Citizenship

Alinas v. Alinas GR No. 158040 April 14, 2008

Villanueva v. Chiong GR No. 159889 June 5, 2008
AASJS v. Datumanong GR No. 160869 May 11, 2007
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 158040 : April 14, 2008]
SPOUSES ONESIFORO and ROSARIO ALINAS, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES VICTOR and
ELENA ALINAS, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, praying that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 25,
2002, and the CA Resolution2 dated March 31, 2003, denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration, be reversed and set aside.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows.
Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas (petitioners) separated sometime in 1982,
with Rosario moving to Pagadian City and Onesiforo moving to Manila. They left
behind two lots identified as Lot 896-B-9-A with a bodega standing on it and Lot
896-B-9-B with petitioners' house. These two lots are the subject of the present
petition.
Petitioner Onesiforo Alinas (Onesiforo) and respondent Victor Alinas (Victor) are
brothers. Petitioners allege that they entrusted their properties to Victor and Elena
Alinas (respondent spouses) with the agreement that any income from rentals of the
properties should be remitted to the Social Security System (SSS) and to the Rural
Bank of Oroquieta City (RBO), as such rentals were believed sufficient to pay off
petitioners' loans with said institutions. Lot 896-B-9-A with the bodega was
mortgaged as security for the loan obtained from the RBO, while Lot 896-B-9-B with
the house was mortgaged to the SSS. Onesiforo alleges that he left blank papers
with his signature on them to facilitate the administration of said properties.
Sometime in 1993, petitioners discovered that their two lots were already titled in
the name of respondent spouses.
Records show that after Lot 896-B-9-A was extra-judicially foreclosed, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-118533 covering said property was issued in the

name of mortgagee RBO on November 13, 1987. On May 2, 1988, the duly
authorized representative of RBO executed a Deed of Installment Sale of Bank's
Acquired Assets4 conveying Lot 896-B-9-A to respondent spouses. RBO's TCT over
Lot 896-B-9-A was then cancelled and on February 22, 1989, TCT No. T-126645
covering said lot was issued in the name of respondent spouses.
Lot 896-B-9-B was also foreclosed by the SSS and on November 17, 1986, the ExOficio City Sheriff of Ozamis City issued a Certificate of Sale6 over said property in
favor of the SSS. However, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney7 signed by
Onesiforo in favor of Victor, dated March 10, 1989, the latter was able to redeem, on
the same date, Lot 896-B-9-B from the SSS for the sum of P111,110.09. On June 19,
1989, a Certificate of Redemption8 was issued by the SSS.
Onesiforo's signature also appears in an Absolute Deed of Sale9 likewise dated
March 10, 1989, selling Lot 896-B-9-B to respondent spouses. The records also show
a notarized document dated March 10, 1989 and captioned Agreement10 whereby
petitioner Onesiforo acknowledged that his brother Victor used his own money to
redeem Lot 896-B-9-B from the SSS and, thus, Victor became the owner of said lot.
In the same Agreeement, petitioner Onesiforo waived whatever rights, claims, and
interests he or his heirs, successors and assigns have or may have over the subject
property. On March 15, 1993, by virtue of said documents, TCT No. 1739411
covering Lot 896-B-9-B was issued in the name of respondent spouses.
On June 25, 1993, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamis City
a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of their conjugal properties
with damages against respondent spouses.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated November 13, 1995, finding that:
1. Plaintiffs have not proven that they entrusted defendant spouses with the care
and administration of their properties. It was Valeria Alinas, their mother, whom
plaintiff Onesiforo requested/directed to "take care of everything and sell
everything" and Teresita Nuez, his elder sister, to whom he left a "verbal" authority
to administer his properties.
2. Plaintiffs have not proven their allegation that defendant spouses agreed to pay
rent of P1,500.00 a month for the occupancy of plaintiffs' house, which rent was to
be remitted to the SSS and Rural Bank of Oroquieta to pay off plaintiffs' loan and to
keep for plaintiffs the rest of the rent after the loans would have been paid in full.
3. Plaintiff Onesiforo's allegation that defendants concocted deeds of conveyances
(Exh. "M", "N" & "O") with the use of his signatures in blank is not worthy of
credence. Why his family would conspire to rob him at a time when life had struck
him with a cruel blow in the form of a failed marriage that sent him plummeting to

the depths of despair is not explained and likewise defies comprehension. That his
signatures appear exactly on the spot where they ought to be in Exhs. "M", "N" &
"O" belies his pretension that he affixed them on blank paper only for the purpose of
facilitating his sister Terry's acts of administration.
This Court, therefore, does not find that defendant spouses had schemed to obtain
title to plaintiffs' properties or enriched themselves at the expense of plaintiffs.12
with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment:
1. declaring [respondents] Victor Jr. and Elena Alinas owners of Lot 896-B-9-A with
the building (bodega) standing thereon and affirming the validity of their acquisition
thereof from the Rural Bank of Oroquieta, Inc.;
2. declaring [petitioners] Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas owners of Lot 896-B-9-B with
the house standing thereon, plaintiff Onesiforo's sale thereof to defendants spouses
without the consent of his wife being null and void and defendant spouses'
redemption thereof from the SSS not having conferred its ownership to them;
3. ordering [petitioners] to reimburse [respondents] Victor Jr. and Elena Alinas the
redemption sum of P111,100.09, paid by them to the SSS (without interest as it
shall be compensated with the rental value of the house they occupy) within sixty
days from the finality of this judgment;
4. ordering [respondents] to vacate the subject house within thirty days from
receiving the reimbursement mentioned in No. 3 above; andcralawlibrary
5. reinstating TCT No. T-7248 in the name of [petitioners] and cancelling TCT No. T17394 in the name of [respondents].
No costs.
SO ORDERED.13
Only respondent spouses appealed to the CA assailing the RTC's ruling that they
acquired Lot 896-B-9-B from the SSS by mere redemption and not by purchase. They
likewise question the reimbursement by petitioners of the redemption price without
interest.
On September 25, 2002, the CA promulgated herein assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the first paragraph of the

dispositive portion of the assailed decision is AFFIRMED and the rest MODIFIED as
follows:
1. declaring [respondents] Victor Jr. and Elena Alinas owners of Lot 896-B-9-A with
the building (bodega) standing thereon and affirming the validity of their acquisition
thereof from the Rural Bank of Oroquieta, Inc.;
2. declaring Onesiforo's sale of Lot 896-B-9-B together with the house standing
thereon to [respondents] in so far as Rosario Alinas, his wife's share of one half
thereof is concerned, of no force and effect;
3. ordering [petitioners] Rosario Alinas to reimburse [respondents] the redemption
amount of P55,550.00 with interest of 12% per annum from the time of redemption
until fully paid.
4. ordering the [respondents] to convey and transfer one half portion of Lot 896-B-9B unto Rosario Alinas, which comprises her share on the property simultaneous to
the tender of the above redemption price, both to be accomplished within sixty (60)
days from finality of this judgment.
5. in the event of failure of [respondents] to execute the acts as specified above,
[petitioner] Rosario Alinas may proceed against them under Section 10, Rule 39 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
6. on the other hand, failure of [petitioner] Rosario Alinas to reimburse the
redemption price within sixty (60) days from the finality of this decision will render
the conveyance and sale of her share by her husband to [respondents], of full force
and effect.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.14
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the CA denied said motion per herein
assailed Resolution dated March 31, 2003.
Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:
The Honorable Court of Appeals abuse [sic] its discretion in disregarding the
testimony of the Register of Deeds, Atty. Nerio Nuez, who swore that the
signatures appearing on various TCTs were not his own;

The Honorable Court of Appeals manifestly abuse [sic] its discretion in declaring the
respondents to be the owners of Lot 896-B-9-A with the building (bodega) standing
thereon when they merely redeemed the property and are therefore mere trustees
of the real owners of the property;
It was pure speculation and conjecture and surmise for the Honorable Court of
Appeals to impose an obligation to reimburse upon petitioners without ordering
respondents to account for the rentals of the properties from the time they occupied
the same up to the present time and thereafter credit one against the other
whichever is higher.15
The first issue raised by petitioners deserves scant consideration. By assailing the
authenticity of the Registrar of Deeds' signature on the certificates of title, they are,
in effect, questioning the validity of the certificates.
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides, thus:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.
Pursuant to said provision, the Court ruled in De Pedro v. Romasan Development
Corporation16 that:
It has been held that a certificate of title, once registered, should not thereafter be
impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished except in a direct
proceeding permitted by law. x x x
The action of the petitioners against the respondents, based on the material
allegations of the complaint, is one for recovery of possession of the subject
property and damages. However, such action is not a direct, but a collateral attack
of TCT No. 236044.17 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
As in De Pedro, the complaint filed by herein petitioners with the RTC is also one for
recovery of possession and ownership. Verily, the present case is merely a collateral
attack on TCT No. T-17394, which is not allowed by law and jurisprudence.
With regard to the second issue, petitioners' claim that it was the CA which declared
respondent spouses owners of Lot 896-B-9-A (with bodega) is misleading. It was the
RTC which ruled that respondent spouses are the owners of Lot 896-B-9-A and,
therefore, since only the respondent spouses appealed to the CA, the issue of
ownership over Lot 896-B-9-A is not raised before the appellate court. Necessarily,
the CA merely reiterated in the dispositive portion of its decision the RTC's ruling on
respondent spouses' ownership of Lot 896-B-9-A.

It is a basic principle that no modification of judgment or affirmative relief can be

granted to a party who did not appeal.18 Hence, not having appealed from the RTC
Decision, petitioners can no longer seek the reversal or modification of the trial
court's ruling that respondent spouses had acquired ownership of Lot 896-B-9-A by
virtue of the sale of the lot to them by RBO.
Furthermore, the CA did not commit any reversible error in affirming the trial court's
factual findings as the records are indeed bereft of proof to support the petitioners'
allegations that they left the care and administration of their properties to
respondent spouses; and that there is an agreement between petitioners and
respondent spouses regarding remittance to the SSS and the RBO of rental income
from their properties. Thus, respondent spouses may not be held responsible for the
non-payment of the loan with RBO and the eventual foreclosure of petitioners' Lot
896-B-9-A.
Petitioners do not assail the validity of the foreclosure of said lot but argues that
respondent spouses merely redeemed the property from RBO. This is, however,
belied by evidence on record which shows that ownership over the lot had duly
passed on to the RBO, as shown by TCT No. T-11853 registered in its name; and
subsequently, RBO sold the lot with its improvements to respondent spouses.
Needless to stress, the sale was made after the redemption period had lapsed. The
trial court, therefore, correctly held that respondent spouses acquired their title over
the lot from RBO and definitely not from petitioners.
However, with regard to Lot 896-B-9-B (with house), the Court finds it patently
erroneous for the CA to have applied the principle of equity in sustaining the validity
of the sale of Onesiforo's one-half share in the subject property to respondent
spouses.
Although petitioners were married before the enactment of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988, the sale in question occurred in 1989. Thus, their property relations
are governed by Chapter IV on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code.
The CA ruling completely deviated from the clear dictate of Article 124 of the Family
Code which provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
shall belong to both spouses jointly. x x x
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in
the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of

the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. x x x (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)
In Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v. Dailo,19 the Court categorically stated thus:
In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the sale of a conjugal property
requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the
Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the
entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to
the husband who contracted the sale. x x x
xxx
x x x By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of
(court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.20
Thus, pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code and jurisprudence, the sale of
petitioners' conjugal property made by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its
entirety.
It is true that in a number of cases, this Court abstained from applying the literal
import of a particular provision of law if doing so would lead to unjust, unfair and
absurd results.21
In the present case, the Court does not see how applying Article 124 of the Family
Code would lead to injustice or absurdity. It should be noted that respondent
spouses were well aware that Lot 896-B-9-B is a conjugal property of petitioners.
They also knew that the disposition being made by Onesiforo is without the consent
of his wife, as they knew that petitioners had separated, and, the sale documents
do not bear the signature of petitioner Rosario. The fact that Onesiforo had to
execute two documents, namely: the Absolute Deed of Sale dated March 10, 1989
and a notarized Agreement likewise dated March 10, 1989, reveals that they had
full knowledge of the severe infirmities of the sale. As held in Heirs of Aguilar-Reyes
v. Spouses Mijares,22 "a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith."23 Such being
the case, no injustice is being foisted on respondent spouses as they risked
transacting with Onesiforo alone despite their knowledge that the subject property
is a conjugal property.
Verily, the sale of Lot 896-B-9-B to respondent spouses is entirely null and void.
However, in consonance with the salutary principle of non-enrichment at another's
expense, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners should reimburse respondent

spouses the redemption price paid for Lot 896-B-9-B in the amount of P111,110.09
with legal interest from the time of filing of the complaint.
In Heirs of Aguilar-Reyes, the husband's sale of conjugal property without the
consent of the wife was annulled but the spouses were ordered to refund the
purchase price to the buyers, it was ruled that an interest of 12% per annum on the
purchase price to be refunded is not proper. The Court elucidated as follows:
The trial court, however, erred in imposing 12% interest per annum on the amount
due the respondents. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it was held
that interest on obligations not constituting a loan or forbearance of money is six
percent (6%) annually. If the purchase price could be established with certainty at
the time of the filing of the complaint, the six percent (6%) interest should be
computed from the date the complaint was filed until finality of the decision. In Lui
v. Loy, involving a suit for reconveyance and annulment of title filed by the first
buyer against the seller and the second buyer, the Court, ruling in favor of the first
buyer and annulling the second sale, ordered the seller to refund to the second
buyer (who was not a purchaser in good faith) the purchase price of the lots. It was
held therein that the 6% interest should be computed from the date of the filing of
the complaint by the first buyer. After the judgment becomes final and executory
until the obligation is satisfied, the amount due shall earn interest at 12% per year,
the interim period being deemed equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
Accordingly, the amount of P110,000.00 due the respondent spouses which could
be determined with certainty at the time of the filing of the complaint shall earn 6%
interest per annum from June 4, 1986 until the finality of this decision. If the
adjudged principal and the interest (or any part thereof) remain unpaid thereafter,
the interest rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the time
the judgment becomes final and executory until it is fully satisfied.24
Thus, herein petitioners should reimburse respondent spouses the redemption price
plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the complaint,
and after the judgment becomes final and executory, the amount due shall earn
12% interest per annum until the obligation is satisfied.
Petitioners pray that said redemption price and interest be offset or compensated
against the rentals for the house and bodega.
The records show that the testimonial evidence for rentals was only with regard to
the bodega.25 However, the Court has affirmed the ruling of the RTC that Lot 896-B9-A with the bodega had been validly purchased by respondent spouses from the
RBO and a TCT over said property was issued in the name of respondent spouses on
February 22, 1989. Testimonial evidence shows that the bodega was leased out by
respondent spouses only beginning January of 1990 when ownership had been

transferred to them.26 Hence, any rentals earned from the lease of said bodega
rightfully belongs to respondent spouses and cannot be offset against petitioners'
obligation to respondent spouses.
As to rentals for Lot 896-B-9-B and the house thereon, respondent Victor testified
that they never agreed to rent the house and when they finally took over the same,
it was practically inhabitable and so they even incurred expenses to repair the
house.27 There is absolutely no proof of the rental value for the house, considering
the condition it was in; as well as for the lot respondent spouses are occupying.
Respondent spouses, having knowledge of the flaw in their mode of acquisition, are
deemed to be possessors in bad faith under Article 52628 of the Civil Code.
However, they have a right to be refunded for necessary expenses on the property
as provided under Article 54629 of the same Code. Unfortunately, there is no
credible proof to support respondent spouses' allegation that they spent more than
P400,000.00 to repair and make the house habitable.
Set-off or compensation is governed by Article 1279 of the Civil Code which
provides, thus:
Article 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary:
1. That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the time a
principal creditor of the other;
2. That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable,
they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated;
3. That the two debts be due;
4. That they be liquidated and demandable;
5. That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by
third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor.
Therefore, under paragraph 4 of the foregoing provision, compensation or set-off is
allowed only if the debts of both parties against each other is already liquidated and
demandable. To liquidate means "to make the amount of indebtedness or an
obligation clear and settled in the form of money."30 In the present case, no definite
amounts for rentals nor for expenses for repairs on subject house has been
determined. Thus, in the absence of evidence upon which to base the amount of
rentals, no compensation or set-off can take place between petitioners and
respondent spouses.

While the courts are empowered to set an amount as reasonable compensation to

the owners for the use of their property, this Court cannot set such amount based
on mere surmises and conjecture
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated September 25, 2002 is MODIFIED to read as follows:
1. declaring respondent spouses Victor Jr. and Elena Alinas owners of Lot 896-B-9-A
with the building (bodega) standing thereon and affirming the validity of their
acquisition thereof from the Rural Bank of Oroquieta, Inc.;
2. declaring Onesiforo's sale of Lot 896-B-9-B together with the house standing
thereon to respondent spouses null and void ab initio;
3. ordering petitioners to jointly and severally reimburse respondent spouses the
redemption amount of P111,110.09 with interest at 6% per annum from the date of
filing of the complaint, until finality of this decision. After this decision becomes
final, interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the principal and interest (or any
part thereof) shall be imposed until full payment;
4. ordering the respondent spouses to convey and transfer Lot 896-B-9-B to
petitioners and vacate said premises within fifteen (15) days from finality of this
Decision; andcralawlibrary
5. in the event of failure of respondent spouses to execute the acts as specified
above, petitioners may proceed against them under Section 10, Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, J., Chairperson, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 159889

June 5, 2008

WALTER VILLANUEVA AND AURORA VILLANUEVA, petitioners,

vs.
FLORENTINO CHIONG AND ELISERA CHIONG, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks the modification of the Decision1 dated
December 17, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 68383, which had
affirmed the Joint Decision2 dated July 19, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dipolog City, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. 4460. The RTC annulled the sale made by
respondent Florentino Chiong in favor of petitioners Walter and Aurora Villanueva
conveying a portion of a parcel of land which respondents acquired during their
marriage.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married sometime in January 1960
but have been separated in fact since 1975. During their marriage, they acquired
Lot No. 997-D-1 situated at Poblacion, Dipolog City and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (T-19393)-2325,3 issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Zamboanga del Norte. Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold the one-half western
portion of the lot to petitioners for P8,000, payable in installments. Thereafter,
Florentino allowed petitioners to occupy4 the lot and build a store, a shop, and a
house thereon. Shortly after their last installment payment on December 13, 1986,5
petitioners demanded from respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their
favor. Elisera, however, refused to sign a deed of sale.
On July 5, 1991, Elisera filed with the RTC a Complaint6 for Quieting of Title with
Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 4383. On February 12, 1992, petitioners filed
with the RTC a Complaint7 for Specific Performance with Damages, docketed as Civil
Case No. 4460. Upon proper motion, the RTC consolidated these two cases.8
On May 13, 1992, Florentino executed the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale9 in
favor of petitioners.
On July 19, 2000, the RTC, in its Joint Decision, annulled the deed of absolute sale
dated May 13, 1992, and ordered petitioners to vacate the lot and remove all
improvements therein. The RTC likewise dismissed Civil Case No. 4460, but ordered
Florentino to return to petitioners the consideration of the sale with interest from
May 13, 1992.10 The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
For Civil Case No. 4383, (a) annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Florentino
Chiong in favor of Walter Villanueva, dated May 13, 1992 (Exhibit "2"); ordering
defendant Walter Villanueva to vacate the entire land in question and to remove all
buildings therein, subject to [i]ndemnity of whatever damages he may incur by
virtue of the removal of such buildings, within a period of 60 days from the finality
of this decision; award of damages is hereby denied for lack of proof.

In Civil Case No. 4460, complaint is hereby dismissed, but defendant Florentino
Chiong, having received the amount of P8,000.00 as consideration of the sale of the
land subject of the controversy, the sale being annulled by this Court, is ordered to
return the said amount to [the] spouses Villanueva, with interest to be computed
from the date of the annulled deed of sale, until the same is fully paid, within the
period of 60 days from finality of this judgment. Until such amount is returned,
together with the interest, [the] spouses Villanueva may continue to occupy the
premises in question.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.11
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated July 19, 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Dipolog City is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioners sought reconsideration, but to no avail. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assign the following errors as issues for our resolution:
I.
THAT THE COURT A QUO AS WELL AS THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ...
GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION BELONGED SOLELY
TO RESPONDENT FLORENTINO CHIONG AND ULTIMATELY TO THE HEREIN
PETITIONERS.
II.
THAT THE LOWER COURT AS WELL AS THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
LIKEWISE ERRED IN DECLARING AS NULL AND VOID THE DEED OF SALE EXECUTED
BY RESPONDENT FLORENTINO CHIONG IN FAVOR OF THE HEREIN PETITIONERS.13
Simply put, the basic issues are: (1) Is the subject lot an exclusive property of
Florentino or a conjugal property of respondents? (2) Was its sale by Florentino
without Elisera's consent valid?
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the lot is
conjugal property. They claim that the lot belongs exclusively to Florentino because

respondents were already separated in fact at the time of sale and that the share of
Elisera, which pertains to the eastern part of Lot No. 997-D-1, had previously been
sold to Spouses Jesus Y. Castro and Aida Cuenca. They also aver that while there
was no formal liquidation of respondents' properties, their separation in fact
resulted in its actual liquidation. Further, assuming arguendo that the lot is still
conjugal, the transaction should not be entirely voided as Florentino had one-half
share over it.
Elisera, for her part, counters that the sale of the lot to petitioners without her
knowledge, consent or authority, was void because the lot is conjugal property. She
adds that the sale was neither authorized by any competent court nor did it
redound to her or their children's benefit. As proof of the lot's conjugal nature, she
presented a transfer certificate of title, a real property tax declaration, and a
Memorandum of Agreement14 dated November 19, 1979 which she and her
husband had executed for the administration of their conjugal properties.15
Anent the first issue, petitioners' contention that the lot belongs exclusively to
Florentino because of his separation in fact from his wife, Elisera, at the time of sale
dissolved their property relations, is bereft of merit. Respondents' separation in fact
neither affected the conjugal nature of the lot nor prejudiced Elisera's interest over
it. Under Article 17816 of the Civil Code, the separation in fact between husband
and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot
retains its conjugal nature.
Likewise, under Article 16017 of the Civil Code, all property acquired by the spouses
during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains,
unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Petitioners' mere insistence as to the lot's supposed exclusive nature is insufficient
to overcome such presumption when taken against all the evidence for
respondents.
On the basis alone of the certificate of title, it cannot be presumed that the lot was
acquired during the marriage and that it is conjugal property since it was registered
"in the name of Florentino Chiong, Filipino, of legal age, married to Elisera
Chiong ."18 But Elisera also presented a real property tax declaration
acknowledging her and Florentino as owners of the lot. In addition, Florentino and
Elisera categorically declared in the Memorandum of Agreement they executed that
the lot is a conjugal property.19 Moreover, the conjugal nature of the lot was
admitted by Florentino in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 13, 1992, where he
declared his capacity to sell as a co-owner of the subject lot.20
Anent the second issue, the sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent is not,
however, void ab initio. In Vda. de Ramones v. Agbayani,21 citing Villaranda v.
Villaranda,22 we held that without the wife's consent, the husband's alienation or

encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on

August 3, 1988 is not void, but merely voidable. Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil
Code 23 provide:
ART. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift,
or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the
wife's consent
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnership before
the effective date of this Code.
ART. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any
act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in
the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or
her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property
fraudulently alienated by the husband. (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying Article 166, the consent of both Elisera and Florentino is necessary for the
sale of a conjugal property to be valid. In this case, the requisite consent of Elisera
was not obtained when Florentino verbally sold the lot in 1985 and executed the
Deed of Absolute Sale on May 13, 1992. Accordingly, the contract entered by
Florentino is annullable at Elisera's instance, during the marriage and within ten
years from the transaction questioned, conformably with Article 173. Fortunately,
Elisera timely questioned the sale when she filed Civil Case No. 4383 on July 5,
1991, perfectly within ten years from the date of sale and execution of the deed.
Petitioners finally contend that, assuming arguendo the property is still conjugal, the
transaction should not be entirely voided as Florentino had one-half share over the
lot. Petitioners' stance lacks merit. In Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares 24
citing Bucoy v. Paulino, et al.,25 a case involving the annulment of sale executed by
the husband without the consent of the wife, it was held that the alienation must be
annulled in its entirety and not only insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal
property is concerned. Although the transaction in the said case was declared void
and not merely voidable, the rationale for the annulment of the whole transaction is
the same. Thus:
The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the contract, in
its entirety, executed by the husband without the wife's consent, may be annulled
by the wife. Had Congress intended to limit such annulment in so far as the contract
shall "prejudice" the wife, such limitation should have been spelled out in the
statute. It is not the legitimate concern of this Court to recast the law. As Mr. Justice

Jose B. L. Reyes of this Court and Judge Ricardo C. Puno of the Court of First Instance
correctly stated, "[t]he rule (in the first sentence of Article 173) revokes Baello vs.
Villanueva, 54 Phil. 213 and Coque vs. Navas Sioca, 45 Phil. 430," in which cases
annulment was held to refer only to the extent of the one-half interest of the wife .
26
Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is
proper.27 Article 1398 of the Civil Code provides:
An obligation having been annulled, the contracting parties shall restore to each
other the things which have been the subject matter of the contract, with their
fruits, and the price with its interest, except in cases provided by law.
In obligations to render service, the value thereof shall be the basis for damages.
The effect of annulment of the contract is to wipe it out of existence, and to restore
the parties, insofar as legally and equitably possible, to their original situation
before the contract was entered into.28
Strictly applying Article 1398 to the instant case, petitioners should return to
respondents the land with its fruits29 and respondent Florentino should return to
petitioners the sum of P8,000, which he received as the price of the land, together
with interest thereon.
On the matter of fruits and interests, we take into consideration that petitioners
have been using the land and have derived benefit from it just as respondent
Florentino has used the price of the land in the sum of P8,000. Hence, if, as ordered
by the lower court, Florentino is to pay a reasonable amount or legal interest for the
use of the money then petitioners should also be required to pay a reasonable
amount for the use of the land.30 Under the particular circumstances of this case,
however, it would be equitable to consider the two amounts as offsetting each
other. Hence, the award of the trial court for the payment of interest should be
deleted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated
December 17, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 68383 affirming the
Joint Decision dated July 19, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch
6, in Civil Case No. 4460 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The order for the
payment of interest is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Tinga, Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro* , Brion, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 160869

May 11, 2007

AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS

AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of
Justice, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice
Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship.1
Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from
implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of
Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the
Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes."
Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5,
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical
to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29,
2003, reads:
SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003."
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking
the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and
legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who reacquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the
Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements
under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a

personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior
to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance
to the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with
the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they
are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in the active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the
armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
SEC. 6. Separability Clause. - If any section or provision of this Act is held
unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall
remain valid and effective.
SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following
its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been raised: (1) Is Rep. Act
No. 9225 unconstitutional? (2) Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the
issue of dual allegiance?
We shall discuss these issues jointly.
Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers
that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not
dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either
natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine
citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance
because said law allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their
Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their

foreign allegiance.2 The Constitution, however, is categorical that dual allegiance is

inimical to the national interest.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a
state policy that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall
be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that
the oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the
former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign
citizenship. The fact that the applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the
supreme authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation
of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.3
In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations of Congress
is necessary to determine the intent of the legislative branch in drafting the assailed
law. During the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No. 9225 would allow
dual allegiance had in fact been the subject of debate. The record of the legislative
deliberations reveals the following:
xxxx
Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two situations
exist - - the retention of foreign citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. In this case, he observed that there are two citizenships and therefore,
two allegiances. He pointed out that under the Constitution, dual allegiance is
inimical to public interest. He thereafter asked whether with the creation of dual
allegiance by reason of retention of foreign citizenship and the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, there will now be a violation of the Constitution
Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the
constitutional injunction on dual allegiance as inimical to public interest. He said
that the proposed law aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by
speedy means. However, he said that in one sense, it addresses the problem of dual
citizenship by requiring the taking of an oath. He explained that the problem of dual
citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country because the
latest oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of allegiance to the
Philippines and not to the United States, as the case may be. He added that this is a
matter which the Philippine government will have no concern and competence over.
Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern, when dual
allegiance is involved.
Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original version of
the bill, which did not require an oath of allegiance. Since the measure now requires

this oath, the problem of dual allegiance is transferred from the Philippines to the
foreign country concerned, he explained.
xxxx
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not denounce
his foreign citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance to the foreign government,
and at the same time, owes his allegiance to the Philippine government, such that
there is now a case of dual citizenship and dual allegiance.
Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the
person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. However, he said that this is not
a matter that he wishes to address in Congress because he is not a member of a
foreign parliament but a Member of the House.
xxxx
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance
contrary to national interest should be dealt with by law. However, he said that the
dual allegiance problem is not addressed in the bill. He then cited the Declaration of
Policy in the bill which states that "It is hereby declared the policy of the State that
all citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act." He stressed that what
the bill does is recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other
citizenship.
Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created
wherein a natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to
another country and in that oath says that he abjures and absolutely renounces all
allegiance to his country of origin and swears allegiance to that foreign country. The
original Bill had left it at this stage, he explained. In the present measure, he
clarified, a person is required to take an oath and the last he utters is one of
allegiance to the country. He then said that the problem of dual allegiance is no
longer the problem of the Philippines but of the other foreign country.4 (Emphasis
supplied.)
From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the
legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in
Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from naturalborn Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No.
9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the
supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign

citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the
problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of
whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What
happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has not yet
passed any law on the matter of dual allegiance, such absence of a law should not
be justification why this Court could not rule on the issue. He further contends that
while it is true that there is no enabling law yet on dual allegiance, the Supreme
Court, through Mercado v. Manzano,6 already had drawn up the guidelines on how
to distinguish dual allegiance from dual citizenship.7
For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual
allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to
entertain issues regarding dual allegiance.8
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and
it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual
allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not
concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens
who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization.9 Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific
parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.10 Until this is done, it would
be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues
pertaining to dual allegiance.
Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed
since the case of Mercado had already set the guidelines for determining dual
allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of
what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual
allegiance and dual citizenship.
Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,11 we said that the courts must assume that
the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and
passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what
is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether
the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed
with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance.12 The doctrine of
separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the
parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has
clearly delegated the duty of determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for
study and legislation by Congress.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justic