Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 162059

January 22, 2008

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of
swindling government funds?
MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na
kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions1 of the
Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioners motion to quash the information and her
motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the PhilippinesCebu. A student of a state university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed by
then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a oneyear term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons
Hall Annex in UP Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives,
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent
Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President
Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the
proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of
the President.

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.5 The succeeding student regent,
Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa
U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently filed a
complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman. 6
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict
petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819
of the Sandiganbayan.7 The Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby
accuses HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa,
defined and penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended committed as follows:
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, abovenamed accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public officer, being then
the Student Regent of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in
the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her
office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her
brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government by falsely and fraudulently
representing to former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the
Vinzons Hall of the University of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as
"President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall," and for which purpose accused
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter
relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered
to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of
FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was subsequently encashed by
accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their personal
use and benefit, and despite repeated demands made upon the accused for them to
return aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused to do so to the damage
and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have
any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student
regent.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates
the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction
over the crime of estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II,

Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa
falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even
assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the
coffers of the government.10
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a
student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast
to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She addsed that she was
a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.
She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. Such
power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the
information that it was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was
committed in connection with her official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.11
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioners interpretation of the law.
Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in
relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner.
In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the money is a matter of
defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown trial.13
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a public officer. As a
member of the BOR, she hads the general powers of administration and exerciseds the
corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems definition of a public office, petitioners stance
that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not
an essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted to include
allowances. By this definition, petitioner was compensated.14
Sandiganbayan Disposition
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for
lack of merit.15 It ratiocinated:
The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this
Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides
that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public
officials and employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no single

doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a public
official in relation to his office.
Accused-movants claim that being merely a member in representation of the student
body, she was never a public officer since she never received any compensation nor
does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view of the express provision of
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
(A) x x x
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Italics
supplied)
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original
exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials enumerated in subsection
(g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the primordial consideration in the
inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions.
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals
that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the
general powers of administration and corporate powers in the university, such as: 1) To
receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums as may be provided by
law for the support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government and
to enact for the government of the university such general ordinances and regulations,
not contrary to law, as are consistent with the purposes of the university; and 3) To
appoint, on recommendation of the President of the University, professors, instructors,
lecturers and other employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours of
service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in
its discretion leave of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other
provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after
an investigation and hearing shall have been had.

It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its
board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations. The board
of directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the corporation.
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines
is performing functions similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock
corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of such board,
accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the category of public officials upon whom
this Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she
does not occupy a position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Finally, this court finds that accused-movants contention that the same of P15 Million
was received from former President Estrada and not from the coffers of the
government, is a matter a defense that should be properly ventilated during the trial on
the merits of this case.16
On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.17 The motion was denied
with finality in a Resolution dated February 4, 2004.18
Issue
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT
QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION."19
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she
paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in relation to her office; (d) the
funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the government.
Our Ruling
The petition cannot be granted.
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
quash is not correctible by certiorari.
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Wellestablished is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is
not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the
special defenses invoked in their motion to quash.20 Remedial measures as regards

interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed.21 The
evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action. 22
In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court clearly explained and illustrated
the rule and the exceptions, thus:
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and
cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41).
The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and
if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The
same rule applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an
answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to
dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to
require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper
venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave
abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases,
the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few
examples of the exceptions to the general rule.
In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and
prohibition against the City Court of Manila and directed the respondent court to
dismiss the case.
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack
of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and
enjoined the respondent court from further proceeding in the case.
In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on
improper venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the
respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar
by prior judgment, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the
respondent judge to dismiss the case.
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based
on the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the
amended complaint.

In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the
motion to quash based on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and
ordered him to desist from further action in the criminal case except to dismiss the
same.
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on
prescription was set aside on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this
Court.24
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan.25 She repeats
the reference in the instant petition for certiorari26 and in her memorandum of authorities.27
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It bears
stressing that petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections made by the
Sandiganbayan.28
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of
the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No.
1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was
promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and
employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the
highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times
accountable to the people.29
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10,
1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding
amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No.
8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it
now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in

all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II
of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintended or higher;
" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27'" and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
" (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27'" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes

committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary
Grade "27'" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and
PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in
the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal
circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions,
and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over
petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases
filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986:
Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme
Court.
" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing
rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative
to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and
petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.
" In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with
the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal
action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all
times, be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same
proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal

action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right
to reserve the filing such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be
recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed
separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is
hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be
transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate
civil action shall be deemed abandoned."
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The said
law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or
corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.31 Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all
prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan. 32
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals. We quote:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person
having family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or
take advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any
other person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with
the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall
include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The
word "close personal relation" shall include close personal friendship, social and
fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which
assures free access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to
commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and
provides for their penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the offense of estafa.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those
crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner
isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding
paragraphs of the said provision.

The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible
construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis
semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such
interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong
kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-tawa.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other
in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature.34 The intention of the legislator
must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into
view.35 In other words, petitioners interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a
statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute
is the statute itself.36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay
marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang
pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials
in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the
offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other
felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over an indictment for estafa versus a director of the National Parks Development
Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then:
The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive
Committee on January 14, 1963, for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta
and other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as the
National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On
January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated
Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it
to the Bureau of Forest Development, Department of Natural Resources, on December
1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated
November 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No.
709, dated July 27, 1981).

Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular
government agency under the Office of the President and allotments for its
maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas,
Item Nos. 2, 3).
The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v.
Sandiganbayan.38 Pertinent parts of the Courts ruling in Bondoc read:
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondocs cases to the Regional Trial
Court, for the simple reason that the latter would not have jurisdiction over the
offenses. As already above intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint
trial of Bondocs cases and those of the government employees separately charged for
the same crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru
falsification punishable by penalties higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of
six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by government employees in conspiracy
with private persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the
regular courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint
trial would nonetheless not be possible.
Petitioner UP student regent
is a public officer.
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or
remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be
called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it
is difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer.39 The 1987 Constitution does not define
who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in different
statutes and jurisprudence.
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which
for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power,
an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices
and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political system is
therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of
some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There
is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to
hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as
regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its
salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).

In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which,
for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power,
an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer."42
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular
tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over
other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We held that while the
first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part
specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and
higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.
Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express
provision of law.44
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under
this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those
of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is,
indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. 46
At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.47
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual
of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public makes one a public officer.48
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution.
UP performs a legitimate governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature,
philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical training.49 Moreover,
UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation
created for profit.50
The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according
to the Information.

Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan
would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed in relation to
her office.
According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR.
She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with
then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the governing body of the state
university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in relation to public
office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information. 51 More than
that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent
in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.52 Otherwise, jurisdiction would
become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent. 53
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then
a student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her official functions, committing the
offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain,
conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x." (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did
not quash the information based on this ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should
be raised during trial on the merits.
It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estradas private funds and not
from the government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.
We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the President
and not its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is
averred that "petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00),
Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing on
said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check
No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is
a matter of defense that should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant
case.54
A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and honesty to the Court.

As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his
motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils the
misquotation. We urge petitioners counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that "a lawyer shall not misquote or
misrepresent."
The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio D.
Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled
that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name different from that with which he was
authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may warrant
suspension or disbarment.56
We admonish petitioners counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyers
conduct before the court should be characterized by candor and fairness.57 The administration
of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor and honesty before
the courts.58
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Corona*, Nachura, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 170122

October 12, 2009

CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 171381
CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are these two (2) consolidated petitions under Rule 65, each interposed by petitioner
Clarita D. Garcia, with application for injunctive relief. In the first petition for mandamus and/or
certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 170122, petitioner seeks to nullify and set aside the August 5,
2005 Order,1 as reiterated in another Order dated August 26, 2005, both issued by the
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, which effectively denied the petitioners motion to dismiss
and/or to quash Civil Case No. 0193, a suit for forfeiture commenced by the Republic of the
Philippines against the petitioner and her immediate family. The second petition for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 171381, seeks to nullify and set aside the November 9, 2005 Resolution2
of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as it likewise denied the petitioners motion to
dismiss and/or quash Civil Case No. 0196, another forfeiture case involving the same parties
but for different properties.
The Facts
To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the aggregate amount of PhP
143,052,015.29 that retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, herein petitioner Clarita,
children Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark (collectively, the Garcias) had allegedly amassed
and acquired, the Republic, through the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), pursuant to Republic

Act No. (RA) 1379,3 filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) on October 29, 2004 a petition for the
forfeiture of those properties. This petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 0193, was eventually
raffled to the Fourth Division of the anti-graft court.
Civil Case No. 0193 was followed by the filing on July 5, 2005 of another forfeiture case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 0196, this time to recover funds and properties amounting to PhP
202,005,980.55. Civil Case No. 0196 would eventually be raffled also to the Fourth Division of
the SB. For convenience and clarity, Civil Case No. 0193 shall hereinafter be also referred to as
Forfeiture I and Civil Case No. 0196 as Forfeiture II.
Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged
the Garcias and three others with violation of RA 7080 (plunder) under an Information dated
April 5, 2005 which placed the value of the property and funds plundered at PhP
303,272,005.99. Docketed as Crim. Case No. 28107, the Information was raffled off to the
Second Division of the SB. The plunder charge, as the parties pleadings seem to indicate,
covered substantially the same properties identified in both forfeiture cases.
After the filing of Forfeiture I, the following events transpired in relation to the case:
(1) The corresponding summons were issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his place
of detention. Per the Sheriffs Return4 dated November 2, 2005, the summons were duly
served on respondent Garcias. Earlier, or on October 29, 2004, the SB issued a writ of
attachment in favor of the Republic, an issuance which Gen. Garcia challenged before
this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 165835.
Instead of an answer, the Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the SBs
lack of jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture. The OMB countered with a
motion to expunge and to declare the Garcias in default. To the OMBs motion, the
Garcias interposed an opposition in which they manifested that they have meanwhile
repaired to the Court on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 165835 to nullify the writ of
attachment SB issued in which case the SB should defer action on the forfeiture case as
a matter of judicial courtesy.
(2) By Resolution5 of January 20, 2005, the SB denied the motion to dismiss; declared
the same motion as pro forma and hence without tolling effect on the period to answer.
The same resolution declared the Garcias in default.
Another resolution6 denied the Garcias motion for reconsideration and/or to admit
answer, and set a date for the ex-parte presentation of the Republics evidence.
A second motion for reconsideration was also denied on February 23, 2005, pursuant to
the prohibited pleading rule.

(3) Despite the standing default order, the Garcias moved for the transfer and
consolidation of Forfeiture I with the plunder case which were respectively pending in
different divisions of the SB, contending that such consolidation is mandatory under RA
8249.7
On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the
forfeiture case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the criminal case of plunder.
(4) On July 26, 2005, the Garcias filed another motion to dismiss and/or to quash
Forfeiture I on, inter alia, the following grounds: (a) the filing of the plunder case ousted
the SB 4th Division of jurisdiction over the forfeiture case; and (b) that the consolidation
is imperative in order to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements.
By Order8 of August 5, 2005, the SB merely noted the motion in view of movants having been
declared in default which has yet to be lifted.
It is upon the foregoing factual antecedents that petitioner Clarita has interposed her first
special civil action for mandamus and/or certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 170122, raising the
following issues:
I. Whether or not the [SB] 4th Division acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion x x x in issuing its challenged order of August 5, 2005 and August 26 2005
that merely "Noted without action," hence refused to resolve petitioners motion to dismiss
and/or to quash by virtue of petitioners prior default in that:
A. For lack of proper and valid service of summons, the [SB] 4th Division could not have
acquired jurisdiction over petitioners, [and her childrens] x x x persons, much less
make them become the true "parties-litigants, contestants or legal adversaries" in
forfeiture I. As the [SB] has not validly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners [and
her childrens] x x x persons, they could not possibly be declared in default, nor can a
valid judgment by default be rendered against them.
B. Even then, mere declaration in default does not per se bar petitioner from challenging
the [SB] 4th Divisions lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of forfeiture I as the
same can be raised anytime, even after final judgment. In the absence of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, any and all proceedings before the [SB] are null and void.
C. Contrary to its August 26, 2005 rejection of petitioners motion for reconsideration of
the first challenged order that the issue of jurisdiction raised therein had already been
passed upon by [the SB 4th Divisions] resolution of May 20, 2005, the records clearly
show that the grounds relied upon by petitioner in her motion to dismiss and/or to
quash dated July 26, 2005 were entirely different, separate and distinct from the

grounds set forth in petitioners manifestation and motion [to consolidate] dated April
15, 2005 that was denied by it per its resolution of May 20, 2005.
D. In any event, the [SB] 4th Division has been ousted of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of forfeiture I upon the filing of the main plunder case against petitioner that
mandates the automatic forfeiture of the subject properties in forfeiture cases I & II as a
function or adjunct of any conviction for plunder.
E. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly repealed by
the plunder law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture mechanism.
F. Since the sought forfeiture includes properties purportedly located in the USA, any
penal conviction for forfeiture in this case cannot be enforced outside of the Philippines
x x x.
G. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is imperative that
the matter of forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main plunder case to avoid possible
double jeopardy entanglements, and to avoid possible conflicting decisions by 2
divisions of the [SB] on the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction.9 (Emphasis added.)
With respect to Forfeiture II, the following events and proceedings occurred or were taken after
the petition for Forfeiture II was filed:
(1) On July 12, 2005, the SB sheriff served the corresponding summons. In his return of
July 13, 2005, the sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to the OIC/Custodian
of the PNP Detention Center who in turn handed them to Gen. Garcia. The general
signed his receipt of the summons, but as to those pertaining to the other respondents,
Gen. Garcia acknowledged receiving the same, but with the following qualifying note:
"Im receiving the copies of Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy but these copies will
not guarantee it being served to the above-named (sic)."
(2) On July 26, 2005, Clarita and her children, thru special appearance of counsel, filed a
motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II primarily for lack of jurisdiction over
their persons and on the subject matter thereof which is now covered by the plunder
case.
To the above motion, the Republic filed its opposition with a motion for
alternative service of summons. The motion for alternative service would be
repeated in another motion of August 25, 2005.
(3) By Joint Resolution of November 9, 2005, the SB denied both the petitioners motion
to dismiss and/or to quash and the Republics motion for alternative service of
summons.

On January 24, 2006, the SB denied petitioners motion for partial reconsideration.10
From the last two issuances adverted to, Clarita has come to this Court via the instant petition
for certiorari, docketed as GR No. 171381. As there submitted, the SB 4th Division acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Joint
Resolution dated November 9, 2005 and its Resolution of January 24, 2006 denying petitioners
motion to dismiss and/or to quash in that:
A. Based on its own finding that summons was improperly served on petitioner, the
[SB] ought to have dismissed forfeiture II for lack of jurisdiction over petitioners person
x x x.
B. By virtue of the plunder case filed with the [SB] Second Division that mandates the
automatic forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties upon conviction, the [SB] Fourth
Division has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of forfeiture.
C. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly repealed by
the plunder law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture mechanism.
D. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is imperative that
the matter of forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main plunder case to avoid possible
double jeopardy entanglements and worse conflicting decisions by 2 divisions of the
Sandiganbayan on the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction.11 (Emphasis added.)
Per Resolution of the Court dated March 13, 2006, G.R. No. 170122 and G.R. No. 171381 were
consolidated.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are partly meritorious.
The core issue tendered in these consolidated cases ultimately boils down to the question of
jurisdiction and may thusly be couched into whether the Fourth Division of the SB has acquired
jurisdiction over the person of petitionerand her three sons for that matterconsidering
that, first, vis--vis Civil Case Nos. 0193 (Forfeiture I) and 0196 (Forfeiture II), summons against
her have been ineffectively or improperly served and, second, that the plunder caseCrim.
Case No. 28107has already been filed and pending with another division of the SB, i.e.,
Second Division of the SB.
Plunder Case in Crim. Case No. 28107 Did Not Absorb the Forfeiture Cases in Civil Case Nos.
0193 and 0196
Petitioner maintains that the SB 4th Division has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Forfeitures I and II as both cases are now covered or included in the plunder case against the

Garcias. Or as petitioner puts it a bit differently, the filing of the main plunder case (Crim. Case
No. 28107), with its automatic forfeiture mechanism in the event of conviction, ousted the SB
4th Division of its jurisdiction over the subject matter of the forfeiture cases. The inclusion of
the forfeiture cases with the plunder case is necessary, so petitioner claims, to obviate possible
double jeopardy entanglements and colliding case dispositions. Prescinding from these
premises, petitioner would ascribe grave abuse of discretion on the SB 4th Division for not
granting its separate motions to dismiss the two forfeiture petitions and/or to consolidate them
with the plunder case on the foregoing ground.
Petitioners contention is untenable. And in response to what she suggests in some of her
pleadings, let it be stated at the outset that the SB has jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture
under RA 1379, albeit the proceeding thereunder is civil in nature. We said so in Garcia v.
Sandiganbayan12 involving no less than petitioners husband questioning certain orders issued
in Forfeiture I case.
Petitioners posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the plunder case, thus
depriving the 4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction over the civil cases, is flawed by the
assumptions holding it together, the first assumption being that the forfeiture cases are the
corresponding civil action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB 4th
Division in its May 20, 2005 Resolution,13 the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise
from the commission of a criminal offense, thus:
Such liability is based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully
acquired properties. The action of forfeiture arises when a "public officer or employee
[acquires] during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion
of his salary x x x and to his other lawful income x x x."14 Such amount of property is then
presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.15 Thus "if the respondent [public
official] is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the
property in question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State,
and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State. 16 x x
x (Citations in the original.)
Lest it be overlooked, Executive Order No. (EO) 14, Series of 1986, albeit defining only the
jurisdiction over cases involving ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his immediate
family and business associates, authorizes under its Sec. 317 the filing of forfeiture suits under
RA 1379 which will proceed independently of any criminal proceedings. The Court, in Republic
v. Sandiganbayan,18 interpreted this provision as empowering the Presidential Commission on
Good Government to file independent civil actions separate from the criminal actions.
Forfeiture Cases and the Plunder Case Have Separate Causes of Action; the Former Is Civil in
Nature while the Latter Is Criminal
It bears stressing, as a second point, that a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause
of action separate and different from a plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of

plunder charged in Crim. Case No. 28107 absorbs the forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for
plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance
of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language of Sec. 4 of RA 7080, for purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder, it is "sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy [to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth]." On the other hand, all that the court needs to
determine, by preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondents
properties to his legitimate income, it being unnecessary to prove how he acquired said
properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature of the
properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a determination of a specific
overt act committed by the respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal
wealth.19
Given the foregoing considerations, petitioners thesis on possible double jeopardy
entanglements should a judgment of conviction ensue in Crim. Case 28107 collapses entirely.
Double jeopardy, as a criminal law concept, refers to jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense,20 suggesting that double jeopardy presupposes two separate criminal prosecutions.
Proceedings under RA 1379 are, to repeat, civil in nature. As a necessary corollary, one who is
sued under RA 1379 may be proceeded against for a criminal offense. Thus, the filing of a case
under that law is not barred by the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in Crim. Case 28107
for plunder.
Moreover, given the variance in the nature and subject matter of the proceedings between the
plunder case and the subject forfeiture cases, petitioners apprehension about the likelihood of
conflicting decisions of two different divisions of the anti-graft court on the matter of forfeiture
as a penal sanction is specious at best. What the SB said in this regard merits approving citation:
On the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction, respondents argue that the division where the
plunder case is pending may issue a decision that would collide or be in conflict with the
decision by this division on the forfeiture case. They refer to a situation where this Courts
Second Division may exonerate the respondents in the plunder case while the Fourth Division
grant the petition for forfeiture for the same properties in favor of the state or vice versa.
Suffice it to say that the variance in the decisions of both divisions does not give rise to a
conflict. After all, forfeiture in the plunder case requires the attendance of facts and
circumstances separate and distinct from that in the forfeiture case. Between the two (2) cases,
there is no causal connection in the facts sought to be established and the issues sought to be
addressed. As a result, the decision of this Court in one does not have a bearing on the other.
There is also no conflict even if the decisions in both cases result in an order for the forfeiture
of the subject properties. The forfeiture following a conviction in the plunder case will apply
only to those ill-gotten wealth not recovered by the forfeiture case and vise (sic) versa. This is
on the assumption that the information on plunder and the petition for forfeiture cover the
same set of properties.21

RA 7080 Did Not Repeal RA 1379

Petitioner takes a different tack in her bid to prove that SB erred in not dismissing Forfeitures I
and II with her assertion that RA 7080 impliedly repealed RA 1379. We are not convinced.
Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would indicate a repeal, expressly or
impliedly, of RA 1379. RA 7080 is a penal statute which, at its most basic, aims to penalize the
act of any public officer who by himself or in connivance with members of his family amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of at least PhP 50 million. On
the other hand, RA 1379 is not penal in nature, in that it does not make a crime the act of a
public official acquiring during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of
proportion of his salary and other legitimate income. RA 1379 aims to enforce the right of the
State to recover the properties which were not lawfully acquired by the officer.
It has often been said that all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal and all efforts
should be exerted to harmonize and give effect to all laws and provisions on the same subject.
To be sure, both RA 1379 and RA 7080 can very well be harmonized. The Court perceives no
irreconcilable conflict between them. One can be enforced without nullifying the other.
Sandiganbayan Did Not Acquire Jurisdiction over the Persons of Petitioner and Her Children
On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire jurisdiction
over her person and that of her children due to a defective substituted service of summons.
There is merit in petitioners contention.1 a vv p h i 1
Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for the
requirements of a valid substituted service of summons, thus:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable
age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by its
decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper
under the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over a person. 22
In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally
on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, who
acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is also undisputed that substituted
service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner and her children
through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted services of
summons were invalid for being irregular and defective.

In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,23 we broke down the requirements to be:

(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted service
or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is
impossibility of prompt service within a reasonable time. Reasonable time being "so
much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and
diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be
done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party." 24
Moreover, we indicated therein that the sheriff must show several attempts for
personal service of at least three (3) times on at least two (2) different dates.
(2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons
the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.
(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at
defendants house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendants
office or regular place of business.
From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons was
made on petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not
comply with the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted service of
summons. Moreover, the third requirement was also not strictly complied with as the
substituted service was made not at petitioners house or residence but in the PNP Detention
Center where Maj. Gen. Garcia is detained, even if the latter is of suitable age and discretion.
Hence, no valid substituted service of summons was made.
The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendants, however, admits of exceptions, as when the party voluntarily
submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by asking affirmative relief. 25 In the instant case,
the Republic asserts that petitioner is estopped from questioning improper service of summons
since the improvident service of summons in both forfeiture cases had been cured by their
(petitioner and her children) voluntary appearance in the forfeiture cases. The Republic points
to the various pleadings filed by petitioner and her children during the subject forfeiture
hearings. We cannot subscribe to the Republics views.
Special Appearance to Question a Courts Jurisdiction Is Not Voluntary Appearance
The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance. (Emphasis ours.)

Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily
before the court. What the rule on voluntary appearancethe first sentence of the abovequoted rulemeans is that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without
qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over
his person due to improper service of summons.
The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do not show that she
voluntarily appeared without qualification. Petitioner filed the following pleadings in Forfeiture
I: (a) motion to dismiss; (b) motion for reconsideration and/or to admit answer; (c) second
motion for reconsideration; (d) motion to consolidate forfeiture case with plunder case; and (e)
motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And in Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss and/or
to quash Forfeiture II; and (b) motion for partial reconsideration.
The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner solely for
special appearance with the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over her person
and that of her three children. Petitioner asserts therein that SB did not acquire jurisdiction
over her person and of her three children for lack of valid service of summons through
improvident substituted service of summons in both Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This stance
the petitioner never abandoned when she filed her motions for reconsideration, even with a
prayer to admit their attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam dated January 22, 2005
setting forth affirmative defenses with a claim for damages. And the other subsequent
pleadings, likewise, did not abandon her stance and defense of lack of jurisdiction due to
improper substituted services of summons in the forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the foregoing
Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner and her sons did not
voluntarily appear before the SB constitutive of or equivalent to service of summons.
Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals26 applies to the instant case. Said
case elucidates the current view in our jurisdiction that a special appearance before the court
challenging its jurisdiction over the person through a motion to dismiss even if the movant
invokes other groundsis not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his
objection to jurisdiction over his person; and such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission
to the jurisdiction of the court.
Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily appeared before the
SB to cure the defective substituted services of summons. They are, therefore, not estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the SB over their persons nor are they deemed to have
waived such defense of lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, there being no valid substituted
services of summons made, the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner
and her children. And perforce, the proceedings in the subject forfeiture cases, insofar as
petitioner and her three children are concerned, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Thus,
the order declaring them in default must be set aside and voided insofar as petitioner and her
three children are concerned. For the forfeiture case to proceed against them, it is, thus,

imperative for the SB to serve anew summons or alias summons on the petitioner and her three
children in order to acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and mandamus are PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division has not acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Clarita D. Garcia
and her three children. The proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196 before the
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as they pertain to petitioner and her three children, are
VOID for lack of jurisdiction over their persons. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO*

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 124644

February 5, 2004

ARNEL ESCOBAL, petitioner,

vs
HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel
Alfonso-Cortez, Executive Clerk of Court IV of the Sandiganbayan, Hon. David C. Naval,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 21, Luz N. Nueca,
respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction filed by Arnel Escobal seeking the nullification of the remand by the
Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan of the records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 21.
The petition at bench arose from the following milieu:
The petitioner is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy, a member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence
Group of the Philippine National Police. On March 16, 1990, the petitioner was
conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking at the Sa Harong Caf Bar and
Restaurant located along Barlin St., Naga City. He somehow got involved in a shooting
incident, resulting in the death of one Rodney Rafael N. Nueca. On February 6, 1991, an
amended Information was filed with the RTC of Naga City, Branch 21, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 90-3184 charging the petitioner and a certain Natividad Bombita, Jr.
alias "Jun Bombita" with murder. The accusatory portion of the amended Information
reads:
That on or about March 16, 1990, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court by virtue of the Presidential Waiver, dated June 1,
1990, with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
each other, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
maul one Rodney Nueca and accused 2Lt Arnel Escobal armed with a caliber .45 service
pistol shoot said Rodney Nueca thereby inflicting upon him serious, mortal and fatal
wounds which caused his death, and as a consequence thereof, complainant LUZ N.

NUECA, mother of the deceased victim, suffered actual and compensatory damages in
the amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVEN &
95/100 (P367,107.95) PESOS, Philippine Currency, and moral and exemplary damages in
the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P135,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency.1
On March 19, 1991, the RTC issued an Order preventively suspending the petitioner from the
service under Presidential Decree No. 971, as amended by P.D. No. 1847. When apprised of the
said order, the General Headquarters of the PNP issued on October 6, 1992 Special Order No.
91, preventively suspending the petitioner from the service until the case was terminated.2
The petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the RTC, while accused Bombita
remained at large. The petitioner posted bail and was granted temporary liberty.
When arraigned on April 9, 1991,3 the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged. Thereafter, on December 23, 1991, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash 4 the
Information alleging that as mandated by Commonwealth Act No. 408,5 in relation to Section 1,
Presidential Decree No. 1822 and Section 95 of R.A. No. 6975, the court martial, not the RTC,
had jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and officers.
Pending the resolution of the motion, the petitioner on June 25, 1993 requested the Chief of
the PNP for his reinstatement. He alleged that under R.A. No. 6975, his suspension should last
for only 90 days, and, having served the same, he should now be reinstated. On September 23,
1993,6 the PNP Region V Headquarters wrote Judge David C. Naval requesting information on
whether he issued an order lifting the petitioners suspension. The RTC did not reply. Thus, on
February 22, 1994, the petitioner filed a motion in the RTC for the lifting of the order of
suspension. He alleged that he had served the 90-day preventive suspension and pleaded for
compassionate justice. The RTC denied the motion on March 9, 1994.7 Trial thereafter
proceeded, and the prosecution rested its case. The petitioner commenced the presentation of
his evidence. On July 20, 1994, he filed a Motion to Dismiss8 the case. Citing Republic of the
Philippines v. Asuncion, et al.,9 he argued that since he committed the crime in the performance
of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
On October 28, 1994, the RTC issued an Order10 denying the motion to dismiss. It, however,
ordered the conduct of a preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the crime charged
was committed by the petitioner in relation to his office as a member of the PNP.
In the preliminary hearing, the prosecution manifested that it was no longer presenting any
evidence in connection with the petitioners motion. It reasoned that it had already rested its
case, and that its evidence showed that the petitioner did not commit the offense charged in
connection with the performance of his duties as a member of the Philippine Constabulary.
According to the prosecution, they were able to show the following facts: (a) the petitioner was
not wearing his uniform during the incident; (b) the offense was committed just after midnight;
(c) the petitioner was drunk when the crime was committed; (d) the petitioner was in the

company of civilians; and, (e) the offense was committed in a beerhouse called "Sa Harong Caf
Bar and Restaurant."11
For his part, the petitioner testified that at about 10:00 p.m. on March 15, 1990, he was at the
Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant at Barlin St., Naga City, to conduct surveillance on alleged
drug trafficking, pursuant to Mission Order No. 03-04 issued by Police Superintendent Rufo R.
Pulido. The petitioner adduced in evidence the sworn statements of Benjamin Cario and
Roberto Fajardo who corroborated his testimony that he was on a surveillance mission on the
aforestated date.12
On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the petitioner committed the
crime charged while not in the performance of his official function. The trial court added that
upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7975,13 the issue had become moot and academic. The
amendatory law transferred the jurisdiction over the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan
to the RTC since the petitioner did not have a salary grade of "27" as provided for in or by
Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof. The trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the
Information pursuant to the ruling in Republic v. Asuncion14 and R.A. No. 7975. The amendment
consisted in the inclusion therein of an allegation that the offense charged was not committed
by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions, nor in relation to his
office.lawphi1.nt
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration 15 of the said order, reiterating that based
on his testimony and those of Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo, the offense charged was
committed by him in relation to his official functions. He asserted that the trial court failed to
consider the exceptions to the prohibition. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975, which was enacted
on March 30, 1995, could not be applied retroactively.16
The petitioner further alleged that Luz Nacario Nueca, the mother of the victim, through
counsel, categorically and unequivocably admitted in her complaint filed with the Peoples Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB) that he was on an official mission when the crime was committed.
On November 24, 1995, the RTC made a volte face and issued an Order reversing and setting
aside its July 31, 1995 Order. It declared that based on the petitioners evidence, he was on
official mission when the shooting occurred. It concluded that the prosecution failed to adduce
controverting evidence thereto. It likewise considered Luz Nacario Nuecas admission in her
complaint before the PLEB that the petitioner was on official mission when the shooting
happened.
The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to allege that the
offense charged was committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions or
in relation to his office; and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the same, as
well as the complete records with the stenographic notes, to the Sandiganbayan, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the Order dated July 31, 1995 is hereby SET ASIDE and RECONSIDERED,
and it is hereby declared that after preliminary hearing, this Court has found that the
offense charged in the Information herein was committed by the accused in his relation
to his function and duty as member of the then Philippine Constabulary.
Conformably with R.A. No. 7975 and the ruling of the Supreme Court in Republic v.
Asuncion, et al., G.R. No. 180208, March 11, 1994:
(1) The City Prosecutor is hereby ordered to file a Re-Amended Information
alleging that the offense charged was committed by the Accused in the
performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office, within fifteen (15)
days from receipt hereof;
(2) After the filing of the Re-Amended Information, the complete records of this
case, together with the transcripts of the stenographic notes taken during the
entire proceedings herein, are hereby ordered transmitted immediately to the
Honorable Sandiganbayan, through its Clerk of Court, Manila, for appropriate
proceedings.17
On January 8, 1996, the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan ordered the Executive Clerk of
Court IV, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, to return the records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to
the court of origin, RTC of Naga City, Branch 21. It reasoned that under P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by R.A. No. 7975,18 the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case, considering that the
petitioner had a salary grade of "23." Furthermore, the prosecution had already rested its case
and the petitioner had commenced presenting his evidence in the RTC; following the rule on
continuity of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with the case and render judgment
therein after trial.
Upon the remand of the records, the RTC set the case for trial on May 3, 1996, for the
petitioner to continue presenting his evidence. Instead of adducing his evidence, the petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari, assailing the Order of the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan
remanding the records of the case to the RTC.
The threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan
committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering
the remand of the case to the RTC.
The petitioner contends that when the amended information was filed with the RTC on
February 6, 1991, P.D. No. 1606 was still in effect. Under Section 4(a) of the decree, the
Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case against him as he was charged with
homicide with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal, and the crime was committed
while in the performance of his duties. He further asserts that although P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by P.D. No. 1861 and by R.A. No. 7975 provides that crimes committed by members
and officers of the PNP with a salary grade below "27" committed in relation to office are within

the exclusive jurisdiction of the proper RTC, the amendment thus introduced by R.A. No. 7975
should not be applied retroactively. This is so, the petitioner asserts, because under Section 7 of
R.A. No. 7975, only those cases where trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan upon the
effectivity of the law should be referred to the proper trial court.
The private complainant agrees with the contention of the petitioner. In contrast, the Office of
the Special Prosecutor contends that the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan acted in
accordance with law when he ordered the remand of the case to the RTC. It asserts that R.A.
No. 7975 should be applied retroactively. Although the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the
crime committed by the petitioner when the amended information was filed with the RTC, by
the time it resolved petitioners motion to dismiss on July 31, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 had already
taken effect. Thus, the law should be given retroactive effect.
The Ruling of the Court
The respondent Presiding Justice acted in accordance with law and the rulings of this Court
when he ordered the remand of the case to the RTC, the court of origin.
The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the
Information or the Complaint and the statute in effect at the time of the commencement of the
action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. The jurisdictional
requirements must be alleged in the Information.19 Such jurisdiction of the court acquired at
the inception of the case continues until the case is terminated.20
Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had
exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving the following:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to
their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00
.21
However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes
committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the
intimate relation between the office of the offender and the discharge of official duties must be
alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime
charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a
conclusion of law.22 The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does
not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the discharge

of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24,
1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation that the
petitioner committed the crime in relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the
elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending
P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect and under Section 2 of the law:
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP
officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but
occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below "27," the proper Regional Trial Court
or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In
this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade "23." He was charged
with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over
the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended
by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal
basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law which may be applied
retroactively.23
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999

PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR,
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO
MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.

MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which further
defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this petition for
prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo
Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings with
the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and documentary proofs,
are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the
Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a
spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon
City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by
Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was
composed of police officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitionerintervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission
Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson;
Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the

Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent

Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what
actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a
shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs,
Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal
liability all the PNP officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a
finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation. 1
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified modified
the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against
twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation
was approved by the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt.
Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in
eleven (11) information for murder 2 before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while
intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same
informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information, 3 the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file
a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action. 4
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11)
amended informations 5 before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an
accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the accused 6
was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic
Act No. 7975. 7 They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade
(SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or
higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only
a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by
Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and
Garchitorena dissenting, 9 the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered
the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive

jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief
Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting
that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and
some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of
jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House
Bill No. 2299 10 and No. 1094 11 (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and
Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844 12 (sponsored by Senator
Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in
Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 13 by the President
of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution 14 denying the
motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution
dated May 8, 1996."
On the same day 15 the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution,
the pertinent portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it,
but before Justice de Leon. Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion,
the legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines
approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new
law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are
now granting, the Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. Justice de
Leon has already done so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief
Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M.
Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases in fact, no order of
arrest has been issued this court has competence to take cognizance of these
cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2,
the court admitted the Amended Informations in these cases by the unanimous

vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring not dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and
decide the cases 16 (Empahasis supplied)
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7
thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over
which trial has not begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner argues that:
a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors
thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which
petitioner's cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereof
to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan
has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident
involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the
law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein
moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner's vested rights under the old
Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again made
to suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioner's cases were under,
namely, that the trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make
certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex
post facto legislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in
Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 to procedural due process.
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous"
provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old
Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title one-subject
requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution. 17
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while Republic Act
No. 8249 innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
the introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of a class
legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the
Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan. 18 They further argued that if their
case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated
as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they
acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate pleadings in support
of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that
both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.

This Court then issued a Resolution 19 requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a
nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the
question of whether the subject amended informations filed a Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057
sufficiently allege the commission by the accused therein of the crime charged within the
meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines,
filed the required supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and
to justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
a doubtful and argumentative one. 20 The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with
those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the
present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as
Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by
public officers and employees including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provisions
in Article XI, Section 4:
Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue
to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by
law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 21 created the
Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order,
were enacted: P.D. No. 1606, 22 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 123, 23 P.D. No. 1860, 24 P.D.
No. 1861, 25 R.A. No. 7975, 26 and R.A. No. 8249. 27 Under the latest amendments introduced by
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:
Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Titile VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the
position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher.
(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice

to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders
Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or
military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their jurisdictions as privided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise
of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising
or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these
petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the
implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter
promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals,
shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In
all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the
Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor,
shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A, issued in 1986.

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or

accessories with the public officers or employee, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
Sec. 7. Transitory provision This act shall apply to all cases pending in any
court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended)
is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
pricipal accused are afficials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineer, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice
to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as presribed in the said Republic
Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or
their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal
circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas
from the final judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court where all the
accused are occupying positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise
covered by the preceding enumeration.

xxx xxx xxx

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not
begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the word
"accused" appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was
deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal" that the parties herein are at
loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on
R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the
subject criminal cases since none of the principal accused under the amended information has
the rank of Superintendent 28 or higher. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman,
through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the Supreme
Court except in certain cases, 29 contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to
R.A. 8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense
committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),
(b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), 30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in
1986 (sequestration cases), 31 or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes; (2) the offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public
official or employee 32 holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and
(3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a
felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional
offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to
"other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to
their office. "The phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of
murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, under
said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or

rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the
same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public
officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A.
8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention
the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
protection of the law 33 because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete
evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the
entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department
as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party
who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. 34
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is
reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class, 35
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of
constitutionality and reasonables of the questioned provisions. The classification between
those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commence
and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the
approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. 36 In the first
instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had
already submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented documents.
Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the
constitutional limitations, 37 it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that
jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to privide for a remedy
in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that
Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them.
Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain

public officials and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any
court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law is not particularly directed
only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which
are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that Kuratong Baleleng cases
are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are
not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is
perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbaya 38 for their
participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator
had expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases
during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator.
Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been
selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word
"principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory provision
of R.A. 8249. 39 R.A 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other
Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and
House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during
the committe hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an
otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed
necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which
one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its
plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to
appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 40
Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249
to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law 41 for they are deprived of their
right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they
had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull,
42 an ex post facto law is one
(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the
law and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such
action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was
committed; or

(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater

punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or
different testimony that the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense on order to convict the defendant. 43
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences,
alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage. 44
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only
but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which
when done was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection
to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a
former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of a amnesty. 45
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law.
It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts
of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; 47 or
those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor their punishment. 48 R.A 7975,
which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and
other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a
procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws
of all kinds can properly administer justice. 49 Not being a penal law, the retroactive application
of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they
acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The
same contention has already been rejected by the court several times 50 considering that the
right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The
mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the
prohibition against ex post facto laws. 51 R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and
being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It
does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition. 52 Moreover,
the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. 53 It has been ruled that
adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of
their passage. 54

In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to
review questions of law. 55 On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme
Court still has the power of review to determine if he presumption of innocence has been
convincing overcome. 56
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of the
Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines"
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction. The
expantion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not
have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of
the amendments. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the
title 57 is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related
to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. 58 Such rule is liberally interpreted
and should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient
compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject
(involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended)
and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject. 59 The Congress, in
employing the word "define" in the title of the law, acted within its power since Section 2,
Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to "define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. 60
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section 4
and the retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249,
we shall now determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is the
Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions over the multiple murder case
against herein petitioner and entervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that
definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has
jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined
by the allegations in the complaint or informations, 61 and not by the evidence presented by the
parties at the trial. 62
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under
Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be
committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have
jurisdiction over it. 63 This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII
of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over
criminal cases committed by the public officers and employees, including those in govermentowned or controlled corporations, "in relation to their office as may be determined by law."
This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared in
Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction
as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was
committed in relation to the office of the accussed PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo, 64 we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to
the office if it (the offense) is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. 65 This intimate relation
between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the
informations." 66
As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court mandates:
Sec. 9 Couse of accusation The acts or omissions complied of as constituting
the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition
not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such from
as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual
recital of the facts." 67 The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption
or preamble of the informations nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information. 68
The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S.
v. Karelsen: 69
The object of this written accusations was First; To furnish the accused with
such a descretion of the charge against him as will enable him to make his
defense and second to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection
against a further prosecution for the same cause and third, to inform the court
of the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction if one should be had. In order that the requirement may be
satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of
certain acts and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances. In
short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as
"he is presumed to have no indefendent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense." 70

Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended
informations for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual
averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and the
discharge of official function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations 71 for murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATIONS
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby
accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE,
SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE
P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2
ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O.
AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF
SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT.
FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O.
MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO,
SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY
NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO
GLORIA, and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined
and penalize under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF
INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP.
JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE ARNADO,
SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R.
JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1
OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage of their public and official positions
as officers and members of the Philippine National Police and committing the
acts herein alleged in relation to their public office, conspiring with intent to kill
and using firearms with treachery evident premeditation and taking advantage
of their superior strenghts did then and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously
shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which
caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP,
CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM JR.,
SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L.
MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN,
INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2
ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office as officers and

members of the Philippine National Police are charged herein as accessories

after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above alleged by among others
falsely representing that there where no arrest made during the read conducted
by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila on or
about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY LAW.
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed
the crime of murder "in relation to thier public office, there is, however, no specific allegation
of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to
the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does
not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter
while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intevenors as
among the accessories after-the-facts, the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged
therein that the said accessories concelead "the crime herein-above alleged by, among others,
falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused
herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May
18, 1995." The sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused"
surprises the reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one
of those arrested by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly
conducted "at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the
immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by
the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests
and shooting happened in the two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while
there is the allegation in the amended information that the said accessories committed the
offense "in relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP)," we, however, do not see
the intimate connection between the offense charged and the accused's official functions,
which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as will reasonably
indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his
office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended
information that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his
office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion between of law, not a factual
avernment that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge
of the accused's official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the
Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:

It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the

complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after trial.
In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended information
alleged
Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized
groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of
regular policeman and . . . special policemen appointed and
provided by him with pistols and higher power guns and then
established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo which is under his command . .
. supervision and control where his co-defendants were stationed
entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding
investigations as well as assumed the authority to arrest and
detain person without due process of law and without bringing
them to the proper court, and that in line with this set-up
established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon
his orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin
Tebag who denied in consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the
accused because it was perpetreated while they were in the performance,
though improper or irregular of their official functions and would not have been
committed had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no personal
motive in committing the crime thus, there was an intimate connection between
the offense and the office of the accused.
Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in
the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the
victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The
informations merely allege that the accused for the purpose of extracting or
extortin the sum of P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the two
victims, and failing in their common purpose they shot; and killed the said
victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that
shall control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in
relation to public office "does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said
phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the
specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between
the discharge of the accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in
order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the
offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, 73 not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The
Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The
Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple
murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over
the said cases.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., CJ., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993

ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU (in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court, NCR, Branch 70, Pasig), The Honorable FRANKLIN DRILON (in his capacity as Secretary
of Justice), JOVENCITO R. ZUO, LEONARDO C. GUIYAB, CARLOS L. DE LEON, RAMONCITO C.
MISON, REYNALDO J. LUGTU, and RODRIGO P. LORENZO, the last six respondents in their
official capacities as members of the State Prosecutor's Office), respondents.
Mario E. Ongkiko and Marciano P. Brion, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
There is probably no more notorious person in the country today than Mayor Antonio L.
Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna, who stands accused of an unspeakable crime. On him, the verdict
has already been rendered by many outraged persons who would immediately impose on him
an angry sentence. Yet, for all the prejudgments against him, he is under our Constitution
presumed innocent as long as the contrary has not been proved. Like any other person accused
of an offense, he is entitled to the full and vigilant protection of the Bill of Rights.
Sanchez has brought this petition to challenge the order of the respondent judge denying his
motion to quash the informations for rape with homicide filed against him and six other
persons. We shall treat it as we would any other suit filed by any litigant hoping to obtain a just
and impartial judgment from this Court.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate
charges against several persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of
Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.

Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a
preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was not present but was
represented by his counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr.
On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to the petitioner
requesting him to appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. It was
served on Sanchez in the morning of August 13,1993, and he was immediately taken to the said
camp.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio Centeno, and
SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed confessions implicating him as a principal in the
rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest
status" and taken to the Department of Justice in Manila.
The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon his arrival, with Atty.
Salvador Panelo as his counsel.
After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez. This warrant was issued on
August 13, 1993, by Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, in
connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of Section 8, in
relation to Section 1, of R.A. No. 6713. Sanchez was forthwith taken to the CIS Detention
Center, Camp Crame, where he remains confined.
On August 16, 1993, the respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna, seven informations charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon,
Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George Medialdea and Zoilo Ama with the rape and killing of
Mary Eileen Sarmenta.
On August 26, 1993, Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that court issued a warrant for the
arrest of all the accused, including the petitioner, in connection with the said crime.
The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his apprehension that the trial of
the said cases might result in a miscarriage of justice because of the tense and partisan
atmosphere in Laguna in favor of the petitioner and the relationship of an employee, in the trial
court with one of the accused. This Court thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of the
seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were raffled to respondent Judge Harriet
Demetriou.
On September 10, 1993, the seven informations were amended to include the killing of Allan
Gomez as an aggravating circumstance.
On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations substantially on the
grounds now raised in this petition. On September 13, 1993, after oral arguments, the

respondent judge denied the motion. Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order/writ of injunction.
The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed against him should be quashed because:
1) he was denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary investigation; 2) only the
Ombudsman had the competence to conduct the investigation; 3) his warrantless arrest is
illegal and the court has therefore not acquired jurisdiction over him, 4) he is being charged
with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons; 5) the informations are
discriminatory because they do not include Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia; and 6) as a
public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan.
The respondents submitted a Comment on the petition, to which we required a Reply from the
petitioner within a non-extendible period of five days. 1 The Reply was filed five days late. 2 The
Court may consider his non-compliance an implied admission of the respondents' arguments or
a loss of interest in prosecuting his petition, which is a ground for its dismissal. Nevertheless,
we shall disregard this procedural lapse and proceed to discuss his petition on the basis of the
arguments before us.
The Preliminary Investigation.
The records of the hearings held on August 9 and 13, 1993, belie the petitioner's contention
that he was not accorded the right to present counter-affidavits.
During the preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993, the petitioner's counsel, Atty. Marciano
Brion, manifested that his client was waiving the presentation of a counter-affidavit, thus:
Atty. Brion, Jr.:
[W]e manifest that after reviewing them there is nothing to rebut or
countermand all these statements as far as Mayor Sanchez is concerned, We are
not going to submit any counter-affidavit.
ACSP Zuo to Atty. Brion:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. So far, there are no other statements.
A. If there is none then, we will not submit any counter-affidavit
because we believe there is nothing to rebut or countermand with
all these statements.
Q. So, you are waiving your submission of counter-affidavit?

A. Yes, your honor, unless there are other witnesses who will
come up soon. 3
Nonetheless, the head of the Panel of Prosecutors, respondent Jovencito Zuo, told Atty. Brion
that he could still file a counter-affidavit up to August 27, 1993. No such counter-affidavit was
filed.
During the hearing on August 1'3, 1993, respondent Zuo furnished the petitioner's counsel,
this time Atty. Salvador Panelo, with copies of the sworn statements of Centeno and
Malabanan, and told him he could submit counter-affidavits on or before August 27, 1993. The
following exchange ensued:
ACSP Zuo:
For the record, we are furnishing to you the sworn statement of
witness Aurelio Centeno y Roxas and the sworn statement of
SPO3 Vivencio Malabanan y Angeles.
Do I understand from you that you are again waiving the
submission of counter-affidavit?
Atty. Panelo:
Yes.
ACSP Zuo:
So, insofar as the respondent, Mayor Antonio Sanchez is
concerned, this case is submitted for resolution. 4
On the other hand, there is no support for the petitioner's subsequent manifestation that his
counsel, Atty. Brion, was not notified of the inquest held on August 13, 1993, and that he was
not furnished with the affidavits sworn to on that date by Vivencio Malabanan and Aurelio
Centeno, or with their supplemental affidavits dated August 15, 1993. Moreover, the abovequoted excerpt shows that the petitioner's counsel at the hearing held on August 13, 1993, was
not Atty. Brion but Atty. Panelo.
The petitioner was present at that hearing and he never disowned Atty. Panelo as his counsel.
During the entire proceedings, he remained quiet and let this counsel speak and argue on his
behalf. It was only in his tardy Reply that he has suddenly bestirred himself and would now
question his representation by this lawyer as unauthorized and inofficious.

Section 3, Paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, provides that if the respondent cannot
be subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits, the investigating officer
shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.
Just as the accused may renounce the right to be present at the preliminary investigation 5, so
may he waive the right to present counter-affidavits or any other evidence in his defense.
At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect
the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the information. 6
If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is flawed, the trial court may, on motion of
the accused, order an investigation or reinvestigation and hold the proceedings in the criminal
case in abeyance. 7 In the case at bar, however, the respondent judge saw no reason or need
for such a step. Finding no arbitrariness in her factual conclusions, we shall defer to her
judgment.
Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
Invoking the case of Deloso v. Domingo, 8 the petitioner submits that the proceedings
conducted by the Department of Justice are null and void because it had no jurisdiction over
the case. His claim is that it is the Office of the Ombudsman that is vested with the power to
conduct the investigation of all cases involving public officers like him, as the municipal mayor
of Calauan, Laguna.
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of R.A. 6770 to
investigate and prosecute, any illegal act or omission of any public official. However, as we held
only two years ago in the case of Aguinaldo v. Domagas, 9 this authority "is not an exclusive
authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in. respect of the offense charged."
Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in
this case needed the approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the
information and amended information here did not have the approval of the
Ombudsman. However, we do not believe that such approval was necessary at
all. In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA. 545 (1990), the Court held that the
Ombudsman has authority to investigate charges of illegal or omissions on the
part of any public official, i.e., any crime imputed to a public official. It must,
however, be pointed out that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
"any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" (191 SCRA at 550) is not an
exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the
offense here charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus, the non-involvement of
the office of the Ombudsman in the present case does not have any adverse
legal consequence upon the authority the panel of prosecutors to file and
prosecute the information or amended information.

In fact, other investigatory agencies, of the government such as the Department of Justice, in
connection with the charge of sedition, 10 and the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, in ill-gotten wealth cases, 11 may conduct the investigation,
The Arrest
Was petitioner Sanchez arrested on August 13, 1993?
"Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person into
custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. Under
Section 2 of the same Rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.
Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal
declaration of arrest is not, required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of one of
the parties to arrest the other and an intent onthe part of the other to submit, under the belief
and impression that submission is necessary. 12
The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, by virtue of a letterinvitation issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting him to appear at the said camp for
investigation.
In Babst v. National Intelligence Board 13 this Court declared:
Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a
hearing and answer some questions, which the person invited may heed or
refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Under
certain circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily assume a different
appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a powerful group composed
predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when the country has
just emerged from martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted, and the designated
interrogation site is a military camp, the same can be easily taken, not as a
strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as an authoritative
command which one can only defy at his peril. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-ranking military official and the investigation
of Sanchez was to be made at a military camp. Although in the guise of a request, it was
obviously a command or an order of arrest that the petitioner could hardly he expected to defy.
In fact, apparently cowed by the "invitation," he went without protest (and in informal clothes
and slippers only) with the officers who had come to fetch him.

It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. 7438, the requisites of a "custodial
investigation" are applicable even to a person not formally arrested but merely "invited" for
questioning.
It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the petitioner was placed on "arrest
status" after he was pointed to by Centeno and Malabanan as the person who first raped Mary
Eileen Sarmenta. Respondent Zuo himself acknowledged during the August 13, 1993 hearing
that, on the basis of the sworn statements of the two state witnesses, petitioner had been
"arrested."
We agree with the petitioner that his arrest did not come under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court, providing as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escapes from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present when the petitioner allegedly
participated in the killing of Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Neither
did they have any personal knowledge that the petitioner was responsible therefor because the
basis of the arrest was the sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover, as the
rape and killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place on June 28-June 29, 1993, or forty-six days
before the date of the arrest, it cannot be said that the offense had "in fact just been
committed" when the petitioner was arrested.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the
Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by virtue of
the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in
connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we find that the trial court still
lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The rule is that if the accused
objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he may move to quash the information,

but only on that ground. If, as in this case, the accused raises other grounds in the motion to
quash, he is deemed to have waived that objection and to have submitted his person to the
jurisdiction of that court. 14
The Court notes that on August 13, 1993, after the petitioner was unlawfully arrested, Judge
Lanzanas issued a warrant of arrest against Antonio L. Sanchez in connection with Criminal
Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of R.A No. 6713. 15 Pending the issuance of the
warrant of arrest for the rape-slay cases, this first warrant served as the initial justification for
his detention.
The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling that the filing of charges, and the issuance of the
corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that
detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of such defect. * Applicable by
analogy to the case at bar is Rule 102 Section 4 of the Rules of Court that:
Sec, 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court
of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor
shall, anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged
with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In one case, 16 the petitioner, sued on habeas corpus on the ground that she had been arrested
by virtue of a John Doe warrant. In their return, the respondents declared that a new warrant
specifically naming her had been issued, thus validating her detention. While frowning at the
tactics of the respondents, the Court said:
The, case has, indeed, become moot and academic inasmuch as the new warrant
of arrest complies with the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court regarding the particular description of the person to be arrested. While
the first warrant was unquestionably void, being a general warrant, release of
the petitioner for that reason will be a futile act as it will be followed by her
immediate re-arrest pursuant to the new and valid warrant, returning her to the
same prison she will just have left. This Court will not participate in such a
meaningless charade.
The same doctrine has been consistently followed by the Court, 17 more recently in the Umil
case. 18
The Informations

The petitioner submits that the seven informations charging seven separate homicides are
absurd because the two victims in these cases could not have died seven times.
This argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor General in this wise:
Thus, where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide
committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a
constituent of the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there
will be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes committed.
In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its
penalty to the highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on the occasion or by
reason of rape, loses its character as an independent offense, but assumes a new
character, and functions like a qualifying circumstance. However,by fiction of
law, it merged with rape to constitute an constituent element of a special
complex crime of rape with homicide with a specific penalty which is in the
highest degree, i.e. death (reduced to reclusion perpetua with the suspension of
the application of the death penalty by the Constitution).
It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one
offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a simple
punishment for various offenses.
Rape with homicide comes within the exception under R.A. 2632 and R.A. 4111, amending the
Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape committed by him in
conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with having himself
raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other words,
the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven times, with each of the seven
accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the other six. Afterwards, their lust
satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta.
Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta and
later killing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The
separate informations filed against each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes
is complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan
Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed in succession by the seven
accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.

It is of course absurd to suggest that Mary Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez were killed seven
times, but the informations do not make such a suggestion. It is the petitioner who does so and
is thus hoist by his own petard.
The Alleged Discrimination
The charge of discrimination against the petitioner because of the non-inclusion of Teofilo
Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia in the informations must also be dismissed.
While the prosecuting officer is required by law to charge all those who in his opinion, appear
to be guilty, he nevertheless cannot be compelled to include in the information a person
against whom he believes no sufficient evidence of guilt exists. 19 The appreciation of the
evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the prosecutor, and we do not find in the
case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave abuse of such discretion. 20
The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice or in
special cases by the President of the Philippines. 21 But even this Court cannot order the
prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to
support at least a prima facie case. The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but as a
rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.
The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of discretion
that will justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But in such a case the
proper remedy to call for such exception is a petition for mandamus, not certiorari or
prohibition. 22 Moreover, before resorting to this relief, the party seeking the inclusion of
another person as a co-accused in the same case must first avail itself of other adequate
remedies such as the filing of a motion for such inclusion. 23
At any rate, it is a preposterous contention that because no charges have been filed against
Alqueza and Lavadia, the charges against the petitioner and his co-accused should also be
dropped.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
The petitioner argued earlier that since most of the accused were incumbent public officials or
employees at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes, the cases against them should
come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and not of the regular courts. This contention
was withdrawn in his Reply but we shall discuss it just the same for the guidance of all those
concerned.
Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No, 1606, as amended by P.D. No.1861, provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code:
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by
law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or a fine of P6,000.00. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged obviously does not
fall under paragraph (1), which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither is it covered by
paragraph (2) because it is not an offense committed in relation to the office of the petitioner.
In Montilla v, Hilario, 24 this Court described the "offense committed in relation to the office" as
follows:
[T]he relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the
Constitution is, in our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of
the Constitution, the relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense
cannot exist without the office. In other words, the office must be a constituent
element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes
defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal
Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either
murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the
penalty is the same except when the perpetrator. being a public functionary took
advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is
increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and
even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises not from the
allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public
officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime
There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the
petitioner's office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the
crime charged. The offense can stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even
alleged in the information that the commission of the crime charged was intimately connected

with the performance of the petitioner's official functions to make it fall under the exception
laid down in People v. Montejo. 25
In that case, a city mayor and several detectives were charged with murder for the death of a
suspect as a result of a "third degree" investigation held at a police substation. The appearance
of a senator as their counsel was questioned by the prosecution on the ground that he was
inhibited by the Constitution from representing them because they were accused of an offense
committed in relation to their office. The Court agreed. It held that even if their position was
not an essential ingredient of the offense, there was nevertheless an intimate connection
between the office and the offense, as alleged in the information, that brought it within the
definition of an offense "committed in relation to the public office."
As Chief Justice Concepcion said:
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an
element of the crime of murder in abstract, as committed by the main
respondents herein, according to the amended information, the offense therein
charged is intimately connected with their respective offices and was
perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular,
of their official functions. Indeed they had no personal motive to commit the
crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid
offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his instructions
because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City. (Emphasis
supplied).
We have read the informations in the case at bar and find no allegation therein that the crime
of rape with homicide imputed to the petitioner was connected with the discharge of his
functions as municipal mayor or that there is an "intimate connection" between the offense
and his office. It follows that the said crime, being an ordinary offense, is triable by the regular
courts and not the Sandiganbayan.
Conclusion
As above demonstrated, all of the grounds invoked by the petitioner are not supported by the
facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. They must, therefore, all be rejected. In
consequence, the respondent judge, who has started the trial of the criminal cases against the
petitioner and his co-accused, may proceed therewith without further hindrance.
It remains to stress that the decision we make today is not a decision on the merits of the
criminal cases being tried below. These will have to be decided by the respondent judge in
accordance with the evidence that is still being received. At this time, there is yet no basis for
judgment, only uninformed conjecture. The Court will caution against such irrelevant public
speculations as they can be based only on imperfect knowledge if not officious ignorance.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The respondent judge is DIRECTED to continue with the
trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 101141, 101142, 101143, 101144, 101145, 101146 and 101147 and
to decide them with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason, Puno and Vitug,
JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., took no part.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 172832

April 7, 2009

ROSARIO T. DE VERA, Petitioner,

vs.
GEREN A. DE VERA, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse the February 28, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its May 24,
2006 Resolution2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 91916.
The facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:
Petitioner Rosario T. de Vera accused her spouse Geren A. de Vera (Geren) and Josephine F.
Juliano (Josephine) of Bigamy. They were thus indicted in an Information, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about the 31st day of July, 2003, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Geren A. De
Vera being previously united in lawful marriage with Rosario Carvajal Tobias-De Vera, and
without said marriage having been legally dissolved, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second marriage with accused Josephine Juliano y Francisco, who
likewise has previous knowledge that accused Geren A. De Veras previous marriage with
Rosario T. De Vera is still valid and subsisting, said second marriage having all the essential
requisites for its validity.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Upon arraignment, Geren pleaded "Guilty." However, in a Motion 4 dated April 8, 2005, he
prayed that he be allowed to withdraw his plea in the meantime in order to prove the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The motion was opposed 5 by petitioner on the
ground that not all the elements of the mitigating circumstance of "voluntary surrender" were
present. She added that "voluntary surrender" was raised only as an afterthought, as Geren had
earlier invoked a "voluntary plea of guilty" without raising the former. Finally, she posited that
since the case was ready for promulgation, Gerens motion should no longer be entertained.

In an Order6 dated June 6, 2005, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted Gerens motion and
appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in the determination of the
penalty to be imposed. Thus, on even date, the RTC promulgated Gerens Sentence, 7 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Geren A. de Vera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of bigamy as charged in the Information and there being two (2) mitigating circumstances
(Plea of guilty and voluntary surrender), and no aggravating circumstance and applying the
provision of Article 349 in relation to paragraph 5, Article 64, Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 6
MONTHS of ARRESTO MAYOR, as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS of PRISION
CORRECCIONAL, as maximum.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Unsatisfied, petitioner moved for the partial reconsideration8 of the decision but the same was
denied in an Order9 dated August 25, 2005.
In the meantime, on June 8, 2005, Geren applied for probation10 which was favorably acted
upon by the RTC by referring it to the Probation Officer of San Juan, Metro Manila.11
For failure to obtain favorable action from the RTC, petitioner instituted a special civil action for
certiorari before the CA. However, she failed to persuade the CA which rendered the assailed
decision affirming the RTC Order and Sentence, and the assailed resolution denying her motion
for reconsideration. In sustaining the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, the CA maintained that all its requisites were present.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT
PROBABLY IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT WHEN:
A. IT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO APPLY THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. CAGAS
REGARDING THE REQUISITES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER TO BE APPRECIATED
IN THE INSTANT CASE.
B. IT INCORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE ORDER AND SENTENCE BOTH DATED JUNE 6,
2005 AND THE ORDER DATED AUGUST 25, 2005 RENDERED BY THE PUBLIC
RESPONDENT IN APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF PLEA OF
GUILTY AND VOLUNTARY SURRENDER IN FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 130139, AN ACT THAT WARRANTS THIS HONORABLE

COURT TO EXERCISE ITS APPELLATE JUDICIAL DISCRETION.12
The petition lacks merit.
While we are called upon to resolve the sole issue of whether the CA correctly denied the
issuance of the writ of certiorari, we cannot ignore the procedural issues which the trial and
appellate courts failed to appreciate.
In filing her motion for reconsideration before the RTC and her petition for certiorari before the
CA, petitioner sought the modification of the courts judgment of conviction against Geren,
because of the allegedly mistaken application of the mitigating circumstance of "voluntary
surrender." The eventual relief prayed for is the increase in the penalty imposed on Geren. Is
this action of petitioner procedurally tenable?
Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 7. Modification of judgment. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused,
be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the
death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting
an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the
accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.
Simply stated, in judgments of conviction, errors in the decision cannot be corrected unless the
accused consents thereto; or he, himself, moves for reconsideration of, or appeals from, the
decision.13
Records show that after the promulgation of the judgment convicting Geren of bigamy, it was
petitioner (as private complainant) who moved for the reconsideration14 of the RTC decision.
This was timely opposed by Geren, invoking his right against double jeopardy.15 Although the
trial court correctly denied the motion for lack of merit, we would like to add that the same
should have been likewise denied pursuant to the above-quoted provision of the Rules.
As explained in People v. Viernes,16 the rule on the modification of judgments of conviction had
undergone significant changes before and after the 1964 and 1985 amendments to the Rules.
Prior to the 1964 Rules of Court, we held in various cases17 that the prosecution (or private
complainant) cannot move to increase the penalty imposed in a promulgated judgment, for to
do so would place the accused in double jeopardy. The 1964 amendment, however, allowed
the prosecutor to move for the modification or the setting aside of the judgment before it
became final or an appeal was perfected. In 1985, the Rules was amended to include the phrase
"upon motion of the accused," effectively resurrecting our earlier ruling prohibiting the
prosecution from seeking a modification of a judgment of conviction. Significantly, the present
Rules retained the phrase "upon motion of the accused." Obviously, the requisite consent of

the accused is intended to protect him from having to defend himself anew from more serious
offenses or penalties which the prosecution or the court may have overlooked.18
Equally important is this Courts pronouncement in People v. Court of Appeals 19 on the
propriety of a special civil action for certiorari assailing a judgment of conviction. In that case,
the trial court convicted the accused of homicide. The accused thereafter appealed his
conviction to the CA which affirmed the judgment of the trial court but increased the award of
civil indemnity. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the prosecution, then
filed before this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion.
The OSG prayed that the appellate courts judgment be modified by convicting the accused of
homicide without appreciating in his favor any mitigating circumstance. In effect, the OSG
wanted a higher penalty to be imposed. The Court declared that the petition constituted a
violation of the accuseds right against double jeopardy; hence, dismissible. Certainly, we are
not inclined to rule differently.
Indeed, a petition for certiorari may be resorted to on jurisdictional grounds. In People v.
Veneracion,20 we entertained the petition for certiorari initiated by the prosecution to resolve
the issue of whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in imposing a lower penalty. In that
case, the trial judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions of the law, refused to impose the
penalty of death because of his strong personal aversion to the death penalty law, and imposed
instead reclusion perpetua. In resolving the case in favor of the prosecution, the Court
concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion, and remanded the case to the trial court
for the imposition of the proper penalty. By so doing, we allowed a modification of the
judgment not on motion of the accused but through a petition initiated by the prosecution. But
it was an exceptional case. Here and now, we reiterate the rule that review is allowed only in
apparently void judgments where there is a patent showing of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The aggrieved parties, in such cases, must clearly
show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.21
Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to "capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.22 Obviously,
no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged
misappreciation of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Consequently, the trial
courts action cannot come within the ambit of the writs limiting requirement of excess or lack
of jurisdiction. Thus, the trial courts action becomes an improper object of, and therefore nonreviewable by, certiorari.23
Even if we dwell on the merit of the case, which had already been done by the appellate court,
we find no cogent reason to grant the instant petition.

For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: 1) the
offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority or the latters agent; and 3) the surrender was voluntary.24 The essence of voluntary
surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to
the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities
the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture. 25 Without these
elements, and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest
and the need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore, cannot be
characterized as "voluntary surrender" to serve as a mitigating circumstance.26
Petitioner is correct in saying that in People v. Cagas27 and in People v. Taraya,28 the Court
added a fourth requisite before "voluntary surrender" may be appreciated in favor of the
accused that there is no pending warrant of arrest or information filed. Since the warrant of
arrest had been issued, petitioner insists that arrest was imminent and the "surrender" could
not be considered "voluntary."
In Cagas, after the stabbing incident, the accused ran to the upper portion of the cemetery
where a police officer caught up with him. Thereupon, he voluntarily gave himself up. The Court
held that if the accused did then and there surrender, it was because he was left with no
choice. Thus, the "surrender" was not spontaneous.
In Taraya, when the accused learned that the police authorities were looking for him (because
of a warrant for his arrest), he immediately went to the police station where he confessed that
he killed the victim. Notwithstanding such surrender and confession to the police, the Court
refused to appreciate the mitigating circumstance in his favor.
Lastly, in People v. Barcino, Jr.,29 the accused surrendered to the authorities after more than
one year from the incident in order to disclaim responsibility for the killing of the victim. The
Court refused to mitigate the accuseds liability because there was no acknowledgment of the
commission of the crime or the intention to save the government the trouble and expense in
his search and capture; and there was a pending warrant for his arrest.
Certainly, we cannot apply the same conclusion to the instant case. Cagas is not applicable
because the accused therein did not surrender but was caught by the police. In Taraya, the
warrant of arrest had, in fact, been issued and was forwarded to the proper authorities for
implementation. In Barcino, it was a year after the commission of the crime when the accused
went to the police station, not for purposes of acknowledging his culpability, nor to save the
government the expense and trouble of looking for and catching him, but actually to deny his
culpability.
In this case, it appears that the Information was filed with the RTC on February 24, 2005. On
March 1, 2005, the court issued an Order finding probable cause for the accused to stand trial
for the crime of bigamy and for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In the afternoon of the

same day, Geren surrendered to the court and filed a motion for reduction of bail. After the
accused posted bail, there was no more need for the court to issue the warrant of arrest. 30
The foregoing circumstances clearly show the voluntariness of the surrender. As distinguished
from the earlier cases, upon learning that the court had finally determined the presence of
probable cause and even before the issuance and implementation of the warrant of arrest,
Geren already gave himself up, acknowledging his culpability. This was bolstered by his
eventual plea of guilt during the arraignment. Thus, the trial court was correct in appreciating
the mitigating circumstance of "voluntary surrender."
We would like to point out that the mere filing of an information and/or the issuance of a
warrant of arrest will not automatically make the surrender "involuntary." In People v. Oco, 31
the Court appreciated the mitigating circumstance because immediately upon learning that a
warrant for his arrest was issued, and without the same having been served on him, the
accused surrendered to the police. Thus, it is clear that notwithstanding the pendency of a
warrant for his arrest, the accused may still be entitled to the mitigating circumstance in case
he surrenders, depending on the actual facts surrounding the very act of giving himself up.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals February 28,
2006 Decision and its May 24, 2006 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 91916 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES*
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 154473

April 24, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioners,

vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 155573

April 24, 2009

PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed under Rules 45
and 122 of the Rules of Court: (1) G.R. No. 154473 assailing the June 18, 20021 and the June 23,
20022 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 102 in Criminal Case No.
Q-02-109407; and (2) G.R. No. 155573 challenging the June 25, 20023 and the September 18,
20024 Orders of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406.
The petitions, while involving the same issues, rest on different factual settings, thus:
G.R. No. 154473
On January 31, 2002, respondent Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), delivered a speech in the "Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and
Responses in the Philippines" held at the Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines-Diliman
Campus, Quezon City.5 The speech was subsequently published in the February 4 and 5, 2002
issues of the Manila Bulletin.6
Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by the respondent when he
stated in his speech that

Even worse, the Commission came right up to the brink of signing a 6.5 billion contract for a
registration solution that could have been bought for 350 million pesos, and an ID solution that
isnt even a requirement for voting. But reason intervened and no contract was signed. Now,
they are at it again, trying to hoodwink us into contract that is so grossly disadvantageous to
the government that it offends common sense to say that it would be worth the 6.5 billion-peso
price tag.7
filed, through its authorized representative, an Affidavit-Complaint8 for libel.
Arguing that he was an impeachable officer, respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP-QC).9 Despite the challenge, the City
Prosecutor filed an Information10 for libel against the respondent, docketed as Criminal Case
No. Q-02-109407, with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 102.
Petitioner later filed a Motion for Inhibition and Consolidation,11 contending that Judge Jaime
N. Salazar of Branch 102 could not impartially preside over the case because his appointment to
the judiciary was made possible through the recommendation of respondents father-in-law.
Petitioner further moved that the case be ordered consolidated with the other libel case
[Criminal Case No. Q-02-103406, which is the subject of G.R. No. 155573] pending with Branch
101 of the RTC.
While the said motion remained unresolved, respondent, for his part, moved for the dismissal
of the case on the assertion that the trial court had no jurisdiction over his person for he was an
impeachable officer and thus, could not be criminally prosecuted before any court during his
incumbency; and that, assuming he can be criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the
Ombudsman that should investigate him and the case should be filed with the
Sandiganbayan.12
On June 18, 2002, the trial court issued the challenged Order13 dismissing Criminal Case No. Q02-109407 and considering as moot and academic petitioners motion to inhibit. While the RTC
found that respondent was no longer an impeachable officer because his appointment was not
confirmed by Congress, it ruled that the case had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
considering that the alleged libel was committed by respondent in relation to his officehe
delivered the speech in his official capacity as COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it was the
Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the case to the exclusion of all other courts.
On motion for reconsideration, the trial court adhered to its ruling that it was not vested with
jurisdiction to hear the libel case.14
Aggrieved, petitioners timely filed before the Court, on pure questions of law, the instant
Petition for Review on Certiorari15 under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
raising the following grounds:

I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FIRST RESOLVED THE MOTION TO INHIBIT BEFORE
RESOLVING THE MOTION TO DISMISS;
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS
COMMITTED BY ACCUSED "IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE;" AND
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE.16
G.R. No. 155573
On March 13, 2002, respondent, as COMELEC Chair, and COMELEC Commissioner Luzviminda
Tangcangco were guests of the talk show "Point Blank," hosted by Ces Drilon and televised
nationwide on the ANC-23 channel. The television shows episode that day was entitled
"COMELEC Wars."17 In that episode, the following conversation transpired:
Drilon: Are you saying, Chairman, that COMELEC funds are being used for a "PR" campaign
against you? Is that what you are saying?
Benipayo: No, I think [its] not COMELEC funds, [its] Photokina funds. You know, admittedly,
according to [c]harg d[a]ffaires of the U.S. Embassy[,] in a letter sent to me in July of 2001, it
is whats been [so] happening to the Photokina deal, they have already spent in excess of 2.4
[m]illion U.S. [d]ollars. At that time[,] thats about 120 [m]illion pesos and I said, what for[?]
[T]hey wouldnt tell me, you see. Now you asked me, [who is] funding this? I think its pretty
obvious.18
Petitioner considered respondents statement as defamatory, and, through its authorized
representative, filed a Complaint-Affidavit19 for libel. Respondent similarly questioned the
jurisdiction of the OCP-QC.20 The City Prosecutor, however, consequently instituted Criminal
Case No. Q-02-109406 by filing the corresponding Information21 with the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 101.
Respondent also moved for the dismissal of the information raising similar arguments that the
court had no jurisdiction over his person, he being an impeachable officer; and that, even if
criminal prosecution were possible, jurisdiction rested with the Sandiganbayan.22
On June 25, 2002, the trial court issued the assailed Order23 dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-02109406 for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. The RTC, in the further
assailed September 18, 2002 Order,24 denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.25
Displeased with the rulings of the trial court, petitioners seasonably filed before this Court, on
pure questions of law, another Petition for Review on Certiorari26 under Rule 122 in relation to
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following grounds:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS
COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT "IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE"; AND
II. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ALLEGATION IN THE INFORMATION THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL WAS
COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE BELOW.
III. EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE,
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ENDORSED THE CASE TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN INSTEAD OF
DISMISSING IT OUTRIGHT.27
Considering that the two petitions, as aforesaid, involve the same issues and the same parties,
the Court, upon the recommendation of the Clerk of Court,28 consolidated the cases.29
The core issue for the resolution of the Court in these twin cases is whether the RTC has
jurisdiction over libel cases to the exclusion of all other courts.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court observes that the parties have argued at length in their pleadings on the issue of
whether the alleged criminal acts of respondent are committed in relation to his office. They
are of the conviction that the resolution of the said question will ultimately determine which
courtthe RTC or the Sandiganbayanhas jurisdiction over the criminal cases filed. The Court,
however, notes that both parties are working on a wrong premise. The foremost concern,
which the parties, and even the trial court, failed to identify, is whether, under our current
laws, jurisdiction over libel cases, or written defamations to be more specific, is shared by the
RTC with the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, if the said courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction to
try the offense, it would be pointless to still determine whether the crime is committed in
relation to office.
Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case
is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless a latter
statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.30 Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC),31 as amended by Republic Act No. 4363,32 is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try
cases of written defamations, thus:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this
chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now, the
Regional Trial Court] of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission
of the offense xxx.33 [Underscoring and italics ours.]1avvphi1.zw+
More than three decades ago, the Court, in Jalandoni v. Endaya,34 acknowledged the
unmistakable import of the said provision:

There is no need to make mention again that it is a court of first instance [now, the Regional
Trial Court] that is specifically designated to try a libel case. Its language is categorical; its
meaning is free from doubt. This is one of those statutory provisions that leave no room for
interpretation. All that is required is application. What the law ordains must then be followed.35
This exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC over written defamations is echoed in Bocobo
v. Estanislao,36 where the Court further declared that jurisdiction remains with the trial court
even if the libelous act is committed "by similar means,"37 and despite the fact that the phrase
"by similar means" is not repeated in the latter portion of Article 360.38 In these cases, and in
those that followed, the Court had been unwavering in its pronouncement that the expanded
jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts cannot be exercised over libel cases. Thus, in Manzano
v. Hon. Valera,39 we explained at length that:
The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which categorically provides
that jurisdiction over libel cases [is] lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Courts).
This Court already had the opportunity to rule on the matter in G.R. No. 123263, People vs.
MTC of Quezon City, Branch 32 and Isah v. Red wherein a similar question of jurisdiction over
libel was raised. In that case, the MTC judge opined that it was the first level courts which had
jurisdiction due to the enactment of RA 7691. Upon elevation of the matter to us, respondent
judges orders were nullified for lack of jurisdiction, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is granted: the respondent Courts Orders dated August 14, 1995,
September 7, 1995, and October 18, 1995 are declared null and void for having been issued
without jurisdiction; and said Court is enjoined from further taking cognizance of and
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 43-00548, which it is commanded to remand to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper disposition."
Another case involving the same question was cited as resolving the matter:
"Anent the question of jurisdiction, we ** find no reversible error committed by public
respondent Court of Appeals in denying petitioners motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
The contention ** that R.A. 7691 divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction to try libel
cases cannot be sustained. While libel is punishable by imprisonment of six months and one day
to four years and two months (Art. 360, Revised Penal Code) which imposable penalty is lodged
within the Municipal Trial Courts jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691 (Sec. 32 [2]), said law
however, excludes therefrom ** cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts **. The Court in Bocobo vs. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520 and Jalandoni vs.
Endaya, 55 SCRA 261, correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, has laid down the rule that
Regional Trial courts have the exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases, hence, the expanded
jurisdiction conferred by R.A. 7691 to inferior courts cannot be applied to libel cases."

Conformably with [these] rulings, we now hold that public respondent committed an error in
ordering that the criminal case for libel be tried by the MTC of Bangued.
For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trail
Courts by expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts, said law is of a general character. Even
if it is a later enactment, it does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law of a
special nature. "Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court, are special in
character, and should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts
(such as the Court of First Instance) which is a general law." A later enactment like RA 7691
does not automatically override an existing law, because it is a well-settled principle of
construction that, in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must
prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law on the
RTC must therefore prevail over that granted by a general law on the MTC.
Moreover, from the provisions of R.A. 7691, there seems to be no manifest intent to repeal or
alter the jurisdiction in libel cases. If there was such intent, then the amending law should have
clearly so indicated because implied repeals are not favored. As much as possible, effect must
be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or
altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. Furthermore, for an implied repeal, a
pre-condition must be found, that is, a substantial conflict should exist between the new and
prior laws. Absent an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior
one unless an irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old
laws. The two laws, in brief, must be absolutely incompatible. In the law which broadened the
jurisdiction of the first level courts, there is no absolute prohibition barring Regional Trial Courts
from taking cognizance of certain cases over which they have been priorly granted special and
exclusive jurisdiction. Such grant of the RTC (previously CFI) was categorically contained in the
first sentence of the amended Sec. 32 of B.P. 129. The inconsistency referred to in Section 6 of
RA 7691, therefore, does not apply to cases of criminal libel.
Lastly, in Administrative Order No. 104-96 issued 21 October 1996, this Court delineated the
proper jurisdiction over libel cases, hence settled the matter with finality:
"RE: DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, CARNAPPING,
DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS AND JURISDICTION IN LIBEL CASES.
xxxx
C
"LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER
THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN
CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS." (Underscoring
supplied)40

As we have constantly held in Jalandoni, Bocobo, People v. Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Br. 32,41 Manzano, and analogous cases, we must, in the same way, declare herein that the
law, as it still stands at present, dictates that criminal and civil actions for damages in cases of
written defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the RTC to the exclusion of
all other courts. A subsequent enactment of a law defining the jurisdiction of other courts
cannot simply override, in the absence of an express repeal or modification, the specific
provision in the RPC vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations in writing or
by similar means.42 The grant to the Sandiganbayan43 of jurisdiction over offenses committed in
relation to (public) office, similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest
the RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written defamation cases regardless of
whether the offense is committed in relation to office. The broad and general phraseology of
Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249,44 cannot be
construed to have impliedly repealed, or even simply modified, such exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the RTC.45
Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without qualification, it
is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is committed in relation
to office. Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial court that the respondent committed the
alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former COMELEC chair, and deprives it of
jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the above disquisition, gross error. This Court,
therefore, orders the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 and
their remand to the respective Regional Trial Courts for further proceedings. Having said that,
the Court finds unnecessary any further discussion of the other issues raised in the petitions.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari are
GRANTED. Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 are REINSTATED and REMANDED
to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
(On official leave)
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING*
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 169004

September 15, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and ROLANDO PLAZA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's resolution is a petition1 dated September 2, 2005 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court that seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division),
dated July 20, 2005, dismissing Criminal Case No. 27988, entitled People of the Philippines v.
Rolando Plaza for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts follow.
Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, at
the time relevant to this case, with salary grade 25, had been charged in the Sandiganbayan
with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, or The Auditing Code of the
Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received on December 19, 1995 in
the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00) . The Information reads:
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo
City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused ROLANDO PLAZA, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense, in relation to office,
having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of
THIRTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P33,000.00), Philippine Currency, which he received by
reason of his office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate the same within the period required
by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of P33,000.00, Philippine Currency, despite
demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss3 dated April 7, 2005 with the
Sandiganbayan, to which the latter issued an Order4 dated April 12, 2005 directing petitioner to

submit its comment. Petitioner filed its Opposition5 to the Motion to Dismiss on April 19, 2005.
Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Resolution6 on July 20, 2005 dismissing the case
for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before the proper court. The dispositive
portion of the said Resolution provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing in the proper court.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, the present petition.
Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal jurisdiction over cases involving public
officials and employees enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, (as amended by
Republic Act [R.A.] Nos. 7975 and 8249), whether or not occupying a position classified under
salary grade 27 and above, who are charged not only for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or any
of the felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, but
also for crimes committed in relation to office. Furthermore, petitioner questioned the
Sandiganbayans appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan,7 claiming that
the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the
enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases
where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) of
P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249, which was made applicable to cases
concerning violations of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office.
In his Comment8 dated November 30, 2005, respondent Plaza argued that, as phrased in
Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
was defined first, while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the
paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4; hence, the Sandiganbayan was right in ruling that it
has original jurisdiction only over the following cases: (a) where the accused is a public official
with salary grade 27 and higher; (b) in cases where the accused is a public official below grade
27 but his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) (a) to (g) of
P. D. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) if the indictment involves offenses or
felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public official
must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could
exercise jurisdiction over him must apply.
In a nutshell, the core issue raised in the petition is whether or not the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and
charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.

This Court has already resolved the above issue in the affirmative. People v. Sandiganbayan and
Amante9 is a case with uncanny similarities to the present one. In fact, the respondent in the
earlier case, Victoria Amante and herein respondent Plaza were both members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. The only
difference is that, respondent Amante failed to liquidate the amount of Seventy-One Thousand
Ninety-Five Pesos (P71,095.00) while respondent Plaza failed to liquidate the amount of ThirtyThree Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00).
In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of
the Philippines, this Court cited the case of Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.10 as a background
on the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of
official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public
officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.11
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10,
1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.12
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding
amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No.
8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x .
Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 7975 which took effect on May 16,
1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. 8249, is the law that should be
applied in the present case, the offense having been allegedly committed on or about
December 19, 1995 and the Information having been filed on March 25, 2004. As extensively
explained in the earlier mentioned case,
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the
institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.13 The exception
contained in R. A. 7975, as well as R. A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R. A. No. 3019, as
amended, R. A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not
applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing
Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said
two provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in
the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense: x x x.14
Like in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b) where other
offenses and felonies committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are
involved where the said provision, contains no exception. Therefore, what applies in the
present case is the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be
determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the
offense. The present case having been instituted on March 25, 2004, the provisions of R.A. 8249
shall govern. P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 8249 states that:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,
city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers
of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions
or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this
section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus:
The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Under Section 4 (a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code.
In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be
committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are
classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and
exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-govenors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department
heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service
occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher
rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the

Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides
that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.15
Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application of the pertinent provisions of
the law, respondent Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged
commission of an offense in relation to his office, necessarily falls within the original jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.
Finally, as to the inapplicability of the Inding16 case wherein it was ruled that the officials
enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, are included within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade and which the
Sandiganbayan relied upon in its assailed Resolution, this Court enunciated, still in the earlier
case of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,17 that the Inding case did not categorically nor
implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4
(a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a
violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code.
As thoroughly discussed:
x x x In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that
the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public official, this Court concentrated its
disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4 (b) where
offenses or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section
4 (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials
enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the
Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their
office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that
are committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as
long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is
alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the
crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the
accused is held to have been indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to his office.18

Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al..,19 where the crime involved was
murder, this Court held that:
The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided
it was committed in relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b,
what determines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender
that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of
Section 4. x x x
Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,20 where the public official was charged with grave
threats, this Court ruled:
x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused,
petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan,
Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised
Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi
during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioners
administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected
with the discharge of petitioners official functions. This was elaborated upon by public
respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it held that the "accused was performing his
official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing" and that "accuseds
violent act was precipitated by complainants criticism of his administration as the mayor or
chief executive of the municipality, during the latters privilege speech. It was his response to
private complainants attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been
irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might have said during said privilege
speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly
assumed jurisdiction over the case.1avvphi1
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against
respondent Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said
offense was committed in relation to her office, making her fall under Section 4 (b) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended.
According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been
to extend the application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan
could assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to distinguish between violations
of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on
the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in
relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction
apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4 (a), it is not disputed that public office
is essential as an element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and
felonies involved in Section 4 (b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were

committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office. In expounding the meaning
of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation to office, this Court held:
In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of
the term "offense committed in relation to [an accuseds] office" by referring to the principle
laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle which
was recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v.
Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accuseds office if
"the offense cannot exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a constituent element of
the crime x x x." In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that
"although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a
particular case may show that
x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accuseds] respective offices
and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their
official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they
would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x"21
Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provisions of Section 4 (b) does not mention any
qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials
with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled
principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain
and ordinary acceptation and signification,22 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a
technical or special legal meaning to those words.23 The intention of the lawmakers - who are,
ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a
manner is always presumed. (Italics supplied.)24
With the resolution of the present case and the earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan and
Amante,25 the issue as to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has now attained clarity.
WHEREFORE, the Petition dated September 2, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated July 20, 2005 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Let
the case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186529

August 3, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JACK RACHO y RAQUERO, Appellant.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00425 affirming the Regional Trial Court2 (RTC) Joint Decision3 dated July 8, 2004 finding
appellant Jack Racho y Raquero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
The case stemmed from the following facts:
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with
appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the transaction to the police
authorities who immediately formed a team composed of member of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the local police
force to apprehend the appellant.4 The agent gave the police appellants name, together with
his physical description. He also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the
following day.
On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on
board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red and
white striped T-shirt. The team members then posted themselves along the national highway in
Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When
appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he
transacted with earlier. Having alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the highway and
waited for a tricycle that would bring him to his final destination. As appellant was about to
board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station on suspicion of
carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he pulled out his hands
from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a
small sachet containing the suspected drug.5

The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The confiscated
specimen was turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera who marked it with his
initials and with appellants name. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents
of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride. 6
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165,
for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing,
dangerous drugs, the accusatory portions of which read:
"That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, unlawfully,
feloniously and willfully have in his possession five point zero one (5.01) [or 4.54] grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "Shabu", a regulated drug without any
permit or license from the proper authorities to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW."7
"That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora, the said
accused did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully transporting or delivering
dangerous drug of 5.01 [or 4.54] grams of shabu without any permit or license from the proper
authorities to transport the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW."8
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.
At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler, Aurora to visit his
brother to inform him about their ailing father. He maintained that the charges against him
were false and that no shabu was taken from him. As to the circumstances of his arrest, he
explained that the police officers, through their van, blocked the tricycle he was riding in;
forced him to alight; brought him to Sea Breeze Lodge; stripped his clothes and underwear;
then brought him to the police station for investigation.9
On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment10 convicting appellant of Violation of
Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of P500,000.00; but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article
II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.11
Hence, the present appeal.
In his brief,12 appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. He likewise
avers that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the confiscated drug because of the
teams failure to mark the specimen immediately after seizure. In his supplemental brief,
appellant assails, for the first time, the legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent

warrantless search. He questions the admissibility of the confiscated sachet on the ground that
it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.
The appeal is meritorious.
We have repeatedly held that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this
is not a hard and fast rule. We have reviewed such factual findings when there is a showing that
the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight
and substance that would have affected the case.13
Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and seizure of the
sachet of shabu and, consequently, the admissibility of the sachet. It is noteworthy that
although the circumstances of his arrest were briefly discussed by the RTC, the validity of the
arrest and search and the admissibility of the evidence against appellant were not squarely
raised by the latter and thus, were not ruled upon by the trial and appellate courts.
It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review.1avvphi1 This
Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if we
find them necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case. Every circumstance in favor of
the accused shall be considered. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate that every
accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.14
After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be discussed below,
we find that appellant can no longer question the validity of his arrest, but the sachet of shabu
seized from him during the warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence against him.
The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he raises the issue. Considering this lapse, coupled
with his active participation in the trial of the case, we must abide with jurisprudence which
dictates that appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is
deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever
defect may have attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the
court over his person. Appellants warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of
his acquittal. 15
As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to ascertain whether
or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.16
The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.17 Said proscription, however, admits of
exceptions, namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.18
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial
question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the
purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured.19
The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring that he was caught
in the act of actually committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime in the presence of
the apprehending officers as he arrived in Baler, Aurora bringing with him a sachet of shabu. 20
Consequently, the warrantless search was considered valid as it was deemed an incident to the
lawful arrest.
Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede
the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the search.21 Thus, given the factual milieu of the case, we
have to determine whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. Although
probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground
of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. 22
The determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a reexamination
of the established facts. On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through
cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to
the police authorities who immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. On May 20,
2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent with the information that he was on board a
Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora anytime of the day wearing a red and white
striped T-shirt. The team members posted themselves along the national highway in Baler,
Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When
appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he

transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him
and invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out
his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened,
yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.23 The team then brought appellant to the
police station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of
appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet
yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip
given by the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This
circumstance gives rise to another question: whether that information, by itself, is sufficient
probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest.
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt
act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.24 We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.
The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta,25 People v. Tudtud,26 and People v. Nuevas.27
In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a certain "Aling Rosa"
would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large volume of marijuana. Acting
on said tip, the police assembled a team and deployed themselves near the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) in Olongapo City. While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the
PNB building where two females and a man got off. The informant then pointed to the team
members the woman, "Aling Rosa," who was then carrying a traveling bag. Thereafter, the
team approached her and introduced themselves. When asked about the contents of her bag,
she handed it to the apprehending officers. Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain
dried marijuana leaves.28
The facts in People v. Tudtud show that in July and August, 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao
City, received a report from a civilian asset that the neighbors of a certain Noel Tudtud (Tudtud)
were complaining that the latter was responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in the area.
Reacting to the report, the Intelligence Section conducted surveillance. For five days, they
gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. On August 1, 1999,
the civilian asset informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back
later that day with a new stock of marijuana. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team of
police officers posted themselves to await Tudtuds arrival. At 8:00 p.m., two men disembarked
from a bus and helped each other carry a carton. The police officers approached the suspects
and asked if they could see the contents of the box which yielded marijuana leaves. 29
In People v. Nuevas, the police officers received information that a certain male person, more
or less 54" in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and
usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana leaves. While

conducting stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking, they saw the
accused who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag. The police accosted the accused and
informed him that they were police officers. Upon inspection of the plastic bag carried by the
accused, the bag contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. In his bid
to escape charges, the accused disclosed where two other male persons would make a delivery
of marijuana leaves. Upon seeing the two male persons, later identified as Reynaldo Din and
Fernando Inocencio, the police approached them, introduced themselves as police officers,
then inspected the bag they were carrying. Upon inspection, the contents of the bag turned out
to be marijuana leaves.30
In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely because there was
no adequate probable cause. We required the showing of some overt act indicative of the
criminal design.
As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense.
At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a
tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable
ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to
commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant would not
have been apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently, the sachet
of shabu would not have been confiscated.
We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems "reliable information"
sufficient to justify a search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. As cited in People v. Tudtud,
these include People v.
Maspil, Jr.,31 People v. Bagista,32 People v. Balingan,33 People v. Lising,34 People v. Montilla,35
People v. Valdez,36 and People v. Gonzales.37 In these cases, the Court sustained the validity of
the warrantless searches notwithstanding the absence of overt acts or suspicious circumstances
that would indicate that the accused had committed, was actually committing, or attempting to
commit a crime. But as aptly observed by the Court, except in Valdez and Gonzales, they were
covered by the other exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches.38
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away
with the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the
arresting team, their office received the "tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise
learned from the informant not only the appellants physical description but also his name.
Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an
assurance that he would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample
opportunity to apply for a warrant.39

Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987
Constitution, "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction cannot be sustained based on the
remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right
to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the trial
of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry
with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.40
One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas,41
x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect
ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some
lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long
as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by
which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law
enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and
the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of
law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we
nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the
Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.42
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2008 in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jack Raquero Racho is
ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of
appellant, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of
the date of his release, or the reasons for his confinement, within ten (10) days from notice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice