voorFilosofie,

68/2005,p. 479-500
Tijdschrifi

EXPERIENCEAND INFINITY IN KANT

AND HUSSERL1
by Lszl Tengelyi (Wuppertal)

Kants Copernican revolutionis often consideredas a turning

towardshumanfinitude.Heideggerwas thefirstto interpret
Kant this
that
the
way,famouslyasserting
CritiqueofPureReasonraises,aboveall
"thequestionof thefinitudein humanbeing".2It is, however,obvious
thatthe idea of infinity
playsan equallyimportantrole in the critical
calledattentionto thisfactin his
philosophyas well.Cassirerrepeatedly
debatewithHeideggerin Davos.3 But Heideggerhimselfsaw thatthe
was impliedin the analysisof humanfinitude.Yet it is
idea of infinity
not easyto see how precisely,
in Kant, the perceptionof finitudeand
theidea of infinity
belongtogether.
We mayfindan answerto thisquestionifwe considerthe relationin thedoctrineoftheantinomyof
shipbetweenexperienceand infinity
to be a mereidea,
pure reason.We shall see thatKant holds infinity
has an indispensableregulative
functionin experience.
which,however,

Lszl TENGELYI,born in 1954 in Budapest, Hungary,is Professorof Philosophyat the Bergische

Universitt
Wuppertalin Germany.He has recentlypublisheda book withthe titleThe WildRegionof
in Northwestern
Life-History
UniversityPress.
1 I would like to
expressmy special thanksto ProfessorGza Kllay forlinguisticcorrectionsand
stylisticsuggestions.
2 M. HEIDEGGER,Kant und das Problemder
Frankfurt
am Main, V. Klostermann,1973
Metaphysik,
(19291), P. 211.
3 Ibid., 247-250.
p.

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LszlTENGELYI

480

to compareKant at this point with Husserl,

It will be instructive
who,drawingupon thenotionof regulative
principleelaboratedin the
the
Pure
defines
Reason,
conceptof a thingas an "Idea in a
Critiqueof
Kantiansense".In spiteof thecommonnotionofa regulative
idea, the
remainssubstantial:Kant putshis
betweenthetwo thinkers
difference
own conceptionin the serviceof an attemptto justifyhis distinction
betweenthe'thingin itselfand 'appearance';Husserl,on thecontrary,
in orderto overconceivesofthingsas Ideas in a Kantiansenseprecisely
idea
come thisopposition.How can thecommonnotionofa regulative
even
or
so
different
which
are
servefortwopurposes
from,
opposedto,
each other?The followingconsiderationsare designed to give an
betweenthe
answerto thisquestion.We mayassumethatthedifference
whereas
notionsof infinity:
two philosophersarisesfromtwo different
in view,rejectingforprincipalreasonsany
Kant has a potentialinfinity
idea of an infinity
actuallyexisting,Husserl,who had firstbeen theasin Berlinand became latera colleagueof
sistantof Karl Weierstrass
establishedformof
in
relies
upon a scientifically
GeorgCantor Halle,
actual,but nevertheless
openinfinity.
in Kant
of Experience
as a RegulativePrinciple
I. Infinity
In the CritiqueofPureReasonthepointof departureforKant is that
fallsoutside of the realmof possibleexperience,it
althoughinfinity
fromthe processof experience.In contradivorced
be
cannot totally
unavailable
distinctionwith other ideas that point to experientially
be separcannotentirely
objectslikemindor God, theidea of infinity
because
the
ated fromexperience(from
infinityis to
phenomena)
whichis condesignatetheunconditionalwhole,theabsolutetotality,
of phenomena,and, thus,of experistantlysoughtforin thesynthesis
because
ence. Kant callssuch an idea a 'cosmicalconcept'(Weltbegriffi,
In a word, then,
it underliesthe verynotion of the world-whole.4
4 1. KANT,Kritikder reinen
(hereafter
abridgedas "KrAr. VT), A 407; in English:I. KANT,
Vernunft
Critiqueof Pure Reason,tr. by N. KEMP SMITH, New York, St Martins Press, 1965 (firstedition:

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EXPERIENCE AND INFINITY IN KANT AND HUSSERL

48 1

infinityis consideredas a cosmical concept in the Critiqueof Pure

Reason.

In thedoctrineof antinomies,however,thetermworld'is provided

withtwodifferent
meanings.In itsbroadersensethisexpressionindeed
signifiesthe unconditionalwhole or absolute totalityof experience.
Kant expressively
saysthat"it is just theexplicationof thisverywhole
thatis demandedin the transcendental
problemsof reason",as they
arise in the doctrineof antinomies.5In its narrowersense,the term
world'is opposed to 'nature'.The word 'nature'is takento designate
theuniverseas "a dynamicwhole"permeatedwithcausalrelationships.6
The distinctionbetween'world'and 'nature'correspondsto the dualand dynamicalcategories.The term'world'refers
ityof mathematical
wholeofexperience;theterm'nature',on theconto themathematical
to itsdynamictotality.
refers
trary,
havetheimpression
The readerofthedoctrineofantinomies
mayfirst
is a possiblefeature
withitsopposite,'finitude',
that'infinity',
together
sense.
of the 'world'onlyin so faras thistermis takenin its narrower
if
a
i.
e.
mathematical
not
What is infinity,
indeed,
quantitative,
characteristic
of the absolutewhole of experience?If this impression
theuniverseonlyas faras
theninfinity
would characterize
werecorrect,
it is localizedin space and time. From this therewould only be one
restson intuitive
morestep to the conclusionthat,forKant, infinity
bearers.This would alreadybe trueeven if onlyspace and timewere
betweentheidea of infinity
takenintoaccount.If therelationship
and
the physicaluniversewere equally reflectedupon, one would be
- as if the
temptedto speak of an empiricalsubstratumof infinity
questioncould be decidedsimplyby an inquiryintophysicalreality.
All thisis, however,a mereappearance.In reality,
Kant is farfrom
beingsimplyconcernedwithspace and time,or evenwiththephysical

whicharereferred
to hereand thereafter,
are
London,Macmillan,1929).The original
pagenumbers,
on themargins
oftheEnglishtext.
indicated
51. Kant, KrAr.V,A 484.
6l.KANT,KrJ.r.V,A4l8i

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482

LszlTENGELYI

universein the doctrineof antinomies.What the antitheticof pure

reasonis all about is rathertheconceptof unconditional
wholeor absolute totality.
Space, time and universecan only be the bearersof the
iftheyare consideredas uncondidetermination
of infinity,
categorial
tionalwholesor absolutetotalities,
which,as such,do not depend on
condition.It is solelythenotionoftheunconditionalwhole
anyfurther
or absolutetotality
whichunderliestheinterpretation
in the
of infinity
CritiqueofPureReason.
Fromthisit followsthatthequestionofinfinity
has an impacton all
the fourantinomies.It is, in otherwords,the conceptof worldin its
sensewhichis involvedin thisquestion.
broaderand notin itsnarrower
In thisrespect,it is of greatsignificance
thatKant distinguishes
the
notionof an infinitewhole fromthe conceptof a maximum.The two
fromeach other,becausea multiplicity
of
conceptsareclearlydifferent
givenunitswhichit containscan neverattaina maximalmagnitude,
"sinceone or moreunitscan alwaysbe added to it".7Consequently,
"no
in another
is thegreatest".8
Kantdefinesinfinity
Therefore,
multiplicity
"in
he
means
it
a
which
relation
to
way:
by
multiplicity
anyassignable unit"- "is greaterthan all number[s]".9
This is, as he says,the
mathematical
He adds,however,thatthisdoes not
conceptofinfinity.10
of a transcendental
excludethepossibility
thatconconceptof infinity:
is
on
the
that
"the
of
based
successive
synthesis unitsrecept
insight
quired for the enumeration of a quantum {Durchmessungdes
Quantums)can neverbe completed".11
fromexperiThis transcendental
conceptsharplyseparatesinfinity
ence.The courseof experienceis submittedto whatmaybe designated
It is onlystepbystep,proceedingfrom
as theruleofsuccessive
synthesis.12

71. Kant, KrAr.V,A 431.

81. Kant, KrAr.V, A 431.
91. Kant, r.^r.K,A 432.
101. Kant, KrAr.V, A 432, n.
111. Kant, KrAr.V,A 432.
121. KANT,
sukzessiv."
KrAr.V,A 500: "[...] die empirische
[ist][...] notwendig
Synthesis

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EXPERIENCE AND INFINITY IN KANT AND HUSSERL

483

one experienceto another,thatreasonmaygo forwardhere.However,

ifinfinity,
as itstranscendental
definition
is to be encountered
suggests,
'can neverbe completed',thenthere
onlywherea successivesynthesis
is an obviousgap betweenexperienceand infinity.
This gap accountsforthefactthatreasonis as soon entangledin contradictionsas it triesto graspthe unconditionalwhole of experience.
Kanttakestheactualsituationofexperienceas his starting-point
foran
inquiryinto the conditionswhich are indispensableforthe different
characteristics
ofthisverysituation.These conditionsarearrangedinto
fourheterogeneous
series,accordingto the fourgroupsof categories.
conFirst,spatio-temporal
series,secondly,moreand moreelementary
ofcomplexappearancesareenvisaged;thirdly,
stituents
causalchainsare
considered,in whichwe stumble,fourthly,
again and again upon conwithout
across
existence
whichmightbe called
any
tingency,
coming
All of thesefourseriesproveto be sourcesof conflictand
necessary.
antinomyas soon as we tryto encompassthemby meansof a regressIn all thefourcases,however,
ivesynthesis.
therealdifficulty
arisesfrom
the gap betweenexperienceand infinity.
Reason has to surpassevery
limitedtotality
ofconditions,
sincethereis no sufficient
reasonto assume
thatany memberof the consideredseriescould radicallydifferfrom
the othersand mighttherefore
be the bearerof the unconditional.As
we haveseen,infinity
cannotbe identified
withtheconceptof a maxiit
to theactuallyor momentarmum,and remainsespeciallyirreducible
of
which
has
totality conditions,
ilygreatest
just been attainedbut may
stillbe surmounted.
In questoftheunconditional
whole,reasonnecessarilytranscendsall finitetotalities.However,an infinitetotalitycan
neverbe attainedby meansof a successivesynthesis.
That is whyreasoninevitably
withitself.On
getsintocontradiction
the one hand, it is, by its verynature,in searchof the unconditional
wholeofexperience.
This searchcompelisitto surmountall finitetotalities.On the otherhand,in experiencereasonis necessarily
submitted
to the rule of successivesynthesis.However,thisrule blocks its road
towardsinfinity.
Here it becomesclearthattheconflictof reasonwith
itselfis engenderedby the collision of two principlesor laws: the

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484

LszlTENGELYI

comes into antagonismwiththeruleof

ofabsolutetotality
requirement
successive
That is why Kant speaksof antinomy,
synthesis.
meaningby
thiswordtheantithetic
of two lawsof reason.
It is not by accidentthatthe term'antinomyis oftenused by Kant
in the singular.Antinomiesin the pluralsharetheircommon mechanismof cominginto being- it is thismechanismthatthe singular
formof the termdesignates.The contradictions
reasongetsintowith
itselfdo not arisefromthepeculiarities
of space and time.These contradictions
are not connectedto the specialcharacteristics
of the universe,either,or to the qualitiesof the dynamicwhole of natureinterwovenbycausalinterconnections.
Therealantinomy
in all antinomies
is
and infinity.
This is theultia consequence
ofthegap between
experience
illusionreasonfallsvictimto when
mategroundof the transcendental
it hopes, again and again, to discoverthe unconditionalwhole, the
absolutetotalityof experiencein the necessarilyincomplete- and,
intoconconditioned- seriesofconditions,gettingthereby
therefore,
- withitself.
- in a way into thecontradiction
tradiction
Let us considerthe mechanismthat generatesthis contradiction
somewhatmore closely!It is, as Kant says,"a certaintranscendental
wherenone is to be
illusion",which"hasmocked[reason]witha reality
found".13Everythingbegins here with the incapacityof reason to
seriesof conditionsby
encompasstheabsolutetotalityof the different
It is added, however,thatreasonfinds
meansof a successivesynthesis.
What does thisnaturalilluitselfmisledby "a quite naturalillusion".14
sion consistin?The answeris clear:it is said to be an illusionto think
thatall seriesof conditionsare "in themselvesin theirtotalityeither
becausehe
Kant calls thisillusion'transcendental',
finiteor infinite".15
considersit not onlyas natural,but as necessaryas well. It seemsindeed to be necessaryto thinkthata seriesof conditionsof an actual

131. Kant, KrAr.V,A 50'.

141. KANT,^r.^.r.V:,A500.
151. Kant, Kr.dr.V,A 505.

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EXPERIENCE AND INFINITY IN KANT AND HUSSERL

485

situationis in itselfeitherfiniteor infinite.Yet,Kant triesto unmask

thisnecessity
as an illusion.He says:theworld"existsin itself
neitheras
wholenoras a finitewhole."16
an infinite
He adds: "Whatwe havehere
said of thefirstcosmologicalidea [...], appliesalso to all theothers."17
These considerationsprovidea clue to the solution of the antinomies.This clue is to be seen in the statementthat"theworldis not
an unconditionedwhole".18In this statementtwo different
thoughts
maybe discerned:
(1) Kantformsherea conceptoftheworldwhichis clearlydifferentfromthenotionof thetotalityof things.In the CritiqueofPure
Reasonthe world provesto be an open wholeof a neverentirely
ratherthan the sum-totalof ready-made
accomplished
synthesis,
things.
(2) However,it must be added that,in Kant's eyes,this new
conceptof the world is at the same time the ultimatejustifying
instanceof thedistinction
betweenthe'thingin itselfand 'appearance'. In the CritiqueofPureReasonit is emphasizedthattheworld
as an openwholeofsuccessive
doesnotexistin itselfThat is
syntheses
whyit maybe said to be, in itself,neithera finite,nor an infinite
whole. Both alternatives
can only be denied because the world is
preciselynot a 'thingin itself. Here an inquiryinto the structural
differences
between'whatis a world*and 'whatis a thingis clearly
initiated.But Kant'smainaim remainsto drawtheconclusionthat
theworldof experienceis a worldof appearancesand "appearances
in generalare nothingoutsideour representations".19
These reflections
do not leave the concept of infinityuntouched,
either.Forsure,thedefinition
of thisconceptremainsunmodified,
but
itsrole,and itsrelationship
withexperience,
appearsin a new light.As

161. KANT,Ar.r.K,A5O5.
171. KANT,A>.r.K,A5O5.
181. Kant, KrAr.V, A 505.
191. Kant, Ar.r.K,A 506.

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486

LszlTENGELYI

we haveseen,infinity
can onlybe encounteredwherea successivesynthesis'can neverbe completed'.Consequently,infinitycan have no
place in theworldof appearances,whichis nothingelse but an open
wholeof successivesyntheses.
theconceptof infinity,
Therefore,
just as
well as the notion of unconditionalwhole, designatesa mere idea,
which"servesas a rule", and not as a "constitutive
principle",in experience.20The gap betweenexperienceand infinity
is in a certainsense
this
function.
serves
hereas a regulative
Infinity
bridgedby
regulative
principleof successivesynthesesin experience.As Kant says,it is "a
principleof thegreatestpossiblecontinuationand extensionof experiSuch a principle
ence,allowingno empiricallimitto hold as absolute".21
is designedto put a stop to thedeceptivetendencyof reasonto search
fortheabsolutetotalityof experiencein the necessarily
incompleteconditioned seriesof conditions.
and, therefore,
As a regulative
obtainsa certainfield
principlethenotionof infinity
of applicationin experience.However,thereis greatemphasison the
can neverbe consideredas a constitutive
observationthatinfinity
prinof
From
this
an
observation, importantconsequence
ciple experience.
to
be
drawn.
Kant,
infinity(in the sense of absolute
may
According
totality)is "onlyproducedin theidea"and it is not evento be regarded
as "equivalentto thinkingan objectthatcannotbe givenin experiento thisidea; it is a mereidea
ce".22In otherwords,nothingcorresponds
withoutany bearingon objects.What has an objectiverealityin the
world of appearances is "successiveinfiniteand never whole'.10
herethesame as
Obviously,theexpression'successiveinfinite'signifies
infinite"in anotherpassageof the Critique
the expression"potentially
incompleteseriesof conditions,which
ofPureReason^ The necessarily
are consideredin the doctrineof antinomies,are alwaysfinite,even if

201. Kant,
211. Kant,
221. Kant,
I. Kant,
241. Kant,

KrAr.V, A 508-509.
r.^r.VT,A 509.
KrAr.V, A 510.
Kr.d.r.V,A 524.
A 418.
ATr.r.V,

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EXPERIENCE AND INFINITY IN KANT AND HUSSERL

487

bynew members.Consequently,
theycan alwaysbe supplemented
they
are what may be describedas 'successive'or 'potential'infinite.But
Kant clearlysees that,they"cannot,therefore,
exhibitan [actually]
infinitemultiplicity".25
By wayof a summaryone maysaythatit is notwithoutreasonthat
is generatedin thehumanmind,but the reasonin
theidea of infinity
questiondoes not residein the objectiverealityof this idea. On the
is a mereidea withoutobjectivereality;
contrary,
infinity
yet,as a regulativeprinciple,it has a functionin experience.The upshot is that,
has a purpose,althoughit has no
accordingto Kant,theidea of infinity
object.If we compare this positionwith the greatsystemsof early
in whichinfinity
modernmetaphysics,
has a constitutive
role,
certainly
we may findindeed appropriateto say thatKant'sCopernicanrevolin theCritiqueofPureReason
utionis a turnto humanfinitude.Infinity
is dissolvedas an illusion,even if its idea is a necessaryruleof experience and, thereby,
also an evidenceforreason'sspontaneity.
II. Husserl's Notion of a Thing as an Idea in a Kantian Sense

In Ideas Pertainingto Pure Phenomenology

and Phenomenological
as well as in the new elaborationof the Sixth Logical
Philosophy,
fromthe summerof 1913, Husserl draws upon Kant's
Investigation
conceptionof a regulative
principle.However,his wayof relyingupon
thisconceptionshowsno signof orthodoxy.
He divergesfromKant at
the outsetby definingthe thingitself(we may even say: thethingin
itself)as an "Idea in a Kantiansense".26

251. Kant, Kr.dr.V, A 418.

26E. HUSSERL,Ideen zu einerreinen
Phnomenologieund phnomenologischen
Philosophie,vol. I,
The Hague, M. Nijhoff,1976 (hereafter
Husserliana,111/
1, ed by K. SCHUHMANN,
quoted as Ideen 7),
ErsterTeil:Entwrfezur
143, p. 330. f. Cf. E. HUSSERL,LogischeUntersuchungen.
Ergnzungsbandy
der VI. Untersuchung
und zur Vorrede
Umarbeitung
fr die Neuauflageder LogischenUntersuchungen
(Sommer1913), ed. by U. Melle, Husserliana,vol. XX/1, Dordrecht/Boston/London,
Kluwer,2002
einesDingeseine 'Idee'in Kantschem
(hereafter
abridgedas "Entwrfe"),
p. 197: "Danach ist Wirklichkeit

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488

LszlTENGELYI

What is meant here by the expressionthe 'thing(in) itself?The

answeris in Husserlthesame as in Kant: theoppositeof 'appearance'.
theoppositionbetweenthingand appearHowever,Husserlinterprets
ance not in the same way as Kant. What he meansby appearanceis a
profile',an 'aspect'or a 'perspective
abridgment'{Abschattung,
perspektivischeVerkrzung)
of the thingitself.That is whyhe claimsthatto
graspan appearanceis to graspthethingitselffroma specificperspective,underone of its possibleaspects.Phenomenologymaintainsthat
thethingitselfin itsbodilypresence.This is conappearancesmanifest
sideredby Husserlas partand parcelof the meaningof perceptualexdifference
betweenthething(in
perience.If thereis stilla fundamental
resultssolelyfromthe factthat
itself)and appearance,thisdifference
the
sense
of
or
appearances(in
profiles aspectsof a thing)necessarily
remaincharacterized
and indeterminacy.27
It mustclearbyone-sidedness
lybe seenthata wholeseriesofdifferent
aspectsbelongsto one and the
samething.Therefore,
each singleappearanceis onlya partialaspectof
thethingitself.The discoveryof such partialaspectsmaybe viewedas
an endlessprocess.
No greatdistanceis markedby these thoughtsfromthe Kantian
of appearance.Undoubtedly,we find no comparable
interpretation
of
analysis perceptionin the CritiqueofPureReason.Yet,it is clearthat,

der'Idee'eines'gewissen,
aberimvorausnievollbestimmten,
vielmehr
unendlich
vielSinn,Korrelat
einesinsUnendliche
Whatis meantby
[...]."
Wahrnehmungsverlaufs,
erweiterungsfhigen
deutigen
' Wirklichkeit
einesDinges(reality
of a thing)in thisquotationbecomesclearfromanotherpassage:
kann
ausdenunendlich
vielenundunendlich
bloen
"Nuraktuelle
Erfahrung sozusagen
vieldeutigen
'des' Dinges,des 'an sich'vlligbestimmten,
herausdie eine,einzigeWirklichkeit
Mglichkeiten
schneiden."
(Ibid.,p. 198.)We mayelicitfromthesetwopassagesthatan Ideaina Kantiansenseis the
'in itself".
i. e. of"the"thing,"asfaras itis entirely
determined
ideaofa thingin itsparticular
reality,
withthereal,butnecessarily
The thingin thissenseof thewordis notidentical
incomplete
object
Fora similar
which,justlikethephenomenal
objectin Kant,is nevergivenas a wholein experience.
etexistence,
oftheterm'Idea in a Kantiansense'in Husserlsee R. Bernet, Conscience
interpretation
est[...] l'idede la chose-en-soi
Paris,PUF,2004,p. 161:"L'Ideau senskantien
[...]." Cf.R. BERNET,
n'estpas donnesousla formed'un objet
La viedu sujet,Paris,PUF, 1994,p. 130: "La chose-en-soi
rel,maisd'uneide."
27E. Husserl,Ideen/, 138, 319.
p.

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EXPERIENCE AND INFINITY IN KANT AND HUSSERL

489

accordingto Kant,appearancesare not so much isolatedsense-dataas

ratherspecial aspectsof an object which is not exhaustedby them.
Here, however,the analogycomes to an end. For Kant adds thatno
in anyfaithful
mannerwhattheobjectas a thingin
suchaspectreflects
itselfmay be. But this is preciselythe view which is challengedin
Husserl'sphenomenology.28
1.
From the perspectiveof the presentdiscussion,it is importantto
decidewhetheror nota thing(in) itselfcan be conceivedofas thesumtotalof itsappearances(i.e. of itspartialaspects).Kants answerto this
questionis unequivocallyin the negative,because,accordingto him,
theabsolutetotality
ofall partialaspectsofa thingcannotbe presentin
thegainingof experience.But a
experience,
exceptas a ruleregulating
ruleof thiskindis not to be confusedwitha giventhing.
considersKant'sinsightintotheregulative
Husserlseriously
function
ofa mereidea. He entirely
reliesupon Kantin sayingthattheonlykind
whichcharacterizes
of infinity
thecourseof experienceis "theendlessness in proceeding".29
Moreover,Husserlundertakesto show in detail
in
how, everyperceptualsituation,the courseof further
experienceis
and how the integralstructure
of such pre-delineations
pre-delineated
is summarizedin the conceptof a concretething.Here, once again,
drawsupon the CritiqueofPureReason,whichclearly
phenomenology
how
the
indicates
conceptof a thingservesas "a ruleforintuitions".30

28There is a difference
betweenKant's and Husserl'sconcept of experienceas well. Science is inteinto
what
Kant
calls
in the CritiqueofPureReasonregulativeideas are
grated
'experience'.Accordingly,
relatedto scientifically
what Husserlhas in view is rathera perorganizedexperience.On the contrary,
ceptualexperiencethatis presupposedby sciences.It is thisperceptualexperiencewhich an 'Idea in a
Kantian sense' is relatedto.
291. Kant, KrAr.V, A 25 and E. Husserl, Ideen /, 149, 346.
p.
30See I. Kant, KrAr.V, A 106 and E. Husserl, Ideen /, 149, 346.
p.

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490

LszlTENGELYI

In spite of all the common features,however,phenomenologyand

Kantianismare, to be sure,separatedby a whole rangeof differences
level.The mostimportantof thesedistinctive
evenon thiselementary
a properintentionality
to intuitionin
is thatHusserlattributes
features
whereasforKant it is only a
generaland to perceptionin particular,
whichlends to perception- and to intuconceptof understanding
to an object.However,such differences,
itionas such - the reference
areof
as
the
be theyas fundamental
exampleof intentionality
suggests,
Husserlis led bytheidea
minorsignificance
forour presentpurposes.31
in perceptualsituationsto formthephenomenologofpre-delineations
ical conceptof horizon.By meansof thisconcepthe is able to restate
is notan unconKant'stenetaccordingto whichtheworldofappearances
ditionalwhole.The notionof theworldas a universalhorizonmaybe
versionof thisKantiantenet.
regardedas a phenomenological
Yet,HusserldistanceshimselffromKanton a decisivepointwhenhe
identifiesthe thing(in) itselfwith the sum-totalof its appearances
hereas partialaspector profile).What makes
(appearanceinterpreted
thisdivergencefromKant possible?The answeris to be soughtforin
ofwhatis meantherebycsum-total'According
Husserl'sinterpretation
to theCritiqueofPureReason^a sum-totalofappearancesis alwayscharhas a "conacterizedas a 'successiveinfinite'.Husserl,on thecontrary,
tinuumofappearances"in view,pointingout the"omnilateral
infinity"
infinite
continuum
thisomnilaterally
It is precisely
ofthiscontinuum.32
of appearanceswhich,in his opinion,amountsto the adequategivennessof thethingitself.
Froma Kantianpointof view it mightbe objectedthatsuch a conThis objectionis,
tinuum,in itsturn,can neverbe givenin experience.
however,onlyan apparentone, since Husserlby no meansarguesfor

31For furtherdifferences
see L. Tengelyi, 'Husserls Begriffdes Horizontes',in: R. Elm (Hrsg.),
und interkulturelle
Horizontedes Horizontbegriffi.
Studien,Sankt
Hermeneutische,
phnomenologische
Augustin,Academia Verlag,2004, p. 144 f. and p. 148 f.
32E. Husserl, Ideen /, 143, 331.
p.

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EXPERIENCE AND INFINITY IN KANT AND HUSSERL

491

the givennessof a continuumin experience.He verywell admitsthat

infinitecontinuumof partialaspectsis nothingbut a
theomnilaterally
mereidea withonlya regulativefunctionin experience.As faras the
to experienceis concerned,he entirelyagrees
applicabilityof infinity
withKant; thatis whyhe evokes,in thiscontext,an Idea in a Kantian
infinite
sense'.What he considersas a givenis not the omnilaterally
continuumof appearancesitself,but onlytheidea of thiscontinuum.33
However,in oppositionto Kant,he claimsthatthisidea has not onlya
but
purposebut also an object^and thatitsobjectis not onlypotentially
- as everycontinuum- actuallyinfinite.
That is whyit maybe identifiedwiththethingitselfin itsadequategivenness.
Here Husserllargelyrelieson the conceptsof continuumand infinIn the
ity,as theyhave been elaboratedin 19th centurymathematics.
had been
traditionofEuropeanphilosophythenotionofactualinfinity
main propositionon thistopicwas
rejectedsinceAristotle.Aristotle's
in mediaevalLatin as infinitum
actu non datur.Although
formulated
as
of God was alreadyrehabilitated
as a characteristic
actual infinity
and althoughit was laterevenappliedto the
earlyas in scholasticism,
world by a whole series of thinkersfrom Nicolaus Cusanus and
GiordanoBruno to Spinoza and Leibniz,it did not allow forany furIt was consideredas uniqueand indivisible,
therarticulation.
consisting
It is thisnoble yetunarof no partsand admittingno measurement.34
thatKant is confronted
ticulatednotionof actualinfinity
with,and he
clearlyrejectsit,becausehe sees in it a sourceof antinomies.It is only
ofactualinfinafterhisdeaththatnew tendenciesin theinterpretation
A
manifests
itself
with
Bernhard
Bolzano,
ityemerge. break-through
withGeorgCantor.
RichardDedekindand,especially,
KarlWeierstrass,
a firmground
19thcenturysettheorymarksa new era by establishing
The decisivestepis takenby
of actualinfinity.
forthe reinterpretation
in
is
as
the
who
erudite
Cantor,
philosophicaltradition,as he is a
just

33E. Husserl, Ideen/, 143, 331.

p.
34See e. B. SPINOZA,Ethica,Pars I,
prop. XV, Schol.
g.

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492

LszlTENGELYI

This decisivestepmaybe said to consistin the

creativemathematician.
It is
from'absoluteinfinity'.
separationofwhatis calledthetransfinite'
Cantorhimself
claimsthatwherenotdifficult
to indicatethedifference.
mulcannotbe enlargedor increased,a transfinite
as absoluteinfinity
This characteristic
tiplicityis always susceptibleto augmentation.35
ones. Whereasno articulationis to be discernedin
leads up to further
withoutpartsand
absoluteinfinity,
becauseit is unique and indivisible,
one in comfrom
another
a
transfinite
measure,
maydiffer
multiplicity
whereasabsoluteinfinity
may
position,orderand size. Consequently,
be described,in Kantianterms,as an 'unconditionedwhole',a transcannotbe characterized
finitemultiplicity
by thisexpression.Nor can
such a mulit be designatedas an 'absolutetotality'.On the contrary,
and
remains,in spiteofitsactualinfinity,
totality
justa relative
tiplicity
a principallyopenwhole, preciselybecause thereare othertransfinite
fromit in composition,orderand size.36
whichdiffer
multiplicities,
Husserlis familiarwith the two papersin whichthisdistinctionis
of
arguedforby Cantor;he refersto themas earlyas in thePhilosophy
It is in one of thesetwo papersthatthe notionof conArithmetics.07
It is not difficultto see that the
tinuum is treatedof at length.38
is a prebetweentransfinity
and absoluteinfinity
Cantonandistinction
the
itself
with
to
the
of
Husserl's
attempt identify thing(in)
requisite

35G. CANTOR,Gesammelte
hrsg.von E. Zermelo, Hildesheim,GeorgOlms
Abhandlungen,
von 1932), p. 405; cf.
Nachdruckder Erstausgabe
1962 (reprographischer
Verlagsbuchhandlung,
d. 375.
r
36Fora moredetailed
'absolute
andthe
distinction
between
oftheCantorian
infinity'
interpretation
Schein.Kantund Cantorin der
Zahl und transzendentaler
see L. Tengelyi,'Transfinite
'transfinite'
durchKritik.Festschrift
Sicht von Marc RichirsPhnomenologie',in: Aufklrung
fur ManfredBaum

Duncker& Humblot,
K. Michel undA. Thomas,Berlin,
zum65. Geburtstag,
Hrsg.vonD. HNlNG,
2004, p. 451-475,especially
p. 452-455.
37E. HUSSERL,
vol. XII, p. 115, n. 2. The twopapersin
derArithmetik,
Husserliana,
Philosophie
einerallgemeinen
(1883; identicalwithpart5 of
Mannigfaltigkeitslehre'
questionare 'Grundlagen
zurLehre
and'Mitteilungen
in theGesammelte
'berlinearePunktmannigfaltigkeiten
Abhandlungen)
vomTransfiniten'
(1887).
38G. CANTOR,
10, in: Gesammelte
Mannigfaltigkeitslehre',
'Grundlageneinerallgemeinen
op.cit.,p. 190-194.
Abhandlungen,

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EXPERIENCE AND INFINITY IN KANT AND HUSSERL

493

infinitecontinuumof its partialaspects. Indeed, this

omnilaterally
identification
ofappearances,
infinite
multiplicities
presupposesdifferent
This
observation
a
chaotic
mixture.
coalesce
into
not
which do
accountsalso forone of the most importantfeaturesof Husserl'sapproach:it is not theworldas a wholebut eachsinglethingin itsparticuwhichis consideredby him as an Idea in a Kantiansense.39
lar reality
pheRelyingupon the new conceptof an actual but open infinity,
To
be
in
of
and
world.
the
marks
a
turn
description thing
nomenology
sure,it is bystrongtiesthat,from1907 on, Husserl'sthinkingis linked
philosophy.It is the elucidationof
up with Kantian transcendental
which is specifiedas the ultimategoal of
transcendental
subjectivity
is
The principleof finiteperspective
investigations.
phenomenological
put to theforeby Husserlin the analysisof space and time,as well as
of worldand thing.However,the idea of a continuumof appearances
in pheof transcendentalism
thebasic structure
transforms
profoundly
In
nomenology:it deprivesit of its exclusivefinitism. oppositionto
boththeworldand thesinglethingas infinite
Kant,Husserlinterprets
wholes.

marksa relapseinto
One shouldnot thinkthatthisturnto infinity
whichhad alreadybeen overcomebytranscendentalism.
an objectivism
in
not
their
It is
objectivegivennessthat phenomenologyconsiders
the
world and thingas respectiveinfinitewholes.40On the contrary,
infinitetotalitiesHusserlhas in mind are totalitiesof appearances(in
thesenseofaspectsor profiles)which,as such,remaindependentupon
This is tantamountto saying
subjectivestandpointsand perspectives.
reductionwhichopensthe wayfor
that it is onlythephenomenological
totalities.
Fromthisit alreadyfolworldand thingas infinite
interpreting

39Cf. R. Bernet, Conscienceet existence.

Paris,PUF, 2004, p. 161:
Perspectives
phnomnologiques,
"[...] l'Ide au sens kantienest [...] l'ide d'une ralitparticulire."
40Cf. E. HUSSERL,
bietet
Husserliana,vol. XX/1, p. 195: "Die aktuelleErfahrungswelt
Entwrfe,
natrlichkeineDinge mitunendlichvielenEigenschaften.Faktischlsstder Fortgangder Erfahrungen
hervortreten.
Dass das aber immerwiedermglichseinmsse,istkein
immerwiederneue Eigenschaften
bloes Faktum,sonderneine im Wesen der Dingerfassungliegende,also apriorischeNotwendigkeit."

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494

LszlTENGELYI

lows that,as opposedtoKant'sCopernicanrevolution,

Husserl's
phenomereduction
cannot
be
considered
as
a
turn
to
human
nological
finitude.
2.
On thebasisof the identification
of each singlethingwiththe continuum of its partial aspects,Husserl undertakesto overcomethe
Kantiandistinction
between'thingin itselfand 'appearance'.Of course,
no refutation
ofthisvenerabledoctrineis intendedbyhim.He does not
Kant's own motivesto draw this distinction.
attemptto reconstruct
Nor does he considerthe manifoldfunctionswhichthe conceptof a
thingin itselffulfillsin the criticalphilosophy.The taskHusserlsets
himselfis quitedifferent.
Whathe is seekingforis a philosophicalpossibilityto eschewwhathe takesto be a pitfallforhis ownthinking.
In orderto understandthistask,we have to takeinto accounthow,
in Kant,'appearance'and 'thingin itselfare relatedto each other.It is
importantto see thatthesetwo termsdo not referto two distinctentities.In sayingthis,I am relying
oftheinterpreupon a wholetradition
tationof Kant's CritiqueofPureReason,markedmainlyby the names
of Gerold Praussin Germanyand of HenryAllison in the EnglishThis conceptionoftherelationship
betweenappearance
speakingworld.41
and thingin itselfis clearlyconfirmed
bysome passagesin the Critique
of
hereto quote themostimportant
ofPureReason.It maybe sufficient
them:"[...] thewordappearancemustbe recognisedas alreadyindicatof whichis,
ing a relationto something,the immediaterepresentation
indeed,sensible,but which,even apartfromour constitution(upon
whichthe formof our intuitionis grounded),mustbe somethingin
It is also in this
itself,thatis an object independentof sensibility."42
areto be understood.
sensethatcertainclaimsin Kant'sOpuspostumum
41I hastento add that,in
viewofPrausswasrightly
modified
myopinion,theoriginal
byAllison.
421. Kant, Kr.d.r.V,A 252.

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AND INFINITYIN KANTAND HUSSERL

EXPERIENCE

495

enHere we are told once morethata thingin itselfis not a different

"just the same, but contityfromappearance;it is, on the contrary,
of
view".43
sideredfroma different
Appearance'- even if this
point
termis now takenin thesenseof a phenomenalobject,and not in that
ofa partialaspect- designatesindeedonlythewayin whicha thingis
Kantadds,however,
necessarily
grasped"from[a] humanstandpoint".44
thatthisis not theonlypossibleway in whicha thingcan be seized.It
to assumethata divinebeing,equipped
is at leastnot contradictory45
withintellectualintuition,could comprehendthesame thingin a differentmanner.Consequently,appearance(even in the senseof a phefromwhatthethingmaybe in
nomenalobject)has to be distinguished
is
once
If thisdistinction
itself.46
drawn,it may be added thatsuch a
divine being can perhaps relatealso to thingswhich do not even
appearto us.
it is clearwhythe propertaskof Kants folFromthesereflections
fromtheconceptualburdenof a
lowers,who tryto liberatethemselves
thing in itself,consistsin showingthat the distinctionbetweena
In
human and a divinecomprehensionof a thingis not pertinent.47
Germanidealismthisendeavorleads up to an assimilationof human
mind to divine intellector spirit.That is why here the boundary
betweenthefiniteand theinfinite
getsmoreand moreblurred.Husserl

431. Kant,
in: Gesammelte
Edition,vol.XXII,p. 45.
Academy
Schrifien,
Opuspostumum,
44Cf.I. Kant, Kr.d.r.
V, A 26.
45Cf.I. KANT,
- thatis,ofa thingwhichis notto
Kr.d.r.
Vf,B 310: "The conceptofa noumenon
- is
in
a pureunderstanding
as an objectofthesensesbutas a thing itself,
be thought
solelythrough
thatit is thesole possiblekindof
Forwe cannotassertof sensibility
notin anywaycontradictory.
thepossibility
of
in "presupposing
thatwe arebyno meansjustified
Kantadds,however,
intuition."
"the[sortof] underthansensible".
another
kindofintuition
Kr.dr.V,B 309.) Therefore,
(I. KANT,
Kr.d.r.
a problem".
towhich[a thingin itself]mightbelongis itself
V, A 256.)
(I. KANT,
standing
46Cf.I. KANT,
whicharemereobjectsofunderstanding
Kr.dr.V.>A 249: "[...] ifI postulate
things
notto one thatis sensiblecan be givenas suchto an intuition,
andwhich,nevertheless
although
noumena
would
be
entitled
intellectuali
such
coram
intuitu
(intelligibilia)."
giventherefore
things
47Cf. M. HEIDEGGER,
der
im
Die metaphysischen
AnfangsgrndeLogik AusgangvonLeibniz^in:
amMain,Kohlhammer,
1978,p. 210: "DerBegriff
' vol.26, ed. byK. Held, Frankfurt
Gesamtausgabe
flltnurdann,wennmanzeigenkann,
einesabsoluten
desDingesan sich[. . .] (alsKorrelat
Verstandes)
ist."
nichtnotwendig
einesabsoluten
Verstandes
da dieVoraussetzung
philosophisch

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496

LszlTENGELYI

takesa different
course.What he aims at demonstrating
is almostthe
thata thing
opposite:it is, as he claims,onlyin theformofappearances
can be intuited,notonlybyourselves,
humanbeings,butalso byGod (as
theideal representative
absolute
of
knowledge)}*
This statement
is somewhatsurprising,
because,at a firstglance,the
of a thingas the omnilaterally
infinitecontinuumof its
interpretation
partialaspectsseemsto allow,or evento require,a distinctionbetween
humanmindand divineintellect.Undoubtedly,
it is alwaysonlya partialaspectof a thingwhichwe, humanbeings,can graspin a perceptual situation.It seems,however,as iftheverydifference
betweenaspect
and thingcould be overcomeat least in an infinitesynthesisof all
aspectsof one and the same thing.To be sure,the resultof an infinite
remainsunattainableforfinitebeingslike ourselves.But is it
synthesis
equallyunattainableforan infinitebeing?Is it not quite naturalto assumethatthethingitselfin thetotality
of itspartialaspectsmaybe the
adequateobjectof absoluteknowledge?
Even ifthisthoughtis natural,it is, alas,onlya naturalillusion.As a
matterof fact,it is an entirelyunwarranted
assumptionto thinkthat
thetotality
ofall partialaspectsof a thingis somethinglikea totalaspect
of it,whichmaybe graspedat once,if not by a humanmind,thenat
least by a divineintellect.It is worthindicatingthat,accordingto a
remarkto be found in the 1907 lectureon Thingand
retrospective
beforehe
Space, Husserl himselfhad fallenvictimto this illusion,49
came, preciselyin the just mentionedlecture,to the insightthat no
totalaspectof a thingcan everbe regardedas given.In Ideas I he considerstheconfusionbetweenthe totalityof partialaspectswitha total
aspectas equivalentto theabsurdidea of "a finiteinfinity".50

48E. Husserl,Ideen/, 150, 351.

p.
49E. HUSSERL, undRaum,Husserliana,
vol.XVI, p. 123: "Ichselbstbinderhierso nahelieDing
vorzweieinhalb
undhabedarber
nochin meinenVorlesungen
unterlegen
gendenTuschungfrher
Falsches
Jahren
vorgetragen."
50E. Husserl,Ideen/, 143, 331.
p.

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AND INFINITYIN KANTAND HUSSERL

EXPERIENCE

497

This idea requires some clarification.Here a recourse to the

Cantorian distinctionbetween 'absolute infinity'and 'transfinity
HusserPsargument.If
provesto be indispensablefor understanding
in
were
infinite
the
first
would
sense,theycertainly
multiplicities
things
offera totalaspectand could,therefore,
be seen byan infinitebeingall
at once,just as all partsare at once graspedby a finitebeing,ifa finite
whole (e. g. thefrontispiece
of a house) is givenin itstotality.
Absolute
internal
withoutany
articulation.
The
infinity
encompasseseverything
ifthingsareinfinitemultiplicities
situationis, however,quitedifferent,
in the second sense. Transfinite
may differfromeach
multiplicities
otherin composition,orderand size. They do not encompasseveryis by no meansnegligible.That is
thing,and theirinternalarticulation
offer
do
not
total
whythey
any
aspect.The integralcontinuumof partial aspects neveramounts to an absolute totality,which could be
an open whole,a thing
graspedat once.51It remainsa relativetotality,
withina horizon.Not even the world itselfcan be consideredas an
It is itselfonlya horizon,evenifit is thehorizonofall
absolutetotality.
horizons.
It is a natural- and perhapsalso necessary,
i. e. transcendental
illusionto thinkthatworldand thingmaybe graspedas givenwholes,
ifnot by ourselves,thenby an infinitebeing.It is nevertheless
an illusion: the mirageof 'a finiteinfinity'.
The expositionof thistranscendentalillusionleads phenomenology
up to a breakwitha whole tradition of metaphysics,
centeredaround the thesisthatan infinitebeing
- as theideal representative
- seesall thingsat
ofabsoluteknowledge
once?1Husserlsetsagainstthisthesisthepropositionthata thingin its

51Cf. R. Bernet, Conscienceet existence.

; op. cit.,p. 160: "[...] l'Ide
Perspectives
phnomnologiques

au senskantien[...] ne peutjamaisfairel'objetd'uneintuition
adquate."
52Cf.Thomasof Aquinas,Summa
p. I, qu. 14,art.7: "Deus [...] omniavidetin uno
theologica,
omniavidet."Heidegger
showsin his lastMarburglecturethat
[...]. Undesimul,et non successive
Leibnizwasstillprofoundly
influenced
whichoriginated
in mediaeval
scholasticism.
bythistradition,
He addsthatevenKantandHegelremainincomprehensible
ifthistradition
is nottakenintoaccount.
M. HEIDEGGER,Die metaphysischen
derLogikimAusgangvonLeibniz,in: Gesamtausgabe,
Anfangsgrnde

vol.26, op.cit.,p. 54: "Die scholastische

Gotteslehre
istnichtnurderSchlssel
zurLogikvonLeibniz,

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498

LszlTENGELYI

particularrealityis nothingelse but an Idea in a Kantiansense,from

which,herebygoingbeyondKant,he drawsthe consequencethatnot
even an infinitebeingcan have access to a thingwithouta successive
of appearances(in thesenseof partialaspectsor profiles).
synthesis
Why is thatso? The answeris relatedto the verynatureof partial
othersare already
aspects.Wheresuch an aspectbecomesperceptible,
pre-delineated,but they still remain imperceptible.Therefore,all
aspectsof a thingcan neverbe givenat once. Fromthisit followsthat
It is
an Idea in a Kantiansenseis not the idea of an absoluteinfinity.
This infinity
is farfrom
rathertheidea of an actualbut open infinity.53
beingan absolutetotalityor an unconditionalwhole. Since it is identified,in each case,withjust one thingamongotherswithintheworldbutremainsembeddedin largwhole,itdoes notencompasseverything,
It is an essenerhorizons.Moreover,it exhibitsan internalarticulation.
of aspects that,while one of them makes its aptial characteristic
Nevertheless,the latter
pearance,all othersremain imperceptible.54
the
are
or
indicated
by
appearanceof the former.It is
aspects implied
of indicationsor pre-delineations
thatan Idea in a
due to thisstructure

auch Kants 'Kritikder reinenVernunft'und ebenso Hegels 'Logik' werden nur von da her in ihren
Triebkrften
fabar.[. . .] Der philosophischeSinn der Orientierungan der scientiaDei ist
eigentlichen
der: sie fungiertals KonstruktioneinerabsolutenErkenntnis,daran die endliche,menschlichegemessen werdensoll."
53E. HUSSERL,
It
Husseriiana,vol. XX/1,p. 200: "GegebenheitoffenerUnendlichkeiten".
Entwrfe,
are meantby thisexpression.Husserlsays:
is clearfromthe contextthatactuallyinfinitemultiplicities
"Sie sind als unendlicheGesamtheit
gegeben[...]." {Ibid., p. 199.) He adds: "Es verstehtsichleicht,dass
auch
also
Evidenz, Unendlichkeitenumspannen kann [...]. Bestndig
Intuition,
originrgebende
rekurrieren
wir,und nichtnur in reinerLogik und Mathematik,auf Unendlichkeiten,derenwahrhafund wirklich evident gilt: 'offeneMengen' als
tes 'Sein' uns als vollkommen selbstverstndlich
oder nichformulierunendlicheReihen, berhauptunendlichedurch formulierbare
Begriffsumfnge,
bare BildungsgesetzegeregelteMannigfaltigkeiten.
[...] - Genau so erfassenwir auch sonstgeordnewie brigens auch ungeordnete'Mengen', als 'offene'
te und konstruierbareMannigfaltigkeiten,
Vielheiten[...], demnach auch in unseremGebiet die Unendlichkeiten'mglicherErfahrungenbeund korrelativz. B. unendlicheFolgen einstimmignher bestimmender
stimmterProgressionsform
intuitiver
Mglichkeiteneines mit unvollkommenemBestimmungsgehalt
Gegebenen als solchen."
54Cf. R. Bernet, "Finitudeet
in:
La
vie
du sujet,Paris,PUF, 1994,
de
la
perception",
teleologie
p. 133: "[...] ce qui est gagn en intuitivitpar une apparenceest perdu par une autre [...]."

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EXPERIENCE AND INFINITY IN KANT AND HUSSERL

499

in finitesteps
a progression
Kantiansensecan serveas a ruleregulating
withoutprejudiceto itsinfinitecharacter.55
Fromtheseconsiderations
we maydrawtheconclusionthatHusserl
could not have defineda thingas an Idea in a Kantiansenseifhe had
from
not reliedupon theCantorianattemptto separatethetransfinite
Cantorhimselfassignsthenotionof absoluteinfinity
absoluteinfinity.
is articulated"in the areas of
to theology,
adding that the transfinite
mathematics".56
What
the
notionof the transfinite
and
sigmetaphysics
is clearlyindicatedby thesettheoryhe put fornifiesformathematics,
ward himself.Cantor is, however,firmlyconvincedthat, "to some
thetransfinite
extentand in certainrelations",
"acquiresalso realityand
in
existence" theworld.57
That is whyhe envisages,beyondmathematical settheory,
a 'metaphysics
of thetransfinite'
as well. However,what
sucha philosophicaldisciplinemightamountto,remainsratherunclarifiedin Cantor'swritings.It is in thisrespectthata particularimportto Husserl'snotionofan Idea in a Kantiansense.
ance can be attributed
It mayindeedbe claimedthatit is the meritof the phenomenological
approachto thingand worldto givean inkling,or evenan outline,of
of thetransfinite'.
whatwas designatedby Cantoras a 'metaphysics

Summary
A reflectionupon HusserPsnotion of an "Idea in a Kantian sense" calls foran
This questionis first
inquiryinto the relationshipbetweenexperienceand infinity.
consideredin Kant'sdoctrineof antinomies.It is shownthat,in the CritiqueofPure
is held to be a mereidea,which,however,has an indispensablereguReason,infinity

55Cf. R. Bernet, 'Finitudeet

teleologiede la perception,in: La viedu sujet,op. cit.,p. 136: "[L'Ide
au kantiensens] peut se rvler un sujet finisans pour autanttrahirson caractreinfini[...]."
56G. CANTOR,Gesammelte
Abhandlungen,
op. cit.,, p. 181.
57G. CANTOR,Gesammelte
Abhandlungen,
op. cit.,, p. 406.

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500

LszlTENGELYI

in experience.
It is at thispointthatKantis compared
withHusserl,
lativefunction
in
notion
of
elaborated
the
the
who,drawing
principle
of
upon
regulative
Critique
ofa thinginitsparticular
as an Ideaina Kantiansense.
PureReason,
conceives
reality
A majordifference
is particularly
Kantuses
betweenthetwothinkers
emphasized:
forjustifying
his distinction
betweenthe'thingin
his analysisof theantinomies
triesto overcome
thisopposition.
itselfand 'appearance';
Husserl,on thecontrary,
Itisarguedforthatthisdifference
between
thetwophilosophers
arisesfromtwodifinview,Husserl,
who
Kanthasa potential
ferent
notionsofinfinity:
whereas
infinity
a
relies
is familiar
withCantor'smathematical
and philosophical
upon
thoughts,
but
nevertheless
established
form
of
actual,
scientifically
openinfinity.

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