the City did not move for the setting of the case for pre-trial. In its defense, the City claimed that the
reason for the delay was that it was waiting for the RTCs resolution on the matter.
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and ruled that the City cannot be faulted for the delay. MR was likewise denied and
it was included in the dispositive part a third order to the Clerk of Court to issue a Writ of Possession. On appeal, LBL
attached a Sec Cert authorizing one Roberto Sison along with Elsie Marino to file the pleadings. CA dismissed the appeal
because no Board Resolution authorizing Sison was attached. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE.
HELD: NO. THE FAULT WAS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE CLERK OF COURT.
While the Court considered that Sison was indeed authorized, it nonetheless ruled that the petition is bereft of merit because
the RTC correctly denied LBLs Motion to Dismiss.
Sec. 1, Rule 18 on Pre-Trial, reads:
Sec. 1. When conducted. After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff
to promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial.
Related to the above section is Sec. 3 of Rule 17, which states:
Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails x x x to prosecute his
action for an unreasonable length of time, x x x the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the
defendant or upon the courts own motion x x x.
Sec. 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court imposes upon the plaintiff the duty to set the case for pre-trial after the last
pleading is served and filed. With this in mind, We have, in several cases, ruled that the plaintiffs omission to
promptly move that the case be set for pre-trial is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint due to his fault,
particularly for failing to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17.
The parties, as well as the courts below, however, failed to consider that the aforequoted Sec. 1 of Rule 18 had already
been superseded by A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, which took effect on August 16, 2004, Item 1.2 of which states:
I. PRE-TRIAL
A. Civil Cases
1. Within one day from receipt of the complaint:
1.2 x x x Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that
the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period,
the Branch [Clerk of Court] shall issue a notice of pre-trial.
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Thus, the present rule is that if the plaintiff fails to file a motion to set the case for pre-trial within 5 days from the filing
of a reply, the duty to set the case for pre-trial falls upon the branch clerk of court. However, this does not relieve the
plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case diligently.
For a plaintiff (City of Lapu-Lapu) to be excused from its burden to promptly prosecute its case, it must convince the
court that its failure to do so was due to justifiable reasons . If the neglect is justified, then a dismissal of the case on said
ground is not warranted.
A consideration of the events that transpired in the said expropriation case readily shows that the delay cannot solely be
attributed to the City of Lapu-Lapu but is in fact due to the failure of the branch clerk of court to set the case for pretrial pursuant to A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, as well as the trial courts delay in resolving LBLs Motion to Conduct Joint
Survey and Set the Case for Pre-Trial.
We find good reason to believe the Citys assertion that it acted in good faith when it did not move to set the case for
pre-trial, since LBL already moved for the pre-trial setting. Another motion from respondent can be simply repetitive of
petitioners earlier motion.
The Court, however, is mindful of LBLs predicament that the delay in the resolution of the expropriation case and the Citys
continued occupation and enjoyment of the subject property for more than half a decade is extremely disadvantageous and
prejudicial to said corporation without any payment of just compensation. To prevent further damage to LBL, the trial court is
directed to immediately resolve its Motion to Conduct Joint Survey, set the case for pre-trial, and take all appropriate measures
to expedite the resolution of said case.
XVII. INTERVENTION (RULE 19)
1.
Looyuko v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102696, July 12, 2001
QUICKIE FACTS:
These consolidated cases involve a house and lot in Mandaloyung previously owned by Sps. Mendoza where various creditors
and assignees are contesting the property.
LOOYUKO AND UY V. SPS. MENDOZA
Looyuko and Uy won. As a result, RTC issued a writ of execution on the property and was later sold at public auction to
Looyuko and Uy as the highest bidders. The Register of Deeds issued a TCT in their name.
GUTANG V. MENDOZA
In this Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages, Gutang won and successfully caused to be annotated on the TCT a
notice of levy on execution. The property was sold at public auction in favor of Gutang. Later, TCT was issued in his name.
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION V. MENDOZA
FGU filed an action against Sps. Mendoza in the RTC of Manila by reason of the failure of Sps. Mendoza to satisfy their
obligation secured by a real estate mortgage over said property. Mendoza filed an Answer but failed to appear during pretrial.
So, they were declared in default and evidence was received ex parte.
RTC then ruled in favor of FGU. No appeal was taken and the decision became final and executory. Upon issuance of the writ
of execution, the property was sold at public auction with FGU as highest bidder. However, before a TCT was issued in
FGUs favor, Gutang filed a Motion in Intervention arguing that they are new registered owners of said property.
RTC allowed the motion and set aside the decision. MR denied. FGU went up the CA on certiorari contending that the
motion for intervention should not be allowed considering that the decision is already final and executory. In the CA,
Looyuko et al filed an Urgent Motion Praying for Leave to File a Motion for Intervention alleging they were attachment
creditors which was allowed. Thereafter, CA denied the Motion for Internvention. Hence, this petition.
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Looyuko et al contend that they were deprived of due process when they were not allowed to intervene. In other words, were
the Motions for Intervention filed by Gutang and Looyuko proper considering that the case was already final and executory?
DOCTRINE:
Then Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, the law prevailing at the time, reads as follows:
Intervention. A person may, before or during a trial be permitted by the court, in its discretion, to intervene
in an action, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof .
None of the grounds underscored above are present to warrant their intervention. Accordingly, we assume for purposes of
discussion that the action was indeed for the foreclosure of the mortgage over the subject property. The rule stated above also
requires that a motion for intervention should be made before or during a trial. Because of varying interpretations of the
phrase, the present Rules have clarified that the motion should be filed any time before rendition of judgment.
In the present case, the motions for intervention were filed AFTER JUDGMENT HAD ALREADY BEEN RENDERED, indeed
when the case was already final and executory. Certainly, intervention can no longer be allowed in a case already
terminated by final judgment.
Intervention is merely collateral or accessory or ancillary to the principal action, and not an independent proceeding;
it is an interlocutory proceeding dependent on or subsidiary to the case between the original parties. Where the main
action ceases to exist, there is no pending proceeding wherein the intervention may be based . Here, there is no more
pending principal action wherein the Spouses Gutang and Looyuko, et al. may intervene.
In EXCEPTIONAL CASES, the Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of judgment by the trial
court. In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, intervention was allowed even when the petition for review of the assailed
judgment was already submitted for decision in the Supreme Court. Recently in Mago vs. Court of Appeals, the Court granted
intervention despite the case having become final and executory.
It must be noted, however, that in both these cases, the intervenors were INDISPENSABLE PARTIES. This is not so in the
case at bar. Section 1, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court requires all persons having or claiming an interest in the premises
subordinate in right to that of the holder of the mortgage be made defendants in the action for foreclosure.
2.
Limpo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124582, July 16, 2000
QUICKIE FACTS:
Despite having been acquitted for charges of estafa and violations of BP 22, Limbo was adjudged to be civilly liable to
Veronica Gonzales in the amount of P275K by the RTC of Malolos. This decision became final and executory. To enforce
said judgment, Gonzales caused the issuance of a Writ of Execution. Pursuant to this, parcels of land registered in Limpos
name were levied upon. Said properties were likewise sold to Gonzales after an auction sale. Later on, Gonzales was able to
cause new TCTs to be issued in her favor. A dispute arose on account of Limpos refusal to vacate the premises. This dispute
reached the SC.
While the case was pending deliberation in the SC, spouses Bulaong filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene alleging that they
have an interest in the parcels of land in question. They claim that as early as 1993, the Limpos mortgaged the lands to them
for 4.3M and that said mortgage was annotated on the TCT.
DOCTRINE:
Intervention cannot be allowed at this late stage of this case. Intervention may be granted only where its allowance will
not unduly delay or prejudice the rights of the original parties to a case.
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Generally, it will be allowed before rendition of judgment by the trial court, as Rule 19, 2 expressly provides. After
trial and decision in a case, intervention can no longer be permitted. Certainly it cannot be allowed on appeal without
unduly delaying the disposition of the case and prejudicing the interest of the parties.
Indeed, there is no justification for granting the motion for the intervention of the spouses Bulaong which they filed only
on April 25, 2000, after the appeal in this case had already been submitted for resolution, when they could have done so
earlier.
The result of all this is that the spouses Bulaong, knowing Gonzales interest in the properties in conflict with theirs ,
could have sought to intervene much earlier and not only now on appeal. It took them nearly 5 years from March 29,
1995, when Gonzales filed a petition for issuance of a writ of possession, before filing their motion for leave to intervene
in this case. Such delay amounts to laches and justifies the denial of their motion. Allowance of intervention at this late stage
would unduly delay the resolution of the appeal as trial would be conducted anew to allow the spouses Bulaong to present
evidence in support of their claim of ownership.
3.
Asian Terminals v. Ricafort, G.R. No. 166901, October 27, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
A shipment of secondhand buses from Japan arrived in the Port of Manila. However, Customs impounded the vehicles and
ordered them stored at Asian Terminals Incs (ATI) warehouse. As a result, the importers filed a Complaint for Replevin in
the RTC of Paranaque with prayer of the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction. RTC granted the Writ
of Replevin. BOC, through the OSG, filed an MR contending that the RTC has no jurisdiction over vehicles subjected to
seizure by the BOC.
ATI then filed a Motion for Intervention and for Admission of its Complaint-in-Intervention alleging that it had a lien on the
vehicles. RTC then dismissed the Complaint stating that it had no jurisdiction over the case. Likewise, the RTC dismissed the
Complaint-in-Intervention. ATI filed an MR which was however denied. On certiorari, CA likewise denied ATIs petition. MR
denied. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
Section 602 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that the Bureau of Customs shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over seized and forfeited cars. It is tasked to enforce tariff, and supervise and control customs law and all other laws, rules
and regulations relating to the tariff and customs administration; and to supervise and control all import and export cargoes,
loaded or stored in piers, terminal facilities, including container yards and freight stations, for the protection of government
revenues.
As the Court ruled in Jao v. Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the
validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or
otherwise interfere with these proceedings. It is the Collector of Customs, sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings, who
has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable
goods.
Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for replevin by respondents herein, issue the writ
of replevin and order its enforcement. The Collector of Customs had already seized the vehicles and set the sale thereof at
public auction. The RTC should have dismissed the petition for replevin at the outset. By granting the plea of
respondents (plaintiffs below) for the seizure of the vehicles and the transfer of custody to the court, the RTC acted without
jurisdiction over the action and the vehicles subject matter thereof.
The RTC cannot be faulted for dismissing ATIs complaint-inintervention. Considering that it had no jurisdiction
over respondents action and over the shipment subject of the complaint, all proceedings before it would be void.
The RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint-in-intervention and act thereon except to dismiss the same.
Moreover, considering that intervention is merely ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation and never an
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intervention. Likewise, a court which has no jurisdiction over the principal action has no jurisdiction over a complaint-inintervention. Intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of intervention is
governed by jurisdiction of the main action.
4.
Salas Jr. v. Aguila, 706 SCRA 252 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Juan S. Salas and Eden Aguila were married. Months after Aguila gave birth to their daughter, Salas left the conjugal dwelling
and no longer communicated with Aguila. Years later, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on account
of psychological incapacity. In her Petition, she stated that they have no conjugal properties. Then, RTC declared the nullity
of the marriage.
Then, Aguila filed a Manifestation and Motion that she discovered parcels of land in QC and Tondo registered under Juan S
Salas, married to Rubina Salas. Salas opposed arguing that Aguilas statement was a judicial admission and was not made
through palpable mistake.
RTC ruled in favor of Aguila. Then, Rubina filed a Complaint-in-Intervention and claimed that said properties were her
paraphernal properties. Also she claimed that her brother was the one who registered the properties in the name of Juan S.
Salas, married to Rubina Salas. On appeal, CA affirmed.
DOCTRINE:
On both Salas and Rubinas contention that Rubina owns the Discovered Properties, we likewise find the contention
unmeritorious. The TCTs state that Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas is the registered owner of the Discovered
Properties. A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to, because there is a strong
presumption that it is valid and regularly issued. The phrase married to is merely descriptive of the civil status of the
registered owner. Furthermore, Salas did not initially dispute the ownership of the Discovered Properties in his opposition to
the manifestation. It was only when Rubina intervened that Salas supported Rubinas statement that she owns the
Discovered Properties.
Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the Discovered Properties, she has no right to
intervene in this case. The Rules of Court provide that only a person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with
leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action.
5.
Smart Communications v. Aldecoa, 705 SCRA 392 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Florentino Sebastian agreed to lease to Smart a piece of vacant lot. Smart immediately constructed and installed a cellular base
station on said property. Within said base station is a communications tower rising 150 ft high with antennas and transmitters.
There was also a power house open on 3 sides with a diesel power generator. Close to said base station are houses, hospitals
clinics, and establishments including properties of Aldecoa et al.
Aldecoa et al filed in the RTC a Complaint against Smart for Abatement of Nuisance and Injunction with TRO. It was alleged
that said base station is susceptible to collapse, emits noxious and deleterious fumes, radiates ultra high frequency radio waves
emissions, and violates the law by constructing a tower without the necessary public hearing, permit, and other requirements
of the NTC. Moreover, they stated that judicial intervention is needed to ensure that death, injuries, and damage will
not happen. On the other hand, Smart denied.
RTC ruled in Smarts favor and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, CA declared the base station a nuisance. Hence, this
petition.
DOCTRINE:
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Based on the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and its corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it was
premature for the Court of Appeals to take cognizance of and rule upon the issue of the validity or nullity of petitioners
locational clearance for its cellular base station.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction were explained at length by the
Court in Province of Zamboanga del Norte v.
Court of Appeals, as follows:
The Court in a long line of cases has held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence,
if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative
officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction , then such remedy
must be exhausted first before the courts power of judicial review can be sought. The premature
resort to the court is fatal to ones cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the
case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without its practical and legal reasons.
Indeed, resort to administrative remedies entails lesser expenses and provides for speedier disposition of
controversies. Our courts of justice for reason of comity and convenience will shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to
give the administrative agency every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case .
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to
resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of
special competence.
In fact, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative
procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial
intervention. The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the
presumption that when the administrative body, or grievance machinery, is afforded a chance to pass upon
the matter, it will decide the same correctly.
The Court again discussed the said principle and doctrine in Addition Hills Mandaluyong Civic & Social Organization, Inc. v.
Megaworld Properties & Holdings, Inc., et al.citing Republic v. Lacap, to wit:
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all
the means afforded him by administrative processe s. The issues which administrative agencies are
authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first giving
such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction;
that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact.
The HLURB is the planning, regulatory, and quasi-judicial instrumentality of government for land use development. In the
exercise of its mandate to ensure rational land use by regulating land development, it issued HLURB Resolution No. R-626,
series of 1998, Approving the Locational Guidelines for Base Stations of Cellular Mobile Telephone Service, Paging Service,
Trunking Service, Wireless Loop Service and Other Wireless Communication Services (HLURB Guidelines). Said HLURB
Guidelines aim to protect providers and users, as well as the public in general while ensuring efficient and responsive
communication services.
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There is no showing that respondents availed themselves of the aforementioned administrative remedies prior to
instituting Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000 before the RTC. While there are accepted exceptions to the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, respondents never asserted nor argued any of
them. Thus, there is no cogent reason for the Court to apply the exceptions instead of the general rule to this case.
XVIII. SUBPOENA (RULE 21)
1.
Collado v. Bravo, A.M.-P-99-1377, April 10, 2011
QUICKIE FACTS:
Lorena Collado charged Teresita Bravo, Clerk of Court of Naguilan, with Grave Misconduct. She alleged that she received
through priority mail a subpoena from the MTC of Naguilan directing her to appear before the MTC at a specified date and
time. Said subpoena was signed by Bravo as Clerk of Court. Upon arriving at the MTC, Bravo told her that no complaint was
filed against her. Bravo only issued a subpoena in order to allow a certain Baterina to talk to Collado about the latters son.
In her Answer, Bravo claimed that she issued the subpoena with good intentions so that Collado and Baterina can already
settle their differences. As a result, OCA recommended that Bravo be fined for Grave Misconduct.
DOCTRINE:
Bravos act of issuing the subpoena to Collado was evidently not directly or remotely connected with her judicial or
administrative duties. It appears that she merely wanted to act as a mediator or conciliator in the dispute between
Collado and the Baterinas, upon the request of the latter.
Bravo, as Clerk of Court, is primarily tasked with making out and issuing all writs and processes issuing from the court. She
should have known or ought to know what a subpoena is. A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to
attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or at any investigation conducted by competent authority, or for
the taking of his deposition.
She should have known that a process is the means whereby a court compels the appearance of the defendant before
it, or a compliance with its demands. Hence, absent any proceedings, suit, or action commenced or pending before
a court, a subpoena may not issue. In this case, Bravo knew there was no case filed against Collado. Neither had Collado
commenced any proceeding against the Baterinas for whose benefit the subpoena was issued. Bravo, then, had absolutely
neither the power nor the authority nor the duty to issue a subpoena to the complainant.
Perusal of the subpoena she issued to complainant shows that the form used was the one used in criminal cases, giving
complainant the impression that her failure to appear would subject her to the penalty of law, and that the subpoena was
issued with the trial courts sanction. We find, therefore, that Bravo was using without authority some element of state
coercion against Collado who was understandably compelled to heed the contents of the subpoena resulting in her
humiliation. Such naked abuse of authority by complainant could not be allowed to pass without appropriate sanction.
2.
Roco v. Contreras, G.R. No. 158275, June 28, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
Roco paid Cals Poultry Supply Corporation with 5 checks for the purchase of dressed chicked which the former used in his
business. However, the checks were dishonored. As a result, complaints for violation of BP 22 were filed in the MTC of Roxas
City. MTC convicted Roco. On appeal, RTC remanded the case to the MTC upon the finding that Roco was not accorded due
process.
During the pendency of the remanded cases, Roco filed a Request for Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Subpoena
Duces Tecum to require Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap to appear and testify and to bring with them specified documents,
records, books of accounts for 1993-1999. In opposition, Cals Poultry argued that the production of said documents were
inmaterial and irrelevant. Thus, MTC denied the Request. MR denied. RTC and CA both affirmed. Hence, this petition.
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DOCTRINE:
A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of an action or
at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition.
In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum.
The FIRST is used to compel a person to testify, while the SECOND is used to compel the production of books, records,
things or documents therein specified. As characterized in H.C. Liebenow vs. The Philippine
Vegetable Oil Company:
The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad testificandum with the exception that it
concludes with an injunction that the witness shall bring with him and produce at the examination the books,
documents, or things described in the subpoena.
Well-settled is the rule that before a SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the
following requisites are present:
(1) the books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the
controversy (TEST OF RELEVANCY); and
(2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (TEST OF DEFINITENESS).
Again, to quote from H.C. Liebenow:
In determining whether the production of the documents described in a subpoena duces tecum should be
enforced by the court, it is proper to consider, FIRST, whether the subpoena calls for the production of
specific documents, or rather for specific proof, and SECONDLY, whether that proof is prima facie
sufficiently relevant to justify enforcing its production. A general inquisitorial examination of all the
books, papers, and documents of an adversary, conducted with a view to ascertain whether something of
value may not show up, will not be enforced.
Further, in Universal Rubber Products, Inc. vs. CA, et al., we held:
Well-settled is Our jurisprudence that, in order to entitle a party to the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, it
must appear, by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be produced contains
evidence relevant and material to the issue before the court, and that the precise book, paper or
document containing such evidence has been so designated or described that it may be identified.
TEST OF DEFINITENESS COMPLIED WITH BUT NOT THE TEST OF RELEVANCY
Going by established precedents, it thus behooves Roco to first prove, to the satisfaction of the court, the relevancy and
the definiteness of the books and documents he seeks to be brought before it.
Admittedly, the books and documents that Roco requested to be subpoenaed are designated and described in his
request with definiteness and readily identifiable. The test of definiteness, therefore, is satisfied in this case.
It is, however, in the matter of relevancy of those books and documents to the pending criminal cases that Roco miserably
failed to discharge his burden. We stress that the gravamen of the offense under BP 22 is the act of making or issuing
a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment . The offense is already
consummated from the very moment a person issues a worthless check , albeit payment of the value of the check, either
by the drawer or by the drawee bank, within five (5) banking days from notice of dishonor given to the drawer is a complete
defense because the prima facie presumption that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds or credit at the
time of the issuance of the check and on its presentment for payment is thereby rebutted by such payment.
Based on the records below and as correctly pointed out by the CA, Roco had been issued by Cals Corporation with
temporary receipts in the form of yellow pad slips of paper evidencing his payments, which pad slips had been
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validated by the corporation itself. Clear it is, then, that the production of the books and documents requested by Roco
are not indispensable to prove his defense of payment.
In short, the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum or ad testificandum to compel the attendance of Vivian Deocampo or
Danilo Yap of Cals Corporation or their duly authorized representatives, to testify and bring with them the records and
documents desired by Roco, would serve no purpose but to further delay the proceedings in the pending criminal
cases.
XIX. DEPOSITION (RULES 23 TO 29)
a.
Deposition taken in another proceeding
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Jose Africa, Imelda Marcos, et al. G.R. No. 152375, December 13, 2011
QUICKIE FACTS:
DOCTRINE:
Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court
does not only require due observance of its subparagraphs (a) to (d); it also requires, as a condition for admissibility,
compliance with the rules on evidence. Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court makes an implied reference to Section 47,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court before the deposition may be used in evidence. By reading Rule 23 in isolation, the Republic failed to
recognize that the principle conceding admissibility to a deposition under Rule 23 should be consistent with the rules on
evidence under Section 47, Rule 130.
In determining the admissibility of the Bane deposition, therefore, reliance cannot be given on one provision to the
exclusion of the other; both provisions must be considered. This is particularly true in this case where the evidence in
the prior proceeding does not simply refer to a witness testimony in open court but to a deposition taken under
another and farther jurisdiction.
A common thread that runs from Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court and Section 47, Rule 130 of the same Rules is
their mutual reference to depositions.
A DEPOSITION is chiefly a mode of discovery whose primary function is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of
disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the
preparation for trial.
Since depositions are principally made available to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts,
depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness . Generally, the
deponent must be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules on
evidence under Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or
affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of
the witness shall be given orally.
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts set forth therein, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in
open court, may be opposed by the adverse party and excluded under the hearsay rule i.e., that the adverse party had
or has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. That opportunity for crossexamination was afforded during the taking of the deposition alone is no argument, as the opportunity for crossexamination must normally be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented
against him during the trial or hearing of a case. However, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes laid
down in Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the deposition may be used without the deponent being actually called to the
witness stand.
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Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is an entirely different provision. While a former testimony or deposition appears under
the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, the classification of former testimony or deposition as an admissible hearsay is not
universally conceded. A fundamental characteristic of hearsay evidence is the adverse partys lack of opportunity to crossexamine the out-of-court declarant. However, Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly requires, inter alia, for the admissibility of a
former testimony or deposition that the adverse party must have had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness or
the deponent in the prior proceeding.
This opportunity to cross-examine though is not the ordinary cross-examination afforded an adverse party in usual trials
regarding matters stated in the direct examination or connected therewith. Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
contemplates a different kind of cross-examination, whether actual or a mere opportunity, whose adequacy depends on the
requisite identity of issues in the former case or proceeding and in the present case where the former testimony or deposition
is sought to be introduced.
Section 47, Rule 130 requires that the issues involved in both cases must, at least, be substantially the same; otherwise, there is
no basis in saying that the former statement was or would have been sufficiently tested by cross-examination or by an
opportunity to do so. (The requirement of similarity though does not mean that all the issues in the two proceedings should be
the same. Although some issues may not be the same in the two actions, the admissibility of a former testimony on an issue
which is similar in both actions cannot be questioned.)
These considerations, among others, make Section 47, Rule 130 a distinct rule on evidence and therefore should not be
confused with the general provisions on deposition under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. In other words, even if the
petitioner complies with Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on the use of depositions, the observance of Section 47, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court cannot simply be avoided or disregarded.
Undisputably, the Sandiganbayan relied on the Bane deposition, taken in Civil Case No. 0130, for purposes of this very
same case. Thus, what the petitioner established and what the Sandiganbayan found, for purposes of using the Bane
deposition, refer only to the circumstances laid down under Section 4(c), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, not necessarily to
those of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a distinct rule on evidence that imposes further requirements in the use
of depositions in a different case or proceeding. In other words, the prior use of the deposition under Section 4(c), Rule 23
cannot be taken as compliance with Section 47, Rule 130 which considers the same deposition as hearsay, unless the
requisites for its admission under this rule are observed. The aching question is whether the petitioner complied with the
latter rule.
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays down the following requisites for the admission of a testimony or deposition
given at a former case or proceeding.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to testify;

The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative;
Involving the same parties;
Relating to the same matter;
The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or deposition taken at a former trial or proceeding are the necessity for the
testimony and its trustworthiness. However, before the former testimony or deposition can be introduced in evidence, the proponent
must first lay the proper predicate therefor, i.e., the party must establish the basis for the admission of the Bane deposition in the
realm of admissible evidence. This basis is the prior issue that we must now examine and resolve.
b.
Deposition may be taken anytime after institution of any action; Uses of Deposition
Jonathan Land Oil v. Mangudadatu, G.R. No. 155010, August 16, 2004
QUICKIE FACTS:
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In a Complaint for Damages filed by Sps. Mangungudatu against JLO, the latter was declared in default for failure to appear a t
Pretrial. Thereafter, a decisin was rendered against it. As a result, JLO filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and Change of
Venue which was also denied. Without having received an Order resolving the Omnibus Motion, JLO received already a copy
of a Writ of Execution. So, JLO filed a Motion to Quash/Recall the Writ of Executio.
Meanwhile, JLOs counsel, Attys. Mario and Peligro withdrew their appearance and were replaced by Ong Abad Santos &
Meneses who filed an Entry of Appearance with a Supplement wherein Attys Mario and Peligros affidavits were attached
stating that they had not received the Order resolving the Omnibus Motion.
Sps. Mangungudatu filed a Vigorus Opposition wherein there was attached a Certification of the Postmaster that the Order
denying the Omnibus Motion was received by Attys. Mario and Peligro. Thus, JLO served on Spouses Mangungudatu a
Notice to Take Deposititon Upon Oral Examination to prove that they never received a copy of the Order.
Then, JLOs previous Motion to Quash was denied. Consequently, Spouses Mangungudatu moved to Set Auction Sale of
JLOs levied properties. As a result, JLO filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA and argued that since it had not received the
Order denying its Omnibus Motion, the judgment never bcame final and thus would not be subject to a Writ of Execution.
However, CA denied. It ruled that JLO could no longer avail of a deposition since trial had already been terminated.
DOCTRINE:
A deposition may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over
property that is the subject of the action; or, without such leave, after an answer has been served. Deposition is chiefly
a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real
points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.
The liberty of a party to avail itself of this procedure, as an attribute of discovery, is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters
inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of
the law.
Limitations would arise, though, if the examination is conducted in bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or
oppress the person who is the subject of the inquiry; or when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the
recognized domains of privilege.
As a mode of discovery resorted to before trial, deposition has advantages, as follows:
(1) It is of great assistance in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing perjury.
(2) It is an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent, and sham claims and defenses.
(3) It makes available in a simple, convenient, and often inexpensive way facts which otherwise could not have been
proved, except with great difficulty and sometimes not at all.
(4) It educates the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses, thereby encouraging
settlements out of court.
(5) It expedites the disposal of litigation, saves the time of the courts, and clears the docket of many cases by
settlements and dismissals which otherwise would have to be tried.
(6) It safeguards against surprise at the trial, prevents delays, and narrows and simplifies the issues to be tried, thereby
expediting the trial.
(7) It facilitates both the preparation and the trial of cases.
The Rules of Court and jurisprudence, however, do not restrict a deposition to the sole function of being a mode of
discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken even after trial has
commenced and may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand. In Dasmarias Garments v. Reyes,
we allowed the taking of the witnesses testimonies through deposition, in lieu of their actual presence at the trial.
Thus, [d]epositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient.
There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of
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depositions after pretrial. There can be no valid objection to allowing them during the process of executing final and
executory judgments, when the material issues of fact have become numerous or complicated.
In keeping with the principle of promoting the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding,
depositions are allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in
open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge . Depositions are allowed, provided they are
taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court (that is, with leave of court if the summons have been
served, without leave of court if an answer has been submitted); and provided, further, that a circumstance for their
admissibility exists (Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court).
The Rules of Court vests in the trial court the discretion to order whether a deposition may be taken or not under specified
circumstances that may even differ from those the proponents have in tended. However, it is well-settled that this discretion
is not unlimited. It must be exercised not arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively but in a reasonable manner and in
consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be attained.
SAFEGUARDS TO ENSURE RELIABILITY
The Rules of Court provides adequate safeguards to ensure the reliability of depositions. The right to object to their
admissibility is retained by the parties, for the same reasons as those for excluding evidence if the witness were present and
had testified in court; and for errors and irregularities in the deposition. As a rule, depositions should be allowed,
absent any showing that taking them would prejudice any party.
USE OF DEPOSITIONS
Depositions may be used for the trial or for the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, under the circumstances
specified unde Section 4. The present case involved a circumstance that fell under the above-cited Section 4(c) (2) of Rule
23 the witnesses of petitioner in Metro Manila resided beyond 100 kilometers from Sultan Kudarat, the place of
hearing. Petitioner offered the depositions in support of its Motion to Quash (the Writ of Execution) and for the purpose of
proving that the trial courts Decision was not yet final.
As previously explained, despite the fact that trial has already been terminated, a deposition can still be properly taken.
However, the SC did found not reason to disturb the findings of the CA as regards the circumstances surrounding the
Omnibus Motion for New Trial.
c.
Deposition not a substitute for actual testimony
Sales v. Sabino, G.R. No. 133154, December 9, 2005

QUICKIE FACTS:
Sabino filed a Complaint against Sales, the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident which killed Sabinos son, Elbert.
Before any responsive pleading was filed, Sabino notified the Sales that he will take the deposition of one Corral before the
RTC. Thus, the deposition on oral examination of Corral was taken in the presence and active participationof Sales counsel
who even cross-examined Corral. During trial, Sabino had the deposition marked as exhibits.
After the presentation of evidence, Sabino made a Formal Offer of Exhibits. Sales opposed the admission. Nonetheless, the
RTC admitted it. MR denied. On certiorari, CA denied. It stated that Sales active participation estopped him from assaling the
admissibility. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, upon which petitioner mounts his challenge to the admission in evidence of the
subject deposition, pertinently reads:
SEC. 4. Use of depositions. At the trial . . . any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules
of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or
who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions:
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(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court
finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred (100)
kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence
was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because
of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to
procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such exception
circumstances exist and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orallyvin
open court, to allow the deposition to be used.
While depositions may be used as evidence in court proceedings, they are generally not meant to be a substitute for the
actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Stated a bit differently, a deposition is not to be used when the
deponent is at hand. Indeed, any deposition offered during a trial to prove the facts therein set out, in lieu of the actual
oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground of hearsay . However,
depositions may be used without the deponent being called to the witness stand by the proponent, provided the
existence of certain conditions is first satisfactorily established. Five (5) exceptions for the admissibility of a deposition
are listed in Section 4, Rule 23, of the Rules of Court. Among these is when the witness is out of the Philippines.
The trial court had determined that deponent Bueneres Corral was abroad when the offer of his deposition was made.
This factual finding of absence or unavailability of witness to testify deserves respect , having been adequately
substantiated. As it were, the certification by the Bureau of Immigration provides that evidentiary support. Accordingly, the
attribution of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court must be struck down . It has been said to be
customary for courts to accept statements of parties as to the unavailability of a witness as a predicate to the use of
depositions. Had deponent Buaneres Corral indeed returned to the Philippines subsequent to his departure via Flight
No. PR 658, petitioner could have presented evidence to show that such was the case. As it is, however, the petitioner
does not even assert the return as a fact, only offering it as a possibility since no contrary proof had been adduced .
In fine, the act of cross-examining the deponent during the taking of the deposition cannot, without more, be
considered a waiver of the right to object to its admissibility as evidence in the trial proper . In participating, therefore,
in the taking of the deposition, but objecting to its admissibility in court as evidence, petitioner did not assume inconsistent
positions. He is not, thus, estopped from challenging the admissibility of the deposition just because he participated
in the taking thereof.
Lest it be overlooked, Section 29, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, no less, lends support to the conclusion just made. In gist, it
provides that, while errors and irregularities in depositions as to notice, qualifications of the officer conducting the
deposition, and manner of taking the deposition are deemed waived if not objected to before or during the taking of
the deposition, objections to the competency of a witness or the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony
may be made for the first time at the trial and need not be made at the time of the taking of the deposition, unless
they could be obviated at that point.
d.
Period to apply for Deposition
Rosete v. Lim, June 8, 2006, G.R. No. 136051

QUICKIE FACTS:
Lim filed a Complaint for Annulment, Specific Perfromance, and Damages against Rosete, AFP Retirement and Separation
Benefits Systems, Espreme Realty, etc. It asked that the Deed of Sale covering certain parcels of land be annulled and that
ownership be resotred to Lim. Motions to Dismiss were filed but were all denied. Rosete et al manifested that they filed a
Petition for Certiorari in the CA to challenge the orders denying the Motions to Dismiss. They likewise informed the RTC that
they filed an Ex Parte Motion to Admit Answers Ex Abundante Cautela.
Thereafter, Lim filed a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination and gave notice that they will take the deposition
of Rosete and Mapalo. Rosete et al filed an Motion and Objection to Take Deposition on the ground that deposition may not
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be taken without leave of court considering no answer has yet been served and the issues have not yet been joined since their
Answer was filed ex abundanti cautela.
RTC denied Rosete et als Motion and Objection and scheduled the taking of the deposition. They then went up on certiorari
to the CA challenging said order but was denied. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
Section 1 of Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained
over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an
answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance
of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may
be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 23.
Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison
may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.
From the quoted section, it is evident that once an answer has been served, the testimony of a person, whether a party or
not, may be taken by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories . In the case before us, Rosete et al
contend they have not yet served an answer to Lim because the answers that they have filed with the trial court were made ex
abudanti cautela. In other words, they do not consider the answers they filed in court and served on Lim as answers
contemplated by the Rules of Court on the ground that same were filed ex abudanti cautela.
We find Rosete et als contention to be untenable. Ex abudanti cautela means out of abundant caution or to be on the safe
side. An answer ex abudanti cautela does not make their answer less of an answer. A cursory look at the answers
filed by Rosete et al shows that they contain their respective defenses . An answer is a pleading in which a defending
party sets forth his defenses and the failure to file one within the time allowed herefore may cause a defending party to be
declared in default.Thus, petitioners, knowing fully well the effect of the non-filing of an answer, filed their answers despite
the pendency of their appeal with the Court of Appeals on the denial of their motion to dismiss.
Rosete et als argument that the issues of the case have not yet been joined must necessarily fail in light of our ruling that
petitioners have filed their answers although the same were made ex abudanti cautela. Issues are joined when all the parties
have pleaded their respective theories and the terms of the dispute are plain before the court. In the present case, the
issues have, indeed, been joined when Rosete, as well as the other defendants, filed their answers. The respective claims
and defenses of the parties have been defined and the issues to be decided by the trial court have been laid down.
Hyatt International v. Ley Construction, G.R. NO. 147143, March 10, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
LCDC filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages in the RTC of Makati against Hyatt International, Princeton
Development, and Yu He Ching (President of Hyatt). LCDC claims that Hyatt reneged on its obligation to transfer 40% of
the real property in favor of LCDC even after LCDCs full payment of the purchase price. Likewise, it was alleged that Hyatt
sold said property to Princeton in fraud of LCDC.
LCDC filed Notices to Take Depositions of Yu, Go (Account Officer of RCBC), and Sy (Finance Officer of Hyatt). Likewise,
Hyatt also filed Notices to Take Depositions of Manuel Ley (President of LCDC). RTC ordered the depositions to proceed.
At the scheduled deposition, Hyatt prayed that depositions be disregarded and instead proceed to Pretrial arguing that the
depositions would just delay the proceedings. RTC agreed and cancelled all scheduled depositions and set the pretrial.
Aggrieved, LCDC appealed to the CA which was however dismissed. During Pretrial, LCDC refused to enter into pretrial. As
such, it was declared non-suited and the complaint was dismissed. MR denied. Then, LCDC went up again to the CA to
appeal. This time, the appeal was granted and the CA remanded the case to allow depositions to be taken. Hyatt now files this
petition. Essentially, they question whether the CA was correct in remanding the case and ordered for deposition-taking to
proceed.
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DOCTRINE:
The CA was correct in remanding the case to the RTC and ordering the deposition-taking to proceed. A deposition should
be allowed, absent any showing that taking it would prejudice any party . It is accorded a broad and liberal treatment and
the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant
and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law.
It is allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court
where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge, consistent with the principle of promoting just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding; and provided it is taken in accordance with the provisions of
the Rules of Court, i.e., with leave of court if summons have been served, and without such leave if an answer has been
submitted; and provided further that a circumstance for its admissibility exists.The rules on discovery should not be unduly
restricted, otherwise, the advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the
disposal of litigation would be defeated.
Indeed, the importance of discovery procedures is well recognized by the Court. It approved A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC on July
13, 2004 which provided for the guidelines to be observed by trial court judges and clerks of court in the conduct of
pre-trial and use of deposition-discovery measures. Under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, trial courts are directed to issue
orders requiring parties to avail of interrogatories to parties under Rule 45 and request for admission of adverse party
under Rule 26 or at their discretion make use of depositions under Rule 23 or other measures under Rule 27 and 28
within 5 days from the filing of the answer. The parties are likewise required to submit, at least 3 days before the pre-trial,
pre trial briefs, containing among others a manifestation of the parties of their having availed or their intention to avail
themselves of discovery procedures or referral to commissioners.
Since the pertinent incidents of the case took place prior to the effectivity of said issuance, however, the depositions
sought by LCDC shall be evaluated based on the jurisprudence and rules then prevailing, particularly Sec. 1, Rule 23 of the
1997 Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. By leave of court after jurisdiction has been
obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or without such
leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person , whether a party or not, may be
taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The
attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21. Depositions shall
be taken only in accordance with these Rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken
only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.
As correctly observed by the CA, LCDC complied with the above quoted provision as it made its notice to take
depositions after the answers of the defendants have been served. LCDC having complied with the rules then prevailing,
the trial court erred in canceling the previously scheduled depositions .
While it is true that depositions may be disallowed by trial courts if the examination is conducted in bad faith; or in such
a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person who is the subject of the inquiry , or when the inquiry touches
upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege, such circumstances, however are absent in
the case at bar.
Hyatt also argues that LCDC has no evidence to support its claims and that it was only after the filing of its Complaint that it
started looking for evidence through the modes of discovery. On this point, it is well to reiterate the Courts pronouncement
in Republic v. Sandiganbayan:
What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be useful in the
preparation for trial, such as the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts; those
relevant facts themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a
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broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of fishing expedition serve to preclude a
party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponents case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant
facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel
the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure
simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the
period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility, of surprise.
The information LCDC seeks to obtain through the depositions of Elena Sy, the Finance Officer of Hyatt and Pacita Tan
Go, an Account Officer of RCBC, may not be obtained at the pre-trial conference, as the said deponents are not parties
to the pre-trial conference.
Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose
of disclosing the real matters of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the
preparation for trial.
In this case, the information sought to be obtained through the depositions of Elena and Pacita are necessary to fully
equip LCDC in determining what issues will be defined at the pre-trial. Without such information before pre-trial,
LCDC will be forced to prosecute its case in the dark the very situation which the rules of discovery seek to prevent.
Indeed, the rules on discovery seek to make trial less a game of blind mans bluff and more a fair contest with the
basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable.
e.
Non-resident foreign corporation to testify through deposition
San Luis v. Rojas, G.R. 159127, March 3, 2008

QUICKIE FACTS:
Suing on an isolated transaction, Berdex International Inc., a corporation based in California, filed a Complaint for Sum of
Money against Ramon San Luis. It was alleged that San Luis loaned money from Berdex and that San Luis refused to sign the
contract of loan. In his defense, San Luis argued that there was no contract of loan.
Berdex then filed a Motion to Authorize Deposition Taking through Written Interrogatories stating that all of its witnesses are
Americans who reside or hold office therein. Likewise, one of the witnesses was old and could not travel to the Philippines.
San Luis opposed this saying that it would deprive the court of the right to examine the demeanor of the witnesses. Moreover,
he also claimed that this would violate his right to cross-examine the witness. Nonetheless, the RTC and the CA allowed the
taking of depositions.
San Luis now questions whether or not Sec 1 of Rule 23 allows a non-resident foreign corporation testify through deposition
upon written interrogatories taken outside the Philippines.
DOCTRINE:
Unequivocally, the rule does not make any distinction or restriction as to who can avail of deposition. The fact that
Berdex is a non-resident foreign corporation is immaterial. The rule clearly provides that the testimony of any person may
be taken by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories, at the instance of any party. Depositions serve
as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to the issues of the case . The evident purpose is to enable the parties,
consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials
and thus prevent the said trials from being carried out in the dark.
In Dasmarias Garments, Inc. v. Reyes, where we upheld the right of plaintiff during the trial stage of the case to present its
evidence by deposition of its witnesses in a foreign jurisdiction in lieu of their oral examination in court, we said:
Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts
resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court.
Depositions, and the other modes of discovery (interrogatories to parties; requests for admission by adverse
party; production or inspection of documents or things; physical and mental examination of persons) are
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meant to enable a party to learn all the material and relevant facts, not only known to him and his
witnesses but also those known to the adverse party and the latters own witnesses. In fine, the object
of discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the material and relevant facts, from
whoever may have knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or motions may not suffer from
inadequacy of factual foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and completely laid before the
Court, without omission or suppression.
Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the
relevant facts; they are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court
of a party or witness. The deponent must as a rule be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial
or hearing.
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the actual
oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay:
the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his
testimony is offered. It matters not that opportunity for crossexamination was afforded during the taking of
the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a party at the time that
the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing.
However, depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand
by the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes. These exceptional
situations are governed by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Rules of Court. It is apparent then that the deposition
of any person may be taken wherever he may be, in the Philippines or abroad. If the party or witness is in
the Philippines, his deposition shall be taken before any judge, municipal or notary public (Sec. 10, Rule
24, Rules of Court). If in a foreign state or country, the deposition shall be taken: (a) on notice before a
secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the
Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters
rogatory.
Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in granting Berdexs MOTION (To Allow
Deposition-Taking Through Written Interrogatories) considering Berdexs allegation in its MOTION that its witnesses are all
Americans residing in the U.S. This situation is one of the exceptions for its admissibility under Section 4(c)(2), Rule 23 of
the Rules of Court, i.e., that the witness resides at a distance of more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place
of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition.
The situation in Dasmarias is the same as in the instant case since in both cases, it was already during the trial stage
that the deposition through written interrogatories was sought to be taken. It does not matter whether one witness for the
plaintiff had already testified since the Dasmarias ruling did not make such testimony in court a condition to grant the
deposition of the two other witnesses. Also, in Dasmarias, the plaintiff sued defendant to recover a certain sum of money
which was the same as in the instant case as private respondent was suing petitioner for collection of sum of money.
While there are limitations to the rules of discovery, even when permitted to be undertaken without leave and without
judicial intervention, such limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the examination is being conducted in bad
faith;or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry; or when the inquiry
touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege. It has been repeatedly held that
deposition discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment and should not be unduly restricted if the matters
inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law.
Otherwise, the advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation
would be defeated. In fact, we find nothing in the rules on deposition that limits their use in case of oral contract as alleged by
petitioner.
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Philippine Computer Solutions v. Jose Hernandez, G.R. NO. 168776, July 17, 2007
QUICKIE FACTS:
PCS filed a complaint before the SEC against 2 of its incorporators, Condol & Lisama, and one Manzo. The complaint alleged
that its corporate name was being unlawfully used in unauthorized business transactions here and abroad. Specifically, it was
alleged that Condol acted as a purported President and Manzo as the purported secretary/treasurer. They entered into a
partnerhsip with PeopleSoft Australia.
Only Manzo filed an Answer to the Complaint because summons was not served on the others on account of their change of
address. Before issuance of summons by publication, RA 8799 took effect, thereby transferring jurisdiction of intracorproate
matters from the SEC to the regular courts. Upon service by publication, no answer was still filed. Thus, PCS moved to
declare them in default.
Also, PCS filed a Motion for Issuance of a Commission to take the deposition in Australia of a corporate officer of PeopleSoft
Australia regaing the details of PeopleSofts transactions with Condol et al. Unfortuantely, the RTC denied the Motion for
Issuance of a Commission. It ruled that, under the Interim Rules for Intra Corporate Disputes, a party can only avail of modes
of discovery within 15 days from the joinder of issues. On appeal, CA dismissed PCS petition. CA ruled that even though no
responsive pleading was filed, PCS failed to serve written interrogatories on its witness abroad within 15 days. MR denied.
DOCTRINE:
This Court notes that during the pendency of the instant Petition, specifically on 27 December 2006, the trial court already
rendered a Decision in the main case, SEC Case No. 68524. Taking her bearings from this incident, Manzo prays in her
memorandum before this Court that the instant petition should now be dismissed.
It is not disputed that a Decision in the main case, SEC Case No. 68524, has already been rendered. While the Court of
Appeals has yet to act on petitioners Petition for Review, it is this Courts view that the issue has become moot and academic.
Considering the trial courts Decision dated 27 December 2006 in SEC Case No. 68524 and the personal testimony of Bergen
before the trial court, this Court finds that the issue of whether a commission should be issued for the taking of
depositions of petitioners witnesses has indeed become moot.
f.
Application of Rule 23 in criminal cases
Manguerra v. Risos, G.R. No. 152643, August 28, 2008

QUICKIE FACTS:
Risos et al were charged with Estafa through Falsification of a Public Document in the RTC of Cebu. It was alleged that Risos
et al falsified a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage when they made it appear that Concepcion Manguerra affixed her signature to
the document.
While in Manila, Concepcion was unexpectedly confined at Makati Med and advised to stay there for futher treatment.
Concepcions lawyer filed a Motion to Take Deposition of Concepcion. He explained that there was a need to perpetate her
testimony due to her weak physical condition and advanced age. As such, RTC granted the Motion and ordered the deposition
of Concepcion before the RTC of Makati. Risos et als MR was denied. Thereafter, Concepcions deposition was finally taken.
Aggrieved, Risos et al assailed via certiorari the Order of the RTC allowing deposition-taking. CA granted the petition and
declared the deposition taken to be void. It was stated that the Rules governing the examination of the prosecution witness is
governed by Sec 15 Rule 119 of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23. Thus, the deposition could only be taken before the
judge where the case is pending (RTC of Cebu) and not in Makati. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of the judge. This is
ESPECIALLY TRUE IN CRIMINAL CASES in order that the accused may be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It also gives the parties and their
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counsel the chance to propound such questions as they deem material and necessary to support their position or to
test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses demeanor .
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of
discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of
witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13, and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and
prosecution witnesses.
In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who, according to the Manguerra, was too sick to
travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus comes into play, and it provides:
Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the
court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after
reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same
manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after
notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.
Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be conditionally examined:
(1) if the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or
(2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning.
Thus, when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had she not been too sick at that time, her motion would
have been denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the trial court, she would have been compelled to appear
before the court for examination during the trial proper.
Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that the conditional
examination be made BEFORE THE COURT WHERE THE CASE IS PENDING. It is also necessary that the accused be
notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner
of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through
question and answer.
Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a prosecution witness shall be made before the court
where the case is pending. Contrary to Manguerras contention, there is nothing in the rule which may remotely be
interpreted to mean that such requirement applies only to cases where the witness is within the jurisdiction of said
court and not when he is kilometers away, as in the present case.
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or
criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal
cases. However, it is likewise true that the criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we
find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
g.
Purpose of taking deposition
Pajarillaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163515, October 31, 2008

QUICKIE FACTS:
Kalangeg filed in the RTC of Bontoc a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against Pajarillaga. In one hearing date,
despite due notice, Pajarillaga failed to appear. Thus, Kalangeg was allowed to present his witnesses subject to cross on the
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next hearing date. However, Pajarillaga was again absent. Consequently, upon Kalangegs motion, the RTC declared that
Pajarillaga waived his right of cross-examination.
Thereafter, Pajarillaga moved to reset the hearing which the RTC granted. Then, Pajarillaga filed a Motion for Leave of Court
to Take the Deposition of Kalangeg upon written interrogatories on the grounds that Pajarilla lives in Manila which is more
tan 400KM away from Bontoc and that he was suffering from an illness which prohibits him from doing strenous activities.
Kalangeg opposed. Afterwards, RTC denied Pajarillagas motion. MR denied. CA also affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Essentially, Pajarillaga questions whether or not the taking of Kalangegs deposition by written interrogatories is proper.
DOCTRINE:
Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, THE PRIMARY FUNCTION of which is to supplement the pleadings for the
purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during
the preparation for trial. It should be allowed absent any showing that taking it would prejudice any party. It is accorded a
broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are
otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law.
It is allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their
demeanor could be observed by the trial judge, consistent with the principle of promoting just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding; and provided it is taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, i.e., with leave of court if summons have been served, and without such leave if an answer has been submitted; and
provided further that a circumstance for its admissibility exists.
There is nothing in the Rules of Court or in jurisprudence which restricts a deposition to the sole function of being a
mode of discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken even after trial
has commenced and may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand. There is no rule
that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition exists against the taking of depositions
after pre-trial. There can be no valid objection to allowing them during the process of executing final and executory
judgments, when the material issues of fact have become numerous or complicated.
Such being the case, there is really nothing objectionable, per se, with Pajarillaga availing of this discovery measure
after Kalangeg has rested his case and prior to Pajarillagas presentation of evidence . To reiterate, depositions may be
taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient.
But when viewed vis the several postponements made by Pajarillaga for the initial presentation of his evidence, we
are of the view that his timing is, in fact, suspect. The records before us show that he stopped attending the hearings after
Kalangeg presented his first witness. He offered no excuse for his and his counsels absences. Moreover, the trial court
has set four (4) hearing dates for the initial presentation of his evidence. But he merely moved for its resetting without
invoking the grounds which he now presents before us.
Here, we find the protracted delay in the litigation at Pajarillagas instance coupled with the belated and
unsubstantiated allegations of illness and threats to his life, more than sufficient reasons for the trial court to deny his
motion.
h.
Letters rogatory and commission
Dulay v. Dulay, G.R. No. 158857, November 11, 2005

QUICKIE FACTS:
Rodrigo Dulay is a naturalized American citizen living in Massachusettes. He opened a trust account in the Bank of Boston in
favor of his nephew Pfeger Dulay in the amount of $230,000. Much to his surprise, Pfeger squandered the money away. Thus,
Rodrigo filed a Complaint for Recovery of Bank Deposit against Pfeger et al.
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Thereafter, Rodrigo filed a Petition for Issuance of Letters Rogatory to get the depositions of several witnesses residing
abroad. Pfeger et al moved to be allowed to file cross-examination quetions to Rodrigos written interrogatories which the
RTC granted. Said order stated that the Clerk of Court in Boston conduct examination of Rodrigo Dulay and the bank
manager of the Bank of Boston.
However, the depositions were instead taken before a notary public in New York. Thus, Pfeger et al filed an Omibus Motion
praying that the written interrogatories be declared inadmisible. However, this was denied by the RTC and stated that there
was substantial compliance with the Rules. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
While the letters rogatory issued by the trial court specifically directed the Clerk of Court of Boston to take the depositions
needed in the case, it became impossible to follow the directive since the Clerk of Court of Boston merely brushed it
aside and refused to cooperate. Rodrigo cannot be faulted for the resultant delay brought about by this
circumstance. Neither can the trial court be faulted for allowing the admission of the depositions taken not in strict
adherence to its original directive, nor for directing the petitioner to have the depositions authenticated.
Obviously, it was not within the trial courts power, much less the Rodrigos to force the Clerk of Court of Boston to
have the deposition taken before it. It would be illogical and unreasonable to expect respondent to comply with the letters
rogatory without the cooperation of the very institution or personality named in the letters rogatory and requested to examine
the witnesses. After all, while a court had the authority to entertain a discovery request, it is not required to provide
judicial assistance thereto. This reality was recognized by the trial court when it ordered Rodrigo to have the questioned
depositions authenticated by the Philippine consulate. Indeed, refusing the allowance of the depositions in issue would be
going directly against the purpose of taking the depositions in the first place, that is, the disclosure of facts which are relevant
to the proceedings in court.
More importantly, the Court finds that Rodrigo substantially complied with the requirements for depositions taken in
foreign countries. In our jurisdiction, depositions in foreign countries may be taken:
(1) on notice before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of
the Republic of the Philippines;
(2) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory; or
(3) before any person authorized to administer oaths as stipulated in writing by the parties.
While LETTERS ROGATORY are requests to foreign tribunals, COMMISSIONS are directives to officials of the issuing
jurisdiction.
Generally, a COMMISSION is an instrument issued by a court of justice , or other competent tribunal, directed to a
magistrate by his official designation or to an individual by name, authorizing him to take the depositions of the
witnesses named therein, while a LETTER ROGATORY is a request to a foreign court to give its aid, backed by its power,
to secure desired information. Commissions are taken in accordance with the rules laid down by the court issuing the
commission, while in letters rogatory, the methods of procedure are under the control of the foreign tribunal .
Leave of court is not required when the deposition is to be taken before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines and the defendants answer has already been served.
However, if the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the Philippines has no secretary of embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent, it may be taken only before such person or officer as
may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory.
In the instant case, the authentication made by the consul was a ratification of the authority of the notary public who
took the questioned depositions. The deposition was, in effect, obtained through a commission, and no longer through
letters rogatory. It must be noted that this move was even sanctioned by the trial court by virtue of its Order dated 28
September 2000. With the ratification of the depositions in issue, there is no more impediment to their admissibility.
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Besides, the allowance of the deposition can not be said to have caused any prejudice to the adverse party. They were
given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses through their cross-interrogatories, which were in turn answered
by the deponents. Save for the complaint of delay in the proceedings, petitioners were unable to point out any injury they
suffered as a result of the trial courts action.
i.
Failure to answer written interrogatories
Jaravata v. Karolus, G.R. No. 154988, June 21, 2007

QUICKIE FACTS:
Felisa Jaravata filed an Action for Reconveyance and Declaration of Nullity of Titles and Damages against Diana Karolus. She
claims that she is the lawful owner and actual occupant of a parcel of land in Zambales which is subdivided into 3 different
lots. She further alleges that Karolus illegally secured titles to 2 of the 3 subdivided lots.
In their Answer, Karolus contended that the issuance of the free patents was not fraudulent and that there was no overlapping
of the lots. They also set up the defense of prescription. Thereafter, a Third Party Complaint was filed against Javaratas
lawyer, Atty. Tacorda.
Later on, Jaravata served two separate sets of written interrogatories upon Karolus. However, the latter objected to them but
was denied by the RTC. As such, Karolus filed a Manifestation and Compliance attaching their answers to the written
interrogatories.
Jaravata and Atty. Tacorda then filed a Joint Omibus Motion to compel Karolus to fully and completely answer the written
interrogatories. Failing this, RTC declared Karolus in default pursuant to Sec 3 (c) of Rule 29. Thereafter, RTC ruled for
Jaravata. However, CA reversed the decisin and ruled in favor of Karolus.
DOCTRINE:
The CA rightly held that the RTC erred in rendering a judgment by default against Karolus for refusal or failure to
answer written interrogatories, without first requiring an application by the proponent to compel an answer. This is
the requisite procedure under Section 1 of Rule 29 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
NEVERTHELESS, the CA erred in proceeding to decide the case on the merits since there was as yet no trial or
presentation of evidence in the RTC. Jaravatas prayer to affirm the trial courts December 18, 1997 default decision does
not mean that there was a trial. The decision of the RTC was based on constructive admissions by Karolus of the
allegations of the plaintiff due to the courts application of the sanction for not answering the written interrogatories. In
reversing the application of the sanction, the CA should have given the parties a chance to substantiate by evidence
their respective claims at the trial court.
This is particularly true with respect to the Jaravatas claim of physical possession for more than 30 years, regarding which the
CA said that clear and convincing evidence was required but wanting. This is because the wrong procedure followed by the
trial court effectively aborted a trial and presentation of evidence.
j.
Consequences of failure to answer interrogatories
Zepeda v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 172175, October 9, 2006

QUICKIE FACTS:
Sps. Zepeda filed a Complaint for Nullification of Foreclosure Proceedings and Loan Documents with Damages against
Chinabank before the RTC. It was claimed that they obtained a loan from CBC secured by a real estate mortgage. When the
Sps Zepeda encountered difficulties in paying the loan, CBC allegedly agreed to a restructuring plan. Despite their agreement,
CBC extrajudicially foreclosed on the property and bcame the highest bidder. Later, title was consolidated in its favor.
CBC filed a Motion to Dismiss but was denied. So, it filed an Answer with affirmative defenses. Also, CBC filed a set of
written interrogatories with 20 questions. However, RTC denied the affirmative defenses and directed the COC to set pre-trial
conference. A Motion to Expunge the complaint for being premature was also denied. Thus, CBC filed a Petition for
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Certiorari in the CA which was granted on the ground that Sps. Zepeda failed to answer CBCs written interrogatories, among
others. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
We do not agree with the CA ruling that the complaint should be dismissed for failure of Sps. Zepeda to answer CBCs
written interrogatories. It should be noted that CBC filed a motion to expunge the complaint based on Section 3(c) of Rule 29
which states:
SEC. 3. Other consequences. If any party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey an order
made under section 1 of this Rule requiring him to answer designated questions, or an order under
Rule 27 to produce any document or other thing for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to
be done, or to permit entry upon land or other property, or an order made under Rule 28 requiring him to
submit to a physical or mental examination, the court may make such orders in regard to the refusal as
are just, and among others the following:
(c) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is
obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party[.]
As we have explained in Arellano v. Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, the consequences enumerated in Section 3(c) of Rule
29 would only apply where the party upon whom the written interrogatories is served , refuses to answer a
PARTICULAR QUESTION in the set of written interrogatories and despite an order compelling him to answer the particular
question, still refuses to obey the order.
In the instant case, Sps. Zepeda refused to answer the whole set of written interrogatories, not just a particular
question. Clearly then, CBC should have filed a motion based on Section 5 and not Section 3(c) of Rule 29.
Section 5 of Rule 29 reads:
SEC. 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers. If a party or an officer or managing agent of a party willfully
fails to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or
fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 25 after proper service of such
interrogatories, the court on motion and notice, may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that
party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default against
that party, and in its discretion, order him to pay reasonable expenses incurred by the other, including
attorneys fees.
Due to CBCs filing of an erroneous motion, the trial court cannot be faulted for ruling that the Motion to Expunge
was premature for lack of a prior application to compel compliance based on Section 3 .
This Court has long encouraged the availment of the various modes or instruments of discovery as embodied in Rules 24 to 29
of the Rules of Court. The imposition of sanctions under Section 5 is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Thus, in Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, we held:
For while the modes of discovery are intended to attain the resolution of litigations with great expediency,
they are not contemplated, however, to be ultimate causes of injustice. It behooves trial courts to examine
well the circumstances of each case and to make their considered determination thereafter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The January 24, 2006 Decision and the March 31, 2006 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals, which granted CBCs petition to annul the April 1, 2004 and October 22, 2004 Orders of the RTC denying
CBCs affirmative defenses without a hearing as well as its motion to expunge the complaint because of Zepedas
failure to answer the written interrogatories are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 30, for further proceedings.
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k.
Request for Admission not answered
Sime Darby v. NLRC, G.R. No. 148021, December 6, 2006

QUICKIE FACTS:
By reason of a bargaining deadlock, Sime Darby declared and implemented a lockout against its hourly employees who belong
to the Union. Thus, the Union filed a Complaint for Illegal Lockout. Meanwhile, stockholders of Sime Darby sold tire
manufacturing assets and closed down its Sale of Tire Manufacturing Operation. Thus, its employees were terminated. As a
result, these terminated employees filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal. Later, a Complaint for Unfair Labor Practice
was filed. These cases were then consolidated.
LA dismissed the complaints and found the lockout as well as the mass termination legal and valid. On appeal, NLRC
affirmed. CA also affirmed. Hence this petition.
The Union claims that the LA erred in not considering as admitted the matters contained in their Request for Admission after
Sime Darby failed to file a sworn answer thereto.
DOCTRINE:
The submission that the Unions Request for Admission should have been deemed admitted in their favor after Sime Darby
had failed to file a sworn reply or objection thereto cannot be sustained.
A REQUEST FOR ADMISSION is a remedy provided by Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, which allows a party to file and serve
upon any other party a written request for the admission of :
(1) the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request; or
(2) the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request.
Said request must be answered under oath within the period indicated in the request, otherwise the matters of which
admission were requested should be deemed admitted. The Union claims that Sime Darby, instead of filing an answer
under oath, filed an unsworn reply/objection thereto. Thus, the admissions should be deemed admitted in their favor.
The Unions Request for Admission does not fall under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. A review of said Request for
Admission shows that it contained matters which are precisely the issues in the consolidated cases , and/or irrelevant
matters; for example, the reasons behind the lockout, the companys motive in the CBA negotiations, lack of notice of
dismissal, the validity of the release and quitclaim, etc. Rule 26 as a mode of discovery contemplates of interrogatories that
would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in a pleading. That is its primary function.
It does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleadings .
Otherwise stated, the Unions request constitutes an UTTER REDUNDANCY and a USELESS, POINTLESS PROCESS which
Sime Darby should not be subjected to. The rule on admission as a mode of discovery is intended to expedite trial and to
relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be
ascertained by reasonable inquiry. Thus, if the request for admission only serves to delay the proceedings by abetting
redundancy in the pleadings, the intended purpose for the rule will certainly be defeated.
l.
Request for Admission instead of Offer to Stipulate
Manzano v. Despabiladeras, G.R.No. 148786, December 16, 2004

QUICKIE FACTS:
Luz Despabiladeras obtained on credit from Roger Manzano various construction materials to be used by the former in a
construction project. According to Manzano, he delivered to Despabiladeras a total of P307,140.50 worth of construction
materials. Having paid only about P130K, Manzano filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against Despabiladeras in the RTC
of Iriga City.
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In her Answer, Despabiladeras claimed that Manzano altered the prices. So, there was a dispute on how much the materials
really were. Thereafter, the case was set for Pretrial. After said pretrial, the RTC ordered that, upon agreement of the parties,
Manzano shall submit an Offer to Stipulate showing an itemized list of the materials delivered to Despabiladeras within 15
days to Despabiladeras who shall be allowed to object thereto.
Instead of submitting an Order to Stipulate, Manzano filed a Request for Admission which asked Despabiladeras to admit
within 15 days from receipt that Manzano in fact delivered construction materials amounting to 300k and that Despabiladeras
only paid 130K thereof.
The Request for Admission remained unheeded during the 15 day period. It was only during trial wherein Despabiladeras filed
a list of tems it admits to having been delivered by Manzano. Thereafter, RTC ruled that the facts requested to be admitted
are confirmed in light of the fact that Despabiladeras did not file an answer. Then, RTC finally ruled in favor of Manzano and
ordered Despabiladeras to pay the balance. On appeal, CA reversed. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
The agreement of the parties during the pre-trial conference of October 2, 1990, as reflected in the pre-trial order of even date,
was that Manzano shall submit an offer to stipulate showing an itemized list of construction materials delivered to
Despalidares together with the cost claimed by Manzano within fifteen (15) days[,] furnishing copy thereof to Despalidares
who will state her objections if any, or comment there[o]n within the same period of time. In substantial compliance with
said agreement, Manzano chose to instead file a REQUEST FOR ADMISSION, a remedy afforded by a party under Rule 26.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 26 should not be disregarded, as in fact the trial court did not, when it ordered Despalidares to
file comment thereon, just because the parties mutually agreed that petitioner submit an offer to stipulate.
For, as stated earlier, the request for admission is a remedy afforded any party after the issues had been joined.
Despalidares having failed to discharge what is incumbent upon her under Rule 26 , that is, to deny under oath the
facts bearing on the main issue contained in the Request for Admission, she was deemed to have admitted that
she received the construction materials, the cost of which was indicated in the request and was indebted to petitioner in the
amount of P184,610.50 (P314,610.50 less the partial payment of P130,000.00).
m.
Failure to respond to a Request for Admission
Limos v. Spouses Odones, G.R. No.186979, August 11, 2011

QUICKIE FACTS:
Spouses Odones filed a Complaint for Annulment of Deed, Title, and Damages against Limos in the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac.
It alleges that Odones are the owners of a parcel of land by virtue of an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale executed
by the heirs of Donata Lardizabal.
When they decided to register the document, they found that the lands OCT was cancelled and a new one was issued under
the names of Limos et al. The latter allegedly obtained title thereto by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by Lardizabal and her
husband Razalan in 1972.
Odones seeks to cancel the Limos TCT on the ground that the signatures in the Deed of Sale were forgeries because its
signatories were already dead prior to 1972. Thus, Limos had to file an Answer. Thereafter, Odones filed a Reply. Then, Limos
served on Odones a Request for Admission on several matters.
Odones failed to respond. Thus, Limos filed a Motion to Set Preliminary Hearing on the Special and Affirmative Defenses
arguig that Odones failure to respondo or object to the Request for Admission amounted to an implied admission. RTC
denied this Motion on the ground that the matters subject to the Request for Admission were essentialy redundant or have
already been challenged in the pleadings already filed. MR denied. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
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DOCTRINE:
Pertinent to the present controversy are the rules on modes of discovery set forth in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules
of Court, viz.:
Section 1. Request for admission. At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file and serve upon
any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and
relevant document described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material and relevant
matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the request unless
copies have already been furnished.
SEC. 2. Implied admission. Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted
unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall be not less than fifteen (15) days after service
thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the request is
directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically
the matters for which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully
either admit or deny those matters.
Under these rules, a party who fails to respond to a Request for Admission shall be deemed to have impliedly
admitted all the matters contained therein. It must be emphasized, however, that the application of the rules on modes
of discovery rests upon the sound discretion of the court. As such, it is the duty of the courts to examine thoroughly the
circumstances of each case and to determine the applicability of the modes of discovery, bearing always in mind the aim to
attain an expeditious administration of justice.
The determination of the sanction to be imposed upon a party who fails to comply with the modes of discovery also
rests on sound judicial discretion. Corollarily, this discretion carries with it the determination of whether or not to impose
the sanctions attributable to such fault.
As correctly observed by the RTC, the matters set fort in Limos Request for Admission were the same affirmative
defenses pleaded in their Answer which Odones already traversed in their Reply . The said defenses were likewise
sufficiently controverted in the complaint and its annexes . In effect, Limos sought to compel Odones to deny once again
the very matters they had already denied, a redundancy, which if abetted, will serve no purpose but to delay the
proceedings and thus defeat the purpose of the rule on admission as a mode of discovery which is to expedite trial and
relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by
reasonable inquiry.
A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting partys
pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact described in the request , whose purpose is to establish
said partys cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is pointless, useless, and a mere redundancy.
Verily then, if the RTC finds that the matters in a Request for Admission were already admitted or denied in previous
pleadings by the requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the requesting
party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied
admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26.
In this case, the redundant and unnecessarily vexatious nature of Limos Request for Admission rendered it
ineffectual, futile, and irrelevant so as to proscribe the operation of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26 of the
Rules of Court. There being no implied admission attributable to Odones failure to respond, the argument that a
preliminary hearing is imperative loses its point.
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n.
Documents to be produced should be described with particlularity
Solidbank v. Gateway Electronics, G.R. No. 164805, April 30, 2008

QUICKIE FACTS:
Gateway obtained from Solidbank 4 foreign currency denominated loans evidenced by promissory notes. To secure the loans,
Gateway assigned to Solidbank the proceeds from its Back-end Services Agreement with Alliance Semiconductor.
Incidentally, Gateway defaulted and had an outstanding debt of $1.9M. After demands went unheeded, Solidbank filed a
Compaint for Collection of Sum of Money against Gateway.
Thereafter, Solidbank received information that Gateway already received from Alliance proceeds of the Back-end Services
Agrrement. As such, Solidbank filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents. Essentially, Solidbank asked the
court to inspect all documents involving said Agreement and copies of all documents and statements connected thereto.
RTC granted the Motion for Production and Inspection. Gateway submitted invoices related thereto. Unsatisfied, it filed
Motion to cite Gateway in contempt. RTC denied said motion and chastized Gateway for exerting no diligent efforts to
produce said documents evidencing payment. MR denied. When Gateway appealed, CA reversed and ruled that the Motion
for Production and Inspection failed to comply with Rule 27 Section 1. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. Upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or
contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or
control; or (b) order any party or permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession or
control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated
relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the
inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
The aforecited rule provides the mechanics for the production of documents and the inspection of things during the
pendency of a case. It also deals with the inspection of sources of evidence other than documents, such as land or other
property in the possession or control of the other party. This remedial measure is intended to assist in the administration
of justice by facilitating and expediting the preparation of cases for trial and guarding against undesirable surprise
and delay; and it is designed to simplify procedure and obtain admissions of facts and evidence, thereby shortening
costly and time-consuming trials. It is based on ancient principles of equity. More specifically, the purpose of the statute is to
enable a party-litigant to discover material information which, by reason of an opponents control, would otherwise
be unavailable for judicial scrutiny, and to provide a convenient and summary method of obtaining material and
competent documentary evidence in the custody or under the control of an adversary. It is a further extension of the
concept of pretrial.
The modes of discovery are accorded a broad and liberal treatment. Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Court permits
fishing for evidence, the only limitation being that the documents, papers, etc., sought to be produced are not
privileged, that they are in the possession of the party ordered to produce them and that they are material to any matter
involved in the action. The lament against a fishing expedition no longer precludes a party from prying into the facts
underlying his opponents case. Mutual knowledge of all relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. However,
fishing for evidence that is allowed under the rules is not without limitations.
In Security Bank Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the REQUISITES in order that a party may compel the
other party to produce or allow the inspection of documents or things, viz.:
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(1) The party must file a motion for the production or inspection of documents or things, showing good cause
therefor;
(2) Notice of the motion must be served to all other parties of the case;
(3) The motion must designate the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things
which the party wishes to be produced and inspected;
(4) Such documents, etc., are not privileged;
(5) Such documents, etc., constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action, and
(6) Such documents, etc., are in the possession, custody or control of the other party.
In order to ascertain the veracity of the information, Solidbank availed of the discovery procedure under Rule 27. The
purpose of Solidbanks motion is to compel Gateway to produce the documents evidencing payments received from Alliance
in connection with the Back-end Services Agreement. Solidbank was able to show good cause for the production of the
documents. It had also shown that the said documents are material or contain evidence relevant to an issue involved in the
action. However, Solidbanks motion was fatally defective and must be struck down because of its failure to specify
with particularity the documents it required Gateway to produce. Solidbanks motion for production and inspection of
documents called for a BLANKET INSPECTION. Solidbanks request for inspection of all documents pertaining to, arising
from, in connection with or involving the Back-end Services Agreement was simply too broad and too generalized in scope.
A motion for production and inspection of documents should not demand a roving inspection of a promiscuous mass of
documents. The inspection should be limited to those documents designated with sufficient particularity in the
motion, such that the adverse party can easily identify the documents he is required to produce .
Furthermore, Solidbank, being the one who asserts that the proceeds of the Back-end Services Agreement were already
received by Gateway, has the burden of proof in the instant case.
XX.
TRIAL, TRIAL BY COMMISSIONERS, HEARINGS AND CONSOLIDATION OF CASES (RULES 30 TO 32)
1.
Lourdez de Castro v. Crispino de Castro, G.R. No. 172198, June 16, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
Crispino and Lourdes De Castro are spouses. The RTC granted Crispinos Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage base
don psychological incapacity for failure of Lourdes to file an Answer. The latter filed a Motion for Leave to FIle an Omnibus
Motion Seeking a New Trial or Reconsideration on the ground that she was misled and prevented from participating in the
annulment case because Crispino promised support for their children. RTC granted said motion.
On July 17, 2002, the RTC had to reset the hearing because there was no return of the notice sent. Thereafter, the hearings
were reset 12 more times. On Aug 20, 2003, the RTC denied Lourdes request to cancel the hearing due to unavailability of
witnesses. RTC deemed to have waived her right to present evidence due to her failure to present evidence that day.
On Dec 12, 20003, RTC denied Lourdes request to Reconsider the denial claiming that her absence was justifiable with no
intent to delay the proceedings. Lourdes filed a Petition fo Certiorari which the CA denied. Hence, this petition. She now
questions Judge Umalis act of ruling that her right to present evidence was waived when she failed to appear at the August 20
hearing.
DOCTRINE:
We take note of the fact that all motions for postponement by Lourdes were made on the scheduled hearing dates
themselves. On the August 20, 2003 hearing, despite previous warning that no further postponement would be
allowed, she still failed to appear. We agree with the CA when it pointed out that she obviously knew in advance that
she could not make it to the August 20, 2003 hearing. As of the last scheduled hearing of July 25, 2003, she was still out of
the country. The least that petitioner could have done was to instruct her counsel to make a timely representation
with the RTC by filing an early motion-manifestation for the resetting of the hearing.
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Between July 25, 2003 and August 20, 2003 she had sufficient time to file one. Obviously, the warning by the court of
the consequence of another non-appearance in the hearing fell on deaf ears. After having been granted numerous motions
for postponement, she cannot now claim that she was denied due process.
In Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines, we ruled that:
Where a party seeks postponement of the hearing of this case for reasons caused by his own
inofficiousness, lack of resourcefulness and diligence if not total indifference to his own interests or
to the interests of those he represents, thereby resulting in his failure to present his own evidence, the
court would not extend to him its mantle of protection. If it was he who created the situation that
brought about the resulting adverse consequences, he cannot plead for his day in court nor claim
that he was so denied of it.
Further in Hap Hong Hardware Co. v. Philippine Company, we sustained the trial courts denial of a motion for postponement
on the ground that the defendants witnesses, officers of the company, could not come because it was the beginning of the
milling season in the municipality of San Jose, Mindoro Occidental and their presence in the Central was necessary. We held
that the reason adduced was not unavoidable and one that could not have been foreseen.
In the case at bar, Lourdes excuse that she was still in the U.S. taking care of her newborn grandchild, while her
witness, Dr. Maria Cynthia Ramos-Leynes, who conducted a psychiatric evaluation on her, was likewise out of the country,
attending a convention was unjustified. These reasons were not unavoidable and one that could not have been
foreseen. The date of the trial was set one month prior, and as of July 25, 2003, Lourdes was in the U.S. Certainly, Loures
would know in advance if she could make it to the August 20, 2003 hearing. Likewise, attending a convention is a
scheduled event, also something known in advance.
It is the basic duty of a litigant to move for postponement BEFORE THE DAY OF THE HEARing, so that the court could
order its resetting and timely inform the adverse party of the new date . This was not the case at bar for the subject
motion was presented only on the day of the trial without any justification. We thus hold that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion for postponement.
2.
Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, G.R. No. 138137, March 8, 2001
QUICKIE FACTS:
Asia Brewery and Zulueta entered into a Dealership Agreement where Asia Brewery would manufacture and distribute beer
for Zulueta to sell in the outlet he operates. Thereafter, alleging violation of said Dealership Agreement, Zulueta filed a
Complaint for Breach of Contrat, Specific Performance, and Damages against Asia Brewery in the RTC of Iloilo. While said
case was pending, Asia Brewery likewise filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money in the RTC of Makati against
Zulueta for the latters unpaid beer products bought.
Zulueta moved to dismiss the Complaint in Maati on the ground of splitting causes of action and violation against the
principle of multiplicity of suits but was denied. Later on Zulueta moved that the cases be consolidated. This was granted. On
appeal, CA reversed the ruling anstated that there is no common issue of law or fact between the two cases since the Iloilo
case was about the alleged violation of the Dealership Agreement while the Makati case was about Zuluetas debt for unpaid
beer products. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
True, Zuluetas obligation to pay for the beer products delivered by Asia Brewery can exist regardless of an alleged breach in
the Dealership Agreement. Undeniably, however, this obligation and the relationship between Asia Brewery and
Zulueta, as supplier and distributor respectively, arose from the Dealership Agreement which is now the subject of
inquiry in the Iloilo case. In fact, Zulueta herself claims that her obligation to pay was negated by Asia Brewerys
contractual breach. In other words, the nonpayment the res of the Makati case is an incident of the Iloilo case.
Inasmuch as the binding force of the Dealership Agreement was put in question, it would be more, practical and
convenient to submit to the Iloilo court all the incidents and their consequences. The issues in both civil cases
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pertain to the respective obligations of the same parties under the Dealership Agreement . Thus, every transaction as
well as liability arising from it must be resolved in the judicial forum where it is put in issue. The consolidation of the two
cases then becomes imperative to a complete, comprehensive and consistent determination of all these related
issues.
Two cases involving the same parties and affecting closely related subject matters must be ordered consolidated and
jointly tried in court, where the earlier case was filed. The consolidation of cases is proper when they involve the
resolution of common questions of law or facts.
Indeed, upon the consolidation of the cases, the interests of both parties in the two civil cases will best be served and the
issues involved therein expeditiously settled. After all, there is no question on the propriety of the venue in the Iloilo case.
3.
Roque Yu v. Magno, G.R. No. 138701, October 17, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
Sps Roque and Asuncion Yu, as controlling stockholders of Leyte Lumber, entered into a verbal agreement with Engr. Magno
where Leyte Lumber would supply Magno with building materials he may need his construction business. Magno then
established BG Magno Construction and Development Enterprises. Thereafter, Roque and Magno entered into a joint venture
called the Great Pacific Construction Company. This continued until Magno died.
A year after Magnos death, Sps Yu and Leyte Lumber filed separate Complaints for Sum of Money with Damages and
Preliminary Attachment against BG Magno and the estate. In the case instituted by Leyte Lumber, it wanted to collect on the
principal amount of 1.2M for construction materials. In the case instituted by Sps. Yu, they wanted to collect on loans and
advances amounting to 3.5M.
Both cases were raffled to separate RTC branches which rendered decisions in favor of BG Magno. Howeever, the 2 decisions
were penned by Judge Francisco. The parties did not file an MR nor called the attention of Judge Francisco on the absence of
an Order for Consolidation. Instead, they directly filed appeals before the CA.
In the CA, the 2 cases were consolidated. CA modified in the case instituted by Leyte Lumber but reserved the one instituted
by Sps. Yu. Sps. Yu filed an MR but was denied. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
On the question of the propriety of Judge Francisco of Branch 6 formulating the decision in Civil Case No. 5822 which was
pending and tried in Branch 8, we declare that there was nothing irregular in the procedure taken. The records show that
there appears to have been a previous agreement to either transfer or consolidate the two cases for decision by the
presiding judge of Branch 6.
Indeed, when the Magno filed a Motion to Lift, Dissolve and Quash the Writs of Attachment with Branch 6 on January
20, 1993, the caption thereof indicated the docket numbers of both cases. Likewise, on October 29, 1993, when the Sps.
Yus new counsel entered his Formal Appearance, in the caption thereof was also written the docket numbers of both
cases. Sps. Yus previous counsel of longstanding (whose representation dates back to the filing of the two complaints in
1979) filed his Motion to Withdraw as Counsel on October 30, 1993, and the caption thereof similarly indicated the
docket numbers of both cases. Subsequent orders of the court which emanated from Branch 6 also bear, in the caption
thereof, the titles and docket numbers of both cases.
In other words, as early as 6 months prior to the promulgation of Judge Franciscos decisions in the 2 cases, there
appears to have been a transfer or consolidation of said cases in Branch 6 and the parties knew of it, albeit the actual
date when the two cases were consolidated or transferred does not appear on record. Nonetheless, the fact remains that no
opposition or objection in any manner was registered by either of the parties to the same , thereby evincing their
consent thereto. It is, therefore, already too late in the day for the Sps. Yu to question the competence of Judge
Francisco to render the separate decisions in the two cases.
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The two cases were filed just a few months apart; they involve simple cases of collection of sums of money between
identical parties and no other; Magnos claim, in both cases, essentially the same defense, which is overpayment; they cover
the same period of transacting continuous business that spans 4 years; they relate to simple issues of fact that are
intimately related to each other; they entailed presentation of practically identical evidence and witnesses; in fact, a
broad part of the evidence and testimonies in one case was totally adopted or reproduced in the other by either or both
parties. And the trial court, being multi-sala courts, its Branches 6 and 8 possessed jurisdiction to try either or both
cases on their own.
A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they arise from the same act,
event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same
evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the case to be consolidated and that a joint trial
will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties .
The obvious purpose of the above rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and
abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short the
attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties litigants.
Consolidation of cases, when proper, results in the simplification of proceedings, which saves time, the resources of the
parties and the courts, and a possible major abbreviation of trial. It is a desirable end to be achieved, within the context of
the present state of affairs where court dockets are full and individual and state finances are limited. It contributes to the
swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the aim of affording the parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of their cases before the courts. Another compelling argument that weighs heavily in favor of consolidation is
the avoidance of the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the courts in two or more cases which
would otherwise require a single judgment.
4.
Mega Land v. C-E Construction, Inc., G.R. No. 165211, July 31, 2007
QUICKIE FACTS:
Mega Land and CE Construction had an arbitration case before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC).
CIAC rendered a decisin ordering Mega Land to pay CE 1.6M. After Megal Land received the decisin on June 20, 2002,
pursuant to Rule 43, it had 15 days (July 5) to appeal to the CA.
On July 4, Fajardo Law Offices filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file a Petition for Review and sought an extensin
until July 20 on the ground that the legal issues are complex and the records are voluminous. This case was raffled to the 16th
Division. However, on July 5, Mega Lands President and GM (Sy) also filed a Motion for Extension which was assigned a
different docket number. This was raffled to the 5th divisin (now 3rd Division) The reason for the second Motion was
because it was no longer availing of the services of Fajardo Law Offices. No move was undertaken to withdraw or disavow the
Motion earlier filed by Fajardo Law Offices. These 2 Motions for Extensions were granted and thus prolonging the period to
July 20.
Meanwhile, Mega Land secured the services of Atty. Flores. As such, he filed a 2nd Motion for Extension of Time with
Formal Entry of Appearance on July 15. Flores sought a new 15 day period to appeal or on Aug 4. In his Motion, the caption
was that of the 2nd case. This was granted thus further prolonging the period to appeal from July 20 to August 4.
On August 1, Flores filed a Petition for Review on behalf of Mega Land but the caption thereof was that of the first case.
As a result, the 16th Division handling the first case dismissed the Petition for Review for having been filed out of time
because the time extensin was only until July 20. As for the 3rd Division handling the 2nd case, the appeal was dismissed on
the ground that Mega Land did not file a Petition for Review within the period granted or on August 4.
Mega Land filed an MR to the 1st case but was denied. Hence, this petition. Essentially, Mega Land contends that the 2nd
Motion for Extension of Time should have bound the 16th Division which would thereby make its period Aug 4 than merely
July 20.
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DOCTRINE:
The fact that the petition for review intended for filing in the second case bore instead the docket number of the first case
indicates that Mega Land and its new counsel, Atty. Flores, knew of the first case earlier initiated by Fajardo Law
Offices. In short, at the time the petition was filed with the CA, Mega Land had known that there were two similar cases
involving the same parties and causes of action.
There were a variety of options Mega Land could have resorted to in order to rectify the anomaly. Upon learning that there
were actually two different cases pending before the Court of Appeals, it could have moved to withdraw either any of the
motions for extension of time, so that there would be only one case pending with the appellate court.
Had Mega Land done this at the onset, even if later the filed petition itself stated the wrong docket number, the Court of
Appeals could have easily recorded the pleading under the case that remained in existence since it would anyway be
incapable of filing the same under the records of a case that had already been withdrawn.
NO MANDATORY CONSOLIDATION IN THE CA
We have duly considered that perhaps this entire untidiness could have been avoided had the Court of Appeals at the outset
consolidated the two cases. Yet such consideration is ultimately of no moment to Mega Land. For one, under the 2002
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), there is no mandatory obligation to consolidate related cases. The
language utilized in Rule 3, Section 3 of the RIRCA, which authorizes consolidation of cases, is merely directory in
character, providing as it does: [w]hen related cases are assigned to different Justices, they may be consolidated and assigned
to one Justice.
More importantly perhaps, the consolidation of cases was never intended to cure the defect of forum shopping. If one
litigant has filed multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action , the consolidation of these
suits is not the correct palliative. These suits should instead be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping.
5.
Neri v. Sandiganbayan, 703 SCRA 350 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
The Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 2 criminal Informations in connection with the ZTE Project. First, it filed an
Information against Abalos (Abalos case) for violation of RA 3019. This was raffled off to the Fourth Division. Subsequently,
an Information was filed against Romulo Neri (Neri case) also for violation of RA 3019. This was raffled off to the Fifth
Division.
During Pretrial of the Abalos case, Neri took the stand against Abalos. Thereafter, the Special Prosecutor in the Neri case
moved that the Neri case be consolidated with the Abalos case to promote a more expeditious and less expensive resolution of
the controversy of cases involving the same business transaction. Neri opposed the consolidation claiming that it would be
oppressive and would violate his rights as an accused.
Nonetheless, the Fifth Division granted consolidation subject to the conformity of the Fourth Division. Neris MR was
DOCTRINE:
ISSUE IS MOOT ON ACCOUNT OF SUPERVENING EVENTS IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN
As may be recalled, the assailed resolution of the Sandiganbayan Fifth Division ordering the consolidation of the Neri case
with the Abalos case pending with the Fourth Division, was subject to the conformity of the said (4th) Division.
On October 19, 2012, the Fourth Division, on the premise that consolidation is addressed to the sound discretion of both the
transferring and receiving courts, but more importantly the latter as the same transferred case would be an added workload,
issued a Resolution refusing to accept the Neri case, thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Fourth Division RESPECTFULLY DECLINES
to accept SB-10-CRM-0099 (Neri case) for consolidation with SB-10-CRM-00998 (Abalos case) pending
before it.
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It declined the consolidation on the ground that it already Heard Neri testify against Abalos. As such, the Fourth Division had
already formed their respective opinions on the matter of Neris credibility.
IMPROPRIETY OF THE CONSOLIDATION OF CASES
CONSOLIDATION is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to be
tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously while providing justice to the parties. Toward
this end, consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the courts docket or consolidation of issues within those cases are
permitted by the rules.
The term consolidation is used in THREE (3) DIFFERENT SENSES OR CONCEPTS, thus:
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment [in one] trial is
conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is referred to as such. ( QUASI CONSOLIDATION)
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a single action in which
a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where several actions are pending between the same
parties stating claims which might have been set out originally in one complaint. (ACTUAL CONSOLIDATION)
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and requires the
entry of a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or cause the
parties to one action to be parties to the other. (CONSOLIDATION FOR TRIAL)
To be sure, consolidation, as taken in the above senses, is allowed, as Rule 31 of the Rules of Court is entitled Consolidation
or Severance. And Sec. 1 of Rule 31 provides:
Section 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all
actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid
unnecessary costs or delay.
The counterpart, but narrowed, rule for CRIMINAL CASES is found in Sec. 22, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court stating:
Sec. 22. Consolidation of trials of related offenses. Charges for offenses founded on the same facts or forming
part of a series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at the discretion of the court.
as complemented by Rule XII, Sec. 2 of the SANDIGANBAYAN REVISED INTERNAL RULES which states:
Section 2. Consolidation of Cases. Cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or involving
common questions of fact and law, may be consolidated in the Division to which the case bearing
the lowest docket number is raffled.
Whether as a procedural tool to aid the court in dispatching its official business in criminal or civil cases, the rule allowing
consolidation in whatsoever sense it is taken, be it as a merger of several causes of actions/cases, in the sense of actual
consolidation, or merely joint trial is designed, among other reasons, to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against
oppression and abuse, attain justice with the least expense and vexation to the litigants.
While the assailed resolution is silent as to the resultant effect/s of the consolidation it approved, there is nothing in the
records to show that what the prosecution vied for and what the Fifth Division approved went beyond consolidation
for trial or joint trial.
Not to be overlooked is the fact that the prosecution anchored its motion for consolidation partly on the aforequoted
Sec. 22 of Rule 119 which indubitably speaks of a joint trial. Given the above perspective, Neri should now disabuse
himself of the unfounded notion that what the Fifth Division intended was a fusion into one criminal Proceedings of the
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Abalos and Neri cases, where one is unidentifiable from the other, or worse, where he will be tried as coaccused in the
Abalos case.
Jurisprudence has laid down the REQUISITES FOR CONSOLIDATION OF TRIAL. As held in Caos v. Peralta, joint trial is
permissible where the [actions] arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend
largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and
that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties.
Criminal prosecutions primarily revolve around proving beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the elements of
the crime charged. As such, they mainly involve questions of fact. There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference
arises from the truth or the falsity of the allegations of facts. Put a bit differently, it exists when the doubt or difference arises
as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the inquiry invites calibration of the whole gamut of evidence considering mainly
the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to
each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.
Since conviction or acquittal in a criminal case hinges heavily on proof that the overt acts constituting, or the
elements, of the crime were indeed committed or are present, allegations in the information are crucial to the success
or failure of a criminal prosecution.
As can be gleaned from the charges in the Informations, the inculpatory acts complained of, the particulars and
specifications for each of the cases are dissimilar, even though they were allegedly done in connection with the
negotiations for and the implementation of the NBN Project. Due to this variance, the prosecution witnesses listed in the
pre-trial order in the Neri case are also different from the list of the peoples witnesses lined up to testify in the
Abalos case, albeit some names appear in both the pre-trial orders.
A consolidation of the Neri case to that of Abalos would expose Neri to testimonies which have no relation whatsoever
in the case against him and the lengthening of the legal dispute thereby delaying the resolution of his case.
Consolidation here would force petitioner to await the conclusion of testimonies against Abalos, however irrelevant or
immaterial as to him (Neri) before the case against the latter may be resolved a needless, hence, oppressive delay in the
resolution of the criminal case against him.
XXI. DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE (RULE 33)
1.
Radiowealth v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 138739, July 6, 2000
QUICKIE FACTS:
Sps. Vicente and Del Rosario jointly and severally executed in favor of Radiowealth Finance Company a PN for P138K on
installments with an acceleration clause. When the Sps Vicente defaulted, demands for payment were sent but went unheeded.
Thus, Radiowealth filed a Complaint for Collection of a Sum of Money before the RTC of Manila.
During the trial, Radiowealts Collection and Credit Officer (Famatico) presented in evidence in check payments, demand
letters, etc. However, he admitted that he had no personal knowledge of the transaction or the exectuion of any documentary
evidence which had been merely endorsed to him. As a result, RTC ordered the termination of the presentation of evidence.
Thereafter, Sps. Vicente filed a Demurrer to Evidence for alleged lack of cause of action. RTC granted it on the ground that
the evidence presented by Radiowealth was merely based on hearsay. On appeal, however, CA reversed and stated that its
genuiness and due execution were deeed admitted thereby establishing the Vicentes indebtedness. As such, CA remanded it
for further proceedings.
DOCTRINE:
The old Rule 35 of the Rules of Court was reworded under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules, but the consequence on appeal of a
demurrer to evidence was not changed. As amended, the pertinent provision of Rule 33 reads as follows:
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SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the
defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted
but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence.
Explaining the consequence of a demurrer to evidence, the Court in Villanueva Transit v. Javellana pronounced:
The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is simple and logical. The defendant is permitted, without
waiving his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is not granted, to move for a dismissal that
upon the facts as thus established and the applicable law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If
the trial court denies the dismissal motion, i.e., finds that plaintiffs evidence is sufficient for an award of
judgment in the absence of contrary evidence, the case still remains before the trial court which should
then proceed to hear and receive the defendants evidence so that all the facts and evidence of the
contending parties may be properly placed before it for adjudication as well as before the appellate
courts, in case of appeal. Nothing is lost. The doctrine is but in line with the established procedural precepts
in the conduct of trials that the trial court liberally receive all proffered evidence at the trial to enable it to
render its decision with all possibly relevant proofs in the record, thus assuring that the appellate courts upon
appeal have all the material before them necessary to make a correct judgment, and avoiding the need of
remanding the case for retrial or reception of improperly excluded evidence, with the possibility thereafter of
still another appeal, with all the concomitant delays. The rule, however, imposes the condition by the same token that if
his demurrer is granted by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant
losses his right to present evidence in his behalf and he shall have been deemed to have elected to
stand on the insufficiency of plaintiffs case and evidence . In such event, the appellate court which
reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of
plaintiffs evidence.
In other words, defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiffs evidence retain the right to present their own evidence, if
the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both
of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. The appellate
court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage
prolonged litigations.
In the case at bar, the RTC, acting on Sps. Vicentes demurrer to evidence, dismissed the Complaint on the ground that
the plaintiff had adduced mere hearsay evidence. However, on appeal, the CA reversed the trial court because the
genuineness and the due execution of the disputed pieces of evidence had in fact been admitted by defendants.
Applying Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the CA should have rendered judgment on the basis of the
evidence submitted by Radiowealth. While the CA correctly ruled that the documentary evidence submitted by
Radiowealth should have been allowed and appreciated, and that it presented quite a number of documentary exhibits
enumerated in the appealed order, we agree with Radiowealth that the CA had sufficient evidence on record to decide
the collection suit. A remand is not only frowned upon by the Rules, it is also logically unnecessary on the basis of
the facts on record.
2.
People v. Cachola, G.R. No. 148712, January 21, 2004
QUICKIE FACTS:
Cachola et al were charged with murder in the RTC of La Union. During trial 12-year old Jessie Barnachea, his older brother
Robert, and their neighbors were presented as witnesses for the prosecution.
Jessie testified that armed men entered their house and shot and stabbed to death his uncle, mother, brother, and cousin.
Meanwhile, Robert testified that while he was in his uncles house next door, he saw armed men running towards their house.
After several shots, they saw them running away and noticed a stainless jeep with fruits and vegetables dealer marked on it
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parked in front of their house. Some neighbors at a nearby store likewise saw the same jeep with an El Shaddai marked in
front and fruits and vegetables dealer marked on the side.
After reporting this to the plice, they intercepted said jeep carrying the 8 accused at a checkpoint in the highway. During a
plice lineup, Jessie identified Cachola et al as assailants.
After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense orally asked for leave of court to file a Demurrer to Evidence. However,
RTC denied this outright and set the Schedule for presentation of evidence for the defense. Instead of presenting evidence,
the Defense filed another Demuruer without leave of court.
Thereafter, RTC no longer allowed the presentation of he defense and convicted Cachola and Amay as principals, and the 6
others as accomplices. Hence, this automatic review. It is contended that the RTC wrongly disallowed the Defenses
presentation of evidence.
DOCTRINE:
As to whether the trial court erred in not allowing the Cachola to present evidence after filing their demurrer to evidence
without leave of court, then Section 15, Rules 119 of the Rules of Court is clear on the matter, thus:
SEC. 15. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity
to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the
accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present
evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
The filing by Cachola of a demurrer to evidence in the absence of prior leave of court was a clear waiver of their right
to present their own evidence. To sustain their claim that they had been denied due process because the evidence they
belatedly sought to offer would have exculpated them would be to allow them to wager on the outcome of judicial
proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by convenience.
Furthermore, it cannot be said that the waiver was not clear. The trial court postponed the hearings on the motion for
demurrer, even after leave of court had been denied, and then granted extensions to Amay until he finally adopted the position
of his co-appellants. At no time other than in this automatic review was there any attempt that is contrary to the waiver of the
presentation of evidence.
XXII.JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RULE 34 AND 35)
1.
Wood Technology v. Equitable Banking, G.R. 153867, February 17, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
Equitable filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against WTC, Cordova, and Young. It was alleged that WTC obtained a loan
from Equitable in the amount of $75K as evidenced by a PN which was signed also by Cordova and Young as representatives
of the WTC. Likewise, Cordova and Young executed a Surety Agreement binding themselves as WTCs sureties for the loan.
In their Answer, WTC admitted that they obtained a loan and that Cordova and Young bound themselves as sureties.
However, they claimed that the loan had not yet matured as the maturity date was purposely left blank subject to the
agreement by the parties at a later date. Thus, since no maturity date had been fixed, the Complaint was filed prematurely and
that it failed to state a cause of action.
Equitable moved for Judgment on the Pleadings. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Equitable. CA affirmed and stated the
PNs genuiness and due execution were deemed admitted and that there was no need to present eveidence to prove the
maturity date of the PN since it was payable on demand. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
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DOCTRINE:
The Rules of Court seeks to shorten the procedure in order to allow the speedy disposition of a case. Specifically, we have
rules on demurrer to evidence, judgment on the pleadings, and summary judgments. In all these instances, a full blown
trial is dispensed with and judgment is rendered on the basis of the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and
admissions of the parties.
In this case, at issue is the propriety and validity of a judgment on the pleadings. A JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS is
proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys
pleading.
We note now that (1) the RTC knew that the Answer asserted special and affirmative defenses ; (2) the Court of
Appeals recognized that certain issues were raised, but they were not genuine issues of fact; (3) WTC insisted that they
raised genuine issues; and (4) Equitable argued that WTCs defenses did not tender genuine issues .
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS V. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
However, whether or not the issues raised by the Answer are genuine is not the crux of inquiry in a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. It is so only in a motion for summary judgment. In a case for JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS, the Answer is such that no issue is raised at all . The essential question in such a case is whether there are
issues generated by the pleadings. This is the distinction between a proper case of summary judgment, compared to a
proper case for judgment on the pleadings. We have explained this vital distinction in Narra Integrated Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, thus,
The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or
fictitious character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for summary judgment from one for a
judgment on the pleadings. In a proper case for JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, there is no ostensible issue
at all because of the failure of the defending partys answer to raise an issue . On the other hand, in the case
of a SUMMARY JUDGMENT, issues apparently exist i.e. facts are asserted in the complaint regarding
which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set
out in the answer but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not genuine , as
shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions.
Indeed, WTCs Answer apparently tendered issues. While it admitted that WTC obtained the loan, that Cordova and
Young signed the promissory note and that they bound themselves as sureties for the loan, it also alleged special and
affirmative defenses that the obligation had not matured and that the promissory note and surety agreement were contracts of
adhesion.
Applying the requisites of a judgment on the pleadings vis--vis a summary judgment, the judgment rendered by the RTC
was not a judgment on the pleadings, but a summary judgment. Although the Answer apparently raised issues, both
the RTC and the CA after considering the parties pleadings, petitioners admissions and the documents attached to the
Complaint, found that the issues are not factual ones requiring trial , nor were they genuine issues.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT is a procedure aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation.
The proper inquiry in this regard would be whether the affirmative defenses offered by petitioners constitute genuine
issues of fact requiring a full-blown trial. In a summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised by petitioners
not genuine so as to justify a summary judgment?
A GENUINE ISSUE means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue
which is fictitious or contrived, an issue that does not constitute a genuine issue for trial.
We note that this is a case for a sum of money, and WTC have admitted that they obtained the loan. They also admitted
the due execution of the loan documents and their receipt of the final demand letter made by Equitable. These
documents were all attached to the Complaint. WTC merely claimed that the obligation has not matured. Notably, based
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on the promissory note, the RTC and the CA found this defense not a factual issue for trial, the loan being payable on
demand.
We agree with both the RTC and CA that this matter proffered as a defense could be resolved judiciously by plain resort to
the stipulations in the promissory note which was already before the trial court. A full-blown trial to determine the date of
maturity of the loan is not necessary. Also, the act of leaving blank the maturity date of the loan did not necessarily mean
that the parties agreed to fix it later. If this was the intention of the parties, they should have so indicated in the promissory
note.
2.
Bascug v. Aranday, A.M.-RTJ 00-1591, April 11, 2002
QUICKIE FACTS:
In the case of Ditching v Odisco Farms System Cooperative, Bascug, President of Odisco, filed an Administrative Complaint
charging Judge Aranday with grave misconduct when he directed a judgment on the pleadings. Bascug claims that Judge
declared that the parties agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings even if Odisco had never agreed to it. In fact,
Odisco never submitted any memorndum for judgment on the pleadings required by the Judge in an Order.
In his defense, Judge claimed that the parties manifested that they had no objection to the submission of the case for judgment
on the pleadings.
DOCTRINE:
Section 1, Rule 34, of the Rules on Civil Procedure provides
Where an answer fails to tender an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
partys pleading, the court may on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading.
In his order, dated 20 December 1994, Judge required the parties to submit their respective memoranda for a judgment
on the pleadings. Bascug was the President of the corporation who maintained that the corporation never agreed to have
the case submitted for judgment on the pleadings. As so aptly put by the Court of Appeals in its decision of 14 August
1998
It is believed that under the circumstances of the case, judgment on the pleadings was not called for and
prevented a fair and full resolution of controversy. The trial court stated that both parties agreed to have
judgment on the pleadings, the minutes of the session held on December 20, 1994 merely stated that both
parties will submit their respective memoranda for judgment on the pleadings . Only the plaintiffs
submitted Memorandum praying for judgment on the pleadings; the defendants did not submit their
memorandum for judgment on the pleadings. In fact, in their Motion for Reconsideration of the
Judgment on the pleadings, the defendants pointed out that the parties presented widely opposing
contentions in their respective pre-trial brief, and the court cannot rely on conjectures on the wild
monetary claims of plaintiffs. In view of the objections expressed by the defendants to the issues raised, there
was no clear agreement to submit the case to a judgment or the pleadings, much less an implied admission of
each others factual allegations, which the defendants-appellants correctly describe as widely opposing, that
would support a submission by the parties to a judgment on the pleadings.
3.
Eland Phil. V. Garcia, G.R. No. 173289, February 17, 2010
QUICKIE FACTS:
Garcia et al filed a Complaint for Queting of Title with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the RTC against Eland Phils. Inc.
They claimed that they are owners of a parcel of land by occupation and possession. They further claim that they were not
aware of any person who had a legal or equitable interest or claim on the same lot until they were requesting that the lot be
declared for tax purposes. They found out that the lot was subject to a Land Registration Proceeding which had already been
decided.
RTC declared Eland in default and allowed Garcia to present evidence ex parte. Eland filed an MR which was granted. Then,
the RTC admitted Elands Answer Ad Coutelam. Thereaafter, Pretrial Conference was set and the parties submitted their
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respective Pretrial briefs. Eland tried to suspend the proceedings by filing a Petition for Certiorari which was however denied.
Hence, the RTC ruled that the reception of evidence presented by Garcia remained as part of the records subject to Elands
right to cross-examine. Eventually, Garia filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to which Eland filed its Opposition. RTC
granted Summary Judgment. Hence, this petition.
Eland questions the propriety of the Summary Judgment rendered in this case of Quieting of Title.
DOCTRINE:
Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 1. Summary judgment for claimant.A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim
or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served,
move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof .
SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon.The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time
specified for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. After
the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions, and admissions on
file together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
NO VIOLATION OF THE 10-DAY NOTICE RULE
Eland contended that the 10-day notice rule was violated, because the copy of the motion for summary judgment was served
only on August 20, 1999 or on the same day it was set for hearing.
The above specific contention, however, is misguided. The CA was correct in its observation that there was substantial
compliance with due process. The CA ruled, as the records show, that the 10-day notice rule was substantially complied
with because when Garcia et al filed the motion for summary judgment on August 9, 1999 , they furnished Eland with
a copy thereof on the same day as shown in the registry receipt and that the motion was set for hearing on August 20,
1999, or 10 days from the date of the filing thereof.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT APPLIES TO QUETING OF TITLE; EXCEPTIONS
This Court has already ruled that any action can be the subject of a summary judgment with the sole exception of
actions for annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation.
IMPROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT; EXISTENCE OF GENUINE ISSUES
A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise
issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.
It must be remembered that the non-existence of a genuine issue is the determining factor in granting a motion for
summary judgment, and the movant has the burden of proving such nonexistence . The RTC found no genuine issue as
to any material fact that would necessitate conducting a full-blown trial. However, a careful study of the case shows
otherwise.
In their motion for summary judgment, the Garcia failed to clearly demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of
fact. They merely reiterated their averments in the complaint for quieting of title and opposed some issues raised by
the Eland in its Answer Ad Cautelam.
Clearly, the facts pleaded by Garcia in their motion for summary judgment have been duly disputed and contested by
Eland, raising genuine issues that must be resolved only after a full-blown trial. When the facts as pleaded by the
parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial .
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In the present case, Eland was able to point out the genuine issues. A genuine issue is an issue of fact that requires the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.
By granting the summary judgment, the RTC has in effect annulled its former ruling based on a claim of possession
and ownership of the same land for more than 30 years without the benefit of a full-blown trial. The fact that Garcia et
al seek to nullify the original certificate of title issued to Eland on the claim that the former were in possession of the same
land for a number of years, is already a clear indicium that a genuine issue of a material fact exists.
4.
Smart Communications v. Aldecoa, supra
DOCTRINE:
At the outset, the RTC erred in granting Smarts Motion for Summary Judgment and ordering the dismissal of Aldecoas
Complaint in Civil Case. Summary judgments are governed by Rule 35 of the Rules of Court.
In Rivera v. Solidbank Corporation, the Court discussed extensively when a summary judgment is proper:
For a summary judgment to be proper, the movant must establish two requisites: (a) there must be no
genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (b) the party presenting the
motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law .
Where, on the basis of the pleadings of a moving party, including documents appended thereto, no genuine
issue as to a material fact exists, the burden to produce a genuine issue shifts to the opposing party.
If the opposing party fails, the moving party is entitled to a summary judgment. A GENUINE ISSUE is an
issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is a sham,
fictitious, contrived or a false claim.
On the other hand, where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a
summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial . The evidence on record must be viewed in light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion who must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences as can
reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Courts must be critical of the papers presented by the moving
party and not of the papers/documents in opposition thereto.
Judging by the aforequoted standards, summary judgment cannot be rendered in this case as there are clearly factual
issues disputed or contested by the parties.
XXIII.JUDGMENT (RULE 36)
1.
Consing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143584, March 10, 2004
QUICKIE FACTS:
As sugar-farm owners, Sps Consing purchased various grades of fertilizer from Sugar Producers Cooperative Marketing
Association (SPCMA), an association assisting planters to procure fertilizer and other farm needs. The debt was evidenced by
a PN. When SPCMA presented the PN to PNB in which Sps. Consing had a Fertilizer Credit Line, the latter refused to honor
the note.
Thus, SPCMA filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money against the Sps Consing with the RTC of Negros. RTC,
through Judge Querubin, ruled in favor of SPCMA. In its 2-page judgment, it merely narrated the facts showing the
indebtedness of the Sps. Consing and immediately went to the dispostive part holding the Sps liable to SPCMA in the amount
of P1.2M. On appeal, CA affirmed. Sps Consings MR denied. Hence this petition.
Sps. Consing allege that their the RTC decisin failed to state the legal basis of its ruling which is in violation of the express
mandate of the Constitution.
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DOCTRINE:
While Judge Querubin mentioned his factual findings, the legal basis of his ruling is not set out in the decision. Judge
Querubin failed to meet faithfully the requirement demanded by the Constitution from the courts in rendering their decisions.
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution declares that:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or
denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
The court must inform the parties to a case of the legal basis for the courts decision so that if a party appeals, it can
point out to the appellate court the points of law to which it disagrees . Every judge should know the constitutional
mandate and the rationale behind it. Judge Querubin should have known the exacting standard imposed on courts by Section
14, Article VIII of the Constitution and should not have sacrificed the constitutional standard for brevitys sake.
The failure of the RTC decision to measure up to the standard set by the Constitution is too gross to ignore as it is in stark
contrast to the CAs decision. The CAs decision, while also brief, being only three pages long, laid down the factual and
legal reasons why Antonio and Soledad are the ones liable to SPCMA, and not PNB. The Court of Appeals
discussion of the merits of this case enabled the parties to pinpoint the proper issues that we now review .
2.
Heirs of Valdez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163208, August 13, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
In an action for Quieting of Title and Declaration of Nullity of TCTs entittled Manila Construction Development v. Sps. Dela Rosa et
al, the RTC granted the Heirs of Valdez & Sps Malvar an Injunction Order and a Writ of Preliminar Mandatory Injunction to
place them in possession of a parcel of land in dispute. Thus, the Sheriff implemented the order and writ in the property in
possession by Lopez Resources. In doing so, they tore down the fence enclosing the said property.
Aggrieved, Lopez Resources questioned the RTC decisin in the CA which was assigned to the Ninth Division. Here, the CA
issued 2 conflicting resolutions. One resolution dismissed the petition without prejudice for violation of the provision
against frum shopping. Subsequently, another resolution was issued which required the Heirs of Valdez & Sps. Malvar
to file their comments to the Petition while requiring Lope Resources to rectify the deficiency in its frum-shopping
certification.
Confusion arose when some parties were not able to get both resolutions. As a result, 86 days after the issuance of the
conficliting resolutions, the CA again issued another resolution clarifying that the first resolution was merely a clerical
error.
Pursuant to this, Lopez Resources made the necessary corrections in its petition and refiled the case. Thereafter, the Heirs of
Valdez and Sps Malvar moved to dismiss the re-filed Petition on the ground that CA has no jurisdiction because the prior
resolution had already become final and executory. However, the CA went to proceed with the case. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
The fact that the Ninth Division of the CA committed a monumental error cannot be erased. But the error was not in the
courts intent on what to do with the forum shopping violation it found. In both resolutions, what is clear is that the court
intended to allow a rectification of the deficiency in Lopez Resources non-forum shopping certification in view
perhaps of what it perceived to be the merits that the face of the petition showed.
We have no doubt that it was within the CAs power and prerogative to issue what either resolution decreed without
committing an abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
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To look at the matter from another perspective, the issuance of two conflicting resolutions one for dismissal, the other
for the continuation of the case, with one cancelling out the other can only mean that no definite, specific
determination was made by the court; at least, there was uncertainty on what the court really intended to do. Under this
situation, we find it fallacious to conclude that one resolution lapsed to finality while the other did not. In legal effect,
there was effectively no definite resolution that could have lapsed to finality because of the mistake the court
committed. This status continued until a clarification was made by the issuing court.
Even granting that the first Resolution became final and executory, the rule on immutability of judgment does not
apply in cases where what is to be modified or altered involves:
(1) the correction of clerical errors;

(2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;
(3) void judgments [such as a dismissal without prejudice that was not intended to be issued] and those where
circumstances transpire after the finality that render the execution or enforcement, as in this case, of the judgment
unjust or inequitable.
To be sure, the rule does not apply in cases where a supervening event such as the mistake undisputably committed by
the court (i.e., the unintended release of one of the resolutions, thus resulting in the conflict and confusion) took place.
3.
Intramuros Tennis v. Philippine Tourism Authority, G.R. No. 135630, September 26, 2000
QUICKIE FACTS:
PTA owns Victoria Tennis Courts located in Intramuros. Pursuant to a MOA, PTA transferred the management, operation,
administration, and development of Victoria to the Philippine Tennis Association (PhilTA) for 10 years. Intramuros Tennis
Club is affiliated with PhilTA and its members are tennis players who frequently use the facilities of Victoria.
During the pendency of the MOA, PTA alleged that PhilTA violated its terms and conditions and thus demanded the
surrender of its possession of Victoria. It likewise asked PhilTA to vacate the premises.
As such, Intramuros filed a case for Preliminary Injucntion, Damages, and TRO in the RTC of Manila against PTA alleging
that PTAs demand to vacate was tantamount to a unilateral pre-termination of the MOA. RTC granted the TRO and the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Thereafter, PTA filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the cause of action bcame moot and academic in light of the
expiration of the MOA. As a result, MOA dismissed the case and lifted the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. It also declared
that PTA is entitled to the possession of Victoria. Aggrieved, Intramuros appealed.
Before the resolution of the appeal, PTA filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. CA granted said Motion. MR denied.
Hence, this petition. Intramuros contends that the CA gravely abused its discretion in ordering execution pending appeal.
DOCTRINE:
Based on the Sec 2 Rule 39 (Discretionary Execution), the CA may order execution pending appeal subject to the following
conditions: (1) there must be a judgment or final order; (2) the trial court must have lost jurisdiction over the case; (3) there
must be good reasons to allow execution; and (4) such good reasons must be stated in a special order after due hearing.
Undoubtedly, the RTC order which granted PTAs Motion to Dismiss and lifted the Writ of Preliminary Injunction is a
final order within the contemplation of Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. Intramuros maintains that the
said RTC order could not be the proper subject of execution because it was still appealed to the CA, but this merely confuses
the concept of a final judgment or order from one which has become final (or to use the more established term,
final and executory) a distinction that is definite and settled.
A FINAL JUDGMENT OR ORDER is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do in
respect thereto such as an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares
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categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right, or a judgment or order that
dismisses an action on the ground of res judicata or prescription, for instance.
It is to be distinguished from an order that is interlocutory, or one that does not finally dispose of the case , such as
an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a
pleading. As such, only final judgments or orders (as opposed to interlocutory orders) are appealable.
Now, a FINAL JUDGMENT OR ORDER in the sense just described becomes final and executory upon expiration of
the period to appeal therefrom where no appeal has been duly perfected or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the
judgment of the appellate court in turn becomes final. It is called a final and executory judgment because execution at
such point issues as a matter of right.
By its provisional nature, the remedy of execution pending appeal requires only a final judgment or order (as
distinguished from an interlocutory order) and not a final and executory judgment or order . In the instant case, the
RTC order dated August 5, 1997 which granted PTAs motion to dismiss, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and held
that PTA entitled to possess the Victoria Tennis Courts is a final order within the contemplation of Section 2, Rule 39 of
the Revised Rules of Court, inasmuch as it makes an adjudication on the merits of the case and dismisses Intramuros
action. Intramuros, in fact, impliedly recognized the finality of this RTC order when they filed an ordinary appeal (and not a
petition for certiorari) therefrom with the CA.
4.
Polymer Rubber Corporation v. Salamuding, 702 SCRA 153 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Salamuding et al were employees of Polymer Rubber Corporation of which Ang was the highest ranking director. They were
dismissed by Polymer for committing certain irregularities. Thus, in 1990, they filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal and
Nonpayment of Monetary Benefits. LA and NLRC ruled in favor of Salamuding et al. An Entry of Judgment was made and an
Alias Writ of Execution issued based on the NLRC ruling. On certiorari, the SC affirmed.
Soon after the SC decisin in 1993, Polymer ceased operations. On motion, another Alias Writ of Execution was issued but
was returned unsatisfied.
In 2004, Polymers office was gutted by a fire. As such, LA issued its 5th Alias Writ of Execution and commanded the sherrif
to collect an amount of P2.9M. In the implementation of the Writ, Angs shares of stock at USA Resources Corporation were
levied. As such, Polymer moved to quash the 5th Alias Writ of Execution alleging that Ang cannot be made solidarily liable
with Polymer considering that it was only the latter whom the LA, NLRC and SC adjudged to be liable previously.
LA quashed the Writ and ruled that Ang can no longer be held liable because the decisin had become final and executory and
would thus vary the tenor of the judgment. NLRC affirmed. MR denied. On certiorari, CA reversed and held Ang liable after
it pierced Polymers corporate veil. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
The CA imputed bad faith on the part of Polymer and Ang when Polymer ceased its operations the day after the promulgation
of the SC resolution in 1993 which was allegedly meant to evade liability. The CA found it necessary to pierce the corporate
fiction and pointed at Ang as the responsible person to pay for Salamudings money claims. Except for this assertion, there is
nothing in the records that show that Ang was responsible for the acts complained of. At any rate, we find that it will
require a great stretch of imagination to conclude that a corporation would cease its operations if only to evade the payment of
the adjudged monetary awards in favor of three (3) of its employees.
The dispositive portion of the LA Decision dated November 21, 1990 which Salamuding attempts to enforce does not
mention that Ang is jointly and severally liable with Polymer. Ang is merely one of the incorporators of Polymer and to
single him out and require him to personally answer for the liabilities of Polymer is without basis. In the absence of a
finding that he acted with malice or bad faith, it was error for the CA to hold him responsible.
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To hold Ang personally liable at this stage is quite unfair. The judgment of the LA, as affirmed by the NLRC and
later by the SC had already long become final and executory. It has been held that a final and executory judgment can no
longer be altered. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. Since the alias writ of execution
did not conform, is different from and thus went beyond or varied the tenor of the judgment which gave it life, it is a nullity.
5.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, 705 SCRA 430 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
FTC manufactures and produces cigarettes. Originally, its cigerette brands were subject to ad valorem tax. However, with the
passage of RA 8240 in 1997, a specific tax system was adopted which imposed excise taxes on cigarette brands. Pursuant to
RRs issued to impement the law, FTC paid excise taxes on all cigarettes manufactured. Thereafter, FTC sought administrative
redress for refund for 3 different periods (2000, 2001, 2002) before the CIR.
Since the claims were not acted upon, FTC filed 3 Petitions for Review in the CTA with claims for refund of the overpaid
excise taxes. As such, the CTA ordered CIR to refund FTC for 3 different periods. MR denied. As a result, CIR went to the
CA on Petition for Review assailing the ruling in the consolidated cases involving the claims from 2000 and 2001.
Subsequently, CIR filed another Petition for Review for the case involving the period 2002.
CA denied the CIRs Petitions for Review. MRs were likewise denied. In the SC, it ruled against the CIR in July 21 2008. In its
fallo, it only said that, The Decision of the CA in CA-GR SP No. 80675 (which consolidated only the claims for 2000
and 2001) are affirmed.
In 2009, upon FTCs motion, CTA issued a Writ of Execution and ordered CIR to refund FTC the amounts stated in the 2008
SC decisin which attained finality by virtue of an Entry of Judgment in Nov 2008. In said Entry of Judgment, however, only
the claims in years 2000 and 2001 were mentioned. Thus, FTC filed a Motion for the Issuance of an Additional Writ of
Execution covering the judgment in the claims for year 2002. However, this Motion was denied. MR was likewise denied. CTA
en banc also denied.
Hence, FTC comes now via Petition for Review.
DOCTRINE:
After a scrutiny of the body of the aforesaid July 21, 2008 Decision, the Court finds it necessary to render a judgment
nunc pro tunc and address an error in the fallo of said decision. The office of a JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC is to
record some act of the court done at a former time which was not then carried into the record, and the power of a
court to make such entries is restricted to placing upon the record evidence of judicial action which has actually
been taken.
The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and the ascertainment and
determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the record, that has been previously rendered, to
make it speak the truth, so as to make it show what the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as
to render a judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously render , not to
supply non-action by the court, however erroneous the judgment may have been. The Court would thus have the record
reflect the deliberations and discussions had on the issue. In this particular case it is a correction of a clerical, not a judicial
error. The body of the decision in question is clear proof that the fallo must be corrected, to properly convey the ruling of
this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The dispositive portion of the Courts July 21, 2008 Decision in G.R. Nos.
167274-75 is corrected to reflect the inclusion of CA-G.R. SP No. 83165 therein. As amended, the fallo of the aforesaid
decision shall read:
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WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases of
CA-G.R. SP No. 80675 and 83165 (2002 claim) dated 28 September 2004, and its Resolution, dated 1 March
2005, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
XXIV. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND NEW TRIAL (RULE 37)
1.
Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131094, May 16, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
Olivarez filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against Fernandez in the MTC. MTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of
sufficient cause of action. On appeal, RTC reversed the MTC and ordered Fernandez to pay rent in a decisin dated May 2,
1994. Fernandez received a copy thereof on June 28, 1994. On July 12 1994 (14 days after), Fernandez filed an MR. On Nov
29, 1994, Fernandez received the denial of his MR. Thus, on Dec 1, 1994, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Review in the CA.
Meanwhile, upon discovering new evidence of receipts proving his rental payments, Fernandez filed a Motion for New Trial in
the RTC on Dec 9, 1994. On Dec 12, 1994, CA granted his Motion for Extension. However, on Dec 29, 1994, Ferndandez
filed a Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review.
On Feb 6, 1995, RTC denied the Motion for New Trial and stated that by filing a Motion to Extend in the CA which was
eventually granted, CA already had jurisdiction over the the case and not the RTC.
Thereafter, upon motion of Olivares, RTC issued a Writ of Execution. This prompted Fernandez to File a Petition for
Certiorari in the CA. However, CA dismissed the Petition. MR denied. Hence this petition.
Fernandez questions whether or not his mere filing of a Motion for Extension (which was later withdrawn) automatically
divested the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case as to take cognizance of a Motion for New Trial.
DOCTRINE:
It may seem at once apparent that the CA had in fact acquired jurisdiction over his person. It has been repeatedly held that an
appearance in whatever form, without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to
the jurisdiction of the court over the person. He may appear by presenting a motion, for example, and unless by such
appearance he specifically objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person.
As we are dealing here with the jurisdiction of an appellate court, additional rules are required for jurisdiction to attach
therein, to wit:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
the petitioner must have invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals within the time for doing so;
he must have filed his petition for review likewise within the time for doing so;
he must have paid the necessary docket fees; and
the other parties must have perfected their appeals in due time.
The Rule requires that in an appeal by way of Petition For Review, the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner
upon the timely filing of the petition and the payment of docket and other lawful fees. In the discussion of the
Committee on the revision of the Rules of Court, it was emphasized that to perfect the appeal, the party has to file the petition
for review and to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period. The law and its intent are clear and unequivocal that
the petition is perfected upon its filing and the payment of the docket fees.
Thus, it may be argued, and rightly so, that the CA has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the case because Fernandez
merely filed a motion for extension of time to file petition but not the petition itself. Withal, sans the petition, it cannot
be said that the CA has acquired jurisdiction over the case as to say that the trial court is without authority to act on a motion
for new trial. It is axiomatic that if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation.
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On this point we fully agree in the position taken by Fernandez that when he filed the motion for extension of time to file
petition for review, jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals had not yet attached, such that his failure to file the petition
itself would normally have the effect of rendering the decision of the lower court final and executory.
COMPUTATION OF PERIOD TO FILE A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Rule 37, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court providing for the period to file a motion for new trial in relation to Rule 41,
Section 3 is in point.
Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration. Within the period for taking an
appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new
trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party.
Sec. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a
notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
It is without question that Fernandez received a copy of the RTC Decision on 28 June 1994. Fourteen (14) days after the
receipt of the decision or specifically on 12 July 1994, he filed a motion for reconsideration. This motion was denied by the
RTC and the Order of denial was received by Fernandez on 29 November 1994. Applying Rule 37, Section 1 of the Revised
Rules of Court, he had only one (1) day left to file a motion for new trial since a motion for new trial should be filed
within the period to appeal, that is, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment. The motion for new trial
suspends the running of the period to appeal but does not extend the time within which an appeal must be
perfected. Hence if denied, a movant, like Fernandez in this case has only the balance of the reglementary period within
which to appeal.
Applying the foregoing, Fernandezs motion for new trial was filed out of time. The fifteen (15)-day period for filing a
motion for new trial cannot be extended.
IN SUM, considering that a motion for new trial must be filed during the period for filing an appeal and that such period
cannot be extended, Fernandez, by filing his motion for new trial beyond the period to appeal, had unwittingly sealed
his fate and stripped himself of any further relief.
2.
Republic v. Peralta, G.R. No. 150327, June 18, 2003, supra
QUICKIE FACTS:
Peralta et al are the heirs of one Benedicto Alonday. The latter was granted a Homestead Patent by the DENR over a lot in
Davao. Title was thereafter issued in his name. In 1969, Bureau of Forest Development sought permission to use a portion of
said property. Instead, BFD constructed a building on it. Benedictos lawyer demanded for the BFD to vacate.
Failing this, Peralta filed a Complaint for Recovery and Ownership of Real Property in the RTC of Davao. RTC ruled in favor
of Peralta and orded the Republic to vacate the property and remove all improvements thereon.
On May 30, 1997 or 5 days before the expiration of the period to appeal, Republic filed through registered mail a Motion
for Reconsideration of the RTC decison. However, on June 11, 1997, the RTC expunged the MR on the ground that it
failed to incorporate any notice of hearing as required by the Rules. The Republic received said order on June 18, 1997.
Thereafter, on July 22, 1997, Republic filed a Notice of Appeal. In opposition, Peralta et al filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the MR was a mere scap of paper and thus did not toll the running of the reglementary period for perfecting
appeal.
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Pending all this, the RTC judge retired. On Jan 28, 1999, the new judge issued an order giving due course to Republics Appeal
but was again reversed in light of jurisprudence brought to its attention. Peralta et al then moved for the execution which was
granted. Republic filed an MR assailing the dismissal of it Appeal as well as the granting of the Writ of Execution. MR denied.
On certiorari in the CA, Republics petition was again dismissed. Hence, this petition. Essentially, the Republic assails the
CAs declaration that they failed to perfect their appeal.
DOCTRINE:
The Court agrees with the CA that the OSG was negligent when it filed on May 30, 1997 the defective motion for
reconsideration. Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for reconsideration or a motion for a new
trial shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefor, a written notice of which shall be served by the movant
on the adverse party. Such written notice is that prescribed in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Under
Section 4, paragraph 2 of said rule , a notice of hearing on a motion shall be served by the movant to all the parties
concerned at least 3 days before the date of hearing. Section 5 of the same rule requires that the notice of hearing shall
be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and place of the hearing of the motion. The requirements,
far from being merely technical and procedural as claimed by the petitioners, are vital elements of procedural due process.
Since the Rules of Court do not fix any period within which the said party may file his reply or opposition, the trial court
would have no way of determining whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion and, if he objects, to hear him on
his objection. Hence, the need for the movant to set the time and place of hearing of its motion. The requirements
entombed in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are mandatory and noncompliance therewith is fatal
and renders the motion pro forma;a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which
the court has no authority to act upon. In cases of motions for a new trial or for the reconsideration of a judgment , the
running of the period for appeal is not tolled by the mere filing or pendency of said motion.
In this case, the Republic, through the OSG, received on May 20, 1997 the decision of the RTC; hence, they had until June
4, 1997 within which to file their motion for reconsideration or for a new trial or to perfect their appeal from said
adverse decision. Although the Republic filed the motion for reconsideration dated May 30, 1997 within the
reglementary period, said motion failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15. The records show that there is no
proof that Peralta et al were actually served with a copy of said motion , as required by Section 10, Rule 13 of the Rules
of Court. The OSG did not bother to file an amended motion for reconsideration containing the requirements of
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
3.
People v. Odilao, April 14, 2004, G.R. No. 155451 ????
QUICKIE FACTS:
Odilao et al were charged with Estafa in an Information filed in the RTC of Cebu. A Warrant of Arrest was issued. However,
upon motion of Odilao, reinvestigation was conducted. Based on the reinvestigation report, no probable cause was found.
Thus, the Prosecution sought to dismiss the case. As a result, the prvate complainant (Bugash) opposed the reinvestigation
report and filed a Petition for Review in the DOJ. Thus, the RTC did not rule on the Motion to Dismiss until the DOJ
resolves the petition.
A year later, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. Thus, Odilao filed an MR which was denied. Consequently, Odilao went
up to the CA via Petition for Certiorari. CA granted the Petition and directed the RTC to wait until the DOJ resolves the
Petition filed before it. As a result, the People filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC.
While said Petition was pending resolution before the SC, Bugash filed an MR before the CA seeking reversal of its decisin
which granted Odilaos Petition. This MR was granted and the CA reversed itself and denied the Motion to Dismiss the case
filed by the Prosecutor.
Thereafter, DOJ denied the Petition for Review and held that there was no probable cause
DOCTRINE:
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It cannot be avoided that we remind the Court of Ap-peals of the provisions of Section 15, Rule VI of the 2002 Internal
Rules of the Court of Appeals (effective August 22, 2002), which explicitly provides thus:
SEC. 15. Effect of Filing an Appeal in the Supreme Court. No motion for reconsideration or rehearing shall
be acted upon if the movant has previously filed in the Supreme Court a petition for review on
certiorari or a motion for extension of time to file such petition. If such petition or motion is subsequently
filed, the motion for reconsideration pending in this Court shall be deemed abandoned.
We are, therefore, quite perplexed why the CA did not act in accord with the aforequoted Rule and instead resolved the
motion for reconsideration of its Decision dated September 27, 2002, filed by Bugash, despite service on it of a copy of the
Motion For Extension To File Petition For Review dated October 15, 2002, filed by the OSG.
At the very least, prudence dictates that the CA should have first required Bugash to secure the conformity of the OSG,
or required the latter to comment on the motion for reconsideration of Bugash. The positions taken by the Office of the
Solicitor General and Bugash are practically identical. In any event the Court of Appeals ought not to have acted on the said
motion for reconsideration of private complainant Bugash. It should have considered said motion which, in the first place,
was without the conformity of the OSG, the representative of the People of the Philippines, as having been abandoned
by the filing of herein petition by the OSG, pursuant to the aforequoted Section 15, Rule VI of the 2002 Internal Rules of
the Court of Appeals.
4.
Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
Neypes et al filed an Action for Annulment of Judgment and Titles and Reconveyance before the RTC against Bureau of
Forests, Bureau of Lands, et al. However, in Feb 12, 1998, RTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground that the action already
prescribed. Neypes received the order on Mar 3, 1998. On Mar 18, 1998 or 15 days later, Neypes filed an MR. On July 1, 1998,
RTC dismissed the MR on and the order was received on July 22, 1998. On July 27, 1998 or 5 days later after receipt, Neypes
filed a Notice of appeal and paid docket fees on August 3, 1998.
RTC denied the Notice of Appeal for having been filed 8 days late. MR was denied. Neypes went up the CA via Petition for
Certiorari and assailed the dismissal of the Notice of Appeal. He claims that they filed it on time and argued that the 15-day
period started to run only from the date they received the order dismissing the MR on July 22. Thus, when they filed their MR
5 days later, it was still within the reglementary period.
CA dismissed the Petition and reckoned the 15-day period from March 3. MR denied. Hence, this petition. Essentially, Neypes
questions the period within which to properly file its Notice of Appeal.
DOCTRINE:
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to
appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.
An appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment
or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication
on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of
the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.
FINAL ORDER
As already mentioned, Neypes argues that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their MR should be construed as the final
order, not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of
their MR only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their
notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.
We sustain Neypes view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their MR was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
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START OF THE 15-DAY REGLEMENTARY PERIOD; FRESH PERIOD RULE

Under Rule 41, Section 3, Neypes had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial
court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), Neypes did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted
to file a MR.
According to the RTC, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. It ruled that Neypes, having filed
their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon
receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Neypes, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh
period of 15 days from receipt of the final order or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the
Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional
Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration .
Henceforth, this FRESH PERIOD RULE shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to
the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform , to be counted from receipt of the order denying
the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial
Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed otherwise,
the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
5.
Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130314, September 22, 1998
QUICKIE FACTS:
Annie Tan leased a portion of her building in Binondo in favor of Bloomberry Export Manufacturing Inc. For alleged
violations of the lease contract, Tan filed a Complaint for Ejectment against Bloomberry. Bloomberry likewise filed a Case for
Consignation on account of Tans refusal to accept its rental payment. These 2 cases were consolidated. As a matter of course,
MTC dismissed the Complaint as well as Bloomberrys counterclaim.
On appeal, RTC affirmed. Consequently, Tan filed an MR which however did not include a Notice of Hearing as required by
the Rules. Thus, Bloomberry filed an Ex Parte Motion for Entry of Judgment on the ground that the MR was a mere scrap of
paper which did not toll the running of the reglemantary period. In other words, Bloomberry contends that the RTC decisin
has already become final and executory.
Thereafer, Tan filed a Motion to Set for Hearing the MR. Tan avers that she inavertently omitted said Notice on account of
her lawyers messengers honest mistake. Also, she claims that, due to work-related pressures, her lawyer was not able to
follow up the motion. Over the vehement opposition of Bloomberry, the RTC granted the Motion and set the hearing at a
specified date and time. Aggrieved, Bloomberry filed an MR which was denied. As such, Bloomberry filed a Petition for
Certiorari in the CA. CA granted the Petition and reversed the RTC in favor of Bloomberry. Hence, this petition.
Tan questions whether or not the omission through inadvertence of a Notice of Hearing for an MR is a fatal defect which
does not toll the running of the reglementary period to appeal.
DOCTRINE:
We are not in the least convinced. First, it is unfair to place the blame for such omission on the messenger. The burden
of preparing a complete pleading falls on counsels shoulders, not on the messengers. The counsel is ultimately responsible for
the acts or omissions of his agents. Hence, the messengers conduct can neither justify the counsels mistake nor warrant a
departure from the mandate of the aforesaid procedural rules.
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Second, it is incredible that the fourth page containing the Notice of Hearing was left behind due to honest mistake.
In fact, there was no such page. Tans claim is belied by the very MR she filed which ended exactly on the 3 rd page as
evidenced by the copy furnished notation. It is safe to conclude that there was no accidental or excusable neglect in
not including a fourth page in this case. In other words, Tans counsel simply failed to include a notice of hearing .
Finally, the fact that Tans former counsel calendared the motion for hearing for August 23, 1996 belies the excuse that an
alleged fourth page had been left behind. In the first place, if a notice of hearing had been included in the MR, there
would have been no need for Tan to file the Motion to set the time and date of hearing. What is clear is that said
counsel filed the latter Motion, only after Bloomberry had submitted its Motion for Entry of Judgment with copy furnished
Tans counsel on the ground that Tans MR was a mere scrap of paper that did not stop the period for appeal.
XXV. PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT (RULE 38)
1.
Alaban v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.156021, September 23, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
Francisco Provido, filed a Petition for Probate of the will of Soledad Provido Elevencionado who died in January 2000 in the
RTC of Iloilo. He alleged that he was an heir of the decedent. The Probate Court allowed the probate of the will. Meanwhile,
Flores filed an Petition for Letters of Administration with the RTC of General Santos. However, RTC of General Santos
dismissed the Petition because the Probate Court in Iloilo already had jurisdiction over the case.
After 4 months from the finality of the Probate Court, Alaban, Flores, et al filed a Motion to Reopen the probate proceedings
claiming that they were intestate heirs of the decedent. Thereafter, RTC issued an Order denying the Motion.
Consequently, Alaban, Flores, et al filed with the CA an Petition for Annulment of the Decision and Order of the RTC. They
claimed that Provido fraudulently secured the probate of the will by making them think that they were going to enter into a
Compromise Agreement.
However, CA dismissed the Petition on the ground that Abalan, Flores, et al failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of New
Trial, Appeal, Petition for Relief from Judgment, or other appropriate remedies. MR was denied. Hence, this petition.
Abalan, Flores, et al essentially claim that since they were not made parties to the proceedings in the RTC of Iloilo (Probate
Court), they could not have availed of the ordinary remedies of New Trial, Appeal, Petition for Relief from Judgment, etc.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ABALAN COULD FILE A PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT WITHOUT AVAILING OF
ORDINARY REMEDIES LIKE PETITION FOR RELEIF FROM JUDGMENT.
HELD: NO. SINCE IT IS AN ACTION IN REM, THEY BECAME PARTIES TO THE PROBATE PROCEEDINGS BY PUBLICATION.
THUS, THEY SHOULD HAVE AVAILED OF THE ORDINARY REMEDIES BEFORE FILING THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF
JUDGMENT.
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Rule 37 allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for new trial on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence. The same Rule permits the filing of an MR on the grounds of excessive award of damages, insufficiency of
evidence to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law. Both motions should be
filed within the period for taking an appeal, or fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is resorted to when a judgment or final order is
entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken, against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence. Said party may file a petition in the same court and in the same case to set aside the judgment, order
or proceeding. It must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment and within six (6)
months after entry thereof.
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A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are remedies available only to parties in
the proceedings where the assailed judgment is rendered. In fact, it has been held that a person who was never a party
to the case, or even summoned to appear therein, cannot avail of a petition for relief from judgment.
NOTICE BY PUBLICATION
However, Alaban, Flores et al are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties to the probate
proceedings.
It has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication
of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate
of the decedent.
It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to
hear and decide it. Thus, even though they were not mentioned in the petition for probate , they eventually became
parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing. As parties to the probate proceedings, they
could have validly availed of the remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from
judgment.
PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT IS THE PROPER REMEDY
Conceding that they became aware of the Decision after it had become final, they could have still filed a petition for
relief from judgment after the denial of their motion to reopen. Petitioners claim that they learned of the Decision only on 4
October 2001, or almost four (4) months from the time the Decision had attained finality. But they failed to avail of the
remedy.
For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available to them, they could no longer resort to
a petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise, they would benefit from their own inaction or negligence.
ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there
will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, and is
based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.
A person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove his
allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby.
2.
Samartino v. Raon, G.R. No. 131482, July 3, 2002
QUICKIE FACTS:
Filomena Crisostomo owns a parcel of land in Noveleta. After her death, she was survived by her sister Leonor Raon. Raon
filed a Complaint for Ejectment against Regalado Samartino in the MTC of Noveleta and alleged that the lease with
Crisostomo already expired and still she refused to vacate.
Summons was served upon Samartinos brother because he was then confined in rehab in Tagaytay. As a result, the liason
officer of the rehab appeared before the MTC with a certification that Samartino cannot comply with the directive file an
Answer within the reglementary period. Nonetheless, upon motion of Raon, MTC declared Samartino in default and ordered
Raon to present evidence ex parte. Then, MTC ruled in favor of Raon and ordered Samartino to vacate.
After learning of the adverse decision by the MTC, Samartino filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment in the RTC. However,
RTC affirmed the MTCs ruling. The RTC decision became final. Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was issued and the parcel of
land was levied upon.
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Thus, Samartino filed in the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment with an affidavit of merit alleging that Filomena
Crisostomo sold the land to him as evidence by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Nevertheless, RTC dismissed the Petition for Relief
from Judgment. MR was likewise denied. On certiorari, CA dismissed Samartinos petition. MR was denied as well. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC CORRECTLY DISMISSED SAMARTINOS PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT.
HELD: NO. NO VALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS. ALSO, THE PETITION FOR RELIEF WAS FILED ON TIME.
There being no valid substituted service of summons (no explanation of impossibility of personal service; brother was not
proven to be of sufficient age and discretion and resident thereof), the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
Samartino.
In addition, the RTC committed reversible error in dismissing the petition for relief from judgment for having been
filed out of time. According to the RTC, the petition for relief, filed on November 25, 1996, was late because Samartino had
actual knowledge of the judgment in the ejectment case since March 1996. The period within which to file a petition for
relief should have been reckoned from the date Samartino learned of the judgment of the RTC. It should not have
been counted from the date of the MTCs decision because , precisely, Samartino appealed the same. It was the RTCs
decision that became final and, hence, was the proper subject of the petition for relief from judgment. It is axiomatic that a
petition for relief is only available against a final and executory judgment.
It is not clear from the records of the case at bar when Samartino learned of the decision of the RTC affirming the judgment
of the MTC. What appears is that the said decision became final only on August 15, 1996, and must have been entered
sometime thereafter. Hence, the petition for relief filed on November 25, 1996 was well within the 6-month period
prescribed by the Rules.
3.
Purcon v. MRM Philippines et al., G.R. No. 182718, September 26, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
Purcon was a seaman working for MRM. He suffered a hernia and was thus repatriated back to the Philippines. After the
doctor declared that he was fit to work, he reported to MRM. However, he was told that there was no vacancy for him. As
such, he filed Complaint for Reimbursement of Disability Benefits and other monetary benefits in the NLRC. In its defense,
MRM averred that since the hernia was not work related, Purcon was not entitled to disability benefit and related claims.
LA dismissed Purcos Complaint. On appeal, NLRC likewise dismissed the appeal which became final and executory.
Thereafter, Purco filed in the CA a Petition for Certiorari which was however denied. The CAs resolution also became final
and executory. Nonetheless, Purco filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC which was also denied. As a result,
Purco filed before the SC a Petition for Relief from Judgment.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A PETITIONER CAN AVAIL OF A PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT FROM AN SC DECISION
WHICH DISMISSED ITS PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI.
HELD: NO. IT IS NOT AN AVAILABLE REMEDY IN THE SC.
FIRST, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final order is entered through fraud, accident, mistake,
or excusable negligence, a party in any court may file a petition for relief from judgment, this rule must be interpreted in
harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the original cases cognizable by the Supreme Court, thus:
Section 1. Original cases cognizable. Only petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus, disciplinary proceedings against members of the judiciary and attorneys, and cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls may be filed originally in the Supreme Court.
A petition for relief from judgment is not included in the list of Rule 56 cases originally cognizable by this Court.
SECOND, while Rule 38 uses the phrase any court, it refers only to MTCs and RTCs. As revised, Rule 38 radically departs
from the previous rule as it now allows the MTC which decided the case or issued the order to hear the petition for
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relief. Under the old rule, a petition for relief from the judgment or final order of Municipal Trial Courts should be filed with
the Regional Trial Court.
The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for MTCs and RTCs and designation
of Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Courts as courts of record.
THIRD, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court. It
may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court through resolutions or
circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the CA allows the remedy of
petition for relief in the CA.
There is no provision in the Rules of Court making the petition for relief applicable in the CA or this Court. The procedure
in the CA from Rules 44 to 55, with the exception of Rule 45 which pertains to the Supreme Court, identifies the remedies
available before said Court such as annulment of judgments or final orders or resolutions (Rule 47), motion for
reconsideration (Rule 52), and new trial (Rule 53). Nowhere is a petition for relief under Rule 38 mentioned.
If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies available in the CA, with more reason that this remedy
cannot be availed of in the Supreme Court. This Court entertains only questions of law . A petition for relief raises
questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, which are beyond the concerns of this Court.
Nevertheless, even if We delve into the merits of the petition, the same must still be dismissed. The late filing of the petition
for review does not amount to excusable negligence. Purcos lack of devotion in discharging his duty, without
demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, cannot be a basis for judicial relief. For a claim of counsels
gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the clients cause must be shown.
The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment
when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence , or mistaken mode of procedure for that matter;
otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost, either because
of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake of procedure by counsel.
XXVI.EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT (RULE 39)
1.
Capa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160082, September 19, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
Capa owns a motor boat which was used for their fish trading business called MB CLM Zoltan. On the other hand, United
Vismin Shipping Lines (UVSL) owns a vessel called MV Cebu Pearl. One evening, these two vessels collided resulting in the
sinking of the Zoltan. Thus, Capa filed a Complaint for Damages in the RTC of Cebu against UVSL RTC ruled in favor of
Capa and ordered UVSL to pay damages.
As a result, UVSL filed a Notice of Appeal which was given due course by the RTC who then orderd the records to be
elevated to the CA. Prior to this, however, Capa filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal because UVSL already notified
the MARINA that it was ceasing its operations. After the RTC granted said Motion, a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal was
issued to Sheriff Belarmino.
Pursuant to this, Belarmino levied upon 2 of UVSLs vessels called MV Island Pearl and MV Sea Pearl. Subsequently one
Jocelyn Raco filed a Third Party Claim stating that it claimed ownership over the 2 vessels levied upon. As a result, the Sheriff
sent to Capa a notice which required them to file an indemnity bond amounting to 2.7M.
Thereafter, UVSL filed a Motion to Quash Levy on the ground that Capa were not required to put up a bond in favor of
UVSL. RTC no longer entertained said Motion to Quash Levy because the RTC has lost jurisdiction at the time the appeal was
perfected.
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Then, Capa filed in the CA a Motion to Approve Sheriffs Indemnity Bond. However, CA denied this. Likewise, Capa filed
with the CA a Motion to Deny Third Party Claim. Unfortunately, CA also denied the Motion stating that it should have been
filed in the RTC of Cebu.
ISSUE: WHETHER CA GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT ACT ON CAPAS MOTION TO DENY THIRD
PARTY CLAIM.
HELD: NO. CA CORRECTLY DENIED THE MOTION.
Based on Rule 39 and Rule 41, as long as the motion for execution pending appeal is filed within the period for
perfecting the appeal and prior to the transmittal of the records to the CA, the trial court may order execution
pending appeal upon good reasons to be stated in the Order granting execution pending appeal. The RTC granted Capas
motion for execution pending appeal and issued the writ of execution commanding sheriff Belarmino to levy the properties of
United Vismin.
However, a third party-claim was filed by Raco through her attorney-in-fact Tolosa pursuant to Section 16, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. If the property levied on is claimed by any person
other than the judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or
right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serve the same upon the
officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to
keep the property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond approved by
the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied
on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of
execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond
unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty days (120) days from the date of the filing of the
bond.
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to any third-party
claimant if such bond is filed.
In this case, Raco availed of the remedy known as terceria, by serving on the officer making the levy an affidavit of his
title and a copy thereof upon Capa. Upon receipt of such affidavit, sheriff Belarmino who is not bound to keep the
properties because of such third party claim, notified Capa of such claim and required them to post an indemnity
bond in the amount of P2,700,000.00 on February 4, 2002 to answer for any liability he may incur by reason of such
execution.
VALIDITY OF THE THIRD PARTY CLAIM WAS NOT QUESTIONED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY
The matter of the invalidity of the affidavit of the third-party claimant (Raco) was never raised by Capa in the trial
court which could have still ruled on the same since the records were still with it at the time such third party claim was filed.
Moreover, Capa even filed an indemnity bond in the amount of P1,400,000.00 with the Office of the Sheriff on February 18,
2002.
As the appeal of UVSL had already been perfected and the records were elevated to the CA on February 6, 2002, Capa
then filed with the CA a motion seeking for the approval of the sheriffs indemnity bond they posted on February 18,
2002. The CA then held in abeyance the action therein pending submission of a certified true copy of a surety bond and a
certification from the Supreme Court that the surety bond is not black-listed. Subsequently, Capas motion to approve bond
in a Resolution dated October 1, 2001 was denied for failure to comply with such directive. Despite motions for extension of
time to look for a qualified and sufficient indemnity bond affordable, Capa failed to do so which prompted the CA to deny the
same.
Capa then filed a Motion to Deny Third-Party Claim with Motion to Admit Claim for Damages which is a complete
turn around from their motion to approve indemnity bond. The CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not
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acting on the same since the invalidity of the affidavit of third-party claim should have been raised at the earliest
opportunity which is in the trial court.
Capa could have then moved for the quashal of the same, thus they could not now invoke the jurisdiction of the CA to
rule on the same when they in fact had already waived the alleged defect in the affidavit when they sought from the CA
the approval of the indemnity bond they posted in the trial court.
2.
Navarosa v. Comelec, G.R. No. 157957, September 18, 2003
QUICKIE FACTS:
After the elections for Mayor of Libacao, Aklan, Navarosa was proclaimed the winner with a margin of 3 votes over Esto. As
such, an election protest was filed in the RTC. In its decision, RTC annulled Navarosas proclamation and declared Esto as
winner with a margin of 42 votes over Navarosa. RTC also awared damages in favor of Esto.
Navarosa appealed to the COMELEC. Likewise, Esto filed in the MTC a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. As a matter
of course, Navarosa opposed the Motion and, in the alternative, offered to file a supersedeas bond to stay the execution
pending appeal in case the RTC grants Estos motion. Thereafter, RTC granted Estos motion as well as Navarosas prayer to
stay execution pending appeal upon filing of a P600k supersedeas bond. Both parties filed an MR but were denied.
Consequently, Esto filed a Petition for Certiorari in the COMELEC. In his defense, Navarosa raised for the first time the issue
that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the election protest allegedly because Esto failed to pay the COMELEC filing fees.
COMELEC Division affirmed the granting of the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal but nullified the stay of execution.
Navarosas MR was denied by the COMELEC en banc. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WERE GOOD REASONS TO GRANT THE EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL.
HELD: YES. THERE WERE GOOD REASONS FOR THE GRANT OF THE EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
To grant execution pending appeal in election protest cases, the following requisites must concur:
(1) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;
(2) there must be good reasons for the execution pending appeal; and
(3) the order granting execution pending appeal must state the good reasons.
Navarosa concedes Estos compliance with the first and third requisites. What she contests is the RTCs finding that there
are good reasons to order discretionary execution of its decision.
In Ramas v. Commission on Elections, the Court, after reviewing pertinent jurisprudence, summarized the circumstances qualifying
as good reasons justifying execution pending appeal, thus:
In a nutshell, the following constitute good reasons, and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant
execution pending appeal:
(1) the public interest involved or the will of the electorate;
(2) the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and
(3) the length of time that the election contest has been pending.
The RTC in the present case, relying on cases reviewed in Ramas, invoked two good reasons to justify its order allowing
execution pending appeal. First, the order will give substance and meaning to the peoples mandate. Second, more
than 10 months or nearly 1/3 of the 3-year term of the office in question had already lapsed. The COMELEC found
these good reasons sufficient. Being consistent with Ramas, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the ruling of the
trial court or of the COMELEC.
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FILING OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND TO STAR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL NOT APPLICABLE TO ELECTION PROTESTS
Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court applies in suppletory character to election cases, thus allowing execution
pending appeal in the discretion of the court.
A primordial public interest to obviate a hollow victory for the duly elected candidate as determined by the trial
court lies behind the present rule giving suppletory application to Section 2. Only a more compelling contrary policy
consideration can prevent the suppletory application of Section 2.
In insisting that the simple expedient of posting a supersedeas bond can stay execution pending appeal, Navarosa
neither claims nor offers a more compelling contrary policy consideration. Instead, she merely contends that Section
3 of Rule 39 applies also in a suppletory character because its Siamese twin provision, Section 2, is already being so
applied. Such simplistic reasoning both ignores and negates the public interest underlying Section 2s application. We
cannot countenance such argument.
Furthermore, a supersedeas bond under Section 3 cannot fully protect the interests of the prevailing party in election
protest cases. Section 3 provides:
Stay of discretionary execution. Discretionary execution issued under the preceding section may be stayed upon
approval by the proper court of a sufficient bond, filed by the party against whom it is directed, conditioned
upon the performance of the judgment or order allowed to be executed in case it shall be finally sustained in
whole or in part. The bond thus given may be proceeded against on motion with notice to the surety.
A supersedeas bond secures the performance of the judgment or order appealed from in case of its affirmation.
Section 3 finds application in ordinary civil actions where the interest of the prevailing party is capable of pecuniary
estimation, and consequently, of protection, through the filing of a supersedeas bond. Thus, the penultimate sentence of
Section 3 states: [T]he bond thus given may be proceeded against on motion with notice to the surety.
Consequently, it finds no application in election protest cases where judgments invariably include orders which are
not capable of pecuniary estimation such as the right to hold office and perform its functions.
By allowing the filing of a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of a judgment in an election protest declaring the
protestant as the winning candidate who is entitled to the right to hold and perform the functions of the contested public
office, would render the judgment in an election protest illusory. While the supersedeas bond ensures that the appealed
decision if affirmed is satisfied, in an election protest case, such bond, in the event the appealed case is affirmed and the execution
pending appeal is proven to be meritorious, cannot adequately answer for the deprivation of a duly elected candidate of his
post, and his constituents of their leader of choice , such deprivation being unquantifiable.
As applied to the present case, the supersedeas bond Navarosa filed can only answer for that portion of the trial courts
ruling ordering her to pay to respondent Esto actual damages , attorneys fees and the cost of the suit. It cannot
secure execution of that portion proclaiming respondent Esto duly elected mayor of Libacao, Aklan by popular will
of the electorate and authorizing him to assume the office. This anomalous situation defeats the very purpose for the
filing of the supersedeas bond in the first place.
3.
International School v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131109, June 29, 1999
QUICKIE FACTS:
The son of Sps. Torralba died while in the custody of ISM. Thus, they filed a Complaint for Damages against the latter and its
officers. RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Torralba. As a result, ISM appealed to the CA. However, during the pendency of said
appeal, Spouses Torralba filed in the RTC a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal on the ground that the appeal is merely
dilatory and that the filing of a bond is another good reason for the execution pending appeal. Naturally, ISM opposed this.
Nonetheless, RTC granted Execution Pending Appeal upon the filing of a 5M bond in favor of Spouses Torralba.
Consequently, ISM filed an MR and, in the alternative, for approval of supersedeas bond to stay the execution pending appeal.
However, RTC denied the MR. Thus, ISM filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA to seek the nullification of the order
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granting the execution pending appeal. Unfortunately, CA dismissed the petition and found that the grounds for granting the
execution pending appeal constituted good reasons (i.e. appeal was dilatory, filing of bond). Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WERE GOOD REASONS FOR THE COURT TO GRANT THE EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL.
HELD: NO. DID NOT CONSTITUTE GOOD REASONS FOR GRANTING THE EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL.
A petition for certiorari lies against an order granting execution pending appeal where the same is not founded upon
good reasons.
In upholding the writ of execution pending appeal, the CA observed that the RTC had, prior to its issuance, duly noted the
presence of the circumstances laid down by Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, allowing execution as an exception,
or pending appeal, even before final judgment, to wit:
(1) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;
(2) There must be good reasons for issuing the execution; and
(3) The good reasons must be stated in a special order.
RTC SAYING THAT APPEAL IS MERELY DILATORY IS NOT A GOOD REASON TO GRANT EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
Likewise, the CA accepted as good reasons that ISMs appeal appears to be dilatory in view of its virtual admission of fault
when it adopted the project Code Red only after the death of plaintiffs-spouses Torralbas son, and the delay of the case
which already affected plaintiffs-spouses Torralbas financially.
This Court has ruled in Ong vs. Court of Appeals that:
Where the reason given is that an appeal is frivolous and dilatory, execution pending appeal cannot
be justified. It is not proper for the trial court to find that an appeal is frivolous and consequently to
disapprove it since the disallowance of an appeal by said court constitutes a deprivation of the right to
appeal. The authority to disapprove an appeal rightfully pertains to the appellate court.
For purposes only of determining the correctness of the writ of execution pending appeal, we cannot see how the lower courts
came upon the conclusion of virtual admission of fault or negligence by ISM based on the above-quoted exchange where
ISMs swimming coach admitted that he read the school paper article introducing Code Red. As correctly pointed out by
ISM, the article was not an official statement of the school, but merely an opinion of its author. Moreover, we cannot
see how the statement of Mr. Noli Reloj that he read the article on Code Red can be construed as an admission of liability
by the school. Clearly then, the conclusion of the RTC that the appeal is dilatory based solely on the foregoing
exchange rests on shaky ground.
MERE FILING OF A BOND IS NOT A GOOD REASON TO GRANT EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
In the case of Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, this Court had occasion to address this issue directly, as follows:
To consider the mere posting of a bond a good reason would precisely make immediate execution
of a judgment pending appeal routinary, the rule rather than the exception. Judgments would be executed
immediately, as a matter of course, once rendered, if all that the prevailing party needed to do was to post a
bond to answer for damages that might result therefrom. This is a situation, to repeat, neither contemplated
nor intended by law.
In fine, the rule is now settled that the mere filing of a bond by the successful party is not a good reason for ordering
execution pending appeal, as a combination of circumstances is the dominant consideration which impels the grant of
immediate execution, the requirement of a bond is imposed merely as an additional factor, no doubt for the protection of the
defendants creditor. Since we have already ruled that the reason that an appeal is dilatory does not justify execution
pending appeal, neither does the filing of a bond, without anything more, justify the same. Moreover, ISM could not be
faulted for its withdrawal of its supersedeas bond inasmuch as the lower court granted the execution pending appeal
and rejected its offer of supersedeas bond.
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AWARDS FOR MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES CANNOT BE SUBJECT TO EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
Finally, we note that writ of execution pending appeal covered the moral and exemplary damages adjudged by the lower court
against ISM. In this regard, we likewise reproduce what was said in Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) vs. Lantin,
et al. that awards for moral and exemplary damages cannot be the subject of execution pending appeal, under the
following rationale:
The execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages is dependent on the outcome of the main
case. Unlike the actual damages for which the petitioners may clearly be held liable if they breach a
specific contract and the amounts of which are fixed and certain , liabilities with respect to moral and
exemplary damages as well as the exact amounts remain uncertain and indefinite pending resolution
by the Intermediate Appellate Court and eventually the Supreme Court. The existence of the factual bases of
these types of damages and their causal relation to the petitioners act will have to be determined in the light
of errors on appeal. It is possible that the petitioners, after all, while liable for actual damages may not be
liable for moral and exemplary damages. Or as in some cases elevated to the Supreme Court, the awards may
be reduced.
4.
Manacop v. Equitable Bank, G.R. No. 162814, August 25, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
Lavine Loungewear Manufacturing Inc insured its building and supplies with PhilFire, Rizal Surety, TICO, First Lepanto,
Equitable Insurance, and Reliance Insurance. All but one of the policies provided that loss is payable to Equitable Bank-Greenhills,
as their interest may appear. Subsequently, a fire gutted Lavines buildings. So, claims were made against the various insurance
policies in the aggregate amount of 112M as determined by the Insurance Commission.
Chandru, one of Lavines Board Members requested that the payments be made first to Lavine who shall thereafter pay
Equitable as the latters interest may appear. Nonetheless, the insurance companies released the proceeds directly to Equitable.
As a result, Chandru filed, in behalf of Lavine, a Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with TRO in the
RTC of Pasig against the insurance companies. Thereafter, as Lavines incumbent directors, Manacop, et al intervened.
The intervenors alleged that its liabilities to Equitable Bank were extinguished because it already received proceeds exceeding
the amount of Lavines obligations. As such, the mortgages given as security by Lavine should be released and the excess be
returned to Lavine. In its defense, Equitable Bank denied that the obligations were fully paid and prayed that the insurance
companies pay their outstanding debts, that the directors be held solidarily liable, and that the REMs be foreclosed.
RTC dismissed the Complaint and ordered Equitable Bank to refund Lavine through the intervenors and also ordered the
insurance companies to pay Lavine through the intervenors.
As such, the intervenors filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. Without filing and MR and even before the RTC could
rule on the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, Equitable filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA. Lavine likewise filed a
similar petition. Thereafter, the RTC granted the Motion and issued a Writ of Execution which was implemented the next day.
As such, the insurance companies likewise filed their Petitions for Certiorari. CA consolidated said petitions.
CA set aside the RTC decision and set aside the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal and ordered the case remanded. Hence,
the intevenors filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE THE WRIT OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL THROUGH
PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI
HELD: CERTIORARI IS A PROPER REMEDY TO ASSAIL AN EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL. HOWEVER, THERE ARE NO GOOD
REASONS SHOWN IN THIS CASE
These certiorari petitions initiated by PhilFire and First Lepanto were directed against the RTCs orders granting
Execution Pending Appeal and the concomitant
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issuance of a Writ of Execution. The proper recourse to be taken from these orders is a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Certiorari lies against an order granting execution pending appeal where the same is not founded upon good
reasons. The fact that the losing party had also appealed from the judgment does not bar the certiorari proceedings,
as the appeal could not be an adequate remedy from such premature execution . Additionally, there is no forum
shopping where in one petition a party questions the order granting the motion for execution pending appeal and at the same
time questions the decision on the merits in a regular appeal before the appellate court. After all, the merits of the main case
are not to be determined in a petition questioning execution pending appeal and vice versa.
NO GOOD REASONS FOR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL

The GENERAL RULE is that only judgments which have become final and executory may be executed. HOWEVER,
discretionary execution of appealed judgments may be allowed under Section 2 (a) of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure upon concurrence of the following requisites:
(a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;
(b) there must be a good reason for execution pending appeal; and
(c) the good reason must be stated in a special order.
The yardstick remains the presence or the absence of good reasons consisting of exceptional circumstances of such
urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage that the losing party may suffer , should the appealed judgment be
reversed later. Since the execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule, the existence of good
reasons is essential.
ADMISSION OF LIABILITY IS NOT A COMPELLING REASON
In the case at bar, the intervenors insist that execution pending appeal is justified because the insurance companies admitted
their liabilities under the insurance contracts and thus have no reason to withhold payment.
We are not persuaded. The fact that the insurance companies admit their liabilities is not a compelling or superior
circumstance that would warrant execution pending appeal. On the contrary, admission of their liabilities and
willingness to deliver the proceeds to the proper party militate against execution pending appeal since there is little
or no danger that the judgment will become illusory.
THAT APPEAL IS MERELY DILATORY IS NOT A GOOD REASON

There is likewise no merit in intervernors contention that the appeals are merely dilatory because, while the insurance
companies admitted their liabilities, the matter of how much is owing from each of them and who is entitled to the
same remain unsettled. It should be noted that the insurance companies are questioning the amounts awarded by the RTC
for being over and above the amount ascertained by the Office of the Insurance Commission. There are also 3 parties claiming
the insurance proceeds, namely: petitioners, Equitable Bank, and Lavine as represented by the group of Chandru.
Besides, that the appeal is merely dilatory is not a good reason for granting execution pending appeal. As held in BF
Corporation v. Edsa Shangri-la Hotel:
It is not for the trial judge to determine the merit of a decision he rendered as this is the role of the
appellate court. Hence, it is not within competence of the trial court, in resolving a motion for execution
pending appeal, to rule that the appeal is patently dilatory and rely on the same as basis for finding good
reasons to grant the motion. Only an appellate court can appreciate the dilatory intent of an appeal as an
additional good reason in upholding an order for execution pending appeal.
THAT THE PREVAILING PARTY WHO IS A CORPORATION IS IN FINANCIAL DISTRESS IS NOT A GOOD REASON
Lastly, the intervenors assert that Lavines financial distress is sufficient reason to order execution pending appeal. Citing Borja
v. Court of Appeals, they claim that execution pending appeal may be granted if the prevailing party is already of advanced age
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and in danger of extinction. Borja is not applicable to the case at bar because its factual milieu is different. In Borja, the
prevailing party was a natural person who, at 76 years of age, may no longer enjoy the fruit of the judgment before he finally
passes away. Lavine, on the other hand, is a juridical entity whose existence cannot be likened to a natural person. Its
precarious financial condition is not by itself a compelling circumstance warranting immediate execution and does
not outweigh the long standing general policy of enforcing only final and executory judgments .
5.
Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 154211, June 22, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
The Batangas Port Zone was placed under the administrative jurisdiction of the PPA. As a result, PPA filed a Complaint for
Expropriation over 185 lots in Batangas. One of the affected owners was the Dimayacyac Group (Curata et al). Thereafter,
Commissioners were appointed by the RTC. These Commissioners reported that the FMV of the lots was 4,800 per sqm.
Nonetheless, the RTC ordered that the Dimayacyac be compensated at the amount of 5,500 per sqm.
Subsequently, on motion of the Dimayacyac Group, the RTC issued Writs of Execution and a Notice of Garnishment of
PPAs bank accounts. PPA ultimately appealed to the CA. As a result, CA nullified the RTCs orders. The Dimayacyac group
assailed the CA order contending that the CA should not have entertained the appeal and that the RTC orders should be
executed pending appeal.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL IS AVAILABLE TO EXPROPRIATION CASES
HELD: NO.
The Court rules that discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal under Sec. 2 (a) of Rule 39 does not apply to
eminent domain proceedings. As early as 1919 in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, the Court held:
When the Government is plaintiff the judgment will naturally take the form of an order merely requiring
the payment of the award as a condition precedent to the transfer of the title, as a personal judgment
against the Government could not be realized upon execution.
In Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, no less than the eminent Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee explained the
rationale behind the doctrine that government funds and properties cannot be seized under a writ of execution, thus:
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government
funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must
be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law . The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
PPAs monies, facilities and assets are government properties. Ergo, they are exempt from execution whether by virtue
of a final judgment or pending appeal. PPA is a government instrumentality charged with carrying out governmental functions
through the management, supervision, control and regulation of major ports of the country. It is an attached agency of the
Department of Transportation and Communication pursuant to PD 505.
An undeniable conclusion is that the funds of PPA partake of government funds, and such may not be garnished absent
an allocation by its Board or by statutory grant. If the PPA funds cannot be garnished and its properties, being
government properties, cannot be levied via a writ of execution pursuant to a final judgment, then the RTC likewise
cannot grant discretionary execution pending appeal, as it would run afoul of the established jurisprudence that
government properties are exempt from execution. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. From the
above discussion, we find that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in its July 24, 2000 Order directing the execution
of the First Compensation Order (July 10, 2000 Order) pending appeal.
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6.
Garcia v. Philippine Air Lines, G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
PAL dismissed Garcia and Dumago for allegedly violating the PAL Code of Discipline after they were caught sniffing shabu
during a raid on the PAL Technical Centers Toolroom. Thus, both of them filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with
Damages with the LA. Prior to the LAs decision, PAL was placed under corporate rehabilitation. Then, LA ruled in favor of
them and ordered PAL to immediately comply with the decision reinstating them. On appeal, NLRC reversed the LA and
dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit. Garcia and Dumagos MR were denied.
Subsequently, LA issued a Writ of Execution with respect to the reinstatement order in its prior decision which had already
been reversed on appeal. LA also issued a Notice of Garnishment. As such, PAL moved to quash the Writ of Execution and
Notice of Garnishment in the NLRC. NLRC affirmed its previous order but suspended the action and referred it to the
Rehabilitation Receiver.
Thus, PAL appealed to the CA. CA nullified the NLRCs decision on the ground that the finding of a valid dismissal removes
the basis for the implementation of the reinstatement aspect of the LAs prior ruling.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE REINSTATEMENT ORDER BY THE LA CAN STILL BE IMPLEMENTED DESPITE THE NLRCS
REVERSAL OF THE FINDING OF ILLEGAL DISMISSAL.
HELD: YES.
The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on
appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during
the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. It settles the view that the Labor Arbiters order of
reinstatement is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY and the employer has to either re-admit them to work under the same
terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal , or to reinstate them in the payroll, and that failing to exercise
the options in the alternative, employer must pay the employees salaries.
7.
Arcenas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150233, February 16, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
In an Action for Annulment of Foreclosure of a Sale of a Barge, the RTC dismissed the Complaint and ordered Espino
(Arcenas co-defandant) to return the barge to a certain Dela Riva and pay damages. Arcenas, as co-defendant was absolved
from liability. On appeal, CA affirmed and modified the amount of damages. Thus, Dela Riva filed a Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Execution with the RTC and it was granted. However, Dela Riva failed to enforce the judgment.
After 5 years from the entry of the judgment, Dela Riva filed a Complaint for Revival of Judgment and Sum of Money with
Damages in the RTC. However, the Summons was returned unserved due to the fact that Arcenas was already residing in the
US. As such, alias summons was served on him via substituted service. For failing to answer, Arcenas was declared in default.
RTC then allowed Dela Riva to present evidence ex parte. As a matter of course, the RTC ruled against Arcenas. In the revived
judgment, Arcenas was directed to pay Dela Riva double the value of the barge (P171K), moral and exemplary damages, and
attorneys fees which was substantially different from the original judgment of P46K with moral and exemplary damages as
well as attorneys fees.
Aggrieved, Arcenas filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA to annul the revived judgment on the ground that it substantially
altered the original judgment.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE REVIVED JUDGMENT COULD SUBSTANTIALLY ALTER THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT
HELD: NO.
Even assuming that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the person of the Arcenas, still, the judgment rendered by
it is a nullity for the reason that the original judgment which was the subject of the action for revival was substantially
modified.
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In Civil Case No. 35349, the judgment of the RTC ordered only Arcenas co-defendant Emilio Espino to return the
barge MV Sta. Lucia I to Jose de la Riva and to pay P48,000.00 a month as unrealized profit from February 3, 1980 or
until June 18, 1980. The said judgment absolved Arcenas from any liability insofar as the barge is concerned but found him
jointly liable to private respondent and Antonio Sy, Sr., for moral and exemplary damages.
On the other hand, THE REVIVED JUDGMENT now subject of this case, substantially modified the original judgment by
directing Arcenas to pay private Dela Riva the sum of P171,022.00 representing double the value of the barge ;
P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; and 15% of the amount recoverable by way of attorneys fees.
These new monetary awards can not be allowed since they were not adjudged in the original judgment which had
long become final and executory. For, it is a fundamental rule that when a final judgment becomes executory , it thereby
becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The only recognized
exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is void.
Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose.
The PURPOSE OF THE ACTION FOR REVIVAL OF A JUDGMENT is not to modify the original judgment subject of the
action but is merely to give a creditor a new right of enforcement from the date of revival. The rule seeks to protect
judgment creditors from wily and unscrupulous debtors who, in order to evade attachment or execution, cunningly conceal
their assets and wait until the statute of limitation sets in.
8.
RCBC v. Serra, 701 SCRA 124 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Serra, as owner, leased to RCBC a parcel of land in Masbate pursuant to a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy. RCBC
informed Serra of its decision to exercise its option to buy. However, Serra replied that it was no longer interested in selling
the property. Thus, RCBC filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against Serra in the RTC of Makati. In
Jan 1989, RTC of Makati ordered Serra to execute and deliver the Deed of Sale in favor of RCBC. Serra appealed.
After the RTCs ruling, Serra donated the property to his mother who, in turn, sold the property to a certain Liok. A new TCT
was issued in favor of Liok. Thus, RCBC filed a Complaint for Nullification of Deed of Donation and Deed of Sale with
Reconveyance and Damages against Liok, Serra, and his mother in the RTC of Masbate.
Meanwhile, CA and the SC affirmed the RTC of Makati in 1994 which became final and executory upon entry of judgment.
Thereafter, in 2001, the RTC of Masbate likewise ruled in favor of RCBC and nullified the donation to Serras mother and
subsequent sale to Liok. CA and the SC affirmed this in 2009.
In 2011, RCBC moved for the execution of the judgment by the RTC of Makati for Specific Performance and alleged that it as
legally impossible to ask for execution of said judgment while the case in the RTC of Masbate for the nullification of the
donation and sale was still pending. Thus, the period to execute by motion was suspended. However, Serra contended that the
Motion for Execution was already barred by prescription and laches.
As a result, RTC of Makati denied the Motion for Execution. RCBCs MR was also denied.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RCBC IS BARRED FROM HAVING ITS 1989 DECISION EXECUTED THROUGH MOTION GIVEN THE
FACT THAT THERE WAS ANOTHER CASE PENDING INVOLVING THE SAME PROPERTY AND THE SAME PARTIES.
HELD: NOT BARRED. RCBC CAN EXECUTED. PERIOD FOR EXECTION DEEMED SUSPENDED DURING THE PENDENCY OF
THE ANNULMENT CASE.
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The Rules of Court provide that a final and executory judgment may be executed by motion within 5 years from the
date of its entry or by an action after the lapse of five years and before prescription sets in .
This Court, however, ALLOWS EXCEPTIONS when execution may be made by motion even after the lapse of 5 years.
These exceptions have one common denominator: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment obligor
and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage .
In Camacho v. Court of Appeals, we held that where the delays were occasioned by the judgment debtors own initiatives
and for her advantage as well as beyond the judgment creditors control, the 5-year period allowed for enforcement
of the judgment by motion is deemed to have been effectively interrupted or suspended .
In the present case, there is no dispute that RCBC seeks to enforce the decision which became final and executory on 15 April
1994. This decision orders Serra to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in favor of RCBC. However, to evade his
obligation to RCBC, Serra transferred the property to his mother Ablao, who then transferred it to Liok. Serras action
prompted RCBC to file the Annulment case. Clearly, the delay in the execution of the decision was caused by Serra for
his own advantage. Thus, the pendency of the Annulment case effectively suspended the 5-year period to enforce
through a motion the decision in the Specific Performance case . Since the decision in the Annulment case attained
finality on 3 March 2009 and RCBCs motion for execution was filed on 25 August 2011, RCBCs motion is deemed filed
within the five-year period for enforcement of a decision through a motion.
This Court has reiterated that the purpose of prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments is to prevent parties from
sleeping on their rights. Far from sleeping on its rights, RCBC has pursued persistently its action against Serra in accordance
with law. On the other hand, Serra has continued to evade his obligation by raising issues of technicality. While strict
compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the
rules will not serve the ends of justice.
9.
Infante v. Aran Builders, G.R. No. 156596, August 24, 2007
QUICKIE FACTS:
Aran filed an Action for Revival of Judgment in the RTC of Muntinlupa against Infante. The judgment sought to be revived
was rendered by the RTC of Makati. The original judgment was for an Action for Specific Performance which ordered Infante
to execute a Deed of Sale over Ayala Alabang properties.
In her defense, Infante filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the venue was improperly laid since the original judgment
was rendered in Makati. RTC denied. On appeal, CA affirmed and ruled in favor of Aran. It stated that since it was an action
involving title to or possession of real property, it should be filed in the RTC where said property is located in Muntinlupa.
Infantes MR was denied. Hence, this petition.
Infante insists that the Action for Revival of Judgment is an action in personam which, therefore, must be filed in the RTC
where the plaintiff or respondent resides.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION FOR REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT CONCERNING TITLE TO OR POSSESSION OF REAL
PROPERTY SHOULD BE FILED IN THE PLACE WHERE THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION IS SITUATED.
HELD: YES.
Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that after the lapse of 5 years from entry of judgment and
before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a final and executory judgment or order may be enforced BY ACTION.
The Rule does not specify in which court the action for revival of judgment should be filed.
In Aldeguer v. Gemelo, the Court held that:
An action upon a judgment must be brought either in the same court where said judgment was
rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other place designated by
the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general.
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but emphasized that other provisions in the rules of procedure which fix the venue of actions in general must be
considered.
Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination of whether the present action for revival of judgment is a real action
or a personal action. Applying Rule 4 on venue, if the action for revival of judgment affects title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein, then it is a real action that must be filed with the court of the place where the real property is
located. If such action does not fall under the category of real actions, it is then a personal action that may be filed with the
court of the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.
The ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT FOR REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT determine whether it is a real action or a
personal action. The Complaint for Revival of Judgment alleges that a final and executory judgment has ordered Infante to
execute a deed of sale over a parcel of land in Ayala Alabang Subdivision in favor of Aran ; pay all pertinent taxes in
connection with said sale; register the deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds and deliver to Ayala Corporation the
certificate of title issued in the name of Aran. The same judgment ordered Aran to pay petitioner the sum of
P321,918.25 upon Infantes compliance with the aforementioned order . It is further alleged that Infante refused to
comply with her judgment obligations despite Arans repeated requests and demands, and that the latter was compelled to file
the action for revival of judgment. Aran then prayed that the judgment be revived and a writ of execution be issued to enforce
said judgment.
The previous judgment has conclusively declared Arans right to have the title over the disputed property conveyed
to it. It is, therefore, undeniable that Aran has an established interest over the lot in question ; and to protect such right
or interest, Aran brought suit to revive the previous judgment. The sole reason for the present action to revive is the
enforcement of Arans adjudged rights over a piece of realty. Verily, the action falls under the category of a real action, for
it affects Arans interest over real property. The present case for revival of judgment being a real action, the complaint
should indeed be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the realty is located .
Thus, it is now the RTC in Muntinlupa City which has territorial jurisdiction or authority to validly issue orders and
processes concerning real property within Muntinlupa City.
10.
Josef v. Santos, G.R. No. 165060, November 27, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
Albino Josef was made liable by the RTC of Marikina for failing to pay Otelia Santos the shoe materials which the former
bought on credit. On appeal, CA affirmed. SC likewise affirmed. The judgment became final and executory. Thus, Santos filed
a Motion for Writ of Execution. Despite Josefs opposition, RTC granted and ordered the issuance of the Writ of Execution.
Pursuant thereto, Josefs personal and, subsequently, real properties located in Marikina were levied upon and auctioned off.
As such, Josef filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA assailing the vailidity of the levy and sale. He alleges that the personal
properties did not belong to him but to his children and that the real property was his family home and thus exempt from
execution. Nonetheless, CA dismissed the petition for failing to file an MR.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE FAMILY HOME CAN BE EXECUTED UPON.
HELD: NO.
Josef, in his opposition to Santos motion for issuance of a writ of execution, claimed that he was insolvent; that he had no
property to answer for the judgment credit; that the house and lot in which he was residing at the time was his family home
thus exempt from execution; that the household furniture and appliances found therein are likewise exempt from execution;
and that these furniture and appliances belonged to his children Jasmin Josef and Jean Josef Isidro. Thus, as early as during
proceedings prior to the issuance of the writ of execution, Josef brought to the fore the issue of exemption from
execution of his home, which he claimed to be a family home in contemplation of the civil law. However, instead of
inquiring into the nature of Josefs allegations in his opposition, the RTC ignored the same and granted Santos
motion for execution.
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The RTCs Order did not resolve nor take into account Josefs allegations in his Opposition, which are material and
relevant in the resolution of the motion for issuance of a writ of execution. This is serious error on the part of the RTC. It
should have made an earnest determination of the truth to Josefs claim that the house and lot in which he and his
children resided was their duly constituted family home . Since it did not, its July 16, 2003 Order is thus null and void.
Where a judgment or judicial order is void it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and
slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.
The FAMILY HOME is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling
place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which
must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases .
Upon being apprised that the property subject of execution allegedly constitutes petitioners family home, the RTC
should have observed the following procedure:
(1) Determine if petitioners obligation to respondent falls under either of the exceptions under Article 155
of the Family Code;
(2) Make an inquiry into the veracity of petitioners claim that the property was his family home;
conduct an ocular inspection of the premises; an examination of the title; an interview of members
of the community where the alleged family home is located, in order to determine if petitioner actually
resided within the premises of the claimed family home; order a submission of photographs of the
premises, depositions, and/or affidavits of proper individuals/parties; or a solemn examination of the
petitioner, his children and other wit nesses. At the same time, the respondent is given the opportunity
to cross-examine and present evidence to the contrary ;
(3) If the property is accordingly found to constitute petitioners family home, the court should
determine:
a.
if the obligation sued upon was contracted or incurred prior to, or after, the effectivity of the
Family Code;
b. if petitioners spouse is still alive, as well as if there are other beneficiaries of the family home;
c. if the petitioner has more than one residence for the purpose of determining which of them, if
any, is his family home;and
d. its actual location and value, for the purpose of applying the provisions of Articles 157 and 160 of
the Family Code.
The family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family, a sacred symbol of family love and repository of cherished
memories that last during ones lifetime. It is the sanctuary of that union which the law declares and protects as a sacred
institution; and likewise a shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge and strengthen the tie that binds
them together and which ultimately forms the moral fabric of our nation. The protection of the family home is just as
necessary in the preservation of the family as a basic social institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement
destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect, the RTCs failure to observe the proper procedures to
determine the veracity of Josefs allegations, is unjustified.
The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold at auction. Despite Josefs allegations in his
Opposition, the RTC did not make an effort to determine the nature of the same , whether the items were exempt from
execution or not, or whether they belonged to Josef or to someone else.
The RTC had enough time to conduct the crucial inquiry that would have spared Josef the trouble of having to seek
relief all the way to this Court. Indeed, the trial courts inaction on Josefs plea resulted in serious injustice to the latter, not
to mention that its failure to conduct an inquiry based on the latters claim bordered on gross ignorance of the law.
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11.
D-Armoured Security v. Orpia, G.R. No. 151325, June 27, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
Orpia et al, as security guards employed by DArmoured Security and assigned to Fortune Tobacco, filed with the LA a
Complaint for lllegal Dismissal and other monetary claims against DArmoured and Fortune Tobacco. LA ruled in favor of the
security guards. As such, Fortune Tobacco appealed but DArmoured did not. As a result, NLRC dismissed the complaint as
to Fortune Tobacco but held DArmoured Security liable. The decision became final and executory.
Theraefter, upon motion of the security guards, the LA issued a Writ of Execution. Pursuant thereto, DArmoured Securities
receivables with Foremost Farms Inc (where it had a services agreement with) were garnished.
DArmoured filed a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ and Notice of Garnishment in the NLRC. LA denied the Motion. MR was
likewise denied. On appeal, NLRC dismissed. MR was also denied. Thus, DArmoured filed in the CA a Petition for Certiorari.
However, CA dismissed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RECEIVABLES FROM FOREMOST FARMS ARE NOT EXEMPT
FROM EXECUTION.
HELD: NO. THEY ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION.
We have ruled that an order of execution of a final and executory judgment, as in this case, is not appealable, otherwise, there
would be no end to litigation. On this ground alone, the instant petition is dismissible.
Assuming that an appeal is proper, still we have to deny the instant petition. Section 1, Rule IV of the NLRC Manual
on Execution of Judgment provides:
SECTION 1. Properties exempt from execution. Only the properties of the losing party shall be the subject of execution, except:
(a) The losing partys family home constituted in accordance with the Civil Code or Family Code or as may be
provided for by law or in the absence thereof, the homestead in which he resides, and land necessarily used in
connection therewith, subject to the limits fixed by law;
(b) His necessary clothing, and that of his family;
(c) Household furniture and utensils necessary for housekeeping, and used for that purpose by the losing party
such as he may select, of a value not exceeding the amount fixed by law;
(d) Provisions for individual or family use sufficient for three (3) months;
(e) The professional libraries of attorneys, judges, physicians, pharmacists, dentists, engineers, surveyors,
clergymen, teachers, and other professionals, not exceeding the amount fixed by law;
(f) So much of the earnings of the losing party for his personal services within the month preceding the levy as
are necessary for the support of his family;
(g) All monies, benefits, privileges, or annuities accruing or in any manner growing out of any life insurance;
(h) Tools and instruments necessarily used by him in his trade or employment of a value not exceeding three
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos;
(i) Other properties especially exempted by law.
The above Rule clearly enumerates what properties are exempt from execution. It is apparent that the exemption
pertains ONLY TO NATURAL PERSONS and not to juridical entities. On this point, the CA correctly ruled that
DArmoured, being a corporate entity, does not fall within the exemption, thus:
Section 13 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear on what properties are exempt from execution.
Section 13 (i) of the Rules pertinently reads:
SECTION 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the following
property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:
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(i) So much of the salaries, wages or earnings of the judgment obligor for his personal services within
the four months preceding the levy as are necessary for the support of his family.
The exemption under this procedural rule should be read in conjunction with the Civil Code, the
substantive law which proscribes the execution of employees wages, thus:
ART. 1708. The laborers wage shall not be subject to execution or attachment, except for debts
incurred for food, shelter, clothing and medical attendance.
Obviously, the exemption under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and Article 1708 of the New Civil Code
is meant to favor only laboring men or women whose works are manual. Persons belonging to this class
usually look to the reward of a days labor for immediate or present support, and such persons are more in
need of the exemption than any other.
In this context, exemptions under this rule are confined only to natural persons and not to juridical
entities such as petitioner. Thus, the rule speaks of salaries, wages and earning from the personal services
rendered by the judgment obligor. The rule further requires that such earnings be intended for the support of
the judgment debtors family.
12.
Caja v. Nanquil, A.M. P-04-1885, September 13, 2004
QUICKIE FACTS:
Triangle Ace filed an Action for Collection of Sum of Money against Subic Realty Corporation, and Florentino and Erickson
Caja. RTC ruled in favor of Triangle Ace and awarded P956K.Thereafeter, a Writ of Execution was issued addressed to Sheriff
Nanquil.
Pursuant thereto, Nanquil sent a Notice of Garnishment to Pag-Ibig and informed it not to deliver, transfer, or dispose the
funds therein except upon orders of the court. For this reason P157K of one Edgar Ballesteros was garnished. Due to the
insufficiency of the amount, the Return indicated that the Writ was unsatisfied.
Thereafter, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued and Nanquil levied upon a parcel of land in the name of Subic Realty with
an assessed value of P1.7M.
Later, Nanquil levied upon Cajas personal properties in the form of a Payloader Truck, Dump Truck, and 77 pieces of
Galvanized Iron. During the case, a Third Party Claim was filed by BAP Credit Guaranty Corp. informing the sheriff that the
trucks were previously mortgaged therewith and requested that the levy be lifted. Nonetheless, the RTC denied this.
Then, Caja filed a Motion to Lift Levy on Execution praying that they levy on the parcel of land be lifted since the levy on
their personal properties was sufficient to satisfy the judgment and thus requested that the court conduct an execution sale.
However, RTC denied the Motion arguing that it cannot be determined at that time if the amount levied is way above the
amount needed to satisfy the judgment. As such, the RTC ordered Nanquil to immediately schedule the auction sale of the real
and personal properties levied.
Consequently, Caja filed an administrative complaint for Grave Misconduct and Gross Ignorance of the Rules on Execution
under the Rules against Nanquil before the OCA.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SHERIFF NANQUIL IS GUILTY OF THE IRREGULARITIES IN THE EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT.
HELD: GUILTY OF GROSS MISCONDUCT. FINED P79K.
ALLEGATION 1: LEVY OF REAL PROPERTY BEFORE PERSONAL PROPERTY GUILTY FOR OVERLEVY OF REAL PROPERTY
It is clear in Section 8 (a) of Rule 39 that satisfaction of the judgment must be carried out first through the personal
property of the judgment debtor, and then through his real property. This directive is evident from the Writ of Execution
and Alias Writ of Execution issued by the RTC.
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Going over the record of the case, it appears that after the decision of the lower court became final and a writ of execution
was issued, the first thing Nanquil did was to serve a Notice of Garnishment to the Manager of PAG-IBIG (Take-Out
Office) advising the latter not to deliver, transfer or dispose of money credits, shares, interests, and deposits in his
control and possession belonging to Subic Realty Corporation, Florentino Caja and Erickson Y. Caja. Subsequently,
an alias writ of execution was issued and pursuant thereto, he levied the real property of Caja on May 19, 1997 and
then the latters personal properties on July 1, 1997 .
Clearly, what Nanquil levied first was personal property via garnishment. GARNISHMENT is considered as a species of
attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor and owing to him from a stranger to the
litigation. It involves money, stocks, credits, and other incorporeal property which belong to the party but is in the possession
or under the control of a third person. Since the properties involved in garnishment are personal properties ,
garnishment is thus a levy on personal property.
We, however, find that Nanquil still violated the rule that satisfaction of the judgment must be carried out first
through the personal property of the judgment debtor, and then through his real property. After levying the real
property of Caja, Nanquil then levied Cajas personal properties which is a direct violation of Section 8, Rule 39 and of the writ
and alias writ of execution issued by the court.
There was negligence on his part when he immediately levied the real property of Caja without checking if the latter
has other personal properties that could satisfy the judgment. He could have easily asked the LTO if Caja had vehicles
registered in his name. If he had done so, Nanquil could have known that Caja had vehicles which he could levy first before
levying any real property. He should have exhausted all means before going after the real property . This, he did not do.
It was only after levying CAjas real property and after discovering that said property was encumbered did he look
for other personal property.
ALLEGATION 2: EXCESSIVE LEVY GUILTY

We find Nanquils contention that the levy on complainants real property was not continued because it was previously
mortgaged to be untenable. The levy thereon was completed as shown by the annotation of the Notice of Levy on TCT. It is
clear that the levy on the real property is still subsisting. There was a valid levy on the real property. Thus, it is improper for
Nanquil to rely, as a defense, on his claim that the levy on the real property was not continued. It was the sale of the levied
real property in an execution sale which did not push through.
Levy is different from an execution sale. LEVY has been defined as the act or acts by which an officer sets apart or
appropriates a part or the whole of a judgment debtors property for the purpose of satisfying the command of the
writ of execution. On the other hand, an EXECUTION SALE is a sale by a sheriff or other ministerial officer under the
authority of a writ of execution which he has levied on property of the debtor.
In the case before us, there was a levy on real property but the levied property was not sold in an execution sale
because said property, if sold, will not satisfy the judgment debt because of an existing encumbrance thereon .
There being a levy on the complainants real property, the amount thereof must be considered in determining if there was an
overlevy. As gathered from the Tax Declaration of the real property involved, including its improvements, its assessed value
amounted to
P1,786,870.00. It must be remembered, however, that said property is mortgaged for P10,000,000.00 in favor of Town Savings
and Loan Bank of Bulacan. The fact that the property is mortgaged for P10M only means that its value is more than
said amount. This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the value of a property is usually bigger than the amount
for which it can be mortgaged. No person, in the ordinary course of business, would give a loan which is bigger than the
value of the property that is used to secure such debt.
The amount of the real property levied upon is definitely more than P10M since the property was mortgaged for
10M. This amount alone is more or less ten times greater than the judgment debt. As it is, there is already a clear case of
overlevy. Although the levied realty was not auctioned at an execution sale , its value should still be taken into
account in computing the total amount levied by Nanquil .
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Nanquils act of levying Cajas real property despite its being mortgaged is tantamount to negligence. As an officer of
the court, he knew fully well that the property cannot be used to satisfy the judgment debt since the mortgagee is the preferred
creditor in relation to said property.
Anent the levy on the Cajas personal properties, he avers that Nanquil made an overlevy since the value of the payloader
and the dumptruck amounted to P3M which is over and above the judgment debt. In the determination of the value of the
two vehicles, it is the duty of Caja to show their true value as substantiated by competent proof. In the case before us,
Caja failed to present the best proof to accurately show their value . He should have adduced in evidence the deeds of sale
of said vehicles, but instead, he merely presented the invoices and delivery receipts. These pieces of evidence are not
sufficient to prove the value of these properties as claimed by Caja considering that when the same, together with the G.I.
sheets, were sold in public auction, the bid amounted only to P705,500.00 which is way below the judgment debt.
ALLEGATION 3: LEVY OF PERSONAL PROPERTIES WITHOUT SERVING A NOTICE OF LEVY OR ISSUING RECEIPT GUILTY
Nanquils answer that he cannot remember if he did leave a copy of the Notice of Levy with the judgment debtor only
shows that he was not performing his duty as sheriff. As sheriff, it was his duty to give the notice of levy or receipt to
the person to whom the personal properties were taken. If no one would like to receive the same, it was his duty to leave
copies of the notice at the place where he levied the personal property . Thereafter, he should have reported the
proceedings by filing a report or return to the court.
In the case at bar, even assuming that no one was willing to accept the notice of levy, the record is bereft of any evidence
showing that Nanquil reported his failure to leave a copy of the notice of levy. Sheriffs are officers of the court who
serve and execute writs addressed to them by the court, and who prepare and submit returns of their proceedings. On this
score, Nanquil was again remiss in his duty as a sheriff.
ALLEGATION 4: DELIVERY OF LEVIED PERSONAL PROPERTIES TO THE JUDGMENT CREDITOR WITHOUT CONDUCTING
AUCTION SALE GUILTY
Nanquils argument that he kept the levied personal properties at the judgment creditors place because the RTC of
Olongapo City does not have any warehouse or place to keep the same does not hold water.
A levying officer must keep the levied properties securely in his custody. The levied property must be in the
substantial presence and possession of the levying officer who cannot act as special deputy of any party litigant .
They should not have been delivered to any of the parties or their representative. The courts lack of storage facility to
house the attached properties is no justification. Nanquil could have deposited the same in a bonded warehouse or
could have sought prior authorization from the court that issued the writ of execution .
In the case at bench, Nanquil brought the personal properties he levied directly to the vacant lot of Triangle Ace in
violation of the rule requiring him to safely keep them in his capacity, after issuing the corresponding receipt therefor. There is
nothing in the record that shows that prior to his delivery of the levied properties to Triangle Ace Corporation, he sought
permission of the court that issued the writ he enforced to keep the properties.
ALLEGATION 5: SOLD LEVIED PROPERTIES IN AN AUCTION SALE ALMOST 4 YEARS AFTER BEING LEVIED NOT GUILTY
The delay of the scheduling of the auction sale cannot be attributed to Nanquil. There were pending incidents that had to be
resolved by the court before the execution sale can be held. From the foregoing, Nanquil cannot be held liable for any
delay of the scheduling of the execution sale for he merely waited for the judge to rule on matters relative to the
properties he had levied.
13.
Zamora v. Villanueva, A.M. P-04-1898, July 28, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
Atty. Zamora was counsel for the plaintiffs in Sps. Cruel v. Sps. Lim. The RTC granted the plaintiffs Motion for Issuance of a
Writ of Execution. Thus, he informed Sheriff Villanueva that the defendants had real property in Nasugbu and requested him
to prepare a Notice of Levy thereon.
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In turn, Villanueva demanded 10K allegedly to defray the expenses for the execution proceedings. Zamora initially gave 5K as
an advance payment the balance of which would be paid upon the transfer of property in his clients name.
After the Notice was annotated in the title, Villanueva refused to proceed with the execution sale unless he is paid the 5K. As
such, Zamora paid the remaining balance after Villanueva assured him that he would proceed with the execution sale.
However, before the date of the sale, Villanueva demanded an additional 5% of the bid price.
To this, Zamora refused. So, Villanueva did not proceed with the execution sale. Thus, Zamora filed an administrative
complaint charging Villanueva of Gross Misconduct.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SHERIFF IS ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE
HELD: YES.DISMISSED FROM SERVICE
VIOLATED SEC 9 RULE 141 IN RELATION TO THE EXPENSES OF THE EXECUTION SALE
Sec. 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires the sheriff to secure the courts prior approval of the estimated expenses
and fees needed to implement the writ. Thus, a sheriff is guilty of violating the Rules if he fails to observe the following :
(1) prepare an estimate of expenses to be incurred in executing the writ, for which he must seek the courts
approval;
(2) render an accounting; and
(3) issue an official receipt for the total amount he received from the judgment debtor.
The rule requires the sheriff executing writs or processes to estimate the expenses to be incurred . Upon the approval
of the estimated expenses, the interested party has to deposit the amount with the Clerk of Court and ex officio Sheriff.
The expenses shall then be disbursed to the executing Sheriff subject to his liquidation within the same period for rendering a
return on the process or writ. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party who made the deposit.
In the present case, there was no evidence showing that Villanueva submitted to the court, for its approval, the
estimated expenses for the execution of the writ before he demanded P10,000 from Zamora. Neither was it shown that
he rendered an accounting and liquidated the said amount to the court. Any act deviating from these procedures laid down by
the Rules is misconduct that warrants disciplinary action.
As regards Villanuevas refusal to proceed with the execution sale, allegedly due to the parties refusal to pay the sales
commission, nowhere in the Rules can it be inferred that payment of any such commission is a prerequisite to an
execution sale. Villanuevas refusal to conduct the execution sale was baseless and illegal.
PREMATURELY ADJOURNED EXECUTION SALE IN VIOLATION OF SEC 22 OF RULE 39
As to the validity of the adjournment of the execution sale, Sec. 22, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court clearly shows that a
sheriff has no blanket authority to adjourn the sale. It is only upon WRITTEN CONSENT of the judgment obligor and
obligee, or their duly authorized representatives, that the sheriff may adjourn the sale to a date and time agreed
upon.
The sheriff may adjourn it from day to day when there is no such agreement but only if it becomes necessary to do so
for lack of time to complete the sale on the day fixed in the notice or the day to which it was adjourned .
Consequently, Villaneuvas act of unilaterally adjourning the execution sale is irregular and contrary to the Rules.
14.
Landrito v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133079, August 9, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
Landrito obtained for 350K from Carmencita San Diego secured by REM over a parcel of land in Muntinlupa. Later, Landrito
obtained another loan from San Diego in the amount of 1M. To secure this, they stipulated that the loan shall be paid within 6
mos otherwise, San Diego may foreclose upon it.
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Upon default by Landrito, San Diego made demands which went unheeded. Thus, San Diego filed in the Clerk of Court and
Sheriff of RTC Makati a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the REM. Pursuant thereto, a Notice of Sheriffs Sale was
sent announcing that the sale of the property. As announced, the sale took place and the property sold to San Diego as the
highest bidder for 2M. As such, San Diego caused the registration of the Certificate of Sale in the ROD. Since Landrito failed
to redeem within the 1-year redemption period, title was consolidated in favor of San Diego.
Aggrieved, Landrito filed a Complaint for Annulment of the Foreclosure and Auction Sale before the RTC of Makati on the
ground that the property was illegally foreclosed because to foreclose a mortgage, it must be limited to the amount of the
mortgage document which was only 1M but was allegedly bloated to P1.9M.
San Diego filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that there was failure to state cause of action. RTC dismissed the
Complaint. On appeal, CA affirmed. MR dismissed. Hence, this petition.
Landrito contends that they were not able to redeem the property because San Diego bloated their original loan of 1M to
1.9M. Thus, they claim that the action for foreclosure must be limited to the 1M amount as mentioned in the mortgage
document.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE FORECLOSURE WAS VALID.
HELD: YES.
The law on redemption of mortgaged property is clear. Republic Act No. 3135 (An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property
Under Special Powers Inserted In Or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages), as amended by Republic Act No. 4118, provides in
Section 6 thereof, thus:
Sec. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the
debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person
having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold,
may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale[.]
In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that the 1-year redemption period should be counted not from the
date of foreclosure sale, but from the time the certificate of sale is registered with the Register of Deeds .
Here, it is not disputed that the sheriffs certificate of sale was registered on 29 October 1993. Under Article 13 of the New
Civil Code, a year is understood to have 365 days each. Thus, excluding the first day and counting from 30 October 1993
(under paragraph 3 of Article 13 of the New Civil Code), and bearing in mind that 1994 was a leap year, petitioners had only
until 29 October 1994, the 365th day after registration of the sheriffs certificate of sale on 29 October 1993, within which to
redeem the foreclosed property in accordance with law. And since 29 October 1994 fell on a Saturday, Landrito had until
the following working day, 31 October 1994, within which to exercise their right of redemption.
From the foregoing, it is clear as day that even the complaint filed by Landrito with the trial court on 09 November 1994
was instituted beyond the 1-year redemption period. In fact, Landrito no less acknowledged that their complaint for
annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale was filed about eleven (11) days after the redemption period
had already expired on 29 October 19947. They merely harp on the alleged increase in the redemption price of the
mortgaged property as the reason for their failure to redeem the same. However, and as already pointed out herein, they chose
not, despite notice, to appear during the foreclosure proceedings.
Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that they were indeed granted such an extension, the hard reality, however, is that at no
time at all did Landrito make a valid offer to redeem coupled with a tender of the redemption price. For, in Lazo v.
Republic Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., this Court has made it clear that it is only where, by voluntary agreement of the parties,
consisting of extensions of the redemption period, followed by commitment by the debtor to pay the redemption
price at a fixed date, will the concept of legal redemption be converted into one of conventional redemption.
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Here, there is no showing whatsoever that Landrito agreed to pay the redemption price on or before 11 November
1994, as allegedly set by Mrs. San Diegos husband. On the contrary, their act of filing their complaint on 09 November
1994 to declare the nullity of the foreclosure sale is indicative of their refusal to pay the redemption price on the
alleged deadline set by the husband. At the very least, if they so believed that their loan obligation was only for
P1,000,000.00, they should have made an offer to redeem within 1 year from the registration of the sheriffs certificate of sale,
together with a tender of the same amount. This, they never did.
It must be remembered that the period of redemption is not a prescriptive period but a condition precedent provided
by law to restrict the right of the person exercising redemption . Correspondingly, if a person exercising the right of
redemption has offered to redeem the property within the period fixed , he is considered to have complied with the
condition precedent prescribed by law and may thereafter bring an action to enforce redemption. If, on the other hand,
the period is allowed to lapse before the right of redemption is exercised, then the action to enforce redemption will not
prosper, even if the action is brought within the ordinary prescriptive period.
Moreover, the period within which to redeem the property sold at a sheriffs sale is not suspended by the institution
of an action to annul the foreclosure sale. It is clear, then, that Landrito have lost any right or interest over the subject
property primarily because of their failure to redeem the same in the manner and within the period prescribed by law. Their
belated attempts to question the legality and validity of the foreclosure proceedings and public auction must accordingly fail.
15.
Marsmony Trading v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170515, May 6, 2010
QUICKIE FACTS:
Hubilla was dismissed as a Techincal Salesman of Marsmony. As such, he filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against
Marsmony. LA ruled in favor of Hubilla and ordered reinstatement and payment of backwages. This was affirmed by the
NLRC on appeal. Eventually, the NLRC decision became final and executory. As a result, Hubilla filed a Motion for the
Issuance of Writ of Execution which was granted.
Pursuant thereto, the NLRC ordered the levy on execution of the real property of Morales, as president of Marmosy.
Marsmony appealed but it was denied. Said decision again became final and executory. When the case was elevated to the CA
and SC, the finding of illegal dismissal was affirmed.
An Alias Writ of Execution was issued ordering the sheriff to execute the judgment and execute on Marsmonys personal and
real properties. As such, the sheriff garnished the bank account of Marsmony. Morales claimed that the account belonged to
Marsomony and to himself.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN ALLOWING THE NOTICE OF LEVY TO BE ANNOTATED ON THE TCT OF THE
REAL PROPERTY OF VICTOR MORALES?
HELD: NO. VALID LEVY
The decision of the Labor Arbiter, rendered on 31 May 1999, has been elevated to, for review by, the NLRC, the Court of
Appeals and finally this Court which entered judgment on the matter 9 years ago, or on 13 August 2001. Until the present, the
decision in 1999 has not yet been executed.
The Labor Arbiters decision has long become final and executory and it can no longer be reversed or modified.
We disfavor delay in the enforcement of the labor arbiters decision. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the
prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party. Final
and executory judgments can neither be amended nor altered except for correction of clerical errors, even if the purpose is to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or of law. Trial and execution proceedings constitute one whole action or suit
such that a case in which execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings in the
execution are proceedings in the suit.
Furthermore, Marsmony did not succeed in overturning the decisions of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. As well,
this Court denied petitioners petition in G.R. No. 145881. Everything considered, what should be enforced thru an order
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or writ of execution in this case is the dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiters decision as affirmed by the NLRC,
the Court of Appeals and this Court. Since the writ of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter does not vary but is in
fact completely consistent with the final decision in this case , the order of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter is
beyond challenge.
It is no longer legally feasible to modify the final ruling in this case through the expediency of a petition questioning
the order of execution. This late in the day, Victor Morales is barred, by the fact of a final judgment, from advancing the
argument that his real property cannot be made liable for the monetary award in favor of Hubilla .
16.
Benitez v. Acosta, A.M. P-01-1473, March 27, 2001
QUICKIE FACTS:
A judgment was renderd against Amparo Osila for a sum of money. On behalf of her mother, Gloria Osila Benitez filed a
Complaint alleging that Sheriff Acosta committed the following irregularities in the impelementation of the Writ of Execution:
(a) ignored the bid of Benitez; (b) sold the jeepney to the highest bidder who was absent and only represented by one Castillo;
(c) the jeepney was sold at an unconscionably low price of 15K; (d) that the plaintiff merely used fronts because he was
interested in the jeepney; (e) the jeepney was not delivered; (f) no return of execution was made; and (g) there was no
compliance with Sec 14 of Rule 39 as there were no notices of posting attached to the certificate of sale.
Meanwhile, Amparo Osila filed a Motion to Declare Null and Void the Auctio Sale on the ground that it was simulated. As a
result, the MTC nullified the public auction sale and held Sheriff Acosta liable for gross misconduct. OCA recommended that
Acosta be dismissed from service.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SHERIFF ACOSTA WAS LIABLE FOR THE SIMULATION OF THE AUCTION SALE.
HELD: YES. GUILTY OF NONFEASANCE
NO RETURN WAS MADE
As per the pertinent portion of the order issuing the writ of execution, Acosta should have made a return on the writ
within 60 days from his receipt of the order, or by February 9, 1998. To date, Acosta has not submitted or made a
return on the writ and has violated a mandate of the court. It is well settled that the sheriffs duty in the execution of a
writ issued by a court is purely ministerial. As such, any failure to comply with such constitutes nonfeasance in the
performance of his duties.
VIOLATION OF SEC 14 RULE 39
Rule 39, 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
Sec. 14. Return of the writ of execution. The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it
immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in
full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state
the reason therefore. Such writ shall continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be
enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings
taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports
shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof
promptly furnished the parties.
Thus, under this provision, Acosta is required:
(1) to make a return and submit it to the court immediately upon satisfaction in part or in full of the judgment; and
(2) if the judgment cannot be satisfied in full, to make a report to the court within 30 days after his receipt of the
writ and state why full satisfaction could not be made. The Sheriff shall continue making a report every 30 days
on proceedings being taken thereon until the judgment is full satisfied.
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The reason for this requirement is to update the court as to the status of the execution and give it an idea why the
judgment has not been satisfied. It also provides the court an idea as to how efficient court processes are after the
judgment has been promulgated. The over-all purpose of the requirement is to ensure the speedy execution of decisions.
In this case, the records show that Acosta received the writ of execution on December 11, 1997. Following Rule 39, 14 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, he was supposed to make a return to the court 30 days after December 11,
1997, or by January 10, 1998, and every 30 days thereafter until the judgment has been satisfie d. However, as of July 17,
2000, he failed to make any report to the court as it was his ministerial duty to do so. He was thus guilty of nonfeasance.
VIOLATION OF SEC 9 RULE 39
Rule 39, 9 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
Sec. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how, enforced. a) Immediate payment on demand. The officer shall
enforce an execution of a judgment for money by demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate
payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. The judgment obligor shall pay
in cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee or any other form of payment acceptable to the
latter, the amount of the judgment debt under proper receipt directly to the judgment obligee, or his
authorized representative if present at the time of payment. The lawful fees shall be handed under proper
receipt to the executing sheriff who shall turn over the said amount within the same day to the clerk of court
that issued the writ.
If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to receive payment, the judgment
obligor shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff. The latter shall turn over all the amounts
coming into his possession within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ, or if the
same is not practicable, deposit said amounts to a fiduciary account in the nearest government depository
bank of the Regional Trial Court of the locality.
The clerk of said court shall thereafter arrange for the remittance of the deposit to the account of the court
that issued the writ which clerk of court shall then deliver said payment to the judgment obligee in
satisfaction of the judgment. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment obligor while the lawful
fees shall be retained by the clerk of court for disposition as provided by law. In no case shall the executing
sheriff demand that any payment by check be payable to him.
Thus, fees collected by the sheriff are required to be paid over to the judgment obligee or the latters authorized
representative. In the absence of both, Acosta is obligated to pay them over to the clerk of the court who issued the
writ or, if this is not possible, to deposit the amount in the nearest government depository bank.
The records show that when Mario Timbol paid the bid price to Acosta, the latter did not turn over the amount to
Atty. Delfin Gruspe, as counsel of Leon Basas, Sr., or the Clerk of Court, but rather to Cesar Gruspe, the brother of
plaintiffs counsel. The Minutes of the Public Auction Sale reveal that during the said sale, the judgment obligee, Leon
Basas, Sr., was absent and so was Cesar Gruspe. As such, under Rule 39, 9, Acosta was under the obligation to turn over
the P15,000.00 to Atty. Delfin Gruspe, the authorized representative of Leon Basas, Sr. Instead, as evidenced by the
Minutes of the Public Auction, Acosta paid the amount to Cesar Gruspe, who was not even present at the bidding, nor
authorized by Leon Basas, Sr. to receive the amount from Acosta .
DISCREPANCIES IN THE MINUTES OF THE PUBLIC AUCTION
As Benitez points out in her Reply to Respondent Medel P. Acostas Counter-Affidavit dated June 29, 1998, there are
discrepancies in the Minutes of Public Auction Sale prepared by Acosta.
It is unusual for the sheriff not to know his duties and functions as laid down by law. These include, among other
things, the preparation of a written account of all his proceedings pursuant to any process issued by the court, particularly
the return of a writ of execution. Because of the irregularities above pointed out, the public auction sale conducted by
respondent appears to have been simulated.
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17.
St. Aviation Services v. Grand International Airways, G.R. No.140288, October 23, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
Grand International Airways (Phil) failed to pay St. Aviation Services (SG) for the services it rendered to maintain GIAs
aircraft. Thus, St. Aviation filed with the High Court of Singapore an Action for Sum of Money amounting to $452K. A Writ
of Summons was served extraterritorially upon GIA. However, despite receipt of said Summons, GIA failed to answer. As a
result, a judgment by default was rendered against GIA.
Thereafter, St. Aviation filed a Petition for Enforcement of Judgment in the RTC of Pasay against GIA. In opposition, the
latter filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the Singapore High Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
GIA and that the foreign judgment is void for having been renderd in violation of GIAs right to due process. Nonetheless,
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. MR was likewise denied.
Thus, GIA filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. CA granted the petition and set aside the RTCs orders without
prejudice. It stated that since the action was in personam, only personal or substituted service was available and not
extraterritorial service. Aggrieved, St. Aviation filed an MR. However, this was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT RENDERED IN SINGAPORE IS ENFORECEABLE IN THE PHILIPPINES.
HELD:
Generally, in the absence of a special contract, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, under the rules of comity, utility and convenience, nations have
established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are
reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries.
Certainly, the Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an action
for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from internationally
accepted doctrines.
The CONDITIONS FOR THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF A FOREIGN JUDGMENT in our legal system are
contained in Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, thus:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a SPECIFIC THING, the judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title to the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order AGAINST A PERSON, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title ;
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Under the above Rule, a foreign judgment or order against a person is merely presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties. It may be repelled, among others, by want of jurisdiction of the issuing authority or by want of notice to
the party against whom it is enforced. The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of its validity.
GIA, in assailing the validity of the judgment sought to be enforced, contends that the service of summons is void and that the
Singapore court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. Generally, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to
the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, which in this
case is the law of Singapore. Here, St. Aviation moved for leave of court to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons
outside Singapore. In an Order dated December 24, 1997, the Singapore High Court granted leave to serve a copy of the
Writ of Summons on the Defendant by a method of service authorized by the law of the Philippines for service of any
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originating process issued by the Philippines at ground floor, APMC Building, 136 Amorsolo corner Gamboa Street, 1229
Makati City, or elsewhere in the Philippines.
This service of summons outside Singapore is in accordance with Order 11, r. 4(2) of the Rules of Court 1996 of
Singapore.
In the Philippines, jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of summons by the sheriff, his deputy or other proper court
officer either personally by handing a copy thereof to the defendant or by substituted service. In this case, the Writ of
Summons issued by the Singapore High Court was served upon respondent at its office located at Mercure Hotel
(formerly Village Hotel), MIA Road, Pasay City. The Sheriffs Return shows that it was received on May 2, 1998 by Joyce
T. Austria, Secretary of the General Manager of GIA.But GIA completely ignored the summons, hence, it was declared
in default.
Considering that the Writ of Summons was served upon GIA in accordance with our Rules, jurisdiction was
acquired by the Singapore High Court over its person. Clearly, the judgment of default rendered by that court against
GIA is valid.
18.
City Government of Makati v. Odena, 703 SCRA 460 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Odena was employed as a public school teacher by the City of Makati since 1980. For allegedly going AWOL, Mayor Elenita
Binay dropped her from the roll of employees. As a result, she appealed to the CSC. CSC found that she was illegally dropped
from the roll. Thus, the CSC ordered her reinstatement and payment of back salaries. Makatis MR was denied. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the finding of illegal termination but modified the award of back salaries to a maximum of 5 years only. This was
later affirmed by the SC. The decision became final and executory.
Upon Odenas motion, CSC directed the Mayor to comply with the decision. However, the city did not comply. Instead,
Odena opted to avail of early retirement wherein Makati paid her 558K representing her back salaries and signed a Release,
Quitclaim, and Waiver.
Afterwards, though a Letter-Complaint, Odena complained to the CSC contending that she was not paid what she was legally
entitled to because 5 year back salaries paid to her did not compensate for her 8 years of suffering. Makati denied the
allegations and contended the SC decision limiting the award to 5 years already attained finality. Nonetheless, CSC ruled in
Odenas favor and awarded her back salaries covering a period of 7 years. It stated that the 5 year limit was inequitable.
Makatis MR was denied.
Thus, Makati filed an appeal by way of Rule 43. However, the CA dismissed the Rule 43 Petition considering that the CSC
ruling was an order of execution of the SC judgment. As a result, resort to Rule 43 was unavailing because orders of execution
cannot be subject to appeal, the proper remedy being Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari. MR denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT CITY OF MAKATI UNDERTOOK THE PROPER REMEDY WHEN IT FILED A RULE 43 PETITION TO
QUESTION THE CSC RESOLUTION
HELD: YES. REMEDY IS PROPER.
Makati insists that its filing of a Rule 43 Petition to assail the CSC Resolutions was proper, as these supposedly involved a
new subject matter and were thus issued pursuant to CSCs exercise of its quasi-judicial function. They were not
merely incidental to the execution of this Courts 2007 Decision. We rule that filing a Rule 43 Petition with the CA is the
proper remedy to assail the CSC Resolutions, but not for the reasons advanced by Makati.
RULE 43 COVERS AWARDS, JUDGMENTS, FINAL ORDERS OF THE CSC
First, the jurisdiction of the CA over petitions for review under Rule 43 is not limited to judgments and final orders of the
CSC, but can extend to appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions issued by the latter. Section 1, Rule 43 of
the Rules, provides in part:
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Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax
Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the
Civil Service Commission.
In PAGCOR v. Aumentado, Jr., this Court ruled that it is clear from the above-quoted provision that the CAs jurisdiction
covers not merely final judgments and final orders of the CSC, but also awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of the CSC.
ORDERS OF EXECUTION MAY BE APPEALED AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE
Second, although the general rule is that an order of execution is not appealable, the CA failed to consider that there
are exceptions to this rule, as illustrated in this case.
A WRIT OF EXECUTION is a direct command of the court to the sheriff to carry out the mandate of the writ , which is
normally the enforcement of a judgment. By analogy, the CSC Resolutions were orders of execution and were issued in
connection with the implementation of this Courts 2007 Decision.
It is obvious from both the body and the dispositive portions of the CSC Resolutions that they carried instructions to enforce
this Courts 2007 Decision, albeit erroneously made. The dispositive portion of CSC Resolution No. 082264, directed
Makati to pay Odenas backwages:
WHEREFORE, the incumbent City Mayor of Makati is hereby directed to recompute the full back salaries
and other benefits of Emerita B. Odea which she is entitled for seven (7) years, eight (8) months, and
twenty-eight (28) days, the entire period she was out of the service as a result of her illegal dismissal.
Based on the foregoing, the CA was correct in treating the CSC Resolutions as orders of execution that were issued in
connection with the implementation of this Courts 2007 Decision. The CA, however erred in dismissing Makatis Rule
43 Petition for being improper.
Indeed, the GENERAL RULE is that an order of execution is not appealable; otherwise, a case would never end. The CA,
however, failed to consider that there are exceptions to this rule. This Court in Banaga v. Majaducon enumerated the
exceptions as follows:
Even prior to the promulgation of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that no appeal lies from an
order or writ directing the execution of a final judgment, for otherwise a case will not attain finality, is
not absolute since a party aggrieved by an improper or irregular execution of a judgment is not
without a remedy. Thus, in Limpin v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court enumerated the exceptional
circumstances where a party may elevate the matter of an improper execution for appeal, to wit:
There may, to be sure, be instances when an error may be committed in the course of execution
proceedings prejudicial to the rights of a party. These instances, rare though they may be, do call for
correction by a superior court, as where
(1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;
(2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust;
xxxx
(6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in
substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or
otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority.
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some
mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. That mode of
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elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari), or by a special civil action of certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus.
The aforementioned pronouncement has been reiterated in cases subsequent to the adoption of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court finds no sound justification to abandon the aforequoted pronouncement
insofar as it recognizes the filing of an ordinary appeal as a proper remedy to assail a writ or order issued in
connection with the execution of a final judgment, where a factual review in the manner of execution is called
for to determine whether the challenged writ or order has indeed varied the tenor of the final judgment.
To rule that a special civil action for certiorari constitutes the sole and exclusive remedy to assail a writ or order of
execution would unduly restrict the remedy available to a party prejudiced by an improper or illegal execution. It
must be borne in mind that the issue in a special civil action for certiorari is whether the lower court acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
In the instant case, the appeal of the CSC Resolutions under Rule 43 is proper on 2 points: (1) they varied the 2007
Decision and (2) the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied.
First, the CSC Resolutions have varied the 2007 Decision, considering that instead of directing the payment of backwages
for a period not exceeding five (5) years, the CSC ordered petitioner to pay an amount equivalent to almost eight (8)
years.
Second, the judgment debt arising from the 2007 Decision has been satisfied as Odena has already received payment
from Makati the amount of 558,944.19, representing her back salaries not exceeding five (5) years, as computed by Makati.
Clearly, these circumstances fall under the abovequoted enumeration of the exceptions to the general rule that an order of
execution is not subject to appeal. Thus, the CA committed grave error when it denied petitioners appeal for being the
wrong remedy.
XXVII.APPEALS/ORIGINAL ACTIONS IN THE SUPREME COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS (RULES 40 TO 56 EXCEPT
RULE 47)
1.
Fernando v. Santamaria, G.R. No. 160730, December 10, 2004
QUICKIE FACTS:
Ferndando owns a parcel of land in Makati. She obtained a loan from Chua which was secured by a REM over a parcel of land
in Makati. Thereafter, Fernando signed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Chua concerning the same property upon
assurance of Borres (Chuas agent) that the Deed was a mere formality. Later on, she discovered that a new TCT was issued in
favor of Chua. Fernando agreed to buy it back for 10M but Chua sold it to Uy for 7M to whom a new TCT was issued.
Thus, Fernando filed a Complaint against Uy, Chua, and Borres for Annulment of the Deeds of Sale, Recovery of Sum of
Money and Damages. However, as a result of Chuas Motion to Dismiss, the RTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of
prescription and abandonment of cause of action. Thereafter, the Complaint was reinstated insofar as Borres was concerned.
As a result, Fernando filed a Notice of Appeal questioning both rulings for the RTC. In response, Chua moved to dismissed
the appeal for failure to file a Record on Appeal within the required period. As such, RTC granted the motion and dismissed
the appeal. Consequently, Fernando filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. However, CA denied. It stated that a Record
on Appeal in addition to a Notice of Appeal should have been filed within 30 days from notice of the assailed order. MR
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT FERNDANDO WAS ABLE TO PERFECT AN APPEAL WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD
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HELD: NO. A RECORD ON APPEAL SHOULD BE FILED BECAUSE IT IS A SEVERAL JUDGMENT

A SEVERAL JUDGMENT is proper when the liability of each party is clearly separable and distinct from that of his coparties, such that the claims against each of them could have been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or against
one of them will not necessarily affect the other. In the instant case, the RTC correctly applied the foregoing provision
because the complaint was filed against several defendants with respect to whom, rendition of several judgment is
proper.
Sections 2 (a), 3 and 13 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. (a) Ordinary appeal.The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with
the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party.
No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate
appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and
served in like manner.
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal, appeal in habeas corpus. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of
the judgment or final order.
SEC. 13. Dismissal of appeal. Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal to the
appellate court, the trial court may motu proprio or on motion to dismiss the appeal for having been
taken out of time, or for non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
The rationale for requiring the filing of a record on appeal in cases where several judgment is rendered is to enable the
appellate court to decide the appeal without the original record which should remain with the court a quo pending
disposal of the case with respect to the other defendants.
Under Section 2(a) in relation to Section 3, of Rule 41, Fernando is required to file a record on appeal within 30 from
November 15, 2001, her date of receipt of the October 25, 2001 order. Considering that no record on appeal was filed,
the CA correctly sustained the order of the RTC dismissing her appeal for failure to perfect the same within the
A fundamental precept is that the reglementary periods under the Rules are to be strictly observed for being
considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and an orderly discharge of judicial business. The
strict compliance with such periods has more than once been held to be imperative, particularly and most significantly in
respect to the perfection of appeals. Upon expiration of the period without an appeal having been perfected, the assailed order
or decision becomes final and executory and the court loses all jurisdiction over the case.
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. In instances
where we applied a liberal interpretation of the rules on filing a record on appeal, the parties although late, filed the required
record on appeal. Such, however, is not the case here because Fernando adamantly refused to file the required record on
appeal.
The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law . The party who seeks to avail of the same
must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.
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2.
Madrigal Transport v. Lapanday, G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004
QUICKIE FACTS:
Madrigal Transport entered into a JVA with Lapanday for the purpose of operating vessels to service the shipping
requirements of Del Monte based on the representations of the Chairman and President of Del Monte, Lapanday, and
Macondray. Pursuant to this JVA, Madrigal obtained a 10M loan. However, Lapanday failed to deliver the charter hire
contracts for the vessels.
Madrigal initially filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency in the Branch 49 in RTC Manila. Subsequently, it filed a Complaint
for Damages against Lapanday and Macondray before Branch 36 of the same RTC. Madrigal was declared to be insolvent.
Thereafter, Lapanday et al filed a Motion to Dismiss in the other case which was granted on theg ground that Madrigal lost its
right to file a Complaint for Damages upon the filing of a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency. Madrigals MR was denied.
As a result, Madrigal filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA. The CA treated the Petition as an exception to the rule that
certiorari is not proper when appeal is available and gave due course to the Petition. Aggrieved, Lapanday filed an MR. As a
result, CA reversed itself and ruled that certiorari cannot lie when appeal is still an available remedy. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT CERTIORARI IS THE PROPER REMEDY.
HELD: NO. CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE WHEN APPEAL IS AVAILABLE.
APPEAL
Under Rule 41, Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by the Rules of Court to be appealable .
An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more can be done
with it in the trial court. In other words, the order or judgment ends the litigation in the lower court. Au contraire, an
interlocutory order does not dispose of the case completely, but leaves something to be done as regards the merits of the
latter.
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
A petition for certiorari is governed by Rule 65. A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any
other purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction. For certiorari to
prosper, the following requisites must concur:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
WITHOUT JURISDICTION means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
APPEAL V. CERTIORARI
AS TO THE PURPOSE. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.
In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the rule in this light:
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would
deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed.
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The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil
action of certiorari.
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of
reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or
of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has
jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of
jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact a mistake of judgment appeal is the remedy.
AS TO THE MANNER OF FILING. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of review. Over
a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and supervision over
the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an
original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order
complained of.
The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are the
aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing
parties (the public and the private respondents, respectively).
AS TO THE SUBJECT MATTER. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so declare are
appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of
the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate
remedy.
AS TO THE PERIOD OF FILING. Ordinary appeals should be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final
order appealed from. Where a RECORD ON APPEAL is required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal within 30 days from the said notice of judgment or final order. A PETITION FOR REVIEW should be filed and
served within 15 days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of the petitioners timely filed motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration. In an APPEAL BY CERTIORARI, the petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the
notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than 60 days from the notice of judgment, order, or
resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the
denial of the motion.
AS TO THE NEED FOR A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. A motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to
the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also
that this motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required before
appealing a judgment or final order.
CERTIORARI NOT PROPER IF APPEAL IS AVAILABLE
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal
(including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not
and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if ones own negligence or error in ones choice of remedy occasioned such
loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
3.
BPI v. Sarabia Manor Hotel, 702 SCRA 432 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Sarabia Corporation obtained loans from Far East Bank to finance the construction of a hotel building. The loans were
secured by REMs. By virtue of a merger, BPI assumed all of FEBTCs rights against Sarabia. Due to cash flow problems,
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Sarabia filed a Petition for Corporate Rehabilitation in the RTC with a prayer for the issuance of a Stay Order since the
maturity date of the loan obligations were approaching and Sarabia foresaw the impossibility of meeting them. For this
purpose, Sarabia submitted a rehabilitation plan. After it was found that the plan was sufficient in form and substance, the
RTC issued a Stay Order and appointed a Receiver. Thereafter, RTC approved the rehabilitation plan over the opposition of
BPI.
As a result, BPI appealed. CA affirmed the RTC ruling. MR was denied. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari. BPI
contends that the RTC and the CA did not give due regard to its interests as a preferred creditor when it granted Sarabias
rehabilation plan and Stay Order.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 SHOULD PROSPER.
HELD: PETITION IS IMPROPER. IT RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT.
It is fundamental that a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of
law. In this relation, questions of fact are not reviewable and cannot be passed upon by the Court unless, the following
exceptions are found to exist:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures;

when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts;
when the findings of fact are conflicting;
when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both parties;
when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondent; and
(j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record.
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is well-defined. A QUESTION OF LAW exists when the doubt
or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts . A QUESTION OF FACT, on the other hand, exists if
the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. This being so, the findings of fact of the CA are final and
conclusive and the Court will not review them on appeal.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds BPIs petition to be improper and hence, dismissible as the issues raised
therein involve questions of fact which are beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.
To elucidate, the determination of whether or not due regard was given to the interests of BPI as a secured creditor in
the approved rehabilitation plan partakes of a question of fact since it will require a review of the sufficiency and weight
of evidence presented by the parties among others, the various financial documents and data showing Sarabias capacity
to pay and BPIs perceived cost of money and not merely an application of law.
Therefore, given the complexion of the issues which BPI presents, and finding none of the above-mentioned exceptions to
exist, the Court is constrained to dismiss its petition, and prudently uphold the factual findings of the courts a quo which
are entitled to great weight and respect, and even accorded with finality. This especially obtains in corporate rehabilitation
proceedings wherein certain commercial courts have been designated on account of their expertise and specialized knowledge
on the subject matter, as in this case.
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4.
NAPOCOR v. Paderanga, G.R. No. 155065, July 28, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
In implementing its Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project, NPC filed a Complaint for Expropriation covering parcels of land in
Cebu in the RTC of Danao. It covers lands co-owned by Petrona Dilao and her siblings as well as land owned by one Estefina
Enriquez. Dilao filed an Answer with Counterclaim while Enriquez did not.
Thereafter, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession in favor of NPC and appointed Commissioners to determine just
compensation. Said Commissioners appraised the land owned by the Dilaos at P516 per sqm. Despite NPC opposition, RTC
adopted the Commissioners findings and ruled that the same amount would be used to determine just compensation for the
Dilaos.
Consequently, NPC filed a Notice of Appeal. However, RTC denied it for failure to perfect the appeal within the reglementary
period since there was no Record on Appeal. NPCs MR was also denied. Then, NPC filed a Petition for Relief which was also
denied. As such, NPC filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. Nonetheless, CA dismissed the Petition stating that the filing
of a Record on Appeal is required in cases of multiple or separate appeals. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A RECORD ON APPEAL IS REQUIRED FOR APPEALS ARISING FROM A COMPLAINT FOR
EXPROPRIATION
HELD: YES.
While admittedly a Complaint for Expropriation is not a special proceeding, Sec 2 of Rule 41 requires the filing of a record
on appeal in other cases of multiple or separate appeal.
Jurisprudential law, no doubt, recognizes the existence of multiple appeals in a complaint for expropriation. The case of
Municipality of Bian v. Garcia vividly expounds on the matter, viz.:
There are 2 stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in
the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for
the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be
a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court
on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly
state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation
(or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is done by the Court with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence
before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of
the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue.
Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of
the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise . Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek reversal
of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.
Thus, in Municipality of Bian, this Court held that in actions for eminent domain, since no less than 2 appeals are allowed
by law, the period for appeal from an order of condemnation is 30 days counted from notice thereof and not the
ordinary period of 15 days prescribed for actions in general. As such, the complaint falls under the classification of
other cases of multiple or separate appeal where the law or these rules so require in above-quoted Section 2(a) of
Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in which a record on appeal is required to be filed and served.
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Multiple or separate appeals being existent in the present expropriation case, NPC should have filed a record on
appeal within 30 days from receipt of the trial courts decision. The trial courts dismissal of its appeal, which was
affirmed by the appellate court, was thus in order.
5.
State Investment v. Delta Motors, G.R. No. 144444
QUICKIE FACTS:
State Investment filed an Action for Sum of Money against Delta Motors in the RTC. Later on, RTC rendered a judgment by
default in favor of State Investment and ordered Delta to pay. After publication of the decisin, State Investment moved for
the issuance of a Writ of Execution which the RTC granted.
Meanwhile, Delta belatedly obtained a copy of the RTC decisin. Thus, it asked the CA to annul the RTC decisin on the
ground that the summons were served upon a person not authorized to receive the same. However, CA ruled that the
summons was properly served. Nonetheless, it also stated that the RTC decisin had not yet attained finality.
As such, Delta filed its Notice of Appeal with the RTC. However, it was dismissed. As a result, Delta filed a Petition for
Certiorari in the CA assailing the RTCs order dismissing its Notice of Appeal. CA granted the Petition and ordered the RTC
to elevate the records of the case to the CA on appeal.
Aggrieved, State Investment questioned the granting of Deltas Petition to the SC. While pending in the SC, Delta filed a
Motion in the CA to Annul the Writ of Execution issued by the RTC previously. CA dismissed this because the Writ of
Execution was not raised during the proceedings in the CA considering that only the denial of Deltas Notice of Appeal was
passed upon. As such, Delta went up to the SC to question the CAs decisin. However, the SC affirmed the CA.
Later, State Investment filed with the RTC an Omnibus Motion asking for the issuance of another Order to Continue the Writ
of Execution. RTC granted this. So, Delta appealed to the CA. CA held that the RTC judgment had not yet attained finality.
Thus, it stated that the RTC acted without jurisdiction to grant the Omnibus Motion.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC CORRECTLY GRANTED STATE INVESTMENTS OMNIBUS MOTION TO CONTINUE THE
WRIT OF EXECUTION.
HELD: NO.
Considering further that the RTC Decision sought to be executed by the Order was not yet final and executory, Section 2 of
Rule 39 of the new Rules on Discretionary Execution should apply:
Discretionary execution. (a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal. On motion of the prevailing
party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is
in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal , as the case may be, at the time of the
filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even
before the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the
appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.
Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court explains the instances when the trial court loses jurisdiction over a case:
A partys appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof
upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the
appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
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In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue
orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter
litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending
appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.
In the case at bar, the appeal filed by Delta was perfected on November 12, 1991, when it filed its Notice of Appeal.
Considering that it had already filed such Notice, and that the period of appeal for State Investment had already expired,
the RTC no longer had jurisdiction over the case.
Hence, the RTC acted improperly when it issued its May 27, 1998 Order granting State Investments Omnibus
Motion. That Motion was filed 4 years after this Court had affirmed the CA Decision directing the elevation of the
records on appeal. For having been issued without jurisdiction, the Order is plainly null and void.
6.
Aguilar v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 185140, June 30, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
During the barangay elections in Brgy Bansarvil I, Aguilar won over Insoy by a margin of 1 vote for the position of Barangay
Captain. Naturally, Insoy instituted a protest in the MTC. MTC nullified Aguilars proclamation and ruled that Insoy was the
winning candidate. Aggrieved, Aguilar filed his Notice of Appeal and paid to the MTC the P1,000 appeal fee in accordance
with the Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials.
COMELEC First Division received the records elevated from the MTC. However, it dismissed Aguilars appeal on the ground
that it failed to pay the required fee. Accordingly, Aguilar filed an MR. Nonetheless, the COMELEC First Division denied the
MR. Thus, another MR was filed by Aguilar on the ground that it should have been the COMELEC en banc who should have
ruled on the MR. However, COMELEC First Division again denied the MR stating that it was a prohibited pleading. Hence,
this Petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION CORRECTLY DENIED AGUILARS APPEAL.
HELD: NO.
Settled is the rule that it is the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc which, in accordance with Article IXA, Section 7 of the Constitution, may be brought to this Court on certiorari. But this RULE SHOULD NOT APPLY when a
division of the COMELEC arrogates unto itself, and deprives the en banc of the authority to rule on a motion for
reconsideration, as in this case. Further, the rule is not ironclad; it admits of exceptions as when the decision or resolution
sought to be set aside, even if it were merely a Division action, is an absolute nullity.
The COMELEC Rules of Procedure, complementing the constitutional provision, also details the course of action to be
undertaken in the event motions for reconsideration are filed; thus, Rule 19, Sections 5 and 6 provide that
Sec. 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of. Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four
(24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days
thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc.
Sec. 6. Duty of Clerk of Court of Commission to Calendar Motion for Reconsideration. The Clerk of
Court concerned shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en banc
within ten (10) days from the certification thereof.
Being a violation of the Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the assailed September 4 and October 6,
2008 Orders are null and void. They were issued by the COMELEC First Division with grave abuse of discretion.
PROPRIETY OF THE DISMISSAL OF APPEAL
Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC provide for the following procedure in the appeal to the COMELEC of
trial court decisions in election protests involving elective municipal and barangay officials:
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SEC. 8. Appeal. An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the Commission on Elections, within
five days after promulgation, by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the decision,
with copy served on the adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel.
SEC. 9. Appeal fee. The appellant in an election contest shall pay to the court that rendered the decision
an appeal fee of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), simultaneously with the filing of the notice of
appeal.
It should be noted from the aforequoted sections of the Rule that the appeal fee of P1,000.00 is paid not to the COMELEC
but to the trial court that rendered the decision. Thus, the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the
P1,000.00 appeal fee perfect the appeal, consonant with Sections 10 and 11 of the same Rule.
Upon the perfection of the appeal, the records have to be transmitted to the Electoral Contests Adjudication
Department of the COMELEC within 15 days. The trial court may only exercise its residual jurisdiction to resolve pending
incidents if the records have not yet been transmitted and before the expiration of the period to appeal.
The appeal to the COMELEC of the trial courts decision in election contests involving municipal and barangay officials is
perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the P1,000.00 appeal fee to the court that
rendered the decision within the 5-day reglementary period.
The non-payment or the insufficient payment of the additional appeal fee of P3,200.00 to the COMELEC Cash
Division, in accordance with Rule 40, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, does not affect the
perfection of the appeal and does not result in outright or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal. Following, Rule 22,
Section 9(a) of the COMELEC Rules, the appeal may be dismissed. And pursuant to Rule 40, Section 18 of the same rules, if
the fees are not paid, the COMELEC may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or the
proceeding. In such a situation, the COMELEC is merely given the discretion to dismiss the appeal or not.
Accordingly, in the instant case, the COMELEC First Division, may dismiss petitioners appeal, as it in fact did, for
petitioners failure to pay the P3,200.00 appeal fee.
Be that as it may, the Court still finds that the COMELEC First Division gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
order dismissing petitioners appeal. The Court notes that the notice of appeal and the P1,000.00 appeal fee were,
respectively, filed and paid with the MTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on April 21, 2008.
On that date, the petitioners appeal was deemed perfected. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8486 clarifying the rule on
the payment of appeal fees only on July 15, 2008, or almost three months after the appeal was perfected. Yet, on July 31, 2008,
or barely two weeks after the issuance of Resolution No. 8486, the COMELEC First Division dismissed petitioners appeal for
non-payment to the COMELEC Cash Division of the additional P3,200.00 appeal fee.
Considering that petitioner filed his appeal months before the clarificatory resolution on appeal fees, petitioners
appeal should not be unjustly prejudiced by COMELEC Resolution No. 8486 .
Instead, the COMELEC First Division hastily dismissed the appeal on the strength of the recently promulgated clarificatory
resolution which had taken effect only a few days earlier.
7.
Cardona v. Amansec, G.R. No. 147216, April 15, 2004
QUICKIE FACTS:
Cardona filed a Complaint for Ejectment against Amansec in the MTC for allegedly entering and building houses on a parcel
of land owned by her sole heir who died intstate. In the Answer, Amansec contended that there was a tenancy relationship
between him and Cardonas predecesor in interest (Raroque) who ended up selling the land to Cardona without his knowledge
and consent.
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Upon Amansecs discovery, he filed in the DARAB a Petition for Nullification of the Deed of Sale between Raroque and
Cardona and issuance of an Emancipation Patent in his favor over said lot. The PARAD rendered a decisin in favor of
Amansec. Instead of appealing to the DARAB, Cardona filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review
under Rule 43 with the CA. In said motion, Cardona averred that she only had until August 30 to file said Petition so she
prayed to be given an extensin of 15 days or until Sept. 15 to file. After the Motion was granted, Cardona filed the Petition
on Sept 15. In its Resolution however, CA dismissed the Petition for having been filed 1 day late. Cardonas MR was also
denied.
Thereafter, MTC found the existence of a tenancy relationship and dismissed the Complaint. As a result, Cardona appealed to
the RTC. On appeal, RTC reversed the MTC upon a finding that Amansec failed to prove the tenancy relationship. Amansecs
MR was denied. The latter also did not file a Petition for Review. As such, Cardona moved for the issuance of a Writ of
Execution. Likewise, Cardona filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC in order that the prior resolutions of the
CA dismissing her petition be nullified. She alleged that she was guilty of excusable negligence when she overlooked that
August had 31 days instead of only 30.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA PROPERLY DISMISSED CARDONAS PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 43.
HELD: YES. ALTHOUGH SHE WAS GUILTY OF EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE, SHE SHOULD HAVE APPEALED IT TO THE DARAB
We agree with Cardona that she was guilty of excusable negligence when she overlooked that the month of August consists
not of 30 days, but of 31 (31) days. In Samala vs. Court of Appeals, we held that a 1-day delay does not justify the outright
dismissal of an appeal.
Nonetheless, we resolve to deny due course to and dismiss the instant petition for review on certiorari on the ground that the
proper remedy from a decision of the PARAD was an appeal to the DARAB and not a petition for review in the
Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Rule XIII, Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the DARAB New Rules of
Procedure provides, thus:
SECTION 1. Appeal to the Board. a) An appeal may be taken from an order, resolution or decision of
the Adjudicator to the Board by either of the parties or both, orally or in writing, within a period of fifteen
(15) days from the receipt of the order, resolution or decision appealed from, and serving a copy thereof on
the adverse party, if the appeal is in writing.
b) An oral appeal shall be reduced into writing by the Adjudicator to be signed by the appellant, and a copy
thereof shall be served upon the adverse party within ten (10) days from the taking of the oral appeal.
SECTION 2. Grounds. The aggrieved party may appeal to the Board from a final order, resolution
or decision of the Adjudicator on any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors in the findings of facts or conclusions of laws were committed which, if not corrected, would
cause grave and irreparable damage or injury to the appellant;
(b) That there is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Adjudicator; or
(c) That the order, resolution or decision is obtained through fraud or coercion.
SECTION 3. Where to File. The notice of appeal shall be filed with the Adjudicator concerned in three
(3) legibly written copies.
SECTION 4. Caption.In all cases appealed to the Board, the party appealing shall be called the appellant
and the adverse party the appellee, and the case shall be assigned a docket number.
SECTION 5. Requisites and Perfection of the Appeal. a) The Notice of Appeal shall be filed within the
reglementary period as provided for in Section 1 of this Rule. It shall state the date, when the appellant
received the order or judgment appealed from and the proof of service of the notice to the adverse party; and
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b) An appeal fee of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) shall be paid by the appellant within the reglementary
period to the DAR Cashier where the Office of the Adjudicator is situated. A pauper litigant shall, however,
be exempt from the payment of the appeal fee. Non-compliance with the above-mentioned requisites shall be
a ground for the dismissal of the appeal.
Under the said rules, Cardona should have appealed the decision of the PARAD to the DARAB orally or in writing,
and perfected the said appeal within the requisite period and in the manner provided therefor . Cardona failed to do so.
The well-entrenched rule is that appeal is merely a statutory right and must be availed of within the period and in the
manner provided for by law; otherwise, upon the lapse of the period to appeal from a decision or final order and no appeal
has been perfected by the aggrieved party, such final order or decision ipso facto becomes final and executory. The appellate
court does not acquire appellate jurisdiction over a belated appeal from the said order or decision.
8.
Canedo v. Kampilan Secutiry and Detective Agency, 702 SCRA 647 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Kampilan Security hired Canedo as security guard and assigned him at NPCs Power Barge. He was suspended for a month
for not wearing the proper uniform. NPC then requested for Canedos replacement. Canedo requested Kampilans GM
(Arquiza) to issue a Certification regararding his intended retirement. Thus, Arquiza issued said Certification stating that he
was terminated from his employment as per clients request.
Canedo filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal. LA held that Canedo was illegally dismissed. On appeal, after Kampilan filed
its Memorandum of Appeal and Canedo his Appellees Memorandum, NLRC initially affirmed the LAs decisin. On MR,
however, NLRC reversed itself and set aside the finding of illegal dismissal. Canedos MR was denied. As such, he filed a
Petition for Certiorari in the CA. However, this was dismissed. After the MR was denied, he filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari.
Canedo submits that the CAs findings are erroneous and inconsistent with the evidence on record.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT QUESTIONS OF FACT CAN BE RAISED VIA PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI.
HELD: YES. THERE IS NO UNIFORMITY IN THE FACTUAL FINDINGS IN THE TRIBUNALS BELOW.
At the outset, the Court notes that this is a question of fact which cannot be raised in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45. However, when there is no uniformity in the factual findings of the tribunals below, as in this case, this Court
is resolved to again examine the records as well as the evidence presented to determine which findings conform
with the evidentiary facts.
The burden of proving the allegations rests upon the party alleging and the proof must be clear, positive and convincing. Thus,
in this case, it is incumbent upon Canedo to prove his claim of dismissal.
Petitioner relies on the word terminated as used in the June 25, 2003 Certification issued him by Arquiza and argues that
the same is a clear indication that he was dismissed from service. We are, however, not persuaded. Canedo cannot simply
rely on this piece of document since the fact of dismissal must be evidenced by positive and overt acts of an
employer indicating an intention to dismiss. Here, aside from this single document, Canedo proffered no other
evidence showing that he was dismissed from employment. While it is true that he was not allowed to report for work
after the period of his suspension expired, the same was due to NPCs request for his replacement as NPC was no longer
interested in his services. And as correctly argued by Kampilan, Canedo from that point onward is not considered
dismissed but merely on a floating status. Such a floating status is lawful and not unusual for security guards
employed in security agencies as their assignments primarily depend on the contracts entered into by the agency
with third parties.
9.
Esteban v. Marcelo, 703 SCRA 82 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Esteban allowed Sps. Marcelo to reside in their land for a monthly rental fee. However, they stopped paying rentals. Naturally,
Esteban sent a demand letter requiring them to settle the rents due and to vacate within 5 days. As their demands remained
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unheeded, Esteban filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against the Sps. Marcelo in the MTC. The MTC ordered the
Marcelos to vacate. RTC affirmed. On appeal, Marcelos raised the defense that they cannot be evicted since they were
protected by PD 1517 (Urban Land Reform) and that they qualified as beneficiaries under RA 7279. Hence, Esteban filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT CA CAN RULE UPON MATTERS ONLY RAISED ON APPEAL.
HELD: NO. ISSUES NOT RAISED MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED AND RULED UPON.
The rule on the propriety of resolving issues not raised before the lower courts cannot be raised on appeal: points of
law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court will not be and ought not to be
considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal . Basic consideration of due
process impels this rule.
As Esteban correctly observed, the Spouses Marcelo never intimated, directly or indirectly, that they were seeking the
protection of RA 7279. Therefore, the CA did not have any authority to rule that they qualified as beneficiaries under
RA 7279.
10.
Dycoco v. Court of Appeals, 702 SCRA 566 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Sps. Dycoco are registered owners of a parcel of land in Albay. Sanchez and 6 others entered the property, registered as
tenants for agrarian reform, and cultivated the property without paying rentals which was in violation of agrarian laws. Thus,
Sps. Dycoco filed a Complaint for Ejectment, Cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer, and Damages against the 7 before
the Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB.
PA ejected Sanchez, Berma, and Talagtag. Thereafter, the PA issued a Writ of Execution in favor of Dycoco. As such,
Sanchez filed a Motion to Quash considering that they previously filed a Notice of Appeal thereby not making the decisin
final and executory. However, the PA denied the Motion to Quash and held that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.
PA considered the receipt of Bermas daughter of the decisin by registered mail on July 10. As such, the Notice of Appeal
filed on Aug. 29 was filed out of time. On appeal, the DARAB reversed the PA and ruled in favor of Sanchez and Berma.
Dycoco received DARABs decisin on Apr 3 2000 and had Apr 18 to appeal. Upon their Motion, CA granted them an
extensin of 15 days to file an appeal. So, they had until May 3 to file an appeal. However, Dycoco filed a Petition for Review
under Rule 43 by registered mail only on May 8. As a result, CA denied the petition for being filed beyond the required period.
As a result, Dycoco filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 in the SC. They asked for the SCs liberality considering that
they hired new counsel who still had to study the voluminous records. Also, they contend that they were deprived of due
process after the DARAB granted the appeal even after the PAs decisin already bcame final and executory.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SPS DYCOCOS PETITION FOR REVIEW WAS PROPERLY DENIED
HELD: YES. ALSO, RULE 65 IS NOT A PROPER REMEDY
Firstly, Dycocos are before this Court with a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which is a wrong
remedy. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that may be resorted to only in
the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law .
Contrary to the claim of Dycoco in the opening paragraph of their petition that there was no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than this petition, the right recourse was to appeal to this Court
in the form of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is appeal. This holds true
even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter , or the
exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the
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decision, order or resolution. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one
of the requirements for the latter remedy is the unavailability of appeal.
The failure of Dycoco to file an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court cannot be remedied by the mere
expedient of conjuring grave abuse of discretion to avail of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost
through fault or negligence. In this case, Dycoco received the Resolution dated January 1, 2001 on January 19, 2001 and,
under the rules, had until February 5, 2001 to file an appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari in this Court. Dycoco
allowed this period to lapse without filing an appeal and, instead, filed this petition for certiorari on March 16, 2001.
PETITION FOR REVIEW WAS FILED OUT OF TIME
The CA granted Dycoco a 15-day extension, within which to file their intended petition. The action of the CA was in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Thus, as the original deadline of Dycoco was April 18, 2000,
they had until May 3, 2000 to file their intended petition. Dycoco, however, filed the petition on May 8, 2000. They even
admit that their petition in the CA was filed 5 days after the extended period. It is therefore clear that the CA simply applied
the rules, while Dycoco concededly failed to observe the very same rules. As such, the CAs dismissal of the petition of
Dycoco was discretion duly exercised, not misused or abused.
ISSUED CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
Dycocos make it appear that there are compelling reasons to support their petition deprivation of property without just
compensation and denial of due process. The Dycocos, however, belatedly raised these issues and failed to substantiate
the same.
There is no question that they are entitled under the law to receive just compensation for the property taken from them and
transferred to private respondents by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. Due process guarantees that taking of private
property by the State for public use should be with payment of just compensation . Unfortunately, they themselves
did not consider the issue of just compensation as compelling enough because they did not raise it in the complaint
or in the position paper which they filed in the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator. They only claimed just
compensation for the first time on appeal, that is, when they filed their petition for review with the Court of Appeals .
The settled rule that issues not raised in the proceedings below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal bursts the
bubble that is the alleged compelling nature of Dycocos claim. They ask for due process, but fairness and due process
dictate that evidence and issues not presented below cannot be taken up for the first time on appeal .
LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION RULE IS NOT A LICENSE TO DISREGARD PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
Dycocos primarily anchor this petition on an invocation of the rule on liberality in the construction of procedural rules.
However, the liberal construction rule is not a license to disregard procedural requirements. Like all rules, procedural rules
should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of
an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed
procedure.
They caused their own predicament when they decided to change horses in midstream and engaged the services of
their present counsel on April 10, 2000 or just a week before the expiration of the period to appeal in the Court of
Appeals, discharging the services of their former counsel who handled the case from the level of the Provincial Adjudicator to
the DARAB. They cannot escape the consequences of a belated appeal caused by the need of their new counsel for
more time to study voluminous records and familiarize himself with the case. Moreover, as shown above, they not only
failed to show any persuasive reason why they should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules when they filed their
petition for review in the Court of Appeals beyond the prescribed period. They again disregarded the rules in various ways
absent any compelling reason when they filed this petition.
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11.
Ang v. San Joaquin, 703 SCRA 269 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Virose Furniture and Glass Supply is a single proprietorship owned by Ang. San Joaquin and Fernandez worked for Ang as a
helper and driver. In a case filed by a co-employee against Ang, San Joaquin and Fernandez testified against Ang. After the
hearing, Ang started treating them with antagonism.
Later on, an altercation ensued between Angs wife and San Joaquin. Angered by this, Ang tore his Daily Time Record.
Fernandezs was also torn. They were then suspended for insubordination. As such, San Joaquin and Fernandez filed a
Complaint for Constructive Dismissal against Ang. LA dismissed the Complaint. On appeal, NLRC affirmed. MR was denied.
As such, they filed a Petititon for Certiorari in the CA. CA reversed the LA and NLRC rulings and found that there was illegal
dismissal. Angs MR was denied. Hence, this Petition.
Ang contends that the findings of administrative special agencies should be given due respect.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DOCTRINE THAT THE FINDINGS OF ADMINISTRATIVE SPECIAL AGENCIES SHOULD BE
RESPECTED MUST BE FOLLOWED.
HELD: NO. THERE WAS A DIVERGENCE IN THE FINDINGS OF FACT AS WELL AS THE CONCLUSIONS ARRIVED AT
When there is a divergence between the findings of facts of the NLRC and that of the CA, there is a need to review the
records. In the present case, not only is there a divergence of findings of facts; the conclusions arrived at by the two
tribunals are diametrically opposed. For this reason, the doctrine that the findings of specialized administrative
agencies or tribunals should be respected must be set aside for a moment.
There is considerable reason to believe that Ang began to treat the employees with disdain and discrimination after
the hearing of the criminal cases on August 24, 1999, when they testified against him. Indeed, they claim in their
Position Paper that Ang began to subject them to verbal abuse, as well as assigning them tasks which were not part of their
work, is not far-fetched. All these are rooted in the 41 charges of estafa pending against Ang, where they were compelled to
testify as witnesses for the State. Ang did not successfully dispute this claim; indeed, on this issue, he has remained silent
all along. His silence on this issue is telling; considering that upon him lay the burden of proof to show that no illegal
dismissal was effected. He should have addressed this issue, which is material and significant to the case as it forms the
foundation for employees claim of illegal constructive dismissal.
XXVIII. PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT (RULE 47)
1.
Orbeta v. Sendiong, July 8, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
Montenegro sold to Sps. Orbeta a portion of a parcel of land in Dumaguete. In the sale, the portion occupied by
Montenegros grandmother was not inlcuded. Thereafter, Orbeta sold to Sps. Sendiong the parcel of land it bought from
Montenegro. However, Montenegro was deprived of the possession of the excluded portion of the lot originally sold to
Orbeta by the Sendiongs. Thus, Montenegro and Orbeta filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession, Quieting of Title, and
Damages against Sendiong. Montenegro reiterated its claim over the unsold portion while Orbeta claims that it was sold
without the consent of his wife.
Sendiong filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that some of the indispensable parties were not impleaded. RTC denied
this. After Orbeta rested its case, Sendiong filed another motion to include indispensable parties. However, this was again
denied. As such, RTC ordered Sendiong to restore to Orbeta the title and possession of their respective shares in the property.
Sendiong filed a Notice of Appeal but the RTC denied it since the Certification Against Forum Shopping was signed by
counsel. Thus, a Petition for Certiorari was filed but the CA dismissed this. After Sendiongs MR was denied, the decisin
lapsed into finality.
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Subsequently, Sendiong filed a Petition for Annulment of Decision with the CA and alleged that it belatedly learned of the
decisin as he was not made a party thereto despite being an indispensable party. Essentially, it claims that the RTC had no
jurisdiction because the indispensable party was not impleaded. CA granted the Petition for Annulment of Judgment due to
the absence of an indispensable party.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA PROPERLY GRANTED THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
HELD: YES.
Annulment of judgment is not a relief to be granted indiscriminately by the courts. Annulment of judgment is a recourse
equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Under
Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the only grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction. If the action is based on extrinsic fraud, it must be brought within four (4) years from discovery ,
and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
Sendiongs petition for annulment is grounded on lack of jurisdiction, owing to the failure to implead the indispensable
parties. The cited ground is ample basis for annulment of judgment. We have long held that the joinder of all indispensable
parties is a condition sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power. The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to
those present.
It takes no great degree of legal sophistication to realize that Paul Sendiong and Lourdes Sendiong were indispensable
parties to Civil Case No. 10173. Paul and Lourdes Sendiong derived their rights to the subject property from their father
Luis Sendiong, who acquired the property by way of donation from the spouses Juan Sendiong and Exequila Castellanes,
who in turn purchased the property from Maximo Orbeta in 1934.
Neither laches nor estoppel serves as a bar. The petition for annulment alleges that Sendiong learned of the existence of
Civil Case No. 10173 only in 1999, or one year after the decision therein had been rendered. Since he was not impleaded
in Civil Case No. 10173, there is no basis to presume that Sendiong was aware of the civil case during its pendency before the
RTC. Moreover, at the time Sendiong according to petitioners learned of the civil case, there was no pending appeal from the
RTC decision therein, the Notice of Appeal having been earlier denied. Under these circumstances, it would be difficult to
discern how in 1999 respondent could have still participated in Civil Case No. 10173. There was no pending appeal to speak of
which he could have involved himself. Nor could have he participated in the special civil action for certiorari, an original
action, then pending before the Court of Appeals.
Indeed, a petition for annulment of judgment was, at that point, the only viable remedy for respondent to avail of, and
it was utilized only 1 year after Sendiong learned of the existence of Civil Case No. 10173. Laches has been defined as
the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting presumption
that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it. Considering that a petition for annulment of
judgment based on extrinsic fraud may be filed within 4 years from discovery of the fraud, a similar petition based
on lack of jurisdiction is generally not barred by laches or estoppel if the petition is filed within one year after
petitioner learns of the questioned decision. This moreover holds true, as in this case, since Sendiong is a foreign resident
restrained by time and distance to undertakean immediate and proximate response, such as judicial
recourse.
PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT PRECLUDES THE DEFENSE OF RES JUDICATA

It is the height of sophistry to argue that res judicata would bar a petition for annulment of judgment whose, as in this case,
prior judgment happens to be that which is sought to be annulled. The petition for annulment of judgment precisely
challenges the validity of the first judgment, and to adopt petitioners argument would lead to permanent
preclusion of annulment of judgment as a remedy. Significantly, the reverse is true for the rationale underlying annulment
of judgment is incongruent with the concept of res judicata. Hence, the action for annulment of judgment precludes the
defense of res judicata. The grounds for annulment of judgment are either lack of jurisdiction or the presence of extrinsic
fraud in the rendition of the judgment sought to be annulled.
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2.
Nery v. Leyson, G.R. No. 139306, August 29, 2000
QUICKIE FACTS:
Nery et al are the children of Mercedes del Rio. When the latter died, she left Nery et al a parcel of land in Lapu-Lapu City
coverd by an OCT in the name of Agatona del Corro, grandmother of Nery et al. Thereafter, they executed an Extrajudicial
Partition of the land in question. However, a Notice of Lis Pendens was executed and annotated on the OCT by the lawyer of
Leyson et al pursuant to a case filed in the RTC of Cebu regarding the Annulment & Cancellation of said OCT which was
ruled in favor of Leyson et al. However, Nery claims that they were not impleaded therein. Also, although their mother was
impleaded in said case, she was impleaded after she had already died. Thus, they claim that the ruling in said case did not bind
them.
Thereafter, Nery et al filed in the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City a case seeking the Declaration of Nullity of the TCT issued in favor
of Leyson et al as well as the Nullification of the Proceedings in the case for Annulment & Cancellation of OCT. In their
defense, Leyson et al contends that the case between them and Nery et als mother already bcame final and executory. As a
result, the RTC ruled in favor of Leyson et al and the case was dismissed. CA denied Nery et als appeal on the ground of
conclusiveness of the earlier judgment. It was likewise stated that an RTC (Lapu-Lapu City) has no jurisdiction to annul the
judgment of a co-equal RTC (Cebu) because said jurisdiction lies with the CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC CAN ANNUL THE JUDGMENT OF A CO-EQUAL COURT.
HELD: NO.
The Nery et als action suffers from a fatal defect which prevents their action for annulment from prospering. The reason
why the herein Petition cannot be granted is the RTCs lack of jurisdiction to annul a final judgment of a coequal
court.
Section 9 of BP 129, as amended, vests in the CA [e]xclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of
regional trial courts. Hence, even if the trial court in Civil Case No. R8646 did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioners,
the trial court in Civil Case No. 2379L cannot annul the final judgment in Civil Case No. R8646, as jurisdiction over the
subject matter, which in this case is annulment of final judgment, is vested by law in a higher court, the CA.
3.
Ceruila v. Delantar, G.R. No. 140305, December 9, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
Rosilyn Delantar complained that her father abused him by exposing her to prostitution. After her father was incarcerated, a
Petition for Voluntary Commitment of Rosilyn in favor of DSWD was filed because her mothers (Librada Ceruila)
whereabouts was unknown. RTC of Pasay granted said petition.
Thereafter, Ceruila filed a Petition in the RTC of Manila for the Annulment of the Birth Certificate of Rosilyn Delantar
praying that it be declared null and void since said birth certifcate was made an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth.
As such, the RTC ordered the hearing of the case and caused publication of said order. However, no representative appeared.
Thus, RTC granted the Ceruilas petition and declared the birth certifcate void
Later on, Rosilyn, represented by DSWD, filed in the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment in the Petition for
Cancellation of her birth certifcate. It was claimed that they were not notified of the Petition and that the decisin was
rendered without jurisdiction since the RTC judge had no authority to declare her illegitimate. CA granted the petition,
nullified the order of the RTC, and resolved the merits of the case. Ceruilas MR was denied. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA, IN A PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT, CAN RULE ON THE MERITS OF THE
CASE SOUGHT TO BE ANNULLED.
HELD: NO.
The function of a petition for annulment of judgment, under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, is not to replace the trial
courts decision sought to be annulled. The action under Sections 1, 2 and 7 of said Rule, to wit:
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Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final
orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.
Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment. The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction. Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in
a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
Sec. 7. Effect of judgment. A judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or final
order or resolution and render the same null and void, without prejudice to the original action being
refiled in the proper court. However, where the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the
ground of extrinsic fraud, the court may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion
for new trial had been granted therein.
is merely for the annulment of the RTC Decision on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, nothing more.
The Rules do not allow the CA to resolve the merits of the petition for the amendment and cancellation of the birth
certificate of Rosilyn or to substitute its own findings thereon.
4.
Salera v. A-1 Investors, G.R. No. 141238, February 15, 2002
QUICKIE FACTS:
Teodora Salera obtained a loan from A-1 in the amount of 50K. However, she failed to pay. As a result, A-1 filed a Complaint
for Sum of Money with the MTC of QC against Teodora and her husband Saturnino who was mayor of Bohol. However,
summons was served and received by their son in their residence in Cebu. For failing to file an Answer, Salera was declared in
default and thus ordered by the MTC to pay A-1. A copy of the decisin was again sent to their home and was received by a
certain Joel Arino. No appeal was filed so the decisin bcame final and executory.
As such, a Writ of Execution and Notice of Levy was received by their daughter who was of age but did not bother to read it.
She only told her parents a week after receiving it. Claiming to have been unaware of the entire proceedings, Mayor Salera filed
a complaint denominated as Injunction with Damages against A-1 in the RTC of Cebu. Said RTC ruled in his favor and
issued a TRO enjoining the execution of the MTC decisin. A Writ of Preliminary Injunction was subsequently issued.
Aggrieved, A-1 filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with Urgent Motion to Quash the Writ. However, this was denied by
the RTC. MR was also denied. A Petition for Certiorari was filed in the CA which was granted thereby prohibiting the RTC
from proceeding with the injunction against the execution of the MTC judgment.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE INJUNCTION WITH DAMAGES IS A PROPER REMEDY.
HELD: NO. THE PROPER REMEDY IS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT SINCE THE JURISDICTION OF THE RTC
WAS BEING ASSAILED.
While Salera is correct that a complaint for injunction is a recognized remedy to enjoin the performance of an act, which
action falls within the province of Regional Trial Courts, it must be taken into account that Saturnino, Sr. sought to
permanently enjoin the public auction of property levied pursuant to a writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 15996
on the ground that he was not served with summons and was denied due process.
In doing so, Saturnino, Sr. was actually seeking the annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 15996 which was the
basis of the writ of execution pursuant to which the public auction was to be held. The proper remedy for Saleras
predicament is therefore not an action for injunction, but for annulment of judgment.
It is thus understandable why Salera is staunch in claiming, in hindsight, that although the complaint filed in the RTC of Cebu
was captioned Injunction with Damages, the allegations therein suffice to constitute an action for annulment of the
decision in Civil Case No. 15996 for lack of due process amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or extrinsic fraud. The
issue of whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Saturnino,
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Sr. in Civil Case No. 15996 and his exclusion from the proceedings in said case amounted to extrinsic fraud which denied him
of due process should be properly resolved in an action for annulment of judgment as mandated by Sections 1 and 2 in
relation to Section 10 of Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Sec. 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final
orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.
Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment. The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction.
Sec. 10. Annulment of judgments or final orders of Municipal Trial Courts. An action to annul a judgment or final
order of a Municipal Trial Court shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the former.
It shall be treated as an ordinary civil action and sections 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of this Rule shall be applicable
thereto.
NOT A PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
Unfortunately for the Salera, the complaint filed by Saturnino, Sr. in the RTC of Cebu was, without a shadow of doubt,
not for annulment of the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 15996. Not only was the complaint captioned Injunction
with Damages, but it likewise did not pray for annulment of judgment.
Section 4 in relation to the abovequoted Section 10, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on annulment of
judgments or final orders provides, viz.:
Sec. 4. Filing and contents of petition. The action shall be commenced by filing a verified petition alleging
therein with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting
the petitioners good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
A certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution shall be attached to the original copy
of the petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the petitioner. The petitioner shall also submit
together with the petition affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action or defense and
a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is
such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same, and if he should thereafter learn that a
similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.
It is clear from the contents of the complaint filed by Salera that the action is not for annulment of the decision in
Civil Case No. 15996. It does not allege with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as
those supporting the petitioners good and substantial cause of action which Salera now claims are extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. Neither is a certified true copy of the decision in Civil Case No. 15996 attached to the original copy of the
petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the petitioner. Nor were affidavits of witnesses or documents
supporting the cause of action, i.e., annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud,
submitted together with the complaint. Salera cannot now mislead the court into treating the complaint for
injunction as an action for annulment of judgment with the ancillary remedy of injunction .
NO JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER
More importantly, even assuming arguendo that the action was for annulment of judgment, the RTC of Cebu did not
have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint as Section 10, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
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Sec. 10. Annulment of judgments or final orders of Municipal Trial Courts. An action to annul a judgment or final
order of a Municipal Trial Court shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the
former.
It is therefore the RTC of Quezon City which has jurisdiction over a case seeking annulment of the final decision of
the MTC of Quezon City, Branch 36, which is similar in rank as the abovementioned Municipal Trial Court.
5.
Cole v. Court of Appeals, December 26, 2000, G.R. No. 137561
QUICKIE FACTS:
Cole et al filed a Complaint for Non-Delivery of Titled before the Arbiter of the HLURB against one Agda and PNB
(mortgagee) pursuant to a sale of certain townhouse units owned by Agda. As a result, the Arbiter ruled against Agda and PNB
and ordered them to deliver the title to the property as well as the ROD to cancel the annotation of the mortgage indebtednes.
PNB appealed to the Board of Commissioners who affirmed the same. As such, PNB thereafter appeald to the Office of the
President. However, the Arbiters decisin was affirmed. As for Agda, she appealed to the CA via Petition for Certiorari which
was however dismissed.
Thereafter, Agda a Petition for Annulment of Judgment before the CA questioning the Arbiter and the Office of the
Presidents decisions on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, Cole moved to dismiss. Nonetheless, the CA via
Justice Ibay-Somera, declared the decisions of the Arbiter and the Office of the President null and void for having been
rendered without jurisdiction. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISIONS OF THE HLURB ARBITER AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT CAN BE
SUBJECTED TO A PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 47.
HELD: NO. IT IS CONFINED TO DECISIONS OF THE RTC.
What was filed in the CA was a Petition for Annulment of Judgment of the decisions of the Arbiter and the Office of the
President. Under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the remedy of annulment of judgment is confined to decisions of the RTC
on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Although the grounds set forth in the petition for annulment of judgment are fraud and lack of jurisdiction, said petition
cannot prosper for the simple reason that the decision sought to be annulled was not rendered by the RTC but by an
administrative agency (HLU Arbiter and Office of the President), hence, not within the jurisdiction of the CA.
There is no such remedy as annulment of judgment of the HLURB or the Office of the President. Assuming arguendo
that the annulment petition can be treated as a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
same should have been dismissed by the CA, because no error of judgment was imputed to the HLURB and the Office of the
President. Fraud and lack of jurisdiction are beyond the province of petitions under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as it covers
only errors of judgment.
A petition for annulment of judgment is an initiatory remedy, hence no error of judgment can be the subject thereof .
Besides, the Arbiter and the Office of the President indisputably have jurisdiction over the cases brought before them in
line with our ruling in Francisco Sycip, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, promulgated on March 17, 2000, where the aggrieved townhouse
buyers may seek protection from the HLURB under Presidential Decree No. 957, otherwise known as Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers Protective Decree.
6.
Arcenas v. Queen City Development Bank, G.R. No. 166819, June 16, 2010
QUICKIE FACTS:
Spouses Arcenas filed an Action for Declaratory Relief against Queen City Development Bank (QCDB) to declare their rights
as lessors under a contract of lease. However, RTC dismissed the petition. Thereafter, Arcenas filed in the RTC another case
for Breach of Contract of Lease. QCDB filed an Answer with Counterclaim. As such, the case was set for Pre-Trial.
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However, due to conflicting Schedule, only QCDBs counsel showed up. As such, on motion of QCDBs Arcenas was
declared non-suited and set the date for the presentation of QCDBs evidence. In said date, Arcenas again failed to appear.
Thus, the RTC submitted the case for decisin. As a result, Arcenas filed a Manifestation with Motion claiming that their
failure to appear was due to their mistaken belief that QCDB wanted to settle. However, RTC denied the Manifestation and
allowed QCDB to present evidence on its Counterclaim.
Aggrieved, Arcenas filed in the CA a Petition for Annulment of the Order declaring them non-suited on the ground of
extrinsic fraud. However, CA dismissed the Petition stating that Arcenas failed to avail of ordinary remedies before resorting
to the Petition for Annulment under Rule 47. Further, it stated that they could have filed a Petition for Relief under Rule 38.
CA likewise denied Arcenas MR. Thereafter, the RTC ruled on the merits of the case in favor of QCDB. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE REMEDY OF PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT IS PROPER.
HELD: NO.
Section 1, Rule 47 provides that it does not allow a direct recourse to a Petition for Annulment of Judgment if other
appropriate remedies are available, such as a petition for new trial, appeal, or a petition for relief. If petitioner fails to
avail of these remedies without sufficient justification, she cannot resort to the action for annulment of judgment
under Rule 47, for otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or negligence.
The Spouses Arcenas were declared non-suited for failure to appear at the pretrial conference and QCDB was allowed to
present evidence on its counterclaim. Such Order was received by the secretary of Arcenas counsel. Arcenas did not move
to set aside the RTCs order of non-suit. While Arcenas counsel claimed that he only learned of such Order of non-suit on
December 4, 2003, yet no motion to lift the order of non-suit was filed. Arcenas did not take any remedial action to lift
the order of non-suit when she had the opportunity to do so. In fact, Arcenas and her counsel did not also appear on the
scheduled January 8, 2004 hearing wherein QCDB presented evidence on its counterclaim and submitted the case for decision.
It was only on January 14, 2004 when Arcenas and her husband filed a pleading captioned as Manifestation and Motion,
wherein they prayed for the reconsideration of the Orders dated November 11, 2003 and January 8, 2004 and for further
pretrial conference. The RTC denied such Manifestation and Motion in its Order dated March 9, 2004, as the same was filed
beyond the reglementary period, and such Order was received by Arcenas on March 12, 2004. They then filed with the CA a
Petition for Annulment of Order of non-suit under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court on the ground of extrinsic fraud .
The CA denied the petition as Arcenas failed to avail of the appropriate remedies provided by the Rules to which we agree.
CANNOT USE EXTRINSIC FRAUD AS A GROUND
Since Arcenas claimed that there was extrinsic fraud committed by QCDBs counsel, she could have filed a petition for
relief under Rule 38 within the period provided for by the Rules of Court, but she did not. Section 2, Rule 47 clearly
states that extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground for annulment of order if it was availed of , or could have been
availed of, in a Motion for New Trial or Petition for Relief. Thus, extrinsic fraud is effectively barred if it could have
been raised as a ground in an available remedial measure .
XXIX. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
A.
ATTACHMENT (RULE 57)
a.1
Security Pacific v. Amelia Tria-Infante, G.R. No. 1444740, August 31, 2005.
QUICKIE FACTS:
Anzures complaint caused the filing of an Information for Violation of BP 22 in the RTC of Manila against Villaluz. Anzures
likewise filed an Ex Parte Motion for Preliminary Attachment was filed. As a result, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment after Anzures posts a bond amounting to 2.1M. Pursuant to said order, said bond was posted and
approved by the RTC. As a result, the sheriff attached the properties of Villaluz. Thereafter, RTC acquitted Villaluz but held
her civilly liable for 2.1M. On appeal by Villaluz, CA affirmed. When the case was elevated to the SC, Villaluz posted a
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Counterbond amounting to 2.5M which was issued by Security Pacific Assurance Corporation. On the same day, Villaluz filed
an Urgent Motion to Discharge the Attachment. Nonetheless, SC affirmed the CA decision and the decision reached finality.
Thus, upon Anzures motion, RTC issued a Writ of Execution. Pursuant thereto, the sheriff sent a Notice of Garnishment on
Security Pacific in the amount of 2.5M. However, Security Pacific refused to assume its obligation on the counterbond. As a
result, Anzures filed a Motion to Proceed with the Garnishment. Over Security Pacifics opposition, the RTC granted said
Motion.
Aggrieved, Security Pacific filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA alleging that the sheriff gravely abused its discretion when it
proceeded against Security Pacifics counterbond even if the SC did not approve of the same. However, CA dismissed the
petition. Security Pacifics MR was denied. Hence, this petition.
Security Pacific contends that since the SC did not approve the counterbond and cause the discharge of the attachment, it
cannot be held liable for the counterbond. Essentially, it argues that the mere filing of a counterbond cannot automatically
discharge the attachment without first obtaining an order of discharge and approval of the bond.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTCS ORDER ALLOWING THE EXECUTION ON THE COUNTERBOND ISSUED SECURITY
PACIFIC IS PROPER.
HELD: YES. IT WAS PROPER.
In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, as reiterated in Vanguard Assurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, we held:
[A]fter the judgment for the plaintiff has become executory and the execution is returned unsatisfied,
as in this case, the liability of the bond automatically attaches and, in failure of the surety to satisfy the
judgment against the defendant despite demand therefore, writ of execution may issue against the surety
to enforce the obligation of the bond.
In Luzon Steel Coporation v. Sia, et al.:
[C]ounterbonds posted to obtain the lifting of a writ of attachment is due to these bonds being
security for the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may obtain ; they are thus mere
replacements of the property formerly attached, and just as the latter may be levied upon after final
judgment in the case in order to realize the amount adjudged, so is the liability of the countersureties
ascertainable after the judgment has become final.
In Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we further held that the counterbond is intended to
secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the action.
In view of the nature and purpose of a surety agreement, Security Pacific, thus, is barred from disclaiming liability.
Security Pacifics argument that the mere filing of a counterbond in this case cannot automatically discharge the attachment
without first an order of discharge and approval of the bond, is lame.
Under the Rules, there are 2 WAYS to secure the discharge of an attachment. First, the party whose property has been
attached or a person appearing on his behalf may post a security. Second, said party may show that the order of attachment
was improperly or irregularly issued. The first applies in the instant case.
It should be noted that in G.R. No. 106214, per our Resolution dated 15 January 1997, we permitted Villaluz to file a counterattachment bond. On 17 February 1997, we required the Anzures to comment on the sufficiency of the counterbond posted
by Villaluz. It is quite palpable that the necessary steps in the discharge of an attachment upon giving counterbond
have been taken. To require a specific order for the discharge of the attachment when this Court, in our decision in
G.R. No. 106214, had already declared that Security Pacific is solidarily bound with Villaluz would be mere surplusage.
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a.2
Torres v. Satsatin, G.R. No. 166759, November 25, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
The Torres siblings own a 20,000 sqm parcel of land in Dasmarinas, Cavite. Satsatin was authorized to negotiate the sale of the
property to Solar for 35M. Satsatin was supposed to remit 28M to the Torres siblings. However, even after Solar already paid
Satsatin the entire purchase price, Satsatin only remitted a total of 9M. Despite repeated demands to remit the balance,
Satasatin failed to do so. Thus, Torres filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages in the RTC of Dasmarinas against
Satsatin.
An Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Attachment was filed. RTC directed Torres to post a bond of 7M. Pursuant
thereto, RTC issued a Writ of Attachment and deputized a sheriff to serve the writ on Nov. 15, 2002. On Nov 19, said writ
was served upon Satsatin and the sheriff levied that the latters properties. On Nov 21, the summons and the copy of the
Complaint was subsequently served to Satsatin.
Thereafter, Satsatin filed an Answer and a Motion to Discharge the Writ of Attachment. Nonetheless, RTC denied the motion
and directed Satsatin to file a counterbond in the amount of 7M. Motions were filed opposing this but were all denied.
Aggrieved, Satsatin filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA. CA found that the RTC gravely abused its discretion and set aside
the RTC order by lifting the levy on Satsatins properties. Torres MR was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA CORRECTLY LIFTED THE ATTACHMENT.
HELD:YES. WHEN THE ATTACHMENT WAS IMPLEMENTED, THE RTC HAD NOT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT.
A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where an action
is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by the sheriff
as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment that might be secured in the said action by the attaching
creditor against the defendant.
In the case at bar, the CA correctly found that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in approving the bond posted by Torres despite the fact that not all the requisites
for its approval were complied with. In accepting a surety bond, it is necessary that all the requisites for its approval are
met; otherwise, the bond should be rejected.
Every bond should be accompanied by a clearance from the SC showing that the company concerned is qualified to
transact business which is valid only for 30 days from the date of its issuance. However, it is apparent that the Certification
issued by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) at the time the bond was issued would clearly show that the bonds
offered by Western Guaranty Corporation may be accepted only in the RTCs of the cities of Makati, Pasay, and
Pasig. Therefore, the surety bond issued by the bonding company should not have been accepted by the RTC of
Dasmarias, Branch 90, since the certification secured by the bonding company from the OCA at the time of the
issuance of the bond certified that it may only be accepted in the abovementioned cities. Thus, the RTC acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it issued the writ of attachment founded on
the said bond.
Moreover, in provisional remedies, particularly that of preliminary attachment, the distinction between the ISSUANCE and the
IMPLEMENTATION of the writ of attachment is of utmost importance to the validity of the writ. The distinction is
indispensably necessary to determine when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired in
order to validly implement the writ of attachment upon his person.
This Court has long put to rest the issue of when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired in cases
where a party resorts to provisional remedies. A party to a suit may, at any time after filing the complaint, avail of the
provisional remedies under the Rules of Court. Specifically, Rule 57 on preliminary attachment speaks of the grant of the
remedy at the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment. This phrase refers to the date of the filing of the
complaint, which is the moment that marks the commencement of the action. The reference plainly is to a time before
summons is served on the defendant, or even before summons issues.
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In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court clarified the actual time when jurisdiction should be had:
It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over
the person of defendant issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ of attachment these do not and
cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually
obtained by the court, either by service on him of summons or other coercive process or his voluntary
submission to the courts authority. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer commences
implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a
copy of the applicants affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of attachment , as explicitly
required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the
complaint.
In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves THREE
STAGES:
(1) First, the court issues the order granting the application;
(2) Second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and
(3) Third, the writ is implemented.
For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained.
However, once the IMPLEMENTATION of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant.
Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.
Thus, it is indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also upon
consideration of fairness, to apprise the defendant of the complaint against him and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment and the grounds therefor that prior or contemporaneously to the serving of the writ of attachment, service of
summons, together with a copy of the complaint, the application for attachment, the applicants affidavit and bond, and the
order must be served upon him.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the RTC validly issued the writ of attachment on November 15, 2002, which was
implemented on November 19, 2002, it is to be noted that the summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was
served only on November 21, 2002.
At the time the RTC issued the writ of attachment on November 15, 2002, it can validly to do so since the motion for its
issuance can be filed at the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment. However, at the time the
writ was implemented, the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over the persons of Satsatin since no summons was yet
served upon them. The proper officer should have previously or simultaneously with the implementation of the writ
of attachment, served a copy of the summons upon Satsatin in order for the RTC to have acquired jurisdiction upon
them and for the writ to have binding effect. Consequently, even if the writ of attachment was validly issued, it was
improperly or irregularly enforced and, therefore, cannot bind and affect Satsatin.
Assuming arguendo that the writ of attachment was validly issued, although the RTC later acquired jurisdiction over the
respondents by service of the summons upon them, such belated service of summons on respondents cannot be deemed
to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. The RTC cannot enforce such a coercive process on
respondents without first obtaining jurisdiction over their person.
The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the defendant
whether by personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted by the circumstances of the case. The
subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because the
law does not allow for retroactivity of a belated service.
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a.3
Insular Savings v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.123638, June 15, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
Far East Bank (FEBTC) instituted an Arbtration case against Insular Savings Bank on account of a dispute involving 3
unfunded checks amounting to 25.3M drawn against FEBTC. Insular refused to refund the money to FEBTC. Thus, pending
arbitration, FEBTC filed a case in the RTC of Makati praying for a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. RTC asked FEBTC to
post a bond of 6M. Thereafter, RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment for 25.3M. Therafter, the parties agreed to
divide the amount while the dispute was not yet resolved. So, 12.6M was already in FEBTCs possession.
Subsequently, Insular moved to discharge the attachment by counterbond in the amount of 12.6M. However, RTC denied the
motion stating that the counterbond should be in the amount of 27.2M. MR was likewise denied. Thus, Insular went to the
CA on Petition for Certiorari. However, CA dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ERRED IN DENYING INSULARS MOTION TO DISCHARGE ATTACHMENT BY
COUNTERBOND IN THE AMOUNT OF 12.6M.
HELD: YES.
The then pertinent provision of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court under which the appellate court issued its assailed decision and
resolution, provides as follows:
SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond. At any time after an order of attachment has been
granted, the party whose property has been attached, may upon reasonable notice to the applicant, apply to
the judge who granted the order or to the judge of the court which the action is pending, for an order
discharging the attachment wholly or in part on the security given. The judge shall, after hearing, order the
discharge of the attachment if a cash deposit is made, or a counterbond executed to the attaching creditor is
filed, on behalf of the adverse party, with the clerk or judge of the court where the application is made in an
amount equal to the value of the property attached as determined by the judge, to secure the
payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the action.
Should such counterbond for any reason be found to be, or become insufficient, and the party furnishing the
same fail to file an additional counterbond, the attaching party may apply for a new order of attachment.
As may be noted, the amount of the counter-attachment bond is, under the terms of the aforequoted Section 12, to be
measured against the value of the attached property, as determined by the judge to secure the payment of any
judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the action . Albeit not explicitly stated in the same section and
without necessarily diminishing the sound discretion of the issuing judge on matters of bond approval, there can be no serious
objection, in turn, to the proposition that the attached property and logically the counterbond necessary to discharge the
lien on such property should as much as possible correspond in value to, or approximately match the attaching
creditors principal claim. Else, excessive attachment, which ought to be avoidedat all times, shall ensue.
The following excerpts from Herrera, REMEDIAL LAW, Vol. VII, 1997 ed., p. 61, citing retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, drive
home the same point articulated in Asuncion:
The sheriff is required to attach only so much of the property of the party against whom the order is issued as
may be sufficient to satisfy the applicants demand, the amount of which is stated in the order, unless a
deposit is made or a counterbond is given equal to said amount. However, if the value of the property
to be attached is less than the amount of the demand, the amount of the applicants bond may be equal to the
value of said property, and the amount of the adverse partys deposit or counterbond may be equal to
the applicants bond. The writ of preliminary attachment is issued upon approval of the requisite bond.
Turning to the case at bar, the records show that the principal claim of FEBTC, as plaintiff a quo, is in the amount of
P25,200,000.00, representing the three (3) unfunded checks drawn against, and presented for clearing to, FEBTC.
Jurisprudence teaches that a writ of attachment cannot be issued for moral and exemplary damages, and other
unliquidated or contingent claim.
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The order of attachment dated January 22, 1992 fixed the bond to be posted by FEBTC, as applicant, at P6,000,000.00. The
writ of attachment issued on January 27, 1992, in turn, expressly indicated that Insular is justly indebted to FEBTC in the
amount of P25,200,000.00. On February 11, 1992, before the Arbitration Committee of the Philippine Clearing House
Corporation, Insular and FEBTC, however, agreed to equally divide between themselves, albeit on a temporary basis, the
disputed amount of P25,200,000.00, subject to the outcome of the arbitration proceedings. Thus, the release by Insular of
the amount of P12,600,000.00 to FEBTC. On March 7, 1994, Insular filed a motion to discharge attachment by
counterbond in the amount of P12,600,000.00 which, to Insular, is the extent that FEBTC may actually be prejudiced in the
event its basic complaint for recovery of money against Insular prospers.
As things stood, therefore, FEBTCs principal claim against Insular immediately prior to the filing of the motion to
discharge attachment has effectively been pruned down to P12,600,000.00. The RTC was fully aware of this reality.
Accordingly, it should have allowed a total discharge of the attachment on a counterbond based on the reduced claim
of FEBTC. If a portion of the claim is already secured, we see no justifiable reason why such portion should still be
subject of counterbond.
It may be that a counterbond is intended to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may recover
in the main action. Simple common sense, if not consideration of fair play, however, dictates that a part of a possible
judgment that has veritably been preemptively satisfied or secured need not be covered by the counterbond.
With the view we take of this case, the RTC, in requiring Insular to post a counterbond in the amount of
P27,237,700.00, obviously glossed over one certain fundamental. We refer to the fact that the attachment FEBTC
applied for and the corresponding writ issued was only for the amount of P25.2 Million. FEBTC, it bears to stress, did
not pray for attachment on its other claims, contingent and unliquidated as they were. Then, too, the attaching writ rightly
excluded such claims. While the records do not indicate, let alone provide a clear answer as to the actual value of the property
levied upon, it may reasonably be assumed that it is equal to FEBTCs principal claim. Be that as it may, it was simply unjust
for the RTC to base the amount of the counterbond on a figure beyond the P25,200,000.00 threshold, as later reduced
to P12,600,200.00.
The RTC, therefore, committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied Insulars motion to discharge attachment by
counterbond in the amount of P12,600,000.00, an amount more than double the attachment bond required of, and given
by, respondent. As a necessary consequence, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it dismissed petitioners
recourse thereto in CA-G.R. SP No. 34876.
a.4
Yu v. Ngo Yet Te, G.R. No. 155868, February 6, 2007
QUICKIE FACTS:
Spouses Yu bought bars of detergent soap from Te in the amount of 594K and issued 3 postdated checks in favor of Te.
However, these were dishonored. After demands for payment were left unheeded, Te filed in the RTC of Valenzuela an action
for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment. After Te posted an attachment bond,
RTC issued an Order of Attachment/Levy. Pursuant thereto, the sheriff attached Yus properties consisting of a parcel of land
and several vehicles.
Yu filed their Answer with Counterclaim for Damages on account of the wrongful attachment of their properties. Likewise, it
filed a Motion to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Attachment and claimed against the bond. RTC only lifted the attachment
on the vehicles. On appeal, however, CA lifted the attachment on the parcel of land. Aggrieved, Te filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari in the SC but was denied. This ruling became conclusive and binding.
Not knowing that the SC already ruled on the matter, RTC ruled in favor of Te and did not rule on Yus counterclaim. As
such, Yu filed an MR which was again denied. Yus Notice of Appeal was likewise denied. Thus, they filed in the CA a Petition
for Certiorari. As a result, CA granted the petition but it stated that Yu failed to adduce evidence to their entitlement to
damages in its Counterclaim. Yus MR was denied. Hence, this petition.
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Yu contends that they are entitled to their Counterclaim for Damages because of the final judgment on the wrongful
attachment of their properties.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE WRIT OF ATTACHMENT WAS PROCURED IN BAD
FAITH AFTER IT WAS ALREADY ESTABLISHED BY FINAL JUDGMENT THAT THERE WAS NO GROUND FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
SAID WRIT.
HELD: NO. SPOUSES YU STILL HAS THE BURDEN TO PROVE THE FACTUAL BASIS OF ITS COUNTERCLAIM FOR DAMAGES.
As early as in Lazatin v. Twao, we laid down the rule that where there is wrongful attachment, the attachment defendant
may recover actual damages even without proof that the attachment plaintiff acted in bad faith in obtaining the
attachment. However, if it is alleged and established that the attachment was not merely wrongful but also malicious,
the attachment defendant may recover moral damages and exemplary damages as well.
Either way, the wrongfulness of the attachment does not warrant the automatic award of damages to the attachment
defendant; the latter must first discharge the burden of proving the nature and extent of the loss or injury incurred by
reason of the wrongful attachment.
In fine, the CA finding that the attachment of the properties of Spouses Yu was wrongful DID NOT RELIEVE Spouses
Yu of the burden of proving the factual basis of their counterclaim for damages.
ACTUAL DAMAGES NOT PROVEN
To merit an award of actual damages arising from a wrongful attachment, the attachment defendant must prove,
with the best evidence obtainable, the fact of loss or injury suffered and the amount thereof. Such loss or injury must be
of the kind which is not only capable of proof but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty . As to
its amount, the same must be measurable based on specific facts, and not on guesswork or speculation. In particular, if the
claim for actual damages covers unrealized profits, the amount of unrealized profits must be established and supported by
independent evidence of the mean income of the business undertaking interrupted by the illegal seizure. Moreover, Yu did not
present evidence as to the damages they suffered by reason of the wrongful attachment of Lot No. 11.
TEMPERATE DAMAGES AWARDED
Nonetheless, we recognize that Spouses Yu suffered some form of pecuniary loss when their properties were wrongfully
seized, although the amount thereof cannot be definitively ascertained. Hence, an award of temperate or moderate
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is in order.
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES NOT PROVEN
As to moral and exemplary damages, to merit an award thereof, it must be shown that the wrongful attachment was
obtained by the attachment plaintiff with malice or bad faith, such as by appending a false affidavit to his application.
Spouses Yu argue that malice attended the issuance of the attachment bond as shown by the fact that Te deliberately
appended to her application for preliminary attachment an Affidavit where Sy perjured himself by stating that they had no
intention to pay their obligations even when he knew this to be untrue given that they had always paid their obligations; and by
accusing them of disposing of their properties to defraud their creditors even when he knew this to be false, considering that
the location of said properties was known to him. However, the testimony of Josefa Yu herself negates their claim for
moral and exemplary damages.
Thus, we cannot attribute malice nor bad faith to Te in applying for the attachment writ. We cannot hold her liable for
moral and exemplary damages.
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B.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (RULE 58)
b.1
Universal Motors Corporation v. Rojas, A.M. RTJ 03-1814, May 26, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
UMC had a dealership agreement with Nissan Specialist Sales Corporation (NSSC). Pursuant thereto, NSSC ordered 5.4M
worth of Nissan spare parts from UMC. However, the checks used for payment were all dishonored. Despite demands, no
payment was made. As a result, UMC terminated its agreement with NSSC and filed a complaint for BP 22 and Estafa against
NSSC.
On the other hand, NSSC filed a case in the RTC of CDO denominated as Complaint for Breach of Contract, Damages, with
Preliminary Injunction and TRO against UMC and its officers and was raffled to the sala of Judge Rojas. Thereafter, judge
ordered a summary hearing on the propriety of the issuance of a TRO. Subsequently, NSSC filed an Amended Complaint
which inserted a prayer for TRO which was not found in the original complaint. After hearing, the judge issued a 20-day TRO
against UMC.
Thereafter, the judge issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction after NSSC posted its bond. Aggrieved, UMC filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari in the CA assailing the issuance of said Writ. Later on, CA found that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion. It also stated that it issued a TRO without requiring a bond and that NSSC never applied for a TRO in their
complaint.
As a result, UMC filed an Administrative Complaint against Judge Rojas for Serious Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Manifest Partiality, and Grave Abuse of Discretion. In his defense, the judge denied the charges and claimed that he fact that
the caption included a TRO, it was already tantamount to an express application for said TRO. Nonetheless, the OCA
found him guilty of Grave Abuse of Discretion and fined him 20K.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT JUDGE ROJAS IS ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR ISSUING A TRO EVEN IF IT WAS NOT PRAYED
FOR IN THE COMPLAINT.
HELD: YES.
NOT ALLEGED FACTS TO SUPPORT THE ISSUANCE OF TRO
We are not impressed with Judges argument that the caption and the body of the complaint showed an intent to include a
prayer for a TRO. Nowhere in the allegations in the complaint was it shown that great or irreparable injury would
result to the NSSC, pending hearing on the preliminary injunction.
Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a TRO may be issued only if it appears from the facts
shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before
the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard. In addition, Section 4(a) of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court is clear with
regard to the procedure to be followed in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction, i.e., a preliminary injunction or
TRO may be granted only when the application in the action or proceeding is verified, and shows facts entitling the
applicant to the relief demanded.
We note that the relief sought by NSSC in the original complaint consisted mainly of its reinstatement as dealer of Nissan
vehicles and spare parts in Northern Mindanao, and the termination of the dealership agreement between UMC and NICAD.
NSSC did not allege facts to support an urgent need to issue a TRO to prevent any great or irreparable injury that it
might suffer while the preliminary injunction is being heard. In one case, the Court penalized a judge who awarded
reliefs to plaintiffs without any showing that such reliefs were applied for.
NO BOND WAS REQUIRED TO BE POSTED
The judge issued the TRO without requiring the plaintiff to post a bond. Sec. 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure states:
Sec. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. A preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when:
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(b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action or proceeding is
pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to
the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he may sustain by
reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the
applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction
shall be issued.
While Section 4(b) of Rule 58 gives the presiding judge the discretion to require a bond before granting a temporary
restraining order, the Rules did not intend to give the judge the license to exercise such discretion arbitrarily to the
prejudice of the defendant. Certainly, each member of the Bench is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under
the sanction of law. The bond under Rule 58 is intended to pay all the damages which the party or person against
whom the temporary restraining order or injunction is issued may sustain by reason thereof should the court finally
decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Hence, it follows that unless it appears that the enjoined party will
not suffer any damage, the presiding judge must require the applicant to post a bond , otherwise the courts could
become instruments of oppression and harassment.
The present Rules now regulate the issuance of temporary restraining orders, not only by requiring a hearing, but also by
imposing a bond on the applicant to prevent the abuse of this relief by litigants.
The TRO issued by the judge effectively enjoined the defendants therein, UMC and NICAD, from doing business as dealer of
Nissan vehicles in Northern Mindanao. It does not require deep thinking to realize the losses that these companies will
suffer if the court orders them to freeze operations . Not only will they be deprived of potential earnings from sales but
they will also have to expend for their overhead even if they are not able to do business.
b.2
Greenstar Mangandingan v. Andiong, A.M. RTJ 041826, February 6, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
Greenstar charged Judge Adiong of the RTC of Lanao del Sur with Gross Ignorance of the Law, among others. He claims that
he was proclaimed as the Punong Barangay during a special election. Thereafter, his opponent, Alizaman Sangcopan, filed an
Action for Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and TRO against the COMELEC commissioners and himself.
Before summons could be served on them, Adiong already issued a TRO without hearing. It is also alleged that 6 days after
the issuance of said TRO, another order was issued extending the effectivity thereof for another 20 days even before the first
TRO had expired. Thereafter, Adiong granted the application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and, as a matter of course,
issued a Writ.
In his defense, Adiong claims that there was valid service of summons and that the issuance of TRO without prior notice was
valid pursuant to Admin Circular which authorizes ex parte issuance of a TRO in matters of extreme urgency. He likewise
claims that the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was also valid.
Nonetheless, OCA found Adiong administratively liable and fined 20K.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT JUDGE ADIONG IS ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE.
HELD: YES.
No matter how urgent a case may be, this fact cannot justify the procedural shortcuts employed by respondent judge, i.e.
dispensing with the proper service of summons, and the violation of Section 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
It is glaringly obvious from the service return of the sheriff that the proper service as provided for in the rules was not
followed. No copy of the summons was handed to any of the defendants who were natural persons. Neither was a copy
left at any of their residences or offices. What the sheriff did was to leave a copy of the summons at the residence of
Datu Hassan Mangondaya, a total stranger to the case.
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Worth stressing, Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court states that:

SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice exception. No preliminary injunction shall be granted
without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts
shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant
before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was
made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days
from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided.
Within the said twenty day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified
time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not
the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the
applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple sala court or the
presiding judge of a single sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy
two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding
section as to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid
seventy two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to
determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary
injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order
exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy two hours provided herein.
In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved within the said period,
the temporary restraining order is deemed automatically vacated. The effectivity of a temporary restraining
order is not extendible without need of any judicial declaration to that effect and no court shall have authority
to extend or renew the same on the same ground for which it was issued.
Judge Adiong disregarded these provisions of the Rules. He could not plausibly claim that he issued a 72-hour TRO
under the second paragraph of the rule quoted above because , first, he was not the executive judge. Second, his order
did not state that the TRO was effective for 72 hours only. On the contrary, the defendants were ordered to desist from
releasing the subject funds until further orders from this Court. Third, there was no showing that the order was being
issued because of extreme urgency to justify the issuance of a 72 hour TRO. Judge Adiong only stated in his order that he
was [a]cting on the prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, without finding that the plaintiff was entitled
thereto. Judge Adiongs violations of the Rules in issuing the TRO are patent and inexcusable.
This Court already ruled that failure to abide by Administrative Circular No. 20-95 constitutes the offense of grave abuse
of authority, misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice . Indeed, a judge is presumed to
know this Circular. Judge Adiongs failure to comply with the clear provisions on issuing TROs constitutes gross ignorance
and gross inefficiency.
We also agree that the presumptions of good faith and regularity in the performance of judicial functions on the part of Judge
Adiong were negated by the circumstances on record. First, there was no proper notice to the herein complainant and the
other defendants in Civil Case No. 191203 that an application for the issuance of a TRO had been filed. Second, Judge
Adiong did not conduct a summary hearing before granting the TRO. Third, as will be discussed hereafter, he
contravened the circular on the raffle of cases.
All these systematically deprived complainant and the other defendants of knowledge of and participation in the TRO
proceedings and ensured the unchallenged victory of Sangcopan therein. These three points, taken together, paint a picture
of bias or partiality on the part of Judge Adiong.
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b.3
Aldover v. Court of Appeals, 706 SCRA 188 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Reyes were registered owners of a parcel of land in Pasig. They obtained a loan from Aldover secured by REM over said
property. When they failed to pay, Aldover extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgage and emerged as the winning bidder.
After the Certificate of Sale was annotated, Aldover filed in the RTC a Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession which was
granted. In compliance thereto, the Sheriff issued a Notice to Vacate. However, this was not fully implemented because other
persons (Respondents) occupying the lot claimed to be owners thereof.
Respondents later on filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Title, Reconveyance, Damages with
Prayer for TRO or Preliminary Injunction against Aldover and Reyes. However, the RTC denied the prayer for TRO. Thus,
they filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA with Prayer for TRO or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. However, CA
dismissed it. On MR, however, CA reconsidered and granted the issuance of TRO and set for hearing for determination of the
propriety of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Aggrieved, Aldover filed an MR but was denied by the CA. After Respodents filed a bond, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
was issued. Hence, this petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUCNTION IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS.
HELD: NO.
Nothing indicates that the CA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Measured against jurisprudentially established parameters, its disposition to
grant the writ was not without basis and, hence, could not have been arrived at capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily
or despotically.
Respondents amply justified the grant of the provisional relief they prayed for . A Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
issued at any stage of an action prior to judgment or final order to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable
injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied or adjudicated. To justify its issuance, the
applicants must prove the following REQUISITES:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
that they have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse;
there is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicants; and
there is no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
Here, respondents alleged in their CA Petition that they possess and own portions of the property subject of the Writ
of Demolition. In support thereof, they annexed to their Petition and Reply deeds of conveyances, contracts to sell, receipts,
etc. showing that the Reyeses already sold to them the portions of the subject lot they respectively occupy . A number
of these documents predate the REM which the Reyeses executed in favor of Aldover while others were executed
subsequent thereto. Respondents allegation of actual possession is likewise confirmed by the Sheriffs Partial Report which
states that there are several other persons who occupy portions of subject lot and claim to be the owners thereof. In fine,
respondents have indubitably shown that they are in actual possession of the disputed portions of subject property .
Their possession, under Article 433 of the Civil Code, raises a disputable presumption that they are the owners thereof.
In fine, the CA cannot be said to have acted capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically in issuing its January
3, 2005 Resolution and February 10, 2005 Writ of Preliminary Injunction to prevent a threatened or continuous
irremediable injury. There is preliminary showing that respondents have clear and unmistakable right over the disputed
portions of the property which must be protected during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 86363. Indeed, the precipitate
demolition of their houses would constitute material and substantial invasion of their right which cannot be remedied under
any standard compensation. Hence, the need for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
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Besides, it has been held that the trial court (or the CA in this case) has a wide latitude in determining the propriety of
issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The assessment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction involve findings of facts ordinarily left to it for its determination. Hence, absent a clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion, the trial courts disposition in injunctive matters is not generally interfered with by the
appellate courts.
Furthermore, we note that although the scheduled hearing on the propriety of issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
did not push through, the parties were nonetheless amply heard thru their pleadings. At the time the CA issued its
challenged January 3, 2005 Resolution, petitioners had already filed their Comment and Rejoinder where they argued at length
why no injunctive relief should be granted in favor of the respondents. In Land Bank of the Phils. v. Continental Watchman Agency,
Inc., we reiterated our ruling that there can be no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent court in
issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction when the parties were amply heard thereon.
b.4
Bacolod City Water v. Labayen, G.R. No. 157994, December 10, 2004
QUICKIE FACTS:
Bacolod City filed a case for Injunction with a Prayer for TRO and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against BCWD for
announcing that increased water rates will be implemented on April 1, 1999 without any public hearing. As such, the City
prayed that before hearing the main case, a TRO of Preliminary Injunction be issued.
After Position Papers and Motions were filed by the parties, the City filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and set the same for hearing. After hearing on Feb 24, 2000, the Judge Labayen of the RTC issued
an order commanding BCWD to stop, desist, and refrain from implementing the proposed water rates. Thereafter, the City
prayed that the RTC issue a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against BCWD.
Thereafter, the RTC rendered a decision granting Final Injunction. Aggrieved, BCWD filed an MR alleging that the case was
not yet ripe for decision. However, this was denied. As such, BCWD filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA alleging grave
abuse. Nonetheless, CA dismissed the Petition. It stated that the order on Feb 24, 2000 was actually a Preliminary Injunction
and not a TRO. Thus, the RTC merely confirmed such Preliminary Injunction wen it rendered a decision granting a Final
Injunction.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC CORRECTLY RENDERED A DECISION GRANTING FINAL INJUNCTION WHICH CONFIRMS
THE ISSUANCE OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.
HELD: NO. THE PREVIOUS ORDER WAS A TRO AND NOT A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
NO PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WAS ISSUED
The sequence of events and the proceedings that transpired in the RTC make a clear conclusion that the Order issued was a
TRO and not a preliminary injunction.
It can be gleaned from the aforequoted Order that what the RTC issued was a TRO and not a preliminary injunction. The
RTC has always referred to it as a TRO in the succeeding Orders it issued on March 10, 2000 and April 6, 2000. The
parties, in their succeeding pleadings, also referred to the assailed Order as a TRO.
Again, it was only when BCWD expressed its vehement objection on the ruling that the final injunction confirmed
the preliminary injunction previously issued, when the City and the RTC started to insist that the questioned Order
was a preliminary injunction. Given the previous undeviating references to it as a TRO, City cannot now consider it as a
preliminary injunction to justify the validity of the assailed Decision. The attendant facts and circumstances clearly show
that the RTC issued a TRO.
INJUCTION AS A MAIN ACTION AND AS A PROVISIONAL REMEDY
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It
may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action.
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The MAIN ACTION for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which
cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course, in AN
ACTION FOR INJUNCTION, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, may
issue. Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from, and
should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve
the status quo until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action
without the court issuing a final injunction.
TRO
A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the application for
preliminary injunction which cannot be issued ex parte. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a TRO
with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue.
If before the expiration of the twenty (20) day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied , the TRO
would be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary
injunction within the said twenty (20) days, the TRO would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of
law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.
Hence, in the case at bar, since no preliminary injunction was issued, the TRO granted automatically expired after
twenty (20) days under the Rules. The fact that the RTC merely ordered the respondent[,] its agents, representatives or any
person acting in his behalf to stop, desist and refrain from implementing in their billings the new water rate increase which will
start on March 1, 2000 without stating the period for the restraint does not convert the TRO to a preliminary
injunction.
The rule against the non-extendibility of the twenty (20) day limited period of effectivity of a TRO is absolute if
issued by a RTC. The failure of the RTC to fix a period for the ordered restraint did not lend the TRO a breath of
semi-permanence which can only be characteristic of a preliminary injunction. The twenty (20) day period provided
by the Rules of Court should be deemed incorporated in the Order where there is an omission to do so. It is because
of this rule on non-extendibility that respondent City was prompted to move that hearings be set for its application of a
preliminary injunction. The City cannot take advantage of this omission by the RTC.
DECISION GRANTING FINAL INJUNCTION IS PREMATURE
Even if we assume that the issued Order was a preliminary injunction, BCDW is correct in contending that the assailed
Decision is premature.
The records reveal that the RTC did not resolve BCWDs MR of the Order denying its Motion to Dismiss before it
issued the assailed Decision. Consequently, there was no answer filed by BCWD, no joinder of issues, no mandatory
pretrial conference, and no trial on the merits, yet, a Decision was handed down by the RTC.
b.5
Calawag v. University of the Philippines-Visayas, 703 SCRA 373 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Calawag et al were enrolled in the Master of Science in Fisheries in UP Visayas. After they enrolled in their thesis program, the
drafted their thesis titles and obtained the consent of a certain professor to be their thesis adviser and other faculty members
consent to constitute their respective thesis committees.This was sent to Dean Baylon for approval. However, the Dean
disapproved the composition of the thesis committees and their tentative thesis topics because they were not appropriate for
their Masters Degrees.
Aggrieved, Calawag et al filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus in the RTC asking the Dean to approve and constitute
the said thesis committees and approve their titles. Likewise, they asked for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
against the Dean to order him to perform such acts while the case was pending.
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RTC granted the Writ which the Dean refused to follow. Thereafter, UP assailed the said order by filing a Petition for
Certiorari before the CA with a Prayer for TRO. CA issued the TRO against the implementation of the RTCs order stating
that Calawag et al had no clear right to compel the Dean. Hence, this petition stating that the CAs decision should be set
aside.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE THE RTCS PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION AGAINST
UPS DEAN.
HELD: NO. CA WAS CORRECT. THERE WAS NO CLEAR RIGHT TO COMPEL THE DEAN TO APPROVE THE THESIS TITLES AND
THE COMMITTEES.
To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, the petitioners must establish the following requisites:
(a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial;
(b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and
(c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Since a PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION commands the performance of an act, it does not preserve the status
quo and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction presents a FOURTH REQUIREMENT: it is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt
or dispute. When the complainants right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the
issuance of injunctive relief is improper.
The CA did not err in ruling that the Calawag et al failed to show a clear and unmistakable right that needs the
protection of a preliminary mandatory injunction. We support the CAs conclusion that the Dean has the discretion to
approve or disapprove the composition of a thesis committee , and, hence, the Calawag et al had no right for an
automatic approval and composition of their thesis committees.
Under the UP Systems faculty manual, the Dean has complete discretion in approving or disapproving the composition
of a thesis committee. Harmonizing this provision with the Graduate Program Manual of UP Visayas, and the Guidelines
for the Master of Science in Fisheries Program, we agree with the CAs interpretation that the thesis committees
composition needs the approval of the dean after the students have complied with the requisites provided.
C.
RECEIVERSHIP (RULE 59)
c.1
Citibank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61508, March 17, 1999
QUICKIE FACTS:
Douglas Anama executed PNs in favor of Citibank after it obtained a loan from the latter. Said loan was secured by a Chattel
Mortgage over machineries and equipment of Anama. For failing to pay the installments, Citibank filed a Complaint for
Collection of his unpaid balance and delivery of the chattels before the CFI of Manila. Later on, the CFI issued an Order of
Replevin over the chattels covered. Despite said order, actual delivery of possession did not take place in light of negotiations
for amicable settlement.
After pre-trial conference was held, the CFI ordered the joint management by Citibank and Anama of the latters business for
10 days. After which, Citibank would be appointed Receiver for said business. Thereafter, Citibank took over as Receiver.
When the amicable settlement failed, CFI tried the case on the merits.
On motion of Citibank, the CFI issued an Alias Writ of Seizure of the chattels and the sheriff removed and delivered them to
Citibanks possession. They were likewise advertised for public auction. Anamas MR was denied. Thus, he filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the CA. CA granted the petition and ruled that the CFI gravely abused its discretion because, among others,
there was non-compliance with the Receivers Bond and Oath of Office. As a result, Citibank filed this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT CITIBANK COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF POSTING A RECEIVERS BOND AND OATH.
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HELD: NO. RULES ON RECEIVERSHIP WERE NOT COMPLIED WITH. PARTICULARLY, THE OATH.
Citibank contends that although it is in agreement with the CA that a receivers bond is separate and distinct from a replevin
bond, under the circumstances it was not required to file a receivers bond because it did not assume receivership over
the properties. It is further argued that assuming that it did assume receivership, the Chattel Mortgage expressly provides,
that:
In case the MORTGAGEE institutes proceedings, judicially or otherwise, for the foreclosure of this Chattel
Mortgage, or to enforce any of its rights hereunder, the MORTGAGEE shall be entitled as a matter of
right to the appointment of a receiver, without bond, of the mortgaged properties and of such other
properties, real or personal, claims and rights of the MORTGAGOR as shall be necessary or proper to enable
the said receiver to properly control and dispose of the mortgaged properties.
From the evidence on record, it is palpably clear that Citibank did, in fact, assume receivership. Citibank cannot
therefore deny that 9 days after the CFI issued the order of receivership, it informed Anama that it would, as it did, assume
receivership.
BOND NOT REQUIRED UNDER THE OLD RULES OF COURT
It should be noted that under the old Rules of Court which was in effect at the time this case was still at trial stage, a
bond for the appointment of a receiver was not generally required of the applicant, except when the application was
made ex parte. Therefore, Citibank was not absolutely required to file a bond. Besides, as stipulated in the chattel
mortgage contract between the parties, Citibank, as the mortgagee, is entitled to the appointment of a receiver without
a bond.
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE OATH
However, the CA was right in finding a defect in such assumption of receivership in that the requirement of taking an
oath has not been complied with. Section 5, Rule 59, states:
SEC. 5. Oath and bond of receiver. Before entering upon his duties, the receiver must be sworn to
perform them faithfully, and must file a bond, executed to such person and in such sum as the court or judge
may direct, to the effect that he will faithfully discharge the duties of receiver in the action and obey the
orders of the court therein.
Consequently, the CFI erred in allowing the Citibank to assume receivership over the machine shop of Anama
without requiring the appointed receiver to take an oath.
c.2
Republic v. Saludares, G.R. No. 111174, March 9, 2000
QUICKIE FACTS:
PCGG issued a Writ of Sequestration against Lianga Bay Logging Company (LBLC) on the ground that the shares stock in
LBLC owned by one Sabido was illegally acquired wealth. Thereafter, the Republic via PCGG filed a Complaint for
Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution, and Damages against Sabido before the Sandiganbayan. Consequently,
Sabido filed a Motion to Lift the Writs of Sequestration which the SB granted. PCGG filed an MR.
Meanwhile, Hung Ming Kuk filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against LBLC with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment in
the RTC but PCGG was not impleaded. Thus, PCGG filed a Petition for Certiorari in the SC.
Later on, SB denied PCGGs MR. Also, RTC granted the Writ of Preliminary Attachment in favor of Kuk. For failure to file
an Answer, the RTC rendered a judgment by default in favor of Kuk. As such, Republic filed this Petition for Certiorari
questioning whether the RTC can decide on Kuks claim considering that LBLCs properties were already sequestered.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC PROPERLY GRANTED THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT IN FAVOR OF KUK.
HELD: NO. LBLC PROPERTIES WERE ALREADY UNDER VALID SEQUESTRATION WHEN THE ATTACHMENT WAS ISSUED
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In BASECO vs. PCGG, SEQUESTRATION is defined as the process, which may be employed as a conservatory writ
whenever the right of the property is involved, to preserve, pending litigation, specific property subject to conflicting
claims of ownership or liens and privileges.
The Court also noted the relationship between attachment and receivership, on one hand, and sequestration, freeze order
and provisional takeover on the other. The latter are ancillary remedies in prosecuting the ill-gotten wealth of the
previous Marcos regime. The Court observed that sequestration, freezing and provisional takeover are akin to the
provisional remedy of preliminary attachment or receivership.
By an order of attachment, a sheriff seizes property of a defendant in a civil suit so that it may stand as security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be obtained, and not disposed of, or dissipated, or lost intentionally, or otherwise,
pending the action. When a writ of attachment has been levied on real property or any interest therein belonging to
the judgment debtor, the levy creates a lien which nothing can destroy but its dissolution. This well-settled rule is
likewise applicable to a writ of sequestration.
Attachment is in the nature of a proceeding in rem. It is against a particular property of a debtor. The attaching creditor
thereby acquires a specific lien upon the attached property which ripens into a judgment against the res when the
order of sale is made. Such a proceeding is in effect a finding that the property attached is an indebted thing and results in its
virtual condemnation to pay for the owners debt. The law does not provide the length of time during which an
attachment lien shall continue after the rendition of the judgment, and it must therefore continue until the debt is
paid, or sale is had under execution issued in the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the statement
discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law.
In our view, the disputed properties of LBLC were already under Custodio legis by virtue of a valid writ of sequestration
issued by the PCGG on April 2, 1986, when Judge Saludares issued the assailed writ of attachment in favor of Hung
Ming Kuk. At that time the writ of sequestration issued by PCGG against LBLC was subsisting . Said writ of the
PCGG could not be interfered with by the RTC of Lianga , because the PCGG is a coordinate and co-equal body. The
PCGG had acquired by operation of law the right of redemption over the property until after the final determination of the
case or until its dissolution.
c.3
Tantano v. Espino-Caboverde, 702 SCRA 508 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Tantano et al are children of Caboverde. Caboverdes children are registered owners of certain parcels of land in Zamboanga
del Norte after they purchased the same from their parents. Later on, some of the siblings filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Deed of Sale in the RTC against the other siblings, Tantano et al. In their Answer, Tantano et al argued for the validty of the
sale.
Fearing that the properties would be squandered, Caboverde filed in the RTC a Petition/Application to place the parcels of
land under Receivership. She claimed that she could not enjoy the property since the income derived was solely appropriated
by her children and that she needs share in the income for her daily sustenance and medical expenses. After hearing on the
Application, the RTC granted it but did not appoint one of the children to be receiver since she was party to the other case.
Thus, Caboverde nominated her husbands relative and one of the children nominated a former barangay kagawad.
Aggrieved, Tantano filed an MR questioning the grant of the application. However, the RTC denied the MR. Thereafter, both
nominees took their oaths and posted the approve bond of 100K each. Thus, Tantano filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA
contending that substantial requirements under the Rules on Receivership were not complied with such as the bond
requirement and lack of factual and legal basis. However, CA denied the petition. MR was likewise denied. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC CORRECTLY GRANTED THE APPLICATION FOR RECEIVERSHIP.
HELD: NO.
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We have repeatedly held that receivership is a harsh remedy to be granted with utmost circumspection and only in
extreme situations. The doctrinal pronouncement in Velasco & Co. v. Gochico & Co is instructive:
The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and should be exercised with extreme caution and only
under circumstances requiring summary relief or where the court is satisfied that there is imminent danger
of loss, lest the injury thereby caused be far greater than the injury sought to be averted. The court
should consider the consequences to all of the parties and the power should not be exercised when it
is likely to produce irreparable injustice or injury to private rights or the facts demonstrate that the
appointment will injure the interests of others whose rights are entitled to as much consideration
from the court as those of the complainant.
To recall, the RTC approved the application for receivership on the stated rationale that receivership was the most convenient
and feasible means to preserve and administer the disputed properties. As a corollary, the RTC, agreeing with Caboverde, held
that placing the disputed properties under receivership would ensure that she would receive her share in the income which she
supposedly needed in order to pay for her vitamins, medicines, her regular checkups and daily sustenance. Considering that, as
the CA put it, the applicant was already an octogenarian who may not live up to the day when the conflict will be
finally settled, the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
granted the application for receivership since it was justified under Sec. 1(d), Rule 59 of the Rules of Court, which
states:
Section 1. Appointment of a receiver. Upon a verified application, one or more receivers of the property
subject of the action or proceeding may be appointed by the court where the action is pending, or by the
Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court, or a member thereof, in the following cases:
(d) Whenever in other cases it appears that the appointment of a receiver is the most convenient and
feasible means of preserving, administering, or disposing of the property in litigation.
Indeed, Sec. 1(d) above is couched in general terms and broad in scope, encompassing instances not covered by the other
grounds enumerated under the said section. However, in granting applications for receivership on the basis of this
section, courts must remain mindful of the basic principle that receivership may be granted only when the
circumstances so demand, either because the property sought to be placed in the hands of a receiver is in danger of being
lost or because they run the risk of being impaired, and that being a drastic and harsh remedy, receivership must be
granted only when there is a clear showing of necessity for it in order to save the plaintiff from grave and immediate
loss or damage.
Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider:
(1) whether or not the injury resulting from such appointment would probably be greater than the injury ensuing
if the status quo is left undisturbed; and
(2) whether or not the appointment will imperil the interest of others whose rights deserve as much a consideration
from the court as those of the person requesting for receivership.
Moreover, this Court has consistently ruled that where the effect of the appointment of a receiver is to take real estate
out of the possession of the defendant before the final adjudication of the rights of the parties, the appointment
should be made only in extreme cases.
After carefully considering the foregoing principles and the facts and circumstances of this case, We find that the grant of
Caboverdes Application for Receivership has no leg to stand on for reasons discussed below.
First, Caboverdes alleged need for income to defray her medical expenses and support is not a valid justification for the
appointment of a receiver. The approval of an application for receivership merely on this ground is not only unwarranted
but also an arbitrary exercise of discretion because financial need and like reasons are not found in Sec. 1 of Rule 59
which prescribes specific grounds or reasons for granting receivership . The RTCs insistence that the approval of the
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receivership is justified under Sec. 1(d) of Rule 59, which seems to be a catch-all provision, is far from convincing. To be clear,
even in cases falling under such provision, it is essential that there is a clear showing that there is imminent danger
that the properties sought to be placed under receivership will be lost, wasted or injured.
Second, there is no clear showing that the disputed properties are in danger of being lost or materially impaired and
that placing them under receivership is most convenient and feasible means to preserve, administer or dispose of
them. Caboverde has not presented or alleged anything else to prove that the disputed properties were in danger of
being wasted or materially injured and that the appointment of a receiver was the most convenient and feasible means to
preserve their integrity.
Third, placing the disputed properties under receivership is not necessary to save Caboverde from grave and immediate
loss or irremediable damage. Contrary to her assertions, Caboverde is assured of receiving income under the PSA
approved by the RTC providing that she was entitled to receive a share of 1/2 of the net income derived from the
uncontroverted properties.
Finally, it must be noted that the defendants in Civil Case No. S760 are the registered owners of the disputed properties
that were in their possession. In cases such as this, it is settled jurisprudence that the appointment should be made
only in extreme cases and on a clear showing of necessity in order to save the plaintiff from grave and irremediable loss or
damage.
A receiver should not be appointed to deprive a party who is in possession of the property in litigation, just as a writ
of preliminary injunction should not be issued to transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to another
where the legal title is in dispute and the party having possession asserts ownership in himself, except in a very clear case of
evident usurpation.
Furthermore, this Court has declared that the appointment of a receiver is not proper when the rights of the parties, one
of whom is in possession of the property, depend on the determination of their respective claims to the title of such
property unless such property is in danger of being materially injured or lost, as by the prospective foreclosure of a
mortgage on it or its portions are being occupied by third persons claiming adverse title.
In any event, Dominaldas rights may be amply protected during the pendency of Civil Case No. S760 by causing her adverse
claim to be annotated on the certificates of title covering the disputed properties.
FILING OF APPLICANTS BOND IS MANDATORY; RECEIVERS BOND IS DISCRETIONARY
As regards the issue of whether or not the CA was correct in ruling that a bond was not required prior to the appointment of
the receivers in this case, We rule in the negative.
Sec. 2 of Rule 59 is very clear in that before issuing the order appointing a receiver the court shall require the applicant
to file abond executed to the party against whom the application is presented. The use of the word shall denotes its
mandatory nature; thus, the consent of the other party, or as in this case, the consent of petitioners, is of no moment. Hence,
the filing of an applicants bond is required at all times. On the other hand, the requirement of a receivers bond rests
upon the discretion of the court. Sec. 2 of Rule 59 clearly states that the court may, in its discretion, at any time after the
appointment, require an additional bond as further security for such damages.
D.
REPLEVIN (RULE 60)
d.1
Twin Ace Holding v. Rufina and Company, G.R. No. 160191, June 8, 2006.
QUICKIE FACTS:
Twin Ace manufactures liquors and uses new bottles for the purpose. It filed in the RTC of Manila a Complaint for Recovery
of Possession of Personal Property against Rufina because the latter allegedly used Twin Aces bottles for its manufacture of
patis without authority from Twin Ace. After Twin Ace posted a bond, RTC granted the application for the Issuance of Writ
of Replevin. Pursuant thereto, the sheriff was able to seize around 26K empty bottles from Rufina.
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In its Answer with Writ of Preliminary Injunction, Rufina claims that it was the owner thereof because it purchased said
bottles from junk dealers. As such, RTC ruled in favor of Rufina and dismissed the complaint and dissolved the writ. On
appeal by Twin Ace, CA affirmed with modification. MR was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC CORRECTLY DISSOLVED THE WRIT OF REPLEVIN.
HELD: YES.
Rule 60, Section 2(a), of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a party praying for the recovery of possession of
personal property must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts that he
is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof.
It must be borne in mind that REPLEVIN is a possessory action the gist of which focuses on the right of possession
that, in turn, is dependent on a legal basis that, not infrequently, looks to the ownership of the object sought to be
replevined. Wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an action for replevin must be
satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ should not be issued.
In this case, Twin Ace has not shown that it is entitled to the possession of the bottles in question and consequently
there is thus no basis for the demand by it of due compensation.
d.2
Superlines Transportation v. PNCC, G.R. No. 169596, March 28, 2007
QUICKIE FACTS:
One of Superlines buses swerved and crashed into the radio room of PNCC. The incident was initially investigated by
PNCCs toll way patrol. Subsequently, the investigation was turned over to Alabang Traffic Bureau. However, due to lack of
space, upon request of traffic investigator Lopera, the bus was towed by the PNCC to its compound.
Thereafter, Superlines requested for PNCC to release the bus but it was denied in spite of PNCCs undertaking to repair the
damaged radio room. Consequently, Superlines filed a Complaint for Recovery of Personal Property (Replevin) with Damages
against PNCC in the RTC. Superlines opted to forego with the Writ of Replevin and just waited for the RTCs decision
because it could not post a bond.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, PNCC claimed that they could not release the bus because they merely towned the same for
safekeeping pursuant to an order by the police. As a result, RTC dismissed the Complaint and awarded to PNCC their
Counterclaim. On appeal, the ruling was essentially affirmed and the CA stated that Superlines should have brought the case
against the police. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SUPERLINES IS ENTITLED TO THE RETURN OF ITS PERSONAL PROPERTY.
HELD: YES. THE SEIZURE BY PNCC PURSUANT TO POLICE ORDERS WAS UNLAWFUL.
Tillson v. Court of Appeals discusses the term replevin as follows:
The term replevin is popularly understood as the return to or recovery by a person of goods or chattels
claimed to be wrongfully taken or detained upon the persons giving security to try the matter in
court and return the goods if defeated in the action; the writ by or the common law action in which
goods and chattels are replevied, i.e., taken or gotten back by a writ for replevin; and to replevy, means to
recover possession by an action of replevin; to take possession of goods or chattels under a replevin
order. Bouviers Law Dictionary defines replevin as a form of action which lies to regain the possession
of personal chattels which have been taken from the plaintiff unlawfully , (or as) the writ by virtue of
which the sheriff proceeds at once to take possession of the property therein described and transfer it to the
plaintiff upon his giving pledges which are satisfactory to the sheriff to prove his title, or return the chattels
taken if he fail to do; the same authority states that the term, to replevy means to redeliver goods which
have been distrained to the original possessor of them, on his giving pledges in an action of replevin. The
term therefore may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of personality, or the provisional
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remedy traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the property may be obtain[ed] by the
plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action.
In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the
possession of the object sought to be recovered, and that Superlines ownership of the bus being admitted by PNCC,
consideration of whether PNCC have been wrongfully detaining it is in order. Following the conduct of an investigation of the
accident, the bus was towed by PNCC on the request of Lopera, the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof,
wrongfully detains the same.
It was thus NOT distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution
or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis.
The seizure and impounding of Superlines bus, on Loperas request, were unquestionably violative of the right to be
let alone by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution.
That a year after the incident the driver of the bus was criminally charged for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to
property in which the bus could possibly be held as evidence does not affect the outcome of this case. As explained in
Bagalihog v. Fernandez:
It is true that property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied. But the rule applies
only where the property is lawfully held, that is, seized in accordance with the rule against warrantless
searches and seizures or its accepted exceptions. Property subject of litigation is not by that fact alone in
custodia legis. As the Court said in Tamisin v. Odejar, A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that
it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his
execution of a legal writ. Only when property is lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is it
considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise.
d.3
Dagudag v. Paderanga, A.M.-RTJ No. 06-2017, June 19, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
PNP Regional Maritime Group headed by Gen. Dagudag and the DENR intercepted and inspected shipping container vans
owned by NMC Container Lines containing illegal forest products from CDO to Cebu. The shipments were falsely declared as
cassava meal and corn grains. The crew of the vessel failed to produce certificates and documents covering said forest
products as required by the DENR. Thus, since nobody claimed said products within a reasonable period, they are considered
abandoned. DENR thus issued a seizure receipt to NMC. Then, it was recommended that the products be confiscated in favor
of the government.
Thereafter, one Roger Edma filed before the RTC under Judge Paderanga a Complaint for Issuance of a Writ of Replevin
praying that DENR, CENRO, and Gen. Dagudag to deliver the forest products to him. As a result, the judge issued a Writ of
Replevin and ordered the sheriff to take possession of the products.
Aggrieved, Dagudag et al filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Replevin and prayed that said Writ be set aside and dismissed.
Nonetheless, the judge denied said motion.
As a result, Dagudag filed an Administrative complaint in the OCA charging the judge with gross ignorance of the law because
Edma cannot avail of the remedy of replevin from the RTC without first exhausting administrative remedies available to him.
Dagudag claimed that the judge should have dismissed the replevin suit. OCA recommended that the judge be held liable for
gross ignorance of the law.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE JUDGE IS LIABLE FOR GRANTING THE WRIT OF REPLEVIN EVEN THOUGH ADMINSTRATIVE
REMEDIES WERE NOT PREVIOUSLY EXHAUSTED.
HELD: YES. LIABLE FOR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW
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In the instant case, the forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc. without the required legal documents
and were abandoned by the unknown owner. Consequently, the DENR seized the forest products. Judge Paderanga should
have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons.
First, under the DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, courts cannot take cognizance of cases
pending before administrative agencies. In Dy v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that a party must exhaust all
administrative remedies before he can resort to the courts. In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any
administrative remedy. He went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages.
Second, under the DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies of special competence . The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws.
The complaint for replevin itself stated that members of DENRs Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest products
and brought them to the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources Office. This should have alerted Judge
Paderanga that the DENR had custody of the forest products , that administrative proceedings may have been
commenced, and that the replevin suit had to be dismissed outright.
Third, the forest products are ALREADY IN CUSTODIA LEGIS and thus cannot be the subject of replevin. There was a
violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the DENR seized the forest products in accordance with law. In Calub v. Court of
Appeals, the Court held that properties lawfully seized by the DENR cannot be the subject of replevin:
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our
view the [properties seized] were validly deemed in custodia legis. [They] could not be subject to an
action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the
custody of the law, and not otherwise.
Judge Paderangas acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of issuing the writ of replevin constitute gross ignorance
of the law.
E.
SUPPORT PENDETE LITE (RULE 61)
e.1
Mangonon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
Belen Mangonon filed a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support with Application for Support Pendente Lite on
behalf of her twin daughters Rina and Rica. It was alleged that her daughters were born out of her marriage with one Federico
Delgado. However, the marriage was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, she was married again and claimed that her daughters
were raised by her and her second husband.
Mangonon filed the case because their daughters were about to enter colleges in the States. Despite their admissions to
respective universities, they were financially incapable of pursuing for said education. Demands were likewise made upon the
grandfather, Francisco Delgado. Mangonon prayed that they should be ordered to provide general and educational support in
the amount of $50,000 per year.
After Francisco and Federico filed their Answers, Mangonon filed an Urgent Motion to Set Application for Support Pendente
Lite for Hearing. Over the opposition of the Deglados, the RTC ordered that a monthly support of P5K for each child be
provided.
Unsatisfied with the measly amount, Mangonon filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA. CA affirmed the RTC ruling. MR was
denied. Hence, this petition. Mangonon contends that in default of the parents (Federico), the grandfather (Francisco) is
obliged to give support.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DAUGHTERS ARE ENTITLED SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE.
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HELD: YES.
ENTITLED TO SUPPORT
As a preliminary matter, we deem it necessary to briefly discuss the essence of support pendente lite. The pertinent portion
of the Rules of Court on the matter provides:
SECTION 1. Application. At the commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior
to the judgment or final order, a verified application for support pendente lite may be filed by any party
stating the grounds for the claim and the financial conditions of both parties, and accompanied by
affidavits, depositions or other authentic documents in support thereof.
SEC. 4. Order. The court shall determine provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall render such orders
as justice and equity may require, having due regard to the probable outcome of the case and such other
circumstances as may aid in the proper resolution of the question involved. If the application is granted, the
court shall fix the amount of money to be provisionally paid or such other forms of support as should be
provided, taking into account the necessities of the applicant and the resources or means of the adverse party,
and the terms of payment or mode for providing the support. If the application is denied, the principal case
shall be tried and decided as early as possible.
Under this provision, a court may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final
order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can
settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence which may
suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other
documentary evidence appearing in the record.
After the hearings conducted on this matter as well as the evidence presented, we find that Mangonon was able to establish,
by prima facie proof, the filiation of her twin daughters to the Delgados and the twins entitlement to support pendente
lite.
GRANDFATHER IS OBLIGED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT
Having addressed the issue of the propriety of the RTCs grant of support pendente lite in favor of Rica and Rina, the next
question is who should be made liable for said award. The pertinent provision of the Family Code on this subject states:
ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the
following persons in the order herein provided:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
The spouse;
The descendants in the nearest degree;
The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
The brothers and sisters.
An eminent author on the subject explains that the obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely
related to the recipient. However, the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the
claimant prove that those who are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so.
In this case, both the RTC and the CA held respondent Federico liable to provide monthly support pendente lite in the total
amount of P10,000.00 by taking into consideration his supposed income of P30,000.00 to P40,000.00 per month. We are,
however, unconvinced as to the veracity of this ground relied upon by the RTC and the CA.
The RTC gave full credence to Federicos allegation in his Answer and his testimony as to the amount of his income. We have,
however, reviewed the records of this case and found them bereft of evidence to support his assertions regarding his
employment and his earning. Notably, he was even required by Mangonons counsel to present to the court his income tax
return and yet the records of this case do not bear a copy of said document. This, to our mind, severely undermines the
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truthfulness of Federicos assertion with respect to his financial status and capacity to provide support to Rica and
Rina. In addition, Francisco himself stated in the witness stand that as far as he knew, his son, Federico did not own anything.
Franciscos assertion that Mangonon had the means to support her daughters education is belied by the fact that Mangonon
was even forced by her financial status in the USA to secure the loan from the federal government. If she were really
making enough money abroad, she certainly would not have felt the need to apply for said loan. The fact that she was
compelled to take out a loan is enough indication that she did not have enough money to enable her to send her
daughters to college by herself. Moreover, even Rica and Rina themselves were forced by the circumstances they found
themselves in to secure loans under their names so as not to delay their entrance to college.
There being prima facie evidence showing that Mangonon and Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, they are
primarily charged to support their childrens college education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation to
furnish said support should be borne by Francisco.
It bears stressing that Francisco is the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel Commercial,
Incorporated, which owns and manages 12 gasoline stations, substantial real estate, and is engaged in shipping, brokerage and
freight forwarding. He is also the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel Shipping which
does business with Hyundai of Korea. Apart from these, he also owns the Citadel Corporation which, in turn, owns real
properties in different parts of the country. He is likewise the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Isla Communication Co.
and he owns shares of stocks of Citadel Holdings. In addition, he owns real properties here and abroad. It having been
established that Francisco has the financial means to support his granddaughters education, he, in lieu of Mangonon
and Federico, should be held liable for support pendente lite.
MANNER OF PROVIDING SUPPORT
Anent Francisco and Federicos claim that they have the option under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to
support Rica and Rina, Francisco insists that Rica and Rina should move here to the Philippines to study in any of the
local universities. After all, the quality of education here, according to him, is at par with that offered in the USA. The
applicable provision of the Family Code on this subject provides:
Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying
the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a
right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal
obstacle thereto.
The OBLIGOR is given the choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give support. Thus, he may give the
determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay in the family dwelling. The second option
cannot be availed of in case there are circumstances, legal or moral, which should be considered.
In this case, this Court believes that Francisco could not avail himself of the second option. From the records, we gleaned
that prior to the commencement of this action, the relationship between Francisco, on one hand, and Mangonon and her twin
daughters, on the other, was indeed quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them expressed profound feelings
of thoughtfulness and concern for one anothers well-being. The photographs presented by Mangonon as part of her exhibits
presented a seemingly typical family celebrating kinship. All of these, however, are now things of the past. With the filing of
this case, and the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly
been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered and
claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all these, we could not see Rica and Rina
moving back here in the Philippines in the company of those who have disowned them.
AMOUNT OF SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our bearings from the provision of the law mandating the amount of
support to be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. Guided by
this principle, we hold Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as
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support pendente lite. As established by Mangonon, Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given his
various business endeavors.
The issue of the applicability of Article 15 of the Civil Code on Mangonon and her twin daughters raised by Francisco is best
left for the resolution of the RTC. After all, in case it would be resolved that Rica and Rina are not entitled to support
pendente lite, the court shall then order the return of the amounts already paid with legal interest from the dates of
actual payment.
XXX. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
A.
INTERPLEADER (RULE 62)
a.1
Ocampo v. Tirona, G.R. No. 147812, April 6, 2005
FACTS:
Ocampo owns a 500 sqm parcel of land in Pasay City. He bought such property from Rosauro Breton, heir of the lands
registered owner. Even though the TCT is not yet in Ocampos name, the possession and administration of said property was
already with Ocampo.
On the other hand, Tirona is a lessee occupying a portion of said land. When Ocampo bought the property, he wrote a letter
to Tirona informing her of the change of ownership. Thus, in recognition of Ocampos ownership, Tirona paid the monthly
rentals due. Later on, however, Ocampo received a letter from Tironas letter which states that Tirona will temporarily stop
paying monthly rentals pursuant to a P.D. which declared the property in question an area for priority development.
Consequently, Ocampo wrote a demand letter to Tirona to pay the rentals in arrears (1,200/mo) and to vacate the premises.
Nonetheless, Tirona refuses to heed Ocampos demands.
Thus, Ocampo filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer against Tirona before the MTC. In her Answer, Tirona asserted that
one Dona Lourdes Yaneza actually owns the land. Then, she was allowed to amend her answer because she filed her first
Answer without the assistance of counsel.. In her Amended Answer, she claimed that the actual owner was a certain Maria
Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. MTC ruled that Tirona has no reason to stop paying rent. As such, she was ordered to vacate. In
the RTC, the MTC ruling was affirmed. In the CA, however, Ocampos complaint was dismissed because, according to the
CA, the property in question should have been partitioned first. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT OCAMPO CAN EJECT TIRONA?
HELD: YES. ALL THE REQUISITES OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER ARE PRESENT. SHE SHOULD HAVE FORCED THE CLAIMANTS TO
INTERPLEAD.
Ocampo has the right to eject Tirona from the subject land. All the elements required for an unlawful detainer case to prosper
are present (i.e. fact of lease; expiration or violation of the lease). Ocampo notified Tirona that he purchased the subject land
from Tironas lessor. Tironas continued occupation of the subject land amounted to acquiescence to Ocampos terms.
However, Tirona eventually refused to pay rent to Ocampo, thus violating the lease.
INTERPLEADER
The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. As a stakeholder, Tirona
should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited
actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader .
An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to
conflicting claims on the property. The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether
personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims
an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons
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who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be
required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing.
The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation
in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new
action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of
interpleader and not a cross-complaint.
a.2
Maglente v. Padilla, G.R. No. 148182, March 7, 2007
QUICKIE FACTS:
Philippine Realty Corp (PRC) owns a parcel of land in Intramuros. It entered into a Lease Contract with Maglente which
provided that Maglente had the Right of First Refusal in case PRC would sell the property. During the lease, Maglente
subleased the property to Gabello et al. When the lease was about to expire, PRC offered to sell the property to Maglente. The
latter expressed its desire to purchase the same.
Thereafter, PRC filed a Complaint for Interpleader in the RTC against Maglente and Gabello et al so they could litigate among
themselves who had the right to purchase said property. RTC ruled in favor of Maglente. Aggrieved, Gabello et al reached the
SC. However, it was affirmed that Maglente had the right to purchase. Thus, judgment was entered. Subsequently, a Writ of
Execution was issued for PRC to execute a Contract of Sale in favor of Maglente. PRC complied.
Afterwards, Maglente filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession. However, Gabello et al, who were in possession
of said property, objected on the ground that the decision on the Interpleader case only resolved Maglentes right to purchase
but did not declare them as owners. Thus, the RTC denied the Motion of Maglente. Aggrieved, they filed this Petition for
Certiorari.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT MAGLENTE IS ENTITLED TO THE WRIT OF POSSESSION AFTER BEING ADJUDGED AS THE PROPER
PARTIES TO BUY THE PROPERTY IN THE INTERPLEADER CASE
HELD: NO. THE INTERPLEADER CASE DID NOT RULE ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP.
A writ of possession shall issue only in the following instances: (1) land registration proceedings; (2) extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession
and no third party has intervened, and (4) execution sales. Here, Maglente seeks the writ as a consequence of the RTCs
decision ordering the execution of a contract of sale/contract to sell in their favor. The writ does not lie in such a
case.
Furthermore, the RTCs decision in the interpleader case (affirmed by both the CA and the SC) merely resolved the
question of who had the right to purchase PRCs property. The directive was only for PRC to execute the necessary
contract in favor of Maglente as the winning parties, nothing else.
It was clear that, at that point, Maglente were not yet the owners of the property. The execution of the deed of sale in
their favor was only preliminary to their eventual acquisition of the property . Likewise, although we stated in G.R. No.
111743 that the contract of sale between Maglente and PRC had already been perfected, we refrained from declaring them the
owners since, pending the execution of the deed of sale or delivery of the property, ownership had yet to transfer to them at
that time.
Thus, Maglentes argument that the RTCs writ of execution in the interpleader case carried with it the corollary right to a writ
of possession is without merit. A writ of possession complements the writ of execution only when the right of
possession or ownership has been validly determined in a case directly relating to either. The interpleader case
obviously did not delve into that issue.
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a.3
Arreza v. Diaz, G. R. No. 133113, August 30, 2001
QUICKIE FACTS:
Bliss Development Corporation owns a housing unit in QC. In the course of a case involving Arreza and Diaz in the RTC of
Makati, Bliss filed a Complaint for Interpleader against the two. RTC ruled in favor of Arreza and ordered the transfer of
rights in favor of Arreza. Said decision became final and was executed when Bliss executed a Contract to Sell in favor of
Arreza. Also, Diaz was made to deliver the property with all its improvements to Arreza.
Subsequently, Diaz filed a Complaint against Bliss and Arreza in the RTC of Makati seeking reimbursement of the costs of
acquisition and improvements on the property. In response, Arreza filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata.
However, this was denied. Arrezas MR was likewise denied. Thus, he filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA but it was
dismissed. MR was also dismissed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DIAZS CLAIMS FOR REIMBURSEMENT IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA
HELD: YES. HE SHOULD HAVE PUT IT IN ISSUE IN THE INTERPLEADER CASE.
Worthy of note, the prior case for interpleader filed with Branch 146 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No.
942086, was settled with finality with this Courts resolution in G.R. No. 128726. The judgment therein is now final.
In its assailed decision, CA pointed out that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide that in a case for interpleader, the
court shall determine the respective rights and obligations of the parties and adjudicate their respective claims. The
CA noted, however, that the defendants in that interpleader case, namely Diaz and Arreza, did not pursue the issue of
damages and reimbursement although the answer of Diaz did pray for affirmative relief arising out of the rights of a
buyer in good faith.
Diaz in effect argues that it was incumbent upon Arreza as a party in Civil Case No. 942086 to put in issue Diazs
demands for reimbursement. However, it was not Arrezas duty to do the lawyering for Diaz. As stated by the CA, the
court in a complaint for interpleader shall determine the rights and obligations of the parties and adjudicate, their respective claims.
Such rights, obligations and claims could only be adjudicated if put forward by the aggrieved party in assertion of his rights.
The second paragraph of Section 5 of Rule 62 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the parties in an
interpleader action may file counterclaims, crossclaims, third party complaints and responsive pleadings thereto, as
provided by these Rules. The second paragraph was added to Section 5 to expressly authorize the additional pleadings
and claims enumerated therein, in the interest of a complete adjudication of the controversy and its incidents.
Pursuant to said Rules, Diaz should have filed his claims against Arreza in the interpleader action. Having asserted his
rights as a buyer in good faith in his answer, and praying relief therefor, Diaz should have crystallized his demand
into specific claims for reimbursement by Arreza. This he failed to do.
Having failed to set up his claim for reimbursement, said claim of respondent Diaz being in the nature of a compulsory
counterclaim is now barred.
B.
DECLARATORY RELIEF (RULE 63)
b.1
Almeda v. Bathala Marketing, G.R. No. 150608, January 28, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
Almeda leased its property to Bathala Marketing Industries Inc for 4 years. One of the provisions of the lease contract stated
that if a new tax is imposed, Bathala will pay additional rent. In another provision, it was also stated that the rent would
likewise be adjusted in cases of extraordinary inflation.
Thereafter, Almeda demanded that Bathala pay VAT and pay the adjusted rentals pursuant to the provisions of its lease
contract. However, Bathala refused to pay. To prevent further damage and prejudice, Bathala instituted an Action for
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Declaratory Relief to determine the correct interpretation of said provisions. Then, Almeda commenced in another court a
separate Action for Rescission, Ejectment, and Damages.
Thereafter, Almeda moved to dismiss on the ground that Bathala was already in breach of its obligation. However, the RTC
denied the motion. On appeal, CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF IS PROPER.
HELD: YES.
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive
order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The vv in such a petition is the
question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the general rule that such an action
must be justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is available under the circumstances.
Decisional law enumerates the REQUISITES of an action for declaratory relief, as follows:
1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction;
3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one between persons whose interests are
adverse;
5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case, except that Almeda insist that Bathala was
already in breach of the contract when the petition was filed. We do not agree.
After Almeda demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that followed, Bathala complied with the terms
and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying the rentals stipulated therein. Bathala religiously fulfilled its
obligations to petitioners even during the pendency of the present suit. There is no showing that Bathala committed an
act constituting a breach of the subject contract of lease . Thus, Bathala is not barred from instituting before the trial
court the petition for declaratory relief.
It is true that in Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation we held that the petition for declaratory relief should be
dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer. However, we cannot apply the same ruling to the
instant case. In Panganiban, the unlawful detainer case had already been resolved by the trial court before the dismissal of the
declaratory relief case; and it was petitioner in that case who insisted that the action for declaratory relief be preferred over the
action for unlawful detainer.
Conversely, in the case at bench, the RTC had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of
the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the RTC, where the rescission case was on appeal, itself initiated the suspension of
the proceedings pending the resolution of the action for declaratory relief.
Given all these attendant circumstances, the Court is disposed to entertain the instant declaratory relief action instead
of dismissing it, notwithstanding the pendency of the ejectment/rescission case before the trial court . The resolution
of the present petition would write finis to the parties dispute, as it would settle once and for all the question of the proper
interpretation of the two contractual stipulations subject of this controversy.
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b.2
Malana v. Tapa, G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
Malana filed in the RTC of Tuguegarao a Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages against Tappa. They
claimed that they were compelled to file in the RTC to remove the cloud from their title over the property in question.
However, before they could file an Answer, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction after it was found that
the property had a value less than P20,000 and thus was properly within the MTCs jurisdiction.
In Malanas MR, it averred that the principal cause of action was Quieting of Title. Thus, the Complaint should not have been
dismissed because under Rule 63 Section 1, an action to quiet title fell under the jurisdiction of the RTC. Nonetheless, RTC
denied the MR. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE RTC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED MALANAS COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION.
HELD: NO. SECOND PARAGRAPH OF RULE 63 SEC 1 SHOULD BE READ WITH THE LAWS OF JURISDICTION (BP 129)
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought
under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial
declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder.
Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly made a distinction
between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court .
The FIRST PARAGRAPH of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general circumstances in which a
person may file a petition for declaratory relief. A petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule
63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its SECOND PARAGRAPH that:
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds
therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, MAY be brought under this
Rule.
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to:
(1) an action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code;
(2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and
(3) an action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase.
These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the adjudication of the
legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the judgment into effect.
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended.
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action to quiet
title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word may that an action for quieting of title may be brought
under [the] Rule on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief may x x x
bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court. The use of the word may in a statute denotes that the provision is
merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.
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In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word SHALL
and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to
or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00 .
CONTRACT WAS ALREADY BREACHED
An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of
rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the
rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or
compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before the
breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers.
A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state
where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest
before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts
can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for
declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.
In the present case, Malanas Complaint for quieting of title was filed after Malana already demanded and Tappa refused
to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint was filed only subsequent to the latters express claim of ownership
over the subject property before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to Malanas title.
Since Malana averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of their property, the
proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory
relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed 1 year after the occurrence of the cause of action or
from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object ones recovery
of possession over the real property as owner.
Malanas Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend
on the value of the property involved.
b.3
Sabistana v. Muertegui, 703 SCRA 145 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Garcia executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale over an unregistered land in Leyte in favor of Muertegui. The latter took actual
possession of said lot. Years later, Garcia again sold the lot to Atty. Sabitsana, Muerteguis family lawyer through a notarized
Deed of Sale which was registered in the ROD. Title was thereafter issued in Sabitsanas name.
Years later, Sabitsana wrote a letter to the DENR and claimed that he was the true owner of said property. As a consequence,
Muertegui filed an Action for Quieting of Title and Preliminary Injunction in the RTC against Sabitsana and claimed that they
bought the lots in bad faith.
In their Answer, Sabitsana contended that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because it involved title to or interest in a
parcel of land with an assessed value of merely P1,230. Nevertheless, RTC ruled in favor of Muertegui. After Sabitsanas MR
was denied, he appealed. However, CA denied the appeal. Hence, this petition.
Sabitsana contends that the CA erred in holding that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE EVEN IF THE AMOUNT
OF THE PROPERTY INVOLVED IS ONLY P1,230.
HELD: YES. (THIS IS IN STARK CONTRAST WITH THE RULING IN MALANA V. TAPA)
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On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be instituted in the
RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action to
quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC .
It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by Sabitsanas August 24, 1998 letter-opposition to
Muertegis application for registration. Thus, in order to prevent a cloud from being cast upon his application for a title,
Muertegi filed Civil Case No. B1097 to obtain a declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory
relief, which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.
b.4
Republic v. Roque, 706 SCRA 273 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Atty. Harry Roque et al filed a Petiton for Declaratory Relief in the RTC assailing the constitutionality of several provisions of
the Human Security Act. The proceedings were suspended on account of several petitions filed in the SC which likewise
assailed the constitutionality of the HSA. Then, in 2010, SC upheld the constitutionality of the law in the Southern Hemishphere
case.
In 2012, the Republic filed their Motion to Dismiss stating that Roque failed to satisfy the requisites for Declaratory Relief and
that the HSA was already upheld as valid in Southern Hemisphere. However, the Motion to Dismiss was denied by the RTC
which stated that the action was properly filed. MR was likewise denied. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO DISMISS.
HELD: YES. NOT ALL REQUISITES OF DECLARATORY RELIEF WERE PRESENT.
The Court observes that while no grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed on the part of the RTC when it found
that the Court did not pass upon the constitutionality of RA 9372 in the Southern Hemisphere cases, it, however,
exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled that Roques petition had met all the requisites for an action for declaratory
relief. Consequently, its denial of the subject motion to dismiss was altogether improper.
Case law states that the following are the REQUISITES FOR AN ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF:
(1) first, the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
(2) second, the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction;
(3) third, there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
(4) fourth, there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one between persons whose
interests are adverse;
(5) fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
(6) sixth, adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
The Court observes that while the first, second, and third requirements appear to exist in this case, the 4th, 5th, and 6th
requirements, however, remain wanting.
NO ACTUAL JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY
As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one
exists in this case.
Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory . Corollary thereto, by ripening seeds it is meant, not
that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception before it has
accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead . The
concept describes a state of facts indicating imminent and inevitable litigation provided that the issue is not settled
and stabilized by tranquilizing declaration.
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A perusal of Roques petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed to demonstrate how they are left to
sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions
of RA 9372.
It is well to note that Roque also lack the required locus standi to mount their constitutional challenge against the
implementation of the abovestated provisions of RA 9372 since they have not shown any direct and personal interest in
the case.
NOT RIPE FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that the controversy at hand is ripe
for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, remain highly speculative and merely theorized. It is well-settled that a
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it.
NO NEED TO CONSIDER RELIEFS SINCE NO THREAT OR INJURY EXISTS IN THE FIRST PLACE
Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a discussion on the availability of
adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the Roque exists in the first place.
C.
REVIEW OF JUDGMENT OF COA OR COMELEC (RULE 64)
D.
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS (RULE 65)

D.1
CERTIORARI
Republic v. Carmel Development, G.R. No.142572, February 20, 2002

QUICKIE FACTS:
Carmel Development filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession against the DECS and Caloocan School Board to recover
possession of a parcel of land occupied by Pangarap Elementary and High School which were established by DECS. For
failure to file an Answer, RTC ruled that DECS was in default and allowed Carmel to present evidence ex parte.
Upon DECS motion, the RTC lifted the default order. However, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss the case. Thus,
DECS filed an MR which the RTC likewise denied. Aggrieved, DECS filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA seeking to annul
the RTCs previous ordrs. Nevertheless, CA dismissed the Petition on the ground that the petition was not accompanied by
certified true copies of the assailed orders of the RTC pursuant to Rule 65 but only by duplicate originals. MR was likewise
DECS contends that either duplicate originals or certified true copies of the assailed orders is allowed under Rule 46. On the
other hand, Carmel insists that Rule 65 is the rule that governs.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA CORRECTLY DISMISSED ITS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
HELD: NO.
This issue has been settled in Rosa Yap Paras and Valente Dy Yap vs. Judge Ismael O. Baldado and Justo De Jesus Paras wherein it was
held that:
The filing of original actions for certiorari in the Court of Appeals is governed by Section 3, Rule 46 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that the petition for certiorari be accompanied by a clearly
legible duplicate original OR certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject
thereof x x x. The same Section provides that the failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition .
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This is the clear import of Sections 1, 2 and 3, Rule 46 (Original Cases) of the 1997 Rules which read in pertinent parts:
SECTION 1. Title of cases. In all cases originally filed in the Court of Appeals, the party instituting the action shall
be called the petitioner and the opposing party the respondent.
SEC. 2. To what actions applicable. This Rule shall apply to original actions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and quo warranto.
Except as otherwise provided, the actions for annulment of judgment shall be governed by Rule 47, for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus by Rule 65, and for quo warranto by Rule 66.
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition effect of noncompliance with requirements. x x x.
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent
with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied
by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or
ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent
thereto.
Rule 46 applies to original actions for certiorari because Section 2 thereof expressly states that [t]his Rule shall apply to
original actions for certiorari, x x x. That Rule 46 applies to actions for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals can hardly
be disputed.
Rule 46 should be construed in relation to Rule 65 without rendering any of its provisions useless. This is evident in
Section 6 of Rule 65 which provides that [i]n petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the
provision of Section 2, Rule 56, shall be observed.
In fine, Rule 46 primarily governs original actions for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals but Rule 65 generally
serves to supplement the same. Rules 46 and 65 coexist with each other and should be construed so as to give effect
to every provision of both rules.
Clearly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition for certiorari filed by the Department of
Education on the ground that it was accompanied by mere duplicate originals instead of certified true copies of the
assailed orders.
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 396 defines DUPLICATE ORIGINALS in this wise:
(1) The duplicate original copy shall be understood to be that copy of the decision, judgment, resolution
or order which is intended for and furnished to a party in the case or proceeding in the court or
adjudicative body which rendered and issued the same.
(2) The duplicate original copy must be duly signed or initialed by the authorities or the corresponding
officer or representative of the issuing entity, or shall at least bear the dry seal thereof or any other
official indication of the authenticity and completeness of such copy.
Jiao et al. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 182331, April 18, 2012
QUICKIE FACTS:
Jiao et al were regular employees of Philbank with at least 10 years of service. Said company likewise provided for a Gratuity
Plan for its employees. Thereafter, Philbank merged with Globalbank wherein Philbank was the surviving corporation.
However, the bank operated under the name of Globalbank. Due to the merger, Jiao et als positions became redundant. As
such, they availed of the Separation Package and were required to sign a Release and Quitclaim in consideration of their
receipt of their separation pay.
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Years later, Metrobank acquired the assets and liabilities of Globalbank. Thereafter, Jiao et al filed Complaints for Nonpayment of Separation Pay before the NLRC. LA dismissed the complaint and absolved Metrobank from liability upon
finding that Jiao et al were already separated from the company even before Metrobank came into the picture. On appeal,
NLRC affirmed. Aggrieved, Jiao et al elevated the case to the CA via Petition for Certiorari.
CA dismissed the petition for failure of Jiao et al to file an MR of the NLRC decision before resorting to the Petition for
Certiorari. MR denied. Hence, this petition. Jiao et al contends that they opted not to file an MR because the issues were
already passed upon by the NLRC.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN DISMISSING THEIR PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR FAILURE TO FILE AN MR AGAINST
THE NLRC DECISION.
HELD: NO. DISMISSAL WAS PROPER.
To begin with, Jiao et al do not have the discretion or prerogative to determine the propriety of complying with procedural
rules. This Court had repeatedly emphasized in various cases involving the tedious attempts of litigants to relieve themselves
of the consequences of their neglect to follow a simple procedural requirement for perfecting a petition for certiorari that he
who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of
the law and the Rules.
The Jiao et al may not arrogate to themselves the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is
necessary or not. To dispense with the requirement of filing a MR, they must show a concrete, compelling, and valid
reason for doing so.
As the CA correctly noted, Jiao et al did not bother to explain their omission and only did so in their MR of the
dismissal of their petition. Aside from the fact that such belated effort will not resurrect their application for a writ of
certiorari, the reason proffered by them does not fall under any of the recognized instances when the filing of a motion
for reconsideration may be dispensed with. Whimsical and arbitrary deviations from the rules cannot be condoned in the
guise of a plea for a liberal interpretation thereof. We cannot respond with alacrity to every claim of injustice and bend the
rules to placate vociferous protestors crying and claiming to be victims of a wrong.
PNB v. Arcobillas, 703 SCRA 226 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Arcobillas, working as teller at PNB, erroneously posted $5,517 in one of its clients accounts which should have only been
$138. Said amount was later withdrawn by the client to the damage of PNB in the amount of P214,641. After discovery,
Arcobillas was administratively charged with neglect of duty.
In her affidavit, Arcobillas admitted and apologized for her mistake and stated that she did not benefit from the misposting.
Later, PNB found Arcobillas guilty of gross neglect and imposed on her a penalty of forced resignation with benefits. After
her plea for reconsideration was denied, Arcobillas filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against PNB in the NLRC.
LA ordered Arcobillas reinstatement. On appeal, NLRC affimed the LA but held her to be equally liable for the losses
suffered. Still aggrieved, PNB, without filing an MR of the NLRC decision, filed a Motion to Extend Time to Flle a Petition
for Certiorari. Thereafter, it filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA. Despite the non-filing of an MR, CA took cognizance of
the petiion but nonetheless dismissed it. Thus, PNB filed an MR which was denied. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PNBS FAILURE TO FILE AN MR BEFORE IT FILED ITS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS A FATAL
INFIRMITY.
HELD: YES. MR SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED BEFORE RESORTING TO THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
It is a well-established rule that a [M]otion for [R]econsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved
party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari. The rationale for the rule is that the law intends to afford the
NLRC an opportunity to rectify such errors or mistakes it may have committed before resort to courts of justice can
be had.
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Of course, the RULE IS NOT ABSOLUTE and jurisprudence has laid down EXCEPTIONS when the filing of a [P]etition for
[C]ertiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file a [M]otion for [R]econsideration, such as:
(1) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(2) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court,
or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(3) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(4) where, under the circumstances, an MR would be useless;
(5) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(6) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relied by the trial
court is improbable;
(7) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(8) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(9) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
Here, PNB did not at all allege to which of the above mentioned exceptions this case falls. Neither did it present any
plausible justification for dispensing with the requirement of a prior MR before the NLRC.
Despite this, the CA still took cognizance of PNBs Petition for Certiorari and ignored this significant flaw. It bears to stress
that the filing of a MR is not a mere technicality of procedure. It is a jurisdictional and mandatory requirement
which must be strictly complied with. Thus, PNBs failure to file a [M]otion for [R]econsideration with the NLRC before
availing [itself] of the special civil action for certiorari is a fatal infirmity.
In view thereof, the CA erred in entertaining the Petition for Certiorari filed before it. It follows, therefore, that the
proceedings before it and its assailed Decision are considered null and void. Hence, the final and executory Decision of
the NLRC dated August 31, 2004 stands.
D.2
PROHIBITION
City Government of Quezon City v. Bayantel, G.R. No. 162015, March 6, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
Initially, Bayantel, a franchise holder allowed to operate telecoms business, enjoyed tax exemption as regards real property and
franchise tax. When the LGC was passed, said exemptions were withdrawn. Thereafter, Bayantels legislative franchise was
likewise amended in accordance with the LGC. Likewise, the QC government also enacted an Ordinance imposing real
property tax on telecoms which included Bayantel who had properties in QC. Subsequently, the Public Telecoms Policy Act
was passed which stated that any advantage, privilege, or exemption granted shall be accorded to grantees of such franchises.
Pursuant thereto, Bayantel wrote the City Assessor seeking the exclusion of its real properties from property tax. After being
denied, Bayantel appealed to the LBAA. Insisting on its exemption, Bayantel did not pay the real property taxes assessed
against it by QC. As such, the QC Treasurer sent out Notices of Delinquency with Warrants of Levy against its properties for
sale at public auction.
Threatened with the imminent loss of its properties, Bayantel withdrew its appeal in the LBAA and instead filed in the RTC of
QC a Petition for Prohibition with TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction. RTC ruled that Bayantel was exempt. QC filed an MR
but was denied. Thus, QC filed a Petition to the SC on pure questions of law contending that the RTC should have denied the
Petition for Prohibition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT BAYANTEL IS REQUIRED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE SEEKING JUDICIAL
RELIEF.
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HELD: NO. THE CASE FALLS UNDER THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Petitions for prohibition are governed by the following provision of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. With the reality that
Bayantels real properties were already levied upon on account of its non-payment of real estate taxes thereon, the Court
agrees with Bayantel that an appeal to the LBAA is not a speedy and adequate remedy within the context of the
aforequoted Section 2 of Rule 65. This is not to mention of the auction sale of said properties already scheduled on July
30, 2002.
Moreover, one of the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies rule is when, as here, only
legal issues are to be resolved. In fact, the Court, cognizant of the nature of the questions presently involved, gave due
course to the instant petition. As the Court has said in Ty vs. Trampe:
Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be exhausted before resort to judicial action can
prosper, there is a well-settled exception in cases where the controversy does not involve questions of
fact but only of law.
Lest it be overlooked, an appeal to the LBAA, to be properly considered, required prior payment under protest of the
amount of P43,878,208.18, a figure which, in the light of the then prevailing Asian financial crisis, may have been difficult
to raise up. Given this reality, an appeal to the LBAA may not be considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy .
It is thus understandable why Bayantel opted to withdraw its earlier appeal with the LBAA and, instead, filed its petition for
prohibition with urgent application for injunctive relief in Civil Case No. Q0247292. The remedy availed of by Bayantel
under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court must be upheld.
LTFRB v. Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc., 706 SCRA 675 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
LTFRB sought to implement a law which required PUV operators to obtain accident insurance policies. For this purpose, the
LTFRB created the Passenger Personal Accident Insurance Program. In this program, LTFRB will accredit 2 groups of
insurance providers selected through public bidding to provide insurance policies to PUV operators. UNITRANS and
Stronghold were chosen as insurance providers under a 5-year contract.
Shortly before the expiration of the agreement, Stronghold participated again in the biddings. To be qualified, an insurance
provider should go through 3 levels of biddings to be qualified. Unfortunately, Stronghold did not qualify in the 3 rd bidding.
As a result, Stronghold was excluded by LTFRB from the pool of qualified bidders.
Before LTFRB could choose the winning bids, Stronghold sought a Writ of Prohibition from the CA to enjoin LTFRB from
opening bid documents and to nullify the bid proceedings. Despite this, CA merely required LTFRB to comment. Thus,
LTFRB was allowed to declare the winners and sign contacts with the 2 new insurers. Thereafter, LTFRB moved to dismiss
Strongholds petition. It contended that it was properly exercising its regulatory powers.
Eventually, CA ruled in favor of Stronghold and nullified the 3rd round of bidding. Likewise, it enjoined LTFRB from
enforcing the agreement until Stronghold shall have been given the right to match the best bidder. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT CA ERRED IN ISSUING THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION AND THUS ANNULLING LTFRBS BIDDING
PROCEEDINGS.
HELD: CA SHOULD NOT HAVE ISSUED THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION.
The writ of prohibition lies upon a showing that the assailed proceedings are [conducted] without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is the extra-jurisdictional nature of the
contested proceedings that grounds the issuance of the writ, enjoining a tribunal or officer from further acting on the
matter before it.
Stronghold made no claim that LTFRB lacked jurisdiction to implement the Program or to issue the References for
each round of bidding to set the parameters for the accreditation of insurance providers. Rather, it rested its case on the
theory that LTFRB acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when LTFRB
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required in the Third Reference a minimum capital requirement on a per insurer basis . Strongholds case therefore,
rises or falls on the question whether such act of LTFRB amounts to grave abuse of discretion.
The CA answered in the affirmative, holding that LTFRB had abused its discretion when it unceremoniously released
the 3rd Reference without considering the legal ramifications on the terms of the [First] MOA.
In the first place, the standard under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of prohibition is grave abuse of discretion
and not mere abuse of discretion. The difference is not a simple matter of semantics. The writs governed by Rule 65
certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition are extraordinary remedies designed to correct not mere errors of judgment (i.e.,
in the appreciation of facts or interpretation of law) but errors of jurisdiction (i.e., lack or excess of jurisdiction).
By conflating abuse of discretion with grave abuse of discretion, the CA failed to follow the rigorous standard of Rule
65, diluting its office of correcting only jurisdictional errors.
Further, LTFRB committed no abuse of discretion, much less a grave one, in disqualifying Stronghold from the third
round of bidding. It is not disputed that Stronghold did not meet the minimum capitalization required for a lead
insurer under the Third Reference, leaving LTFRB no choice but to disqualify it. To find fault in its exclusion, Stronghold
charges LTFRB with committing grave abuse of discretion in abandoning the aggregated mode to reckon compliance with the
minimum capitalization requirement under the First and Second References and in adopting the new nonaggregated, per
insurer basis under the Third Reference. In short, Stronghold questions the change in the manner by which the minimum
capitalization of lead and member insurers is determined under the Third Reference.
Vivas v. Monetary Board of the BSP, 703 SCRA 290 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Vivas et al acquired controlling interest in the Rural Bank of Faire and transformed it into EuroCredit Community Bank Inc.
(ECBI). As a matter of course, the BSP conducted a general examination on ECBI. It was found that there were many
unsound banking practices. Years later, ECBI refused to go through another general examination. As such, BSP fined the bank
and referred the matter to the Office of the Special Investigation (OSI) for the filing of the appropriate legal action. Thus, OSI
filed a Complaint for Estafa through Falsification against ECBI and some of its officers in the DOJ.
Later on the Monetary Board of the BSP released Resolution 276 which placed ECBI under receivership. In assailing said
Resolution, Vivas filed a Petition for Prohibition in the SC and ascribed grave abuse of discretion on the Monetary Board for
prohibiting ECBI from continuing its banking business and for placing it under receivership.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PROHIBITION WAS THE PROPER REMEDY TO QUESTION THE MONETARY BOARDS RESOLUTION.
HELD: NO. VIVAS AVAILED OF THE WRONG REMEDY. IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
The Monetary Board issued Resolution No. 276, dated March 4, 2010, in the exercise of its power under R.A. No. 7653.
Under Section 30 thereof, any act of the MB placing a bank under conservatorship, receivership or liquidation may
not be restrained or set aside except on a petition for certiorari.
Granting that a Petition for Prohibition is allowed, it is already an ineffective remedy under the circumstances
obtaining. Prohibition or a writ of prohibition is that process by which a superior court prevents inferior courts,
tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by
law, and confines them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred . Its office is to restrain subordinate courts,
tribunals or persons from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction
in matters of which it has cognizance.
Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which would direct the defendant to
desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal . As a rule, the proper function of a writ of
prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done . It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts
already accomplished.
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Though couched in imprecise terms, this petition for prohibition apparently seeks to prevent the acts of closing of
ECBI and placing it under receivership. Resolution No. 276, however, had already been issued by the MB and the
closure of ECBI and its placement under receivership by the PDIC were already accomplished . Apparently, the
remedy of prohibition is no longer appropriate. Settled is the rule that prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is
already a fait accompli.
PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED IN THE CA
Even if treated as a petition for certiorari, the petition should have been filed with the CA. Section 4 of Rule 65 reads:
Section 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice
of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether
such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of
a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial
area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it
involves the acts or omissions of a quasijudicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules,
the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
Even in the absence of such provision, the petition is also dismissible because it simply ignored the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts. True, the Court, the CA and the RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus. The concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not grant the party seeking any of the extraordinary writs
the absolute freedom to file a petition in any court of his choice. The Vivas has not advanced any special or important
reason which would allow a direct resort to this Court. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to this Court
only on pure questions of law. In the case at bench, there are certainly factual issues as Vivas is questioning the findings of the
investigating team.
Corales v. Republic, supra
QUICKIE FACTS:
Corales was elected Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna for 3 consecutive terms. In those 3 terms, he appointed Dr.
Angeles as Municipal Administrator. In his first term, the appointment was unanimously approved. However, in the last 2
terms, the Sanggunian disapproved on the ground of nepotism and allegedly because of Dr. Angeles unsatisfactory
performance. Despite this, Dr. Angeles still discharged the duties of his office for which he received salary.
Thereafter Maximo Andal, as Provincial State Auditor, issued an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) to Corales and
asking the latter to comment/reply. Instead, Corales and Angeles filed a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus against Andal and
the Sanggunian before the RTC of San Pablo. In opposition, SolGen, representing Andal, filed a Motion to Dismiss based on
lack of cause of action, prematurity, and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss by SolGen. MR denied. Thus, the Republic went up the CA. CA granted the petition in
favor of the Republic. Essentially, the CA dismissed Corales action for Prohibition. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE FILING OF THE SUIT FOR PROHIBITION WAS RIPE.
HELD: NO. IT WAS FILED PREMATURELY.
As can be gleaned from the AOM, Corales was simply required to submit his comment/reply on the observations
stated in the AOM. As so keenly observed by the CA, any mention in the AOM that Corales shall reimburse the
salaries paid to Dr. Angeles in light of the repeated disapproval or rejection by the Sangguniang Bayan of his appointment as
Municipal Administrator was merely an initial opinion , not conclusive, as there was no showing that Andal had taken any
affirmative action thereafter to compel Corales to make the necessary reimbursement. Otherwise stated, it has not been shown
that Andal carried out or enforced what was stated in the AOM.
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Corales was given an opportunity to refute the findings and observations in the AOM by requesting him to
comment/reply thereto, but he never did. Concomitantly, the AOM did not contain any recommendation to the effect
that Corales would be held personally liable for the amount that would be disallowed. It is, therefore, incongruous to
conclude that the said AOM is tantamount to a directive requiring Corales to reimburse the salaries paid to and
received by Dr. Angeles during the latters stint as Municipal Administrator after his appointment thereto was held
invalid for want of conformity from the Sangguniang Bayan.
Viewed in this light, this Court can hardly see any actual case or controversy to warrant the exercise of its power of
judicial review. A question is considered RIPE FOR ADJUDICATION when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
The action taken by the Corales and Angeles to assail the AOM was, indeed, premature and based entirely on surmises,
conjectures and speculations that Corales would eventually be compelled to reimburse Dr. Angeles salaries, should the audit
investigation confirm the irregularity of such disbursements. Further, as correctly pointed out by the Republic in its
Memorandum, what Corales and Angeles actually assail is Andals authority to request them to file the desired
comment/reply to the AOM, which is beyond the scope of the action for prohibition, as such request is neither an
actionable wrong nor constitutive of an act perceived to be illegal.
Prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with the
commission of an act perceived to be illegal, may only be resorted to when there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law .
From the final order or decision of the Director, an aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission proper . It is the
decision or resolution of the Commission proper which can be appealed to this Court.
Clearly, Corales and Angeles have all the remedies available to them at the administrative level but they failed to
exhaust the same and instead, immediately sought judicial intervention. Otherwise stated, the auditing process has just begun
but they already thwarted the same by immediately filing a Petition for Prohibition.
D.3
MANDAMUS
Raul Lambino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006

QUICKIE FACTS:
Pursuant to the Initiative and Referendum Act, Lambino gathered signatures for an Initiative Petition to amend the
Constitution and ultimately change the form of government from bicameral to unicameral. When the filed said Petition, they
alleged they were able to gather the requisite signatures and had said signatures verified. They prayed that, after publication of
their Petition, the COMELEC should conduct a plebiscite.
However, COMELEC issued a Resolution denying due course to the Petition because there was no enabling law regarding
Initiative Petitions to amend the Constitution. Thus, Lambino prayed to the SC for the issuance of Writs of Certiorari and
Mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution and compel COMELEC to give due course to their Initiative Petition
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT MANDAMUS WILL LIE TO COMPEL THE COMELEC TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE INITIATIVE
PETITION.
HELD: NO.
Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who act to enforce a public right and to compel the persons of a public duty
most especially when mandated by the Constitution.99 However, under Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
for a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition is a ministerial act or duty and
not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain
right to warrant the grant thereof.
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A PURELY MINISTERIAL ACT or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority , without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon
the propriety or impropriety of the act done . If the law imposes a duty upon a public official and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty should be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial
only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of an official discretion nor judgment.
To stress, in a petition for mandamus, petitioner must show a well defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant
thereof. In this case, petitioners failed to establish their right to a writ of mandamus as shown by the foregoing disquisitions.
Esquivel v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 137237, September 17, 2002
QUICKIE FACTS:
A raid was conducted by the police which led to the arrest of gambling syndicates connected to Municipal Mayor Esquivel.
Irked by this, Mayor Esquivel and his brother, as barangay captain, along with several other members of the police, abducted
and maltreated PO2 Eduardo and Catacutan, police officers involved in the raid. Before they released them, Esquivel made
them sign a certification that they were in good condition.
As such, they charged Esquivel for Illegal Arrest, Arbitrary Detention, Maltreatment, Attempted Murder, and Grave Threats.
After investigation, the records were forwarded to the Ombudsman. After preliminary investigation, informations for Less
Serious Physical Injuries and Grave Threats were filed in the Sandiganbayan. Later, they filed an MR regarding the
Ombudsmans decision to file the informations. However, this MR was denied.
Thus, they filed a Peition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus. In their Mandamus petition, they sought to compel
Ombudsman to consider the certification signed by Eduardo and Catacutan that they left the custody of Esquivel in good
condition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT MANDAMUS MAY LIE TO COMPEL THE OMBUDSMAN TO EXERCISE A DISCRETIONARY DUTY.
HELD: NO.
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a
discretionary duty. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion nor judgment.
Hence, this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to control or review the exercise of discretion by the
Ombudsman, for it is his discretion and judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the Court. When a decision
has been reached in a matter involving discretion, a writ of mandamus may not be availed of to review or correct it, however
erroneous it may be. Moreover, as earlier discussed, Esquivel had another remedy available in the ordinary course of law.
Where such remedy is available in the ordinary course of law, mandamus will not lie.
Dolot v. Paje, 703 SCRA 650 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Dolot et al are residents of Matnog, Sorsogon. The filed a Petition for Continuing Mandamus, Damages, and TEPO with the
RTC of Sorsogon against DENR and the government of Sorsogon and alleged that due to the small scale mining of various
corporations against the mining laws, their area became susceptible to various environmental dangers.
The Petition was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that there was no final court order, decree, or
decision that the public officials should act on; that they failed to attach required affidavits; and that they failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. Aggrieved, Dolot et al filed this Petition to the SC.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PROPER FOR THE RTC TO SUMMARILY DISMISS THE WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS.
HELD: YES. IT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
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The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of
Manila Bay. Now cast in stone
under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil
actions for the enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are covered by Part II (Civil Procedure).
Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and substance before a court
may take further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright. Courts must be cautioned, however, that the
determination to give due course to the petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be applied
in a reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of the law and always with the view in mind of seeing to it that justice is
served.
On MATTERS OF FORM, the petition must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as well as a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an act or
omission of the government agency, instrumentality or its officer concerned.
Sufficiency of SUBSTANCE, on the other hand, necessitates that the petition must contain substantive allegations
specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for
the issuance of the writ, viz.:
(1) an agency or instrumentality of government or its officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an act or
unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right;
(2) the act to be performed by the government agency, instrumentality or its officer is specifically enjoined by law as
a duty;
(3) such duty results from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an
environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and
(4) there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of to compel the performance of an act
specifically enjoined by law. The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or
regulation or a right therein. The RTCs mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is
apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:
(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or
instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final
judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied.
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually pertains to the judgment or decree
that a court would eventually render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or
decree shall subsequently become final.
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and such judgment has
become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the government agency
concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks . It is
only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ shall be made to the court and
if the court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court
docket.
A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance with a final judgment as it
permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs
mandated under the courts decision.
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The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners should have first filed a case with the Panel of
Arbitrators (Panel), which has jurisdiction over mining disputes under R.A. No. 7942. Indeed, as pointed out by the
respondents, the Panel has jurisdiction over mining disputes. But the petition filed below does not involve a mining
dispute. What was being protested are the alleged negative environmental impact of the small scale mining operation
being conducted.
The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to attach judicial affidavits. As
previously stated, Rule 8 requires that the petition should be verified, contain supporting evidence and must be
accompanied by a sworn certification of nonforum shopping . There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion
of judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It is only if the evidence of the petitioner would consist of testimony of witnesses
that it would be the time that judicial affidavits (affidavits of witnesses in the question and answer form) must be attached to
the petition/complaint
E.
QUO WARRANTO (RULE 66)
1.
Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
Liban and other members of the QC Red Cross Chapter filed a Petition in the SC denominated as Petition to Declare Gordon as
Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. It alleged that during Gordons incumbency as Senator, he was elected as Chairman of the
PNRC. By accepting said chairmanship, pursuant to the Constitution, he is deemed to have forfeited his seat in the senate.
In his defense, Gordon avers that Liban has no standing to file the action which appears to be a Quo Warranto because Liban
et al do not claim to be entitled to his Senate seat; that it is barred by prescription. Moreover, he contends the PNRC is not a
GOCC and thus does not render applicable the constitutional prohibition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION SHOULD PROSPER.
HELD: NO.
NO STANDING TO FILE QUO WARRANTO PETITION
Liban et al are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, Gordon has
automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short, Liban et al filed an action for usurpation of public office against
Gordon, a public officer who allegedly committed an act which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his public office.
Clearly, such an action is for quo warranto, specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule
66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such an action if he claims to be entitled to the public office
allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can bring the action in his own name. The person instituting quo
warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute ,
otherwise the action may be dismissed at any stage. In the present case, Liban et al do not claim to be entitled to the
Senate office of Gordon. Clearly, they have no standing to file the present petition.
Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition and treats it as a taxpayers suit, the petition would still fail on the
merits.
2.
Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting, G.R. No. 162272, April 7, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
CBS and PBS are radio networks comprising Bombo Radyo Philippines. They are grantees of legislative franchises. In said
franchises, it there was a provision which encouraged the democratization of ownership of public utilities pursuant to the
constitution.
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Divinagracia, who claims to each own 12% shares of stock in CBS and PBS, filed 2 complaints in the NTC against both
networks. It alleged that despite the provisions of their legislative franchise which mandated a public offering of at least 30%
of its common stocks, the networks failed to make such offerings. Thus, it claimed that they violated their franchise.
NTC consolidated the cases and dismissed both complaints. It stated that the complaints amounted to collateral attacks on the
legislative franchises. As such, NTC was not competent to rule on said issue. After Divinagracias MR was denied, he filed a
Petition for Review under Rule 43 in the CA. However, CA upheld the NTC and stated that a Petition for Quo Warranto was
the proper remedy to address the issue raised by Divinagracia.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE NTCS POWER TO DECIDE VIOLATIONS OF LEGISLATIVE FRANCHISES CAN BE BROUGHT VIA
PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO.
HELD: YES. QUO WARRANTO IS PROPER
There is in fact a more appropriate, more narrowly-tailored and least restrictive remedy that is afforded by the law. Such
remedy is that adverted to by the NTC and the Court of Appeals the resort to quo warranto proceedings under Rule 66 of
the Rules of Court.
Under Section 1 of Rule 66, an action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be brought in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises public office,
position or franchise. Even while the action is maintained in the name of the Republic, the Solicitor General or a public
prosecutor is obliged to commence such action upon complaint, and upon good reason to believe that any case specified
under Section 1 of Rule 66 can be established by proof.
The special civil action of quo warranto is a prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any person to
show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise. It is settled that [t]he determination
of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by nonuser,
is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to
the State upon complaint or otherwise, the reason being that the abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and not a
private injury.
A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the State
because a franchise is granted by law and its unlawful exercise is primarily a concern of Government. Quo warranto is
specifically available as a remedy if it is thought that a government corporation has offended against its corporate
charter or misused its franchise.
To cancel the provisional authority or the CPC is, in effect, to cancel the franchise or otherwise prevent its exercise.
By law, the NTC is incapacitated to frustrate such mandate by unduly withholding or canceling the provisional authority
or the CPC for reasons other than the orderly administration of the frequencies in the radio spectrum.
And the role of the courts, through quo warranto proceedings, neatly complements the traditional separation of powers
that come to bear in our analysis. The courts are entrusted with the adjudication of the legal status of persons, the final
arbiter of their rights and obligations under law. The question of whether a franchisee is in breach of the franchise
specially enacted for it by Congress is one inherently suited to a court of law, and not for an administrative agency,
much less one to which no such function has been delegated by Congress. In the same way that availability of judicial review
over laws does not preclude Congress from undertaking its own remedial measures by appropriately amending laws, the
viability of quo warranto in the instant cases does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative by abrogating the
legislative franchises of respondents should it be distressed enough by the franchisees violation of the franchises extended to
them.
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F.
EXPROPRIATION (RULE 67)
1.
Bardillon v. Bgy. Masili, G.R. No. 146886, April 30, 2003
QUICKIE FACTS:
Barangay Masili filed a Complaint for Expropriation against Bardillon in the MTCof Calamba for the purpose of acquiring
parcel of land to erect a multi-purpose hall for the barangay. MTC dismissed the case for failure of the Barangay and its
counsel to appear at the pre-trial. MR was likewise denied.
Subsequently, a Second Complaint for Eminent Domain was filed in the RTC of Calamba and sought to expropriate the same
property for the same purpose. In response, Bardillon moved to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata. However, the
judge denied the Motion to Dismiss and held that there was no res judicata because the MTC which previously dismissed the
case had no jurisdiction over the expropriation proceeding. Thereafter, the RTC ruled in favor of the Barangay and issued a
Writ of Possession in its favor.
On appeal, CA affirmed. Hence, this Petition. Bardillon claims that the MTC has jurisdiction of the case because the value of
the land was only P11,448.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MTC HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE EXPROPRIATION CASE.
HELD: NO. RTC HAD JURISDICTION BECAUSE IT IS INCAPABLE OF PECUNARY ESTIMATION. SINCE MTC HAD NO
JURISDICTION, NO RES JUDICATA.
An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the
government of its authority and right to take property for public use . As such, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation
and should be filed with the RTC. This was explained by the Court in Barangay San Roque
v. Heirs of Francisco Pastor:
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government
or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property.
Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation,
and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the
governments exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is
dutybound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the
expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety
of the expropriation.
To reiterate, an expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the value of the land, because the
subject of the action is the governments exercise of eminent domain a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Since the MTC had no jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application even if
the Order of dismissal may have been an adjudication on the merits.
ENTRY INTO THE PREMISES WAS PROPER
The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case are expressly and specifically governed
by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On the part of local government units, expropriation is also
governed by Section 19 of the Local Government Code. Accordingly, in expropriation proceedings, the REQUISITES FOR
AUTHORIZING IMMEDIATE ENTRY are as follows:
(1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and
(2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15%of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on
its current tax declaration.
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In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of the Barangay after it had filed the Complaint for
expropriation and deposited the amount required was proper, because it had complied with the foregoing requisites.
The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly addressed to the RTC in the course of the expropriation
proceedings. If Bardillon objects to the necessity of the takeover of her property , she should say so in her Answer to
the Complaint. The RTC has the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to
determine whether there is a genuine necessity for it.
2.
Republic v. Mangotara, G.R. No. 170375, July 7, 2010
QUICKIE FACTS:
Iron and Steel Authority (now National Steel Corporation) was created in 1973 pursuant to PD 2729. Its existence was only
until 1988. In 1983, ISA filed a Complaint for Expropriation against Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp (MCFC) and its mortgagee,
PNB in the RTC presided by Judge Mangotara.
During the pendency of the case, ISAs statutory existence expired. Thus, MCFC filed a Motion to Dismiss for ISAs lack of
capacity to sue. RTC granted the Motion. CA likewise affirmed the dismissal. On appeal to the SC, the SC remanded the case
to the RTC so the Republic could be substituted in place of ISA. This became final and executory. However, no motion for
execution was filed.
In the 1997 Cacho case, part of the land in question was adjudged in favor of Cacho and the decision lapsed into finality.
Because of this, the Republic filed a Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint and to implead Cacho and their
successors-in-interest. MCFC opposed this contending that the Republic was already time barred.
As a result, RTC denied the Republics Motion for Leave. An MR was filed to assail the said order. Later on, MCFC filed a
Motion to Dismiss for failure of Republic to implead indispensible parties because MCFC insisted it was not the owner of the
parcels of land sought to be expropriated but rather it was Cacho. As a result, the RTC dismissed the case for not having been
filed against the owner-indispensible party. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY IS AN INDISPENSIBLE PARTY IN AN EXPROPRIATION
PROCEEDING.
HELD: NOT NECESSARILY. AN OWNER IN AN EXPROPRIATION CASE IS NOT NECESSARILY THE INDISPENSIBLE PARTY.
The right of the Republic to be substituted for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106 had long been affirmed by no less
than this Court in the ISA case. The ISA case had already become final and executory, and entry of judgment was made.
The failure of the Republic to actually file a motion for execution does not render the substitution void. A writ of
execution requires the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it is directed to enforce the terms of the writ. The November
16, 2001 Order of the RTC Branch 1 should be deemed as voluntary compliance with a final and executory judgment of this
Court, already rendering a motion for and issuance of a writ of execution superfluous.
Rule 67, Section 1 of the then Rules of Court72 described how expropriation proceedings should be instituted:
Section 1. The complaint. The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a complaint which
shall state with certainty the right and purpose of condemnation, describe the real or personal property
sought to be condemned, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying,
any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the interest of each defendant separately.
If the title to any property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines,
although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the
plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect may be
made in the complaint.
For sure, defendants in an expropriation case are NOT LIMITED to the owners of the property to be expropriated, and
just compensation is not due to the property owner alone. As this Court held in De Knecht v. Court of Appeals:
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The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property condemned.
They include all other persons owning, occupying or claiming to own the property. When [property] is
taken by eminent domain, the owner is not necessarily the only person who is entitled to compensation.
At the time of the filing of the Complaint for Expropriation in 1983, possessory/occupancy rights of MCFC over the
parcels of land sought to be expropriated were undisputed. Being the occupant of the parcel of land sought to be
expropriated, MCFC could very well be named a defendant in Civil Case No. 106. The RTC Branch 1 evidently erred in
dismissing the Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC for not being a proper party.
Also erroneous was the dismissal by the RTC Branch 1 of the original Complaint for Expropriation for having been
filed only against MCFC, the occupant of the subject land, but not the owner/s of the said property. Dismissal is not the
remedy for misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties.
An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action. Now, is the owner
of the property an indispensable party in an action for expropriation? Not necessarily. Going back to Rule 67, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court, expropriation proceedings may be instituted even when title to the property sought to be condemned
appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals. The same rule provides that a
complaint for expropriation shall name as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any
part thereof or interest in the property sought to be condemned. Clearly, when the property already
3.
Republic v. Court of Appeals, August 14, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
Reyes owns a parcel of land in CDO. DPHW wanted to built an extension road on Osmena St. Without initiating an
expropriation proceeding, DPWH took possession of Reyes property on Dec 20, 1990. Thus, Reyes sent letters to DPWH to
express its objection to the taking of the property. Likewise, Reyes requested to appraise her property but this was denied.
Thus, Reyes filed a Complaint Claiming Just Compensation and Damages in the RTC of CDO against DPWH.
Before the reports could be sent by the commissioners, DPWH said that it was ready to pay Reyes just compensation of
P3,200 psm. Thus, Reyes filed an Urgent Motion for DPWH to deposit said amount. However, DWPH was only able to
deposit P2,121,600 in the RTC months later.
Meanwhile, new commissioners submitted their report based on the values of 1990. Thereafter, RTC held that Reyes is
entitled to 4,696,000 based on the values in 1990 but the basis was obscure in the actual decision. Thus, the CA remanded the
case. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN REMANDING THE CASE TO RECONVENE THE COMMISSIONERS TO DETERMINE
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES FOR THE REMAINING LOT.
HELD: NO.
VALUATION OF JUST COMPENSATION
Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State, as sovereign, to take private property for public use upon observance
of due process of law and payment of just compensation.
JUST COMPENSATION is the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be expropriated. Among the factors to be
considered in arriving at the fair market value of the property are the cost of acquisition, the current value of like
properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax
declarations thereon. The measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. To be just, the compensation must be fair
not only to the owner but also to the taker.
Just compensation is based on the price or value of the property at the time it was taken from the owner and
appropriated by the government. However, if the government takes possession before the institution of expropriation
proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession, not of the filing of the complaint.
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The value at the time of the filing of the complaint should be the basis for the determination of the value when the
taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings.
Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing of complaint for eminent domain with the appropriate court by the expropriator.
If no such complaint is filed, the expropriator is considered to have violated procedural requirements , and hence,
waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just
compensation.
In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we clarified that when there is no action for expropriation and the case
involves only a complaint for damages or just compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court on ascertainment
of just compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67) are no longer applicable, and a trial before commissioners is
dispensable.
RTC HAD NO BASIS IN DETERMINING THE JUST COMPENSATION
In this case, DPWH took possession of the subject property without initiating expropriation proceedings.
Consequently, Reyes filed the instant case for just compensation and damages. To determine just compensation, the
RTC appointed 3 commissioners pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. None of the parties
objected to such appointment.
The RTCs appointment of commissioners in this particular case is not improper. The appointment was done mainly to aid
the RTC in determining just compensation, and it was not opposed by the parties. Besides, the RTC is not bound by the
commissioners recommended valuation of the subject property. The court has the discretion on whether to adopt the
commissioners valuation or to substitute its own estimate of the value as gathered from the records.
However, we agree with the CA that the RTCs decision is not clear as to its basis for ascertaining just compensation.
The RTC simply gave the total amount of just compensation due to the property owner without laying down its basis. Thus,
there is no way to determine whether the adjudged just compensation is based on competent evidence. For this
reason alone, a remand of the case to the trial court for proper determination of just compensation is in order.
Although the determination of just compensation lies within the trial courts discretion, it should not be done arbitrarily or
capriciously. The decision of the RTC must be based on all established rules, correct legal principles, and competent
evidence. The court is proscribed from basing its judgment on speculations and surmises.
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED
No actual taking of the remaining portion of the real property is necessary to grant consequential damages. If as a
result of the expropriation made by DPWH, the remaining lot (i.e., the 297square meter lot) of Reyes suffers from
IMPAIRMENT or decrease in value, consequential damages may be awarded to Reyes.
On the other hand, if the expropriation results to BENEFITS to the remaining lot of Reyes, these consequential benefits
may be deducted from the awarded consequential damages, if any, or from the market value of the expropriated
property.
An award of consequential damages for property not taken is not tantamount to unjust enrichment of the property owner.
4.
NPC v. Santa Loro, G.R. No. 175176, October 17, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
To implement its Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project, NPC expropriated various parcels of land in the Municipality of
Carmen in Cebu. Among the affected lots were those owned by Santa Loro vda. De Capin. Thus, to be able to enter into their
property, NPC obtained their permission. Later, Capin signed the permits in return for NPCs payment of just compensation.
After construction was completed, restrictions were imposed upon the use of Capins property such that they lost income.
After NPC paid Capin just compensation, Capin found out that the other landowners in their Municipality who brought the
expropriation proceedings to court and entered into compromise agreements with NPC and were able to receive much greater
just compensation.
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Accordingly, Capin filed a Complaint for Rescission of Agreement, Recovery of Possession of Parcels of Land, Removal of
Tower and Transmission Lines, Damages, etc against NPC in the RTC. Thereafter, the parties during pre-trial that they would
submit to Summary Judgment. Later, RTC ruled in favor of Capin and ordered NPC to pay damages amounting to 448 psm
for the 3,199 sqm taken by NPC. MR denied. On appeal, CA affirmed. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
NPC contends that the RTC should have appointed commissioners in accordance with Rule 67 and not according to the rules
on Summary Judgments because the case was Reversed Eminent Domain.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RTC SHOULD HAVE FIRST APPOINTED COMMISSIONERS BEFORE HOLDING NPC LIABLE.
HELD: NO. THE COMPLAINT IS ONE FOR DAMAGES.
It should be emphasized that the present case stemmed from a Complaint for Rescission of Agreement, Recovery of
Possession of Parcels of Land, Removal of Tower and Transmission Lines, Damages and Other Reliefs filed by the
Capin against NPC. It was an ordinary civil action for the rescission of Capins agreement with NPC, as well as recovery
of the possession of the lots taken, for failure of petitioner to comply with its obligation to pay just compensation for the
respondents properties. Payment of just compensation or damages was an alternative remedy, akin to specific
performance by the NPC of its obligation under its agreement with respondents, which would prevent the rescission of
the agreements altogether and the return of the possession of the properties to Capin. The parties, at the Pre-Trial
Conference, implicitly agreed to pursue the remedy for payment of damages rather than rescission of the agreement.
Clearly, the proceedings before the RTC were not for expropriation, but were for damages, to which Section 5, Rule 67
of the Revised Rules of Court is irrelevant.
Reference may be made to National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals. In the said case, after therein petitioner NAPOCOR
withdrew its second Petition for Expropriation, what was left for the trial courts determination was the counterclaim
of therein private respondent Antonino Pobre , contained in his Motion to Dismiss, for damages. The Court ruled therein:
This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC dismissed its complaint for
expropriation. Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages , the provisions
of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid were no longer
applicable. A trial before commissioners, for instance, was dispensable.
Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession.
The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission
lines also falls within the ambit of the term expropriation.
5.
Apo Fruits v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164195, December 4, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
Apo Fruits (AFC) and Hijo Plantation (HPI) offered to sell land to the government through DAR pursuant to CARP. DAR
issued a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) in favor of AFC and HPI in order to pay for the lands for 165,000 per hectare. This
was rejected for being unreasonably low. As such, DAR directed Land Bank (LBP) to deposit amounts in the accounts of AFC
and HPI. They each withdrew the amounts. Thereafter, TCT was issued in favor of DAR which would be distributed to the
farmers.
Later, AFC and HPI filed separate Complaints for Determination of Just Compensation in the DARAB. Since DARAB did
not act on the complaints for more than 3 years, 2 complaints were then filed with the RTC and the cases were consolidated.
RTC ruled in favor of AFC and HPI and ordered just compensation of 1.383 Billion in T-Bills, interests, attys fees, costs, and
Commissioners fees.
Lanbnd Banks MR was denied. Thus, Land Bank filed a Notice of Appeal. However, pending appeal, a case was decided
stating that the mode of appeal from the RTC as Special Agrarian Court should be via Petition for Review. So, RTC denied
the appeal. In the CA, RTCs order was nullified. AFC and HPIs MR was denied. Thus, they went up to the SC via Rule 45.
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SC partially granted Petition. When Land Bank filed an MR, SC deleted the interest rate and attorneys fees. So, AFC and HPI
filed their MR which was denied by the SC. Thereafter, judgment was entered.
Unfazed, AFC and HPI still filed a Motion for Leave to File and Admit a 2 nd MR regarding the denial of the award of interest
and attorneys fees.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT AFC AND HPI ARE ENTITLED LEGAL INTEREST AND ATTORNEYS FEES.
HELD: NO. LAND BANK ALREADY PAID JUST COMPENSATION WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY.
The Second MR is denied, because, firstly, to grant it is to jettison the immutability of a final decision a matter of
public policy and public interest, as well as a time-honored principle of procedural law; and secondly, to award interest and
attorneys fees despite the fact that Land Bank paid the just compensation without undue delay is legally and
factually unwarranted.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Court allows the reopening of a final judgment, AFC and HPI are still not
entitled to recover interest on the just compensation and attorneys fees.
The taking of property under CARL is an exercise by the State of the power of eminent domain. A basic limitation on
the States power of eminent domain is the constitutional directive that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation. Just compensation refers to the sum equivalent to the market value of the property,
broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action
and competition, or the fair value of the property as between one who receives and one who desires to sell.
It is fixed at the time of the actual taking by the State. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation
is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just
value, to be computed from the time the property is taken up to the time when compensation is actually paid or
deposited with the court.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, however, the Court came to explicitly rule that interest is to be imposed on the just
compensation only in case of delay in its payment, which fact must be sufficiently established. Significantly, Wycoco was
moored on Article 2209, Civil Code.
The history of this case proves that Land Bank did not incur delay in the payment of the just compensation. As earlier
mentioned, after AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell their lands on October 12, 1995, DAR referred their VOS
applications to Land Bank for initial valuation. Land Bank initially fixed the just compensation at P165,484.47/hectare, that is,
P86,900,925.88, for AFC, and P164,478,178.14, for HPI.
However, they both rejected Land Banks initial valuation, prompting Land Bank to open deposit accounts in the
their names, and to credit in said accounts the amounts equivalent to their valuations . Although AFC withdrew the
amount of
P26,409,549.86, while HPI withdrew P45,481,706.76, they still filed with DARAB separate complaints for determination of
just compensation.
The Third Division justified its deletion of the award of interest thuswise:
AFC and HPI now blame LBP for allegedly incurring delay in the determination and payment of just
compensation. However, the same is without basis as AFC and HPIs proper recourse after rejecting the
initial valuations of respondent LBP was to bring the matter to the RTC acting as a SAC, and not to
file two complaints for determination of just compensation with the DAR, which was just circuitous as
it had already determined the just compensation of the subject properties taken with the aid of LBP.
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6.
Republic v. Holy Trinity Development Corp., G.R. No. 172410, April 14, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) sought to expropriated parcels of land to construct the NLEX. Thus, it filed Consolidated
Complaints for Expropriation in the RTC of Malolos. Holy Trinity Realty was one of the respondents. In accordance with RA
8974 (An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site, or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects
and for Other Purposes), TRB made a deposit of 28M in the DPWH account in Land Bank. Thereafter, TRB filed an Urgent
Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession since it already made a deposit and, thus, pursuant to Rule 67 Sec 2,
the issuance of the Writ if ministerial. RTC the motion. However, the landowners did not voluntary vacate the properties. So,
they sought help from the PNP.
Later on, Holy Trinity filed a Motion to Withdraw the Deposit in the RTC and sought to withdraw the principal amount and
any interest accruing thereon. Withdrawal of the principal was allowed but the withdrawal of the accrued interest was still to be
determined in a proceeding. Pending the proceedings, the account earned interest. Then, RTC ruled that said interests
belonged to Holy Trinity pursuant to the principle of accession.
TRBs MR was granted and stated that the issue as to interest should be determined before the Board of Commissioners. Holy
Trinity filed an MR but was denied. On certiorari, CA granted the petition and ruled that the intresest belonged to Holy
Trinity by accession. Hence, this petition.
TRB contends that pursuant to RA 8974 and Rule 67 Sec 2, the landowner is entitled to an amount equivalent to the assessed
value of the property for purposes of taxation/current zonal valuation of the BIR.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT INTEREST ACCRUED FROM THE DEPOSIT MADE IN THE EXPROPRIATION CASE BELONGED TO THE
LANDOWNER.
HELD: YES.
At the outset, we call attention to a significant oversight in the TRBs line of reasoning. It failed to distinguish between the
expropriation procedures under Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule
67 of the Rules of Court speak of different procedures, with the former specifically governing expropriation proceedings
for national government infrastructure projects. Thus, in Republic v. Gingoyon, we held:
There are at least TWO CRUCIAL DIFFERENCES between the respective procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974 and Rule 67.
Under the STATUTE, the Government is required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing
of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in RULE 67, the Government is required only to make
an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as
the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration OR the
current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the
improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method.
Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it
serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private property. For example, Section 19 of
the Local Government Code governs as to the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain through
an enabling ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national
government infrastructure projects.
Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67 ,
inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property for national government infrastructure
projects. Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than national
infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply.
There is no question that the proceedings in this case deal with the expropriation of properties intended for a national
government infrastructure project. Therefore, the RTC correctly applied the procedure laid out in Republic Act No.
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8974, by requiring the deposit of the amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of the properties sought to be
expropriated before the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the Republic.
LANDOWNER OWNS THE INTEREST
Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, the implementing agency of the government pays just compensation twice:
(1) immediately upon the filing of the complaint, where the amount to be paid is 100% of the value of the property
based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR (initial payment); and
(2) when the decision of the court in the determination of just compensation becomes final and executory,
where the implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the
just compensation as determined by the court (final payment).
Holy Trinity never alleged that it was seeking interest because of delay in either of the two payments enumerated above.
In fact, Holy Trinitys cause of action is based on the prompt initial payment of just compensation, which effectively
transferred the ownership of the amount paid to it. Being the owner of the amount paid, Holy Trinity is claiming, by the
right of accession, the interest earned by the same while on deposit with the bank.
That the expropriation account was in the name of DPWH, and not of HTRDC, is of no moment. Considering that the
expropriation account is in the name of DPWH, then, DPWH should at most be deemed as the trustee of the amounts
deposited in the said accounts irrefragably intended as initial payment for the landowners of the properties subject of the
expropriation, until said landowners are allowed by the RTC to withdraw the same.
G.
JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE (RULE 68)
1.
Huerta Alba Resort v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128567, September 1, 2000
QUICKIE FACTS:
Huerta Alba mortgage 4 parcels of land in favor of Intercon Fund Resource Inc. The latter assigns its rights over the mortgage
to Syndicated Management. Syndicated filed a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure against Huerta Alba to foreclose on said
properties. RTC, CA, and the SC all ruled in favor of Syndicated. Thereafter, the decision became final and executory and was
entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
As such, Syndicated filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution in the RTC which was granted. Huerta Alba sought
nullify the other by filing a Motion to Quash contending that the 150-day period for Equity Redemption has not yet lapsed.
However, RTC denied this. On appeal, CA dismissed the appeal. Consequently, Huerta Alba filed in the CA a Motion for
Clarification as regards the commencement of the 1-year period for the Right of Redemption of the properties in question.
Again this was denied. Hence, this petition.
Huerta Alba contends that it should be allowed to redeem the properties within 1 year from the sale as a result of a foreclosure
of mortgage
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT HUERTA ALBA IS ENTTILED TO RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER THE GENERAL BANKING ACT
HELD: NO
From the various decisions, resolutions and orders a quo it can be gleaned that what Huerta Alba has been adjudged to
have was only the equity of redemption over subject properties. On the distinction between the equity of redemption and
right of redemption, the case of Gregorio Y. Limpin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, comes to the fore. Held the Court in the said
case:
The equity of redemption is, to be sure, different from and should not be confused with the right of redemption. The
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION in relation to a mortgage understood in the sense of a prerogative to
reacquire mortgaged property after registration of the foreclosure sale exists only in the case of
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the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. No such right is recognized in a JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
except only where the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or a bank or banking institution .
Where a mortgage is FORECLOSED EXTRAJUDICIALLY, Act 3135 grants to the mortgagor the right of
redemption within one (1) year from the registration of the sheriffs certificate of foreclosure sale.
Where the FORECLOSURE IS JUDICIALLY EFFECTED, however, no equivalent right of redemption
exists. The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale, when confirmed by an order of the court, x x shall operate to divest
the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be
allowed by law. Such rights exceptionally allowed by law (i.e., even after confirmation by an order of the court)
are those granted by the charter of the Philippine National Bank (Acts No. 2747 and 2938), and the General
Banking Act (R.A. 337).
These laws confer on the mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the mortgagor,
the right to redeem the property sold on foreclosure after confirmation by the court of the
foreclosure sale which right may be exercised within a period of one (1) year, counted from the date
of registration of the certificate of sale in the Registry of Property. But, to repeat, no such right of
redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of a mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a
bank or banking institution. In such a case, the foreclosure sale, when confirmed by an order of the court
shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser.
There then exists only what is known as the equity of redemption. This is simply the right of the
defendant mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the
secured debt within the 90-day period after the judgment becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68, or
even after the foreclosure sale but prior to its confirmation.
Section 2, Rule 68 provides that
If upon the trial x x the court shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to be true, it shall ascertain the
amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or obligation, including interest and costs, and shall
render judgment for the sum so found due and order the same to be paid into court within a period of not
less than ninety (90) days from the date of the service of such order , and that in default of such payment
the property be sold to realize the mortgage debt and costs.
This is the mortgagors equity (not right) of redemption which, as above stated, may be exercised by
him even beyond the 90-day period from the date of service of the order, and even after the foreclosure
sale itself, provided it be before the order of confirmation of the sale. After such order of confirmation, no
redemption can be effected any longer.
The failure of Huerta Alba to seasonably assert its alleged right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 precludes it from so
doing at this late stage of the case. Estoppel may be successfully invoked if the party fails to raise the question in the early
stages of the proceedings. Thus, a party to a case who failed to invoke his claim in the main case, while having the
opportunity to do so, will be precluded, subsequently, from invoking his claim, even if it were true, after the decision has
become final, otherwise the judgment may be reduced to a mockery and the administration of justice may be placed in
disrepute.
2.
Bacaling v. Muya, G.R. No. 148404, April 11, 2002
QUICKIE FACTS:
Sps. Bacaling owned parcels of land which they subdivided into 110 sub-lots. Later, the Bureau of Lands approved the
subdivision plan for purposes of developing it into a low-cost housing residential community known as the Bacaling-Moreno
Subdivision. To get funds for the development, Bacaling obtained a loan from GSIS. To secure said loan, Bacaling executed in
favor of GSIS a REM over the said property. However, the Bacalings were not able to pay. Consequently, in 1961, GSIS
foreclosed on the lots. The case reached all the way to the SC. It was only in 1989 wherein Bacaling was restored as the owner.
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Meanwhile, while the case was pending, a dispute over the property arose between Bacaling and Muya. Bacaling claims that
Muya clandestinely entered and occupied the property. On the other hand, Muya claims that they started out as assigns as
tenat-tillers of the land and eventually became agricultural tenants under a leasehold. As such, they were able to secure
Certificates of Land Transfer in their names.
After the SC case ruled in favor of Bacaling, the latter filed a Petition for Cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer
against Muya in the DAR. However, this was dismissed. As a result, Bacaling appealed to the Office of the President which
reversed the DAR and ordered the cancellation of said Certificates. Aggrieved, Muya appealed to the CA. CA reversed the OP
and validated the Certificates.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT MUYA ET AL ARE AGRICULTURAL TENANTS
HELD: NO.
The requisites in order to have a valid agricultural leasehold relationship are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
The subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land;
There is consent between the parties to the relationship;
the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
We find that the first, third and sixth requisites are lacking in the case at bar. One legal conclusion adduced from the facts
in Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals provides that GSIS, not Bacaling, was the owner of the subject
properties from 1961 up to 1989 as a result of the foreclosure and confirmation of the sale of the subject properties.
Although the confirmation only came in 1975, the ownership is deemed to have been vested to GSIS way back in 1961 ,
the year of the sale of the foreclosed properties. This is due to the fact that the date of confirmation by the trial court of
the foreclosure sale retroacts to the date of the actual sale itself.
Thus, Muya cannot validly claim that they are legitimate and recognized tenants of the subject parcels of land for the
reason that their agreement to till the land was not with GSIS, the real landowner. There is no showing that GSIS
consented to such tenancy relationship nor is there proof that GSIS received a share in the harvest of the tenants.
Consequently, Muya cannot claim security of tenure and other rights accorded by our agrarian laws considering that they have
not been validly instituted as agricultural lessees of the subject parcels of land. And from the time Bacaling recovered the
subject properties from GSIS up to the time the former changed her legal position in the instant case, Bacaling has
consistently disclaimed Muya as her alleged tenants. Bacalings current legal posture cannot also overturn our finding since, as
earlier mentioned, the said change of mind of Bacaling has little or no evidentiary weight under the circumstances.
3.
Monzon v. Relova, G.R. No. 171827, September 17, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
Monzon executed separate PNs in favor of Spouses Relova and Spouses Perez. Said PNs were secured by REM over separate
lots in Tagaytay. Thereafter, Deeds of Sale were executed in favor of Relova and Perez. As it happens, Monzon previously
mortgaged both properties in favor of Coastal Lending Corp to secure its indebtedness with the latter. Since Monzon
defaulted on its obligation to pay Coastal, the latter Extrajudicially Foreclosed on the mortgage which covered both lots.
Addio Properties acquired the lots at auction. However, there was a residue because the bid price exceeded the mortgage debt.
Consequently, Relova and Perez filed a Petition for Injunction against Monzon and the Clerk of Court of RTC of Tagaytay
and claimed that the residue be delivered to them pursuant to Rule 68 Section 4. In its Answer, Monzon claimed that the
Petition failed to state a cause of action. RTC ruled in favor of Relova and Perez. On appeal, CA dismissed. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RELOVA AND PEREZ ARE ENTITLED TO THE RESIDUE PURSUANT TO SEC 4 OF RULE 68.
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HELD: NO. THIS IS A CASE FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE.

Section 4, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, which is the basis of Relovas alleged cause of action entitling them to the residue of
the amount paid in the foreclosure sale, provides as follows:
SEC. 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale. The amount realized from the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged
property shall, after deducting the costs of the sale, be paid to the person foreclosing the mortgage, and when
there shall be any balance or residue, after paying off the mortgage debt due , the same shall be paid
to junior encumbrancers in the order of their priority, to be ascertained by the court, or if there be no
such encumbrancers or there be a balance or residue after payment to them, then to the mortgagor or his
duly authorized agent, or to the person entitled to it.
However, Rule 68 governs the judicial foreclosure of mortgages. Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages, which was
what transpired in the case at bar, is governed by Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, Section 6 of Republic Act No.
7353, Section 18 of Republic Act No. 7906, and Section 47 of Republic Act No. 8791. A.M. No. 9910050, issued on 14
December 1999, provides for the procedure to be observed in the conduct of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
Thus, we clarified the different types of sales in Supena v. De la Rosa, to wit:
We have three different types of sales, namely: an ordinary execution sale, a judicial foreclosure sale,
and an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. An ORDINARY EXECUTION SALE is governed by the pertinent
provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments. Rule 68 of
the Rules, captioned Foreclosure of Mortgage, governs JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE SALES. On the other hand,
Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property
under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages, applies in cases of EXTRAJUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE SALES of real estate mortgages.
Unlike Rule 68, which governs judicial foreclosure sales, neither Act No. 3135 as amended, nor A.M. No. 9910050 grants to
junior encumbrancers the right to receive the balance of the purchase price. The only right given to second
mortgagees in said issuances is the RIGHT TO REDEEM the foreclosed property pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 3135,
as amended by Act No. 4118, which provides:
Sec. 6. Redemption. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore
referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor,
or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which
the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the
date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty
four to four hundred and sixty six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not
inconsistent with this Act.
Even if, for the sake of argument, Rule 68 is to be applied to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages, such right can only be
given to second mortgagees who are made parties to the (judicial) foreclosure. While a second mortgagee is a proper and
in a sense even a necessary party to a proceeding to foreclose a first mortgage on real property, he is not an
indispensable party, because a valid decree may be made, as between the mortgagor and the first mortgagee, without regard
to the second mortgage; but the consequence of a failure to make the second mortgagee a party to the proceeding is
that the lien of the second mortgagee on the equity of redemption is not affected by the decree of foreclosure .
In view of the foregoing discussions, we find that Relova and Perez do not have a cause of action against the Clerk of
Court for the delivery of the subject amounts on the basis of Section 4, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, for the reason that
the foregoing Rule does not apply to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages.
CASE MAY PROSPER AS TO MONZON
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However, while the case should indeed be dismissed insofar as Atty. Luna is concerned, the same is not necessarily true with
respect to Monzon. Other than Relovas prayer that the amount due to them be delivered by Atty. Luna to them, they also
pray for a judgment declaring Monzon liable for such amounts. Said prayer, as argued by Monzon herself, may
constitute a cause of action for collection of sum of money against Monzon.
The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may elect to waive his security and bring, instead, an ordinary action to
recover the indebtedness with the right to execute a judgment thereon on all the properties of the debtor including
the subject matter of the mortgage, subject to the qualification that if he fails in the remedy elected by him, he cannot pursue
further the remedy he has waived.
However, due to the fact that construing Relovas Petition for Injunction to be one for a collection of sum of money would
entail a waiver by Relova of the mortgage executed over the subject properties, we should proceed with caution before making
such construction. We, therefore, resolve that upon the remand of this case to the trial court, Relova should be ordered to
manifest whether the Petition for Injunction should be treated as a complaint for the collection of a sum of money.
4.
Nagtalon v. UCPB, 702 SCRA 615 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Nagtalon entered into a Credit Accommodation Agreement with UCBP which was secured by a REM over parcels of land in
Aklan. When Nagtalon failed to pay, UCBP extrajudicially foreclosed on the properties. UCPB likewise bought the properties
at auction. After the lapse of the redemption period without redemption being made, UCPB consolidated ownership over the
properties. Also, they filed an Ex Parte Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession with the RTC.
As a result, Nagtalon opposed on the ground that there was a civil case pending assailing the validity of the Credit
Accommodation Agreement. Consequently, RTC held in abeyance the Writ of Possession on the ground of prematurity due to
the pendency of the civil case. MR was denied. On appeal, CA reversed stating that the issuance of the Writ was ministerial
and ordered the RTC to issue the same. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE CAN BAR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION.
HELD: NO. WRIT OF POSSESSION MUST ISSUE. IT IS A MINISTERIAL FUNCTION OF THE RTC.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is
a ministerial function of the court, which cannot be enjoined or restrained, even by the filing of a civil case for the
declaration of nullity of the foreclosure and consequent auction sale .
We have long recognized the rule that once title to the property has been consolidated in the buyers name upon failure
of the mortgagor to redeem the property within the 1-year redemption period, the writ of possession becomes a MATTER
OF RIGHT belonging to the buyer. Consequently, the buyer can demand possession of the property at anytime .
Its right to possession has then ripened into the right of a confirmed absolute owner and the issuance of the writ becomes a
ministerial function that does not admit of the exercise of the courts discretion. The court, acting on an application for
its issuance, should issue the writ as a matter of course and without any delay.
In Spouses Ruben and Violeta Sagun v. Philippine Bank of Communications and Court of Appeals,19 the Court laid down the established
rule on the issuance of a writ of possession, pursuant to Act 3135, as amended. The Court said that a writ of possession
may be issued either
(1) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or
(2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond.
DURING the one-year redemption period, as contemplated by Section 7 of the abovementioned law, a purchaser may
apply for a writ of possession by filing an ex parte motion under oath in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the
property is registered, or in special proceedings in case the property is registered under the Mortgage Law. In this case, a bond
is required before the court may issue a writ of possession.
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On the other hand, UPON THE LAPSE of the redemption period, a writ of possession may be issued in favor of the
purchaser in a foreclosure sale, also upon a proper ex parte motion. This time, no bond is necessary for its issuance; the
mortgagor is now considered to have lost any interest over the foreclosed property. The purchaser then becomes the owner of
the foreclosed property, and he can demand possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership of the property
and the issuance of the corresponding TCT in his/her name. It is at this point that the right of possession of the purchaser can
be considered to have ripened into the absolute right of a confirmed owner. The issuance of the writ, upon proper application,
is a ministerial function that effectively forbids the exercise by the court of any discretion. This second scenario is governed
by Section 6 of Act 3135, in relation to Section 35, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
PENDING CASE NOT A BAR
In the case of Spouses Montano T. Tolosa and Merlinda Tolosa v. United Coconut Planters Bank, a case closely similar to the present
petition, the Court explained that a pending action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure (where the nullity of the
loan documents and mortgage had been alleged) does not stay the issuance of a writ of possession. It reiterated the wellestablished rule that as a ministerial function of the court, the judge need not look into the validity of the mortgage or
the manner of its foreclosure, as these are the questions that should be properly decided by a court of competent jurisdiction
in the pending case filed before it. It added that questions on the regularity and the validity of the mortgage and foreclosure
cannot be invoked as justification for opposing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the new owner.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE MINISTERIAL ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION
(1) Gross inadequacy of purchase price
In Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate Court which involved an execution sale, the court took exception to the general rule in view of
the unusually lower price (P57,396.85 in contrast to its true value of P500,000.00) for which the subject property was sold
at public auction. The Court perceived that injustice could result in issuing a writ of possession under the given factual
scenario and upheld the deferment of the issuance of the writ.
(2) Third party claiming right adverse to debtor/mortgagor
In Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court, consistent with Section 35, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the Court held that the
obligation of a court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure of mortgage case ceases to be
ministerial when a third party in possession of the property claims a right adverse to that of the debtor-mortgagor.
In this case, there was a pending civil suit involving the rights of third parties who claimed ownership over the disputed
property. The Court found the circumstances to be peculiar, necessitating an exception to the general rule. It thus ruled that
where such third party claim and possession exist, the trial court should conduct a hearing to determine the nature of the
adverse possession.
(3) Failure to pay the surplus proceeds of the sale to mortgagor
We also deemed it proper to defer the issuance of a writ in Sulit v. Court of Appeals in light of the given facts, particularly the
mortgagees failure to return to the mortgagor the surplus from the proceeds of the sale (equivalent to an excess of
approximately 40% of the total mortgage debt). We ruled that equitable considerations demanded the deferment of the
issuance of the writ as it would be highly unfair and iniquitous for the mortgagor , who as a redemptioner might choose
to redeem the foreclosed property, to pay the equivalent amount of the bid clearly in excess of the total mortgage debt.
H.
JUDICIAL PARTITION (RULE 69)
1.
Sepulveda v. Pelaez, G.R. No. 152195, January 31, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
Pelaez filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership of his undivided share of several parcels of land against
Pedro Sepulveda, his grand uncle. The parcels of land were inherited from his mother who, in turn, inherited it from her
grandmother. Essentially, it was alleged that Pedro made it appear in under a Project of Partition executed in 1937, that he
owned Pelaezs mothers share in the parcel of land. Despite his demands for Pedro to deliver his mothers share, Pedro refuse
to deliver the same.
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During the pendency of the case, Pedro died. He was then substituted by the adminstratrix of his estate, Soccoro. As Pedros
representative, Soccoro averred that Pelaez failed to implead indispensible parties who were likewise co-owners of the parcel
of land.
Nonetheless, RTC ruled in favor of Pelaez. On appeal, CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT SHOULD PROSPER DESPITE THE FACT THAT INDISPENSIBLE PARTIES WERE NOT
IMPLEADED.
HELD: NO.
The petition is granted for the sole reason that the Pelaez failed to implead as parties, all the indispensable parties in his
complaint.
Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides that in an action for partition, all persons interested in the property
shall be joined as defendants. Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties;
as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.
The mere fact that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. has repudiated the co-ownership between him and the Pelaez does not deprive
the trial court of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for partition, for, in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff
seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject property ; and, second, the conveyance of his lawful
shares. As the Court ruled in De Mesa v. Court of Appeals:
The FIRST STAGE of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is concerned with the determination
of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, that is, it is not otherwise legally
proscribed and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase
may end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the desired partition either because a coownership does not exist or a partition is legally prohibited. It may also end, on the other hand, with an
adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, that partition is proper in the premises, and that
an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in
order.
The SECOND STAGE commences when the parties are unable to agree upon the partition ordered by the
court. In that event, partition shall be effected for the parties by the court with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissioners. This second phase may also deal with the rendition of the accounting
itself and its approval by the Court after the parties have been accorded the opportunity to be heard thereon,
and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just shares in the rents and
profits of the real estate in question.
In the present action, the Pelaez, as the plaintiff in the trial court, failed to implead the following indispensable parties: his
father, Rodolfo Pelaez; the heirs of Santiago Sepulveda, namely, Paz Sepulveda and their children; and the City of Danao
which purchased the property covered by T.D. 19804 (T.D. No. 35090) from
Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. and maintained that it had failed to pay for the purchase price of the property.
Rodolfo Pelaez (father) is an indispensable party he being entitled to a share in usufruct, equal to the share of the
Pelaezs in the subject properties. There is no showing that Rodolfo Pelaez had waived his right to usufruct.
To reiterate, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. Hence, the RTC should have ordered the
dismissal of the complaint.
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I.
EJECTMENT (RULE 70)
1.
Inocencio v. Hospicio de San Jose, 706 SCRA 388 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Hospicio leased a parcel of land to German Inocencio for 1 year and renewed for 1 year periods. The lease stipulated that the
contract is non-transferrable unless prior consent of the lessor is obtained in writing. During the pendency of the lease,
Inocencio built 2 buildings on the land which he subleased. The rents he earned were, in turn, paid to Hospicio.
Later on, German Inocencio died. As such, his son Ramon was the one collecting rents from the sublessees and paid them to
Hospicio. Thereafter, Hospicio informed Ramon that it was terminating the lease effective March 31, 2001. On March 3, 2005,
Hospicio reiterated the termination of the lease and gave Ramon 30 days to vacate.
On June 28, 2005, Hospicio filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against Ramon and his sublesees before the MTC of
Pasay. It alleged that the parcel of land was being illegally occupied since March 31, 2001. MTC ruled in favor of Hospicio. On
appeal, RTC denied it. MR was likewise denied. Thus, Inocencio went up the CA via Rule 42 which affirmed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION.
HELD: NO.
The action for unlawful detainer was not barred by prescription. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that
actions for unlawful detainer must be filed within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession. In interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court, in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation, held that:
[T]he one-year period to file an unlawful detainer case is not counted from the expiration of the lease
contract on 31 December 2002. Indeed, the last demand for petitioners to vacate is the reckoning
period for determining the one-year period in an action for unlawful detainer. Such one year period
should be counted from the date of plaintiffs last demand on defendant to vacate the real property, because
only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful.
Hospicios last demand was made on 3 March 2005, and it filed the complaint for unlawful detainer on 28 June 2005.
Thus, the complaint was filed within the period provided under the Rules of Court.
2.
Serrano v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 162366, November 10, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
Gutierrez filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against Serrano et al in the MTC. They claim that they are the registered owners
of the lot in question and that Serrano et al entered and occupied said lot. Despite their demands to vacate, Serrano et al refuse
to vacate. In their Answer, Serrano et al claims that the lot was part of the estate of their heir.
MTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because it found that the real issue involved is ownership and not merely
possession. Thus, it refused to assume jurisdiction. On appeal, RTC ordered Serrano et al to vacate. Moreover, it concurred
with the finding that the MTC had no jurisdiction. Aggrieved, Serrano appealed. CA affirmed the RTC but stated that the
MTC had jurisdiction over the case even if the issue involved was ownership. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MTC HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE FORCIBLE ENTRY CASE WHERE OWNERSHIP IS AT ISSUE.
HELD: YES.
The MTC clearly erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7691, states:
Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such
cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
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cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession.
Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court further affirms this provisional determination of ownership in ejectment cases,
thus:
Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession .
As the law now stands, inferior courts have jurisdiction to resolve questions of ownership whenever it is necessary to
decide the question of possession in an ejectment case. Corollarily, the RTC erred when it agreed with the MTCs
decision to dismiss the case. Along with the erroneous premise, the RTC also blundered in applying Section 8, Rule 40 of
the Rules of Court.
3.
Esteban v. Marcelo, 703 SCRA 82 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Estaban owned a parcel of land in Mandaluyong wherein they constructed a foundry shop. When this business became
unproductive, Estaban allowed Sps. Marcelo to reside therein for a monthly rental fee. However, the Marcelos stopped paying
rent on March 2001. On Oct. 31, 2005, Estaban sent the spouses a demand letter requiring them to settle their arrears and
vacate within 5 days. Since the Marcelos did not comply, Estaban filed an Action for Unlawful Detainer.
MTC ordered that the Marcelos to vacate since there was a valid ground to eject. RTC affirmed this. On appeal, CA reversed.
It stated that the reckoning point to determine when the action interdictal can be filed started in March 2001 when the Marcelos
stopped paying rent. Since the action was filed only in 2005, the action was no longer cognizable by the MTC. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RECKONING POINT TO FILE AN ACCION INTERDICTAL STARTS ON THE DAY THE CONTRACT
WAS BREACHED.
HELD: NO.
As correctly pointed out by the Esteban, there should first be a demand to pay or to comply with the terms of the lease
and a demand to vacate before unlawful detainer arises.
Since 1947, case law has consistently upheld this rule. Mere failure to pay rents does not ipso facto make unlawful
tenants possession of the premises. It is the owners demand for tenant to vacate the premises, when the tenant has
failed to pay the rents on time, and tenants refusal or failure to vacate, which make unlawful withholding of possession.
Furthermore, in cases where there were more than one demand to pay and vacate, the reckoning point of one year for
filing the unlawful detainer is from the last demand as the lessor may choose to waive his cause of action and let the defaulting
lessee remain in the premises.
4.
Philippine Tourism Authority v. Sabandal-Herzentiel, 701 SCRA 517 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
In 1981, PTA purchased a parcel of land in Cebu from Tri-Island Corporate Holdings Inc. It had been in actual, physical,
continuous, and uninterrupted possession thereof. In 1997, Sabandal-Herzentiel entered into a portion of said land and cut
down trees and introduced improvements. Despite demands to vacate, Sabandal ignored them. As such, PTA filed a
Complaint for Forcible Entry against them in the MTC.
In their Answer, Sabandal averred that the sale by Tri-Island to PTA was void and that PTA did not prove prior possession of
said land. Nonetheless, MTC ordered Sabandal to vacate. On appeal, RTC dismissed the appeal for failure to file a
memorandum. MR denied. In the CA, the MTC and RTC rulings were reversed and ruled that Sabandal was the lawful
possessor because PTA failed to establish that it had prior possession of the property. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
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ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SABANDAL ET AL MAY BE LAWFULLY EJECTED FROM THE PROPERTY.
HELD: YES. SABANDAL DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT IT WAS IN PRIOR POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY
In an ACTION FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of the disputed property
and that the defendant deprived him of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth.
In this case, Sabandal failed to establish their prior and continued possession of the subject property after its sale in
favor of PTA in 1981. On the contrary, they even admitted in their Answer to the complaint that PTA exercised
dominion over the same by instituting caretakers and leasing portions thereof to third persons.
Suffice it to state that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of the ground before he is deemed in possession. Thus, finding PTAs assertion to be well-founded, the MCTC
properly adjudged it to have prior possession over the subject property as against Sabandal-Herzenstiel, who never claimed
ownership or possession thereof.
PTAs supposed failure to describe in detail the manner of Sabandals entry into the subject property is inconsequential.
Jurisprudence states that proving the fact of unlawful entry and the exclusion of the lawful possessor as PTA had
sufficiently demonstrated would necessarily imply the use of force. As held in Estel v. Heirs of Recaredo P. Diego, Sr.:
Unlawfully entering the subject property and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily
imply the use of force and this is all that is necessary. In order to constitute force, the trespasser does
not have to institute a state of war. No other proof is necessary. In the instant case, it is, thus, irrefutable
that respondents sufficiently alleged that the possession of the subject property was wrested from them
through violence and force.
Similarly, in Arbizo v. Santillan, it has been held that the acts of unlawfully entering the disputed premises, erecting a
structure thereon, and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force , as in this case.
In fine, the Court upholds the findings and conclusions of the MCTC, adjudging PTA to be the lawful possessor of the
subject property, square as they are with existing law and jurisprudence. Accordingly, the CAs ruling on the merits must
perforce be reversed and set aside.
J.
CONTEMPT (RULE 71)
1.
Curata v. PPA, supra
QUICKIE FACTS:
In connection with the case filed by PPA to expropriate lots part of the Batangas Port Zone, Presiding Judge Tac-an of RTC
of Batangas issued 2 Orders against PPA despite the previous issuance by the CA of a TRO and Writs of Preliminary
Injunction. As such, PPA a Petition to Cite Judge Tac-An for Contempt. CA resolved to deny the petition for lack of merit.
Thus, the case was elevated to the SC.
However, the First Division considered as moot the issue raised by PPA on the denial of the contempt charge in light of Judge
Tac-ans compulsory retirement. PPA however still filed an MR.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT JUDGE TAC-ANS RETIREMENT RENDERED MOOT THE RESOLUTION OF PPAS PETITION TO SET
ASIDE THE CA RESOLUTION DENYING PPAS PETITION FOR CONTEMPT.
HELD: NO.
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The objective of criminal contempt is to vindicate public authority. It is an effective instrument of preserving and
protecting the dignity and authority of courts of law. Any act or omission that degrades or demeans the integrity of
the court must be sanctioned, lest it prejudice the efficient administration of justice if left unpunished.
Contempt of court applies to all persons, whether in or out of government. Thus, it covers government officials or
employees who retired during the pendency of the petition for contempt. Otherwise, a civil servant may strategize to
avail himself of an early retirement to escape the sanctions from a contempt citation, if he perceives that he would be made
responsible for a contumacious act. The higher interest of effective and efficient administration of justice dictates that
a petition for contempt must proceed to its final conclusion despite the retirement of the government official or
employee, more so if it involves a former member of the bench. While there is still no definitive ruling on this issue when the
judge charged with contempt has retired, we apply by analogy the settled principle in administrative disciplinary cases
that separation from service does not render the case moot and academic.
JUDGE TAC-AN COMMITTED CONTUMACIOUS ACTS
We find that Judge Tac-an committed contumacious acts in utter disobedience of the January 10, 2005, March 15, 2005,
April 19, 2005 and June 3, 2005 Resolutions of the CA. Prior to the Order of Judge Tac-an, he was already aware of the
January 10, 2005 Resolution of the CAs Ninth Division granting a TRO.
Thereafter, Judge Tac-an was already notified that a writ of preliminary injunction was issued against him. Despite
the March 15, 2005-issued writ of preliminary injunction and the April 19, 2005 TRO, Judge Tac-an still acted on the
Manifestation and Motion of the Bureau of Treasury pertaining to the money deposited by PPA with said bureau, when he
knew fully well that such incident was already subject of the injunctive writ and the CA TRO, which was a clear breach
of said processes.
Lastly, Judge Tac-an set and conducted a hearing of Civil Case No. 5447 on June 21, 2005. On June 21, 2005, the Judge
was already notified of the June 3, 2005 CA Resolution ordering him to cease and desist from further proceeding in
Civil Case No. 5447 until further orders from the Honorable Court.
Based on the totality of the foregoing circumstances, the Court finds Judge Paterno Tac-an guilty of indirect contempt
of court.
2.
Fuentes v. Albarracin, A.M. RTJ 05-1587, April 15, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
JS Francisco & Sons filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry aganst Fuentes et al. After trial, MTC Judge Albarracin ruled in favor
of JS Francisco. Thus, Fuentes et al filed with the RTC a Petition for Annulment of Judgment. During the pendency of the
Petition, Judge Albarracin issued a Writ of Demolition. Aggrieved, Fuentes et al filed a Petition for Prohibition to restrain the
judge from acting on the cases while the Petition for Annulment of Judgment was pending.
During the pendency of the Petitoin for Prohibition, the judge issued Writs of Execution and Writs of Demolition. Later on,
JS Fransico filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion seeking the issuance of an order directing the sheriff to enforce said writs of
execution and demolition. Fuentes et al claims that there were not served a copy of said motion and that no hearing was set
therefore. Nonetheless, the judge still granted it.
Thus, Fuentes et al charged the judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law. OCA recommended the dismissal of the
administrative case. Likewise, it recommended that Fuentes et al pay a fine. It stated that the Ex Parte Motion was merely to
request the sheriff to implement the writs of execution and demolition which had previously been issued after several hearings.
Thus, it was considered non-litigious.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE SHOULD PROSPER.
HELD: NO. FINE WAS LIKEWISE EXPUNGED.
This Court has ruled that when a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the publics
confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. However, gross ignorance of the law is
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more than an erroneous application of legal provisions. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a
judge in his judicial capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of
official duties must not only be found to be erroneous but, most importantly, it must be established that he was moved by
bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other like motive. Such circumstances are not obtaining in the case at bar.
The evidence reveals that the judge notified complainants and conducted a hearing before the issuance of the writ of
execution and special writ of demolition. It was only when the execution and demolition were not implemented that,
upon ex parte motion of the plaintiffs, the judge directed Sheriff del Campo to enforce the writ of execution and special
writ of demolition despite the absence of notice and hearing considering that these rights had already been availed of by
Fuentes.
Thus, in issuing the assailed order, the judge merely sought to carry out the expeditious implementation of a judgment
which was already final and executory. For such commendable act, the judge should be praised, not condemned.
NO CONTEMPTUOUS ACT WAS DIRECTED AGAINST THE COURT ITSELF TO PENALIZE FUENTES WITH A FINE
Nonetheless, assuming that the acts of the complainants may be considered as delaying tactics, remedial action may
be enforced against them through contempt of court proceedings. A brief review of the rules governing contempt
proceedings is useful.
CONTEMPT OF COURT is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court, such conduct as tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigant or their
witnesses during litigation.
There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law: direct contempt and indirect contempt.
DIRECT CONTEMPT is committed when a person is guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to
obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same , including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities
toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully
required to do so.
INDIRECT CONTEMPT or CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEMPT is that which is committed out of the presence of the court. Any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice would
constitute indirect contempt. The employment of delaying tactics to obstruct the administration of justice falls under
this latter category.
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the following REQUISITES prior to conviction of indirect
contempt:
(1) a charge in writing to be filed;
(2) an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court; and
(3) to be heard by himself or counsel.
With respect to constructive contempts or those which are committed without the actual presence of the court, it is essential
that a hearing be allowed and the contemner permitted, if he so desires, to interpose a defense to the charges before
punishment is imposed. The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature. The modes of
procedure and rules of evidence adopted in contempt proceedings are similar in nature to those used in criminal prosecutions.
Section 4 of Rule 71, however, provides that proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the
court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt. There is no way for this Court to initiate indirect contempt
proceedings against complainants for the injury was not committed against this tribunal, but against respondent
judge.
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There is no basis for this Court to initiate contempt proceedings or condemn the complainants to suffer the penalty for
contempt, considering that the contemptuous act was not directed against the Court itself . The penalty as
recommended by the OCA cannot be sustained and the question of whether the complainants should be penalized for
filing the instant complaint is best litigated in a separate proceeding, if warranted, within the confines of Rule 71 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
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Remedial Law Review Doctrines (Civil Procedure)

Atty. Tranquil Salvador III

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IN RE: EXEMPTION OF THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION FROM PAYMENT OF

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Batas Pambansa Bilang 129

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JURISDICTION DETERMINED BY ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

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Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires;

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JURISDICTION V. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION

the court where the carrier is domiciled;

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NO VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION TO JURISDICTION

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CAUSE OF ACTION (RULE 2)

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the former judgment must be final;

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Atty. Tranquil Salvador III

Art. 1302. It is presumed that there is legal subrogation:

Remedial Law Review Doctrines (Civil Procedure)

Atty. Tranquil Salvador III