G.R. No.

170498

January 9, 2013

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY,

Petitioner,
vs.
ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve petitioner Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Company's (Metro bank's) petition for review on
certiorari1 seeking the reversal of the decision2
dated August 25, 2005 and the resolution3 dated
November 17, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 86336. The assailed decision affirmed
the order4 dated May 7, 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 80. The RTC had
denied the admission of Metrobank's Fourth-Party
Complaint5 against the Estate of Jose L. Chua for
being a money claim that falls under Section 5, Rule
86 of the Rules of Court; the claim should have been
filed in the pending judicial settlement of Chuas
estate before the RTC of Pasay City. The CA affirmed
the RTCs order based on the same ground.
Factual Antecedents
On October 5, 2000, Sherwood Holdings Corporation,
Inc. (SHCI) filed a complaint for sum of money
against Absolute Management Corporation (AMC).
The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-0042105 and was assigned to the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 80.6
SHCI alleged in its complaint that it made advance
payments to AMC for the purchase of 27,000 pieces
of plywood and 16,500 plyboards in the sum of
P12,277,500.00, covered by Metrobank Check Nos.
1407668502, 140768507, 140768530, 140768531,
140768532, 140768533 and 140768534. These
checks were all crossed, and were all made payable
to AMC. They were given to Chua, AMCs General
Manager, in 1998.7

Chua died in 1999, 8 and a special proceeding for the

settlement of his estate was commenced before the
RTC of Pasay City. This proceeding was pending at
the time AMC filed its answer with counterclaims and
third-party complaint.9

SHCI made demands on AMC, after Chuas death, for

allegedly undelivered items worth P8,331,700.00.
According to AMC, these transactions could not be
found in its records. Upon investigation, AMC
discovered that in 1998, Chua received from SHCI 18
Metrobank checks worth P31,807,500.00. These were
all payable to AMC and were crossed or "for payees
account only."10
In its answer with counterclaims and third-party
complaint,11 AMC averred that it had no knowledge
of Chuas transactions with SHCI and it did not
receive any money from the latter. AMC also asked
the RTC to hold Metrobank liable for the subject
checks in case it is adjudged liable to SHCI.
Metrobank filed a motion for bill of particulars,12
seeking to clarify certain ambiguous statements in
AMCs answer. The RTC granted the motion but AMC
failed to submit the required bill of particulars.
Hence, Metrobank filed a motion to strike out the
third-party complaint.13
In the meantime, Metrobank filed a motion to
dismiss14 against AMC on the ground that the latter
engaged in prohibited forum shopping. According to
Metrobank, AMCs claim against it is the same claim
that it raised against Chuas estate in Special
Proceedings No. 99-0023 before the RTC of Pasay
City, Branch 112. The RTC subsequently denied this
motion.15
The RTC of Quezon City opted to defer
consideration16 of Metrobanks motion to strike out
third-party complaint17 and it instead granted AMCs
motion for leave to serve written interrogatories on
the third-party defendant.18 While Metrobank filed
its answer to the written interrogatories, AMC was
again directed by the RTC, in an order19 dated
August 13, 2003, to submit its bill of particulars.
Instead, AMC filed a motion for reconsideration20
which was denied in an order21 dated October 28,

2003. AMC still did not file its bill of particulars. The
RTC, on the other hand, did not act on Metrobanks
motion to strike out AMCs third-party complaint.22
In its answer23 dated December 1, 2003, Metrobank
admitted that it deposited the checks in question to
the account of Ayala Lumber and Hardware, a sole
proprietorship Chua owned and managed. The
deposit was allegedly done with the knowledge and
consent of AMC. According to

Metrobank, Chua then gave the assurance that the

arrangement for the handling of the checks carried
AMCs consent. Chua also submitted documents
showing his position and interest in AMC. These
documents, as well as AMCs admission in its answer
that it allowed Chua to manage AMC with a relative
free hand, show that it knew of Chuas arrangement
with Metrobank. Further, Chuas records show that
the proceeds of the checks were remitted to AMC
which cannot therefore now claim that it did not
receive these proceeds.
Metrobank also raised the defense of estoppel.
According to Metrobank, AMC had knowledge of its
arrangements with Chua for several years. Despite
this arrangement, AMC did not object to nor did it call
the attention of Metrobank about Chuas alleged lack
of authority to deposit the checks in Ayala Lumber
and Hardwares account. At this point, AMC is already
estopped from questioning Chuas authority to
deposit these checks in Ayala Lumber and
Hardwares account.
Lastly, Metrobank asserted that AMC gave Chua
unbridled control in managing AMCs affairs. This
measure of control amounted to gross negligence
that was the proximate cause of the loss that AMC
must now bear.
Subsequently, Metrobank filed a motion for leave to
admit fourth-party complaint24 against Chuas
estate. It alleged that Chuas estate should
reimburse Metrobank in case it would be held liable
in the third-party complaint filed against it by AMC.
The RTCs Ruling

In an order25 dated May 7, 2004, the RTC denied

Metrobanks motion. It likewise denied Metrobanks
motion for reconsideration in an order26 dated July 7,
2004.
The RTC categorized Metrobanks allegation in the
fourth-party complaint as a "cobro de lo indebido"27
a kind of quasi-contract that mandates recovery of
what has been improperly paid. Quasi-contracts fall
within the concept of implied contracts that must be
included in the claims required to be filed with the
judicial settlement of the deceaseds estate under
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. As such
claim, it should have been filed in Special
Proceedings No. 99-0023, not before the RTC as a
fourth-party complaint. The RTC, acting in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction, does not have the
authority to adjudicate the fourth-party complaint. As
a trial court hearing an ordinary action, it cannot
resolve matters pertaining to special proceedings
because the latter is subject to specific rules.

Metrobank responded to the RTC ruling by filing a

petition for certiorari28 under Rule 65 before the CA.

In its present petition for review on certiorari,30

Metrobank asserts that it should be allowed to file a
fourth-party complaint against Chuas estate in the
proceedings before the RTC; its fourth-party
complaint was filed merely to enforce its right to be
reimbursed by Chuas estate in case Metrobank is
held liable to AMC. Hence, Section 11, Rule 6 of the
Rules of Court should apply.
AMC, in its comment,31 maintains the line that the
CA and the RTC rulings should be followed, i.e., that
Metrobanks claim is a quasi-contract that should be
filed as a claim under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules
of Court.
AMC also challenges the form of Metrobanks petition
for failure to comply with Section 4, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. This provision requires petitions filed
before the Supreme Court to be accompanied by
"such material portions of the record as would
support the petition."
According to AMC, the petitions annexes are mostly
Metrobanks pleadings and court issuances. It did not
append all relevant AMC pleadings before the RTC
and the CA. For this reason, the petition should have
been dismissed outright.

The CAs Ruling

Issues
The CA affirmed the RTCs ruling that Metrobanks
fourth-party complaint should have been filed in
Special Proceedings No. 99-0023.29 According to the
CA, the relief that Metrobank prayed for was based
on a quasi-contract and was a money claim
categorized as an implied contract that should be
filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
Based on the statutory construction principle of lex
specialis derogat generali, the CA held that Section 5,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court is a special provision
that should prevail over the general provisions of
Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court. The latter
applies to money claims in ordinary actions while a
money claim against a person already deceased falls
under the settlement of his estate that is governed
by the rules on special proceedings. If at all, rules for
ordinary actions only apply suppletorily to special
proceedings.
The Present Petition

The parties arguments, properly joined, present to

us the following issues:
1) Whether the petition for review on certiorari filed
by Metrobank before the Supreme Court complies
with Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; and
2) Whether Metrobanks fourth-party complaint
against Chuas estate should be allowed.
The Courts Ruling
The Present Petition Complies With Section 4, Rule 45
of the Rules of Court
AMC posits that Metrobanks failure to append
relevant AMC pleadings submitted to the RTC and to
the CA violated Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court,32 and is a sufficient ground to dismiss the
petition under Section 5, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.33

We disagree with AMCs position.

In F.A.T. Kee Computer Systems, Inc. v. Online
Networks International, Inc.,34 Online Networks
International, Inc. similarly assailed F.A.T. Kee
Computer Systems, Inc.s failure to attach the
transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the RTC
proceedings, and claimed this omission to be a
violation of Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
that warranted the petitions dismissal. The Court
held that the defect was not fatal, as the TSN of the
proceedings before the RTC forms part of the records
of the case. Thus, there was no incurable omission
that warranted the outright dismissal of the petition.
The Court significantly pointed out in F.A.T. Kee that
the requirement in Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is not meant to be an absolute rule whose
violation would automatically lead to the petitions
dismissal.35 The Rules of Court has not been
intended to be totally rigid. In fact, the Rules of Court
provides that the Supreme Court "may require or
allow the filing of such pleadings, briefs, memoranda
or documents as it may deem necessary within such
periods and under such conditions as it may consider
appropriate";36 and "[i]f the petition is given due
course, the Supreme Court may require the elevation
of the complete record of the case or specified parts
thereof within fifteen (15) days from notice."37 These
provisions are in keeping with the overriding
standard that procedural rules should be liberally
construed to promote their objective and to assist
the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding.38
Under this guiding principle, we do not see
Metrobanks omission to be a fatal one that should
warrant the petitions outright dismissal. To be sure,
the omission to submit the adverse partys pleadings
in a petition before the Court is not a commendable
practice as it may lead to an unduly biased narration
of facts and arguments that masks the real issues
before the Court. Such skewed presentation could
lead to the waste of the Courts time in sifting
through the maze of the parties narrations of facts
and arguments and is a danger the Rules of Court
seeks to avoid.

Our examination of Metrobanks petition shows that

it contains AMCs opposition to its motion to admit
fourth-party complaint among its annexes. The rest
of the pleadings have been subsequently submitted
as attachments in Metrobanks Reply. A reading of
these pleadings shows that their arguments are the
same as those stated in the orders of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals. Thus, even if Metrobanks
petition did not contain some of AMCs pleadings, the
Court still had the benefit of a clear narration of facts
and arguments according to both parties
perspectives. In this broader view, the mischief that
the Rules of Court seeks to avoid has not really been
present. If at all, the omission is not a grievous one
that the spirit of liberality cannot address.
The Merits of the Main Issue
The main issue poses to us two essential points that
must be addressed. First, are quasi-contracts
included in claims that should be filed pursuant to
Rule 86, Section 5 of the Rules of Court? Second, if
so, is Metrobanks claim against the Estate of Jose
Chua based on a quasi-contract?
Quasi-contracts are included in
claims that should be filed under Rule

quasi-contracts and from law are both considered as

implied contracts. Thus, the term quasi-contract is
included in the concept "implied contracts" as used
in the Rules of Court. Accordingly, liabilities of the
deceased arising from quasi-contracts should be filed
as claims in the settlement of his estate, as provided
in Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.41
Metrobanks fourth-party complaint is
based on quasi-contract
Both the RTC and the CA described Metrobanks
claim against Chuas estate as one based on quasicontract. A quasi-contract involves a juridical relation
that the law creates on the basis of certain voluntary,
unilateral and lawful acts of a person, to avoid unjust
enrichment.42 The Civil Code provides an
enumeration of quasi-contracts,43 but the list is not
exhaustive and merely provides examples.44
According to the CA, Metrobanks fourth-party
complaint falls under the quasi-contracts enunciated
in Article 2154 of the Civil Code.45 Article 2154
embodies the concept "solutio indebiti" which arises
when something is delivered through mistake to a
person who has no right to demand it. It obligates
the latter to return what has been received through
mistake.46

86, Section 5 of the Rules of Court

In Maclan v. Garcia,39 Gabriel Maclan filed a civil
case to recover from Ruben Garcia the necessary
expenses he spent as possessor of a piece of land.
Garcia acquired the land as an heir of its previous
owner. He set up the defense that this claim should
have been filed in the special proceedings to settle
the estate of his predecessor. Maclan, on the other
hand, contended that his claim arises from law and
not from contract, express or implied. Thus, it need
not be filed in the settlement of the estate of Garcias
predecessor, as mandated by Section 5, Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court (now Section 5, Rule 86).
The Court held under these facts that a claim for
necessary expenses spent as previous possessor of
the land is a kind of quasi-contract. Citing Leung Ben
v. OBrien,40 it explained that the term "implied
contracts," as used in our remedial law, originated
from the common law where obligations derived from

checks payable to AMC could be deposited to Ayala

Lumber and Hardwares account. Second, Ayala
Lumber and Hardware had no right to demand and
receive the checks that were deposited to its
account; despite Chuas control over AMC and Ayala
Lumber and Hardware, the two entities are distinct,
and checks exclusively and expressly payable to one
cannot be deposited in the account of the other. This
disjunct created an obligation on the part of Ayala
Lumber and Hardware, through its sole proprietor,
Chua, to return the amount of these checks to
Metrobank.
The Court notes, however, that its description of
Metrobanks fourth-party complaint as a claimclosely
analogous to solutio indebiti is only to determine the
validity of the lower courts orders denying it. It is not
an adjudication determining the liability of Chuas
estate against Metrobank. The appropriate trial court
should still determine whether Metrobank has a
lawful claim against Chuas estate based on quasicontract.1wphi1
Metrobanks fourth-party complaint,
as a contingent claim, falls within the
claims that should be filed under
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of

Solutio indebiti, as defined in Article 2154 of the Civil

Code, has two indispensable requisites: first, that
something has been unduly delivered through
mistake; and second, that something was received
when there was no right to demand it.47

In its fourth-party complaint, Metrobank claims that

Chuas estate should reimburse it if it becomes liable
on the checks that it deposited to Ayala Lumber and
Hardwares account upon Chuas instructions.

This fulfills the requisites of solutio indebiti. First,

Metrobank acted in a manner akin to a mistake when
it deposited the AMC checks to Ayala Lumber and
Hardwares account; because of Chuas control over
AMCs operations, Metrobank assumed that the

Court
A distinctive character of Metrobanks fourth-party
complaint is its contingent nature the claim
depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be
adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that may or
may not happen. This characteristic unmistakably
marks the complaint as a contingent one that must
be included in the claims falling under the terms of
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice.

If not filed, barred; exceptions. All claims for money
against the decedent, arising from contract, express
or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decedent, must be
filed within the time limited in the notice. [italics
ours]

In sum, on all counts in the considerations material

to the issues posed, the resolution points to the
affirmation of the assailed CA decision and
resolution. Metrobank's claim in its fourth-party
complaint against Chua's estate is based on quasicontract. It is also a contingent claim that depends
on another event. Both belong to the category of
claims against a deceased person that should be
filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Comi
and, as such, should have been so filed in Special
Proceedings No. 99-0023.

Specific provisions of Section 5, Rule

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY

the petition for lack of merit. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated August 25, 2005, holding that
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80,
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company's motion for
leave to admit fourth-party complaint Is

86 of the Rules of Court prevail over

general provisions of Section 11, Rule
6 of the Rules of Court
Metrobank argues that Section 11, Rule 6 of the
Rules of Court should apply because it impleaded
Chuas estate for reimbursement in the same
transaction upon which it has been sued by AMC. On
this point, the Court supports the conclusion of the
CA, to wit:

AFFIRMED. Costs against Metropolitan Bank & Trust

Company.

Notably, a comparison of the respective provisions of

Section 11, Rule 6 and Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules
of Court readily shows that Section 11, Rule 6 applies
to ordinary civil actions while Section 5, Rule 86
specifically applies to money claims against the
estate. The specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 x
x x must therefore prevail over the general provisions
of Section 11, Rule 6.48

Associate Justice

We read with approval the CAs use of the statutory

construction principle of lex specialis derogat
generali, leading to the conclusion that the specific
provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court
should prevail over the general provisions of Section
11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court; the settlement of the
estate of deceased persons (where claims against
the deceased should be filed) is primarily governed
by the rules on special proceedings, while the rules
provided for ordinary claims, including Section 11,
Rule 6 ofthe Rules of Court, merely apply
suppletorily.49

SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION

Barredo vs Garcia
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which
held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in
damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by
the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver
employed by said Fausto Barredo.

At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936,

on the road between Malabon and Navotas, Province
of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi
of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and
a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela
was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-yearold boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which
he died two days later. A criminal action was filed
against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to

two years of prision correccional. The court in the

criminal case granted the petition that the right to
bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court
in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea
Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939,
brought an action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor
of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro
Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance
of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs
for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the
complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of
Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with
legal interest from the time the action was instituted.
It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the
cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong
side of the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's
responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's
employer. There is proof that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is
shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who
had been caught several times for violation of the
Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) violation
which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public
Works available to be public and to himself.
Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the
provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of
Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal
Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as
there has been no civil action against Pedro
Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo
cannot be held responsible in the case. The
petitioner's brief states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is
being sued for his failure to exercise all the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages
suffered by the respondents. In other words, The
Court of Appeals insists on applying in the case
article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil
Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the
Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil
liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar

simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the

Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the
Civil Code itself, is applicable only to "those
(obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts
or commission not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is
expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention.
The liability sought to be imposed upon him in this
action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or
a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but
an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil
Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or
supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the
plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against
Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and
directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil
Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The
defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence
being punishable by the Penal Code, his
(defendant's) liability as an employer is only
subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but
Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his
property has not been exhausted. To decide the main
issue, we must cut through the tangle that has, in the
minds of many confused and jumbled together
delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal
Code and fault or negligence under articles 19021910 of the Civil Code. This should be done, because
justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless principles
and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately,
we are aided in our inquiry by the luminous
presentation of the perplexing subject by renown
jurists and we are likewise guided by the decisions of
this Court in previous cases as well as by the solemn
clarity of the consideration in several sentences of
the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict
or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal institution
under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own,
and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle
and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil
Code, the primary and direct responsibility of
employers may be safely anchored.

CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089
Obligations arise from law, from
contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts and
omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of
fault or negligence intervenes.
ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or
misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of
the Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or
omissions in which fault or negligence, not
punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the
provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this book.
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission
causes damage to another by his fault or negligence
shall be liable for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next
preceding article is enforcible, not only for personal
acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are liable for any damages caused by the
minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or
incapacitated persons subject to their authority and
living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business
are equally liable for any damages caused by their
employees while engaged in the branch of the
service in which employed, or on occasion of the
performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts
through a special agent, but not if the damage shall
have been caused by the official upon whom properly
devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in
which case the provisions of the next preceding
article shall be applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable
for any damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody.

The liability imposed by this article shall cease in

case the persons mentioned therein prove that they
are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused
by his employees may recover from the latter what
he may have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain
cases. The exemption from criminal liability
established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article
12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does
not include exemption from civil liability, which shall
be enforced to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12
the civil liability for acts committed by any imbecile
or insane person, and by a person under nine years
of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of
age, who has acted without discernment shall
devolve upon those having such person under their
legal authority or control, unless it appears that there
was no fault or negligence on their part.
G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979
EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitioner
vs.
HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of
Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Manila,
FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO SALAZAR,
respondents.
David G. Nitafan for petitioner.
Arsenio R. Reyes for respondent Timbol.
Armando M. Pulgado for respondent Salazar.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:

Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on

certiorari of the Orders of respondent Judge in Civil
Case No. 80803 dismissing his Complaint for
Damages based on quasi-delict against respondents
Felino Timbol and Rodolfo Salazar.
The facts which spawned the present controversy
may be summarized as follows:
On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, a three- way vehicular accident occurred
along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao, Bulacan,
involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by
petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven by
respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand
truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and
driven by Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of said
mishap, two separate Informations for Reckless
Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed
against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The race against
truck-driver Montoya, docketed as Criminal Case No.
SM-227, was for causing damage to the jeep owned
by Salazar, in the amount of Pl,604.00, by hitting it at
the right rear portion thereby causing said jeep to hit
and bump an oncoming car, which happened to be
petitioner's Mercedes Benz. The case against jeepowner-driver Salazar, docketed as Criminal Case No.
SM 228, was for causing damage to the Mercedes
Benz of petitioner in the amount of P8,890.00
At the joint trial of the above cases, petitioner
testified that jeep-owner- driver Salazar overtook the
truck driven by Montoya, swerved to the left going
towards the poblacion of Marilao, and hit his car
which was bound for Manila. Petitioner further
testified that before the impact, Salazar had jumped
from the jeep and that he was not aware that
Salazar's jeep was bumped from behind by the truck
driven by Montoya. Petitioner's version of the
accident was adopted by truck driver Montoya. Jeepowner-driver Salazar, on the other hand, tried to
show that, after overtaking the truck driven by
Montoya, he flashed a signal indicating his intention
to turn left towards the poblacion of Marilao but was
stopped at the intersection by a policeman who was
directing traffic; that while he was at a stop position,
his jeep was bumped at the rear by the truck driven
by Montova causing him to be thrown out of the jeep,

which then swerved to the left and hit petitioner's

car, which was coming from the opposite direction.

On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of

Bulacan, Branch V, Sta. Maria, rendered judgment,
stating in its decretal portion:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the

accused Freddie Montoya GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of damage to property thru
reckless imprudence in Crime. Case No. SM-227, and
hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P972.50 and to
indemnify Rodolfo Salazar in the same amount of
P972.50 as actual damages, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, both as to fine
and indemnity, with costs.
Accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED from
the offense charged in Crime. Case No. SM-228, with
costs de oficio, and his bond is ordered canceled
SO ORDERED. 1
Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver
Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal, in view of
its findings that the collision between Salazar's jeep
and petitioner's car was the result of the former
having been bumped from behind by the truck driven
by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded
damages as he was not a complainant against truckdriver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver
Salazar
On August 22, 1970, or after the termination of the
criminal cases, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 80803
with the Court of First Instance of Manila against
respondents jeep-owner-driver Salazar and Felino
Timbol, the latter being the owner of the gravel and
sand truck driven by Montoya, for indentification for
the damages sustained by his car as a result of the
collision involving their vehicles. Jeep-owner-driver
Salazar and truck-owner Timbol were joined as
defendants, either in the alternative or in solidum
allegedly for the reason that petitioner was uncertain
as to whether he was entitled to relief against both
on only one of them.

On September 9, 1970, truck-owner Timbol filed a

Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 80803 on the
grounds that the Complaint is barred by a prior
judgment in the criminal cases and that it fails to
state a cause of action. An Opposition thereto was
filed by petitioner.
In an Order dated September 12, 1970, respondent
Judge dismissed the Complaint against truck-owner
Timbol for reasons stated in the afore- mentioned
Motion to Dismiss On September 30, 1970, petitioner
sought before this Court the review of that dismissal,
to which petition we gave due course.
On January 30, 1971, upon motion of jeep-ownerdriver Salazar, respondent Judge also dismissed the
case as against the former. Respondent Judge
reasoned out that "while it is true that an
independent civil action for liability under Article
2177 of the Civil Code could be prosecuted
independently of the criminal action for the offense
from which it arose, the New Rules of Court, which
took effect on January 1, 1964, requires an express
reservation of the civil action to be made in the
criminal action; otherwise, the same would be barred
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 111 ... 2 Petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration thereof was denied in the
order dated February 23, 1971, with respondent
Judge suggesting that the issue be raised to a higher
Court "for a more decisive interpretation of the rule.
3

On March 25, 1971, petitioner then filed a

Supplemental Petition before us, also to review the
last two mentioned Orders, to which we required
jeep-owner-driver Salazar to file an Answer.
The Complaint against
truck-owner Timbol
We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated
September 12, 1970, dismissing petitioner's
Complaint against truck-owner Timbol.
In dismissing the Complaint against the truck-owner,
respondent Judge sustained Timbol's allegations that
the civil suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in

Criminal Cases Nos. SM-227 and SM-228, wherein no

reservation to file a separate civil case was made by
petitioner and where the latter actively participated
in the trial and tried to prove damages against jeepdriver-Salazar only; and that the Complaint does not
state a cause of action against truck-owner Timbol
inasmuch as petitioner prosecuted jeep-owner-driver
Salazar as the one solely responsible for the damage
suffered by his car.

that the same negligent act may produce either a

civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal
Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above
cited render it inescapable to conclude that the
employer in this case the defendant- petitioner is
primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the
Civil Code.

Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to

constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following
requisites must concur: (1) it must be a final
judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a Court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over
the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits;
and (4) there must be, between the first and second
actions, Identity of parties, Identity of subject matter
and Identity of cause of action.

That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in

the civil case is based on quasi-delict is evident from
the recitals in the complaint to wit: that while
petitioner was driving his car along MacArthur
Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and
driven by Salazar suddenly swerved to his
(petitioner's) lane and collided with his car That the
sudden swerving of Salazar's jeep was caused either
by the negligence and lack of skill of Freddie
Montoya, Timbol's employee, who was then driving a
gravel and sand truck iii the same direction as
Salazar's jeep; and that as a consequence of the
collision, petitioner's car suffered extensive damage
amounting to P12,248.20 and that he likewise
incurred actual and moral damages, litigation
expenses and attorney's fees. Clearly, therefore, the
two factors that a cause of action must consist of,
namely: (1) plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that he is the
owner of a Mercedes Benz, and (2) defendant's delict
or wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff's
primary right, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill
either of jeep-owner Salazar or of Timbol's employee,
Montoya, in driving the truck, causing Salazar's jeep
to swerve and collide with petitioner's car, were
alleged in the Complaint. 6

It is conceded that the first three requisites of res

judicata are present. However, we agree with
petitioner that there is no Identity of cause of action
between Criminal Case No. SM-227 and Civil Case
No. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said criminal
case truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted for
damage to petitioner's car but for damage to the
jeep. Neither was truck-owner Timbol a party in said
case. In fact as the trial Court had put it "the owner
of the Mercedes Benz cannot recover any damages
from the accused Freddie Montoya, he (Mendoza)
being a complainant only against Rodolfo Salazar in
Criminal Case No. SM-228. 4 And more importantly,
in the criminal cases, the cause of action was the
enforcement of the civil liability arising from criminal
negligence under Article l of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is based on quasidelict under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176
of the Civil Code As held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al.
5

The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the

separate in. individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show
that there is a distinction between civil liability
arising from criminal negligence (governed by the
Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence
under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and

Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being

based on quasi-delict, respondent Judge committed
reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit
against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.

But it is truck-owner Timbol's submission (as well as

that of jeep-owner-driver Salazar) that petitioner's
failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of
his right to file an independent civil action bars the
institution of such separate civil action, invoking
section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, which says:
Section 2. Independent civil action. In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action may be brought by the injured party
during the pendency of the criminal case, provided
the right is reserved as required in the preceding
section. Such civil action shau proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia
vs. Florida 7 said:
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent
act causing damages may produce a civil liability
arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict
or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation
of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
independent negligence, having always had its own
foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are
of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the
civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed
independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal
negligence and regardless of the result of the latter.
Hence, 'the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with
reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil
Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said
articles, for these articles were drafted ... and are
intended to constitute as exceptions to the general
rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The
proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded
as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law,
Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not
provide for the reservation required in the proviso ... .
In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr.
Justice Antonio Barredo further observed that
inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code
create a civil liability distinct and different from the
civil action arising from the offense of negligence
under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation,
therefore, need be made in the criminal case; that

Section 2 of Rule 111 is inoperative, "it being

substantive in character and is not within the power
of the Supreme Court to promulgate; and even if it
were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand
because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an
enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of
1940."
We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner
Timbol is concerned, Civil Case No. 80803 is not
barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in
the criminal action, his right to file an independent
civil action based on quasi-delict.
The suit against
jeep-owner-driver Salazar
The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who
was acquitted in Criminal Case No. SM-228, presents
a different picture altogether.
At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as
civil liability co-exists with criminal responsibility in
negligence cases, the offended party has the option
between an action for enforcement of civil liability
based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and an action for recovery of
damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article
2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of
civil liability based on culpa criminal under section 1
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed
simultaneously instituted with the criminal action,
unless expressly waived or reserved for separate
application by the offended party. 8
The circumstances attendant to the criminal case
yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to
base his cause of action against jeep-owner-driver
Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana
as evidenced by his active participation and
intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit
against said Salazar. The latter's civil liability
continued to be involved in the criminal action until
its termination. Such being the case, there was no
need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a
separate civil action as his action for civil liability was
deemed impliedly instituted in Criminal Case No. SM228.

Neither would an independent civil action he.

Noteworthy is the basis of the acquittal of jeepowner-driver Salazar in the criminal case, expounded
by the trial Court in this wise:
In view of what has been proven and established
during the trial, accused Freddie Montoya would be
held able for having bumped and hit the rear portion
of the jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo Salazar,
Considering that the collision between the jeep
driven by Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned and
driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the
hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by
Freddie Montoya, this Court behaves that accused
Rodolfo Salazar cannot be held able for the damages
sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's car. 9
Crystal clear is the trial Court's pronouncement that
under the facts of the case, jeep-owner-driver Salazar
cannot be held liable for the damages sustained by
petitioner's car. In other words, "the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist. " Accordingly,
inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as against
jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action
must be held to have been extinguished in
consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court 10 which provides:

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution

is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance
of evidence ...
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is
based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the
decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.
In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar
is concerned, therefore, we sustain respondent
Judge's Order dated January 30, 1971 dismissing the
complaint, albeit on different grounds.
WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970
dismissing Civil Case No. 80803 against private
respondent Felino Timbol is set aside, and
respondent Judge, or his successor, hereby ordered
to proceed with the hearing on the merits; 2) but the
Orders dated January 30, 1971 and February 23,
1971 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No.
80803 against respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby
upheld.
No costs.

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In

all cases not included in the preceding section the
following rules shall be observed:

SO ORDERED.

c)
Extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civil night arise did not
exist. ...

G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

And even if petitioner's cause of action as against

jeep-owner-driver Salazar were not ex-delictu, the
end result would be the same, it being clear from the
judgment in the criminal case that Salazar's acquittal
was not based upon reasonable doubt, consequently,
a civil action for damages can no longer be
instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29
of the Civil Code quoted here under:

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez,

Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION,

JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M.
MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOEZBENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R.
BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents.

Balgos and Perez for petitioners.

Collantes, Ramirez & Associates for private
respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused
the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the secondfloor premises of the Philippine School of Business
Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the
deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (Branch 47) presided over by Judge (now
Court of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoez-Benitez, for
damages against the said PSBA and its corporate
officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was
enrolled in the third year commerce course at the
PSBA. It was established that his assailants were not
members of the school's academic community but
were elements from outside the school.
Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the
following school authorities: Juan D. Lim (President),
Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio M.
Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief
of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of
Security). Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private
respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for the
victim's untimely demise due to their alleged
negligence, recklessness and lack of security
precautions, means and methods before, during and
after the attack on the victim. During the
proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his
relationship with the other petitioners by resigning
from his position in the school.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have
the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are
presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, the complaint states no cause of action against
them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect
that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are
beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated
article.

The respondent trial court, however, overruled

petitioners' contention and thru an order dated 8
December 1987, denied their motion to dismiss. A

subsequent motion for reconsideration was similarly

dealt with by an order dated 25 January 1988.
Petitioners then assailed the trial court's disposition
before the respondent appellate court which, in a
decision * promulgated on 10 June 1988, affirmed the
trial court's orders. On 22 August 1988, the
respondent appellate court resolved to deny the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition.
At the outset, it is to be observed that the
respondent appellate court primarily anchored its
decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. 1 Pertinent
portions of the appellate court's now assailed ruling
state:
Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code
is an adoption from the old Spanish Civil Code. The
comments of Manresa and learned authorities on its
meaning should give way to present day changes.
The law is not fixed and flexible (sic); it must be
dynamic. In fact, the greatest value and significance
of law as a rule of conduct in (sic) its flexibility to
adopt to changing social conditions and its capacity
to meet the new challenges of progress.
Construed in the light of modern day educational
system, Article 2180 cannot be construed in its
narrow concept as held in the old case of Exconde vs.
Capuno 2 and Mercado vs. Court of Appeals; 3 hence,
the ruling in the Palisoc 4 case that it should apply to
all kinds of educational institutions, academic or
vocational.
At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of
the school staff liable unless they relieve themselves
of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of
Article 2180 by "proving that they observed all the
diligence to prevent damage." This can only be done
at a trial on the merits of the case. 5
While we agree with the respondent appellate court
that the motion to dismiss the complaint was
correctly denied and the complaint should be tried on
the merits, we do not however agree with the
premises of the appellate court's ruling.

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the

Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis.
This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited
cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more
recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. 6 In all
such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article
2180) plainly provides that the damage should have
been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he
educational institution sought to be held liable for the
acts of its pupils or students while in its custody.
However, this material situation does not exist in the
present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants
of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose
acts the school could be made liable.
However, does the appellate court's failure to
consider such material facts mean the exculpation of
the petitioners from liability? It does not necessarily
follow.
When an academic institution accepts students for
enrollment, there is established a contract between
them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both
parties are bound to comply with. 7 For its part, the
school undertakes to provide the student with an
education that would presumably suffice to equip
him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue
higher education or a profession. On the other hand,
the student covenants to abide by the school's
academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or
"built-in" obligation of providing their students with
an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining
its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge.
Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of
physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm
of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying
or grenades exploding in the air or where there
looms around the school premises a constant threat
to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure
that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and
order within the campus premises and to prevent the
breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case
evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and
Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not
really govern. 8 A perusal of Article 2176 shows that

obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also

known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only
between parties not otherwise bound by contract,
whether express or implied. However, this impression
has not prevented this Court from determining the
existence of a tort even when there obtains a
contract. In Air France vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722),
the private respondent was awarded damages for his
unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard
the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the
Court referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as
one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract
of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the
view that liability from tort may exist even if there is
a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may
be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs. Thomas,
248 Fed. 231).
This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as
early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar
mind. In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780),
Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus:
The field of non-contractual obligation is much
broader than that of contractual obligation,
comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical
human relations. These two fields, figuratively
speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact
that a person is bound to another by contract does
not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to
such person. When such a contractual relation exists
the obligor may break the contract under such
conditions that the same act which constitutes a
breach of the contract would have constituted the
source of an extra-contractual obligation had no
contract existed between the parties.

Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of

the Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly
Article 21, which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
custom or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage. (emphasis supplied).
Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline
which emboldened the petitioner's employee to

forcibly oust the private respondent to cater to the

comfort of a white man who allegedly "had a better
right to the seat." In Austro-American, supra, the
public embarrassment caused to the passenger was
the justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals,
(Second Circuit), to award damages to the latter.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that should
the act which breaches a contract be done in bad
faith and be violative of Article 21, then there is a
cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar,
however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract
between the school and Bautista had been breached
thru the former's negligence in providing proper
security measures. This would be for the trial court to
determine. And, even if there be a finding of
negligence, the same could give rise generally to a
breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test
of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would
not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that
negligence becomes material only because of the
contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In
other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine
qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of
the school cannot exist independently of the
contract, unless the negligence occurs under the
circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the attendant
difficulties posed by the obligation of schools, abovementioned, for conceptually a school, like a common
carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against
all risks. This is specially true in the populous student
communities of the so-called "university belt" in
Manila where there have been reported several
incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of
hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of
schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass
upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security
measures installed, the same may still fail against an
individual or group determined to carry out a
nefarious deed inside school premises and environs.
Should this be the case, the school may still avoid
liability by proving that the breach of its contractual
obligation to the students was not due to its
negligence, here statutorily defined to be the
omission of that degree of diligence which is required
by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to
the circumstances of persons, time and place. 9

As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on

the substance of the private respondents' complaint,
the record is bereft of all the material facts.
Obviously, at this stage, only the trial court can make
such a determination from the evidence still to
unfold.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the
petition is DENIED. The court of origin (RTC, Manila,
Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue proceedings
consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs against
the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Regalado and Nocon, JJ.,
concur.
AMADORA VS CA
CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was
looking forward to the commencement exercises
where he would ascend the stage and in the
presence of his relatives and friends receive his high
school diploma. These ceremonies were scheduled
on April 16, 1972. As it turned out, though, fate
would intervene and deny him that awaited
experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the
auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun
that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations
and his life as well. The victim was only seventeen
years old. 1
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence . 2 Additionally, the herein petitioners,
as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for
damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against
the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high
school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics
teacher, together with Daffon and two other
students, through their respective parents. The
complaint against the students was later dropped.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the
remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the
sum of P294,984.00, representing death
compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of
litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages,

exemplary damages, and attorney's fees . 3 On

appeal to the respondent court, however, the
decision was reversed and all the defendants were
completely absolved . 4

In its decision, which is now the subject of this

petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the respondent court found that Article 2180
was not applicable as the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an
academic institution of learning. It also held that the
students were not in the custody of the school at the
time of the incident as the semester had already
ended, that there was no clear identification of the
fatal gun and that in any event the defendant, had
exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the
injury. 5
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora
went to the San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972, and
while in its auditorium was shot to death by Pablito
Daffon, a classmate. On the implications and
consequences of these facts, the parties sharply
disagree.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the
school to show his physics experiment as a
prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then
under the custody of the private respondents. The
private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora
had gone to the school only for the purpose of
submitting his physics report and that he was no
longer in their custody because the semester had
already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun
used which the petitioners consider important
because of an earlier incident which they claim
underscores the negligence of the school and at least
one of the private respondents. It is not denied by
the respondents that on April 7, 1972, Sergio
Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose
Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to
him without making a report to the principal or taking
any further action . 6 As Gumban was one of the
companions of Daffon when the latter fired the gun
that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this
was the same pistol that had been confiscated from

Gumban and that their son would not have been

killed if it had not been returned by Damaso. The
respondents say, however, that there is no proof that
the gun was the same firearm that killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on
the interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it
happens, is invoked by both parties in support of
their conflicting positions. The pertinent part of this
article reads as follows:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices so long as
they remain in their custody.

Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in

connection with the above-quoted provision, to wit:
Exconde v. Capuno 7 Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 8
and Palisoc v. Brillantes. 9 These will be briefly
reviewed in this opinion for a better resolution of the
case at bar.
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the
Balintawak Elementary School and a Boy Scout,
attended a Rizal Day parade on instructions of the
city school supervisor. After the parade, the boy
boarded a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it so
recklessly that it turned turtle, resulting in the death
of two of its passengers. Dante was found guilty of
double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the
separate civil action flied against them, his father
was held solidarily liable with him in damages under
Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of the Civil Code for
the tort committed by the 15-year old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista
Angelo on June 29,1957, exculpated the school in an
obiter dictum (as it was not a party to the case) on
the ground that it was riot a school of arts and
trades. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom Justices
Sabino Padilla and Alex Reyes concurred, dissented,
arguing that it was the school authorities who should
be held liable Liability under this rule, he said, was
imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of
schools of arts and trades in particular. The
modifying clause "of establishments of arts and

trades" should apply only to "heads" and not

"teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and
with an elaboration. A student cut a classmate with a
razor blade during recess time at the Lourdes
Catholic School in Quezon City, and the parents of
the victim sued the culprits parents for damages.
Through Justice Labrador, the Court declared in
another obiter (as the school itself had also not been
sued that the school was not liable because it was
not an establishment of arts and trades. Moreover,
the custody requirement had not been proved as this
"contemplates a situation where the student lives
and boards with the teacher, such that the control,
direction and influences on the pupil supersede those
of the parents." Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take part
but the other members of the court concurred in this
decision promulgated on May 30, 1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971,
a 16-year old student was killed by a classmate with
fist blows in the laboratory of the Manila Technical
Institute. Although the wrongdoer who was already
of age was not boarding in the school, the head
thereof and the teacher in charge were held solidarily
liable with him. The Court declared through Justice
Teehankee:
The phrase used in the cited article "so long as
(the students) remain in their custody" means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school
and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils
and students for as long as they are at attendance in
the school, including recess time. There is nothing in
the law that requires that for such liability to attach,
the pupil or student who commits the tortious act
must live and board in the school, as erroneously
held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as
well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be
deemed to have been set aside by the present
decision.
This decision was concurred in by five other
members, 10 including Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who
stressed, in answer to the dissenting opinion, that
even students already of age were covered by the
provision since they were equally in the custody of
the school and subject to its discipline. Dissenting
with three others, 11 Justice Makalintal was for

retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado and

submitted that the rule should apply only to torts
committed by students not yet of age as the school
would be acting only in loco parentis.

In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with

Justice Reyes' dissent in the Exconde Case but added
that "since the school involved at bar is a nonacademic school, the question as to the applicability
of the cited codal provision to academic institutions
will have to await another case wherein it may
properly be raised."
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos has been directly impleaded and is
sought to be held liable under Article 2180; and
unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and trades
but an academic institution of learning. The parties
herein have also directly raised the question of
whether or not Article 2180 covers even
establishments which are technically not schools of
arts and trades, and, if so, when the offending
student is supposed to be "in its custody."
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the
Court has come to the conclusion that the provision
in question should apply to all schools, academic as
well as non-academic. Where the school is academic
rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student
will attach to the teacher in charge of such student,
following the first part of the provision. This is the
general rule. In the case of establishments of arts
and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who
shall be held liable as an exception to the general
rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be
liable for the acts of their students except where the
school is technical in nature, in which case it is the
head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the
canon of reddendo singula singulis "teachers" should
apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads
of establishments of arts and trades" to the word
"apprentices."

The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion

expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde where
he said in part:
I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of
the Old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and
not to academic ones. What substantial difference is
there between them insofar as concerns the proper
supervision and vice over their pupils? It cannot be
seriously contended that an academic teacher is
exempt from the duty of watching that his pupils do
not commit a tort to the detriment of third Persons,
so long as they are in a position to exercise authority
and Supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the
phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades" used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code,
the words "arts and trades" does not qualify
"teachers" but only "heads of establishments." The
phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent
terms "preceptores y artesanos" used in the Italian
and French Civil Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the
presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa
in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are
supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their
authority, it would seem clear that where the parent
places the child under the effective authority of the
teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the
one answerable for the torts committed while under
his custody, for the very reason/that the parent is not
supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school
nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher
while the child is under instruction. And if there is no
authority, there can be no responsibility.
There is really no substantial distinction between the
academic and the non-academic schools insofar as
torts committed by their students are concerned. The
same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the
students under his control and supervision, whatever
the nature of the school where he is teaching. The
suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is that
the provision would make the teacher or even the
head of the school of arts and trades liable for an
injury caused by any student in its custody but if that
same tort were committed in an academic school, no
liability would attach to the teacher or the school
head. All other circumstances being the same, the
teacher or the head of the academic school would be

absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the

non-academic school would be held liable, and
simply because the latter is a school of arts and
trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of
vigilance should be exercised by the school
authorities on the basis only of the nature of their
respective schools. There does not seem to be any
plausible reason for relaxing that vigilance simply
because the school is academic in nature and for
increasing such vigilance where the school is nonacademic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is
caused by the student and not by the school itself
nor is it a result of the operations of the school or its
equipment. The injury contemplated may be caused
by any student regardless of the school where he is
registered. The teacher certainly should not be able
to excuse himself by simply showing that he is
teaching in an academic school where, on the other
hand, the head would be held liable if the school
were non-academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the
teacher of the academic school is to be held
answerable for the torts committed by his students,
why is it the head of the school only who is held
liable where the injury is caused in a school of arts
and trades? And in the case of the academic or nontechnical school, why not apply the rule also to the
head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on
the teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact
that historically the head of the school of arts and
trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils
than the head of the academic school. The old
schools of arts and trades were engaged in the
training of artisans apprenticed to their master who
personally and directly instructed them on the
technique and secrets of their craft. The head of the
school of arts and trades was such a master and so
was personally involved in the task of teaching his
students, who usually even boarded with him and so
came under his constant control, supervision and
influence. By contrast, the head of the academic
school was not as involved with his students and
exercised only administrative duties over the
teachers who were the persons directly dealing with
the students. The head of the academic school had

then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with the

students. Consequently, while he could not be
directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head
of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer
ties with them, could be so blamed.

It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains

at present in view of the expansion of the schools of
arts and trades, the consequent increase in their
enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the
direct and personal contract of their heads with the
students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged.
In its present state, the provision must be interpreted
by the Court according to its clear and original
mandate until the legislature, taking into account the
charges in the situation subject to be regulated, sees
fit to enact the necessary amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the
responsibility of the teacher or the head of the school
of arts and trades over the students. Is such
responsibility co-extensive with the period when the
student is actually undergoing studies during the
school term, as contended by the respondents and
impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it
is clear that while the custody requirement, to repeat
Palisoc v. Brillantes, does not mean that the student
must be boarding with the school authorities, it does
signify that the student should be within the control
and under the influence of the school authorities at
the time of the occurrence of the injury. This does not
necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous
with the semester, beginning with the start of classes
and ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the
time before or after such period, such as the period
of registration, and in the case of graduating
students, the period before the commencement
exercises. In the view of the Court, the student is in
the custody of the school authorities as long as he is
under the control and influence of the school and
within its premises, whether the semester has not
yet begun or has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes
under the discipline of the school only upon the start
of classes notwithstanding that before that day he

has already registered and thus placed himself under

its rules. Neither should such discipline be deemed
ended upon the last day of classes notwithstanding
that there may still be certain requisites to be
satisfied for completion of the course, such as
submission of reports, term papers, clearances and
the like. During such periods, the student is still
subject to the disciplinary authority of the school and
cannot consider himself released altogether from
observance of its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the
school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student
objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student
right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the
school authorities over the student continues.
Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing
more than relaxing in the campus in the company of
his classmates and friends and enjoying the
ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still
within the custody and subject to the discipline of the
school authorities under the provisions of Article
2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the
teacher-in-charge who must answer for his students'
torts, in practically the same way that the parents
are responsible for the child when he is in their
custody. The teacher-in-charge is the one designated
by the dean, principal, or other administrative
superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the
specific classes or sections to which they are
assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the
injury, the teacher be physically present and in a
position to prevent it. Custody does not connote
immediate and actual physical control but refers
more to the influence exerted on the child and the
discipline instilled in him as a result of such
influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the
student, the teacher and not the parent shag be held
responsible if the tort was committed within the
premises of the school at any time when its authority
could be validly exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability
imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on
the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the

school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer

for the acts of its teachers or even of the head
thereof under the general principle of respondeat
superior, but then it may exculpate itself from
liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of
a bonus paterfamilias.

Such defense is, of course, also available to the

teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades
directly held to answer for the tort committed by the
student. As long as the defendant can show that he
had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the
injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from
the liability imposed by Article 2180, which also
states that:
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the Persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the
teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting
in loco parentis for the law does not require that the
offending student be of minority age. Unlike the
parent, who wig be liable only if his child is still a
minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for
the act of the student under him regardless of the
student's age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability
attached to the teacher and the head of the technical
school although the wrongdoer was already of age. In
this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more
favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions
expressed by Justice Makalintal in his dissenting
opinion in Palisoc that the school may be unduly
exposed to liability under this article in view of the
increasing activism among the students that is likely
to cause violence and resulting injuries in the school
premises. That is a valid fear, to be sure.
Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the
present ruling, it is not the school that will be held
directly liable. Moreover, the defense of due diligence
is available to it in case it is sought to be held
answerable as principal for the acts or omission of its
head or the teacher in its employ.

The school can show that it exercised proper

measures in selecting the head or its teachers and
the appropriate supervision over them in the custody
and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and
regulations for the maintenance of discipline among
them. In almost all cases now, in fact, these
measures are effected through the assistance of an
adequate security force to help the teacher
physically enforce those rules upon the students. Ms
should bolster the claim of the school that it has
taken adequate steps to prevent any injury that may
be committed by its students.

A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this

defense as it would otherwise be unfair to hold him
directly answerable for the damage caused by his
students as long as they are in the school premises
and presumably under his influence. In this respect,
the Court is disposed not to expect from the teacher
the same measure of responsibility imposed on the
parent for their influence over the child is not equal
in degree. Obviously, the parent can expect more
obedience from the child because the latter's
dependence on him is greater than on the teacher. It
need not be stressed that such dependence includes
the child's support and sustenance whereas
submission to the teacher's influence, besides being
coterminous with the period of custody is usually
enforced only because of the students' desire to pass
the course. The parent can instill more las discipline
on the child than the teacher and so should be held
to a greater accountability than the teacher for the
tort committed by the child.
And if it is also considered that under the article in
question, the teacher or the head of the school of
arts and trades is responsible for the damage caused
by the student or apprentice even if he is already of
age and therefore less tractable than the minor
then there should all the more be justification to
require from the school authorities less accountability
as long as they can prove reasonable diligence in
preventing the injury. After all, if the parent himself is
no longer liable for the student's acts because he has
reached majority age and so is no longer under the
former's control, there is then all the more reason for
leniency in assessing the teacher's responsibility for
the acts of the student.

Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has

arrived at the following conclusions:
1.
At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally
shot, he was still in the custody of the authorities of
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that
the fourth year classes had formally ended. It was
immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to
finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his
physics report for what is important is that he was
there for a legitimate purpose. As previously
observed, even the mere savoring of the company of
his friends in the premises of the school is a
legitimate purpose that would have also brought him
in the custody of the school authorities.
2.
The rector, the high school principal and the
dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of
them was the teacher-in-charge as previously
defined. Each of them was exercising only a general
authority over the student body and not the direct
control and influence exerted by the teacher placed
in charge of particular classes or sections and thus
immediately involved in its discipline. The evidence
of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-incharge of the offending student was. The mere fact
that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in
connection with his physics report did not necessarily
make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino
Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
3.
At any rate, assuming that he was the
teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon
was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or
that he had waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school or condoned their nonobservance. His absence when the tragedy happened
cannot be considered against him because he was
not supposed or required to report to school on that
day. And while it is true that the offending student
was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even
if the latter was physically absent when the tort was
committed, it has not been established that it was
caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon
the student. On the contrary, the private respondents
have proved that they had exercised due diligence,
through the enforcement of the school regulations, in
maintaining that discipline.

4.
In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is
probably the dean of boys who should be held liable
especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that he
had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one
of the students and returned the same later to him
without taking disciplinary action or reporting the
matter to higher authorities. While this was clearly
negligence on his part, for which he deserves
sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link
him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been
shown that he confiscated and returned pistol was
the gun that killed the petitioners' son.
5.
Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable
under the article because only the teacher or the
head of the school of arts and trades is made
responsible for the damage caused by the student or
apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the
tort committed by any of the other private
respondents for none of them has been found to
have been charged with the custody of the offending
student or has been remiss in the discharge of his
duties in connection with such custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed
by the record and in the light of the principles herein
announced that none of the respondents is liable for
the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo
Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the
auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on
April 13, 1972. While we deeply sympathize with the
petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic
circumstances here related, we nevertheless are
unable to extend them the material relief they seek,
as a balm to their grief, under the law they have
invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Yap, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernan, Padilla and Teehankee, C.J., JJ, took no part.
G.R. No. L-21438
AIR FRANCE, petitioner,

September 28, 1966

vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.
Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R.
Carrascoso.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced
petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the
difference in fare between first class and tourist class
for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these
various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from
the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus
P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the
amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from
P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the
appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs
against petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully
supported by the evidence of record", are:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of
48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on
March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France,
through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines,
Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip
airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to
Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at
Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced
plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was
occupying because, in the words of the witness
Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who,
the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat.
When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the
plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told
defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken
over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and,

according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the

Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class;
when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having
a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they
came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr.
Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man"
(Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and
plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the
plane.3
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that
we review "all the findings" 4 of respondent Court of
Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court
failed to make complete findings of fact on all the
issues properly laid before it. We are asked to
consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to
overturn the appellate court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that
"No decision shall be rendered by any court of record
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based". 5 This is
echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment
determining the merits of the case shall state
"clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
it is based"; 6 and that "Every decision of the Court
of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on
all issues properly raised before it". 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The law, however,
solely insists that a decision state the "essential
ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is
drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to write
in its decision every bit and piece of evidence 10
presented by one party and the other upon the
issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened with the
obligation "to specify in the sentence the facts"
which a party "considered as proved". 11 This is but
a part of the mental process from which the Court
draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision is not
to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not
confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the
Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to
warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said court to
withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with
respect to the evidence for the defense". Because as
this Court well observed, "There is no law that so
requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in
the decision) the contentions of the appellant and

the reasons for refusing to believe them is not

sufficient to hold the same contrary to the
requirements of the provisions of law and the
Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it
was held that the mere fact that the findings "were
based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution
without taking into consideration or even mentioning
the appellant's side in the controversy as shown by
his own testimony", would not vitiate the judgment.
13 If the court did not recite in the decision the
testimony of each witness for, or each item of
evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does
not mean that the court has overlooked such
testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate,
the legal presumptions are that official duty has been
regularly performed, and that all the matters within
an issue in a case were laid before the court and
passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is
required to make, maybe defined as "the written
statement of the ultimate facts as found by the
court ... and essential to support the decision and
judgment rendered thereon". 16 They consist of the
court's "conclusions" with respect to the
determinative facts in issue". 17 A question of law,
upon the other hand, has been declared as "one
which does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised"
in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as
to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of
this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions
of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of
whether the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he
claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958
he paid to and received from petitioner a first class
ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not
represent the true and complete intent and
agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew

that he did not have confirmed reservations for first

class on any specific flight, although he had tourist
class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a
first class ticket was no guarantee that he would
have a first class ride, but that such would depend
upon the availability of first class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly
presented and discussed in its brief before the Court
of Appeals under its third assignment of error, which
reads: "The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff
had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first
class seats on the "definite" segments of his journey,
particularly that from Saigon to Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention
thus:

Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that

the issuance of a first-class ticket was no guarantee
that the passenger to whom the same had been
issued, would be accommodated in the first-class
compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had
yet to make arrangements upon arrival at every
station for the necessary first-class reservation. We
are not impressed by such a reasoning. We cannot
understand how a reputable firm like defendant
airplane company could have the indiscretion to give
out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received
the corresponding amount in payment of first-class
tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the
mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the
ordinary course of business that the company should
know whether or riot the tickets it issues are to be
honored or not.22
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court
similarly disposed of petitioner's contention, thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a
"First class" ticket, there can be no question. Apart
from his testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1",
"B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and defendant's own
witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's
testimony and testified as follows:
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what
you know, what does this OK mean?

A. That the space is confirmed.

Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its
witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that
although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first
class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to
confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give
credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral
evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and
plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1"
belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly
show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first
class ticket without any reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own
witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation
for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was
confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such
confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding
with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him
by defendant would be subject to confirmation in
Hongkong. 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except
for a slight difference of a few pesos in the amount
refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the
Court of First Instance was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that
such a judgment of affirmance has merged the
judgment of the lower court. 24 Implicit in that
affirmance is a determination by the Court of Appeals
that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was
free from prejudicial error and "all questions raised
by the assignments of error and all questions that
might have been raised are to be regarded as finally
adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the
judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free from all
error". 25 We reached this policy construction
because nothing in the decision of the Court of
Appeals on this point would suggest that its findings
of fact are in any way at war with those of the trial
court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of
Appeals upon a ground or grounds different from
those which were made the basis of the conclusions
of the trial court. 26

If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket

holder is not entitled to a first class seat,
notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in
specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air
passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an
airline. What security then can a passenger have? It
will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by
its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in
the ticket, and say that there was a verbal
agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger
had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that,
as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform
language; that spoken word could be notoriously
unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations
between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the
ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here.
The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence
intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to
the conclusion that there are facts upon which the
Court of Appeals predicated the finding that
respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and
was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is
a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight. 27
We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of
Appeals of petitioner's statement of its position", as
charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to
petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso
"surreptitiously took a first class seat to provoke an
issue". 29 And this because, as petitioner states,
Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in
Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because from
Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". 30 Why,
then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the
plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another
had a better right to the seat?

4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of

moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that
Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of
contract; that to authorize an award for moral
damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad
faith;31 and that the decision of the Court of Appeals
fails to make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal
allegations in the complaint bearing on this issue are:

3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air

carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a valuable
consideration, the latter acting as general agents for
and in behalf of the defendant, under which said
contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant
agreed to furnish plaintiff, First Class passage on
defendant's plane during the entire duration of
plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as starting
point up to and until plaintiff's return trip to
Manila, ... .

4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from

Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to Bangkok,
defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class
accommodation but only after protestations,
arguments and/or insistence were made by the
plaintiff with defendant's employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class
passage, but instead furnished plaintiff only Tourist
Class accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran
and/or Casablanca, ... the plaintiff has been
compelled by defendant's employees to leave the
First Class accommodation berths at Bangkok after
he was already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no
repetition of the inconvenience and embarrassments
brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced
to take a Pan American World Airways plane on his
return trip from Madrid to Manila.32
2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to
furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid,
plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments,
and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social
humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral
damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33
The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver:
First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a
first class passage covering, amongst others, the
Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was
breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class
transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was
bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation

berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a

seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he
suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and
humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true
that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith
in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is
there, it may be drawn from the facts and
circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract was
averred to establish the relation between the parties.
But the stress of the action is put on wrongful
expulsion.

Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the

start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed
petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso intended to
prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok,
Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner's manager who
gave his seat to a white man; 35 and (b) evidence of
bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was
presented without objection on the part of the
petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as
to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the
complaint to justify an award for moral damages.
Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the
evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the
evidence is not even required. 36 On the question of
bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first
class compartment of the plane belonging to the
defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was
transferred to the tourist class not only without his
consent but against his will, has been sufficiently
established by plaintiff in his testimony before the
court, corroborated by the corresponding entry made
by the purser of the plane in his notebook which
notation reads as follows:
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist
class against his will, and that the captain refused to
intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G.
Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The captain of the
plane who was asked by the manager of defendant
company at Bangkok to intervene even refused to do

so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of

defendant ever contradicted or denied this evidence
for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for
defendant to present its manager at Bangkok to
testify at the trial of the case, or yet to secure his
disposition; but defendant did neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior
reservation was made by the white man. Hence, if
the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a
first-class ticket to him when all the seats had
already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not
have been picked out as the one to suffer the
consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation
and indignity of being ejected from his seat in the
presence of others. Instead of explaining to the white
man the improvidence committed by defendant's
employees, the manager adopted the more drastic
step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely
ensconsced in his rightful seat. We are strengthened
in our belief that this probably was what happened
there, by the testimony of defendant's witness Rafael
Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning of
the letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff,
said "that the space is confirmed for first class.
Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for
defendant, who was the chief of the Reservation
Office of defendant, testified as follows:
"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office
know what reservation the passenger has arranged
with you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for the
confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19, 1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the
trial Judge has said on this point:
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, "white man" have a "better right" to the seat
occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The
defendant airline did not prove "any better", nay, any
right on the part of the "white man" to the "First
class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying and for
which he paid and was issued a corresponding "first
class" ticket.

If there was a justified reason for the action of the

defendant's Manager in Bangkok, the defendant
could have easily proven it by having taken the
testimony of the said Manager by deposition, but
defendant did not do so; the presumption is that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of Court]; and,
under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to
find, as it does find, that the Manager of the
defendant airline in Bangkok not merely asked but
threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane
if he did not give up his "first class" seat because the
said Manager wanted to accommodate, using the
words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white
man".38
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in
the quoted portion first transcribed did not use the
term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the
recital of facts therein points to bad faith? The
manager not only prevented Carrascoso from
enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he
imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him
from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of
having to go to the tourist class compartment - just
to give way to another passenger whose right thereto
has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith.
Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning
different from what is understood in law. For, "bad
faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or with some motive of
self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is
the express finding of bad faith in the judgment of
the Court of First Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its
contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad faith,
with the aggravating circumstances that defendant's
Manager in Bangkok went to the extent of
threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many
passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to
give the "first class" seat that he was occupying to,
again using the words of the witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, a "white man" whom he (defendant's
Manager) wished to accommodate, and the
defendant has not proven that this "white man" had

any "better right" to occupy the "first class" seat that

the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for
which the corresponding "first class" ticket was
issued by the defendant to him.40

5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious

act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well
settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of
petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must
answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:

ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury

to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing
legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions
of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite
different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. 43 And this, because of the
relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public.
Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It
invites people to avail of the comforts and
advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage,
therefore, generates a relation attended with a public
duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's
employees, naturally, could give ground for an action
for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation.
They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is,
that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of
employees towards a passenger gives the latter an
action for damages against the carrier. 44

presence of third persons to falsely notify her that

the check was worthless and demand payment under
threat of ejection, though the language used was not
insulting and she was not ejected." 46 And this,
because, although the relation of passenger and
carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature"
nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may
be also a tort". 47 And in another case, "Where a
passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor
came to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to
a point where the train was scheduled not to stop,
and told him that as soon as the train reached such
point he would pay the cash fare from that point to
destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the
passenger which justified the conductor in using
insulting language to him, as by calling him a
lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South Carolina
there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering
of said passenger.1awphl.nt
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended
with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as
we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion.
This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air
carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent
Carrascoso's testimony, thus
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that
attendant and purser?
A When we left already that was already in the trip
I could not help it. So one of the flight attendants
approached me and requested from me my ticket
and I said, What for? and she said, "We will note that
you transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing
of that kind. That is tantamount to accepting my
transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to note
anything there because I am protesting to this
transfer".
Q Was she able to note it?

A No, because I did not give my ticket.

Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted
a passenger's check, it was a breach of contract and
a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the

Q About that purser?

A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel

uncomfortable and you don't have enough leg room,
I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to
me and the purser was there. He told me, "I have
recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it
and translated it to me because it was recorded in
French "First class passenger was forced to go to
the tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of
the witness because the best evidence would be the
notes. Your Honor.
COURT
I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of
Appeals that the purser made an entry in his
notebook reading "First class passenger was forced
to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon
evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above] which is
incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of
inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident.
Testimony on the entry does not come within the
proscription of the best evidence rule. Such
testimony is admissible. 49a
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted,
when the dialogue happened, the impact of the
startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to
be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down.
Statements then, in this environment, are admissible
as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of
the nervous excitement and mental and physical
condition of the declarant". 51 The utterance of the
purser regarding his entry in the notebook was
spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the
ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been
guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the
hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.

would have been an easy matter for petitioner to

have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were
really true that no such entry was made, the
deposition of the purser could have cleared up the
matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of
Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil
Code gives the court ample power to grant
exemplary damages in contracts and quasicontracts. The only condition is that defendant
should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner
of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first
class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in
addition to moral damages.54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established.
The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar
judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be
said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and
equitable that attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not
intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion
well exercised as it was here should not be
disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts
decreed by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages;
P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and
P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these
amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The
Court of Appeals did not interfere with the same. The
dictates of good sense suggest that we give our
imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and
circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of
Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We
accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against
petitioner. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-7089

August 31, 1954

DOMINGO DE LA CRUZ, plaintiff-appellant,

At all events, the entry was made outside the
Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It

vs.

NORTHERN THEATRICAL ENTERPRISES INC., ET

AL., defendants-appellees.
Conrado Rubio for appellant.
Ruiz, Ruiz, Ruiz, Ruiz, and Benjamin Guerrero
for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:

The facts in this case based on an agreed statement

of facts are simple. In the year 1941 the Northern
Theatrical Enterprises Inc., a domestic corporation
operated a movie house in Laoag, Ilocos Norte, and
among the persons employed by it was the plaintiff
DOMINGO DE LA CRUZ, hired as a special guard
whose duties were to guard the main entrance of the
cine, to maintain peace and order and to report the
commission of disorders within the premises. As such
guard he carried a revolver. In the afternoon of July 4,
1941, one Benjamin Martin wanted to crash the gate
or entrance of the movie house. Infuriated by the
refusal of plaintiff De la Cruz to let him in without first
providing himself with a ticket, Martin attacked him
with a bolo. De la Cruz defendant himself as best he
could until he was cornered, at which moment to
save himself he shot the gate crasher, resulting in
the latter's death.

For the killing, De la Cruz was charged with homicide

in Criminal Case No. 8449 of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte. After a re-investigation
conducted by the Provincial Fiscal the latter filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint, which was granted
by the court in January 1943. On July 8, 1947, De la
Cruz was again accused of the same crime of
homicide, in Criminal Case No. 431 of the same
Court. After trial, he was finally acquitted of the
charge on January 31, 1948. In both criminal cases
De la Cruz employed a lawyer to defend him. He
demanded from his former employer reimbursement
of his expenses but was refused, after which he filed
the present action against the movie corporation and
the three members of its board of directors, to
recover not only the amounts he had paid his lawyers
but also moral damages said to have been suffered,

due to his worry, his neglect of his interests and his

family as well in the supervision of the cultivation of
his land, a total of P15,000. On the basis of the
complaint and the answer filed by defendants
wherein they asked for the dismissal of the
complaint, as well as the agreed statement of facts,
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte after
rejecting the theory of the plaintiff that he was an
agent of the defendants and that as such agent he
was entitled to reimbursement of the expenses
incurred by him in connection with the agency (Arts.
1709-1729 of the old Civil Code), found that plaintiff
had no cause of action and dismissed the complaint
without costs. De la Cruz appealed directly to this
Tribunal for the reason that only questions of law are
involved in the appeal.
We agree with the trial court that the relationship
between the movie corporation and the plaintiff was
not that of principal and agent because the principle
of representation was in no way involved. Plaintiff
was not employed to represent the defendant
corporation in its dealings with third parties. He was
a mere employee hired to perform a certain specific
duty or task, that of acting as special guard and
staying at the main entrance of the movie house to
stop gate crashers and to maintain peace and order
within the premises. The question posed by this
appeal is whether an employee or servant who in line
of duty and while in the performance of the task
assigned to him, performs an act which eventually
results in his incurring in expenses, caused not
directly by his master or employer or his fellow
servants or by reason of his performance of his duty,
but rather by a third party or stranger not in the
employ of his employer, may recover said damages
against his employer.

The learned trial court in the last paragraph of its

decision dismissing the complaint said that "after
studying many laws or provisions of law to find out
what law is applicable to the facts submitted and
admitted by the parties, has found none and it has
no other alternative than to dismiss the complaint."
The trial court is right. We confess that we are not
aware of any law or judicial authority that is directly
applicable to the present case, and realizing the
importance and far-reaching effect of a ruling on the

subject-matter we have searched, though vainly, for

judicial authorities and enlightenment. All the laws
and principles of law we have found, as regards
master and servants, or employer and employee,
refer to cases of physical injuries, light or serious,
resulting in loss of a member of the body or of any
one of the senses, or permanent physical disability or
even death, suffered in line of duty and in the course
of the performance of the duties assigned to the
servant or employee, and these cases are mainly
governed by the Employer's Liability Act and the
Workmen's Compensation Act. But a case involving
damages caused to an employee by a stranger or
outsider while said employee was in the performance
of his duties, presents a novel question which under
present legislation we are neither able nor prepared
to decide in favor of the employee.
In a case like the present or a similar case of say a
driver employed by a transportation company, who
while in the course of employment runs over and
inflicts physical injuries on or causes the death of a
pedestrian; and such driver is later charged
criminally in court, one can imagine that it would be
to the interest of the employer to give legal help to
and defend its employee in order to show that the
latter was not guilty of any crime either deliberately
or through negligence, because should the employee
be finally held criminally liable and he is found to be
insolvent, the employer would be subsidiarily liable.
That is why, we repeat, it is to the interest of the
employer to render legal assistance to its employee.
But we are not prepared to say and to hold that the
giving of said legal assistance to its employees is a
legal obligation. While it might yet and possibly be
regarded as a normal obligation, it does not at
present count with the sanction of man-made laws.
If the employer is not legally obliged to give, legal
assistance to its employee and provide him with a
lawyer, naturally said employee may not recover the
amount he may have paid a lawyer hired by him.

of homicide which made it necessary for him to

defend himself with the aid of counsel. Had no
criminal charge been filed against him, there would
have been no expenses incurred or damage suffered.
So the damage suffered by plaintiff was caused
rather by the improper filing of the criminal charge,
possibly at the instance of the heirs of the deceased
gate crasher and by the State through the Fiscal. We
say improper filing, judging by the results of the
court proceedings, namely, acquittal. In other words,
the plaintiff was innocent and blameless. If despite
his innocence and despite the absence of any
criminal responsibility on his part he was accused of
homicide, then the responsibility for the improper
accusation may be laid at the door of the heirs of the
deceased and the State, and so theoretically, they
are the parties that may be held responsible civilly
for damages and if this is so, we fail to see now this
responsibility can be transferred to the employer who
in no way intervened, much less initiated the criminal
proceedings and whose only connection or relation to
the whole affairs was that he employed plaintiff to
perform a special duty or task, which task or duty
was performed lawfully and without negligence.
Still another point of view is that the damages
incurred here consisting of the payment of the
lawyer's fee did not flow directly from the
performance of his duties but only indirectly because
there was an efficient, intervening cause, namely,
the filing of the criminal charges. In other words, the
shooting to death of the deceased by the plaintiff
was not the proximate cause of the damages
suffered but may be regarded as only a remote
cause, because from the shooting to the damages
suffered there was not that natural and continuous
sequence required to fix civil responsibility.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower
court is affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. L-4089

January 12, 1909

ARTURO PELAYO, plaintiff-appellant,

Viewed from another angle it may be said that the
damage suffered by the plaintiff by reason of the
expenses incurred by him in remunerating his
lawyer, is not caused by his act of shooting to death
the gate crasher but rather by the filing of the charge

vs.
MARCELO LAURON, ET AL., defendantsappellees.

J.H. Junquera, for appellant.

Filemon Sotto, for appellee.

defendants presented, on the same date, their

amended answer, denying each and every one of the
allegations contained in the complaint, and
requesting that the same be dismissed with costs.

TORRES, J.:
On the 23rd of November, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a
physician residing in Cebu, filed a complaint against
Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella setting forth that on
or about the 13th of October of said year, at night,
the plaintiff was called to the house of the
defendants, situated in San Nicolas, and that upon
arrival he was requested by them to render medical
assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to
give birth to a child; that therefore, and after
consultation with the attending physician, Dr. Escao,
it was found necessary, on account of the difficult
birth, to remove the fetus by means of forceps which
operation was performed by the plaintiff, who also
had to remove the afterbirth, in which services he
was occupied until the following morning, and that
afterwards, on the same day, he visited the patient
several times; that the just and equitable value of
the services rendered by him was P500, which the
defendants refuse to pay without alleging any good
reason therefor; that for said reason he prayed that
the judgment be entered in his favor as against the
defendants, or any of them, for the sum of P500 and
costs, together with any other relief that might be
deemed proper.
In answer to the complaint counsel for the
defendants denied all of the allegation therein
contained and alleged as a special defense, that their
daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the said
childbirth, and that when she was alive she lived with
her husband independently and in a separate house
without any relation whatever with them, and that, if
on the day when she gave birth she was in the house
of the defendants, her stay their was accidental and
due to fortuitous circumstances; therefore, he prayed
that the defendants be absolved of the complaint
with costs against the plaintiff.
The plaintiff demurred to the above answer, and the
court below sustained the demurrer, directing the
defendants, on the 23rd of January, 1907, to amend
their answer. In compliance with this order the

As a result of the evidence adduced by both parties,

judgment was entered by the court below on the 5th
of April, 1907, whereby the defendants were
absolved from the former complaint, on account of
the lack of sufficient evidence to establish a right of
action against the defendants, with costs against the
plaintiff, who excepted to the said judgment and in
addition moved for a new trial on the ground that the
judgment was contrary to law; the motion was
overruled and the plaintiff excepted and in due
course presented the corresponding bill of
exceptions. The motion of the defendants requesting
that the declaration contained in the judgment that
the defendants had demanded therefrom, for the
reason that, according to the evidence, no such
request had been made, was also denied, and to the
decision the defendants excepted.
Assuming that it is a real fact of knowledge by the
defendants that the plaintiff, by virtue of having been
sent for by the former, attended a physician and
rendered professional services to a daughter-in-law
of the said defendants during a difficult and laborious
childbirth, in order to decide the claim of the said
physician regarding the recovery of his fees, it
becomes necessary to decide who is bound to pay
the bill, whether the father and mother-in-law of the
patient, or the husband of the latter.
According to article 1089 of the Civil Code,
obligations are created by law, by contracts, by
quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or
by those in which any kind of fault or negligence
occurs.
Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those
expressly determined in the code or in special laws,
etc., are the only demandable ones. Obligations
arising from contracts have legal force between the
contracting parties and must be fulfilled in
accordance with their stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and
1091.)

The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness

is comprised among the mutual obligations to which
the spouses are bound by way of mutual support.
(Arts. 142 and 143.)
If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not
doing something (art. 1088), and spouses are
mutually bound to support each other, there can be
no question but that, when either of them by reason
of illness should be in need of medical assistance,
the other is under the unavoidable obligation to
furnish the necessary services of a physician in order
that health may be restored, and he or she may be
freed from the sickness by which life is jeopardized;
the party bound to furnish such support is therefore
liable for all expenses, including the fees of the
medical expert for his professional services. This
liability originates from the above-cited mutual
obligation which the law has expressly established
between the married couple.
In the face of the above legal precepts it is
unquestionable that the person bound to pay the
fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services
that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the
defendants during her childbirth, is the husband of
the patient and not her father and mother- in-law,
the defendants herein. The fact that it was not the
husband who called the plaintiff and requested his
assistance for his wife is no bar to the fulfillment of
the said obligation, as the defendants, in view of the
imminent danger, to which the life of the patient was
at that moment exposed, considered that medical
assistance was urgently needed, and the obligation
of the husband to furnish his wife in the
indispensable services of a physician at such critical
moments is specially established by the law, as has
been seen, and compliance therewith is unavoidable;
therefore, the plaintiff, who believes that he is
entitled to recover his fees, must direct his action
against the husband who is under obligation to
furnish medical assistance to his lawful wife in such
an emergency.
From the foregoing it may readily be understood that
it was improper to have brought an action against
the defendants simply because they were the parties
who called the plaintiff and requested him to assist
the patient during her difficult confinement, and also,
possibly, because they were her father and mother-

in-law and the sickness occurred in their house. The

defendants were not, nor are they now, under any
obligation by virtue of any legal provision, to pay the
fees claimed, nor in consequence of any contract
entered into between them and the plaintiff from
which such obligation might have arisen.
In applying the provisions of the Civil Code in an
action for support, the supreme court of Spain, while
recognizing the validity and efficiency of a contract
to furnish support wherein a person bound himself to
support another who was not his relative, established
the rule that the law does impose the obligation to
pay for the support of a stranger, but as the liability
arose out of a contract, the stipulations of the
agreement must be held. (Decision of May 11, 1897.)
Within the meaning of the law, the father and
mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the
obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide
support, among which is the furnishing of medical
assistance to his wife at the time of her confinement;
and, on the other hand, it does not appear that a
contract existed between the defendants and the
plaintiff physician, for which reason it is obvious that
the former can not be compelled to pay fees which
they are under no liability to pay because it does not
appear that they consented to bind themselves.
ether or not the use of forceps is a surgical operation.
Therefore, in view of the consideration hereinbefore
set forth, it is our opinion that the judgment
appealed from should be affirmed with the costs
against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-46179 January 31, 1978
CANDIDA VIRATA, TOMAS VIRATA, MANOLITO
VIRATA, EDERLINDA VIRATA, NAPOLEON
VIRATA, ARACELY VIRATA, ZENAIDA VIRATA,
LUZMINDA VIRATA, PACITA VIRATA, and
EVANGELINA VIRATA, petitioners,
vs.
VICTORIO OCHOA, MAXIMO BORILLA and THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, 7th
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH V, stationed at
BACOOR, CAVITE, respondents.

Remulla, Estrella & Associates for petitioners

at Bacoor granted the motion to Civil Case No. B-134

for damages. 2

Exequi C. Masangkay for respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari, from the order of the
Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch V, in Civil
Case No. B-134 granting the motion of the
defendants to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause. 1
The record shows that on September 24, 1975 one
Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been
bumped while walking along Taft Avenue, Pasay City
by a passenger jeepney driven by Maximo Borilla and
registered in the name Of Victoria Ochoa; that Borilla
is the employer of Ochoa; that for the death of
Arsenio Virata, a action for homicide through reckless
imprudence was instituted on September 25, 1975
against Maximo Borilla in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal at Pasay City, docketed as C Case No. 3162-P
of said court; that at the hearing of the said criminal
case on December 12, 1975, Atty. Julio Francisco, the
private prosecutor, made a reservation to file a
separate civil action for damages against the driver
on his criminal liability; that on February 19, 1976
Atty. Julio Francisco filed a motion in said c case to
withdraw the reservation to file a separate civil
action; that thereafter, the private prosecutor
actively participated in the trial and presented
evidence on the damages; that on June 29, 1976 the
heirs of Arsenio Virata again reserved their right to
institute a separate civil action; that on July 19, 1977
the heirs of Arsenio Virata, petitioners herein,
commenced Civil No. B-134 in the Court of First
Instance of Cavite at Bacoor, Branch V, for damages
based on quasi-delict against the driver Maximo
Borilla and the registered owner of the jeepney,
Victorio Ochoa; that on August 13, 1976 the
defendants, private respondents filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that there is another action,
Criminal Case No. 3162-P, pending between the
same parties for the same cause; that on September
8, 1976 the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay
City a decision in Criminal Case No. 3612-P acquitting
the accused Maximo Borilla on the ground that he
caused an injury by name accident; and that on
January 31, 1977, the Court of First Instance of Cavite

The principal issue is weather or not the of the

Arsenio Virata, can prosecute an action for the
damages based on quasi-delict against Maximo
Borilla and Victoria Ochoa, driver and owner,
respectively on the passenger jeepney that bumped
Arsenio Virata.
It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved
parties may choose between an action under the
Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is
prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent
act.
The Supreme Court has held that:
According to the Code Commission: 'The foregoing
provision (Article 2177) though at first sight startling,
is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the
exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The
former is a violation of the criminal law, while the
latter is a 'culpa aquiliana' or quasi-delict, of ancient
origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence.
Such distinction between criminal negligence and
'culpa extra-contractual' or quasi-delito has been
sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain
and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable
by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore,
under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an
accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising
from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a
quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article
forestalls a double recovery. (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to
literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same
argument of Justice Bocobo about construction that
upholds 'the spirit that given life' rather than that
which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker
should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human
relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes

the separability and independence of liability in a

civil action for acts criminal in character (under
Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising
from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Penal Code,
and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2
and 3(c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same
separability, it is 'more congruent' with the spirit of
law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with
modern progress', to borrow the felicitous language
in Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. to
359, to hod as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it
refers to 'fault covers not only acts 'not punishable
by law' but also criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or consequently, a separate
civil action lies against the in a criminal act, whether
or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty
and acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally,
to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award
of the, two assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words the extinction of civil
liability refereed to in Par. (c) of Section 13, Rule 111,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict
only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Brief stated, We hold, in
reitration of Garcia, that culpa aquilina includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law. 3
The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for
the same negligent act. Before Criminal Case No.
3162-P was decided, they manifested in said criminal
case that they were filing a separate civil action for
damages against the owner and driver of the
passenger jeepney based on quasi-delict. The
acquittal of the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime
charged in Criminal Case No. 3162-P is not a bar to
the prosecution of Civil Case No. B-134 for damages
based on quasi-delict The source of the obligation
sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. B-134 is
quasi-delict, not an act or omission punishable by
law. Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, quasi-delict and an act or omission
punishable by law are two different sources of
obligation.

Moreover, for the petitioners to prevail in the action

for damages, Civil Case No. B-134, they have only to
establish their cause of action by preponderance of
the evidence.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is
hereby set aside and Civil Case No. B-134 is
reinstated and remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings, with costs against the private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma and
Guerrero, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 158995

September 26, 2006

L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO

GABOR, Vice-President and General Manager,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR,
in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional
Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, and SPS.
FLORENTINO and THERESA VALLEJERA,
respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition
for review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated April
25, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA), as reiterated
in its Resolution of July 10, 2003,2 in CA-G.R. SP No.
67600, affirming an earlier Order of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 43, which denied
the petitioners' motion to dismiss in Civil Case No.
99-10845, an action for damages arising from a
vehicular accident thereat instituted by the herein
private respondents - the spouses Florentino
Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera - against the
petitioners.
The antecedent facts may be briefly stated as
follows:

On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old

son of the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa
Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the
petitioners and driven at the time by their employee,
Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a
result of the accident.
In time, an Information for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Homicide was filed against the driver
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Bacolod City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 67787,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Vincent Norman
Yeneza.
Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded,
the accused driver committed suicide, evidently
bothered by conscience and remorse. On account
thereof, the MTCC, in its order of September 30,
1998, dismissed the criminal case.
On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the
spouses Vallejera filed a complaint3 for damages
against the petitioners as employers of the deceased
driver, basically alleging that as such employers,
they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection
and supervision of their employees. Thereat
docketed as Civil Case No. 99-10845, the complaint
was raffled to Branch 43 of the court.
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,4 the
petitioners as defendants denied liability for the
death of the Vallejeras' 7-year old son, claiming that
they had exercised the required due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees,
including the deceased driver. They thus prayed in
their Answer for the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of cause of action on the part of the Vallejera
couple.
During pre-trial, the defendant petitioners insisted
that their dismissal prayer be resolved. Hence, the
trial court required them to file within ten days a
memorandum of authorities supportive of their
position.
Instead, however, of the required memorandum of
authorities, the defendant petitioners filed a Motion
to Dismiss, principally arguing that the complaint is
basically a "claim for subsidiary liability against an
employer" under the provision of Article 1035 of the

Revised Penal Code. Prescinding therefrom, they

contend that there must first be a judgment of
conviction against their driver as a condition sine qua
non to hold them liable. Ergo, since the driver died
during the pendency of the criminal action, the sine
qua non condition for their subsidiary liability was not
fulfilled, hence the of lack of cause of action on the
part of the plaintiffs. They further argue that since
the plaintiffs did not make a reservation to institute a
separate action for damages when the criminal case
was filed, the damage suit in question is thereby
deemed instituted with the criminal action. which
was already dismissed.
In an Order dated September 4, 2001,6 the trial court
denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and set
the case for pre-trial. With their motion for
reconsideration having been denied by the same
court in its subsequent order7 of September 26,
2001, the petitioners then went on certiorari to the
CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 67600, imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to
dismiss the basic complaint for damages in Civil Case
No. 99-10845.
In the herein assailed decision8 dated April 25, 2003,
the CA denied the petition and upheld the trial court.
Partly says the CA in its challenged issuance:
It is clear that the complaint neither represents nor
implies that the responsibility charged was the
petitioner's subsidiary liability under Art. 103,
Revised Penal Code. As pointed out [by the trial
court] in the Order of September 4, 2001, the
complaint does not even allege the basic elements
for such a liability, like the conviction of the accused
employee and his insolvency. Truly enough, a civil
action to enforce subsidiary liability separate and
distinct from the criminal action is even unnecessary.
Specifically, Civil Case No. 99-10845 exacts
responsibility for fault or negligence under Art. 2176,
Civil Code, which is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Revised Penal Code. Verily, therefore, the liability
under Art. 2180, Civil Code, is direct and immediate,
and not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee or prior showing of the latter's
insolvency. (Underscoring in the original.)

In time, the petitioners moved for a reconsideration

but their motion was denied by the CA in its
resolution9 of July 10, 2003. Hence, the petitioners'
present recourse on their submission that the
appellate court committed reversible error in
upholding the trial court's denial of their motion to
dismiss.

7. That a criminal case was filed against the

defendant's employee, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 67787, (earlier filed as Crim. Case No. 96-17570
before RTC) before MTC-Branch III, entitled "People v.
Yeneza" for "Reckless Imprudence resulting to
Homicide," but the same was dismissed because
pending litigation, then remorse-stricken [accused]
committed suicide;

We DENY.
As the Court sees it, the sole issue for resolution is
whether the spouses Vallejeras' cause of action in
Civil Case No. 99-10845 is founded on Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code, as maintained by the
petitioners, or derived from Article 218010 of the
Civil Code, as ruled by the two courts below.

It thus behooves us to examine the allegations of the

complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 99-10845.
That complaint alleged, inter alia, as follows:
3. That defendant [LG Food Corporation] is the
registered owner of a Ford Fiera Van with Plate No.
NMS 881 and employer sometime February of 1996
of one Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer, a salesman
of said corporation;
4. That sometime February 26, 1996 at around 2:00
P.M. at Rosario St., Bacolod City, the minor son of
said plaintiffs [now respondents], Charles Vallejera, 7
years old, was hit and bumped by above-described
vehicle then driven by said employee, Vincent
Norman Yeneza y Ferrer;
5. That the mishap was due to the gross fault and
negligence of defendant's employee, who drove said
vehicle, recklessly, negligently and at a high speed
without regard to traffic condition and safety of other
road users and likewise to the fault and negligence of
the owner employer, herein defendants LG Food
Corporation who failed to exercise due diligence in
the selection and supervision of his employee,
Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer;
6. That as a result of said incident, plaintiffs' son
suffered multiple body injuries which led to his
untimely demise on that very day;

8. That the injuries and complications as well as the

resultant death suffered by the late minor Charles
Vallejera were due to the negligence and imprudence
of defendant's employee;
9. That defendant LG Foods Corporation is civilly
liable for the negligence/imprudence of its employee
since it failed to exercise the necessary diligence
required of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of his employee, Vincent
Norman Yeneza y Ferrer which diligence if exercised,
would have prevented said incident. (Bracketed
words and emphasis ours.)
Nothing in the foregoing allegations suggests, even
remotely, that the herein petitioners are being made
to account for their subsidiary liability under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code. As correctly pointed
out by the trial court in its order of September 4,
2001 denying the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss, the
complaint did not even aver the basic elements for
the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code, such as the prior
conviction of the driver in the criminal case filed
against him nor his insolvency.
Admittedly, the complaint did not explicitly state that
plaintiff Vallejeras were suing the defendant
petitioners for damages based on quasi-delict. Clear
it is, however, from the allegations of the complaint
that quasi-delict was their choice of remedy against
the petitioners. To stress, the plaintiff spouses
alleged in their complaint gross fault and negligence
on the part of the driver and the failure of the
petitioners, as employers, to exercise due diligence
in the selection and supervision of their employees.
The spouses further alleged that the petitioners are
civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of their
driver since they failed to exercise the necessary
diligence required of a good father of the family in
the selection and supervision of their employees,

which diligence, if exercised, could have prevented

the vehicular accident that resulted to the death of
their 7-year old son.
Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
defines cause of action as the "act or omission by
which a party violates the right of another." Such act
or omission gives rise to an obligation which may
come from law, contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or
quasi-delicts.11
Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to
another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities
on the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex
delicto;12 and 2) independent civil liabilities, such as
those (a) not arising from an act or omission
complained of as felony (e.g., culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law;13 the intentional
torts;14 and culpa aquiliana15); or (b) where the
injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action.16
Either of these two possible liabilities may be
enforced against the offender.17

choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his

cause of action in his initiatory pleading or
complaint,21 and not with the defendant who can not
ask for the dismissal of the plaintiff's cause of action
or lack of it based on the defendant's perception that
the plaintiff should have opted to file a claim under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of
the employer is direct or immediate. It is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior showing of
insolvency of such employee.22
Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the
death of the couple's minor son was caused by the
negligent act of the petitioners' driver; and that the
petitioners themselves were civilly liable for the
negligence of their driver for failing "to exercise the
necessary diligence required of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of [their]
employee, the driver, which diligence, if exercised,
would have prevented said accident."

Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs

have a choice between an action to enforce the civil
liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasidelict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194
of the Civil Code. If, as here, the action chosen is for
quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the employer
liable for the negligent act of its employee, subject to
the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of
a good father of the family. On the other hand, if the
action chosen is for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can
hold the employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof
of prior conviction of its employee.18

Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the

petitioners based on Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, they would have alleged that the guilt of the
driver had been proven beyond reasonable doubt;
that such accused driver is insolvent; that it is the
subsidiary liability of the defendant petitioners as
employers to pay for the damage done by their
employee (driver) based on the principle that every
person criminally liable is also civilly liable.23 Since
there was no conviction in the criminal case against
the driver, precisely because death intervened prior
to the termination of the criminal proceedings, the
spouses' recourse was, therefore, to sue the
petitioners for their direct and primary liability based
on quasi-delict.

Article 116119 of the Civil Code provides that civil

obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be
governed by penal laws subject to the provision of
Article 217720 and of the pertinent provision of
Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relation, and
of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages.
Plainly, Article 2177 provides for the alternative
remedies the plaintiff may choose from in case the
obligation has the possibility of arising indirectly from
the delict/crime or directly from quasi-delict/tort. The

Besides, it is worthy to note that the petitioners, in

their Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim,24
repeatedly made mention of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code and anchored their defense on their allegation
that "they had exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of [their] employees." The
Court views this defense as an admission that indeed
the petitioners acknowledged the private
respondents' cause of action as one for quasi-delict
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

All told, Civil Case No. 99-10845 is a negligence suit

brought under Article 2176 - Civil Code to recover
damages primarily from the petitioners as employers
responsible for their negligent driver pursuant to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The obligation imposed
by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible. Thus, the employer is liable
for damages caused by his employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former is not engaged in any
business or industry.
Citing Maniago v. CA,25 petitioner would argue that
Civil Case No. 99-10845 should have been dismissed
for failure of the respondent spouses to make a
reservation to institute a separate civil action for
damages when the criminal case against the driver
was filed.
The argument is specious.
To start with, the petitioners' reliance on Maniago is
obviously misplaced. There, the civil case was filed
while the criminal case against the employee was
still pending. Here, the criminal case against the
employee driver was prematurely terminated due to
his death. Precisely, Civil Case No. 99-10845 was
filed by the respondent spouses because no remedy
can be obtained by them against the petitioners with
the dismissal of the criminal case against their driver
during the pendency thereof.
The circumstance that no reservation to institute a
separate civil action for damages was made when
the criminal case was filed is of no moment for the
simple reason that the criminal case was dismissed
without any pronouncement having been made
therein. In reality, therefor, it is as if there was no
criminal case to speak of in the first place. And for
the petitioners to insist for the conviction of their
driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable
for damages is to ask for the impossible.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED for
lack of merit.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133347

October 15, 2008

ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION,

EUGENIO LOPEZ, JR., AUGUSTO ALMEDA-LOPEZ,
and OSCAR M. LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ROBERTO S.
BENEDICTO,* EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA, MIGUEL V.
GONZALES, and SALVADOR (BUDDY)
TAN,* respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court challenging the Joint Resolution1 dated
May 2, 1997 of then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto in
OMB-0-94-1109, dismissing the complaint filed by
petitioners against private respondents, and the
Order2 denying their motion for reconsideration.
This case stems from an all too familiar chapter in
Philippine history, i.e., the declaration of martial law
by then President Ferdinand Marcos and the
simultaneous sequestration of not a few private
corporations, including one of the petitioners herein,
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN).
On April 18 and 26, 1994, petitioners Eugenio, Jr.,
Oscar and Augusto Almeda, all surnamed Lopez, as
officers and on behalf of ABS-CBN, executed separate
complaint-affidavits charging private respondents
Roberto S. Benedicto, Exequiel B. Garcia, Miguel V.
Gonzalez, and Salvador (Buddy) Tan with the
following crimes penalized under the Revised Penal
Code (RPC): (a) Article 298 - Execution of Deeds by
Means of Violence or Intimidation; (b) Article 315
paragraphs 1[b], 2[a], 3[a] - Estafa; (c) Article 308 Theft; (d) Article 302 - Robbery; (e) Article 312 Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real
Rights in Property; and (f) Article 318 - Other Deceits.
Individual petitioners' complaint-affidavits3 uniformly
narrated the following facts:
1. The day after the declaration of martial law, or on
September 22, 1972, just before midnight, military

troops arrived at the ABS-CBN Broadcast Center in

Bohol Avenue, Quezon City, and informed the officers
and personnel thereat of the seizure and closure of
the premises by virtue of Letter of Instruction (LOI)
No. 1 issued by President Marcos ordering the closure
of all radio and television stations in the country.
2. LOI No. 1 authorized the Secretary of National
Defense to "take over or control, or cause the taking
over and control of all x x x newspapers, magazines,
radio and television facilities and all other media of
communications" throughout the country.
Consequently, a total of seven (7) television stations
owned and operated by ABS-CBN were closed down
by the government.4
3. When it became apparent that petitioners would
not be granted a permit to re-open, ABS-CBN on
October 31, 1972, terminated the services of all its
employees, giving each employee his/her retirement
benefits. Corollary thereto, sometime in November
1972, Eugenio Lopez, Jr., then president of ABS-CBN,
wrote then Secretary of National Defense, Juan Ponce
Enrile,5 of their desire to sell ABS-CBN to the
government. In that same month, however, Eugenio
Lopez, Jr. was arrested by the military, and detained
at Fort Bonifacio for almost five (5) years until his
escape therefrom on September 30, 1977.
4. Subsequently, after the proposal to sell ABS-CBN
to the Marcos government did not materialize, ABSCBN started negotiations with then Governor of
Leyte, Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, who expressed
his desire and intention to acquire the former.
However, the negotiations with Kokoy Romualdez in
1973 likewise did not result in the sale and reopening of ABS-CBN.
5. On June 6, 1973, the television and radio stations
of Kanlaon Broadcasting System (KBS) on Roxas
Boulevard, Pasay City were consumed by fire. KBS
was the umbrella corporation of the Benedicto Group
of broadcasting companies, including Radio
Philippines Network (RPN),6 which operated TV
Channel 9, the only television station allowed to
continue operating during the early years of the
martial law regime. Respondent Benedicto, then
Philippine Ambassador to Japan, managed,
controlled, and was one of the principal stockholders
of RPN.

6. On even date, both Benedicto and Alfredo

Montelibano, who at that time was Chairperson of the
Board of Directors (BOD) of ABS-CBN, were in
Bacolod. Benedicto constituted Montelibano as his
emissary to the Lopezes, relaying his plan to
temporarily use ABS-CBN's broadcast studios in
Quezon City, from which to operate TV Channel 9, for
such period of time as may be necessary to rebuild
KBS' burned studios.
7. On June 8, 1973, Montelibano met with other
officers and executives of ABS-CBN, including herein
petitioners Oscar and Augusto Lopez, informing them
of Benedicto's request. Oscar and Augusto, and the
rest of the ABS-CBN management team, strongly
opposed the request. Eventually, however, when
Montelibano mentioned that Malacaang and
Romualdez had cleared said request, the possibility
of a government-ordered confiscation of ABS-CBN,
and not least of all, the possible release of Eugenio
Lopez, Jr., petitioners Oscar and Augusto, as with the
rest of ABS-CBN's executives, acquiesced to
Benedicto's request.
8. Thus, at noontime on the same day,
representatives of KBS headed by Jose Montalvo
arrived at the Meralco Building to finalize the
proposed arrangement with ABS-CBN. The
transaction between ABS-CBN and KBS is evidenced
by a letter-agreement dated June 8, 1973, which
reads in relevant part:
This is to confirm the agreement arrived at between
RPN and ABS-CBN to the following effect:
1. Commencing on the date hereof, ABS-CBN hereby
conveys to RPN by way of lease its TV and radio
equipment (excluding TV channels and radio
frequencies) and its premises at the ABS-CBN
Broadcast Center, Bohol Avenue, Quezon City
(collectively called the "leased facilities") listed in the
schedule attached hereto and marked as Annex "A".
2. RPN shall pay ABS-CBN monthly rental as is
reasonable compensation for the use of the leased
facilities. The amount of the rental shall be
determined after a discussion with Ambassador
Roberto Benedicto.

3. The term of this lease shall commence on the date

hereof and continue for such reasonable time as may
be normally necessary for the rehabilitation of RPN's
facilities unless an earlier period may be fixed by
RPN and ABS-CBN after discussion with Ambassador
Benedicto.
4. RPN hereby assumes full and complete
responsibility for the leased facilities and shall be
answerable for any and all losses and damages to
such facilities.
xxxx
6. Upon termination of this lease, RPN shall return
the possession of the leased facilities to ABS-CBN
and vacate the same without the need of notice or
demand.
7. ABS-CBN, through its Chairman, Mr. Alfredo
Montelibano, shall have the right to select and
designate the personnel (not to exceed 20 at any one
time) to maintain and operate all specialized TV and
radio equipment.
xxxx
10. ABS-CBN shall have the right to enter the
Broadcast Center at any reasonable time during the
term of this lease for the purpose of determining
compliance by RPN of the terms hereof.
xxxx
12. RPN shall not, without the prior written consent of
ABS-CBN, sub-lease the leased facilities or any part
thereof nor shall any part be removed from the
premises except the equipment, which are intended
for operation the Broadcast Center in due course of
operations.
9. Meanwhile, it appears that the parties were hard
pressed to negotiate and fix the monthly rental rate.
Several attempts by Oscar to set up a meeting with
Benedicto for the fixing of the monthly rentals proved
unsuccessful.
10. After more than four months of trying, a meeting
between Oscar and Benedicto finally materialized on
October 31, 1973. At that meeting, the discussion
not only covered fixing of reasonable rentals for the

lease of the ABS-CBN studios, but likewise included

the possibility of an outright sale.
11. Thereafter, the discussions and negotiations
stopped as none of the petitioners were able to meet
anew with Benedicto who had supposedly referred
the matter to "people above" and the "man on top."
12. Frustrated, then Senator Lorenzo Taada, as
counsel for ABS-CBN, in May 1976, wrote Benedicto
demanding vacation of the ABS-CBN Broadcast
Center and payment of back rentals for the use of
the ABS-CBN studios and facilities.
13. In response, Senator Estanislao Fernandez, on
behalf of Benedicto, met with Senator Taada in June
1976. Another meeting took place between the
parties' respective counsels which included
respondent Gonzales, another counsel for Benedicto.
Despite these meetings, no agreement was reached
between Benedicto and ABS-CBN. On the whole, from
June 8, 1973, the time KBS occupied the ABS-CBN
studios in Quezon City, no rental was paid by the
former to the latter.
14. In the years following until the Marcos
government was toppled in 1986, the ABS-CBN
stations were transferred to the National Media
Production Center (NMPC) headed by Gregorio
Cendaa of the Ministry of Information. Starting in
January 1980, KBS, on a staggered basis, transferred
possession, control and management of ABS-CBN's
provincial television stations to NMPC. Some of the
radio stations of ABS-CBN were turned over to the
government's Bureau of Broadcast, while some were
retained by KBS thru the Banahaw Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC) and Radio Philippines Network
(RPN).
15. Parenthetically, during a military inventory in
1979-1980, and a visit by ABS-CBN executives at
ABS-CBN's radio transmitting stations in
Meycauayan, Bulacan, headed by petitioner Augusto,
on August 13, 1984, ABS-CBN properties and massive
equipment were found to be missing. In addition, the
musical records and radio dramas accumulated by
ABS-CBN in a span of twenty-five (25) years and
stored in its library were now gone.

16. In June 1986, President Corazon Aquino, acting on

the request of ABS-CBN through Senator Taada,
returned to ABS-CBN these radio and TV stations on a
gradual and scheduled basis.
As required by the Ombudsman, the respondents,
except for Garcia, filed their respective counteraffidavits,7 with Benedicto adopting that of Gonzales',
denying petitioners' charges, and averring that:
1. The execution of the June 8, 1973 letter-agreement
was a free and voluntary act of ABS-CBN which
agreed thereto fully expecting remuneration in the
form of rentals, thus:
2. RPN shall pay ABS-CBN monthly rental as is
reasonable compensation for the use of the lease
facilities. The amount of the rental shall be
determined after a discussion with Ambassador
Roberto Benedicto.
2. In that regard, respondent Gonzales, counsel for
KBS, RPN and Benedicto, participated in the
negotiations and was present at three (3) meetings
for the fixing of rentals. Also in attendance were
former Senator Estanislao Fernandez, specially
engaged to represent RPN and Benedicto, and
Senator Taada and petitioner Augusto for ABS-CBN.
3. Initially, the discussions centered on the possible
formulas for the fixing of rentals. Later on, however,
before an agreement on the rental rate could be
reached, the discussions shifted to the possibility of
an outright sale. The discussions on the sale were
expanded as various creditors of ABS-CBN had made
and presented claims before respondent Garcia, then
Comptroller of KBS-RPN.
4. However, the discussions were discontinued when
then Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile
reminded KBS of the sequestered status of ABS-CBN
facilities such that arrangements undertaken for the
use and lease thereof should be taken up with the
government.8
5. Meanwhile, in July 1974, Secretary Ponce Enrile
authorized KBS, acting on behalf of BBC, to make use
of the ABS-CBN provincial stations which were not
covered by the June 8, 1973 letter-agreement. The
authorization was granted in connection with the

increased undertakings assigned by the Department

of National Defense (DND) to KBS, specifically, for
the government's mass-media developmental peace
and order nationwide campaign.
7. Thereafter, in October 1977, RPN vacated the ABSCBN studios and turned over the properties to
George Viduya, the general manager of the
government station GTV-4. Viduya continued
operations of GTV-4 at the ABS-CBN properties, after
which, the properties were all delivered in 1979 to
the NMPC headed by Cendaa. The provincial
stations were delivered and turned over on a
staggered basis, with the DZRI station in Dagupan
handed over in 1979. The successive transfer of all
ABS-CBN studios and stations, in Quezon City and the
provinces, were covered by receipts which were
collated by the law firm of respondent Gonzales
retained by KBS for that purpose.
8. The use of the ABS-CBN studios involved only
three (3) juridical entities, RPN, ABS-CBN and the
government. The charges leveled by petitioners in
their complaint-affidavits merely point to civil liability
as specified in the letter-agreement itself:
4. RPN hereby assumes full and complete
responsibility for the leased facilities and shall be
answerable for any and all losses and damages to
such facilities.
On the whole, the allegations of petitioners do not
support the elements of the crimes charged.
9. Lastly, respondents invoke the grant of absolute
immunity to Benedicto as part of the Compromise
Agreement in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 34 which
states:
The Government hereby extends absolute immunity,
as authorized under the pertinent provisions of
Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, to
Benedicto, the members of his family, officers and
employees of the corporations above mentioned,
who are included in past, present and future cases
and investigations of the Philippine Government,
such that there shall be no criminal investigation or
prosecution against said persons for acts, omissions
committed prior to February 25, 1986 that may be
alleged to have violated any penal law, including but

not limited to Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to

the acquisition of any asset treated, mentioned or
included in this Agreement.
Expectedly, the petitioners in their joint replyaffidavit refuted respondents' counter-affidavits.
Contrary to respondents' allegations, petitioners
reiterated Benedicto's over-all ploy, in conspiracy
with the other respondents who were officers of KBS
and/or RPN, to use and occupy ABS-CBN properties
without paying compensation therefor. Petitioners
maintain that respondents' grand scheme was to
take-over ABS-CBN, albeit ostensibly covered by the
letter-lease agreement, giving the take over a
semblance of legality.
Thereafter, with the issues having been joined, the
Ombudsman issued the herein assailed Joint
Resolution dismissing petitioners' complaints. To the
Ombudsman, the following circumstances did not
give rise to probable cause necessary to indict
respondents for the various felonies charged:
1. The Letter-Agreement of June 8, 1973 belie any
illegal take-over of the ABS-CBN complex.
While the Lopezes are now complaining that the
letter-agreement was virtually forced unto them thru
intimidation, hence, the vitiated consent of Mr.
Montelibano, there is nothing however which the
complainants adduced to prove this allegation except
their threadbare allegations of threats. On the
contrary, it appears that the Lopezes blessed the
letter-agreement hoping that their financial
difficulties with respect to the affairs of the ABS-CBN
and their problem concerning the continued
detention of Eugenio Lopez, Jr. by the military, would
at least be mitigated. x x x
It is thus clear that the ABS-CBN complex was freely
leased by Montelibano upon consultation with the
Lopezes who entertained some ulterior motives of
their own which they expect would result from the
agreement, either directly or indirectly. Of course, the
Lopezes may not have realized some of these
expectations (i.e., the rentals, the release of Eugenio,
Jr. from detention) but this does not change the fact
that the parties' consent to the contract appears to
have been freely given. Perforce, the complaint

under Article 298 of the Revised Penal Code of the

Philippines must fail.
2. Other TV and radio stations were taken over
pursuant to LOI 1-A, hence no violations of Art. 312,
302 and 308 of RPC.
To the alleged violation of Art. 312 of the Revised
Penal Code, the respondents contended that their
use of ABS-CBN's facilities other than those included
in the lease-agreement, was in fact with the authority
of the then Department of National Defense (DND).
There is no denying that all of the ABS-CBN
properties including the provincial ones are under
sequestration pursuant to Presidential Letter of
Instruction No. 1-A, issued on September 28, 1972. It
was under the strength of this Presidential Letter of
Instruction that KBS-RPN was authorized to enter,
occupy and operate the facilities of ABS-CBN. This
was also confirmed by DND Secretary Juan Ponce
Enrile in his letter to RPN dated June 26, 1976.
Unmistakably, KBS-RPN's possession of the ABSCBN's property other than those in the ABS-CBN
complex is primarily anchored on the authority
pursuant to LOI 1-A. With this apparent authority, this
investigation can not see in any which way how the
respondents could have illegally taken over the
properties of the [petitioners], particularly those in
the province; there is therefore no convincing proof
to support a charge under Article 312 of the Revised
Penal Code. It may come to mind that "occupation of
real property or usurpation of real rights in property"
under Article 312 requires as one of its elements the
presence of violence against or intimidation of
persons as a means in securing real property or
rights belonging to another. Plainly, this element is
not shown. The complainants may have felt
intimidated by the sequestration order, but it is in the
nature of such Order to be coercive. It was an act
flowing from the martial law powers of then President
Marcos.
3. No unlawful taking as to justify charges for
Robbery or Theft.
Robbery and Theft under Articles 302 and 308 of the
Revised Penal Code were also attributed by the
[petitioners] against the respondents. From the
records, it is clear that KBS-RPN has juridical
possession of the ABS-CBN properties subject of this

complaint; a right which can be validly set-up even

against ABS-CBN itself. It can be recalled that KBSRPN was authorized to enter, occupy and operate
ABS-CBN facilities by virtue of the authority granted
by the President, pursuant to LOI No. 1-A. Aside, the
Broadcast Center itself was covered by the leaseagreement. Under these situations, there is obviously
no basis to charge the respondents for robbery and
theft; for these penal offense require as an element
the act of unlawful taking or asportation. Asportation
is simply poles apart from the juridical possession
which KBS-RPN enjoyed over the properties.
4. No deceit was employed to gain possession of the
Broadcast Center and the provincial TV and radio
stations.
In the prosecution for estafa under [Articles 315,
paragraphs 2(a), 3(a) and 318] of the Revised Penal
Code, it is indispensable that the element of deceit,
consisting in the false statement of fraudulent
representation of the accused, be made prior to, or,
at least simultaneously with, the delivery of the thing
by the complainants, it being essential that such
false statement or fraudulent representation
constitutes the very cause or the only motive which
induces the complainants to part with the thing. If
there be no such prior or simultaneous false
statement or fraudulent representation, any
subsequent act of the respondent, however
fraudulent or suspicious it may appear, can not serve
as basis for the prosecution of these crimes.
[From petitioners' complaint-affidavits], it is very
clear that the late Alfredo Montelibano was the one
who talked with Roberto Benedicto, preparatory to
the signing of the lease-agreement. As the
complainants did not identify exactly which
constitute the deceitful act (or the intimidation)
which could have induced the Lopezes into accepting
the lease agreement, in most probability, the
occurrences which vitiated their consent happened
during this preliminary discussion. Noticeably
however, it is not Alfredo Montelibano, the one who
supposedly talked with Benedicto, who is testifying
on the alleged "veiled threat" or deceits, if there are.
Precisely, because he is already dead.
x x x [I]t is submitted that the Lopezes can not now
testify on something which are not derived from their

own personal perception. The bottomline is that what

they are now trying to adduce, pertaining to the
alleged deceits [or intimidation] attending the
negotiation of the lease agreement are purely
hearsay. This is a matter which only Alfredo
Montelibano could testify competently.9
The Ombudsman saw no need to discuss the
defenses of prescription and immunity from suit
raised by the respondents given his dismissal of the
complaint-affidavits on the merits. However, in a
subsequent Order denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration of the Joint Resolution, the
Ombudsman lifted the Office of the Chief Legal
Counsel's ratiocination for dismissing the complaintaffidavits, thus:
Incidentally, RPN has been identified as among the
corporation in which respondent Benedicto has
substantial interests. In fact, it was one of the subject
matters of the Compromise Agreement reached by
the government and respondent Benedicto in
Sandiganbayan Civil Case no. 34.
In that Compromise Agreement, for and in
consideration of respondent Benedicto's cession of
equities, and assignment of his rights and interest in
corporations therein listed, among them RPN, the
government extended "absolute immunity" to
Benedicto, including officers of his corporations as
therein mentioned, "such that there shall be no
criminal investigation or prosecution against said
persons for acts or omissions committed prior to
February 25, 1986 that may be alleged to have
violated any penal law, including but not limited to
Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to the acquisition
of any asset treated or included in this Agreement."
In effect, the People of the Philippines as the
offended party in criminal cases has waived its right
to proceed criminally against Benedicto, et. al., for
whatever crime they may have committed relative
to, among others, the alleged plunder of ABS-CBN
properties. Again, whatever liability that remains
thereabout on respondents' part is perforce only civil
in nature.10
Hence, this recourse by the petitioners alleging grave
abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman's Joint
Resolution and Order.

Before anything else, we note that on April 5, 1999

and June 13, 2000, the respective counsel for
respondents Tan and Benedicto, in compliance with
Section 16,11 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, filed
pleadings informing the Court of their clients'
demise. Benedicto's counsel filed a Notice of Death
(With Prayer for Dismissal)12 moving that Benedicto
be dropped as respondent in the instant case for the
reason "that the pending criminal cases subject of
this appeal are actions which do not survive the
death of the party accused."
Petitioners opposed the move to drop Benedicto as
respondent, citing Torrijos v. Court of Appeals13 which
held that "civil liability of the accused survives his
death; because death is not a valid cause for the
extinguishment of civil obligations."
Our ruling on this issue need not be arduous. The
rules on whether the civil liability of an accused,
upon death, is extinguished together with his
criminal liability, has long been clarified and settled
in the case of People v. Bayotas:14
1. Death of an accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined
by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in
senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from
which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x

e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may
be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure15 as amended. The
separate civil action may be enforced either against
the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon
which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action
by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the
Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible [de]privation of right by
prescription.
Applying the foregoing rules, ABS-CBN's insistence
that the case at bench survives because the civil
liability of the respondents subsists is stripped of
merit.
To begin with, there is no criminal case as yet against
the respondents. The Ombudsman did not find
probable cause to prosecute respondents for various
felonies in the RPC. As such, the rule that a civil
action is deemed instituted along with the criminal
action unless the offended party: (a) waives the civil
action, (b) reserves the right to institute it
separately, or (c) institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action,16 is not applicable.
In any event, consistent with People v. Bayotas,17 the
death of the accused necessarily calls for the
dismissal of the criminal case against him, regardless
of the institution of the civil case with it. The civil
action which survives the death of the accused must
hinge on other sources of obligation provided in
Article 1157 of the Civil Code. In such a case, a
surviving civil action against the accused founded on
other sources of obligation must be prosecuted in a
separate civil action. In other words, civil liability

based solely on the criminal action is extinguished,

and a different civil action cannot be continued and
prosecuted in the same criminal action.
Significantly, this Court in Benedicto v. Court of
Appeals,18 taking cognizance of respondent
Benedicto's death on May 15, 2000, has ordered that
the latter be dropped as a party, and declared
extinguished any criminal as well as civil liability ex
delicto that might be attributable to him in Criminal
Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to
101892, and 92-101959 to 92-101969 pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Lastly, we note that petitioners appear to have
already followed our ruling in People v. Bayotas19 by
filing a separate civil action to enforce a claim
against the estate of respondent Benedicto. 20 The
claim against the estate of Benedicto is based on
contract-the June 8, 1973 letter- agreement-in
consonance with Section 5,21 Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court. Plainly, the dropping of respondents Benedicto
and Tan as parties herein is in order.
We now come to the core issue of whether the
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioners' complaint against the
respondents. We rule in the negative and,
accordingly, dismiss the petition.
We cannot overemphasize the fact that the
Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty bound to
"investigate on its own, or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient."22 The raison d 'etre for its creation and
endowment of broad investigative authority is to
insulate it from the long tentacles of officialdom that
are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and
others involved in the prosecution of erring public
officials, and through the execution of official
pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss
investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances
committed by public officers.23
In Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) v. Desierto,24 we dwelt on the powers,
functions and duties of the Ombudsman, to wit:

The prosecution of offenses committed by public

officers is vested primarily in the Office of the
Ombudsman. It bears emphasis that the Office has
been given a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutory powers under the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of
1989). This discretion is all but free from legislative,
executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the
Office is insulated from any outside pressure and
improper influence.
Indeed, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine
whether there exist reasonable grounds to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to
file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts. The Ombudsman may thus
conduct an investigation if the complaint filed is
found to be in the proper form and substance.
Conversely, the Ombudsman may also dismiss the
complaint should it be found insufficient in form or
substance.
Unless there are good and compelling reasons to do
so, the Court will refrain from interfering with the
exercise of the Ombudsman's powers, and respect
the initiative and independence inherent in the latter
who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of
the people and the preserver of the integrity of
public service.
The pragmatic basis for the general rule was
explained in Ocampo v. Ombudsman:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but
upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of
the courts will be grievously hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed
before it, in much the same way that the courts
would be extremely swamped if they would be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time
they decide to file an information in court or dismiss
a complaint by private complainants.25

From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that we do not

interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers vested by the
Constitution. In short, we do not review the
Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in prosecuting or
dismissing a complaint except when the exercise
thereof is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility.26 In this regard,
petitioners utterly failed to demonstrate the
Ombudsman's abuse, much less grave abuse, of
discretion.
Apart from a blanket and general charge that
remaining respondents herein, Gonzales and Garcia,
are officers of KBS/RPN and/or alter egos of
Benedicto, petitioners' complaint-affidavits are bereft
of sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that crimes have been committed and the
respondents, namely, Gonzales and Garcia, are
probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial.27 Certainly, the Ombudsman did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners'
complaint-affidavits.
From the entirety of the records, it is beyond cavil
that petitioners seek to attach criminal liability to an
unequivocally civil undertaking gone awry. As pointed
out by the Ombudsman, although the petitioners
may not have realized their expectations in entering
into the June 8, 1973 letter-agreement, such does not
render their consent thereto defective.
The execution and validity of this letter-agreement is
connected with respondents' culpability for the
felonies charged as these include the element of
whether they had juridical possession of the ABS-CBN
properties. Essentially, petitioners claim they did not
freely give their consent to the letter-agreement.
However, on more than one occasion, petitioners
have invoked the letter-agreement's provisions, and
made claims thereunder.

First, petitioners met and discussed with respondents

the fixing of the rental rate for the ABS-CBN studios
in Quezon City as provided in paragraph 2 of the
letter-lease agreement. Next, petitioners' counsel
wrote a demand letter to respondents for the
payment of rentals for the latter's occupation and
use of ABS-CBN properties pursuant to the letteragreement. Last and most importantly, petitioners
have made a claim against the estate of Benedicto
based on the same June 8, 1973 letter-agreement.

PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO., LTD., plaintiffappellant,

vs.
UNITED STATES LINES, defendant-appellee.

This action of petitioners clearly evinces their

ratification of the letter-agreement. As previously
discussed, the civil liability of respondents Benedicto
and Tan hinging on the charged criminal acts herein
was extinguished upon their death. But other civil
liabilities founded on other sources of obligations
under Article 1157 of the Civil Code may still be
prosecuted either against the estate of the deceased
if based on contract,28 or against the executors and
administrators of the deceased's estate if based on
quasi-delict.29

The facts antecedent to this appeal from a

decision dated October 31, 1964 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, are as follows:

As petitioners have ratified the letter-agreement,

even after the lifting of martial law and the toppling
of the Marcos government, and advanced the validity
of the letter-agreement in their claim against the
estate of Benedicto, they cannot, in the same breath,
aver that respondents' actuations in the execution of
the letter-agreement were criminal in nature, or that
the letter-agreement was more ostensible than real
and to insist on the prosecution of respondents for
felonies supposedly committed in connection with
this ubiquitous letter-agreement.30
In fine, the Ombudsman did not abuse his discretion
in determining that the allegations of petitioners
against respondents are civil in nature, bereft of
criminal character. Perforce, he was correct in
dismissing petitioners' complaint-affidavits.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED. Roberto S. Benedicto and
Salvador Tan are dropped as private respondents
without prejudice to the filing of separate civil actions
against their respective estates. The assailed Joint
Resolution and Order of the Ombudsman in OMB-094-1109 are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-24033

February 22, 1968

Quasha, Asperilla, Blanco & Associates for plaintiffappellant.

Enriquez D. Perez for defendant-appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:

On June 29, 1962, General Motors shipped and

consigned on a CIF basis to Davao Parts and Service,
Inc. at Davao City from New York aboard the United
States Lines' vessel SS "Pioneer Moor" a cargo of
truck spare parts in 25 cases and 4 crates (2 pieces
unboxed), for which United States Lines issues
a short form bill of lading No. T-1 (Annex "A" and Exh.
"1"), and which shipment was insured against loss
and damage with Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd.
The short form bill of lading No. T-1 indicated Manila
as the port of discharge and Davao City as the place
where the goods were to be transshipped, and
expressly incorporated by reference the provisions
contained in the carrier's regular long form bill of
lading (Annex "B" and Exh. "2").
The SS "Pioneer Moor" on July 28, 1962
discharged at Manila to the custody of the Manila
Port Service which was then the operator of the
arrastre service at the Port of Manila, the above
described cargo, complete but with the exception of
two crates, namely, Crates Nos. 3139 and 3148
valued at P1,498.25.
On July 30, 1962, the Luzon Brokerage
Corporation, Customs broker hired by the United
States Lines, filed in behalf of the latter a provisional
claim against the Manila Port Service for short
landed, short-delivered and/or landed in bad order
cargo ex-United States Lines' vessel.
On August 30, 1962, the afore-described
cargo, with the exception of Crates Nos. 3139 and
3148 which were not discharged at the Manila Port,
and Crates Nos. 3648 and 3649 which were

discharged at the Manila Port but were lost in the

custody of the Manila Port Service, was transshipped
by United States Lines to Davao through a vessel of
its Davao agent, Columbian Rope Company, and duly
received in good order by the Davao Parts and
Service, Inc.
Davao Parts and Service, Inc. filed on
December 26, 1962 a formal claim with the United
States Lines through the latter's agent, Columbian
Rope Company, for the value of Crates Nos. 3139,
3148, 3648 and 3649 in the total sum of P2,010.37.
The United States Lines, after proper
verification, paid Davao Parts and Service, Inc. the
sum of P1,458.25, representing the value of Crates
Nos. 3139 and 3148, when it was discovered that
these two crates had been overlanded in Honolulu,
but refused to pay for the value of Crates Nos. 3648
and 3649 for the reason that these crates had been
lost while in the custody of the Manila Port Service.
The two crates (Nos. 3139 and 3148) which
were overlanded in Honolulu and for which United
States Lines paid Davao Parts and Service, Inc. the
sum of P1,458.25, were later recovered and returned
to Davao Parts and Service, Inc. and the latter
refunded United States Lines for the sum it paid.
In view of United States Lines' refusal to pay
for the two crates (Nos. 3648 and 3649) which were
lost while in the custody of the Manila Port Service,
Ker & Company, Ltd., agent of Phoenix Assurance
Co., Ltd., in the Philippines, and insurer of Davao
Parts and Service, Inc., paid to the latter the value of
said crates in the sum of P552.12.
On March 25, 1963, the United States Lines,
through the Columbian Rope Company, by letter
informed the Davao Parts and Service, Inc. that it
was filing a claim for the undelivered crates with the
Manila Port Service. And true to its word, it filed on
March 30, 1963 a formal claim with the Manila Port
Service for the value of Crates Nos. 3648 and 3649,
but the latter declined to honor the same.
On June 26, 1963, United States Lines, through
Columbian Rope Company, its Davao agent, informed
the Davao Parts and Service, Inc., inter alia, that the
Manila Port Service had not yet settled its claim, and

that the one-year period provided by law within

which to bring action against the Manila Port Service
for the two crates (Nos. 3648 and 3649) would expire
on July 28, 1963.

contracting parties, which include the consignee,

fixes the route, destination, and freight rate or
charges, and stipulates the rights and obligations
assumed by the parties. 5

Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd., through Ker &

Company Ltd., its agent in the Philippines, wrote on
July 24, 1963 the United States Lines expressing its
appreciation to the latter for taking action against
the Manila Port Service. In the same letter it
requested for an extension of time to file suit against
the United States Lines (the prescriptive period for
doing so being set to expire on July 28, 1963),
explaining that it could not file suit against any entity
(including the Manila Port Service) except the United
States Lines with whom its subrogee the Davao Parts
and Service, Inc., was in contract.

In this jurisdiction, it is a statutory and

decisional rule of law that a contract is the law
between the contracting parties, 6 and where there is
nothing in it which is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public policy, or public order, the validity of
the contract must be sustained. 7

No reply having been received by it from the

United States Lines, the Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd.
on July 29, 1963 filed a suit praying that judgment be
rendered against the former for the sum of P552.12,
with interest at the legal rate, plus attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation. 1
On August 16, 1963, the United States Lines
filed its answer with counterclaim, 2 while Phoenix
Assurance Co., Ltd. filed its answer to said
counterclaim on August 26, 1963.
On March 9, 1964, the parties submitted a
Partial Stipulation of Facts. 3
After trial, the lower court on October 31, 1964
rendered a decision dismissing plaintiff's complaint. 4
Thus this appeal, raising the sole issue of
whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing
the complaint and in exonerating defendant-appellee
from liability for the value of the two undelivered
crates Nos. 3648 and 3649.
It must be stated at the outset that a bill of
lading operates both as a receipt and as a contract. It
is a receipt for the goods shipped and a contract to
transport and deliver the same as therein stipulated.
As a receipt, it recites the date and place of
shipment, describes the goods as to quantity, weight,
dimensions, identification marks and condition,
quality, and value. As a contract, it names the

The Bill of Lading (short form) No. T-1 dated

June 29, 1962 (Annex "A" and Exh. 1) provides under
Section 1 thereof (Exh. that, "It is agreed that the
receipt, custody carriage, delivery and transshipping
of the goods are subject to the norms appearing on
the face and back hereof and also to the terms
contained in the carrier's regular long form, bill of
lading, used in this service, including any clauses
presently being stamped or endorsed thereon which
shall be deemed to be incorporated in this bill of
lading, which shall govern the relations whatsoever
they may be between shipper, consignee, carrier and
ship in every contingency, wheresoever and
whensoever occurring and whether the carrier be
acting as such or as bailee, . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, the regular long form Bill of
Lading (Annex "B" and Exh. "2") provides, inter alia,
that:1wph1.t
The carrier shall not be liable in any capacity
whatsoever for any loss or damage to the goods
while the goods are not in its actual custody. (Par. 2,
last subpar. Emphasis supplied.)
The carrier or master, in the exercise of its or
his discretion and altho' transshipment or forwarding
of the goods may have been contemplated or
provided for herein, may at port of discharge or any
other place whatsoever transship or forward the
goods or any part thereof by any means at the risk
and expense of the goods and at any time, whether
before or after loading on the ship named and by any
route, whether within or outside the scope of the
voyage or beyond the port of discharge or
destination of the goods and without notice to the
shipper or consignee. The carrier or master may
delay such transshipping or forwarding for any

reason, including but not limited to awaiting a vessel

or other means of transportation whether by the
carrier or others.
The carrier or master in making arrangements
with any person for or in connection with all
transshipping or forwarding of the goods or the use
of any means of transportation not used or operated
by the carrier shall be considered solely the agent of
the shipper and consignee and without any other
responsibility whatsoever or for the cost thereof . The
receipt, custody, carriage and delivery of the goods
by any such person or on carrier and all
transshipping and forwarding shall be subject to all
the provisions whatsoever of such person's or on
carrier's form of bill of lading or agreement then in
use, whether or not issued and even though such
provisions may be less favorable to the shipper or
consignee in any respect than the provisions of this
bill of lading. The shipper and consignee authorize
the carrier or master to arrange with any such person
or on-carrier that the lowest valuation or limitation of
liability contained in the bill of lading or other
agreement of such person or on-carrier shall apply.
All responsibility of the carrier in any capacity
shall altogether cease and the goods shall be
deemed delivered by it and this contract of carriage
shall be deemed fully performed on actual or
constructive delivery of the goods to itself as such
agent of the shipper and consignee or to any such
person or on carrier at port of discharge from ship or
elsewhere in case of an earlier transshipment.
The shipper and consignee shall be liable to
this carrier for and shall indemnify it against all
expense of forwarding and transshipping, including
any increase in or additional freight or other charges
whatsoever.
Pending or during forwarding or transshipping
this carrier or the master may store the goods ashore
or afloat solely as agent of the shipper and at the risk
and expense of the goods and this carrier shall not
be responsible for the acts, neglect, delay or failure
to act of anyone to whom the goods are entrusted or
delivered for storage, handling, or any service
incidental thereto.

In case the carrier issues a bill of lading

covering transportation by a local or other carrier
prior to the goods being delivered to and put into the
physical custody of the carrier, it shall not be under
any responsibility or liability whatsoever for any loss
or damage to the goods occurring prior to or until the
actual receipt or custody of the goods by it at the
port or place of transportation to such port or place
where the goods are put in its physical custody, it
acts solely as the agent of the shipper. (Par. 16,
emphasis supplied.)
It is admitted by both parties that the crates
subject matter of this action were lost while in the
possession and custody of the Manila Port Service.
Since the long form of Bill of Lading (Annex "B" and
Exh. "2") provides that "The carrier shall not be liable
in any capacity whatsoever for any loss or damage to
the goods while the goods are not in its actual
custody," appellee cannot be held responsible for the
loss of said crates. For as correctly observed by the
lower court, it is hardly fair to make appellee
accountable for a loss not due to its acts or omissions
or over which it had no control. 8
Contrary to appellant's stand, the appellee did
not undertake to carry and deliver safely the cargo to
the consignee in Davao City. The short form Bill of
Lading (Annex "A" and Exh. "1") states in no
uncertain terms that the port of discharge of the
cargo is Manila, but that the same was to be
transshipped beyond the port of discharge to Davao
City. Pursuant to the terms of the long form Bill of
Lading (Annex "B" and Exh. "2"), appellee's
responsibility as a common carrier ceased the
moment the goods were unloaded in Manila; and in
the matter of transshipment, appellee acted merely
as an agent of the shipper and consignee. Contrary
likewise to appellant's contention, the cargo was not
transshipped with the use of transportation used or
operated by appellee. It is true that the vessel used
for transshipment is owned and operated by
appellee's Davao agent, the Columbian Rope
Company, but there is no proof that said vessel is
owned or operated by appellee. The vessels of
appellee's agent are being erroneously presumed by
appellant to be owned and operated by appellee.
Appellant argues that the provisions of the Bill
of Lading exculpating the appellee from liability for

cargo losses, do not apply where full cargo freight is

paid up to and beyond the point of stipulated
discharge, and here defendant-appellee agreed to
absorb all costs of forwarding and transshipment
freight having been prepaid up to Davao City. But the
receipt of full cargo freight up to Davao City cannot
render inoperative the provisions of the Bill of Lading
relied upon by appellee inasmuch as such a situation
is not provided therein as an exception. In fact, one
searches the Bills of Lading (short and long forms) in
vain for such an exception. Besides, it is for the
convenience of both parties that full freight up to
Davao City had been prepaid, otherwise there would
have been need to make further arrangements
regarding the transshipment of the cargo to Davao
City. After all, the long form Bill of Lading provides
that, "The shipper and consignee shall be liable to
this carrier for and shall indemnify it against all
expense of forwarding and transshipping, including
any increase in or additional freight or other charge
whatsoever." (Annex "B" and Exh. "2", par. 6, subpar.
4)
The filing of a claim by defendant-appellee
with the Manila Port Service for the value of the
losses cannot be considered as an indication that it is
answerable for cargo losses up to Davao City. On the
contrary, it is a convincing proof that said party was
not remiss in its duties as agent of the consignee.
That appellee captioned its claim against the Manila
Port Service as "SS 'Pioneer Moor' Voy. 25, Reb. 1067
New York/Davao via Manila B/L T-1 31 Packages Truck
Spare Parts Cons: Davao Parts and Service," likewise,
is no proof that appellee knowingly assumed liability
for cargo losses up to Davao City. It merely showed
that the goods would have to be, as indeed they
were, first unloaded in Manila and thereafter
transshipped to Davao City.
Through the short form Bill of Lading (Annex
"A" and Exh. "1"), incorporating by reference the
terms of the regular long form bill of lading (Annex
"B" and Exh. "2"), the United States Lines
acknowledged the receipt of the cargo of truck spare
parts that it carried, and stated the conditions under
which it was to carry the cargo, the place where it
was to be transshipped, the entity to which delivery
is to be made, and the rate of compensation for the
carriage. This it delivered to the Davao Parts and
Service, Inc. as evidence of a contract between

them. By receiving the bill of lading, Davao Parts and

Service, Inc. assented to the terms of the
consignment contained therein, and became bound
thereby, so far as the conditions named are
reasonable in the eyes of the law. Since either
appellant nor appellee alleges that any provision
therein is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public policy, or public order, and indeed We found
none the validity of the Bill of Lading must be
sustained and the provisions therein properly applied
to resolve the conflict between the parties.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.1wph1.t
G.R. No. L-17133

consolidating existing laws on non-agricultural

cooperatives in the Philippines. The two provisions of
said Act which bear on the present case are sections
4 (1) and 66 (1), which read as follows:

time of the approval of this Act which has been

registered under existing cooperative laws (as is the
case of appellee here) shall be deemed to be
registered under this Act.

SEC. 4 (1) Every cooperative under the jurisdiction of

the Cooperatives Administration Office existing at the
time of the approval of this Act which has been
registered under existing cooperative laws
(Commonwealth Act five hundred sixty-five, Act
Twenty five hundred eight and Act Thirty-four
hundred twenty-five, all as amended) shall be
deemed to be registered under this Act, and its bylaws shall so far as they are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act, continue in force , and be
deemed to be registered under this Act.

Appellant next argues that since the taxes and

license fees in question were voluntarily paid they
can no longer be recovered, as appellee was
presumed to know the law concerning its exemption
and hence must be considered as having waived the
benefit thereof. That the payment was erroneously
made there can be no doubt. The error consisted in
appellee's not knowing of the enactment of Republic
Act No. 2023, which although passed in Julie 1957
was published only in the issue of the Official Gazette
for December of the same year. The following
authorities cited by appellee appear to us to be of
persuasive force:

December 31, 1965

U.S.T. COOPERATIVE STORE, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
THE CITY OF MANILA and MARCELINO
SARMIENTO, as Treasurer of the City of
Manila, respondents-appellants.
Herras Law Office for petitioner-appellee.
City Fiscal H. Concepcion, Jr. and Assistant City Fiscal
Manuel T. Reyes for respondents-appellants.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an appeal by respondents from the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Manila ordering them to
refund to appellee the sums it had paid to the City of
Manila as municipal taxes and license fees for the
period beginning July 1957 up to December 1958.
The total amount involved is P12,345.10.
The material facts were stipulated by the parties.
Appellee is a duly organized cooperative association
registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on March 18, 1947 in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 5165 as amended. Its net
assets never exceeded P500,000 during, the years
1957, 1958 and 1959. From the time of its
registration it was under the jurisdiction of the
Cooperative Administration Office.
On June 22, 1957 Republic Act No. 2023, otherwise
known as the Philippine Non-Agricultural Cooperative
Act, was approved by Congress, amending and

SEC. 66 (1) Cooperatives with net assets of not more

than five hundred thousand pesos shall be exempt
from all taxes and government fees of whatever
name, and nature except those provided for under
this Act: ... .
Unaware of the exemption provided for in section 66
(1) appellee paid to respondent City of Manila
municipal taxes and license fees in the total amount
and for the period already stated. In May 1959
appellee requested a refund of said amount from the
City Treasurer, but the request was denied. Hence
the present suit.
Appellants contend that the exemption under section
66 (1) does not apply to appellee because the latter
was trying business not only with its members but
also with the general public. It may be noted that this
fact is not ground for non-exemption from taxes and
license fees. What the law imposes and that under
another section (Sec. 58) is a restriction to the
effect that a cooperative shall not transact business
with non-members to exceed that done with
members. There is no proof that this restriction has
been violated; and in any case, the law does not
provide that the penalty for such violation is the nonexemption of the cooperative concerned. All that is
required for purposes of exemption is that the
cooperative be registered under Republic Act 2023
and that its net assets be not more than P500,000.
On the question of registration, section 4 is clear that
every cooperative under the jurisdiction of the
Cooperatives Administration Office existing at the

A payment of taxes under a mistake of fact has been

held not to be voluntary, and is therefore
recoverable. (51 Am. Jur. 1023)
On principle, a recovery should be allowed where
money is paid under a mistake of fact although such
mistake of fact may be induced by a mistake of laws,
or where there is both a mistake of fact and a
mistake of law. (40 Am. Jur. 846)
When money is paid to another under the influence
of a mistake of fact that on the mistaken
supposition of the existence of a specific fact which
would entitle the other to the money and it would
not have been known that the fact making the
payment was otherwise, it may be recovered. The
ground upon which the right of recovery rests is that
money paid through misapprehension of facts
belongs, in equity , and in good conscience, to the
person who paid it. (4 Am. Jur. 514)
We find no reason to attribute negligence to appellee
in making the payments in question, especially
considering that the new law involved a change in its
status from a taxable to a tax-exempt institution; and
if it continued to pay for a time after the exemption
became effective it did so in a desire to abide by
what it believed to be the law. No undue
disadvantage should be visited upon it as a
consequence thereof.

The decision appealed from is affirmed, without

pronouncement as to costs.
UTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the then

Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the
decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of
Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide.

The records disclose the following facts of the case.

At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23,

1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield
at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan
located at about 100 meters from the tobacco
seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where
he stored his palay flooded with water coming from
the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed.
Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to
see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier
and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who
was responsible for the opening of the irrigation
canal and Javier admitted that he was the one.
Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay
for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued.
Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long,
including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked
Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which
was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was
then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was
overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting
Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said
bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano
tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter
embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.

Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and

Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house about 50
meters away from where the incident happened.

Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain

Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio
looked for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead.
Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with
Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to
report the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio,
Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to
Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of San
Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead
suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses
because Padilla had no available medicine.

After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his

companions returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who
conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla
issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated
September 28, 1981) which reads:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that I have examined the wound of

Marcelo Javier, 20 years of age, married, residing at
Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on
October 23, 1980 and found the following:

1
-Incised wound 2 inches in length at the
upper portion of the lesser palmar prominence, right.

As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9)

days period. This wound was presented to me only
for medico-legal examination, as it was already
treated by the other doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)

Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano

and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano
promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of
Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two
accompanied by Solis appeared before the San
Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement.

Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police

blotter (Exhibit A), to wit:

xxx

xxx

xxx

Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on

page 257 both parties appeared before this Station
accompanied by brgy. councilman Felipe Solis and
settled their case amicably, for they are neighbors
and close relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier
accepted and granted forgiveness to Filomeno
Urbano who shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his
medical treatment, and promising to him and to this
Office that this will never be repeated anymore and
not to harbour any grudge against each other. (p. 87,
Original Records.)

Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police

station. On November 3, 1980, the additional
P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the
presence of barangay captain Soliven.

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was

rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very
serious condition. When admitted to the hospital,
Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr.
Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier
found that the latter's serious condition was caused
by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a
healing wound in Javier's palm which could have
been infected by tetanus.

On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier

died in the hospital. The medical findings of Dr.
Exconde are as follows:

Date Diagnosis

11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus

adm. at DX TETANUS

1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With

diffi-

#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times.

Febrile

11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden

cessa-

Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After

trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as charged.
He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison
term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as
minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, together with the accessories of the law,
to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in
the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid
Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the
decision, in view of the nature of his penalty.

The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the

conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised the award
of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to
P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.

tion of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.

02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscita-

The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration

and/or new trial. The motion for new trial was based
on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven
(Annex "A") which states:

That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates

of the dam leading to the canals and ditches which
will bring water to the ricefields, the water in said
canals and ditches became shallow which was
suitable for catching mudfishes;

That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey

in the area affected, with my secretary Perfecto
Jaravata;

That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting

survey, I saw the late Marcelo Javier catching fish in
the shallow irrigation canals with some companions;

That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I

came to know that said Marcelo Javier died of
tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)

The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

tion and cardiac massage done but to no avail.

Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M.

PMC done and cadaver brought home by rela-

tives. (p. 100, Original Records)

In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno

Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide
before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan
City, Third Judicial District.

That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio

Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to the
present having been re-elected to such position in
the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;

That sometime in the first week of November, 1980,

there was a typhoon that swept Pangasinan and
other places of Central Luzon including San Fabian, a
town of said province;

That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates

of the Bued irrigation dam which irrigates the
ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or controlled
so much so that water and its flow to the canals and
ditches were regulated and reduced;

In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due

course to the petition.

The case involves the application of Article 4 of the

Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal
liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended ..."
Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally
responsible for acts committed by him in violation of
law and for all the natural and logical consequences
resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA
631).

The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by

the petitioner who used a bolo as a result of which
Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right
palm; that on November 14, 1981 which was the
22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the
hospital in a very serious condition and that on the
following day, November 15, 1981, he died from
tetanus.

healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty

irrigation canals in the first week of November, 1980,
is an afterthought, and a desperate attempt by
appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found
himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is
impossible to conceive that the deceased would be
reckless enough to work with a disabled hand. (pp.
20-21, Rollo)

Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled

that Javier's death was the natural and logical
consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he
was declared responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the
appellate court said:

The petitioner reiterates his position that the

proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was
due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses
found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got
infected with tetanus when after two weeks he
returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants
with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful
elements like tetanus germs.

The claim of appellant that there was an efficient

cause which supervened from the time the deceased
was wounded to the time of his death, which covers
a period of 23 days does not deserve serious
consideration. True, that the deceased did not die
right away from his wound, but the cause of his
death was due to said wound which was inflicted by
the appellant. Said wound which was in the process
of healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately
caused his death.

Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General

Hospital testified that the victim suffered lockjaw
because of the infection of the wound with tetanus.
And there is no other way by which he could be
infected with tetanus except through the wound in
his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently, the
proximate cause of the victim's death was the wound
which got infected with tetanus. And the settled rule
in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all
the consequences of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par.
1, R.P.C. People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v.
Cornel 78 Phil. 418).

Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of

the victim's death was due to his own negligence in
going back to work without his wound being properly

The evidence on record does not clearly show that

the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with
tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The
evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was
already healing at the time Javier suffered the
symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected
with tetanus However, as to when the wound was
infected is not clear from the record.

In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181),

we adopted the following definition of proximate
cause:

xxx

xxx

xxx

... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is

found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American
Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their
brief. It is as follows:

... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous

sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)

The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there

was an efficient intervening cause from the time
Javier was wounded until his death which would
exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.

We look into the nature of tetanus-

The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time

between injury and the appearance of unmistakable
symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over
80 percent of patients become symptomatic within
14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe
disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3
days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100
percent.

Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as

restlessness, irritability, and headache are
encountered occasionally, but the commonest
presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the
jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As
the progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and
patients often complain of difficulty opening their

mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest

manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the
familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more
muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized,
and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus.
The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is
quite variable. In a small proportion of patients, only
local signs and symptoms develop in the region of
the injury. In the vast majority, however, most
muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs
and symptoms encountered depend upon the major
muscle groups affected.

Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of

the first symptom, an interval referred to as the
onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a
short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis.
Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of
afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which
increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and
excessive contraction of muscles and their
antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and
dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or
inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer
lasting spasms with increasing frequency. Respiration
may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic
contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent
adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to
irreversible central nervous system damage and
death.

Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period

of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6
days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is
absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild.
Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter
incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked,
dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but
ventilation remains adequate even during spasms.
The criteria for severe tetanus include a short
incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less,
severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent
prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms.
(Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983
Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)

was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

(People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to
tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the
incubation period of the disease.

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised

wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo
which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took
place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on
November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of
tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The
following day, November 15, 1980, he died.

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the

appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at
the time, it is more medically probable that Javier
should have been infected with only a mild cause of
tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared
on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more
than 14 days after the infliction of the wound.
Therefore, the onset time should have been more
than six days. Javier, however, died on the second
day from the onset time. The more credible
conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was
inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus
that killed him was not yet present. Consequently,
Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus
after the hacking incident. Considering the
circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound
could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few
but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the

direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v.
Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a
criminal conviction, the proof that the accused
caused the victim's death must convince a rational
mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings,
however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the
infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier
was wounded to the time of his death. The infection

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the

wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent
infection, for failure to take necessary precautions,
with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of
Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing
to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v.
Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of

an action if such remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and
the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the instances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."
(45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)

It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor

to go scot free of criminal liability. At the very least,
the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight
physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal
liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's
own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and
Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to
effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave
Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses
of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed
under the express provisions of Presidential Decree
G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v.
Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).
We must stress, however, that our discussion of
proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the

criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does

not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free
of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a
person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly
liable. Thus, in the recent case of People v. Rogelio
Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we
said:
... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal
prosecution must be established beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required
in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code).
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil
liability of the accused only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals,
129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil
Code, which provides that the acquittal of the
accused on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the
same act or omission, has been explained by the
Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a
criminal case also releases him from civil liability is
one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal
system. It has given use to numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to
a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the
guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from
the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved,
civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking
leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences.
Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of
demarcation between criminal liability and civil
responsibility, and to determine the logical result of
the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and
distinct from each other. One affects the social order
and the other, private rights. One is for the
punishment or correction of the offender while the
other is for reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so
different from each other that article 1813 of the
present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may

be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a

crime; but the public action for the imposition of the
legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is
just and proper that, for the purposes of the
imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the
offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
But for the purpose of indemnity the complaining
party, why should the offense also be proved beyond
reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of
every private right to be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the
aggrieved person any less private because the
wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the
adoption of the reform under discussion. It will
correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an
inexhaustible source of injustice-a cause for
disillusionment on the part of the innumerable
persons injured or wronged."
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00
indemnification imposed by the trial court to
P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was
based solely on the finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil
liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly
examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller
development if the heirs of the victim are so minded.

Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No.
Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al.
dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants,
the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages
from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the
time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant
Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting
subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of
the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when
criminally prosecuted, the said accused was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal,
because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the
following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a
violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III,
of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is
now final and or in res-adjudicata;

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby

GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.

3. The complaint had no cause of action against

defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as
guardian of the other defendant through
emancipation by marriage.

SO ORDERED.

(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon

motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such
denial, reiterating the above grounds that the
following order was issued:

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their

capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
deceased,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as
father and Natural Guardian of said
minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.

Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by

the defendants on January 14, 1965 and after
thoroughly examining the arguments therein
contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious
and well-founded.

WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8,

1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the
dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40,
Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the
spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the
following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE
BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT
ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW
RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND
THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT
IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT
WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176
TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN
THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS
RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT
THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4,
Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of
plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald
Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No.
5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City.
After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that
his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to
kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of
the parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision

of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not

dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the
court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their
complaint against appellees Reginald and his father,
Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son,
the appellees filed the motion to dismiss abovereferred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case,
the two decisive issues presented for Our resolution
are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by
the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein
the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the
Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time
of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a
minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his
father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the
need for a reiteration and further clarification of the
dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or
negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly
established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia,
73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on
the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo
on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa
criminal or delito and mereculpa or fault, with
pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court
of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and
earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given
act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal
Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion
holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that
the same act machinist. come under both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of
the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and
therefore could have been the subject of a criminal
action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper
subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer
and not the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615616, 73 Phil.). 1

It will be noticed that the defendant in the above

case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case
because his negligence causing the death of the
child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is
therefore a clear instance of the same act of
negligence being a proper subject matter either of a
criminal action with its consequent civil liability
arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this
jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasidelito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has
been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard
to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal
case and for which, after such a conviction, he could
have been sued for this civil liability arising from his
crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this
Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil
Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have
been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple
negligence and not only punished but also made
civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an
independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already
invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of
this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing
doctrines that have been little understood, in the
past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their
foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365
punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the
literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the
legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very
little scope and application in actual life. Death or
injury to persons and damage to property- through
any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would
have to be Idemnified only through the principle of
civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of
affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasidelito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to

the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation

so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the
letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth
life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to
smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such
ancient origin and such full-grown development
as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved
and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal
case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal
negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the
defendant can and should be made responsible in a
civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified
remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the
provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code
on this subject, which has given rise to the
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the
character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to
seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility
arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another
remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of
the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is
allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered
practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present
case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual
course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out
to the harms done by such practice and to restore
the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence
under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full
rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasidelict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural
channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted
into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it
is believed, make for the better safeguarding or

private rights because it realtor, an ancient and

additional remedy, and for the further reason that an
independent civil action, not depending on the
issues, limitations and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get
upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the
opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal
Code and the Civil Code therein referred to
contemplate only acts of negligence and not
intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would
reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein
is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to
fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference
made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court
of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved
a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed,
Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here
at the time of Garcia, provided textually that
obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions
in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law,
intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV
of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is
precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable
by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead
to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the
letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit
that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not
use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient
origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana orquasi-delito, which is conserved and
made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo
was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted
the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be
noted that the said Code, which was enacted after
the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not
punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the
concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are
criminal in character or in violation of the penal law,
whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding
provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which
is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived
fromquasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions
of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts)

and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision,

Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing
provision (Article 2177) through at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we
consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal
law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasidelict, of ancient origin, having always had its own
foundation and individuality, separate from criminal
negligence. Such distinction between criminal
negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasidelito" has been sustained by decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear,
sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an
outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the
proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation
of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt
or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action,
not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence,
but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa
aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double
recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to
literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same
argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that
upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that
which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker
should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human
relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes
the separability and independence of liability in a
civil action for acts criminal in character (under
Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising
from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under
Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the
same separability, it is "more congruent with the
spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony
with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous
relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and

Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that

Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia
covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also
acts criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil
action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party
is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made
in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction
of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule
111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the
civil liability for the same act considered as a quasidelict only and not as a crime is not estinguished
even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not
been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We
here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, thatculpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill
in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability
for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to
the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of
Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the possible
civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our
considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees

that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility

cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated
upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes
place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really
full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or
by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the
minor to administer his property as though he were
of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his
father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be
sued in court only with the assistance of his father,
mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by
article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by
the minor children who live in their company." In the
instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald,
although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald
was still subservient to and dependent on his father,
a situation which is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa,

the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of
presuncion with their offending child under Article
2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to
supervise their minor children in order to prevent
them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the
other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in
providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may
not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the
assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation
does not carry with it freedom to enter into
transactions or do any act that can give rise to
judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites
judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a
minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty
to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not
give answerable for the borrowings of money and
alienation or encumbering of real property which
cannot be done by their minor married child without
their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180
applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation
by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is
evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of
equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling,
subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed
and the trial court is ordered to proceed in
accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against
appellees.