Anaxagoras' Parmenidean

Cosmology: Worlds within Worlds

within the One
John E. Sisko

The aim of this paper is to suggest a limited solution to a long-standing

puzzle regarding the history of Pre-Socratic philosophical cosmology.
The puzzle concerns the development of post-Parmenidean pluralism.
Specifically, it concerns the relationship between Parmenides' account
of existence and the physical theories advanced by Democritus, Empedocles and Anaxagoras.
Parmenides argues that all that is is one, an ungenerable, imperishable, and unchangeable whole (DK 28 B 8.3, 8.6 & 8.38). Further, he
asserts that all that is is continuous, lacking in nothing, and full of what
is (DK 28 B 8.6 & 8.24). Debate over the precise nature of Parmenides'
theory continues, but it is widely accepted that he advances a thesis of
'real monism': numerical monism.1 According to Parmenides, there is,

This view is endorsed in Montgomery Furth, 'Elements of Eleatic Ontology', in

A.P.D. Mourelatos, ed., The Presocratics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1974), 241-70; G.E.L. Owen, 'Eleatic Questions' 1986 (/1960); rev. ed. reprinted in
Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1986), 3-26;
D.J. Furley, 'Melissus of Samos', in K. Boudouns, ed., Ionian Philosophy (Athens:
International Association for Greek Philosophy 1989), 114-22; David Gallop, Parmemdes ofElea: Fragments (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1984), esp. 40 n 81;
David Sedley, 'Parmenides and Melissus' in A.A. Long, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy (Cambndge: Cambridge University Press 1999), 113-33;
Aryeh Finkleberg, 'Parmenides: Material and Logical Monism', Archivfr Geschichte
der Philosophie 70 (1988), 1-14; Theo Sinnige, Matter and Infinity m the Presocratic
Schools and Plato (Assen: Van Gorcum 1971), esp. 45; John Malcolm, 'On Avoiding

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88 John E. Sisko

within physical reality, numerically one thing and what this one thing is
it has always been and shall always be. It is an immobile, unalterable,
and homogeneous whole. At first blush, this theory seems paradoxical;
for, when we look to the world of appearance, we see that there is more
than just one thing, we see that objects are created and destroyed, and
we see that various items move and undergo qualitative change. However, according to the widely accepted view, this seeming paradox fails
to give Parmenides pause. For he is an arch-rationalist: he is willing to
follow what he understands to be the requirements of reason no matter
where they might lead. Consequently, Parmenides considers the world
of appearance to be an illusion and he thinks that those who trust in such
a world amount to nothing more than a dazed, ignorant, horde of mere
mortals (DK 28 B 6.4-9).
Parmenides advances persuasive arguments in support of his theory.
His initial argument centers on the unintelligibility of negation. He
argues that no thing can be nothing and no thing can be fruitfully
described as not-a-thing (DK 28 B 2). From his critique of negation,
Parmenides advances the thesis of 'No Becoming'. He argues that there
is no thing which comes-to-be, for such a thing would have to come-to-be
out of what is not (or out of what it is not) and 'not' is unintelligible (DK
28 B 8.19-21). Further, he holds, that there is no thing which ceases-to-be,
for, presumably, such a thing would have to perish into what is not (or
into what it is not) and, again, 'not' is unintelligible. In addition, Parmenides utilizes his own critique of negation in order to advance the
thesis of 'real monism'. He argues that what exists is both one and
continuous, for what is cannot be spatially contiguous with or hindered

the Void', Oxford Studies m Ancient Philosophy 9 (1991), 75-94; G.S. Kirk, J E. Raven
& M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers. (Second edition). (Cambridge. Cambridge University Press 1983), 250-4; R. McKirahan, Philosophy Before Socrates (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 1994), esp. 175. Some argue that Parmenides
does not advance a thesis of 'real monism'. See Jonathan Barnes, Tarmenides and
the Eleatic One', Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 61 (1979a), 1-21; A.P.D. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1971), esp
130-3; Patricia Curd, Tarmenidean Monism', Phronesis, 35 (1991), 241-64, and P.
Curd, The Legacy of Parmenides: Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1998). I concur with the widely accepted view
But, for the purpose of this paper, it need only be supposed that Anaxagoras
understood Parmenides to be a numerical monist.

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Anaxagoras' Parmenidean Cosmology 89

by what is not (or by what it is not), since, once again, 'not' is unintelligible (DK 28 B 8.22-25 & 8.46-48).
Several philosophers from the generation subsequent to Parmenides'
own incorporate the thesis of 'No Becoming' into their own cosmological
theories. While these philosophers, unlike Parmenides, are pluralists,
each thinks that the basic constituents of the cosmos are imbued with
what has now come to be called 'Parmenidean Being'. That is, each holds
that there are basic material stuffs which are eternal and unchanging in
their essential nature. For Democritus the basic constituents of the cosmos are atoms and void (DK 68 A 37); for Empedocles these are the four
elements: earth, air, fire, and water (DK 31 B 17); and for Anaxagoras
these are many, indeed, quite many things. Among those mentioned in
the surviving fragments are the wet and the dry, the hot and the cold,
the bright and the dark, colours, flavours, earth, flesh and seeds (DK 59
B 4a.l-4,4b.3-6 and 10.1-2).2
These philosophers embrace the thesis of 'No Becoming', but they also
assert plurality, and this brings us to the long-standing puzzle. For, when
we look to the surviving fragments of the pluralists, we find, in each case,
that something is conspicuously absent. What is absent is an argument
that is meant to justify pluralism. The pluralists accept the thesis of 'No
Becoming', which Parmenides derives from his own critique of negation.
Yet, they seem to simply posit their own pluralism, even though Parmenides rejects pluralism in light of his critique of negation. The pluralists appear to beg the question against Parmenides. So, the relationship
between Parmenides and the pluralists presents historians of philosophy
with an interesting puzzle: Why do the pluralists so readily reject monism, while endorsing key features of the account which leads Parmenides to embrace monism?

There is a substantial body of literature on Anaxagoras' understanding of seeds. I

follow Jonathan Barnes and Malcolm Schofield in supposing that the account of
seeds is nothing more than an elaboration on Anaxagoras' Principle of Universal
Mixture (discussed below). On this interpretation the claim that a seed of X is in
means that may grow from X (as any type of substance may emerge from any
other type of substance on Anaxagoras' account). See Jonathan Barnes, The
Presocrattc Philosophers, v.2 (London 1979b), 21 and Malcolm Schofield, An Essay on
Anaxagoras (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1980), 130-1. For a recent
criticism of this view see Eric Lewis, 'Anaxagoras and the Seeds of a Physical
Theory', Apeiron 33 (2000), 1-24.

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90 John E. Sisko

I wish to propose a limited solution to this puzzle. My solution

concerns only the relationship between Anaxagoras' physical theory and
Parmenides' arguments. I suggest that Anaxagoras has little need to
argue against Parmenides, because Anaxagoras' own cosmology begins
right where Parmenides' cosmology leaves off. Anaxagoras accepts the
basic tenets that Parmenides draws from the critique of negation, but he
then proceeds to show how a specific sort of plurality might be brought
to light within Parmenides' One.3 That is, Anaxagoras develops a pluralistic cosmology which is consistent with Parmenides' foundational
claims about the One.
Now, even the more charitable reader shall not, at first, find this thesis
to be especially plausible. Such a reader is likely to judge the thesis to be
at most half right. For, it is well known that Anaxagoras ostensibly
divides the history of the cosmos into two periods, an initial staue period
and a subsequent dynamic period. And, while the initial period the
period of the Primordial Chaos has features that are taken to suggest
a possible kinship with Parmenides' One, the latter period the period
of the Whirl is, universally, held to be overtly and objectively dissimilar to the One.4 In this paper, I hope to correct certain broadly held
misconceptions about Anaxagoras' cosmology. I shall argue that
Anaxagoras' cosmos, in each of its purported periods, conforms with the
basic definitional requirements for Parmenides' One: the Primordial
Chaos is Parmenides' One under an alternate description, and the Whirl
the dynamic period of the cosmos in which the world, as we know it,
has come to be formed meets the fundamental requirements for
Parmenides' One. Anaxagoras provides a substantially Parmenidean

3 In this paper, I follow the practice of calling the numerical unity, which constitutes
all that exists on Parmenides' account, 'the One'. However, it should be noted that,
while Parmenides attributes unity to that which exists (see DK 28 B 8.6), he does not
explicitly call this unitary being 'the One'
4 Some scholars accept the view that Anaxagoras' Primordial Chaos is meant to be
equivalent to Parmenides' One. See C.D.C. Reeve, 'Anaxagorean Panspermism',
Ancient Philosophy 1 (1981), 89-108, esp. 102, n 56; and D. Graham, 'Empedocles and
Anaxagoras: Responses to Parmenides', in A.A. Long, ed., 1999,159-80. Others reject
this view. See, for example, Jonathan Barnes, 1979b, 38. Yet, even those scholars who
accept that the Primordial Chaos meets the definitional requirements for the One,
tend to argue that the cosmos of the dynamic period violates basic Parmenidean
principles. See C.D C. Reeve, 1981,104 and D. Graham, 1999,173.

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Anaxagoras' Parmenidean Cosmology 91

account of the existence of our world within the heavens. Yet, he does a
great deal more. Anaxagoras not only argues for a world of plurality
within a Parmenidean framework, he argues for a plurality of worlds
within this selfsame framework. Anaxagoras maintains that our world
is one among many, possibly infinitely many, worlds nested within the
heavens and, interestingly, the existence of such a plurality of worlds
does nothing to violate the basic definitional requirements for Parmenides' One. So, all in all, I shall show that Anaxagoras' cosmology is
uniquely Parmenidean: it is a cosmology of worlds within worlds within
the One.5

Parmenides
Let us agree that, for Parmenides, there is numerically one thing in
existence: the One. This unity possesses a number of salient features and
certain of these features are basic insofar as they issue directly from
Parmenides' reflections on negation. In order to avoid positing either a
that-which-is-not simpliciter or a that-which-is-not-the-One, Parmenides
maintains that the One cannot fail to be complete in respect to time or
space, or even quality. He argues that the One is (1) eternal, (2) spatially
unbounded (as a material plenum), and (3) predicationally saturated (it
possesses all predicates, of a given sort, everywhere throughout itself).
In addition, Parmenides maintains that the One is (4) immobile, (5)
unalterable and (6) phenomenally homogeneous. These latter features
of the One are non-basic insofar as they do not issue directly from
Parmenides' reflections on negation. Since a firm grasp of the salient
features of the One is crucial to the project of discerning Anaxagoras'
Parmenidean commitments, let us consider each feature in rum.
(1) The One is eternal. The One is without generation or destruction.
Parmenides advances a pair of arguments against generation (but he
leaves it to the reader to supply analogous arguments against destruction). First, he appeals to the thesis of 'No Becoming', which is derived

I borrow the phrase 'worlds within worlds' from D. Graham, 'The Postulates of
Anaxagoras', Apeiron 27 (1994), 77-121, esp. 105. Graham compares the infinite
regress of ingredients in Anaxagorean substances to Leibniz' account of worlds
within worlds in the Monadology. Graham does not suggest that, for Anaxagoras,
our world is one among a plurality of worlds within the cosmos.

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92 ]ohn E. Sisko

from his own critique of negation. He argues that no thing can come-tobe out of what is not (or out of what it is not), since 'not' is unintelligible
(see DK 28 B 8.3-9). Second, he argues against the possibility of a first
event. Parmenides asks, if what-is is to be generated, 'what could have
made it grow later rather than sooner?' (DK 28 B 8.9-10). His argument
rests on a particular application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
Admitting the possibility of time distinctions, Parmenides suggests that
if there had been a first event (the generation of what-is) at some time f,
then there must be a sufficient reason for this event having occurred at
f and not at some earlier time f-n.6 Since there is no such reason, there
could not have been a first event at t, nor, for that matter, could there have
been such an event at any other time. Thus, having shown that a first
event is impossible (and having supposed that a last event is similarly
impossible), Parmenides concludes that the One is complete insofar as
it has neither a temporal beginning nor a temporal end.
(2) The One is an infinitely extended material plenum. Parmenides argues
that the One is spatially complete. He states,
... [it] is completed,
From every direction like the bulk of a well-rounded sphere,
Equally balanced in every way from the center; for [it] must not
be any larger
Or any smaller here or there;
For there is not what-is-not, which could stop it from reaching
[its] like ... (DK 28 B 8.42-7, Trans. Gallop with slight changes)

Here I take up a line of interpretation that was introduced in G.E.L. Owen, 1974
(/1966), 'Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present', reprinted in A.P.D. Mourelatos, ed., 1974,279-82. Owen ultimately rejects this line and instead maintains that
Parmenides attacks the very notion of temporal distinctions. According to Owen,
Parmenides does not think that the One is eternal, rather he thinks that it exists in
a 'timeless present'. One reason why Owen rejects the view that Parmenides admits
time-distinctions is that Anaxagoras, in responding to Parmenides' challenge, not
only theorizes about a first event in an otherwise static cosmos, but also'... <takes>
. . no care to meet the query why it should have happened when it did.' (Owen,
ibid., 282). I shall argue (below) that Anaxagoras, together with Empedocles,
circumvents the problem of a first event. Thus, I see no reason to reject the notion
that Parmenides admits time-distinctions.

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Anaxagoras' Parmenidean Cosmology 93

Parmenides' use of spatial language in this passage is unmistakeable. He

maintains that the One is physically extended in a manner that lacks
both variation and any sign of imperfection. There is, however, an initial
lack of clarity about the precise nature of the One's spatial perfection. On
the one hand, Parmenides compares the One to the bulk of a sphere
(8.43) and this might be taken to suggest that the One is spherical.7 On
the other hand, he claims that the One is not hindered by what-is-not
(8.46) and this might be taken to suggest that the one is without spatial
limit and is infinitely extended.8 A moment's reflection shows that, for
Parmenides, the One is infinitely extended in space. First, the One
cannot be spherical, since it would then be bordered by what-is-not, and
'not' (as we have learned) is unintelligible. Second, and more importantly, Parmenides does not actually claim that the One is spherical.
Instead, he claims that the One is akin to the bulk of a sphere insofar as
it exhibits equal balance. Yet, such balance is not exhibited about some
one center. Instead, it is exhibited about each and every location within
the One. For, in elucidating the character of this balance, Parmenides
claims that the One 'must not be any larger or any smaller here or there'
(8.44-45) and this suggests that any location within the One must itself
stand as a point of equal balance (or equilibrium). Now, while only a
single location within a sphere (i.e., the center) will stand as a point of
balance, any location within an infinitely extended plenum will stand as
such a point. So, Parmenides' One is an infinitely extended material
plenum. It is spatially complete, existing with neither a physical beginning nor a physical end.9
(3) The One is predicationally saturated. It is qualitatively complete:
every predicate, of the sort with which Parmenides is concerned, is
instantiated both within the One as a whole and within every region of

7 David Sedley maintains that Parmenides' One is literally spherical. See his 1999,117
and 125.
8 Many scholars hold that the One is infinitely extended. See, for example, D. Gallop,
1984,20; G.E.L. Owen, 1986 (/1960), 20; and R. McKirahan, 1994,172-3.
9 Parmenides does claim that the One has a limit (; DK 28 B 8.26, 8.31 & 8.49)
and this might, at first, be taken to mean that it has a spatial limit. But, as G.E.L.
Owen has persuasively argued, Parmenides uses to mark the fixity or
uniformity of what-is. He does not use this term to mark a spatial boundary. See
Owen, 1986 (/1960), 20.

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94 JohnE.Sisko
the One.10 The demand for predicational saturation issues from Parmenides' reflections on negation. He contends that no negative predicate
no predicate of the form not-F can be instantiated within physical
reality, while all positive predicates predicates of the form F are
instantiated (see DK 28 B 8,33 & b.37-38). On the face of it, this contention
is highly problematic; for it would seem that if we were to attribute two
non-synonymous positive predicates to the One, we would violate Parmenides' prohibition against negative predication. Consider, for example, the attribution of both hot and cold to the One (although, we need
not focus only on contraries). Once we acknowledge that hot is not-cold
and cold is not-hot, such attribution brings negative predicates in its
train.11 However, this is not a problem that confronts Parmenides; for he
approaches issues of predication from the perspective of the naive metaphysics of things.12 His predicational concerns range over, what we now
call, mass-terms (like earth and fire) and quality-powers, or qualitythings (like dry and black, taken as independent things). Parmenides is
neither concerned with relational predicates (like the left of) nor is he
concerned with other ancillary predicates (like of this quantity, taken as
dependent upon more basic things). Further, the predicates that interest
Parmenides are considered to mark 'things' that are conceptually independent of one another. So, for Parmenides, hot fails to be not-cold and
cold fails to be not-hot.13 From his perspective, the attribution of multiple
non-synonymous predicates to the One fails to be problematic. For if the
One were both hot and cold (and each throughout itself), then we could
not say that what-is is not-hot and we could not say that it is not-cold

10 This view is endorsed in Furth, 1974, 267-8 and in McKirahan, 1994,166 and 169.
11 This particular worry has caused some to suggest that Parmenides is a predicational
monist. On this view, Parmenides holds that, regarding what-is, we can say no more
than that it is: only a single predicate, being, can be attributed to the One. See Curd,
1991,242 7. Curd, herself, does not endorse this view.
12 See A.P.D. Mourelatos, 'Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the Naive Metaphysics of
Things', in Exegesis and Argument, E.N. Lee, A.P.D. Mourelatos and R. Rorty, eds.
(Assen: Van Gorcum 1973), 16-48.
13 The core difficulty within the admittedly false cosmology that is introduced in the
second part of Parmenides' poem (at DK 28 B 8.55-61) is that fundamental objects
(like aetherial fire) are defined as being conceptually dependent on their opposites:
each is what its opposite is not. If this is the source of difficulty in the false
cosmology, then it cannot be a part of Parmenides' positive ontology.

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Anaxagoras' Parmenidean Cosmology 95

(further, we could not say that any part of what-is is not-hot or not-cold);
for in being both hot and cold it would neither be not-hot nor not-cold. So,
from Parmenides' perspective, there is no difficulty with attributing all
positive predicates to the One. The One is predicationally saturated: it is
qualitatively complete.
(4) The One is immobile. Beyond the basic features of being complete in
respect to time, space and quality, the One has a number of non-basic
features. Chief among these is immobility. Parmenides maintains that
the One is infinitely extended and lacking any sort of empty space within
itself. It is full and complete in every direction and, so, it is entirely
'chained up' (cf. DK 28 B 8.14). Thus, Parmenides contends that the One
cannot locomote as a whole, having no external space into which it might
move. Further, he contends that there cannot be locomotion within the
One, since there are no empty spaces within it into which some part of
it might move.14 Parmenides' explicit argument against such internal
locomotion issues from his concern over whether the putative physical
laws of the plenum might allow for a separation of the One into a
plurality. He states,
Look upon things which, though far off, are yet firmly present
to the mind;
For you shall not split off () what-is from holding fast
to what-is,
neither being dispersed () itself in every way
everywhere in order,
Nor being gathered together ().
(DK 28 B 4, trans. Gallop, with slight changes).

Parmenides contends that any process of dispersal and gathering (which

might fracture the One into many), requires a splitting, or cutting, within
the One. Such splitting is not possible, insofar as it would require the
emergence of empty space (or void), i.e., the emergence of that-which-

14 See P.J. Bicknell, Tarmenides Refutation of Motion and an Implication', Phronesis

12 (1967), 1-5; W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, v.2, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1965), 36; Owen, 1986 (/1960), 22-3, and John Malcolm,
1991, esp. 85-7 and 91-4.

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96 John E. Sisko
is-not simpliciter, within the One and this is unintelligible.15 Thus, the One
is completely immobile.
(5) The One is unalterable. Second among the non-basic features of the
One is its inability to undergo qualitative change. Parmenides contends
that alteration within the One would require a mode of change that is
independent of locomotion and, consequently, alteration would require
that some attribute, at a given location within the One, should perish,
while another is generated in its place (DK 28 B 8.29-31). Since both
generation and perishing are prohibited on the grounds that they introduce negation and are, thus, unintelligible (DK 28 B 8.6-21), Parmenides
contends that the One is wholly unalterable.
(6) The One is phenomenally homogeneous. Last among the non-basic
features of the One is its lack of apparent differentiation. Since the One
is complete in respect to time, space and quality, it lacks any internal
variability and, as such, it can only appear as a uniform mass.16 The One
is phenomenally homogeneous.

Anaxagoras (1): Principles

Anaxagoras proposes four principles within his physics: the principle of
no becoming (PNB), the principle of universal mixture (PUM), the principle
of predominance (PP), and the principle of infinite divisibility (PID).17 PNB is

15 What is especially interesting about Parmenides' treatment of the possibility of

generating a numerical plurality out of the One is his assumption that internal
locomotion would require a cutting, or splitting, within the One and, thus, would
require the generation of empty space. If Parmenides' argument is to work, it must
be the case that dispersal and gathering can be achieved only through cutting. Yet,
there is no necessary connection between these processes and cutting. For, cyclical
motion causes dispersal and gathering, and it is conceptually possible for such
motion to occur in a void-less plenum. (Strata's experiment of taking a sealed jar
full of water with a pebble inside and turning it upside down was meant to show
as much. See J. Barnes, 1979, v.2,99.) Parmenides does not consider the possibility
of cyclical motion when he theorized about the plenum. But, Anaxagoras does. And
(as we shall see) by supposing that cyclical morion can occur in a material plenum,
Anaxagoras is able to bring plurality to light within Parmenides' One.
16 See Gallop, 1984,16.
17 For PNB, see DK 59 B 10 & 17; for PUM, see B 1,4,6, & 12; for PP, see B 12; and for
PID, see B1,3, & 6.1 shall not discuss the supposed principle of homoiomerity, since,

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Anaxagoras' Parmenidean Cosmology 97

Table 1
Parmenldes
The One
Eternal
Infinitely extended plenum
Predicationally saturated
Immobile
Unalterable
Phenomenally homogeneous

V
V
V
V
V
V

a Parmenidean legacy. But, as Anaxagoras understands this principle, it

allows for the appearance of change within the cosmos: while there is
neither true generation nor true destruction, there can be change as a
function of the redistribution of pre-existing things. Anaxagoras states,
The Greeks do not employ (the words) "coming to be" and "perishing"
correctly, for nothing comes into being or is even destroyed; rather,
from (pre-)existing things there is combining and breaking up. They
would, therefore, be correct to call coming-to-be "combining"
() and perishing "breaking up" (). (DK 59 B
17, trans. Sider)

Other post-Parmenidean pluralists share this general view. But the

special nature of Anaxagoras' physics becomes apparent once we consider his treatment of the basic material stuffs of the cosmos. Here PUM

on the evidence of the fragments alone, there is no basis for attributing this principle
to Anaxagoras. For an excellent discussion of the logical relations among
Anaxagoras' principles, see D. Graham, 1994. The standard critical edition of the
fragments with English translation is D. Sider, The Fragments of Anaxagoras: edited
with Introduction and Commentary (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain 1981).
A translation and commentary, by Patricia Curd, is due to be published in the near
future.

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98 John E. Sisko

and PP are crucial. According to Anaxagoras, each kind of thing that is

is contained within each kind of thing that is. This is PUM. This principle
requires that a body of water (for instance) contains not only a portion
of water but also portions of each and every other kind of thing that is.
Such a body contains earth, flesh, heat, cold and all the other sorts of
things that exist. What makes it water, as opposed to something else, is
that it has water as a predominant ingredient. The (phenomenal) substance water is what it is, because there is more (elemental) water within
it than any other substance.18 This is PP. If the body of water were to
change, say, if some of the water were to disperse, leaving behind what
appears to be salt, this change would be brought about through a
redistribution of things that had existed within the water (conjoined with
a redistribution of some of the things that had existed outside of the
water). The deposit left behind would be salt, because salt would have
become its predominant ingredient. (Yet the deposit would still have a
portion of each kind of thing within it, including a portion of water.) Such
redistribution might be thought to introduce the possibility of pure
elements and, as a consequence, place PUM in jeopardy. For, one might
suppose that if we were to continue extracting the other elements from
the sal t, we would eventually be left with a sample of pure salt. However,
PID saves Anaxagoras' system from this inconsistency. P1D requires that
there is no smallest bit of what is and, so, redistribution need not, and
cannot, reveal a pure element.19 For whatever we might (mistakenly)

18 The distinction between phenomenal substances and elemental substances is introduced by C. Strang. See his 'The Physical Theory of Anaxagoras', Archiv f r
Geschichte der Philosophie 45 (1963) 101-18. The distinction is merely a relative one.
That is, while at one level of analysis shall be an elemental substance within the
phenomenal substance X, once some of this is extracted from X, that which is
extracted becomes a phenomenal substance which can, in turn, be analyzed in terms
of the elemental substances which it contains. On Strang's account there is no
ultimate (or pure) elemental substance.
19 Graham argues that, if we assume the starting point of the Primordial Chaos,
Anaxagoras' principles would be forever maintained in the cosmos only if one were
to posit a Law of Distribution such that' ... if <any> Body A were divided into
Bodies and C, the quantity of element in A would be distributed between and
C.' (Graham, 1994, 100). Graham supposes that, for Anaxagoras, this law is a
contingent fact about the universe. My thesis implies that the Law of Distribution
is motivated by the Parmenidean demand for predicational saturation.

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Anaxagoras' Parmenidean Cosmology 99

suppose to be the smallest bit of a thing would still have room in it for
bits of every other kind of thing.
And yet, to speak of T?its' of matter in Anaxagorean physics is,
technically, a mistake. Anaxagoras did not propose a particulate theory
of matter and, if his theory is to hang together, one must suppose that
Anaxagorean 'things' are something like inter-penetrating fluids (or
infinitesimal powders).20 PUM, together with PID, suggests that matter
is continuous and has the nature of a fluid. On Anaxagoras' view, the
various phenomenal items that are constituted by matter are nothing
more than localized pockets in which one sort of fluid material predominates over the other sorts. Thus, all change, on his model, reduces to
localized shifts of predominance among the various types of matter.
Further, these types of matter inter-penetrate one another to the extent
that there cannot be a location, no mater how small, from which any one
type is absent.21 Finally, Anaxagoras supposes that the cosmos is infinite
in size.22 For, he not only flat-out states,'... [the] surrounding matter [of
the heavens] is infinite in amount' (DK 59 B 2), but he also offers a
positive rationale for taking reality to be both infinitely extended and
infinitely divisible. He states,
... of the small there is no smallest, but always a smaller ... Moreover,
there is always (something) larger than the large; and it is equal to the
small in plenitude, but in relation to itself it is both large and small. (DK
59 B 3, trans. Sider)

Here Anaxagoras contends that for any given spatial magnitude there is
not only another that is smaller by a given proportion, but there is in
addition yet another that is larger by the same proportion. This explains
why he thinks that any one thing can be said to be both large and small
in respect to itself. While some object may be half the size of a given
object, there is yet another object that is double the size. Thus, any given

20 See Graham, 1994,102-4 and R. Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion (London: Duckworth 1988), 64.
21 Reeve puts this clearly, when he states, Tor every entity x, place p, and time t: x is
at at t: See his 1981,104.
22 Most scholars agree. For representative arguments see Sider, 1981,54; McKirahan,
1994,227; Taran, 1965,152 and Schofield, 1980,83.

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100 John E. Sisko

object shall be in one respect a double and in another respect a half: it

shall be large and small in respect to itself. So, Anaxagoras understands
the cosmos to be an infinite sea of inter-penetrating fluid material, a sea
in which the predominance of some material in a given location determines the nature of the phenomenal thing that is constituted at that
location.
It is generally acknowledged that the material principles of Anaxagoras' physics are not sufficient to explain the occurrence of change
within the cosmos. These principles might govern an entirely static
world. And Anaxagoras seems to treat the cosmos as if it were up to a
unique moment in time a static plenum. In order to explain the apparent
emergence of change within the cosmos, Anaxagoras introduced a motive cause. This cause is nous (or mind). Nous, he suggests, is responsible
for the emergence of a whirl (or vortex) within the otherwise static
cosmos and this whirl sets off a redistribution of matter, which is the
basis for all subsequent change within the cosmos. By introducing nous
as motive cause, Anaxagoras ostensibly divides the history of the cosmos
into two periods: an initial static period and a subsequent dynamic
period.23 Let us consider each period in turn.

Anaxagoras (2): Primordial Chaos

Simplicius tells us that Anaxagoras began his book with the following
description of the Primordial Chaos:
All things were together, infinite in regard to plenitude; for the small
too was infinite. Since all things were together, nothing was clear
because of smallness; for aer and aither pervaded all things, both being
infinite. (DK 59 B 1, trans. Sider)

Anaxagoras' Primordial Chaos is an infinitely extended mass which

lacks any manifest characteristics. The Chaos has no evident nature,
because aer and aither, themselves possessing opposed qualities (aer is

23 It shall be argued (below) that the bifurcation of the history of the cosmos is, for
Anaxagoras, merely a heuristic device. There is, for Anaxagoras, not a single
moment in the history of the heavens in which there is absolutely no motion.

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Anaxagoras' Parmenidean Cosmology 101

dense, cold, dark and heavy, while aither is rare, hot, bright and light24),
jointly predominate within the mixture. As a result, each of these two
elements prevents the other from becoming manifest. The Chaos, thus,
remains as a murky and qualitatively indeterminate mass (a primordial
soup, if you will).
Recent discussion of Anaxagoras' theory has focused on the ways in
which his account seems to challenge the Parmenidean world-view.25
Anaxagoras speaks of a plurality of 'things' (; DK 59 B 1.1), whereas
Parmenides speaks of a 'unity' (ev; DK 28 B 8.6). Further, Anaxagoras
suggests that some things have existed in the past which do not exist in
the present and some things that exist in the present shall not exist in the
future (DK 59 B 12.17-19), whereas Parmenides proclaims that what-is
exists alone throughout all time (DK 28 B 8.5 and 8.14). In each case,
Anaxagoras' language is in strict opposition to the language that we find
in Parmenides' poem. However, such differences in language should not
be taken to suggest that Anaxagoras' Primordial Chaos fails to meet the
definitional requirements for Parmenides' One. For, the Chaos does, in
fact, meet these requirements. First, the Chaos is complete in respect to
time and space, and quality. It is eternal, lacking a beginning and lacking
any internal temporal distinctions. It is infinitely extended, having no
spatial boundary. And it is predicationally saturated: each positive
predicate can be meaningfully attributed to any location within the
Chaos. Thus, Anaxagoras' Primordial Chaos possesses each of the basic
feature of the One. Second, the Chaos is unmoved, unaltered, and, as a
static plenum, lacking any internal differentiation, it stands as a phenomenally homogeneous mass. Thus, the Chaos possesses each of the
non-basic features of the One. So, as Anaxagoras describes the Primordial
Chaos, it meets each of the definitional requirements for Parmenides'
One and, up to this point, Anaxagoras' physics does not stand in opposition to Parmenidean Monism. Clearly, Anaxagoras posits the Primordial Chaos as a surrogate for Parmenides' One.

24 See Sider, 1981,47.

25 See Owen, 1974 (/1966), 276 and Schofield, 1980,

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102 John E. Sisko

Table 2
Parmenides
The One
Eternal
Infinitely extended plenum
Predicationally saturated
Immobile
Unalterable
Phenomenally homogeneous

V
V
V

Anaxagoras
The Chaos
V
V
V
Unmoved
Unaltered
V

Anaxagoras (3): The Whirl

The Primordial Chaos is a uniform and undifferentiated sea of matter.

Yet, once the whirl surfaces, we enter into a new age. This is an age of
seeming plurality: it is an age in which the world as we now it comes to
be formed. The cosmos of the whirl is a cosmos of motion and phenomenal change. It is (in part) our familiar world of appearance. It is the very
world that Parmenides rejects as illusory. For this reason, scholars standardly suppose that the cosmos of the whirl fails to meet the definitional
requirements for Parmenides' One. This, however, is not correct. A close
examination of the fragments shows that Anaxagoras' dynamic cosmos
is akin to the One. The cosmos of the whirl possesses each of the basic
properties of the One and it approximates each of its non-basic properties.
Further, in regard to the limited differences (between the whirl and the
One), Anaxagoras provides a clear rationale for diverging from Parmenides' position.
Let us turn to the account of nous and the whirl. Anaxagoras states,
... Nous came to control the whole revolution, so that revolution would
begin ( ). And at first it began to revolve out from a small area
( ), it then revolves more
widely, and will revolve over a still greater area. And Nous gave heed
to all the things coming together, separating out and breaking up; and
whatever sorts of things were to be what were and are no longer,
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Anaxagoras' Parmenidean Cosmology 103

revolution ( ) through which now revolve the

stars, sun, moon, aer, and aither which separated .... (DK 59 12.13-21,
trans. Sider)

Anaxagoras claims that nous, beginning from a small area, controls an

ever-expanding vortex. All change within this dynamic cosmos is
brought about through a cyclical redistribution of matter. But, this
redistribution can never be completed, owing to PUM together with the
infinite extension and infinite divisibility of the cosmos.
The cosmos of the whirl, like the Primordial Chaos, possesses the basic
features of Parmenides' One. First, this dynamic cosmos has no spatial
boundary: it is infinite in size. Second, since the cosmos of the whirl is
governed by PUM, it remains a predicationally saturated plenum. And
third, since this cosmos is a development of the Chaos, it too is eternal.26
Anaxagoras' dynamic cosmos does not possess the non-basic properties of Parmenides' One; for, within it, we find local motion together with
phenomenal alteration and heterogeneity. However, this cosmos does
approximate the non-basic properties of the One. First, it possesses global
phenomenal homogeneity. Since there is an unlimited quantity of matter
within the cosmos and the relative portions of each type of matter remain
constant, aer and aither continue to jointly predominate throughout the
history of the whirl such that the cosmos as a whole shall continually
seem to be a static and qualitatively uniform mass. Yet, deep within this
mass, localized shifts in predominance cause the emergence of phenomenal differences. And this certainly marks a departure from Parmenides' One. But, Anaxagoras does not beg the question against
Parmenides in regard to phenomenal homogeneity. For Parmenides
does not offer an argument for homogeneity. He merely assumes that
thoroughgoing homogeneity would be an immediate consequence of
predicational saturation. Anaxagoras shows us that Parmenides' assumption is faulty. He does so by developing an account that allows for
phenomenal heterogeneity without sacrificing predicational saturation.
While phenomenal heterogeneity is caused by localized shifts among
types of matter, no type of matter is ever excluded from any region of

26 One might argue that even if the whirl has no temporal terminus, it has a temporal
beginning and, thus, fails to be eternal. This would be correct, if Anaxagoras'
bifurcation of the history of the heavens were not merely a heuristic device. It shall
be argued (below) that the whirl has no temporal beginning.

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104 John E. Sisko

the cosmos (no matter how small that region might be) and, so, predicational saturation is maintained throughout.27 Thus, by introducing a
limited form of non-homogeneity, Anaxagoras marks out a conceptual
possibility that Parmenides does not effectively preclude and he does so
without doing violence to Parmenides' own basic definitional requirements for the One.
Second, the cosmos of the whirl possesses global unalterability as an
immediate consequence of its global homogeneity. And, in respect to its
basic material make-up, no part of the cosmos is altered, since every part
remains predicationally saturated. However, this cosmos fails to possess
thoroughgoing unalterability and herein lies an obvious difference between the whirl and the One. But, this difference is not, in itself, problematic. For, on Anaxagoras' account, all (phenomenal) alteration is
caused by locomotion, while in Parmenides' argument against alteration, it is assumed that locomotion and alteration are functionally independent modes of change. So, we cannot impugn the propriety of
Anaxagoras' approach to alteration without first determining whether
his position on locomotion is adequately justified. This suggests that if
Anaxagoras provides a plausible rationale for locomotion, then it cannot
be said that he begs the question against Parmenides in respect to either
locomotion or alteration.
Anaxagoras' dynamic cosmos is an infinitely extended plenum and,
as such, it possesses global immobility. Simply put, it has nowhere to go.
However, this cosmos lacks thoroughgoing immobility. The whirl is
clearly a source of morion within an otherwise static plenum and herein
lies the crucial difference between the whirl and the One. Yet, oddly
enough, it is a difference that does no violence to Parmenides' explicit
prohibition against motion. For Parmenides' argument against motion
rests on the principle that what-is is a material plenum together with the
auxiliary assumption that motion requires the existence, or emergence,
of vacancies in space. A void-less plenum is, as he understands it,
entirely 'chained up' and is, as such, immobile (DK 28 B 8.31). However,
Parmenides does not consider the possibility of cyclical motion within

27 See Reeve, 1981,102-3. Linguistically speaking, it is not the case that all predicates
apply to every part of the cosmos. For, at the phenomenal level an object is what it
most is at the elemental level: the level of . However, at the elemental
level all portions of the cosmos consist of every type of .

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Anaxagoras' Parmenidean Cosmology 105

the plenum and this is precisely the sort of motion that Anaxagoras
himself takes into account.
Anaxagoras suggests that cyclical motion is possible within a Parmenidean framework and this, in itself, is sufficient to circumvent Parmenides' own argument against motion.28 For all that Anaxagoras need
show is that cyclical motion does not violate any of the basic definitional
requirements for the One. Clearly, cyclical motion does not jeopardize
the infinite extension of the One and it does not jeopardize the One's
etemality. Rather, as Parmenides' own argument makes clear, the driving concern is over whether motion would rob the One of its status as a
predicationally saturated material plenum, by requiring the emergence
of empty spaces. Anaxagoras is keenly aware of this concern. For, in a
fragment that echoes Parmenides' treatment of dispersal and gathering
(in DK 28 B 4), he suggests that the process of cyclical motion will not
violate the principle of predicational saturation.29 Anaxagoras states,
The stuff of this universe has not been separated ( ) one
from the other; not even with an axe has the hot been hacked from
() the cold, nor the cold from the hot. (DK 59 8, trans.
Sider)

Anaxagoras maintains that predicational saturation shall not be jeopardized within the cosmos of the whirl. The hot shall not be cleaved from
the cold and no part of what-is shall be split off from what-is. Thus,
together with Parmenides, Anaxagoras holds that no void-space can be
generated within the material plenum. Nevertheless, Anaxagoras goes
on to provide empirically based arguments, which are meant to show
that cyclical motion is possible in a void-less plenum. Aristotle tells us
that Anaxagoras performed experiments with clepsydras in order to

28 Barnes develops a Neo-Melissian argument against the possibility of rearrangement

through cyclical motion. He suggests that, since rearrangement is a form of alteration, Melissus' argument against alteration can be used to show the impossibility of
any motion that produces rearrangement See Barnes, 1979b, v.2,130-1. Anaxagoras'
target is, however, Parmenides and not Melissus. Parmenides' own rejection of
alteration rests on the assumption that alteration is a mode of change which is
independent of locomotion. Thus, Parmenides' argument against alteration cannot
be used to defeat Anaxagoras' thesis.
29 Both Schofield and Coxon assert that DK 59 8 echoes DK 28 4. See Schofield,
1980,63 and Coxon, 1986,188-9.

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106 JohnE.Sisko
show that void does not exist.30 The experiments were not especially
complex. In the first experiment, Anaxagoras covered the top of a
clepsydra, immersed it in fluid and then removed it, showing that
nothing had entered the air-filled chamber. In the second experiment, he
immersed the uncovered clepsydra, covered its top, and then removed
the clepsydra, showing that the fluid had (in this case) entered the
chamber. These experiments not only provide some evidence against the
existence of void, they also provide evidence in support of cyclical
motion. For the fluid entered the clepsydra only once the air that had
been trapped inside was permitted to cycle out. These experiments
provide sufficient justification for the contention that cyclical motion,
governed by PUM and PID, does not violate the basic definitional requirements for the One. And this suggests that Anaxagoras, while
adhering to Parmenides' basic definitional requirements, provides us
with a plausible rationale for diverging from Parmenides' position in
regard to the One's non-basic properties. For, Anaxagoras' position on
cyclical motion allows him to explain alteration as a function of locomotion and this is a possibility that Parmenides does not envision.

Table 3
Parmenides
The One
Eternal
Infinitely extended plenum
Predicationally saturated
Immobile
Unalterable
Phenomenally homogeneous

Anaxagoras
The Chaos One World

V
V
V

V
V
V

V
V

Unmoved Global 1.
Unaltered Global U.
V
Global H.

V
V
V

30 See Aristotle, Physics IV 6,213a22-28; cf. de Caelo IV 2,309al9-26 and de Respiratione

I 470b35-lal9. Empedocles performed similar experiments with clepsydras. See
Aristotle, de Respiratione 7,473b9-21.

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Anaxagoras' Parmenidean Cosmology 107

We have found that, for Anaxagoras, the emergence of our world

within the Chaos does little to diminish its basic kinship with Parmenides' One. So, at this point we might be tempted to conclude that the
fundamental unity of Anaxagoras' dynamic cosmos and the One has
been successfully maintained. However, as things stand, this conclusion is
not wholly justified. A problem remains. Anaxagoras claims that nous controls a revolution which '... at first... began to revolve out from a small
area ...' (DK 59 B 12.13-14) and, so, he seems to propose the occurrence of
a first event. Surely this is how most scholars interpret Anaxagoras'
claim.31 Yet, if this is correct, then we must admit that, however successful his journey has been up to this point, Anaxagoras' enterprise is ultimately ruined, owing to a collision with Parmenides' prohibition against
a first event. This seems to be a serious problem, but, thankfully, the fragments show us a way to navigate through it: the textual evidence suggests that Anaxagoras dodges the problem of a first event.

Anaxagoras (4): A First Event?

It is thought that the only way for Anaxagoras to avoid the problem of
a first event, would be for him to specify a feature of nous or of the Chaos
that accounts for the initiation of the whirl.32 Along these lines, it has
been suggested that nous, being cognizant of the features of the Chaos,
might have chosen the correct time and place for initiating the whirl.
However, this suggestion falls flat, since each time and each place within
the Chaos differs in no substantive way from any other time or place.33

31 See Owen, 1974 (/1966), 279-82; Schofield, 1980,9-10; Reeve, 1981,103; Sider, 1981,
102-4; McKirahan, 1994, 223-4; and Felix Cleve, The Philosophy of Anaxagoras (New
York: Columbia University Press 1949), 131.
32 See McKirahan, 1994, 224. McKirahan insists that Anaxagoras fails to circumvent
the problem.
33 Graham suggests the view that I criticize. He states: 'Choosing, then, the correct
time, place, and rate of morion for an incipient vortex, Mind can set in order all
things past, present, and future' (Graham, 1994, 111). This approach leaves
Anaxagoras with, not only the temporal problem of a first event, but with an added
spatial problem. For, given that the Chaos is infinite in extension, there is no
sufficient reason for having the vortex emerge at any one location as opposed to
another.

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108 John E. Sisko

It might also be suggested that nous could have initiated the whirl out of
sheer caprice. But, there is no textual evidence to support this view.
Another approach to the issue is suggested by Simplicius. He states,
'[Anaxagoras] ... assumed a beginning of cosmogony [just] for the
purpose of a didactic arrangement of presentation.'34 Of course, if there
were no temporal beginning of the whirl, then Anaxagoras would no
longer be faced with the problem of a first event and fortiori he need not
specify some feature of nous or of the Chaos in order to explain the
initiation of the whirl. Simplicius, in discussing Anaxagoras' cosmogony, is motivated to provide an interpretation that harmonizes with
parts of his own account of Plato's cosmogony in the Timaeus. This
motivation is highly dubious. But, whatever the cause, Simplicius' suggestion is worth exploring. It is, in fact, dead-on right. An examination
of the fragments strongly suggests that Anaxagoras treats the history of
the cosmos as if it were divided into two periods only so that he might
effectively mark out the important similarities between his own cosmology and Parmenides' account of the One. Anaxagoras' division between
the static Chaos and the dynamic whirl is a matter of heuristic convenience and Anaxagoras himself understands the cosmos of the whirl to be
(strictly) eternal.
Let us begin by considering some details from Empedocles' cosmology. Empedocles is a contemporary of Anaxagoras. He too is a post-Parmenidean pluralist. In response to Parmenides, Empedocles maintains
that all seeming generation and destruction is the product of an unending cyclical process involving eternal and unchangeable elements. Empedocles' cycle has four stages (see DK 3117,22,26 and 35). First, under
the complete dominion of Love, the cosmos is an homogeneous mixture
of the four elements. Second, under the ascendancy of Strife, the cosmos
is a dynamic mass in which unlike elements separate from one another.
This process of separation continues until we reach the third stage, when
Strife has complete dominion and the cosmos is a perfectly heterogeneous whole, consisting of four nested levels, one for each element. Finally,
Love begins its own ascendancy, drawing unlike elements together, until
it once again comes to have complete dominion over the cosmos. Within
Empedocles' cycle, the world as we know it comes to be formed in one,
if not in each, of the dynamic stages of ascendancy. Importantly, in

34 Simplicius, in Physica 1121,21

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Anaxagoras' Parmenidean Cosmology 109

Empedocles' system there is no initial cosmogonical happening and, so,

Empedocles' does not run afoul of the problem of z first event. His cycle
has neither a temporal beginning nor a temporal end. But, this truth does
not keep Empedocles himself from occasionally speaking as if his cycle
did have a beginning. For example, he states:
But come, I shall first tell you the beginning ()... from which all
that we now look upon came to be clear, earth and sea with many waves
and moist air and the Titan aither, squeezing all things round about in
a circle. (DK 31 38, trans. McKirahan)

For ease of exposition, Empedocles lapses into treating the start of a

period of ascendancy as if it were a first event and he does this even
though he knows that there is no true cosmogonical beginning within
his own system. Anaxagoras' own occasional mentions of a beginning
can, and must, be understood in the same way.
Consider Anaxagoras' statement that the nous-caused whirl'... at first
... began to revolve out from a small area (
) ... ' (DK 59 12.13-14). This claim can be understood to
suggest, not an unqualified first moment of change within the Chaos,
but a phenomenal beginning to some one stage in the development of a
dynamic cosmos. Other claims made by Anaxagoras show that this view
is to be favoured. Anaxagoras states that 'nous put all in order, as well
as this revolution ( ) through which now revolve
the stars, sun, moon, aer, and aither which separated' (DK 59 12.18-21).
Here Anaxagoras' use of the demonstrative pronoun, , suggests
that there is more than one stage in the expansion of the dynamic cosmos
and that our world (with its stars, sun and moon) constitutes just one
among these stages (or revolutions). More forceful support for this view
can be developed from DK 59 12. There Anaxagoras claims that the
whirl' ... began to revolve out from a small area ( ) ... '
and we have already learned a good deal about Anaxagoras' conception
of the small. According to Anaxagoras, neither the small nor the large is
objectively what it is named. Rather, each thing is both small and large
in respect to itself (see DK 59 3). This requires that whatever area might
be considered, at one level of analysis, to be small is, at another level of
analysis, vastly large. So, it follows that the small area from which the
whirl purportedly first emerges is also, at the same time, an enormous
area within which there must also be a small region from which the whirl
first emerges. Further, this second small region is additionally, at the
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110 fohn E. Sisko

from which the whirl first emerges. This pattern of emerging whirls (or
whirlings) continues ad infinitum into the temporal past. So, it turns out
that Anaxagoras' whirl has no beginning: there is, for Anaxagoras, no
first event. The whirl has always existed, in smaller and smaller regions
of extended reality, and it shall never cease to exist, for it expands
continually into larger and larger regions of the Chaos. The dynamic
cosmos of the whirl is strictly eternal.

Anaxagoras (5): Another World

Now that we have come to see how Anaxagoras circumvents the problem of a first event, our final question is whether, given his emphasis on
the recurrence of structure-within-structure, Anaxagoras postulates the
existence of multiple worlds.35 Famously, there is one fragment in which
Anaxagoras speaks of another world. He states,
These things being so, it is necessary to suppose that in all things that
are being mixed together there are many things of all kinds ... and that
humans too were compounded and all other animals that possess life;
and that there are inhabited cities and cultivated fields for the humans
just as with us, and that there are for them a sun and a moon and the
rest just as with us, and that the earth grows many things of all kinds
for them, of which they gather the most useful into their dwellings and
use it. I have said these things about the separating off, because it would
have occurred not only with us, but elsewhere too. (DK 59 B 4a, trans.
McKirahan)*

Anaxagoras suggests that there is another world just like our own and
this second world has come to be formed through the same processes
that have formed our own world. Scholars have offered a variety of
interpretations of this passage: (1) It has been suggested that Anaxagoras' other world had existed only in the distant past prior to the genesis

35 I have borrowed the phrase 'structure-within-structure' from Mansfeld, 1980,3.

36 In addition to this fragment, Simplicius quotes a passage from Theophrastus in
which it is said that Anaxagoras discussed the generation of 'the worlds'. (Simplicius, in Physicu 27.15-17)

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Anaxagoras' Parmenidean Cosmology 111

of our own world.37 (2) It has been suggested that the other world is not
a unique world at all, but merely some other inhabited location on the
surface of our Earth.38 (3) It has been suggested that the other world
exists, like an atomist world, being roughly the same size as our world,
but occupying a different region in space.39 (4) And it has been suggested
that the other world is a microscopic world, a dimunitive world, which
somehow exists within our own world.40 Much ink has been spilled over
this issue. But when we consider the texts, it becomes evident that the
only location available for this other world in Anaxagoras' system is
within our own world. First, the other world exists at the same time as
does ours; for Anaxagoras uses the present indicative to describe the
actions of humans in that world.41 So, interpretation (1) is untenable.
Second, the other world is not some other location upon our Earth, for
Anaxagoras claims that it has both a sun and a moon: he does not say
that it has the sun (that is, our sun) or the moon (that is, our moon).42 So,
interpretation (2) is untenable. And third, the other world is not an
atomist world, for Anaxagoras never speaks of a plurality of vortices,
which might cause like-sized worlds to appear here and there throughout the heavens.43 Anaxagoras speaks only of one vortex and he speaks,
quite explicitly, of just one cosmos ( ; DK 59 B 8): one ordered
whole. So, interpretation (3) is untenable. By comparison, nothing that
Anaxagoras says stands in opposition to the thesis that a microscopic

37 This view is suggested by Simplicius only to be immediately rejected. See Simplicius, in Physica 157.18-20; cf. Malcolm Schofield, 'Anaxagoras' Other World
Revisited', in Keimpe Algra, Pieter van der Horst, & David Runia, eds. Polyhistor:
Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy (Leiden: E.J. Brill 1996),
3-20, esp. 5.
38 This view is championed in P.M. Cornford, 'Innumerable Worlds in Presocratic
Philosophy', Classical Quarterly 28 (1934), 1-16.
39 J. Bumet defends this view in his Early Creek Philosophy, 4th ed. (London 1930),
269-70.
40 Versions of this view are defended in P. Leon, 'The Homoiomeries of Anaxagoras',
Classical Quarterly 21 (1927), 133-41; Mansfeld, 1980; and Schofield, 1996.
41 See Simplicius, m Physica 157.18-20; cf. Schofield, 1996,5.
42 See Simplicius, in Physica 157.20-24; cf. Schofield, 1996,5.
43 See Mansfeld, 1980,3.

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112 JohnE.Sisko

world exists within our own world. Further, once we are confronted with
the possibility of a single microscopic world, Anaxagoras' own general
emphasis on the repetition of structure-within-structure in infinitely
expansive and infinitely divisible space suggests the existence of a
plurality of such worlds. A plurality thesis of this sort (and in this
context) has been articulated in a pair of ways: First (4a), it has been
suggested that, for Anaxagoras, a multitude of microscopic worlds is
spread throughout or own world, existing like quasi-Leibnizian worlds
in every bit of available matter.44 Second (4b), it has been suggested that,
for Anaxagoras, a plurality of microscopic worlds exists at smaller and
smaller levels nested concentrically within our own world.45 The latter
interpretation (4b) is the more plausible of the two. First, 'world', as a
type, is not among the basic stuffs (or basic sortals) in the Primordial
Chaos. So, worlds are not subject to PUM and we should not expect them
to exist, just like Anaxagoras' basic material stuffs (such as water and
salt), in all things. Yet, the quasi-Leibnizian view places worlds in all
things. Second (and more importantly), since the genera tive cause of any
microscopic world must be the one vortex that has generated our own
world, we should expect that any world other than our own will be
centered about the locus of the vortex, just as our world is centered about
this locus. Yet, the quasi-Leibnizian view places worlds eccentrically
within the vortex. Third (and most importantly), if the whirl, prior to
forming our world, had been expanding from the infinite past with its
own unique pattern of motion, then we should expect that this motion
had effects at (what is for us) the microscopic level that are akin to the
effects which it now has at our own macroscopic level. Given the eternal
expansion of the whirl, we should expect a series of nested worlds.
Finally, there is a clear and tractable logic to this view: once we have a
second world within our own, the notion that that world is just like our
own suggests that it too may have another world nested within it. And
since our own world is just like that other world (the second one), our

44 This view is defended in Leon, 1927, and in Schofield, 1996.

45 This view is defended in Mansfeld, 1980. Schofield offers his account as a defense
of Mansfeld's position, but he sanctions the Leibnizian view, whereas Mansfeld
envisions a plurality worlds contained successively within one another; for he
compares these worlds to 'tins of Droste chocolates, on one side of which a girl
appeared who held such a tin of Droste chocolates picturing the same girl holding
the same tin, etc.' (Mansfeld, ibid., 4 n 11.).

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Anaxagoras' Parmenidean Cosmology 113

world may itself be nested within another larger world. So, the textual
evidence clearly suggests that, according to Anaxagoras, there exists a
vast series of worlds nested within worlds lying concentrically within
the Chaos.46
Interestingly, an Anaxagorean theory of worlds within worlds stands
on par with the theory of a lone world that is commonly attributed to
Anaxagoras, when it comes to any link with Parmenides' definitional
requirements for the One. The universe of multiple worlds is eternal. It
is, in fact, strictly eternal, whereas, on the common view, a lone
Anaxagorean world requires a temporal beginning, a triggering first
event. Further, the universe of worlds within worlds remains both infinitely extended and predicationally saturated. It possesses global immobility and global unalterability, not to mention global homogeneity.

Table 4
Parmenides
The One
Eternal
Infinitely extended plenum
Predicationally saturated
Immobile
Unalterable
Phenomenally homogeneous

V
V
V
V
V
V

Anaxagoras
The Chaos One World Many Worlds

V
/

V
V
V

Unmoved Global 1.
Unaltered Global U.
V
Global H.

V
V
V
Global 1.
Global U.
Global H.

46 Each of these worlds must be so large compared to the one below it that the one
below is (relatively) microscopic and, thus, imperceptible. But, even if the world
that is nested immediately below our own is so small that it is not within our power
to perceive it, one might ask why it is not possible to perceive the world that is
immediately above our own. In response, Anaxagoras could suggest that as we gaze
upon the heavens, we gaze upon a body in which aer and aither predominate and,
thus, from our vantage point, the world above us must be Imperceptible: it is, in a
manner, swallowed up by the aer and aither which jointly predominate within the
whole of physical reality.

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114 fohnE.Sisko

In conclusion, this investigation has revealed a limited solution to the

long-standing puzzle. In so far as the puzzle concerns the relation
between Anaxagoras' physical theory and Parmenides' arguments, we
need not suppose that Anaxagoras somehow fails to adequately consider
Parmenides' basic principles. Anaxagoras does not attack these principles, because he takes them to be compatible with a specific sort of
pluralism. Anaxagoras not only provides a brilliant explanation of the
emergence of our world within the Chaos, he also posits a bold cosmology of worlds within worlds within the Chaos. And since his Chaos is
Parmenides' One, Anaxagoras offers an essentially Parmenidean cosmology: a cosmology of worlds within worlds within the One.47
Department of Philosophy and Religion
The College of New Jersey
PO Box 7718
Ewing, NJ 08628-0718
U.S.A.
e-mail: sisko@tcnj.edu

47 Earlier versions of this paper have been read at Notre Dame, New York, Ewing, San
Bernardino and Budapest, Hungary. I would like to thank Sarah Broadie, Patricia
Curd, Brie Gertler, Daniel Graham and Tony Roy for especially helpful comments
on earlier drafts. In addition, I would like to thank the editor and my three
anonymous referees for useful advice and guidance. All errors are my own.

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