Toward a Theory of Ethnic Solidarity in Modern Societies

Author(s): Franois Nielsen

Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Apr., 1985), pp. 133-149
Published by: American Sociological Association
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TOWARD A THEORY OF ETHNIC SOLIDARITY IN

MODERN SOCIETIES *
FRAN(OIS NIELSEN
Universityof North Carolinaat ChapelHill
Ethnic resurgences in modern societies are examined within the framework of a
general model of collective action, of which ethnic collective action is a particular
instance. Social trends associated with industrialization may affect groups in such a
way that ethnicity becomes a more convenient basis for mobilization than others,
e.g., class. In such cases, ethnic solidarity is a natural outcome of development.
Historical scenarios associated with this possibility are discussed.

It has become commonplaceto point out that

contemporaryresurgencesof ethnicityin modem societies, particularlyas a basis for political demands,constitutea paradoxwith respect
to long-established currents of sociological
thought. The surprise caused by ethnic resurgencesin such advancedcountries as Great
Britain (Hechter, 1975), France (Beer, 1980),
Canada (Olzak, 1982) and Belgium (Nielsen,
1980) comes because they seem to challenge the basic predictions of the structurofunctionalist (e.g., Lipset and Rokkan,
1967:1-64), Marxist (Marx, 1964; Beer,
1980:42-43) and even human ecological
traditions(Park, 1950). These views concur in
predictingthat modernizationwill bring about
a decrease in the importanceof ethnic distinctions' (see, e.g., Glazer and Moynihan, 1975;
Hechter, 1975; Beer, 1980;Nielsen, 1980). In
order to capture the common thrust of these
perspectives, the present paper expands the
terminology of Hechter (1975) and uses the
term diffusion-erasure. The diffusion-erasure

work of Hechter (1975, 1978);and the competition model discussed by Hannan (1979),
among others.2
Hechter (1975)proposed explainingthe persistence of ethnic solidarityin modernsocieties
within the frameworkof the reactive-ethnicity
model. In this view, ethnic solidarityis a reaction of the culturallydistinct peripheryagainst
exploitationby the center. Reactive solidarity
occurs when there is a cultural division of
labor, or a patternof structuraldiscrimination
such that "individualsare assigned to specific
types of occupations and other social roles on
the basis of observable cultural traits or
markers"(Hechter, 1974:1154).With cultural
division of labor, ethnic boundaries tend to
coincide with lines of structuraldifferentiation,
and ethnic solidarityis increased. The greater
this coincidence, and the relative disadvantage
of the peripheralpopulation, the greater the
likelihood of solidarity.3
The competitionmodel of ethnic resurgences
is based on the same premise as the functionalist one: as culturally heterogeneous
populationsbecome industrialized,the spread
of a market economy, increasing bureaucratizationand other aspects of modernityentail the precedence of universalistic criteria
that cut across the traditional system of as-

model implies that the salience of ethnicity

shoulddecrease as modernizationdiffusesover
a culturally heterogeneous population. While
the model may have merit in many historical
instances, it is obviously inadequateto explain
the more spectacular instances of ethnic resurgences in some of the most advanced industrialsocieties. To explain these unexpected
occurrences, two competing views have re2 I do not includein this discussionexplanationsof
ceived attention from sociologists: the ethnic resurgences based on mechanisms of rising
reactive-ethnicitymodel, as illustratedby the expectations (see, e.g., Beer, 1980: Ch. 3). Mech* Direct all correspondence to: Frangois Nielsen,

Department of Sociology, University of North

Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27514.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at
the 1982 World Congress of Sociology in Mexico
City, August 1982. I wish to thank Jacques Delacroix, Eric Leifer, Joane Nagel, Anthony Oberschall,
Susan Olzak, Rachel Rosenfeld and two anonymous
reviewers for useful advice.
1 The meaning of "modernization" will be discussed below.

anisms of rising expectations are relevant mainly to

the short-termdynamic aspects of ethnic mobilization, and are thereforecompatiblewith both the reactive and competitiontheories.
3 See also Hechter (1978). This is a simplifieddescriptionof the reactive-ethnicitymodel. As noted
by Ragin (1976) and Nielsen (1980), it is not as incompatible as it may seem with the functionalist
view (e.g., Smelser, 1969:52).It is also possible to
argue that reactive ethnicity is compatible with a
Marxist perspective, although little is known of
Marx'sor Engels's thinkingon ethnic issues (Beer,
1980:42-43).

American Sociological Review, 1985, Vol. 50 (April: 133-149)

133

134
cribed statuses. As modernizationaffects distinct ethnic groups more homogeneously, assignmentsof individualsto occupationsandthe
distributionof societal rewardsin generaltend
to be made increasinglyon the basis of rational
and achieved criteria that crosscut ethnic
boundaries.It does not follow that ethnic distinctions become irrelevant, however. The
crucialelement of such a situationis that members of different groups find themselves increasingly in a position to compete for the
same occupations and the same rewards. The
competitive tensions are manifested by a
heighteningof solidaritywithin the groups involved. This diffusion-competition explanation

of ethnic resurgencesin modern societies has

been discussed, for example, by Hannan
(1979), Nielsen (1980), Ragin(1979)and Olzak
(1982).4
The reactive ethnicity and the diffusioncompetition models associate ethnic resurgences in modern societies with very different kinds of structuralarrangements.In the
reactive-ethnicity approach, resurgences are
more likely when there is a culturaldivision of
labor such that membersof one group are restrictedto subordinateand unrewardingsocial
positions. The greater the economic inequalities between groups, the greater the
likelihood of status group (ethnic) solidarity
(Hechter, 1975:43).The competitionmodel, on
the other hand, predicts that resurgenceswill
occur precisely where the culturaldivision of
labor breaks down and group inequalities diminish, because members of different groups
are then more likely to compete for the same
resources.
The recent literatureon ethnicity contains a
numberof attemptsto assess the meritsof one
model or the other in a variety of empirical
instances (see Hechter, 1975; Ragin, 1979;
Nielsen, 1980;Olzak, 1982;Beer, 1980;Portes,
1984). The literatureas a whole suggests that
both the reactive ethnicity and competition
models have some merits in specific countries
and time periods.5One majorpurpose of this
4However, the centralintuitionthat the intensity
of ethnic solidaritywithina groupis a functionof the
degree to which membersof differentgroups compete for the same resources has been developed in
othercontexts and underdifferentlabelsby a variety
of writers, including Park (1950), Deutsch (1953),
Lieberson (1961), Harris (1964), Van den Berghe
(1967), Barth (1969), and Bonacich (1972). Barth's
(1969: Introduction)exposition of the competition
model is particularlygeneral. In the sociologicalliterature,variantsof the competitionmodel are commonly associated with Bonacich's "split labor
market"or Van den Berghe's "paternalisticversus
competitive"terminologies.
5 In Belgium, for example, the circumstancesof

AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
paperis to go beyond this dilemmaby proposing a more comprehensivetheory of ethnic resurgencesthat would allow for both processes
to take place. The next section presents more
specific purposes, definitions of major concepts, andadditionalconsiderationsrelevantto
the scope of the discussion.
GOALS, DEFINITIONSAND SCOPE
One assumptionpervadingmost social science
discussions of collective action is that individuals tend to organize for collective action on
the basis of characteristicsthat are important
in terms of their own fate and lifestyle. For
example, in modem societies the occupational
statusof an individualis the majordeterminant
of his or her consumptionpatternand way of
life. Therefore, accordingto this assumption,
one would expect occupation to become the
majorbasis of political alignmentin a normal
state of affairs. This reasoning underlies the
diffusion-erasure perspective. Ethnic resurgences are viewed as somehow accidental,
the result of a singularity in development
(Smelser, 1969:52;Nielsen, 1980:78).
The premiseis much more problematicthan
is commonly realized, because there is no
guarantee that a social categorization that
largelydeterminesthe lifestyle of its members
is also the best vehicle for collective action. If
the assumption is discarded, it is possible to
explainethnic collective action as the result of
mechanismsthat are inherentin the process of
modernization.The emergence of collective
action based on ethnicitymay be the most natural outcome under certain conditions in developed societies even though, and perhaps
especially when, ethnicity becomes a weaker
predictorof individuallifestyle. Locating the
origins of ethnic resurgences in mechanisms
that are intrinsicto modernizationis not a logical requirementfor such a theory, but it has
aesthetic appeal and would seem to have face
plausibilityin view of the ubiquityof the phenomenon. An elaborationof this theme is one
purpose of this paper. It will be done through
the developmentof a series of propositionsthat
relate various consequences of modernization
to prospects for ethnic resurgences.
Another purpose of the article is to argue
that ethnic solidarity and its unexpected resurgencein modem societies are forms of collective action. As such, they are better underthe rise of the FlemishmovementafterWorldWarII
support the competition model. However, the reactive model appearsas a better explanationof the
movement before the war (Nielsen, 1980). Ragin
(1979)finds similarperioddifferencesin the bases of
ethnic mobilizationin Great Britain.

ETHNIC SOLIDARITY

135

stood when placed in the frameworkof a general theory of collective action. Elements of
such a generaltheory that are necessary for our
purposesare presentedin the next section. The
propositions relating dimensions of modernization to ethnic collective action will be particular specifications of this more general
model.
Centralconcepts are definedfirst in this section, althoughthe meaningof "solidarity"will
be discussed later. In this paperthe termmodernizationwill be defined as "all the long-term
changes associated with industrialization,"
where industrializationrefers to "increasing
reliance on inanimate sources of energy and
the machines powered by them" (Lenski and
Lenski, 1982:445-46).Modernizationtherefore
denotes social trends such as the spread of
education, the growthof government,the shift
from the primaryto the secondaryand tertiary
sectors, in additionto changes in purely technologicalaspects of production.6The theory of
ethnic solidaritypresentedlater is restrictedto
modern, or industrialized, societies. (See
Nagel and Olzak [1982]for an attempt to explain ethnic resurgences in both modern and
developing societies.)
An ethnic group is defined as (Barth,
1969:11)"a populationthat has a membership
that identifiesitself, and is identifiedby others,
as constituting a category distinguishedfrom
other categories of the same order." Identification is presumedto be made on the basis of
racial or cultural markers such as language,
religionor customs. This choice of a definition
implies that ethnicity, at least to the extent of
casual recognitionof ethnic differencesby the
populations involved, precedes solidarity.7
Barth'sdefinitionis minimal,in the sense that
many attributes usually associated with
ethnicity such as biological self-perpetuation,
shared values and bounded interactions are
treatedas variablesto be explainedratherthan
as definitionalrequirements.
Despite their differences, the diffusionerasure, reactive ethnicity and competition

models are all structuraltheories in the sense

that they seek the causes of ethnic solidarity
among exogenous characteristicsof the social
structure, such as the existence of a cultural
division of labor, a split labor market or the
extension of the marketeconomy (see Hechter
et al., 1982,for furtherdiscussion of structural
theories). The model proposed in this paper
belongs to the same category of theories.
However, structural explanations of ethnic
solidarityare incomplete because they largely
ignore possible feedback effects on solidarity
due to efforts by the central government to
regulate or institutionalize ethnic divisions.
The issue is the extent to which structural
theories are affected by the omission of autonomous political processes. To illustrate the
problem, Figure 1 depicts a more general
model of ethnic solidarity than will be developed furtherin this paper.
The model should be general enough to be
noncontroversial. Structural theories, even
thoughthey disagreein theirparticulars,correspond to (causal) link 1 in the Figure, and deal
with the direct effects of demographic, economic and other social-structuralfactors on
solidarity.Political-incorporationtheories correspondingto link 2 emphasize the effects of
solidarityon the polity as governmentsadjust
their structure to accommodate (or repress)
ethnic divisions. The conflict resolution literature in political science emphasizes this
causal link. An example is the consociational
democracy model (e.g., Lijphardt, 1968). Finally, mechanisms pertaining to link 3 have
been called the "political construction of
ethnicity" by Nagel (1979, 1982). She argues
that the recognitionof ethnicity as a legitimate
basis for political organizationby the central
government renders prior ethnic divisions
more permanent, increases group solidarity,
and also promotes new mobilization by formerly unrecognized groups lest they be excluded from an ethnically defined polity. An
example of such mechanismsis the emergence
of a "native American"ethnicity as a result of
the activities of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(Nagel, 1982; see also Nagel and Olzak, 1982;
6 The use of modernizationin this sense clearly
implies no endorsementof so-called "modernization Lauwagie, 1979).
Considering a simplified model consisting
theory" (Lenski and Lenski, 1982:403-404;Chirot
and Hall, 1982:81-83), the view that obsolete atti- only of links 1, 2, and 3, it appears that
tudes, values and institutionsare responsiblefor the structuraltheories are not very sensitive to a
problems of developing countries. The discussion neglect of links 2 and 3. Even if political indoes assume, however, roughlysimilaroutcomes of corporation and political-constructionactividevelopment.This assumptionmightbe qualifiedin ties take place, a structuraltheory may still be
some cases, for example, late-industrializedcoun- viewed as a nonspuriousreduced model of the
tries such as Russiaand Japan(Chirot, 1977:76-83).
effects of structuralfactors on ethnic solidarity
7This assumption is made for simplicity, not to
deny the possibility that new ethnicities can be that simply does not separate direct effects
created by the mobilization process. Such from indirect ones through state activities.8
emergences, as opposed to resurgences,of ethnicity
are discussed by Nagel and Olzak (1982).

8 Political-construction
theoriesthatdo not control
for structuralfactors are more sensitive to specifica-

136

AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
Link 4

Exogenous characteristics
of the social
structure
(e.g.,
cultural
division
of
increased
labor,
competition,
etc.
Opinions differ.)

Link 1
(Structural
theories)

_)

Ethnic
solidarity

Link 2
in(Political
corporation

Link 3
(Political
struction

contheories)

Is >theories)
Link

Official
ethnicity

recognition
of
by the state

Figure 1. Extended Model of Ethnic Solidarityand a Typology of Theories

However, structuraltheoriesmay be biased by

the failureto controlfor links 4 and 5. Solidarity directly affects the social structure(link 4)
when, for example, ethnic strife leads to substantial population shifts. Official recognition
affects the social structure(link 5) when, say,
the occupationaldistributionis changedby an
affirmativeaction effort. All structuraltheories
have to assume that, within their relevant
context and time frame, links 4 and 5 can be
neglected in a first approximation. The
structuralmodel presentedin this papershares
this assumption.

ethnic group, even though only a minority of

membersmay supportit initially.The formulation of goals mightbe indicatedby the release
of manifestoes, the emergenceof an issue, the
airingof grievances.9The degree of mobilization might be measured as the percentage of
votes for an ethnic party, the amount of violence related to ethnic strife (e.g., bombings,
arrests, casualties), and other expressions of
discontent such as graffiti,posters, and ethnic
jokes (see Hechter, 1975;Nielsen, 1980;Beer,
1980, for examples of these measurement
strategies). The expression "in contradistinction with" in the first part of the definitionis
necessary
because claims on the basis of
ETHNIC SOLIDARITYAS A FORM
ethnicityare often neutralwith respect to other
OF COLLECTIVEACTION
groups in the system. A movementfor the inSolidarityin the context of ethnicity has been dependence of Quebec is in principle neither
used in a varietyof senses in the literature(see opposed nor favorable to the goal of equal
the review by Olzak, 1983:356-57).Here the rightsfor women. The goal of independenceis
term is used in a sense close to the dictionary defined on the basis of being a Quebecois in
definition(RandomHouse, Sense 2) of "com- contradistinction with being a woman (as opmunity of interests, feelings, purposes, etc.," posed to a man). The second partof the definiwith an emphasison purposes. A specific defi- tion, in terms of "degree of mobilization,"is
nition of ethnic solidarity that is empirically deliberatelyquantitativeto take into account
practicalrequires two elements:
varying intensities of mobilization.
1. the formulationof specific goals or claims
The definitionof ethnic solidarityjust predefinedon the membershipof the ethnic group sented assumespreexistingethnic identities,as
as opposed to, or in contradistinctionwith, noted above. However, it is minimal in the
other groups in the society;
sense that it does not presumeother structural
2. a degree of ideologicaland organizational characteristicsof an ethnic group, such as a
mobilizationof group membershipfor the im- common language,a propensityto endogamy,
plementationof these claims.
a closed networkof interactions,that may well
The first part of the definition requires the
existence of a programof some sort for the
9
tion bias, since an apparentcorrelationbetweenofficial recognitionof ethnicityand solidaritymay have
been producedentirelythroughlinks I and2, with no
political-constructioneffect.

One might view the formulationof goals or

claims in itself as part of the mobilizationprocess.
This would be justified theoretically,but it is practical to keep these two elementsseparatebecausethey
are usually measured empirically from different
sources.

ETHNIC SOLIDARITY
facilitate the expression of solidarity but are
not intrinsic parts of it. These characteristics
are best treated separately as possible causes
of solidarity.IOThe minimaldefinitionof ethnic
solidaritycan obviously be adaptedto solidarity on bases other than ethnicity by simply
changing the criterion of group membership.
For example, the women's movement would
be characterizedby claims defined on gender
and a degree of mobilization of the female
population.It is an instance of gender solidarity. The essential elements of other forms of
solidarity would still be the formulation of
group-specificclaims and the mobilizationof
the membershipin view of implementingthese
claims. The definition of ethnic solidarity,
therefore,emphasizes that it should be viewed
as a particularform of collective action (see
Hechter et al., 1982; and Nielsen, 1978a, for
elaborationsof that view).
The view that ethnic solidarity is only one
among many possible forms of collective action has strong implications for a theory of
ethnic resurgence in modem societies. The
crucialarticulationis that individualsin society
have available a large variety of identities."
Each one of them can be used to distinguish
10 This simplifieddefinitionis also agnostic as to
whether ethnicity, because of shared fundamental
values, is a distinctive,primordialidentity. Here the
issue is ethniccollective action, so thatthe definition
of solidarity has a purely behavioral emphasis.
Ethnicity is viewed as one basis for mobilization
among many possible ones. Primordialaspects of
ethnicity are importantto the extent that common
symbols, sharedvalues, emotionalattachmentaffect
the ability of the group to recruit participationresources from membersin competitionwith alternating bases for mobilization. This possibility is discussed below. Ethnicitymay be primordial,but it is
triviallytrue that sharingthe same ethnicitydoes not
preventintense conflict amongmembersof a group.
11 Stone's definition of identity discussed by
Stryker(1980:60),"one has an identitywhen one is
placed as a social object by others in the same terms
thatone appropriatesand announcesfor oneself," as
well as Barth's (1969) conception of ethnicity presuppose a structuredrole relationship.Identity is
used here in an extended sense to include objective
characteristics of individuals (markers) that are
potentialidentities in Stone's sense but do not currently serve to structure role relationships. Residency in geographicalareasthat do not communicate
is one example. In terms of Stryker's(1980:61)conception of a salience hierarchyof identities, such
markersare identities with no salience. Assessing
the effect of prior identity salience on solidarity(as
defined here) is delicate. While it seems plausible
that prior identity salience facilitates solidarity,
emergentethnic solidaritiesdevelop on the basis of
identitieswith little or no priorsalience(e.g., "native
American";see Nagel, 1982).These issues deserve
furtherstudy beyond the scope of this paper.

137
subsets of the population. In principle, each
identity can be chosen as the basis for the
formulationof claims or goals, and an attempt
can be madeto mobilizemembersof the subset
in view of implementingthese goals. In other
words, each subset is a potential solidary
group.Mobilizationof the membersmeans that
they allocate some of their resources, such as
time, energy, money, votes, psychological
commitmentand physical courage, to the collective effort.12But social identities in a population can be nested, crosscutting or overlapping. There are identitiesbased on occupation,
with various degrees of inclusiveness from the
local workshop to professional associations
and class identifications; family or kinship
loyalties; identitiescorrespondingto residence
in territorialunits of various sizes (the block,
the village, the South, the nation); social distinctions based on biological, demographic,or
physical characteristics(gender, age, weight,
skin color). As noted by Hannan(1979), identities based on culture often constitute a complex structurein which subsets are delineated
by differential emphasis on various cultural
components. Dialects within a largerlinguistic
group, for example, correspond to nested
identities. Religion can cut across the boundaries of several language groups. Since the
total amountof resources an individualis able
to devote to collective action is necessarily
finite, potential solidary groups compete for
the participationof their members. Withinthis
framework, the question of the origins of
ethnic resurgences may be reformulated as
follows: "Under what conditions does ethnicity in modern societies compete successfully
for the participationof members with other
forms of solidarity?"
To illustrate this abstract framework, consider the hypotheticalcase of a Belgianwoman
in her early thirties who lives in the small village in Flanders where she was born, some
thirty kilometers from Brussels. Her mother
tongue and home languageis Flemish, but she
speaks French well enough to carry on ordinary conversation. She goes to Brussels by
train every morning to work at the large
chocolate factory near the train station, where
she operates one of the automatic machines
that wrap the chocolate-covered candies. Her
husband is a civilian mechanic in the Army
assigned to the maintenanceand repairof tank
engines at a base near Brussels. In the workshop, he is informallyviewed as the specialist
12 This description corresponds to the modem
view on collective action, Oberschall's(1973:28)"resource management"or McCarthyand Zald's(1977)
"resource mobilization" perspective. See Jenkins
(1983)for a review.

138

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW

in the repair of the clutches of the aging

American-madetanks that are constantly failing'because they are used to traindraftees.Her
three childrengo to the local primaryschool,
but there are plans to send the eldest daughter
next year to the Catholicschool near by. Both
she and her husbandare devout Catholics.Part
of the constellationof social identitiesin which
this woman participatesis representedin Figure 2.

lic school next year, this could directly affect

her tuition. The Catholic party is opposed to
the bill, and she might vote for them just for
that. At work, she is frustratedby the strict
division of labor between men and women,
especiallyconcerningthe taffymakers.Theyare
all men and are paid much more than she is for
ajob that is not very difficult.It is not the fault
of the company. There is an old contract with
the candy-makersunion, of which the taffy
makersare members. It is the union that does
not admitwomen. On the other hand, her husband has been passed over for promotion to
shop supervisor,despite his seniority, in favor
iff
of a French-speakingcolleague. He is very
angry and has been pressuringher to join the
Volksunie, the Flemish party.
It would not be difficultto imaginecircumstances in which other identitiesof the Flemish
woman would become salient for her. Every
individualin society is in a similarsituationof
having to choose how to allocate limited participation resources to potential solidarity
groups correspondingto one of multipleidentities. Individualdecisions in that respect are
typicallythe resultof a very complicatedinterplay of circumstances. The possibility of a
macro-sociologicaltheory of collective action
in general, and a theory of ethnic resurgences
in particular, depends on finding systematic
relationships between structural characteristics of a society and the success of a parFigure2. Some OverlappingIdentitiesof the Belgian ticular potential solidary group in recruiting
WomanDescribed in the Text
participationresources from the social environment.'4 I will refer to this capacity of a
It is not difficult to list circumstances in group to recruit resources as the carryingcawhich each one of these overlappingidentities pacityof participationof the groupin the social
might become activated, in the sense that she environment.'5The rest of this section is dewould be more willing to participatein collec14
tive action on that basis.'3 As a memberof the
The expression"a grouprecruitsparticipation"
workingclass, she may be sensitive to a variety is used metaphoricallyhere and in the rest of the
of issues such as a proposedincrease in retire- paperto indicatethat structuralconditionsare such
ment benefits, the amountof paid vacationper that individualstend to allocatetheirlimitedparticiyear, a revision in the promotionschedule in pation resources to that groupratherthan others of
the chocolate company. She agrees with the which they are potential members.The expression
Socialist party on these issues and may be refers to the aggregatemanifestationof individual
It does not imply that the groupnecessartemptedto vote for them, which is one way to behavior.
ily "acts" in any meaningfulsense. An organization
participatein collective action on the basis of associatedwith the group,however, mightbe said to
her blue-collaridentity. But she is also Catho- act in a real sense. This is relatedto the distinction
lic. That identity may be activated if, for between social movementand social movementorexample, there is a bill in Parliamentto reduce ganizationmade by McCarthyand Zald (1977).
'5 The termcarryingcapacityis used to emphasize
governmentsubsidiesto privateschools. Since
her eldest daughteris going to a privateCatho- the fact that any one groupdoes not always succeed

in actually recruitingall of its carryingcapacity of

participation. This is because mobilization takes
13 The activationof an identityin this way is simitime, and because the group competes with others
lar to an increasein salience, or "probabilityof invo- for the participationof members. These dynamic
cation," in Stryker's (1980:61) salience hierarchy aspects of competition for participationare disframework.However, the conative("I want")rather cussed in Nielsen (1978b).The modelof the carrying
than cognitive dimension of an identity is crucial capacityof participationmay be viewed as the comhere. This is related to the discussion of interests parativestatics part of an ideal model of collective
below.
action that would include the relevantdynamics.

ETHNIC SOLIDARITY

139
Structure
of events
in the social
system
-

j___

___

____

___

___

____

___

_-_-

---

---

----

-------

--------------------------__

Size

of latent

+
group
_

\
\

Resources

of latent

Potential
control
over events

\
+Xx

\|+
Homogeneity of
individual
interests

group

+ \\_

Carrying capacity
of participation

+I

Potential

tonal

entrepreneurs
entrepreneurspotentialI

Figure 3. Model of the CarryingCapacityof Participationof a Solidary Group

voted to proposinga simple model of the carrying capacity of participationof a potential

solidary group.
The model assumes that any potential solidary group is composed of individual actors
characterizedby a set of interests definedwith
respect to events in the social system. For
example, the proposed reduction of subsidies
to private education, a rise in the price of
monthlyrailwaypasses, the failureof her husband to obtain a promotionare all events that
affect the interests of the Belgian woman described above. The distributionof interests of
the individual members of a subset of the
populationsharinga common social identity is
crucial for the carrying capacity of solidarity
based on this identity. In turn, the distribution
of interestsof the potentialmembersof a solidary groupdependson the structureof events in
the system, the systematic ways in which
events such as politicaldecisions affect groups
in the population.Figure 3 depicts the way in
which interests of individualmembers of the
subset are translatedinto participationgiven a
particular event structure. The carrying capacity of participationin a solidary group is
presented as dependenton three main characteristics of the latent group:the organizational
potential of the membership; the homogeneity

of interests of memberswith respect to events;

and the potential control by the group over

solidary group refers to the relative ease with

which the groupcan tap resources of members
and allocate them to collective pursuits. If, as
Olson (1965) argues, collective action is
primarily organizational, the organizational
potentialis an importantingredientof the carrying capacity of participationin a solidary
group.The potentialis highwhen memberscan
be organized with low expenditures of resources. This may dependon obvious technical
factors such as the geographicaldispersion of
the membership,the qualityof communication
channels, the sharingof a commonlanguage.If
the latent group is already characterizedby a
dense network of smaller organizations, recruitmentof participationmay proceed more
effectively through the federation of blocks
(Von Eschen et al., 1971;Oberschall,1973:Ch.
4). The organizationalpotential may also depend on ideological factors, such as shared
symbols that can be used to construct an effective group ideology. For example, ethnicity
may be richerin sharedsymbols such as songs,
emblems, pageantrythan, say, a professional
association, and better able to arouse the
romanticfeelings of members.
The impactof a form of collective action, or
its "strategicefficacy" (Glazerand Moynihan,
1975:9), depends primarily on the extent to
which organizedaction modifies the utilities of
individualactors.16 The impact of a collective

16 For simplicity, the relationshipbetween indievents.

The organizationalpotential of the latent vidualinterests and group mobilizationis treatedas

140

effort on individualutilities is high if it secures

much control over the outcome of events, if
these events are importantfor members,and if
outcomes affect interestsof membersin homogeneous ways. The potentialimpact of collective action capturestwo distinct elements: the
potentialcontrol by the group over events and
the homogeneityof interests of memberswith
respect to these events. Potentialcontrolis the
extent to which the group would influence
events, given a certainamountof participation.
Potential control and organizationalpotential
are independentconcepts. A groupcould have
high potential control but fail to mobilize because of communicationdifficulties,for example. Homogeneity of interests is the degree
of similarityof the ways in which events affect the utilities of individualactors. Despite
the logical difficulties associated with such
operations, it is necessary to think of the
homogeneity of interests as weighted by the
relative importanceof events and the relative
importanceof actors. Thus, an equal increase
in the importanceof an event for all members
of the group is viewed as increasing the
homogeneity of interests of the group.17
The three intermediatevariables,the organiunproblematic.This is not to ignore the paradoxof
collective action and Olson's (1965) rigorous criticism of the traditionalassumptionson groupformation. It can be shown that the relationshipspostulated in the model still hold even though collective
actionis the by-productof an organizationthatexists
primarily to provide selective incentives to participatingmembers(Nielsen, 1978b).The utilitarian
emphasisof the model does not imply that individuals participate in collective action for individualrationalmotives only. Emotional,nonutilitarianmotives certainly play a role (Wilson, 1978: Ch. 7;
Fireman and Gamson, 1979; Marwell, 1982). The
model is based on two assumptionsconcerningthis
issue. First, participationin collective actionwill not
last if the collective outcomes obtainedor soughtgo
against individualinterests of members.Substantial
homogeneityof interestsis a necessary, but not sufficient conditionfor participation.Second, whatever
nonrationalfeelings motivate humansto participate
have to be allocated to a group. It is assumed that
structuralfeaturesof a groupthat facilitateconvincing membersof their common (individual)interests
are the same that facilitatethe mobilizationof their
more emotionalfeelings. (See Margolis[1982]for a
promisingattemptto integrateutilitarianand groupdirectedmotives in the social psychology of collective action.)
17 A better formalizationof the concept, which
would involve assumptions about interpersonal
comparisonsof utilities, is beyond the scope of this
paper. See Coleman(1973a)for an attemptto define
an aggregatemeasureof utility by weighingindividual utilities by the control of an actor over events.

AMk.RICAN

O(iCATl
SQCbT(CT

pRVTFW

zationalpotential,the homogeneityof interests

and the potentialcontrol, dependon structural
characteristicsof the latent group. Some of
the most important relationships between
structuralcharacteristicsand the three intermediate variablesare also summarizedin Figure 3. The model postulatesa positive effect of
the amountof resources in the latent groupon
both the potentialcontrol over events and the
organizationalpotential. Resources comprise
money, talents, free time, and control by individualsover events. The concept is appliedon
a per capita basis. Resources are thereforeindependentof the sheer size of the latentgroup.
The size of the latentgroupaffects positively
its potential control over events. In a representative system, size correspondsto electoral
strength. In more violent situations, physical
force depends directly on number. However,
the size of the latentgrouphas a negativeeffect
on both the homogeneityof interests of members and the organizationalpotential. These
assumptions follow from obvious and not so
obvious reasons. Everythingelse constant, the
likelihood that membershave divergentinterests with respect to events increases with the
size of the membership.However, largerlatent
groups also have lower organizationalpotential. One reason may be simply that a large
group is more dispersed geographically. A
largegroupis also morelikely to be what Olson
(1965) calls a "latent" group (in contrast with
my more generaluse of this term), that is, one
in which no individualwould benefit so much
from the collective good that s/he is ready to
bear the cost of collective action alone. Members of a "latent"grouphave no naturalincentive to organizeand would ratherbe "free riders." Therefore, a latent group with a large
membership typically has a lower organizational potential.
Finally, the model postulates a positive effect of the presence of potentialentrepreneurs
on the organizationalpotential. Potential entrepreneursare individualswho are not committed to the pursuit of collective goods defined on other groupboundaries,or whose individualprospectsin existingorganizationsare
poor. They constitute potential recruits as
leaders of the group. The availabilityof such
individualsincreases the organizationalpotential of a latent group.
The model depicted in Figure 3 applies in
principle to every potential solidary group,
every subsetof a populationsharinga common
social identity. The next section considers the
mechanisms by which modernizationaffects
the parametersof the modelfor variousgroups
by modifyingeither the structureof events or
the composition of the group.

ETHNIC SOLIDARITY
ETHNIC SOLIDARITYAND
MODERNIZATION
Some of the propositionsdiscussed in this section are attempts to identify aspects of modernizationthat affect the carryingcapacity of
participationof ethnic solidaritydirectly, and
indirectlyby reducingthe appeal of collective
action on alternative(competing)bases. Two
caveats are necessary. First, the propositions
below are intended to summarize central results of the discussion, not to constitute a formal deductive system. The propositionshave
different logical statuses: some are historical
generalizations,some relate a historical trend
to the generalmodel of collective action, some
are relatively specific empirical statements.
This informal style of presentationis chosen
because a more axiomatic treatment would
have to rely on a reasonablycomplete decomposition of this complex set of processes. Such
a decomposition is beyond the scope of this
paper. The propositions are only intended to
reorganizeand clarify previous theoreticalapproaches and empirical findings concerning
ethnic collective action, and to provide a
frameworkfor future research.
Second, the perspectivechosen is purelydevelopmental, in the sense that only secular
trends associated with modernizationare considered. In such a simplifiedform, the model
cannot explain shorter-term fluctuations in
ethnic mobilizationthat are observed in many
instances. Explanations of such fluctuations
are likely to depend on country-specifictactical factors that are hard to incorporateat this
level of generality. The failure to explain
higher-frequency fluctuations is a common
featureof models that are first approximations
to reality.'8
This paper follows the approach recommendedby Barth(1969:Introduction),in which
the focus is on the formationand maintenance
of ethnic boundariesratherthanon the content
18 An
anonymousreviewer correctly emphasized
this point. Ethnic solidaritymay, for example, temporarily decrease due to a resurgence in the importanceof class, itself a result of currenteconomic
conditions. Such competitionprocesses are consistent with the model of solidarity.Ragin and Davies
(1981)use this argumentto explainthe decline of the
Celtic partiesin Great Britainduringthe late 1970s.
Ethnic solidaritymay also appearto decline because
of tactical decisions by the groups involved. In Belgium, the rise of the Flemish party may have been
arrested in the 1970s in part by the breakup of
nonethnic parties into separate linguistic wings,
which permitted each wing to also emphasize regionalissues and regainlost voters (Hill, 1974).Such
a fluctuationconstitutesa reexpression,ratherthana
decline, of ethnic solidarity.

141

of culture.However, it is not possible to ignore

the massive impact of modernizationon cultural diversity. Insofar as ethnic solidarity
utilizes cultural markers to circumscribe the
potential membership,culturaldiversity is important in this context. In an early but thoroughly modern treatment, Deutsch (1953) describes the aggregate consequences of the
better-knowneffect of modernizationon culture, the progressiveassimilationof the dominantcultureby the populationof the periphery.
Less well researched,but no less significant,is
the process by which assimilation occurs
withinthe peripheralculture, as the networkof
interactionswidens and individualsof the peripheryexperience more contacts outside their
local setting. When the peripheralculture is
made up of many local variations within a
larger culturalgroup, as is typically the case,
this leads to homogenizationand a reductionin
culturaldiversity. In some instances, such as
Belgium and Norway (Haugen, 1968),
homogenizationis carried out deliberately by
innovators. It often involves the standardization of the languageand the manufactureof a
gloriouspast complete with battles and heroes.
The spread of education contributes to this
process. A majorconsequence of homogenization is that the relative sizes of culturallydistinct groups increase. The first proposition
summarizesthis outcome.
Proposition1. Modernizationoften entails a
decrease of the cultural diversity within the
periphery.Thisreductionin diversityentails an
increase in the relative sizes of groups distinguishable by cultural markers in the social
system.
Modernization,as defined earlier, typically
entails progressin communicationtechnology,
transportationand the response time of largescale news media. Modernizationreduces the
cost of organizinga large group of individuals.
This trend may be formulatedin terms of the
model of collective action presented earlier.
Proposition 2. Modernization reduces the
negative effect of size on the organizational
potential of a group, and therefore increases
the carryingcapacity of participationof large
groups.
Hannan (1979:266) proposes a useful distinction between two aspects of modernization. Polity modernizationis defined as "the
degree to which organizational mechanisms
exist and function to bring the interests of
membersto bear upon the formulationand adjudication of political issues." State modernization, by contrast, refers to the degree to
which a single center constitutes the forum in
which those issues are formulatedand settled.
Polity modernizationoften corresponds to

142
the expansionof the franchiseto more individuals in the society. The franchiseis a resource
that can be used to control events. In a representativesystem, the size of the membershipof
a group corresponds to potential electoral
strengthand greatercontrol over the outcome
of events. Therefore, one would expect polity
modernization to increase the carrying capacity of participationof large groups. State
modernization,the process by which an increasing number of important events come
underthe jurisdictionof higher-levelinstances
of decision making,has similarconsequences.
Insofar as more importantevents are defined
and settled at the top of the decision structure,
and a representativesystem of some sort is
operational,the potentialcontrol of a groupis
enhancedby the size of its membership.However, the carryingcapacity of participationof
large groups may increase with state modernization even in the absence of polity modernization. Coleman (1973b) argues that organizations that attempt to implement collective
goals have to adjust their mode of operation
so as to compete successfully for outcomes
with otherorganizationsin the system. Hannan
(1979) extends Coleman's argument by suggesting that the centralized state itself constitutes a powerfulorganization.Solidarygroups
willing to challenge its power must choose
commensurateforms of collective action. A
large membershipmeans there are a variety of
resources that can be used to affect state decisions and secure control over events (see
Nagel and Olzak, 1982, for an elaborationof
this view as a more general "principle of
isomorphism"). Since polity and state modernizationmay not occur to the same degree,
this discussion is summarizedas two separate
propositions.
Proposition 3. Polity modernization increases the positive effect of size on potential
control by a group over events.
Proposition 4. State modernization (centralization) increases the positive effect of size
on potential control over events.

Propositions2, 3 and 4 describemechanisms

by which modernizationincreases the carrying
capacityof participationof solidarygroupswith
a large potential membership.In combination
with Proposition1, this means that modernization may make collective action on the basis of
an inclusive definition of ethnic membership
more attractive. However, ethnicity is by no
means the only criterion that can be used to
define large subsets of a population.A subset
circumscribedby gender, for example, comprises roughly half the population and is
thereforelargein any society. The propositions
thatfollow will differentiateamonggroupswith
a large potential membership.

AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
One social identity that can be used to circumscribe a large group in the population is
class. Class membershipis determinedby the
position of the individualwithin the system of
production and exchange. When populations
with heterogeneouscultures are progressively
incorporatedwithinthe modernsystem of production, the potential membershipof a classbased solidaritygroupbecomes culturallyheterogeneous. Cultural heterogeneity of the
potential membershipentails at least a reduction in the organizational potential of the
group. Overcomingculturalbarriersis costly.
The additionalcost may originatefrom technical reasons (e.g., linguistic differences) or
ideological ones (e.g., the difficulty of using
existing powerful symbols in constructingthe
class ideology when these symbols vary across
cultures).
Proposition 5. When modernization incorporates populations that are culturally heterogeneous, it decreases the organizational potential of groups defined by broad occupational
lines.

The diffusion-competitionmodel of ethnic

solidaritybriefly reviewed in the introduction
to this papercan be cast in termsof the general
model of collective action. The model suggests that ethnic solidarity and conflict are
more intense when individuals of different
ethnic groups are in a position to compete for
the same occupations, resources, statuses and
rewards. Modernizationentails the extension
of a rationallabor marketin which individuals
are allocated to occupations on the basis of
universalistic criteria. Therefore, the likelihood of competitionbetween membersof different ethnic groups for the same occupations
increases. One importantaspect is the spread
of education. With an educationalcertificate,
members of various groups can compete for
the same positions. Competition between
membersof differentethnic groups makes the
utilitiesof individualsmore sensitive to events
that may give a competitiveedge to all individual membersof an ethnic group as opposed to
others. State modernization, with the centralizationof decision-makingactivities, makes
the occurrenceof such events more likely, and
so does the move away from occupationswith
a local focus such as agricultureand mining.
The competitionargumentcan be summarized
in the terminologyof the model of collective
action as the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Extension of the rational
labor market increases the homogeneity of
interests of members of an ethnic group and its
carrying capacity of participation (Competi-

tion theory).
Hechter (1975:Ch. 2) discusses the possible
roles of elites within the culturallydistinct pe-

ETHNIC SOLIDARITY
riphery. Individual members of a culturally
subordinategroupwho achieve high-statusoccupational roles may either reconsider their
ethnic identity and pass into the dominant
group, or seek incremental improvement for
their group within the existing political
structure,or reactivelyassert the value of their
culture and organize solidarity. (Ragin [1980]
discusses such strategiesfurtherin the context
of Celtic nationalismin Britain.)The outcome
is likely to dependon the rate of modernization
of the peripheralpopulation.Any social order
is presumablycharacterizedby a particularset
of selection mechanisms that regulate access
by individuals to positions of power or authority. The channels of power in the
traditionaland modern social orders are likely
to differ.Whenmodernizationof the peripheral
population proceeds quickly, the leadership
structure inherited from the traditionalorder
may not correspond to what would have resulted from the new rules of the game. A bluecollar workerwho would have no politicalambition in the traditionalsystem may become a
successful trade-unionofficial in a position to
contend for power at the nationallevel. When
the top positions are occupied by incumbents
of the old regime, the dissatisfied candidates
for power have no alternativebut to organize
solidarity on the basis of new boundaries.
These potentialentrepreneursin the peripheral
populationmay choose ethnicity as the vehicle
of their ambitions. Beer (1980) finds from a
survey of leaders of ethnic movements in
France that they have experienced more upward social mobilitythan the rest of the population. He views this finding as evidence in
favor of his thesis that rapid social change
causes anomie, and that espousing the ethnic
cause represents a search for identity, "a
means of assuagingfeelings of dislocation resultingfrom rapid social change and the experienceof rapidsocial mobility"(Beer, 1980:91).
An alternative explanation is that their activism is due to a structural imbalance, the
incapacityof the traditionalelite to absorb the
new crop of candidates for power. Further
examples of the role of leaders in ethnic
movementsare discussed by Breton(1978)and
Rothschild (1981).
Proposition 7. Rapid modernizationof the
peripheryupsets the traditionalmechanismsof
elite formation, produces potential entrepreneurs and increases the organizationalpotential of ethnicity.
It was argued above that state modernization, with its "mushroomingstate apparatus"
(Smelser, 1969:46),increases the impacton individualactors of events at the higherlevels of
decision making.Thereis an evolutionnot only
in the volume but in the natureof these events.

143
Decisions at the state level may affect homogeneous categories of the population defined
by universalistic criteria. A minimum-salary
law is an example. These events affect individuals regardless of their place of residence.
However, growinginterferenceby the state in
resource producing and other daily activities
may also lead to the occurrenceof events that
affect homogeneously individuals residing in
the same geographicalarea, regardlessof their
other statuses. This situationmay occur when
modernizationentails an increase in the average size of economic units. State modernization implies increased control by the state of
the survival value of these large economic
units. The state can boost an ailing enterprise
through subsidies, influence its behavior
through regulations, and distribute large government contracts. The fate of a large economic unit usually affects the interests of a
large numberof individualsin the area where it
is located. It is true for individualswho depend
directlyon the unitfor their subsistence andfor
those who benefit indirectlythrough the multiplier effect. A government decision on automotive safety concerns many people in Detroit, and not only those directly involved with
the productionof automobiles.
The synchronizationof interests of individuals residing in the same area can occur also
throughthe growth of what Adam Smith calls
the natural activities of the state. These are
activities that cannot be performedthroughthe
free interplayof market mechanisms. A decision to build a freeway in a particularplace is
likely to affect the residents in similar ways,
irrespectiveof occupationalcategories. In the
terminologyof the general model, such events
increase the homogeneity of interests of individuals residingin the same geographicalarea.
Whenever ethnic groups occupy distinct territories, geographicalpatchiness of state decisions increases the homogeneityof interests in
the potential membershipof solidaritygroups
defined on ethnic lines.'9
19 This point is well madeby Rothschild(1981:43).
Belgiumoffers a clear example of the interactionof
ethnic concentrationand patchiness of government
decisions. Any actionwith any regionalimplications,
such as a projectto develop the portat Zeebrugge,to
builda nuclearreactorin the French-speakingSouth,
even a choice to buy Frenchor Americanplanes for
the Air Force because the formerwould be assembled in a plantin Walloonia,immediatelybecomes an
ethnic issue. In many cases the situation is more
complicated. In the United States, for example,
blacks do not occupy a single connected territory,
like the Flemingsin Belgium,but are concentratedin
certainlocations such as the inner cores of cities. A
typical patchy event such as a decision on where to
base new missiles may not affect ethnic solidarity.
The relevantevents, such as the allocationof urban

144
Proposition 8. When ethnic groups occupy
distinct territories, state modernization and the
increased geographic "patchiness" of centralized decisions increase the homogeneity of
interests of members of an ethnic group and its
carrying capacity of participation.

Modernizationis commonly associated with

a progressive differentiation of roles and
statuses. The explosive growth of registers of
occupationaltitles captures this phenomenon.
The carryingcapacity of participationof solidarity groups based on broad occupational
identities such as class should decrease with
differentiationof the potential membership.
The higherlevels of decision makingare able to
generate events that affect homogeneouslyindividuals in a given occupational category.
Differentiationincreases the difficulty of formulating coherent claims over events that
would benefit all individualsin a broad occupationalcategory. The consequence is that the
homogeneityof interests of memberswithin a
class is reduced. A social-democratic party
which defines its potentialmembershipas individuals who are salariedworkerscan recruita
more unanimous support when the potential
membership is composed almost entirely of
unspecialized blue-collar workers than when
the latent group includes a large proportionof
employees and the manualworkersthemselves
are scattered into a variety of specialties
(Form, 1982). Differentiation increases the
heterogeneity of individual interests within
broad categories of individualsdefined by any
criterion.The argumentis only valid for solidary groups that rely on the size of their membershipfor controlover events. Groupswilling
to sacrifice the advantageof size in potential
control can keep interests of potential members homogeneousby restrictingthe participation basis of the group. This means that the
solidary group adopts a specialist strategy.20
Proposition 9, which summarizes this discussion, is consistent with explanations of
ethnic solidaritybased on a logic of overlapping cleavages, such as the discussion of
Smelser (1969) and Hechter's (1975) culturaldivision-of-labor model. These explanations
assume that a group that is distinguishableon
renewal funds, are geographicallypatchy in a differentsense. They affecthomogeneouslyresidentsin
a category of locations.
20 A solidarygroupwith a specialiststrategyrelies
on smallsize, homogeneousinterestsand low cost of
organizationfor its success. A group with a generalist (or size-directed)strategy, on the other hand,
relies mostly on the size of its membershipfor control over events. It can tolerategreaterheterogeneity
of interests and, usually, lower resources. The distinction between specialists and generalists is discussed furtherin Nielsen (1978b).

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
culturallines and that has a membershipthat
engages in similaroccupationsis more likely to
become solidary. They assume the converse
of Proposition9. Low differentiationwithinthe
group entails the homogeneity of individual
interestsand a greaterlikelihoodof solidarity.
Proposition 9. Modernization entails the occupational differentiation of the membership
of any large group, which decreases the
homogeneity of interests of members and the
carrying capacity of participation. This effect
is particularly strong for groups defined on
broad occupational lines.

Deutsch (1969:26) use a marginal-return

argumentto articulatethe relationshipbetween
wealth and political violence. He argues:"All
past history [of violence] deals with situations
where most incomes were so low that the marginalutilityof an incrementin incomewas high
enough to offer reinforcementfor the learning
of violent habits, or of violent action for or
against change. We do not know in practice,
but we must assume, in theory, that there
could be income levels where the marginal
utility of an additionalincrementin economic
income mightbe lower than the individualand
social costs of violence. We do not know just
how highthis 'peace level' of income is, but we
have some theoretical reasons to believe that
there oughtto be such a level, unless we throw
out the complete principleof declining marginal utility of economic goods." Lenski (1966)
uses a similarargumentto predicta decrease in
the inequalityof the distributionof resourcesin
modernsocieties. A generalincrease in wealth
means for the dominantclass a lower inducement to defend a less useful fraction of its
privileges.
The marginal-returnargument may be directly applied to the dynamics of solidarity.
The carryingcapacity of participationof a solidary group is low if the return to organizationalefforts on that basis is expected to be
low. Mobilizationon the basis of class usually
succeeds in pushing the system close to the
realizationof the welfare state, in which the
state often provides for such things as social
security, minimumwages, the incorporationof
labor contentions into the legal system, socialized health care and free education. The
very success of class-based politics decreases
the marginalreturn of collective action organized on class lines. Individualsmay findthat it
is more profitableto allocate efforts to collective action on the basis of some other partitioningof the population.Bell (1975)discusses
the effect of the embourgeoisement

of the

working class on ethnic resurgences. He asserts (1975:157):"The reductionin class sentiment is one of the factors one associates with
the rise of ethnic identification."The following

ETHNIC SOLIDARITY

145

propositionsummarizesthe logic of this argu- tive of the achieved status of the individual.
Therefore, a subset of the population defined
ment in more general terms.
Proposition 10. The success of groups de- on ethnic lines may in principlecorrespondto a
representativesample of the various roles, ocfined by broad occupational criteria may decupationsand statuses in the social system as a
crease the marginal return offurther collective
action on that basis. This increases the carry- whole. By contrast, occupation is the very
criterion of membershipfor groups based on
ing capacity of participation of groups defined
class. Therefore,the potentialmembershipof a
by alternative boundaries, including ethnicity.
Michels's (1919)study of democraticorgani- class-based solidarity group is inherently less
zations suggests that success of a collective differentiated occupationally. The organimovement depends to a large extent on the zational potential and the potential control of
internal differentiationof its membership. A the group are correspondingly lower.
composition of the potential membershipthat Paradoxically, the advantage of ethnicity or
reflects more closely the distributionof roles, any ascribed status as a basis for collective
occupations, and talents in the system as a action lies in its total arbitrarinessfrom a funcwhole enhances the organizationalpotentialof tional or technical point of view.
Proposition 11. The more functionally difthe group. Organization is easier when the
group can tap individuals already trained to ferentiated the potential membership of a
fulfill a variety of specialized functions that group, the greater its organizational potential
are necessary for collective action. Internal and its potential control over events. Ethnic
differentiation also increases the potential groups have a greater capacity of differentiacontrol of the group over events. Controlover tion than classes.
As modernization diffuses more homogeevents may take the form of incrementalaction
at all levels of the social structure, such as a neously, the incorporationof culturallydistinct
mutual help network. The more functionally populationswithin the modem system of proheterogeneous the potential membership, the duction and exchange is bound to increase the
further the group can reach in the social share of economic resources they have availstructureto influence events. Functional het- able. Economic resources are a useful ingreerogeneity of the potential membership con- dient for both organization and control over
stitutes a resource for collective action that events (McCarthyand Zald, 1977).
Proposition 12. Modernization of a culturally
increases the carryingcapacity of participation
distinct group increases its share of economic
of a group.
Hawley (1968) develops similar ideas in a resources. This increases the organizational
generalhumanecological frameworkby distin- potential and the potential control of the
guishingbetween communitiesand "categoric group.
units." The criterion for membership in a
categoric unit is the possession of a common
RESURGENCES:
characteristic,so that membersin a unit are of ETHNIC
SOME HISTORICALSCENARIOS
the same functional type and occupy equivalent positions in the power hierarchy(Hawley, The propositions developed in the previous
1968:333): "groups of elders, the medieval section, although restricted to secular trends
guilds, laborunions, professionalassociations, associated with modernization (see footnote
and associations of manufacturersare exam- 18), suggest mechanisms by which a carrying
ples of categoricunits. A social class is at most capacity of participationfor ethnic solidarity
a loose form of categoric unit." Hawley mightbe createdby modernizationin the social
(1968:334)argues that it is inherentlydifficult environment.However, as emphasizedbefore,
for categoric units to organize for collective it is necessary to analyze ethnic solidarity in
action: "So long as it retains its pure categoric the context of competitionbetween groups for
form . . . such a unit can do little more than participation (Nielsen, 1978b), so that one
react to circumstancesaffecting it. Nor can it should discuss the effects of modernizationon
have more than a transitoryexistence, since in ethnic solidaritytogetherwith effects modernorder to engage in positive action of any kind ization has on other forms of solidaritythat are
and to attain some measure of permanence,it likely to compete for the resources of the same
must develop at least a core of specialists." In individuals.Of particularinterest is a compariother words, in order to engage in collective son of the fates of three broad categories of
action, a categoric unit must acquire some of collective movements in modern societies,
the internal differentiationcharacteristicof a since each one has predominatedhistoricallyat
some period of time and location. These are
community.
This discussion suggests that the ascriptive
1) solidaritybased on small scale and local
natureof ethnicity constitutes an asset for col- identities such as the family, kinship, and
lective action. Ethnicity is attributedirrespec- micro-unitsof residence;

146

AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW

2) solidaritybased on class identification,or

any broadlydefined occupationalcriterion;
3) ethnic solidarity, especially those movements based on an inclusive definition of
ethnicity (Bell, 1975:143)that have startledsocial observers. The generalmodel of collective
action and the specific propositionspresented
earlierprovide some guidanceas to what may
have happenedhistorically.2'
First, Propositions2, 3 and 4 suggest that an
increased premiumis associated with size for
the potentialimpactof a formof solidarity,and
that modernizationmakes organizinga large
membershipless difficult.The patchy effect of
some central decisions typically synchronizes
individualinterests over areas that are larger
than the traditionalunits of organizationsuch
as a village (Proposition8). At this point in the
process, modernizationleads to a general decrease in the carryingcapacities of participation of small-scale, local, potential solidary
groups. The carrying capacities of sizedirected groups correspondingly increases.
This conclusion agrees with the description
proposed by Hannan(1979)of the progressive
eliminationof locally based solidarities.22
Once traditional small-scale loyalties are
weakened, class-based solidarityis one candidate for a size-directedstrategy. It may attain
spectacularsuccess at one stage of the industrialization and modernization process for
many of the reasons that are traditionallyadvanced, such as the concentrationof workers
in urbanareas, the similarityof their fate with
corresponding homogeneity of interests and
the amount to be gained from new legislation
that is class oriented.The manyoccurrencesof
this phenomenoncould be related to the general model of collective action proposed earlier, but it is not the purposeof this paperto do
so. However, modernizationmay also entail a
paralleldecrease in culturaldiversity(Proposition 1). At that stage, the average size of
groups distinguishableon a cultural basis increases, and this leads to an interestingsituation in which ethnicity is able to compete with
class for participationof the overlappingmem-

berships in the category of groups with a sizedirected strategy.23

Several elements may influence the outcome
of such a contest. Both contenders, classbased and ethnicity-based solidarity, have
larger carrying capacities of participation because the size of their potential memberships
increases the impact of collective action (Propositions 3 and 4) and communication technology makes mobilization possible (Proposition
2). Both are progressively handicapped by
greater internal differentiation of roles and
statuses, since differentiation entails a lesser
homogeneity of interests of members (Proposition 9). However, internal differentiation also
increases the organizational potential and
potential control of both groups (Proposition
11). As modernization spreads more homogeneously over culturally distinct groups, the
potential membership of ethnic solidarity becomes more functionally differentiated than
the potential membership of class solidarity
and Proposition 11 implies a greater impact of
collective action based on ethnicity. The carrying capacity of participation for ethnic solidarity is enlarged by several other mechanisms. When ethnic groups occupy distinct
territories, the patchy effect of state decisions
increases the homogeneity of interests of the
potential members (Proposition 8). Increased
competition for resources between members
of different ethnic groups increases the
homogeneity of interests within a group (Proposition 6). Modernization
of culturally
heterogeneous groups makes mobilization on
the basis of class more difficult (Proposition 5).
This decreases the carrying capacity of classbased solidarity. Success of collective action
on a class basis also reduces the marginal return of further participation (Proposition 10).
Mobilization of the periphery increases the
number of uncommitted elites and the organizational potential of ethnic solidarity (Proposition 7). Finally, modernization increases the
share of economic resources allocated to the
periphery and increases the potential impact of
ethnic solidarity (Proposition 12).

21
Other forms of collective action such as the
women's movement, specialized lobbies and terrorismcould be explained along similartheoretical
lines. These topics are beyond the scope of this
paper.
22 This trend is likely to affect mostly traditional
units of organization, such as the village. Other
groups with a small potentialmembership,such as
professionallobbies, may be enhanced by modernization because the homogeneity of interests of
membersandthe resourcesat theirdisposalmakeup
for their small size.

23
As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, the
model implies that the outcome of competitionin a
given society is likely to dependon the relativesizes
of the workingclass and the ethnic groupspresent.
One would expect ethnic mobilizationto be more
successful in a society like Belgium, where major
ethnic groupsare largerelativeto the workingclass,
thanin GreatBritain,where they are small, because
in the latterethnicityis handicappedin size-directed
competition. Such considerationslead to testable
predictionsin a comparativeframework.Furtherresearch shouldexplore the effect of size, takinginto
account such complicatingfactors as the degree of
centralizationof the polity and electoral laws.

ETHNIC SOLIDARITY
These mechanisms suggest a historical
scheme of the evolution of participation in
various solidaritygroups in a poly-ethnic society. Modernizationfirst eliminates collective
action on the basis of small-scale and local
cleavages (Hannan, 1979). Solidaritybased on
class is most successful at intermediatestages
of development and when distinct cultural
groups of the peripheryare not yet completely
integratedwithin the modem system of production and exchange. Furthermodernization
and homogenization of the socioeconomic
system over the entire territoryincreases the
carrying capacity of participation of ethnic
solidarity, especially on the basis of an inclusive definition of ethnicity with syncretic
ideological trappings, and this is the type of
event that is labeled a resurgenceof ethnicity
by observers. From the point of view of the
model developed in this paper, of course, this
constitutes a naturalevolution of the system of
political alignments in a modernizingsociety.
Ethnicity seems to reappear as salient, although it is often a very different kind of
ethnicity than in the past, simply because it
becomes a more efficaciousbasis for collective
action relative to other possible bases, including class alignments.24
The model of collective action also helps to
assess variouselementarytheories of ethnicity
in modem societies discussed in the introduction. These 'theories can be viewed as embedded in the general model, in the sense that
theirpredictedoutcomes are compatiblewith it
given the rightconditions.Thecultural-divisionof-labormodel, for example, can be translated
into the terminologyof the propositionsof the
previous section. If there is a culturaldivision
of labor such that individualsare assigned to
certain categories of occupations on the basis
of cultural markers, members of an ethnic
group will have similar occupations and the
homogeneityof their interests will be presumably high. In a cultural division of labor, the
peripheralgroup is restricted to occupations
that entail low rewards and prestige, so that
their organizationalpotential is low and they
have few resources to influence events in the
system. The explanation for solidarity, then,
rests in a crucial way on the homogeneity of
interests of membersof the peripheralgroup,
since other conditionsof the groupwould tend
to reduce its potentialto organize,at least with
respect to the general model.
The competition model, on the other hand,
depicts a situation in which the peripheral
24
Even though an ethnic resurgence may be
spectacular,it can coexist with a continuedsalience
of class. Great Britainis a case in point (Hechter,
1975;Ragin, 1979, 1980).

147
group begins to participatein the modem system on a more equal basis, so that the resources available increase. Ethnicity becomes
more salient when the peripheralgroup is becoming wealthier and more differentiatedoccupationally, so that more members are competing with membersof the core and the organizationalpotentialof the peripheryincreases,
sometimes simply because they have more
lawyers. This occurs despite the decrease in
occupational homogeneity and the corresponding loss in homogeneity of interests.
Here, reasons other than the similarityof economic conditions are viewed as predominant.
These two theories differ by the emphasis
they attach to various trends associated with
the development process. Therefore, one
might argue that they are not incompatiblein
principle, and that it is even possible that one
theory is more correct in the case of one country as compared with another, or even for
one countryin the case of one historicalperiod
and not another, depending on which trends
have major causal effects in the situation. If
this is the case, one would expect to find instances in which each model is appropriate,in
the sense that the social correlates of ethnic
solidaritydiffer from one social system to another and over time. This is exactly what the
empirical evidence available suggests. In the
case of Great Britain, the work of Hechter
(1975) and Ragin (1979) shows that the
cultural-division-of-labormodel does apply
roughlyduringone period, and the competition
model afterwards.A similarpattern seems to
hold for Flemish nationalismbefore and after
World War II (Nielsen, 1980). Quebec
nationalism and its social correlates has
evolved in similar ways (see Olzak, 1982).
These examples mean that differentcauses become predominantat differentpoints in time in
these instances. This is the theoretical spirit
which the model of collective action and derivedpropositionshave attemptedto illustrate.
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