Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
Petitioner
subleased
from
respondent
Susanna
Atayde
(hereinafter Atayde) the other half of the second floor of a building
located at corner Reposo and Oliman Streets, Makati, Metro Manila.
She operated and maintained therein a beauty parlor. 3
At the outset, it must be stated that were it not for the importance
of the issue to be resolved in the light of the revised law
on katarungang
pambarangay provided
for
in
the
Local
the
accused
is
under
While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the Local Government
Code of 1991, the jurisprudence built thereon regarding prior
referral to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of an action in
court remains applicable because its provisions on prior referral
were substantially reproduced in the Code.
Thus, Morata vs. Go, 125 SCRA 444 (1983), and Vda.
de Borromeo vs. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217 (1983) have
held that P.D. No. 1508 makes the conciliation
process at the Barangay level a condition precedent
for the filing of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance
with that condition precedent could affect the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make
his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground
of lack of cause of action or prematurity. The
condition
is
analogous
to
exhaustion
of
administrative remedies, or the lack of earnest
efforts to compromise suits between family
members, lacking which the case can be dismissed.
In the proceeding before the court a quo, the petitioner and the
respondent had in mind only P.D. No. 1508. The petitioner further
invoked the aforequoted Section 18. None knew of the repeal of the
decree by the Local Government Code of 1991. Even in her instant
petition, the petitioner invokes the decree and Section 18 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. However, the private
respondents, realizing the weakness of their position under P.D. No.
1508 since they did refer their grievances to what might be a
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Will the lot owner's agreement to sell the property to the
government as evidenced by the minutes of a meeting of the
Sangguniang Bayan, absent a formal deed, constitute a sufficient
ground to defeat a forcible entry suit? This was the main question
raised in this petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set
aside the Decision dated January 26, 1994 of the Court of
Appeals1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33332. By a Resolution dated October
25, 1995, this case, along with several others, was transferred from
the First Division to the Third. After due deliberation on the
submissions
of
the
parties,
it
was
assigned
to
undersigned ponente for the writing of the Court's Resolution.
This case arose from an "ejectment suit" 2 filed by private
respondent against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 64, Mauban, Quezon. Private respondent alleged: (1) that
sometime in May 1981, petitioner surreptitiously built his dwelling
on a portion of her land at Barangay Lual (Poblacion), Mauban,
Quezon, registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-91037 in
the name of private respondent's husband Publio (deceased); (2)
that the matter was reported to the Barangay Captain who
conducted several conferences during which petitioner promised to
vacate the land and remove his house therefrom, notwithstanding
which he still failed or refused to do so; (3) that she instituted
Criminal Case No. 1068 against petitioner in 1986 for violation of
P.D. No. 772 (the Anti-Squatting Law); (4) that the trial court
convicted petitioner of the offense and imposed a fine of P1,500.00
on him; (5) that, despite such judgment, and notwithstanding
Footnotes
1
REGALADO, J.:
Before us is an appeal by certiorari from the judgment of the Court
of Appeals 1 setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Naval, Biliran, Branch 16, 2 without prejudice to the refiling of the
case by petitioners after due compliance with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the
"Katarungang Pambarangay Law."
Prefatorily, the Court desires to digress and call attention to the
lamentable saga of delay in the dispensation of justice and the
regrettable abuse of judicial processes exemplified by this case.
For, if just to collect an indebtedness of P7,862.55 incurred way
back in 1988, the proceedings had to go through all the rungs of
the judicial ladder and still present the prospect of hereafter
infringing again upon the time of this Court and three other courts,
such protraction being manipulated by trifling with the very law
which ironically was intended to prevent such delay, then the
bench and the bar should soberly reflect thereon and now take
stock of themselves. Indeed, it is not improbable that there are
other cases agonizing under the same ennui created by our courts.
Coming now to the case at hand, it appears that on several
occasions from January 8, 1988 up to and until April 18, 1989,
private respondent Patricia Pagba purchased on credit various
articles of merchandise from petitioners' store at Naval, Biliran, all
valued at P7,862.55, as evidenced by receipts of goods marked as
Annexes "A" to "O" of petitioner's Manifestation filed in the trial
court, dated August 9, 1991. Private respondents failed to pay
despite repeated demands.
Petitioners brought the matter before the Barangay Chairman of
Naval and the latter set the case for hearing, but private
respondents failed to appear. When the case was again set for
hearing, the parties appeared but they failed to reach an amicable
settlement.
Accordingly,
the barangay chairman
issued
a
Certification to File Action. 3Petitioners then filed their complaint for
a sum of money before the Municipal Trial Court of Naval.
Private respondents, in their Answer, 4 while admitting the
indebtedness to petitioner, interposed two counterclaims, namely,
(1) one for P6,227.00 as alleged expenses for maintenance and
repair of the boat belonging to petitioners, and (b) another for
P12,000.00 representing the cost of the two tires which petitioners
allegedly misappropriated. Private respondents likewise alleged
that despite the confrontations before the barangay chairman,
petitioners refused to pay their just and valid obligations to private
respondent and her husband.
Aside
from
petitioners
claim
and
private
respondents'
counterclaims, the Municipal Trial Court of Naval also resolved the
issue on whether or not there was compliance with the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 1508 on conciliation. In resolving the said
issue,
the
trial
court
relied
on
the
case
of Tijam
5
vs. Sibonghanoy which held that:
While petitioners could have prevented the trial court
from exercising jurisdiction over the case by
seasonably taking exemption thereto, they instead
invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an
answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is
more, they participated in the trial of the case by
cross-examining the respondent. Upon this premise,
petitioner cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt
an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction
of the court to which they had submitted themselves
voluntarily. 6
However, said lower court dismissed the complaint by ruling
against the admissibility of Exhibits "E-1" to "E-15", which are the
receipts of good marked as Annexes "A" to "O" of petitioners'
manifestation therein, for not having been properly identified in
court. 7
of the two lower courts. It is also worth stressing that while the case
was filed when Presidential Decree No. 1508 was still in force, the
procedural provisions of the Local Government Code, which we
have earlier noted as being supportive of the validity of the
conciliation proceedings, are also applicable to this case. Statutes
regulating procedure in courts are applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense. 16
To indulge private respondents in their stratagem will not only
result in a circuitous procedure but will necessarily entail undue
and further delay and injustice. This is inevitable if this Court
should dismiss the complaint and require the parties to meet before
the pangkat, only to bring the case all over again through the
hierarchy of courts and ultimately back to us for decision on the
merits. Obviously, this is the game plan of private respondents. For,
when private respondents appealed to respondent court, they did
not at all assail the propriety or correctness of the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court holding them liable to petitioners for the sum of
money involved. Such primary substantive issue, therefore, has
been laid to rest, but private respondents would wish to keep the
case alive merely on a conjured procedural issue invoking their
supposed right to confrontation before the pangkat.
However, from the very start of this action, private respondents
failed to show or evince any honest indication that they were
willing to settle their obligations with petitioners, notwithstanding
the efforts of the latter to submit the matter to conciliation. It is,
therefore, quite obvious that their insistence on technical
compliance with the requirements of the barangay conciliation
process is a dilatory maneuver. This is an evident and inevitable
conclusion since the main argument of respondents in this petition
is only the supposed failure of petitioners to comply with
the barangay conciliatory procedure and not the denial or
repudiation of their indebtedness.
We do not agree with the findings of respondent appellate court
that inasmuch as private respondents pleaded in their answer the
alleged lack of cause of action of petitioners, an objection to the
complaint had been timely made. It will be readily observed that
January 7, 1991
said Decision.
3. In giving undue weight and credence to the selfserving allegations of the private respondent that
summons was not served him, contrary to law,
established jurisprudence and evidence on record.
4. In disregarding the well-known principle of law that
barangay authorities are presumed to have
performed their official duties and to have acted
regularly in issuing the certificate to file action and
grossly and manifestly erred in making an opposite
conclusion to this effect, contrary to law, established
jurisprudence and evidence on record.
5. In not holding that the settlement was repudiated,
contrary to law and evidence on record.
6. In not affirming the judgment rendered by the
Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court
below.
Petitioner assails private respondent for raising the issue of noncompliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 only in his petition
for review with the appellate court and which mislead the court to
erroneously dismiss her complaint for ejectment.
10
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
10
however, we
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132624
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71
dated August 26, 1997. 1
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioners Fidel M. Baares II, Lilia C. Valeriano, Edgar M. Baares,
Emilia Gatchialian and Fidel Besarino were the accused in sixteen
criminal cases for estafa2 filed by the private respondents. The
cases were assigned to the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal,
Branch II.
After the petitioners were arraigned and entered their plea of not
guilty,3 they filed a Motion to Dismiss the aforementioned cases on
the ground that the filing of the same was premature, in view of the
failure of the parties to undergo conciliation proceedings before the
Lupong
Tagapamayapa
of
Barangay
Dalig,
Antipolo,
Rizal.4Petitioners averred that since they lived in the same
barangay as private respondents, and the amount involved in each
of the cases did not exceed Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00), the said
cases were required under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 5 and Section 18 of the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure 6 to be referred to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of the barangay
concerned for conciliation proceedings before being filed in court. 7
22
32
we stated, thus:
xxx
xxx
relation to Rule 13, Sections 9 and 10, 44 and Rule 36, Section 2 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, leads to no other
conclusion than that the rules regarding finality of judgments also
apply to cases covered by the rules on summary procedure.
Nothing in Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure conflicts with the prevailing rule that a judgment or order
which is not appealed or made subject of a motion for
reconsideration within the prescribed fifteen-day period attains
finality. 46 Hence, the principle expressed in the maxim interpretare
et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi, or that every
statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes
as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence 47 applies in
interpreting both sets of Rules.
The rationale behind the doctrine of finality of judgments and
orders, likewise, supports our conclusion that said doctrine applies
to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure:
The doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound
practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of
the courts must become final at some definite date set by
law. 48
It is but logical to infer that the foregoing principle also applies to
cases subject to summary procedure especially since the objective
of the Rule governing the same is precisely to settle these cases
expeditiously. 49 To construe Section 18 thereof as allowing the
revival of dismissed cases by mere motion even after the lapse of
the period for appealing the same would prevent the courts from
settling
justiciable
controversies
with
finality, 50 thereby
undermining the stability of our judicial system.
The Court also finds it necessary to correct the mistaken impression
of petitioners and the municipal trial court that the non-referral of a
case for barangay conciliation as required under the Local
Government Code of 1991 51 may be raised in a motion to dismiss
even after the accused has been arraigned.1wphi1
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Ynares-Santiago,
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
JJ.,
concur.
Petitioners argue that the CA was duty-bound, under the rules and
jurisprudence, to give weight to the findings of fact of the MTC
since the same had already been affirmed in toto by the RTC.
Further, it is argued that the action is not barred by prior judgment
and the principle of litis pendentia does not apply; that the
petitioners complied with the requirements of PD 1508; and that
demand to vacate is not necessary for judicial action in case of
expiration of the lease contract.
The petition is devoid of merit, we find that the MTC had improperly
assumed jurisdiction over the ejectment suit.
First, this case being one of unlawful detainer, it must have been
filed within one year from the date of last demand with the
Municipal Trial Court, otherwise it is an accion publiciana cognizable
by the Regional Trial Court. 7 The rule is that the one-year period
provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court 8 within
which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be
counted from the last letter of demand to vacate. 9 Accion
publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession
when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. 10
PER CURIAM:
The Court agrees with respondent judge that the certification to file
an action required under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not
necessary in the prosecution for grave oral defamation 8 for the
same is beyond the coverage of said Katarungan Pambarangay
Law. 9 But, the charge of partiality, abuse of authority and grave
abuse of discretion as regards respondent judge's taking
cognizance of the criminal case despite the fact that private
complainant is his brother a relative within the second degree of
consanguinity in violation of the rule on compulsory
disqualification of judges under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of
Court is a different matter.
The Court, in this regard, will not hesitate to exercise its full
disciplinary powers in the instant case where the violation is so
patent and the same has caused grave injustice to a party in a
criminal case. The facts manifesting respondent's partiality are
patent in the records.
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides, thus:
Sec.1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or
judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his
wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of
the civil law, or in which he has been executor
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he was presided in any inferior court when his
ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by
them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or
valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
(Emphasis supplied)
Katarungang
court can still disregard the supersedeas bond but only when there
are special and compelling reasons justifying immediate
execution. 18 If that discretion is exercised arbitrarily, the aggrieved
party has the right to question such act in a petition for certiorari.
To recapitulate, when the Municipal Trial Court ruled that it could
act on the complaint for ejectment filed by the private respondent
even without prior barangay conciliation proceedings, it committed
a mere error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. We have held in
many cases that while the referral of a case to the Lupon
Tagapayapa is a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in
court, non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction
which the court has already required over the subject matter and
over the person of the defendant. 19 Hence, the remedy available to
the petitioner was to question the ruling of the court a quo in an
ordinary appeal and not, as he mistakenly did, in a special action
for certiorari.
At any rate, even assuming that the petition for certiorari filed by
the petitioner was the proper remedy, the same cannot be granted
as it cannot be said that the court a quo committed grave abuse of
discretion in finding the allegations for the issuance of preliminary
injunction to be sufficient compliance with the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law. We agree with the Regional Trial Court that:
Thus, when the lower court allegedly disregarded the
counterclaims of petitioner, when it refused to rule
on "compensation off-setting" and ruled that the
application for a provisional remedy in the complaint
for ejectment was not sham or that it was not proved
as such, and also when said court failed to dismiss
the case for lack of compliance with the requirement
of PD 1508 there was no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the lower court . . . It cannot be said
that respondent judge acted in a capricious,
whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner to be said to
be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.