DUERO vs. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS (Jurisdiction)

The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived
by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent.
Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the
proceedings and even on appeal. The appellate court did not err in saying that the RTC should
have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action. Even if private respondent actively
participated in the proceedings before said court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot still be properly
invoked against him because the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at anytime and at
any stage of the action. Precedents tell us that as a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a
question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Also,
neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, except: barring highly
meritorious and exceptional circumstances. The Court of Appeals found support for its ruling in
our decision in Javier vs. Court of Appeals, thus:
The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in a court
that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed
sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the result of an honest mistake, or of divergent
interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such
course of action, part of the blame should be placed on the court which shall entertain the
suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their remedies in the
correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action whenever it
appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of
Court) Should the Court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be
impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from
the finality of the same.
Indeed, the trial court was duty-bound to take judicial notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction
and its failure to do so, makes its decision a lawless thing.
Since a decision of a court without jurisdiction is null and void, it could logically never become
final and executory; hence appeal therefrom by writ of error would be out of the question. Resort
by private respondent to a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was in order.

BARANGAY SAN ROQUE vs. HEIRS of FRANCISCO PASTOR (Jurisdiction)

In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money.
Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private
property for public use. In National Power Corporation v. Jocson the Court ruled that
expropriation proceedings have two phases:
"The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power
of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.
It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff
has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint. An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one,
of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court
on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules
expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, no objection to the exercise of the right
of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.
"The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court
of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is done by the Court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on
the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would
finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court
regarding the issue."
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the
government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private
property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the
expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation
suit is the governments exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is
duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the

expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the
propriety of the expropriation.
Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines v. Zurbano that "condemnation proceedings
are within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance," 14 the forerunners of the regional trial courts.
The said case was decided during the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like BP 129 in
respect to RTCs, provided that courts of first instance had original jurisdiction over "all civil
actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation." The 1997
amendments to the Rules of Court were not intended to change these jurisprudential precedents.
We are not persuaded by respondents argument that the present action involves the title to or
possession of a parcel of land. They cite the observation of retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, an
eminent authority in remedial law, that condemnation or expropriation proceedings are examples
of real actions that affect the title to or possession of a parcel of land.
Their reliance is misplaced. Justice Feria sought merely to distinguish between real and personal
actions. His discussion on this point pertained to the nature of actions, not to the jurisdiction of
courts. In fact, in his pre-bar lectures, he emphasizes that jurisdiction over eminent domain cases
is still within the RTCs under the 1997 Rules.
To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether the government may expropriate private
property under the given set of circumstances. The government does not dispute respondents
title to or possession of the same. Indeed, it is not a question of who has a better title or right, for
the government does not even claim that it has a title to the property. It merely asserts its inherent
sovereign power to "appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public
necessity, convenience or welfare may demand."

RUSSELL vs. HONORABLE AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL (Jurisdiction)

The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one incapable of pecuniary
estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, we had the occasion to rule that:
[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or
in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim
is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,
and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance,
support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; also actions questioning the
validity of a mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid and
for rescession, which is a counterpart of specific performance.
While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law
specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed
value of the real property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if
located elsewhere. If the value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the
Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2).
However, the subject matter of the complaint in this case is annulment of a document
denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS
ORAL PARTITION."
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the document in
which private respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the late spouses Casimero
Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and divided his property among themselves to the exclusion of
petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the property. While the complaint also
prays for the partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the
declaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint
and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some
of the claims asserted therein.

ROXAS vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Jurisdiction)

On the first issue, we hold that petitioner is already estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction.
What she raised in her position paper as a special and affirmative defense was the purported
failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, arising from an alleged failure to exhaust
administrative remedies before the HLURB as a condition precedent to filing a case in court. This
is not an explicit attack on the courts jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, but
merely a claim for the need to go through an alleged jurisdictional requirement, namely
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Granted that she placed MeTCs jurisdiction at issue, on the supposition that it is the HLURB that
has jurisdiction over Manotoks complaint below, she abandoned her theory after she obtained a
favorable judgment at the MeTC. She chose not to appeal the MeTCs decision and instead
consistently adopted in her pleadings before the RTC and CA, the MeTCs ruling that the action is
one for accion publiciana. Nowhere in her pleadings before the RTC and CA did she raise the
argument that jurisdiction properly lies with the HLURB. As earlier mentioned, it was only in her
present petition with this Court that she squarely asserted for the first time that the HLURB has
exclusive jurisdiction over the instant case.
Indeed, the general rule is that a question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even on
appeal, provided that doing so does not result in a mockery of the tenets of fair play. When,
however, a party adopts a particular theory, and the case is tried and decided upon that theory in
the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal. Where the case was
tried by the lower court and the parties on a certain theory, it will be reviewed and decided on that
theory, insofar as the pleadings, liberally construed, permit, and not be approached from a
different point of view.
Petitioner is bound by the theory behind her arguments before the RTC and CA that the case is
properly an accion publiciana as the cause of action arises from the termination of possession by
mere tolerance. Her assertion now that the issue involves the determination of whether or not the
terms and conditions of the contract to sell have been violated by private respondent, which must
be decided by the HLURB, constitutes a change of theory that could require presentation of
further evidence. Given this premise, the Court cannot countenance petitioners act of adopting
inconsistent postures by attacking the jurisdiction of the regular courts to which she has
submitted, voluntarily. Estoppel bars her from doing so.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS INC vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Jurisdiction)

In Russell, et al., v. Vestil, et al., the Court held that in determining whether an action is one the
subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction over the action will depend
on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, the action is one where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, which is cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective
of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.
In the case at bar, the allegations in the complaint plainly show that private respondents cause of
action is breach of contract.
Clearly, the action for specific performance case, irrespective of the amount of rentals and
damages sought to be recovered, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable
exclusively by the Regional Trial Court. The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying
petitioners motion to dismiss.

CEROFERR vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Jurisdiction)

The rules of procedure require that the complaint must state a concise statement of the ultimate
facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot
be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint
states a cause of action only when it has its three indispensable elements, namely: (1) a right in
favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an
act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages. If these elements are not extant, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a
motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the
complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted
therein. The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the
complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings
filed by the defendant.
While the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of an action, nevertheless, the
party raising such question may be estopped if he has actively taken part in the very proceedings
which he questions and he only objects to the courts jurisdiction because the judgment or the
order subsequently rendered is adverse to him.
In this case, respondent Santiago may be considered estopped to question the jurisdiction of the
trial court for he took an active part in the case. In his answer, respondent Santiago did not
question the jurisdiction of the trial court to grant the reliefs prayed for in the complaint. His
geodetic engineers were present in the first and second surveys that the LRA conducted. It was
only when the second survey report showed results adverse to his case that he submitted a
motion to dismiss.
Both parties in this case claim that the vacant lot is within their property. This is an issue that can
be best resolved by the trial court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.
After the land has been originally registered, the Court of Land Registration ceases to have
jurisdiction over contests concerning the location of boundary lines. In such case, the action in
personam has to be instituted before an ordinary court of general jurisdiction.
The regional trial court has jurisdiction to determine the precise identity and location of the vacant
lot used as a jeepney terminal.

GONZAGA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Jurisdiction)

Petitioners claim that the recent decisions of this Court have already abandoned the doctrine laid
down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. We do not agree. In countless decisions, this Court has
consistently held that, while an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and
may be assailed at any stage, active participation in the proceedings in the court which rendered
the order or decision will bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction. As we held in the leading
case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate, or
question that same jurisdiction x x x x [T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either
of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because
the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid
and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be
tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.
Tijam has been reiterated in many succeeding cases. Thus, in Orosa vs. Court of Appeals; Ang
Ping vs. Court of Appeals; Salva vs. Court of Appeals; National Steel Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals; Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals; PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals, this Court affirmed the rule that a partys active participation in all stages of
the case before the trial court, which includes invoking the courts authority to grant affirmative
relief, effectively estop such party from later challenging that same courts jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo by
instituting an action for reformation of contract against private respondents. It appears that, in the
proceedings before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from start to finish.
Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the courts jurisdiction during the entire
proceedings which lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court rendered its decision and
issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction
and it was only because said decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively
waived their right to question the courts jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.
Petitioners should bear the consequence of their act. They cannot be allowed to profit from their
omission to the damage and prejudice of the private respondent. This Court frowns upon the
undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment
but only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if not.
Public policy dictates that this Court must strongly condemn any double-dealing by parties who
are disposed to trifle with the courts by deliberately taking inconsistent positions, in utter
disregard of the elementary principles of justice and good faith. There is no denying that, in this

case, petitioners never raised the issue of jurisdiction throughout the entire proceedings in the
trial court. Instead, they voluntarily and willingly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of said
court. It is now too late in the day for them to repudiate the jurisdiction they were invoking all
along.

MANILA BANKERS vs. NG KOK WEI (Jurisdiction)

We have consistently held that complaints for specific performance with damages by a lot or
condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the HLURB.
While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitioners active
participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it. We have held that it is
an undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting its case for
decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction,
when adverse.
Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the Appellate
Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified the trial courts jurisdiction over this case.
Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no longer question the trial courts jurisdiction.
On petitioners claim that it did not incur delay, suffice it to say that this is a factual issue. Time
and again, we have ruled that the factual findings of the trial court are given weight when
supported by substantial evidence and carries more weight when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Whether or not petitioner incurred delay and thus, liable to pay damages as a result
thereof, are indeed factual questions.
The jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the
factual findings being assailed are not supported by evidence on record or the impugned
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. These exceptions are not present here.

LOTTE PHIL. CO., INC. vs. DELA CRUZ (Rule 3)

An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable
parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with
jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case.
Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court
cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions
of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as
to those present.
In Domingo v. Scheer, we held that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for
the dismissal of an action and the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner refuses to
implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the
complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiffs failure to comply therefor.
Although 7J was a co-party in the case before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, respondents
failed to include it in their petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. Hence, the Court of
Appeals did not acquire jurisdiction over 7J. No final ruling on this matter can be had without
impleading 7J, whose inclusion is necessary for the effective and complete resolution of the case
and in order to accord all parties with due process and fair play.

DE LA CRUZ vs. JOAQUIN (Rule 3)

When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules of Court
require a substitution of the deceased. The procedure is specifically governed by Section 16 of
Rule 3.
The rule on the substitution of parties was crafted to protect every partys right to due process.
The estate of the deceased party will continue to be properly represented in the suit through the
duly appointed legal representative. Moreover, no adjudication can be made against the
successor of the deceased if the fundamental right to a day in court is denied.
The Court has nullified not only trial proceedings conducted without the appearance of the legal
representatives of the deceased, but also the resulting judgments. In those instances, the courts
acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or the heirs upon whom no
judgment was binding.

This general rule notwithstanding, a formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they
themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in defense of the
deceased. These actions negate any claim that the right to due process was violated.
The Court is not unaware of Chittick v. Court of Appeals, in which the failure of the heirs to
substitute for the original plaintiff upon her death led to the nullification of the trial courts
Decision. The latter had sought to recover support in arrears and her share in the conjugal
partnership. The children who allegedly substituted for her refused to continue the case against
their father and vehemently objected to their inclusion as parties. [29] Moreover, because he died
during the pendency of the case, they were bound to substitute for the defendant also. The
substitution effectively merged the persons of the plaintiff and the defendant and thus
extinguished the obligation being sued upon.[30]
Strictly speaking, the rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a
requirement of due process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right of the
representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance
with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision. Mere failure to substitute for a
deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial courts decision. The alleging party
must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.
Evidently, the heirs of Pedro Joaquin voluntary appeared and participated in the case. We stress
that the appellate court had ordered his legal representatives to appear and substitute for him.
The substitution even on appeal had been ordered correctly. In all proceedings, the legal
representatives must appear to protect the interests of the deceased. After the rendition of
judgment, further proceedings may be held, such as a motion for reconsideration or a new trial,
an appeal, or an execution.[35]
Considering the foregoing circumstances, the Motion for Substitution may be deemed to have
been granted; and the heirs, to have substituted for the deceased, Pedro Joaquin. There being
no violation of due process, the issue of substitution cannot be upheld as a ground to nullify the
trial courts Decision.

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION vs. OLIVER (Rule 3)

An indispensable party is a party in interest, without whom no final determination can be had of
an action. It is true that mortgagor Oliver One is a party in interest, for she will be affected by the
outcome of the case. She stands to be benefited in case the mortgage is declared valid, or
injured in case her title is declared fake. However, mortgagor Oliver Ones absence from the case
does not hamper the trial court in resolving the dispute between respondent Oliver Two and
petitioner. A perusal of Oliver Twos allegations in the complaint below shows that it was for
annulment of mortgage due to petitioners negligence in not determining the actual ownership of
the property, resulting in the mortgages annotation on TCT No. S-50195 in the Registry of Deeds
custody. To support said allegations, respondent Oliver Two had to prove (1) that she is the real
Mercedes M. Oliver referred to in the TCT, and (2) that she is not the same person using that
name who entered into a deed of mortgage with the petitioner. This, respondent Oliver Two can
do in her complaint without necessarily impleading the mortgagor Oliver One. Hence, Oliver One
is not an indispensable party in the case filed by Oliver Two.
In Noceda vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 313 SCRA 504 (1999), we held that a party is not
indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible
from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which
does complete justice to the parties in court. In this case, Chinabank has interest in the loan
which, however, is distinct and divisible from the mortgagors interest, which involves the land
used as collateral for the loan.
As to the second issue, since mortgagor Oliver One is not an indispensable party, Section 7, Rule
3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires compulsory joinder of indispensable
parties in a case, does not apply. Instead, it is Section 11, Rule 3, that applies. Non-joinder of
parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court,
either on its own initiative or on motion of the parties. Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no
error when it found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court for denying Chinabanks
motion to dismiss and, instead, suggested that petitioner file an appropriate action against
mortgagor Oliver One. A person who is not a party to an action may be impleaded by the
defendant either on the basis of liability to himself or on the ground of direct liability to the plaintiff.

RELUCIO vs LOPEZ (Rule 3)

A real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit.
In this case, petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in Special Proceedings M-3630.
If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An indispensable
party is one without whom there can be no final determination of an action. Petitioners

participation in Special Proceedings M-3630 is not indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can
issue a judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an accounting of his conjugal partnership
with respondent, and give support to respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez
conjugal partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez share in property co-owned by
him and petitioner. Such judgment would be perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J.
Lopez.
Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in Special Proceedings M-3630. A necessary party as
one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if complete relief is to be
accorded those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject
of the action. In the context of her petition in the lower court, respondent would be accorded
complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez were ordered to account for his alleged conjugal partnership
property with respondent, give support to respondent and her children, turn over his share in the
co-ownership with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute community
property with respondent.

RIVIERA FILIPINA, INC vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Rule 3)

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Section 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, upon
which Riviera anchors its argument, has already been amended by the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure Even applying the old Rules, the failure of a counsel to comply with his duty under
Section 16 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, to inform the court of the death of his client
and no substitution of such is effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment
thereon if the action survives the death of such party, as this case does, since the death of Reyes
did not extinguish his civil personality. The appellate court was well within its jurisdiction to
proceed as it did with the case since the death of a party is not subject to its judicial notice.
Needless to stress, the purpose behind the rule on substitution of parties is the protection of the
right of every party to due process. This purpose has been adequately met in this case since
both parties argued their respective positions through their pleadings in the trial court and the
appellate court. Besides, the Court has already acquired jurisdiction over the heirs of Reyes by
voluntarily submitting themselves to our jurisdiction.

KATON vs. PALANCA (Rule 3)

Thus, when the plaintiff admits in the complaint that the disputed land will revert to the public
domain even if the title is canceled or amended, the action is for reversion; and the proper party
who may bring action is the government, to which the property will revert. A mere homestead
applicant, not being the real party in interest, has no cause of action in a suit for reconveyance.
As it is, vested rights over the land applied for under a homestead may be validly claimed only by
the applicant, after approval by the director of the Land Management Bureau of the formers final
proof of homestead patent.
Consequently, the dismissal of the Complaint is proper not only because of lack of jurisdiction, but
also because of the utter absence of a cause of action, a defense raised by respondents in their
Answer. Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court ordains that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest, who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit. Indeed, one who has no right or interest to protect has no cause of action by
which to invoke, as a party-plaintiff, the jurisdiction of the court.
Finally, assuming that petitioner is the proper party to bring the action for annulment of title or its
reconveyance, the case should still be dismissed for being time-barred. It is not disputed that a
homestead patent and an Original Certificate of Title was issued to Palanca on February 21,
1977, while the Complaint was filed only on October 6, 1998. Clearly, the suit was brought way
past ten years from the date of the issuance of the Certificate, the prescriptive period for
reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property.

ALDAY vs. FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION (Rule 6)

Before going into the substantive issues, the Court shall first dispose of some procedural matters
raised by the parties. Petitioner claims that respondent is estopped from questioning her nonpayment of docket fees because it did not raise this particular issue when it filed its first motion the Motion to Strike out Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim And To Declare Defendant In
Default with the trial court; rather, it was only nine months after receiving petitioners answer
that respondent assailed the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over petitioners counterclaims based
on the latters failure to pay docket fees. Petitioners position is unmeritorious. Estoppel by
laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to
assert it. In the case at bar, respondent cannot be considered as estopped from assailing the trial
courts jurisdiction over petitioners counterclaim since this issue was raised by respondent with
the trial court itself the body where the action is pending - even before the presentation of any
evidence by the parties and definitely, way before any judgment could be rendered by the trial

court.
The basic issue for resolution in this case is whether or not the counterclaim of petitioner is
compulsory or permissive in nature. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable
by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the opposing partys claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
In Valencia v. Court of Appeals, this Court capsulized the criteria or tests that may be used in
determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, summarized as follows:
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendants
counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
Another test, applied in the more recent case of Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, is the compelling
test of compulsoriness which requires a logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim,
that is, where conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a
substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court.
Tested against the abovementioned standards, petitioners counterclaim for commissions,
bonuses, and accumulated premium reserves is merely permissive. The evidence required to
prove petitioners claims differs from that needed to establish respondents demands for the
recovery of cash accountabilities from petitioner, such as cash advances and costs of premiums.
The recovery of respondents claims is not contingent or dependent upon establishing petitioners
counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials will not result in the substantial duplication of
the time and effort of the court and the parties. One would search the records in vain for a logical
connection between the parties claims. This conclusion is further reinforced by petitioners own
admissions since she declared in her answer that respondents cause of action, unlike her own,
was not based upon the Special Agents Contract. However, petitioners claims for damages,
allegedly suffered as a result of the filing by respondent of its complaint, are compulsory.
There is no need for petitioner to pay docket fees for her compulsory counterclaim. On the other
hand, in order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissive counterclaim, petitioner
is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. The rule on the payment of filing fees has been laid
down by the Court in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano AsuncionThe above mentioned ruling in Sun Insurance has been reiterated in the recent case of Suson v.
Court of Appeals. In Suson, the Court explained that although the payment of the prescribed
docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment does not result in the automatic
dismissal of the case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. Coming now to the case at bar, it has not been alleged by respondent and
there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner has attempted to evade the payment of the
proper docket fees for her permissive counterclaim. As a matter of fact, after respondent filed its
motion to dismiss petitioners counterclaim based on her failure to pay docket fees, petitioner
immediately filed a motion with the trial court, asking it to declare her counterclaim as compulsory
in nature and therefore exempt from docket fees and, in addition, to declare that respondent was
in default for its failure to answer her counterclaim. However, the trial court dismissed petitioners
counterclaim. Pursuant to this Courts ruling in Sun Insurance, the trial court should have instead
given petitioner a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period, to pay the filing fees for her permissive counterclaim.
Petitioner asserts that the trial court should have declared respondent in default for having failed
to answer her counterclaim. Insofar as the permissive counterclaim of petitioner is concerned,
there is obviously no need to file an answer until petitioner has paid the prescribed docket fees for
only then shall the court acquire jurisdiction over such claim. Meanwhile, the compulsory
counterclaim of petitioner for damages based on the filing by respondent of an allegedly
unfounded and malicious suit need not be answered since it is inseparable from the claims of
respondent. If respondent were to answer the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner, it would
merely result in the former pleading the same facts raised in its complaint.

DONATO vs CA (Rule 7)
The requirement regarding the need for a certification of non-forum shopping in cases filed before
the CA and the corresponding sanction for non-compliance thereto are found in the then
prevailing Revised Circular No. 28-91. It provides that the petitioner himself must make the

certification against forum shopping and a violation thereof shall be a cause for the summary
dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint. The rationale for the rule of personal execution of
the certification by the petitioner himself is that it is only the petitioner who has actual knowledge
of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in other courts or tribunals; even
counsel of record may be unaware of such fact. The Court has ruled that with respect to the
contents of the certification, the rule on substantial compliance may be availed of. This is so
because the requirement of strict compliance with the rule regarding the certification of non-forum
shopping simply underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether
dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict
substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.
We have stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were precisely designed to promote
and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective which is simply to prohibit and
penalize the evils of forum-shopping. The subsequent filing of the certification duly signed by the
petitioner himself should thus be deemed substantial compliance, pro hac vice.
The Courts pronouncement in Republic vs. Court of Appeals is worth echoing: cases should be
determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and
defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of
justice would be better served. Thus, what should guide judicial action is that a party litigant is
given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for him to
lose life, honor or property on mere technicalities. This guideline is especially true when the
petitioner has satisfactorily explained the lapse and fulfilled the requirements in his motion for
reconsideration, as in this case.

BENGUET EXPLORATION, INC vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Rule 8)

The admission of the due execution and genuineness of a document simply means that the party
whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his
authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the
pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formal
requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks,
are waived by him. In another case, we held that When the law makes use of the phrase
genuineness and due execution of the instrument it means nothing more than that the instrument
is not spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face from the one executed. Execution
can only refer to the actual making and delivery, but it cannot involve other matters without
enlarging its meaning beyond reason. The only object of the rule was to enable a plaintiff to
make out a prima facie, not a conclusive case, and it cannot preclude a defendant from
introducing any defense on the merits which does not contradict the execution of the instrument
introduced in evidence.

REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION vs. CA (Rule 10)

Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly states that a pleading may be
amended as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served. This only means that prior
to the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the complaint whether a
new cause of action or change in theory is introduced. The reason for this rule is implied in the
subsequent Section 3 of Rule 10. Under this provision, substantial amendment of the complaint
is not allowed without leave of court after an answer has been served, because any material
change in the allegations contained in the complaint could prejudice the rights of the defendant
who has already set up his defense in the answer.
Conversely, it cannot be said that the defendants rights have been violated by changes made in
the complaint if he has yet to file an answer thereto. In such an event, the defendant has not
presented any defense that can be altered or affected by the amendment of the complaint in
accordance with Section 2 of Rule 10. The defendant still retains the unqualified opportunity to
address the allegations against him by properly setting up his defense in the answer.
Considerable leeway is thus given to the plaintiff to amend his complaint once, as a matter of
right, prior to the filing of an answer by the defendant.
The right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law to amend the complaint before an answer
has been served is not precluded by the filing of a motion to dismiss or any other proceeding
contesting its sufficiency. Were we to conclude otherwise, the right to amend a pleading under
Section 2, Rule 10 will be rendered nugatory and ineffectual, since all that a defendant has to do
to foreclose this remedial right is to challenge the adequacy of the complaint before he files an
answer.
Moreover, amendment of pleadings is favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance
of justice in order to determine every case as far as possible on its merits without regard to
technicalities. This principle is generally recognized to speed up trial and save party litigants from

incurring unnecessary expense, so that a full hearing on the merits of every case may be had and
multiplicity of suits avoided.
The fact that the other defendant below has filed their answers to the complaint does not bar
petitioners right to amend the complaint as against respondent. Indeed, where some but not all
the defendants have answered, the plaintiff may still amend its complaint once, as a matter of
right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the non-answering defendant, but not as to
claims asserted against the other defendants.
Furthermore, we do not agree with respondents claim that it will be prejudiced by the admission
of the Amended Complaint because it had spent time, money and effort to file its petition before
the appellate court. We cannot see how the result could be any different for respondent, if
petitioner merely re-filed the complaint instead of being allowed to amend it. As adverted to
earlier, amendment would even work to respondents advantage since it will undoubtedly speed
up the proceedings before the trial court. Consequently, the amendment should be allowed in the
case at bar as a matter of right in accordance with the rules.

OAMINAL vs. CASTILLO (Rule 14)

In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by the
service of summons or by the latters voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of the
former. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of
summons may be made through personal or substituted service in the manner provided for by
Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service. Resort to the latter is
permitted when the summons cannot be promptly served on the defendant in person and after
stringent formal and substantive requirements have been complied with.
For substituted service of summons to be valid, it is necessary to establish the following
circumstances: (a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible; (b)
efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was served upon a person of
sufficient age and discretion residing at the partys residence or upon a competent person in
charge of the partys office or regular place of business. It is likewise required that the pertinent
facts proving these circumstances are stated in the proof of service or officers return.
Verily, respondents did not raise in their Motion to Dismiss the issue of jurisdiction over their
persons; they raised only improper venue and litis pendentia. Hence, whatever defect there was
in the manner of service should be deemed waived.
Assuming arguendo that the service of summons was defective, such flaw was cured and
respondents are deemed to have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court when
they filed an Omnibus Motion to Admit the Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Counterclaim, an
Answer with Counterclaim, a Motion to Inhibit, and a Motion for Reconsideration and Plea to
Reset Pre-trial. The filing of Motions seeking affirmative relief -- to admit answer, for additional
time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with
motion for reconsideration -- are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
Having invoked the trial courts jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief, respondents cannot -- after
failing to obtain the relief prayed for -- repudiate the very same authority they have invoked.
As much as possible, suits should be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. For this
reason, courts have repeatedly been admonished against default orders and judgments that lay
more emphasis on procedural niceties at the expense of substantial justice. Not being based
upon the merits of the controversy, such issuances may indeed amount to a considerable
injustice resulting in serious consequences on the part of the defendant. Thus, it is necessary to
examine carefully the grounds upon which these orders and judgments are sought to be set
aside.

E. B. VILLAROSA LTD vs. HON. HERMINIO I. BENITO (Rule 14)

Earlier cases have uphold service of summons upon a construction project manager; a
corporations assistant manager; ordinary clerk of a corporation; private secretary of corporate
executives; retained counsel; officials who had charge or control of the operations of the
corporation, like the assistant general manager; or the corporations Chief Finance and
Administrative Officer. In these cases, these persons were considered as agent within the
contemplation of the old rule. Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent
of the corporation is no longer authorized.
The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic
corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states general manager instead of only manager;
corporate secretary instead of secretary; and treasurer instead of cashier. The phrase

agent, or any of its directors is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.

The particular revision under Section 11 of Rule 14 was explained by retired Supreme Court
Justice Florenz Regalado, thus:
x x x the then Sec. 13 of this Rule allowed service upon a defendant corporation to be made on
the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors. The aforesaid terms
were obviously ambiguous and susceptible of broad and sometimes illogical interpretations,
especially the word agent of the corporation. The Filoil case, involving the litigation lawyer of the
corporation who precisely appeared to challenge the validity of service of summons but whose
very appearance for that purpose was seized upon to validate the defective service, is an
illustration of the need for this revised section with limited scope and specific terminology. Thus
the absurd result in the Filoil case necessitated the amendment permitting service only on the inhouse counsel of the corporation who is in effect an employee of the corporation, as distinguished
from an independent practitioner. (underscoring supplied)
Retired Justice Oscar Herrera, who is also a consultant of the Rules of Court Revision
Committee, stated that (T)he rule must be strictly observed. Service must be made to one
named in (the) statute x x x.
It should be noted that even prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, strict
compliance with the rules has been enjoined. In the case of Delta Motor Sales Corporation vs.
Mangosing, the Court held:
A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a
corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute;
otherwise the service is insufficient. x x x.
The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper
notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so
integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served
on him. In other words, to bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action. x x x.
The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for the plain legal
requirements as to the manner in which summons should be served on a domestic corporation. x
x x. (underscoring supplied).
Service of summons upon persons other than those mentioned in Section 13 of Rule 14 (old
rule) has been held as improper. Even under the old rule, service upon a general manager of a
firms branch office has been held as improper as summons should have been served at the
firms principal office. In First Integrated Bonding & Ins. Co., Inc. vs. Dizon, it was held that the
service of summons on the general manager of the insurance firms Cebu branch was improper;
default order could have been obviated had the summons been served at the firms principal
office.
Accordingly, we rule that the service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at its
branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general manager at its principal office at
Davao City is improper. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the petitioner.
The fact that defendant filed a belated motion to dismiss did not operate to confer jurisdiction
upon its person. There is no question that the defendants voluntary appearance in the action is
equivalent to service of summons. Before, the rule was that a party may challenge the jurisdiction
of the court over his person by making a special appearance through a motion to dismiss and if in
the same motion, the movant raised other grounds or invoked affirmative relief which necessarily
involves the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court, the party is deemed to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. This doctrine has been abandoned in the case of La Naval
Drug Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., which became the basis of the adoption of a new
provision in the former Section 23, which is now Section 20 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules.
Section 20 now provides that the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance. The emplacement of this rule clearly underscores the purpose to enforce strict
enforcement of the rules on summons. Accordingly, the filing of a motion to dismiss, whether or
not belatedly filed by the defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, precisely objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant can by no means be deemed a
submission to the jurisdiction of the court. There being no proper service of summons, the trial
court cannot take cognizance of a case for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Any proceeding undertaken by the trial court will consequently be null and void.

MILLENIUM INDUSTRIAL COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, vs. TAN (Rule 14)

Summons is the means by which the defendant in a case is notified of the existence of an action
against him and, thereby, the court is conferred jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. If
the defendant is corporation, Rule 14, 13 requires that service of summons be made upon the
corporations president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. The rationale
of the rule is that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation
sued as to make it a priori presumable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he
should do with any legal papers received by him.
Petitioner contends that the enumeration in Rule 14, 13 is exclusive and that service of
summons upon one who is not enumerated therein is invalid. This is the general rule. However, it
is settled that substantial compliance by serving summons on persons other than those
mentioned in the above rule may be justified. In G & G Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
we ruled that although the service of summons was made on a person not enumerated in Rule
14, 13, if it appears that the summons and complaint were in fact received by the corporation,
there is substantial compliance with the rule as its purpose has been attained.
In Porac Trucking, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court enumerated the requisites for the
application of the doctrine of substantial compliance, to wit: (a) there must be actual receipt of the
summons by the person served, i.e., transferring possession of the copy of the summons from
the Sheriff to the person served; (b) the person served must sign a receipt or the sheriff's return;
and (c) there must be actual receipt of the summons by the corporation through the person on
whom the summons was actually served. The third requisite is the most important for it is through
such receipt that the purpose of the rule on service of summons is attained.
In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites were fulfilled. With respect to
the third, the appellate court held that petitioner's filing of a motion to dismiss the foreclosure suit
is proof that it received the copy of the summons and the complaint. There is, however, no direct
proof of this or that Lynverd Cinches actually turned over the summons to any of the officers of
the corporation. In contrast, in our cases applying the substantial compliance rule, there was
direct evidence, such as the admission of the corporation's officers, of receipt of summons by the
corporation through the person upon whom it was actually served. The question is whether it is
allowable to merely infer actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the person on
whom summons was served. We hold that it cannot be allowed. For there to be substantial
compliance, actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the person served must be
shown. Where a corporation only learns of the service of summons and the filing of the complaint
against it through some person or means other than the person actually served, the service of
summons becomes meaningless. This is particularly true in the present case where there is
serious doubt if Lynverd Cinches, the person on whom service of summons was effected, is in
fact an employee of the corporation. Except for the sheriff's return, there is nothing to show that
Lynverd Cinches was really a draftsman employed by the corporation.
Our decision in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals settled this question. The rule prior
to La Naval was that if a defendant, in a motion to dismiss, alleges grounds for dismissing the
action other than lack of jurisdiction, he would be deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. This rule no longer holds true. Noting that the doctrine of estoppel by
jurisdiction must be unequivocal and intentional, we ruled in La Naval:
Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a motion to
dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense. Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a waiver of
this defense. The assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall not be construed as an
estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.
Finally, we turn to the effect of petitioner's prayer for "other reliefs" in its Motion to Dismiss. In De
Midgely v. Fernandos, it was held that, in a motion to dismiss, the allegation of grounds other than
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, including a prayer "for such other reliefs as"
may be deemed "appropriate and proper" amounted to voluntary appearance. This, however,
must be deemed superseded by the ruling in La Naval that estoppel by jurisdiction must be
unequivocal and intentional. It would be absurd to hold that petitioner unequivocally and
intentionally submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court by seeking other reliefs to which it
might be entitled when the only relief that it can properly ask from the trial court is the dismissal of
the complaint against it.

MASON vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Rule 14)

The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under Section 11, Rule
14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has been settled in Villarosa which applies squarely to
the instant case. In the said case, petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd. (hereafter Villarosa)
with principal office address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with branches at 2492 Bay
View Drive, Tambo, Paraaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City,
entered into a sale with development agreement with private respondent Imperial Development
Corporation. As Villarosa failed to comply with its contractual obligation, private respondent
initiated a suit for breach of contract and damages at the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
Summons, together with the complaint, was served upon Villarosa through its branch manager at
Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Villarosa filed a Special Appearance with Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons and lack of jurisdiction. The trial court
denied the motion and ruled that there was substantial compliance with the rule, thus, it acquired
jurisdiction over Villarosa. The latter questioned the denial before us in its petition for certiorari.
We decided in Villarosas favor and declared the trial court without jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the case. We held that there was no valid service of summons on Villarosa as service was
made through a person not included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, which revised the Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court. We
discarded the trial courts basis for denying the motion to dismiss, namely, private respondents
substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons, and fully agreed with petitioners
assertions that the enumeration under the new rule is restricted, limited and exclusive, following
the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Had the Rules of
Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, we said, it could
have easily done so by clear and concise language. Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the
rule, we stressed strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Neither can herein petitioners invoke our ruling in Millenium to support their position for said case
is not on all fours with the instant case. We must stress that Millenium was decided when the
1964 Rules of Court were still in force and effect, unlike the instant case which falls under the
new rule. Hence, the cases cited by petitioners where we upheld the doctrine of substantial
compliance must be deemed overturned by Villarosa, which is the later case.
At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other party to be heard and to
present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial
proceedings. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. We
will deprive private respondent of its right to present its defense in this multi-million peso suit, if
we disregard compliance with the rules on service of summons.
Since we have ruled that service of summons upon private respondent through its filing clerk
cannot be considered valid, it necessarily follows therefore that the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City did not acquire jurisdiction over private respondent. Consequently, all the subsequent
proceedings held before it, including the order of default, are null and void. As private respondent
points out, the second issue has become moot and academic.

VALMONTE vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Rule 14)

In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible and he cannot be
personally served, substituted service, as provided in Rule 14, 7-8 is essential for the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who does not voluntarily
submit himself to the authority of the court. If defendant cannot be served with summons because
he is temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of summons may, by
leave of court, be made by publication. Otherwise stated, a resident defendant in an action in
personam, who cannot be personally served with summons, may be summoned either by means
of substituted service in accordance with Rule 14, 8 or by publication as provided in 17 and
18 of the same Rule.
In all of these cases, it should be noted, defendant must be a resident of the Philippines,
otherwise an action in personam cannot be brought because jurisdiction over his person is
essential to make a binding decision.
On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country,
summons may be served extraterritorially in accordance with Rule 14, 17.
In such cases, what gives the court jurisdiction in an action in rem or quasi in rem is that it has
jurisdiction over the res, i.e. the personal status of the plaintiff who is domiciled in the Philippines
or the property litigated or attached. Service of summons in the manner provided in 17 is not for
the purpose of vesting it with jurisdiction but for complying with the requirements of fair play or
due process, so that he will be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the

possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be
subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and he can thereby take steps to protect his
interest if he is so minded.
Applying the foregoing rules to the case at bar, private respondents action, which is for
partition and accounting under Rule 69, is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an
action is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendants interest in a specific property
and not to render a judgment against him.
As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of
summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, 17. Such service, to be effective outside
the Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy
of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known
address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.
Since in the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was
not done by means of any of the first two modes, the question is whether the service on her
attorney, petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, can be justified under the third mode, namely, in any . . .
manner the court may deem sufficient.
We hold it cannot. This mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside the Philippines,
such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the defendant resides.
Moreover, there are several reasons why the service of summons on Atty. Alfredo D. Valmonte
cannot be considered a valid service of summons on petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte. In the first
place, service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the order of the
court as required by Rule 14, 17 and certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court
which in fact refused to consider the service to be valid and on that basis declare petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for her failure to file an answer.
In the second place, service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made upon prior
leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, 17. As provided in 19, such leave must be
applied for by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf
and setting forth the grounds for the application.
Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such leave, petitioner Lourdes
A. Valmonte was not given ample time to file her Answer which, according to the rules, shall be
not less than sixty (60) days after notice. It must be noted that the period to file an Answer in an
action against a resident defendant differs from the period given in an action filed against a
nonresident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. In the former, the period is fifteen (15)
days from service of summons, while in the latter, it is at least sixty (60) days from notice.
Strict compliance with these requirements alone can assure observance of due process. That is
why in one case, although the Court considered publication in the Philippines of the summons
(against the contention that it should be made in the foreign state where defendant was residing)
sufficient, nonetheless the service was considered insufficient because no copy of the summons
was sent to the last known correct address in the Philippines.
In contrast, in the case at bar, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte did not appoint her husband as her
attorney-in-fact. Although she wrote private respondent s attorney that all communications
intended for her should be addressed to her husband who is also her lawyer at the latters
address in Manila, no power of attorney to receive summons for her can be inferred therefrom. In
fact the letter was written seven months before the filing of this case below, and it appears that it
was written in connection with the negotiations between her and her sister, respondent Rosita
Dimalanta, concerning the partition of the property in question. As is usual in negotiations of this
kind, the exchange of correspondence was carried on by counsel for the parties. But the authority
given to petitioners husband in these negotiations certainly cannot be construed as also including
an authority to represent her in any litigation.

JOSE vs. BOYON (Rule 14)

In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of
summons. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, such
service may be done by personal or substituted service, following the procedures laid out in
Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court
Personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be
made promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service of
summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b)
specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served
upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge
of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise required that the

pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officers
return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of
substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective.
In the instant case, it appears that the process server hastily and capriciously resorted to
substituted service of summons without actually exerting any genuine effort to locate
respondents.
The Return of Summons shows that no effort was actually exerted and no positive step taken by
either the process server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on
respondents. At best, the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without
indicating that such information was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof.
Certainly, without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to
serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes
of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons.
It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only
when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. The first is an action against the thing itself instead of
against the defendants person; in the latter, an individual is named as defendant, and the
purpose is to subject that individuals interest in a piece of property to the obligation or loan
burdening it.
In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific performance
directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a piece of land, the ownership
or possession thereof was not put in issue, since they did not assert any interest or right over it.
Moreover, this Court has consistently declared that an action for specific performance is an action
in personam.
Having failed to serve the summons on respondents properly, the RTC did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over their persons. Consequently, due process demands that all the proceedings
conducted subsequent thereto should be deemed null and void.

RAMOS vs. RAMOS (Rule 14)

To be able to rule on this point, the Court needs to determine whether the action is in personam,
in rem or quasi in rem. The rules on the service of summons differ depending on the nature of
the action.
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is
directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a
person as defendant, but its object is to subject that persons interest in a property to a
corresponding lien or obligation.
The Complaint filed by respondents with the RTC called for an interpleader to determine the
ownership of the real property in question. Specifically, it forced persons claiming an interest in
the land to settle the dispute among themselves as to which of them owned the property.
Essentially, it sought to resolve the ownership of the land and was not directed against the
personal liability of any particular person. It was therefore a real action, because it affected title to
or possession of real property.
Clearly, petitioners were not the registered owners of the land, but represented merely an
inchoate interest thereto as heirs of Paulino. They had no standing in court with respect to
actions over a property of the estate, because the latter was represented by an executor or
administrator. Thus, there was no need to implead them as defendants in the case, inasmuch as
the estates of the deceased co-owners had already been made parties.
Furthermore, at the time the Complaint was filed, the 1964 Rules of Court were still in effect.
Under the old Rules, specifically Section 3 of Rule 3, an executor or administrator may sue or be
sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is prosecuted or defended. The present
rule, however, requires the joinder of the beneficiary or the party for whose benefit the action is
brought. Under the former Rules, an executor or administrator is allowed to either sue or be sued
alone in that capacity.

TEH vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Rule 16)

When the appellate court studied the petitioners motion for reconsideration and found that the
contention therein was correct, it proceeded to look into the merits of the petition. However, it
found that the same should be dismissed for lack of merit because it found that the trial courts
order assailed by the petitioner therein was an order denying a motion to dismiss. Based on the
factual circumstances of the case, the appellate court ruled that the order sought to be reversed
was an interlocutory order which is beyond the scope of a petition for certiorari, and that the trial
court did not commit abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and ordered the issuance of an alias

summons to the latter.

The Court agrees with the appellate courts ruling that there was no abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court when the latter denied the petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint and
ordered the issuance of an alias summons to be served upon him. Although the respondent
should have resorted to other means to determine the correct address of the petitioner when it
was informed by the sheriff that he failed to serve the summons on the petitioner, the respondent
is not entirely to blame for such failure because the petitioners address as indicated by Wood
Based Panels, Inc., and Sinrimco, Inc. on their respective General Information Sheets, was
incorrect.
Moreover, the trial court was merely exercising its discretion under Rule 16, Section 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure when it denied the petitioners motion to dismiss. Under said rule, after
hearing the motion, a judge may dismiss the action, deny the motion to dismiss or order the
amendment of the pleading. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss based on its finding that
the issues alleged by the respondent in its complaint could not be resolved fully in the absence of
the petitioner. In its desire to resolve completely the issues brought before it, the trial court
deemed it fitting to properly acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by ordering the
issuance of alias summons on the petitioner. Evidently, the trial court acted well within its
discretion. The Court of Appeals did not, therefore, err in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed
before it.

JACINTO SAGUID vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Rule 18)

Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of the defendant to file
a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial, i.e., the plaintiff may
present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. The
remedy of the defendant is to file a motion for reconsideration showing that his failure to file a pretrial brief was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect. The motion need not really
stress the fact that the defendant has a valid and meritorious defense because his answer which
contains his defenses is already on record.
In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to file a pre-trial brief is justified because he
was not represented by counsel. This justification is not, however, sufficient to set aside the order
directing private respondent to present evidence ex parte, inasmuch as the petitioner chose at his
own risk not to be represented by counsel. Even without the assistance of a lawyer, petitioner
was able to file a motion for extension to file answer, the required answer stating therein the
special and affirmative defenses, and several other motions. If it were true that petitioner did not
understand the import of the April 23, 1997 order directing him to file a pre-trial brief, he could
have inquired from the court or filed a motion for extension of time to file the brief. Instead, he
waited until May 26, 1997, or 14 days from his alleged receipt of the April 23, 1997 order before
he filed a motion asking the court to excuse his failure to file a brief. Pre-trial rules are not to be
belittled or dismissed because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a partys
substantive rights. Like all rules, they should be followed except only for the most persuasive of
reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
In the instant case, the fact that petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is not a persuasive
reason to relax the application of the rules. There is nothing in the Constitution which mandates
that a party in a non-criminal proceeding be represented by counsel and that the absence of such
representation amounts to a denial of due process. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is
not indispensable. The legal profession is not engrafted in the due process clause such that
without the participation of its members the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated.
However, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, specifically, Section 6, Rule 18 thereof, rendered moot and academic the issue of
whether or not the plaintiff may be allowed to present evidence ex parte for failure of the
defendant to file a pre-trial brief. While the rules may indeed be applied retroactively, the same is
not called for in the case at bar. Even before the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on
July 1, 1997, the filing of a pre-trial brief was required under Circular No. 1-89 which became
effective on February 1, 1989. Pursuant to the said circular, [f]ailure to file pre-trial briefs may be
given the same effect as the failure to appear at the pre-trial, that is, the party may be declared
non-suited or considered as in default.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PEREZ y SEBUNGA (Rule 18)

The purpose of pre-trial is to consider the following: (a) plea bargaining; (b) stipulation of facts; (c)
marking for identification of evidence of the parties; (d) waiver of objections to admissibility of
evidence; (e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes
lawful defenses; and (f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal
and civil aspects of the case. Facts stipulated and evidence admitted during pre-trial bind the

parties. Section 4, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial order. - After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting
the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the
parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action during
the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice. (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Mayia herself testified in open court as to her age. During the trial on December 15,
1998, which was about twenty-three (23) months after the rape incident occurred on January 17,
1997, Mayia testified on cross-examination that she was 8 years old last May 23. Thus, by
deduction, since Mayia was born on May 23, 1990 as shown in her birth certificate, she was
about six (6) years and seven (7) months old on January 17, 1997, the day the crime took place.
We rule that the prosecution has indisputably proven that Mayia was below seven years old at the
time appellant raped her.

PINLAC vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Rule 19)

The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure is intended to make the powers of the
Court fully and completely available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive
adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof. Indeed,
in exceptional cases, the Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of judgment
by the trial court. In one case, intervention was allowed even when the petition for review of the
assailed judgment was already submitted for decision in the Supreme Court.
Clearly, the intervention of the Republic is necessary to protect public interest as well as
government properties located and projects undertaken on Lot No. 3. The Constitutional
mandate that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law
can certainly be invoked by the Republic which is an indispensable party to the case at bar. As
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, while the provision is intended as a protection of
individuals against arbitrary action of the State, it may also be invoked by the Republic to protect
its properties.

YAO vs. HONORABLE NORMA C. PERELLO (Rule 19)

Consequently, petitioners claim that he had the right to intervene is without basis. Nothing in the
said provision requires the inclusion of a private party as respondent in petitions for prohibition.
On the other hand, to allow intervention, it must be shown that (a) the movant has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation or otherwise qualified, and (b) consideration must be given as to whether
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the
intervenors rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not. Both requirements must
concur as the first is not more important than the second.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners right as a judgment creditor was adversely
affected by the lifting of the levy on the subject real property. Records reveal that there are other
pieces of property exclusively owned by the defendants in the HLURB case that can be levied
upon.
Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that petitioner indeed had the right to intervene,
he must exercise said right in accordance with the rules and within the period prescribed
therefore.
As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for intervention may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court. Petitioner filed his motion only on April 25, 2002, way
beyond the period set forth in the rules. The court resolution granting private respondents petition
for prohibition and lifting the levy on the subject property was issued on March 22, 2002. By April
6, 2002, after the lapse of 15 days, the said resolution had already become final and executory.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LI KA KIM (Rule 37)

The requisites of newly discovered evidence in order to justify a new trial are that:
(a) the evidence is discovered after trial;
(b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; and
(c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such
weight that, if admitted, would likely change the judgment.
Not one of the requisites mentioned is attendant. Appellants passport could have easily been
presented and produced during the trial. Then, too, the presentation of appellants passport
would hardly be material to the outcome of the case. Appellant was positively identified by the
prosecution witnesses as being the perpetrator of the crime. Most importantly, appellant even
identified himself as Li Ka Kim at the trial and not as Huang Xiao Wei that bolsters the conclusion

that appellant deliberately concealed his true identity in the nefarious enterprise.

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Rule 38)

A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases
when there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available
to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial
court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing
such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. In order for a petition
for relief to be entertained by the court, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that he has
faithfully and strictly complied with the provisions of Rule 38. It is also incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the said petition was filed within the reglementary period specified in
Section 3, Rule 38 (within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or
other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final
order was entered, or such proceeding was taken). And the rule is that the reglementary period is
reckoned from the time the partys counsel receives notice of the decision for notice to counsel of
the decision is notice to the party for purposes of Section 3 of Rule 38.
In the present case, the YEES were served a copy of the judgment of the lower court through
their counsel, Attorney Ralph Lou I. Willkom on March 3, 1995. Thus, the YEES are considered to
have received notice on March 3, 1995 when their counsel was served notice and not on March
24, 1995 when they actually learned of the adverse decision. Consequently, their petition for
relief, which was filed on May 15, 1995 or over sixty days from notice of their counsel, was filed
out of time. This Court has consistently held that the failure of a partys counsel to notify him on
time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence, which is not
excusable. However, notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or
failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal
is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.
We are not persuaded by the YEES claim that they were denied due process inasmuch as they
were not denied their day in court. In fact, they were able to prosecute their action and actively
participated through counsel in the proceedings before the lower court. Their failure to file an
appeal from the decision rendering it final and executory is not a denial of due process. They may
have lost their right to appeal but they were not denied their day in court. The right to appeal is
not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. In the same
manner, the YEES failure to file their petition for relief within the period provided for under the
Rules is not tantamount to a denial of due process. More important, no evidence was presented
to support respondents bare and self-serving allegation that their lawyer did not inform them of
the decision against them. It bears stress that we are not concerning ourselves with the lawyers
duty to his client but with the timeliness of the filing of the petition for relief which cannot be given
due course on the simple and expedient claim of a party that their lawyer failed to inform them of
the decision in the case. Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the
effects of the judgment when the loss of remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise
the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost+- though
inexcusable negligence.

MESINA vs MEER (Rule 38)

As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the petitioners allegation of extrinsic fraud
should have been brought at issue in the Metropolitan Trial Court. If they truly believe that the
default of the spouses Mesina prejudiced their rights, they should have questioned this from the
beginning. Yet, they chose to participate in the proceedings and actively presented their defense.
And their efforts were rewarded as the Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in their favor.
When the respondent appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court, they never raised this issue.
Even after the Regional Trial Court reversed the finding of the MeTC, and the Court of Appeals
sustained this reversal, petitioners made no effort to bring this issue for consideration. This Court
will not allow petitioners, in guise of equity, to benefit from their own negligence.
The same is true with regard to the defenses forwarded by the petitioners in support of their
petition. These contentions should have been raised in the MeTC, as they have been available to
them since the beginning.
Finally, it is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from
the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or
a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the
right of appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to

mistaken mode of procedure by counsel.i[27] Petitioners, however, place the blame on their
counsel and invoke honest mistake of law. They contend that they lack legal education, hence,
were not aware of the required period for filing an appeal. ii[28]
In exceptional cases, when the mistake of counsel is so palpable that it amounts to gross
negligence, this Court affords a party a second opportunity to vindicate his right. But this
opportunity is unavailing in the instant case, especially since petitioners have squandered the
various opportunities available to them at the different stages of this case. Public interest
demands an end to every litigation and a belated effort to reopen a case that has already attained
finality will serve no purpose other than to delay the administration of justice.

SERRANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Rule 38)

Generally, the execution upon a final judgment is a matter of right on the part of the prevailing
party. It is the ministerial and mandatory duty of the trial court to enforce its own judgment once it
becomes final and executory. It may happen, however, that new facts and circumstances may
develop or occur after a judgment had been rendered and while an appeal therefrom is pending;
or new matters had developed after the appeal has been dismissed and the appealed judgment
had become final and executory, which the parties were not aware of and could not have been
aware of prior to or during the trial or during the appeal, as they were not yet in existence at that
time. In the first situation, any attempt to frustrate or put off the enforcement of an executory
decision must fail. Once a judgment has become final and executory, the only remedy left for
material attention thereof is that provided for in Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
There is no other prerequisite mode of thwarting the execution of the judgment on equitable
grounds predicated on facts occurring before the finality of judgment. In the second situation, the
execution may be stayed, notwithstanding the affirmance of the appealed judgment by this Court.
It is required, however, that the supervening facts and circumstances must either have a direct
effect upon the matter already litigated and settled or create a substantial change in the rights or
relations of the parties therein which would render execution of a final judgment unjust,
impossible or inequitable or when it becomes imperative in the interest of justice. The interested
party may file a motion to quash a writ of execution issued by the trial court, or ask the court to
modify or alter the judgment to harmonize the same with justice and further supervening facts.
Evidence may be adduced by the parties on such supervening facts or circumstances.

BAEZ vs BAEZ (Rule 39)

In this case, considering the reasons cited by petitioner, we are of the view that there is no
superior or urgent circumstance that outweighs the damage which respondent would suffer if he
were ordered to vacate the house. We note that petitioner did not refute respondents allegations
that she did not intend to use said house, and that she has two (2) other houses in the United
States where she is a permanent resident, while he had none at all. Merely putting up a bond is
not sufficient reason to justify her plea for execution pending appeal. To do so would make
execution routinary, the rule rather than the exception.
Similarly, we are not persuaded that the P100,000 advance payment to petitioners counsel was
properly granted. We see no justification to pre-empt the judgment by the Court of Appeals
concerning said amount of P100,000 at the time that the trial courts judgment was already on
appeal.

CITY OF ILIGAN vs. PRINCIPAL MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC (Rule 39)

There are three requisites for the execution of a judgment pending appeal: a) a motion must be
filed by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; b) there must be good reasons for
execution pending appeal; and c) the good reasons must be stated in a special order.
Execution pending appeal is, of course, the exception to the general rule. Normally, execution
cannot be obtained until and unless (a) the judgment has become final and executory; (b) the
right of appeal has been renounced or waived; (c) the period for appeal has lapsed without an
appeal having been filed; or (d) having been filed, the appeal has been resolved and the records
of the case have been returned to the court of origin -- in which case, execution shall issue as a
matter of right.
On the other hand, when the period of appeal has not yet expired, the execution of a judgment
should not be allowed except if, in the courts discretion, there are good reasons therefor.
Since the execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule, the
existence of good reasons is essential. These reasons must be stated in a special order,
because unless these are divulged, it will be difficult to determine on appeal whether judicial
discretion has been properly exercised by the lower court.
Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances that justify the immediate execution of a
judgment, lest it become illusory; or the prevailing party be unable to enjoy it after the lapse of

time, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may have no recourse but to delay.
In the present case, the good reason relied upon by both the trial and the appellate courts was
that the partial adjudication of the case was based on petitioners own admission; hence, any
appeal based on that point would be unmeritorious and merely dilatory. Indeed, both courts ruled
that an appeal by petitioner would only serve as a good and sufficient reason upon which to
issue execution.

VILLARUEL, JR vs. REYNALDO D. FERNANDO (Rule 39)

Furthermore, the resolution of the Ombudsman finding Abarca guilty of violating Section 7(d) of
RA 6713 did not and could not supersede the decision of the trial court holding petitioner liable for
damages. The action filed by the petitioner before the Ombudsman is completely different from
the action instituted by respondents before the trial court. The two actions, which are clearly
separate and distinct from each other, presented two different causes of action. Petitioners
cause of action arose from respondents alleged violation of certain provisions of RA 6713
whereas respondents cause of action resulted from petitioners refusal to recall respondents to
their mother unit at CATC. In the administrative case before the Ombudsman, the issue was
whether respondents were guilty of violating RA 6713. In contrast, the issue in the civil action
before the trial court was whether respondents were entitled to the issuance of the writ of
mandamus and damages.

MORTA vs. BAGAGAN (Rule 39)

There is no mistaking the mandatory character of the period prescribed under Section 14 of Rule
39 of the Revised Rules of Court on the Return of a Writ of Execution, which reads:
SEC. 14. Return of writ of execution. The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court
issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment
cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall
report to the court and state the reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect during the
period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a
report to the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment
is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the
whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly
furnished the parties.
A similar rule is stated in Administrative Circular No. 12 dated October 1, 1985, and incorporated
in the Manual for Clerks of Court. According to this Circular, all sheriffs and deputy sheriffs shall
submit to the judge concerned a report on actions taken on all writs and processes assigned to
them within 10 days from receipt.
Per the records of this case, a Writ of Execution was issued on November 22, 1999 in Civil Case
Nos. 481 and 482. Respondent Sheriffs Return of Service of that Writ was filed only on May 25,
2000, however, or six months thereafter. There is nothing in the records showing that he
submitted before then a periodic report on the actions he had taken on the Writ every 30 days
from the date of receipt as required. On the contrary, the Report indicates that the Writ was
partially executed on December 15-28, 1999 and January 11, 2000; and that the damages
adjudged were partly paid in the amount of P3,500 plus one unit of Karaoke machine. But it was
only on May 25, 2000, that this matter was reported to the trial court.
The excuse proffered by respondent sheriff -- heavy workload -- cannot absolve him from
administrative sanctions. As an officer of the court, he should at all times show a high degree of
professionalism in the performance of his duties. He has failed to observe that degree of
dedication required of him as a sheriff. The charge of connivance is, however, dismissed for lack
of basis.

SANTOS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (Rule 39)

While it was indeed held that shortness of the remaining term of office and posting a bond are not
good reasons, we clearly stated in Fermo v. COMELEC that:
A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it should be
based upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. The following constitute good
reasons and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant execution pending
appeal: (1.) public interest involved or will of the electorate; (2.) the shortness of the
remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and (3.) the length of time that the
election contest has been pending (italics supplied).

FAJARDO vs. QUITALIG (Rule 39)

We find respondents explanation to be utterly wanting. He is guilty of dereliction of his duty as a
sheriff, because he failed to (1) execute the Writ within 30 days from his receipt thereof, (2)
submit his Report of Service within the same period, (3) make periodic reports to the MTCC until
the judgment was fully satisfied, and (4) furnish the parties with copies of the Reports.
By his own words, respondent admitted his dereliction of duty. First, as we have said earlier, he
should have immediately executed the Writ when he served it upon the defendant on March 9,
2000. Second, he should have immediately reported to the MTCC that he was unable to enforce
the Writ because another court had issued a TRO enjoining him from doing so. Third, he should
have informed the parties, particularly the plaintiff or his counsel, about his inability to enforce the
Writ. Fourth, he should have immediately enforced it twenty days after its issuance. Fifth, he
should have made periodic Reports to the MTCC until the judgment was fully satisfied and the
parties furnished a copy thereof. Sixth, within thirty days from his receipt of the Writ, he should
have promptly made his Return, a copy of which he should have immediately furnished the
parties. In several cases, the Court has said that the failure to make a return of a writ within the
required period is nonfeasance.

ii