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CONTENTS
Application for adm. Tabasa vs CA
Jacot vs Dal
Co vs HRET
Frivaldo vs COMELEC De Guzman vs COMELEC
Ma vs Commissioner Alterajos vs COMELEC
Japzon vs COMELEC
Republic vs Dela Rosa
Bengson vs HRET
Cordora vs COMELEC
Co vs Civil Registrar Petition for leave..
Akbayan vs COMELEC
Kilosbayan vs Ermita Labo vs COMELEC
Palatino vs COMELEC
Vilando vs HRET
Djumantan vs Domingo
Rumualdez vs RTC
Aznar vs COMELEC Mercado vs Manzano Asistio vs Trinidad-Pe
Valles vs COMELEC Valles vs COMELEC Velasco vs COMELEC
Yu vs Santiago
AASJS vs Datumanong
Macalintal vs COMELEC
Nicolas-Lewis vs COMELEC
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR. VICENTE D
CHING, digested
Bar Matter. No. 914, October 1, 1999 (Constitutional Law Citizenship)
FACTS: Petitioner, who resided in the Philippines since his birth during the 1935
Constitution, is a legitimate son of a Filipina married to a Chinese citizen.
Subsequently, petitioner elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after he reached
the age of majority. OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the
construction of the phrase reasonable period and the allowance of the
petitioner to elect Philippine citizenship due to circumstances like petitioner
having lived in the Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a
Filipino.
ISSUE: Whether or not a legitimate child under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino
mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship 14 years after he
has reached the age of majority.
HELD: No, despite the special circumstances, Petitioner failed to validly elect
Philippine citizenship. The span of 14 years that lapsed from the time he reached
the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine
citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement upon
reaching the age of majority. In addition, there was no reason why he delayed his
election of Philippine citizenship.
Co vs HRET
FACTS:
The respondents father, Jose Ong Chuan, was born in China but was brought to
and grew up in the Philippines. He married a native Filipina, who bore eight
children including the respondent. In 1955, Jose Ong Chuan was declared a
Filipino citizen, and in 1957, he took his Oath of Allegiance and was issued a
certificate of naturalization.

Jose Jr. was a minor by that time and was finishing his elementary education in
Samar. In search for better education, he went to Manila in order to acquire his
secondary and college education, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the
respondent looked for work there. He found a job in the Central Bank of the
Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business
of his family in Manila. The respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar,
where he grew up and spent his childhood days.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of
Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during those elections. After
being engaged for several years in the management of their family business, he
decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for public office. On May
11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samal was
held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative are the
petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co, and the private respondent, Jose Ong,
Jr.
Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests against the private
respondent on the following grounds:
1)
Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2)
Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET decided in favor of the respondent.

ISSUE:
WON the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that Ong was a
resident of Northern Samar and a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
HELD:
No, the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion, based on the following
premises:
1.
On the issue of Jurisdiction
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
members; and so long as the Constitution grants the HRET this power, any final
action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be
reviewed by the Supreme Court.
The power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in
any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power
as will constitute a denial of due process." In the case at bar, the Court finds no

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improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which
will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review.
2.
On the issue of Citizenship
Under the 1935 Constitution, one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother
was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen, while one born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship.
However, under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those
born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They
were both considered as natural-born citizens. The Constitutional provision in
question is curative in nature, thus it has to be applied retroactively.
The respondent was born in the rural town of Samar. He has lived the life of a
Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization when he was still a small
boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government agency.
His profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting a
license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always
considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that
he does not embrace Philippine customs and values, no acts to show that this
country is not his natural homeland.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an
alien, or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is
no doubt in this case that Jose Ong, Jr. is a Filipino when he turned 21. Any
election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the respondent would not only
have been unnecessary but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a
Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
3.
On the issue of Residence
The term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only
under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The term
"domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, one intends to return. The absence of a person from said
permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the
domicile of that person.
The petitioners alleged that since the private respondent owns no property in
Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place. The Court ruled
that it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his
residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a
rented house or in that of a friend or relative. The Constitution only requires that
the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements.
Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own
property in order to be qualified to run.

MA VS COMMISSIONER
FACTS:
The petitioners herein were born of a Taiwanese father and a natural-born Filipino
mother, under the 1935 Constitution. At that time, those who were born of a
Filipino mother but an alien father have to elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority. However, they were all raised, have resided and
lived their whole lives in this country. They do not speak nor understand the
Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and do not know any relative of
their father. During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of
Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration (ACRs). Immediately upon
reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship. Having taken
their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have
the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section
1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625.

ISSUE:
WON late registration of the acquired Filipino citizenship in the Civil Registry
impedes persons to become naturalized citizens of the Philippines.
HELD:
No. Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching
the age of majority. They timely took their oath of allegiance to the Philippines.
This was a serious undertaking. It was commitment and fidelity to the state
coupled with a pledge "to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance" to any
other state. This was unqualified acceptance of their identity as a Filipino and the
complete disavowal of any other nationality.
It was only the registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that
was belatedly done. The SC ruled that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners,
the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be
allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election. Petitioners have
passed decades of their lives in the Philippines as Filipinos. Their present status
having been formed by their past, petitioners can no longer have any national
identity except that which they chose upon reaching the age of reason. The actual
exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners,
is actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration
of the election of Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of
Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both
automatically considered as natural-born citizens. This Constitutional provision is
curative in nature, and has to be applied retroactively. Thus, while the 1935

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Constitution requires that children of Filipino mothers elect Philippine citizenship

upon reaching their age of majority, upon the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution,
they automatically become Filipinos and need not elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority.

xNo, It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of
naturalization of their father, Co Boon Peng, and of his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They are
likewise mandated to prove the following material allegations in their petition:

REPUBLIC vs DELA ROSA

Facts:
Frivaldo, in his intent to run as Governor of Sorsogon, filed a petition for
naturalization to be re-admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. When the judge set
the date of the petition hearing on March, 1992, Frivaldo filed a Motion to Set the
Hearing Ahead of Schedule for it to be held on January instead, as the elections
will be on May. On February, Judge Dela Rosa vested Frivaldo as a natural-born
Filipino by naturalization. Subsequently, Frivaldo ran and won as the Governor of
Sorsogon in the May 1992 Elections. Petitioner questioned the validity of
Frivaldos citizenship, arguing that his citizenship is still pending at the moment.

(a) that they are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng;

Issue:
Whether or not Frivaldo is already a Filipino citizen when he ran as Governor of
Sorsogon

Ruling:
No, Frivaldo is not yet a Filipino citizen when he ran as Governor of Sorsogon.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in
naturalization proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its
promulgation. Therefore, Frivaldo is not yet a Filipino citizen at the time of the
elections, as his petition for citizenship can only be made final after two years.
CO vs CIVIL REGISTRAR
Facts:
Hubert and Arlene Co, born in 1974 and 1975 respectively, are children of Co
Boon Peng, who applied for naturalization to become a citizen of the Philippines.
In 1977, Pengs application was granted and took an oath as a naturalized citizen
of the country. In 1998, petitioners filed for correction of entries in their certificate
of birth to become Filipino citizens on the ground of their fathers naturalization.
Issue:
Whether or not Pengs naturalization would also grant naturalization to his
children
Ruling:

(b) that they were born in the Philippines; and,

(c) that they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was naturalized as a Filipino
citizen.
KILOSBAYAN vs Ermita
G.R. No. 177721
FACTS:
May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary Ermita announced an appointment
in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
The appointment was reported the following day, May 17, 2007. However, on the
day of the said appointment, it was recalled by the Malacaang in question of
Ongs citizenship, and was being validated by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)."
Petitioners contend that the appointment of Ong is patently unconstitutional and
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners
also claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, as indicated in his birth
certificate,which also reveals that at the time of respondents birth on May 25,
1953, his parents were Chinese.
Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after
respondent Ongs birth his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by
naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born
Filipino citizen. Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued
annulling the appointment. Subsequently, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to prevent and restrain
respondent Executive Secretary from releasing the appointment of respondent
Ong. The Court required respondents to Comment on the petition in which Ermita
stated that the appointment of respondent Ong was made by the President
pursuant to the powers vested in her by Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution.
In support, Ermita submits that 1) The President did not gravely abuse her
discretion as she appointed a person, duly nominated by the JBC. 2) Ong is a
natural-born citizen as determined by the Bureau of Immigration and affirmed by
the Department of Justice. 3) Undisputed evidence disclosed that respondent Ong

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is a natural-born citizen. 4) Petitioners are not entitled to a temporary restraining

order.

for certiorari filed by Limkaichong assailing the Joint Resolution issued by the
COMELEC which resolved the disqualification cases against her.

Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, maintaining that he is a

natural-born Filipino citizen; that petitioners have no standing to file the present
suit and the petitioners failed to include the President who is an indispensable
party as the one who extended the appointment.

On April 1, 2009, the Court granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong,

reversed the Joint Resolution of the Comelec, dismissed the three (3) other
petitions, and directed the petitioners to seek relief before the HRET by way of a
petition for Quo Warranto.

Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and the
DOJ a certification and an identification that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen
under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution, since his mother was a
Filipino citizen when he was born.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen
RULING
Yes, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. On this point, the
Court takes judicial notice of the records of Ongs petition to be admitted to the
Philippine bar. In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, Ong alleged
that he is qualified to be admitted to the Philippine bar because he is a Filipino
citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng,
a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a minor
of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became a Filipino citizen. It was on the
basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of
naturalization that this Court allowed respondent Ong to take the oath as a
lawyer.

On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Vilando as taxpayer; and Jacinto
Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district concerned, filed separate
petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET. Petitioners
asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she
was elected. They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose
naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese
citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter.

It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a
naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born
status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision
of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized
along with his father.

ISSUE

Vilando vs HRET
G.R. Nos. 192147 & 19214
FACTS
In the May 14, 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for
the position of Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. She won
over the other contender, Olivia Paras. On July 23, 2007, she assumed office as
Member of the House of Representatives. Thereafter, petitions that questioned
Limkaichongs citizenship were filed by her detractors: Louis Biraogo, Olivia
Paras and Renald F. Vilando. These petitions were consolidated with the petition

For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino

citizen. She averred that the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father
was regular and in order and had already attained the status of res
judicata. Further, she claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not be
assailed through a collateral attack. On March 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed both
petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the House of
Representatives. The petitioners sought reconsideration of the aforesaid decision,
but it was denied by the HRET in its Resolution dated May 17, 2010. Hence, this
petition for certiorari filed by Vilando.

Whether or not HRET erred in favoring the qualification of Limkaichongs

citizenship.
RULING
No, the Court is of the view that the HRET committed no grave abuse of
discretion in finding that Limkaichong is not disqualified to sit as Member of the
House of Representatives. Vilandos argument, that the petition does not operate
as a collateral attack on the citizenship of Limkaichongs father as the certificate
of naturalization is null and void from the beginning, is of no merit.
In this petition, Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is
a Chinese citizen. To prove his point, he makes reference to the alleged nullity of
the grant of naturalization of Limkaichongs father which, however, is not allowed
as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. In our
jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct

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action for its nullity. Vilando asserts that as an incident in determining the
eligibility of Limkaichong, the HRET, having the jurisdiction to determine her
qualifications, can pass upon the efficacy of the certificate of naturalization.
Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9,
1959. Indubitably, with Limkaichongs father having been conferred the status as
a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino
father.
Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent
issuance of certificate of naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother
and having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority
age. The HRET is, thus, correct in declaring that Limkaichong is a natural-born
Filipino citizen. Vilandos assertion that Limkaichong cannot derive Philippine
citizenship from her mother because the latter became a Chinese citizen when
she married Julio Sy, as provided for under Section 1 (7) of Commonwealth Act
No. 63 in relation to Article 2 (1) Chapter II of the Chinese Revised Nationality Law
of February 5, 1959, must likewise fail.

As aptly pointed out by the HRET, Vilando was not able to offer in evidence
a duly certified true copy of the alleged Chinese Revised Law of Nationality to
prove that Limkaichongs mother indeed lost her Philippine citizenship. Verily,
Vilando failed to establish his case through competent and admissible evidence to
warrant a reversal of the HRET ruling.
AZNAR VS COMELEC
Facts:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his
certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor
of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections. On January 22, 1988, the
Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as represented by
petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed
with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the
ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United
States of America.
Private respondent maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the
legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President
Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine

Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously
residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for
more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines
since 1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to
proclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes,
private respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu. Thereafter,
on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for
disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that
private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent is an alien. NO
Ruling:
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and,
therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of
Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing
evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct
proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes
provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a
foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing
to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country.
From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his
Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other
mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the
United States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private
respondent was issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance
and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is
an American and "being an American", private respondent "must have taken and
sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81,
Rollo)
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who
are not. Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the
United States does not concern Us here. By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino

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father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was

incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his
Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively
establish this fact.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath
of allegiance of the United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and
subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral
process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a
candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and
the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.

jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2)
she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure
under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her
Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration
and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly
cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4)
furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case
No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective
position of Davao Oriental governor.
Issue:

VALLES VS COMELEC

Whether or not Rosalind Lopez is an Australian or a Filipino.

Facts:

Ruling:

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome,
Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of
Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age
of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines. On June 27,
1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic
Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral
process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial
Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she
ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested
by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No.
92-54, alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However,
finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine
citizenship, the Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition.

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.

Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless
of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which
determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election
as governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for
disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before the COMELEC, First Division,
contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by
the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed
to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born
on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified
true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen.
By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth,
Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise
a citizen of the Philippines.

The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she
ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Her candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No.
98-336.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez
is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1)
her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier
Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino
citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian.
Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at
that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal
organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the
Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916,
also known as the Jones Law.

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood
relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973[4] and 1987[5]
Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a
Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in

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Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia

follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim
Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
YU vs SANTIAGO
FACTS:
Petitioner was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971 valid for 5 years and
is renewable after presentment to the proper Portuguese consular officer.
Although he became a naturalized Philippine citizen on February 10, 1978, the
petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese passport by the Consular
Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo in July 21, 1981. While he was still a
citizen of the Philippines, he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial
documents which he signed sometime in April 1980.
The Court issued TRO pending hearings with the Board of Special Inquiry,
CID. However, the pleadings submitted before the Court clearly showed that the
petitioner expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners claim to continued citizenship is still valid as a
ground to be released from detention in spite having reacquired Portuguese
citizenship
RULING:
No, the petitoners motion for the release from detention is denied.
Philippine citizenship is not a commodity or were to be displayed when
reacquired and suppressed when convenient.
TABASA vs CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. In 1968, when he was seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa
became a naturalized US citizen. By derivative naturalization (citizenship derived
from that of another as from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of
naturalization), the petitioner also acquired American citizenship.
Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995 as a balikbayan.
He was arrested and detained on May 23, 1996. Records showed that on April 16,
1996, the Consul-General of the U.S. Embassy in Manila, filed a request with the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) to apprehend and deport petitioner

on the ground that a standing warrant for several charges had been issued
against him and that respondents passport had been revoked.

Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order on May 29, 1996. On May 30,
1996, the CA ordered that the Bureau be restrained from summarily deporting
him. Meanwhile, Tabasa was temporary released through bail.
However, on June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition
alleging that he had acquired Filipino citizenship through repatriation in
accordance with RA No. 8171 An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino
Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of
Natural-Born Filipinos. He further contended that because of this, he was already
a Filipino citizen and therefore cannot be deported or detained by BID.
The CA, in its August 7, 1996 Decision, 16 denied Tabasas petition on the ground
that he had not legally and successfully acquiredby repatriationhis Filipino
citizenship as provided in RA 8171. The court said that although he became an
American citizen by derivative naturalization when his father was naturalized in
1968, there is no evidence to show that he lost his Philippine citizenship "on
account of political or economic necessity," as explicitly provided in Section 1, RA
8171(note: find further explanation below, after the ruling). The court noted that
after petitioner was ordered deported by the BID on May 29, 1996, he
successively executed an Affidavit of Repatriation on June 6, 1996 and took an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on June 13, 1996more than
ten months after his arrival in the country on August 3, 1995.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under
RA 8171
RULING: No, the petitioner has no legal and valid reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
RA 8171 provides repatriation to two kinds of persons:
(1)Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens
(2)Natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their
minor children, on account of political or economic necessity except those
provided by Sec 4, CA 63:

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CLASS COMPILATION 5

(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or

group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized
government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases
This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to
political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his
repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. To claim the
benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the
petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. It is clear that Tabasa can no longer
claim repatriation under RA 8171 given that only a parent can file for it, the
approval of which will only benefit the children by extension. Also, clearly, he lost
his citizenship by operation of law and not due to political and economic reasons.
Even if the SC concedes that petitioner Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA 8171,
still he failed to follow the procedure for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He
has to file his petition for repatriation and submit required documents with the
Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN), designated to process petitions for it.
Such will which enable the SCN to verify if his reasons indeed qualify him for
repatriation under RA 8171.
The petitioner is not entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 for he has not shown
that his case falls within the coverage of the law.
Since Tabasa remains to be an alien and his passport has already been cancelled
by the U.S. Embassy, under Immigration Act Sec 10 and 15, the alien
automatically loses the privilege to undergo deportation proceedings. A summary
judgment of deportation may be issued to take effect immediatel
Frivaldo vs Comelec
Facts: On March 20, 1995 private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate
of Candidacy for the Office of Governor in May, 8, 1995 election. Petitioner Raul
Lee another candidate filed a petition with the COMELEC praying that Frivaldo be
disqualified from seeking and holding any public office or position by reason of
not being a citizen of the Philippines and that his Certificate of Candidacy be
cancelled. In defense Frivaldo stated that he was able to regain his Filipino
Citizenship through Repatriation.

The Second Division of COMELEC promulgated a Resolution granting the petition

of Lee. The motion for reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted until the
May 8, 1995 elections. His candidacy continued and was voted during the
elections and he garnered the highest number of votes. The COMELEC affirmed
the resolution of the 2nd resolution and directed the Board of Canvassers to
reconvene thus Raul Lee was proclaimed the governor of Sorsogon.
Issue: Whether or not the Repatriation of Frivaldo was valid and legal and would
qualify him to act and hold office of being a Governor in Sorsogon.
Ruling: No, the Repatriation of Frivaldo was valid and legal and it will qualify him
to hold an office of being a Governor.
Under Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified
voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the
Philippines, this
being an indispensable requirement for
suffrage under Article V, Section 1,
of the Constitution. PD 725, was
enacted to cure the defect of existing
naturalization law in the
Philippines after the regime of Marcos. Curative
Statutes are
retroactive since they are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities in existing laws and curb certain evils. This was being used
by the Petitioner to claim his Citizenship through
Repatriation with
Naturalization.
Section 39 of the Local Government Code it states that the law intended
Citizenship to be a qualification distinct from being a voter, even if being a voter
presumes being a citizen first.
Philippine Citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective
public office. Mr. Frivaldo indubitably a Filipino Citizen having taken his oath of
allegiance and the candidate being proclaimed, who garnered the highest number
of votes and such oath had already cured his previously judicially declared
alienage.
The law intended citizenship to be a qualification distinct from being a voter, even
if being a voter presumes being a Citizen first. Frivaldos status as a registered
voter would also be deemed settled. In as much as he is considered having been
repatriated, his Filipino Citizenship resolved and his previous registration as a
voter is likewise deemed validated. To put all doubts on this issue with
repatriation of Frivaldo, it retroacted to the date of the filing of his application.
Alterajos vs COMELEC

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CLASS COMPILATION 5

Facts:
Petitioner was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San
Jacinto,
Masbate in the May 10, 2004 local and national
election. Private
respondents filed a petition with the
COMELEC to disqualify and deny or
cancel his candidacy on the
grounds that he is not a Filipino citizen and he
made false
representation
on Certificate of Candidacy he was not a
permanent resident of the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate. Altarejos
answered that he was already issued a Certificate of
Repatriation by the
Special Committee on Naturalization in
December 17, 1997.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA

2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who
Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the
Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections.

Issue:
Whether or not the registration of petitioners repatriation with the
proper
civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a
prerequisite in effecting
repatriation and he is eligible to run as
a Mayor of Masbate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cruz can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon
his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship to qualify him to become a member of
the House of Representatives?

Ruling: Yes. Alterajos registration with Civil Registry is a prerequisite in effecting

repatriation.

Yes. The court ruled that his Filipino citizenship was valid and thus qualified his
position as member of the House of Representatives. He reacquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which allowed any person who has rendered
service to the Armed Forces of the United States to reacquire Philippine
citizenship after taking the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry.

Section 2 RA 8171 The repatriation shall be effected by taking the Oath of

allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper
Civil Registar under the Bureau of Immigration.
Petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance Dec. 12, 1997 but his Certificate of
Repatriation was registered in the Civil Registry of Makati City only after 6
years February 18, 2004 and with the Bureau of Immigration March 1,
2004. Petitioner therefore completed all the requirements of repatriation
after he filed his Certificate of Candidacy.
Petitioners repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application,
he is qualified to run for a mayoralty position i the government.

therefore

Bengzon v. HRET
FACTS:
Cruz is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, born of Filipino parents who
enlisted in the US Marine Corps in 1985. Taking an oath of allegiance to the USA
without expressed consent of the Republic of the Philippines, he lost his Filipino
citizenship based on CA No. 63 by rendering service to or accepting commission
in the armed forces of a foreign country.

Subsequently, petitioner Bengson, filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam

with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member
of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
section 6 of the Constitution.

RULING:

Also, respondent was still considered a natural-born Filipino as correctly defined in

Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he obtained the requisite of
becoming a natural-born Filipino, given that the two requisites are: (1) a person
must be a Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act
to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of
the House of Representatives.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
Facts:

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CLASS COMPILATION 5

Petitioner here is a lawyer who migrated to Canada and became a citizen thereof
in order to avail Canadas free medical aid program to remedy his ailments.
Two years after acquiring his Canadian citizenship, he re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 and returned to his home country intending to
resume his practice in law.
Issue: Whether or not the re-acquisition of petitioners citizenship qualifies him to
continue his practice in law in the Philippines?
Ruling:
Yes. The court held that the re-acquisition of petitioners citizenship will qualify
him to resume practice in law in the Philippines given some conditions. A Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he
is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no
automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the
Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions
(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice. 18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure
from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal
education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners
knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties
and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his
pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of
the Philippine bar.

Labo v. Comelec

Facts:
Ramon Labo, Jr. is the respondent in question of his qualification for the position
of Mayor of Baguio given the speculation on his Filipino citizenship. He was
naturalized as an Australian in 1976, not in accordance to his marriage to an
Australian spouse, but by formally taking an Oath of Allegiance to Australia. He
used an Australian Visa in coming back to the Philippines in 1980, when he
declared before the immigration authorities that he was an alien. He later asked
for the change of his status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine
citizen and was granted Immigrant certificate.
His rival for the Mayoral position, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto
against Labo, asserting that he is disqualified on the ground of the invalidity of his
Philippine citizenship. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not
make him an Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and
Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian when he married an
Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian
was later declared void for being bigamous.
Issue: Whether or not Labo has re-acquired his Filipino citizenship from an
Australian one, thus, qualifying him to assume the position of Mayor of Baguio?
Held:
No. It was held that Labo has not proven that he re-acquired his Filipino
citizenship after he took an Oath of Allegiance to Australia, nor was it proven that
he has dual citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand against the clear
provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are
applicable to the petitioner.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does
not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial
decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship
upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725 which
requires him to take the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon
cancel their certificate of registration.

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CLASS COMPILATION 5

It can be concluded that the petitioner is not nor was he on the day of the local
elections a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter
under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. He was therefore ineligible
as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City under Section 42 of the Local
Government Code.
Djumantan v. Domingo
G.R. No. 99358
Facts:
Bernard Banez, Marina Cabaels husband, went to Indonesia as a contract
worker. On April 1974, he was converted to Islam and married petitioner
Djumantan in accordance with Islamic rites. He then returned to the Philippines
on January 1979 and petitioner with their two children immediately followed.
Banez made it appear that they were just his guests. Petitioner and her children
were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors and lived in the house of
Banez and Marina. In 1981, Marina discovered the true relationship of her
husband and petitioner. On March 1982, petitioners immigration status was
changed to that of permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the Immigration Act
of 1940 allowing an alien wife of a Philippine citizen to be admitted. However, on
September 1990, upon finding that petitioners marriage with Banez was not in
accordance with the Philippine laws, the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) revoked the status of permanent resident given to petitioner
and made pending deportation proceedings. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of
the deportation case on the ground that she was validly married to a Filipino
citizen.
Issue:
Whether the Indonesian wife has the right to stay in the Philippines
Ruling:
No. There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be
admitted, much less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines. The fact
of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from operation of
immigration laws governing admission & exclusion of aliens. Marriage of an alien
woman to Filipino citizen does not automatically make her a Filipino citizen & does
not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon expiration of her
extended stay here as alien.
Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the CID to
admit any alien who applies for a visitor's visa. Once admitted into the country,
the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. Under Section 13 of the law, an alien
allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and "may be

admitted" as a permanent resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for

permanent residency is the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen (Immigration
Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The entry of aliens into the country and their admission
as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally married to Filipino
citizens.

Mercado vs Manzano
G.R. No. 135083
Facts:
Petition for disqualification was filed against Eduardo Manzano to hold elective
office on the ground that he holds dual citizenship, having been born in the United
States whose laws are under the principle of jus soli and of Filipino parents, under
the principle of jus sanguinis. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified
Manzano for being a dual citizen pursuant to Section 4(d) of RA 7160, stating that
those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position.
Issue:
Whether the involuntary acquirement of dual citizenship of respondent Manzano
is a ground for disqualification to hold or run office in the local position
Ruling:
No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance,
such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state
which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli, like in the case of respondent Manzano, who as a result was
able to acquire dual citizenship without any voluntary act on his part. What is
inimical is not dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain
their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence,
the phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under
this disqualification.
In the case at bar, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran, private
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship. Such act sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Also, by private

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

CLASS COMPILATION 5

respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact
that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and has taken part in past elections in this country, leaves
no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

Constitution, refers to "dual allegiance" and as such, the respondent's dual

citizenship does not automatically disqualify her from running for public office.

Cirilo Valles,petitioner vs COMELEC

Facts: The petitioner filed petition praying for a writ of prohibition to stop
respondent from mplementing RA 9225, particularly sections 2 and 3, on the
ground that it violates Section 5, Article 4 of the 1987 Constitution which
states, "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall
be dealt with by law".

Facts: Rosalind Y basco Valles ran for re<election as governor of Davao Oriental.
As with her previous experiences in running for public office, an issue was raised
by her opponents, this time one by the name of Cirilo Valles, questioning the
authenticity of her Filipino citizenship with regards to qualifying her to run as
governor.
The COMELEC ruled in favor of the respondent stating that there were no
new and enough evidence to prove that the respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner argues that the respondents, aside from renouncing her Filipino
citizenship when she acquired a an alien certificate from the Bureau of
Immigration as an Australian national, an immigrant certificate of residence,
and an Australian passport, even assuming that the respondent is Filipino,
she cannot run as government official because of her dual citizenship.
Issue: Whether the respondent's dual citizenship, inter alia, disqualifies her from
running as a governor of Davao Oriental?
Ruling: The court dismissed the petition and affirmed the previous rulings in the
previous cases of the same matter against the respondent.
First, there was sufficient evidence proving that the respondent cancelled the
documents stating she was an Australian national.
Second, under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Jones Law, as well as the
1935 Philippine Constitution, the respondent is a Filipino given that she is born
to a Filipino father. Moreover,under Commonwealth Act No. 63, in order for
one to lose his/her citizenship s/he must expressly renounce it < one which
the respondent did not do, and where the respondent has not met the
requirements to lose her citizenship under the said Act < and her being
born in a different country is not a ground for losing one's Philippine citizenship.
Lastly, the court reiterated the decision in Mercado( v( Manzano, stating
that the term "dual citizenship" used in the Local Government code and as
reconciled in Sec 5, Art 4 of the 1987

AASJS vs Datumanong

The OSG contends that section 2 merely declares a state policy while section 3 is
an "effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship" and
"recognizes the supreme authority of the Philippines".
Issues:
1. Whether Republic Act no. 9225 ("An Act Making the Citizenship of
Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for
the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended and for Other Purposes") is
unconstitutional?
2. Whether the Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance?
Ruling: The court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The court ruled that the Section 2 of RA 9225 only allows dual
citizenship, and not dual allegiance, to Filipinos who have lost their
Philippine citizenship due to their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country. Section 3 of said Act steers clear from the problem of dual
allegiance by shifting the burden of resolving the said problem to the concerned
foreign country.
Section 5 of Article 4 of the 1987 Constitution, noting that it is a declaration of
policy and not a self-executing provision, states that dual allegiance shall be dealt
with by law. Thus, the court held that it would be premature for the judicial
department to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance until the legislature
enacts a law governing it.
Jacot vs Dal
Facts:
Petitioner Jacot, a natural born Philippine citizen, became a naturalized US
citizen. He sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225, so he filed a request for Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

CLASS COMPILATION 5

Philippines with the PCG of Los Angeles, California. The PCG issued on 2006 an
Order of Approval of petitioners request, and on the same day he took his Oath of
Allegiance. The Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 0612019 recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines.
On March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position
of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin.
Respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification against
petitioner before the COMELEC, arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US
citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225.
Petitioner countered that his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and the oath contained in his
Certificate of Candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of his foreign
citizenship.
Petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice
Mayor.
On 12 June 2007, COMELEC issued its Resolution disqualifying the
petitioner from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for
failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating that his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and his oath in his Certificate of
Candidacy sufficed as an effective renunciation of his US citizenship. Attached to
the said Motion was an "Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States
and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship" dated 27 June 2007, wherein
petitioner explicitly renounced his US citizenship. The COMELEC dismissed
petitioners Motion for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 2007
local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US
citizenship.
Ruling:
Yes, he is disqualified. The Court held that his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially
comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied with for
different purposes.

Now, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 specifically provides that:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those who retain or reacquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions: x x x x
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath. x x x x
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who
either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public
officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of
the certificate of candidacy.
To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have
one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.

De Guzman vs COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner and Angelina Dela Cruz were vying for the vice-mayoralty post
of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 Elections. Respndent Dela Cruz filed
a petition for disqualification against De Guzman, alleging that he is not a Filipino
Citizen but an immigrant of the USA.
Petitioner De Guzman admitted that he is a naturalized American, and that
he applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225),
otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, and
took oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 2006. With this, he
argued that he is now entitled to exercise full civil and political rights, and is
qualified to run for vice-mayor.
During the May 14, 2007 elections, private respondent won as vice-mayor.
On June 15, 2007, the COMELEC rendered a decision regarding the petition
for disqualification filed by Dela Cruz, disqualifying Petitioner De Guzman, stating
that he failed to meet the requirement in Subparagraph (2) Section 5 of RA 9225.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was dismissed by the COMELEC
for having been rendered moot in view of private respondents victory.

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CLASS COMPILATION 5

Petitioner filed petition for certiorari alleging that COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it disqualified him, invoking the rulings in Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections and Mercado v. Manzano, that the filing by a person with
dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of allegiance,
constituted as a renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
Respondent contends that RA 9225 effectively abandons the Courts
rulings in Frivaldo and Mercado, and that petitioner, having failed to renounce his
American citizenship, remains a dual citizen and is therefore disqualified from
running for an elective public position under Section 40 of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).

Issue: Whether petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba,

Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his
American citizenship in accordance with R.A. No. 9225.
Ruling: Yes, petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor in view of his
failure to renounce his American citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine
citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship
by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) naturalborn citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become
citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance.
Petitioner falls under the first category, being a natural-born citizen who lost his
Philippine citizenship upon his naturalization as an American citizen. In the
instant case, there is no question that petitioner re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship after taking the oath of allegiance on 2006. However, it must be
emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement on those who
wish to seek elective public office, as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or reacquire Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: xxxx
(2)
Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a

personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath. xxxx
The filing of a certificate of candidacy does not amount to a renunciation of his
foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. The rulings in Frivaldo and Mercado are
not applicable to the instant case because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more
requirements.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who
have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or
retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, AND (2) for those seeking elective public
offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer
prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as
candidates in Philippine elections.
To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have ONE
citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.
Japzon v COMELEC
FACTS:
Japzon filed a petition to the COMELEC to disqualify Ty from running for public
office and the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. For the reason that Ty
was not able to fulfill the requirements in running for public office- he was not
able to renounce his foreign citizenship and he did not reside in East Samar long
enough to be able to run for public office. He contended that private respondent
left the Philippines from July 2006-January 2007 while still declaring his American
citizenship. Private respondent (Ty) admitted that he was a natural born Filipino
then went to the USA to work and then became a naturalized citizen there. Ty
contended that he already fulfilled the necessary requirements to become a
Filipino citizen once again and to be able to run for public office. He was able to
apply for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship in Los Angeles from the Philippine
consulate general office. And on October 2005 he executed an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines in Los Angeles from the Vice Consul of the
Philippine Consulate General. And when he applied for a Philippine Passport on
October 26, 2005, he indicated that his address was at east samar where he
would reside. The passport was approved and later he paid taxes in the said
address and obtained tax certificate from the said address. He even became a
registered voter in the said address. He then renounced his citizenship by March
19, 2007. He had reacquired Filipino Citizenship, renounced his American

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citizenship, and lived in east Samar for more than a year prior to the May 14,
2007 elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ty is ineligible to be mayor of the Municipality of General
McArthur, Eastern Samar?
DECISION:
No he is not ineligible; he is eligible to be mayor.
HELD:
R.A. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born
Filipino. Tys intent to establish a new domicile of choice in eastern Samar became
apparent when he applied for a Philippine passport indicating that his residence
or domicile in the Philippines was at Mabini St., Brgy 6, Poblacion, Gen McArthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines. The Supreme Court held that the length of residence
shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice. The court
sees no basis for it to require Ty to never leave the address he stated, the fact
that he returned after his trips proved his intent to stay in the said address.
Cordora v COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner alleges that private respondent Tambunting is not eligible to run for
public office because he lacked citizenship requirements and residency
requirements necessary for said office. Petitioner claims that Tambunting is not a
Filipino citizen but a naturalized American citizen. Tambunting on the other hand
says that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father therefore making
him a dual citizen and not a naturalized American citizen. Private respondent also
stated that he took an oath of allegiance by virtue of R.A. 9225 (Citizen Retention
and Reacquisition act of 2003) and he resided in the Philippines since birth.
The COMELEC dismissed the complaint because petitioner failed to substantiate
his claim but commissioner Sarmiento pointed out that Tambunting can be
considered a person with dual citizenship but he effectively renounced his
American citizenship when he filed the certificate of candidacy in 2001 and 2004
and ran for public office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent Tambunting is eligible for public office?

DESICION
Yes he is eligible for public office.
HELD:
The fact that he had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public
office. In a previous case decided by the Supreme Court it was held that dual
citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local
position. In cases of dual citizenship, where it is most of the time involuntary to be
one, when they run for public office they just have to elect their Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. The problem
posits when it is an issue of dual allegiance, which may be a ground for
disqualification, because it is a result of ones volition. One simply cannot govern
a place where their allegiance is not fully dedicated to the place where they ought
to serve.
AKBAYAN-Youth v. COMELEC
G.R. 147066
FACTS;
* Youth Sectors, represented by different organizations wanted to COMELEC to
conduct an additional special registration specifically for new voter ages 18-21
yrs. old in preparation for the upcoming May 2001 General Elections because
around 4M youth failed to register before December 27, 2000.
* Due to clamor of students and civic leaders, Sen. Raul Roco, Committee
Chairperson on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage and Peoples Participation invited
officials from the COMELEC for a public hearing for the purpose of discussing the
extension of the registration.
* As a result of the meeting and the consensus among regional heads and
representatives, COMELEC Resolution No. 3584, dated February 8, 2001, denying
the request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on the
ground that Section 8 of RA 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be
conducted during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and that
the COMELEC has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities
ISSUE/S;
1. Whether or not COMELECs Resolution No. 3584 is an exercise of grave abuse
of discretion?
2. Whether or not Supreme Court can compel COMELEC, through the
extraordinary writ of mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new voters,
less than 120 days before the May 14, 2001general elections?
RULING:
1. NO, COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in relation to the
issuance of Resolution No. 3584 denying the request of petitioners (AKBAYAN-

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Youth) for the extension of voters registration. It acted within the bounds and
confines of the applicable law on the matter. The act of registration is an
indispensable precondition of the right of suffrage. However, Article V of the 1987
Philippine Constitution and Section 8 of RA 8189 clearly provides for the
procedural limitations and requirements in order for a citizen to exercise his right
to vote. Considering that the aforesaid law explicitly provides that no registration
shall be conducted during the period starting (120) days before a regular election.
Furthermore, it is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that the
determination of administrative agency as to the operation, implementation and
application of a law would be accorded great weight considering that these
specialized government bodies are, by their nature and functions, in the best
position to know what they can possible do or not do, under the prevailing
circumstances. Thus, COMELEC acted within the bounds of its authority in
implementing the clear text of the law.
2. NO, the Supreme Court cannot issue an extraordinary writ of mandamus to
compel COMELEC to conduct a special registration for new voters. The petitioner
failed to establish, to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court that they are entitled
to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively compel respondent
COMELEC to conduct special registration of voters. The determination with regard
to preparation of all requirements for voters registration is an exercise of
discretion. As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel
an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will
not issue to control the exercise of discretion of a public office where the law
imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner
in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised an
not that of the court.

* COMELEC maintains, the basis of their resolution to shorten the date is the
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code confers upon it the power to
promulgate rules and regulations in order to ensure free, orderly and honest
elections.
ISSUE/S:
* Whether or not the COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is unconstitutional based on
its alleged encroachment of the legislative powers of Congress in relation to the
provisions provided for by Section 8 of Republic Act 8189?
RULING:
* YES, the COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is null and void insofar as it set deadline
of voter registration for the May 2010 elections on October 31,2009.
* The right of suffrage as stated in Article V of the 1987 Philippine Constitution,
lies at the heart of our constitutional democracy. The right of every Filipino to
choose the leaders who will lead the country and participate, to the fullest extent
possible, in every national and local election is so zealously guarded by the
fundamental law. The paramount importance of this right is also a function of the
State policy of people empowerment. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.
* Section 8 of RA 8189 provides for System of Continuing Registration of Voters.
Registration must be conducted daily. No registration shall be conducted during
the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before special
election. The extension prayed for, December 15, 2009 is within the limit
prescribed by law. Clear text of the law needs no interpretation.
* COMELECs rule-making power should be in accordance with the prevailing law.
Courts primary duty is to harmonize laws rather than consider one as repealed
by the other.

Palatino v. COMELEC
G.R. 189868
FACTS:
* COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8514 to set the date for continuing voter
registration all over the Philippines except ARMM from December 2 December
15, 2008 in relation to May 10, 2010 National Election
*However, for the reason that it needs ample time to prepare for the automated
election, COMELEC issued a subsequent Resolution No. 8585 adjusting the
deadline and changed it to October 31, 2009
* Petitioners (KABATAAN Party List) contend that there are 12M unregistered
voters to be disenfranchised if the registration will not be extended. Further
contend, Resolution No. 8585 is an unconstitutional encroachment on legislative
power of Congress as it amends the system of continuing voter registration under
Section 8 of Republic Act 8189, The Voters Registration Act of 1996. There was an
intense clamor for an extension of registration date.

Romualdez vs. RTC

G.R. No. 104960
Facts:

Philip Romualdez, a natural born citizen of the Philippines, in consonance

with his decision to establish his legal residence at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte, fearing for their personal safety, "fled" the country, together with his
immediate family, left the Philippines and sought "asylum" in the United States
which the United States (U.S.) government granted.

On 25 September 1991, Romualdez received a letter from Mr. Charles

Cobb, District Director of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
informing him that he should depart from the U.S. at his expense on or before 23
August 1992. Upon receipt of the letter, Romualdez departed from the U.S. for the
Philippines, arriving on December 1991 apparently without any government
document.

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When Romualdez came back in the Philippines and run in National

Congress the Congress the Commission on Elections allowed him to vote and
have him registered on precint 9 of Tolosa, Malbog, Leyte where he had resided.

Private respondent Donato Advincula filed a petition with the Municipal

Trial Court of Tolosa, Leyte, praying that Romualdez be excluded from the list of
voters in Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, under BP 881 and RA 7166.

Advincula alleged that Romualdez was a resident of Massachusetts, U.S.A.

That his profession and occupation was in the U.S.A.; that he had just recently
arrived in the Philippines; and that he did not have the required one-year
residence in the Philippines and the six-month residence in Tolosa to qualify him
to register as a voter in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.

The court finds the respondent to be a resident of Brgy. Malbog, Tolosa,

Leyte and qualified to register as a voter thereat. Hence, the instant petition for
exclusion of Philip G. Romualdez from the list of voter of Precinct No. 9, Malbog,
Tolosa, Leyte is hereby ordered DENIED and petition DISMISSED

Advincula appealed the case to the respondent court.

Issues: Whether or not the respondent court erred in finding the petitioner to
have voluntarily left the country and abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte.
Ruling
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms,
thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with
"domicile", which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention." Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent
for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. That residence,
in the case of the petitioner, was established during the early 1980's to be at
Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost
by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new
domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old
domicile.
The political situation brought about by the "People's Power Revolution" must
have truly caused great apprehension to the Romualdezes, as well as a serious

concern over the safety and welfare of the members of their families. Their going
into self-exile until conditions favorable to them would have somehow stabilized is
understandable. Certainly, their sudden departure from the country cannot be
described as "voluntary," or as "abandonment of residence" at least in the
context that these terms are used in applying the concept of "domicile by choice."
The court finding merit on the petition the same is hereby GRANTED DUE
COURSE.
Asistio vs. Trinidad - Pe
G.R. No. 191124
Facts:

On January 26, 2010, private respondent Enrico R. Echiverri filed against

petitioner Luis A. Asistio a Petition for Exclusion of Voter from the Permanent List
of Voters of Caloocan City before MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City.

Echiverri alleged that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City, specifically

not of 123 Interior P. Zamora St, Barangay 15, Caloocan City as stated in his
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor in the 2010 Automated National and
Local Elections. Both were candidate for Mayor of Caloocan City.

On January 28, 2010, the MeTC issued a Notice of Hearing notifying Asistio,
through Atty. Carlos M. Caliwara, his counsel of record in SPA No. 09-151 (DC),
entitled "Asistio v. Echiverri," before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), of
the scheduled hearings of the case on February 1, 2 and 3, 2010.

Trial on the merits ensued and on February 5, 2010, Judge Malabaguio

rendered a decision directing removal of the name of LUIS AQUINO ASISTIO from
the list of permanent voters of Caloocan City.

An appeal to the MeTC decision was made as it would deprive Asistio of his
right to vote. Echiverri filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal, arguing that the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over the Appeal on the ground of failure to file the
required appeal fees. Petitioner having paid his docket fee only on February 11,
2010 which was not simultaneous with the filing of his notice of appeal on
February 10, 2010 . RTC granted the motion of Echiverri to dismiss Asistios
appeal of the MeTC decision on the ground of non-payment of the required docket
fees.

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Issue: Whether or not Asistio should be excluded from the permanent list of
voters of Precinct 1811A of Caloocan City for failure to comply with the residency
required by law evidenced by the declaration of a false or non- existent address.
Ruling:
Under Section 117 of The Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang 881)
and Section 9 states the qualifications of a voter. From these provisions, the
residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year residence in the
Philippines and at least six (6) months in the place where the person proposes or
intends to vote.
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence where, when absent for business
or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. Domicile is not easily lost.
To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual
removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond
with that purpose
Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more
than 72 years. His family is known to be among the prominent political families in
Caloocan City. In 2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. Asistio cast his vote
in the same city. It cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to
qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has established
domicile elsewhere, or that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his
residence in Caloocan City. He I1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City.
The petition of Luis A. Asistio is GRANTED.
Velasco vs Comelec
GR NO. 180051
Facts:
Sasmuan, Pampanga on June 22, 1952. He got married in Pampanga and on
1983, he moved to and worked in the USA where he became a citizen. In 2006,
Velasco applied for dual citizenship under RA 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. His application was
approved on July 31, 2006. He returned to the Philippines on September 14, 2006
and has not left since. Soon thereafter or on October 13, 2006, Velasco applied for
registration as a voter of Sasmuan, Pampanga. The Election Registration Board
(ERB) denied his application. Velasco filed a petition for the inclusion of his name
in the list of voters with the Municipal Trial Court of Sasmuan (MTC). Finding no
evidence of Velascos change of domicile, MTC granted Velascos petition on
February 9, 2007.

On March 1, 2007, the RTC reversed and set aside, on appeal, the MTC decision.
The RTC reasoned out that Velasco lost his domicile of origin when he became a
US citizen; under Philippine immigration laws, he could only stay in the Philippines
as a visitor or as a resident alien. Velasco only regained or reacquired his
Philippine residency on July 31, 2006 when he reacquired his Filipino citizenship.
Velasco filed for an appeal via petition for review under rule 42 of the rules of
ourt.
It was his contention that his COC contains the required information that he is a
registered voter of Precinct No. 103-A of Sasmuan, Pampanga. He executed on
even date an Affidavit renouncing, abandoning, and relinquishing his American
citizenship. The next day, private respondent Mozart Panlaqui, who also filed his
COC for the position of Mayor of Sasmuan, filed a Petition to Deny Due Course To
and to Cancel Velascos COC, claiming that he is not a registered voter of Precinct
as his name is not included in the list of voters and the RTC has rendered a
decision denying Velascos petition for inclusion as voter. Also Velasco does not
possess the constitutional requirement of legal residency (i.e., one year residency
in the Philippines immediately preceding the election as provided under Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution) to register as voter. Panlaqui asked for the
annulment, revocation and cancellation of, or denial of due course to,
Velascos COC that allegedly contained obvious and gross material
misrepresentation
In his Answer, Velasco denied the allegations of Panlaquis petition and claimed in
defense that he possesses all the qualifications of a voter of Sasmuan, as he is a
domiciliary and permanent resident of the Philippines and Sasmuan since birth;
that, when he took his oath of allegiance on July 31, 2006, he is considered not to
have lost his Philippine citizenship and therefore continues to enjoy full civic and
political rights under the Constitution and the statutes and he did not act with
malice, bad faith and gross misrepresentation when he stated that he is a
registered voter of Precinct No. 103-A of Sasmuan in his COC.
In the May 2007 election, Velasco garnered 7,822 for the position of Mayor of
Sasmuan. As the COMELEC failed to resolve Panlaquis petition prior to the
election, Velasco was proclaimed Mayor. He took his oath of office and assumed
the powers and functions of the office on June 30, 2007.
On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued a Resolution canceling Velascos COC
and declaring his proclamation as Mayor of Sasmuan null and void. Citing Section
138 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) which declared the decision of the RTC in
the voters inclusion/exclusion proceedings final and executory, the Second
Division of the COMELEC found Velasco guilty of material misrepresentation when
he claimed in his COC filed on March 28, 2007 that he is a registered voter of
Sasmuan, Pampanga. This defect, according to the Second Division, effectively
voided Velascos COC. Velasco moved to reconsider but the COMELEC denied the

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motion. Velasco responded to this development by filing the present petition with
the Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Velasco is disqualified to vote thereby declaring his victory
as a mayor null and void.
RULING: YES. At the time he filed his application for registration with the
COMELEC local office on October 13, 2006, Velasco was a dual citizen. The
records show that Velasco renounced his American citizenship only on March 28,
2007, although he secured his dual citizenship status as early as July 31, 2006 at
the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, California. Under his dual citizenship
status, he possessed the right to vote in Philippine elections through the absentee
voting scheme under Republic Act No. 9189. Absentee voters are exempted from
the constitutional residency requirement for regular Philippine voters. Thus, the
residency requirements cited do not apply to Velasco, assuming he registered as
a dual citizen/absentee voter. By law, however, the right of dual citizens who
vote as absentee voters pertains only to the election of national officials,
specifically: the president, the vice-president, the senators, and party-list
representatives. Thus, Velasco was not eligible to vote as an absentee voter in
the local election of 2007. In fact, the records do not show that Velasco ever
registered as an absentee voter for the 2007 election. On the other hand, Velasco
could not have registered as a regular voter because he did not possess the
residency requirement of one-year stay in the Philippines and six-months stay in
the municipality where he proposed to vote at the time of the election. The
records show that he arrived in the Philippines only on September 14, 2006 and
applied for registration on October 13 of that year. Velasco could not have
therefore validly registered as a regular voter eight months before the May 2007
local elections.
In the present case, Velasco is not only going around the law by his claim that he
is registered voter when he is not, as has been determined by a court in a final
judgment. Equally important is that he has made a material misrepresentation
under oath in his COC regarding his qualification. For these violations, he must
pay the ultimate price the nullification of his election victory. He may also have
to account in a criminal court for making a false statement under oath, but this is
a matter for the proper authorities to decide upon.
Macalintal vs Comelec
GR No. 157013
FACTS: Macalintal, as a taxpayer and a lawyer, filed a petition questioning the
validity of the provisions of RA 9189 (Overseas absentee voting act of 2033). He
claimed that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of the
case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and

appropriated. Petitioner claims that it is violative of the residency requirement in

Section 1 Article V of the Constitution which requires the voter must be a resident
in the Philippines for at least one yr., and a resident in the place where he
proposes to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding an election.
ISSUES: Whether or not Section 5(d) of RA 9189 violates the residency
requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution.
Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the constitutional mandate
under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for
President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress.
Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in Section 25 of RA 9189, exercise the power to review, revise,
amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the
Commission on Elections, promulgate without violating the independence of the
COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution.
RULING: No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified
voting under this Act. It disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is
recognized as such in the host country. However, an exception is provided i.e.
unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose
by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of registration.
Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in
another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of
the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee
Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia. However, OSG
held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and that the Court
may have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the controversy: Affidavit
for without it,
the presumption of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The qualified
Filipino abroad who executed an affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile
in the Philippines and presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical
absence from this country. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 does not only require the
promise to resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not
later than 3 years after approval of registration but it also requires the Filipino
abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a temporary visitor or even on business
trip, must declare that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country.
Thus, he/she must return to the Philippines otherwise consequences will be met
according to RA No. 9189.
Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has
exercised his right to vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of

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the law or to repeal or modify it if such law is found to be impractical. However, it

can be said that the Congress itself was conscious of this probability and provided
for deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return as promised stands to
lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast shall not be invalidated
because he was qualified to vote on the date of the elections. In fine, considering
the underlying intent of the Constitution, which is to grant Filipino immigrants and
permanent residents abroad the unquestionable right to exercise the right of
suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is not
constitutionally defective.
Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of
the winning candidates for President and Vice President for the entire nation must
remain in the hands of Congress as its duty and power under Section 4 of Article
VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the winning
candidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps.
No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the
Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond the
scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional
mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is
left with no option but to withdraw from its usual silence in declaring a provision
of law unconstitutional.
Nicolas-Lewis v. Commission On Elections
G.R. No. 162759
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a petition on April 1, 2004 to be able to vote in the May 2004
elections. As dual citizens, they were questioned by the COMELEC whether or not

they accomplished the requirements stated in Sec. 1 and sec. 2 of Art. 5 of the
1987 constitution.
Petitioners contend that they can exercise their right to suffrage as absentee
voters since it is indicated in R.A 9189 (OAVL) as amended in R.A 9225 that they
(as duals) are free to exercise their political rights. COMELEC counteracted by
saying, petitioners werent able to comply the one year residence requirement
prescribed by the constitution and R.A 9225 right to suffrage was not made for
those who have re-acquired their citizenship.
After filing the petition, COMELEC filed a comment praying for the denial of the
petition. Comment was granted by the lower court. As a result, petitioners werent
able to register let alone vote in the said elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under R.A no.
9225 may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in R.A
9189.
HELD:
Yes, dual citizens are allowed to enjoy full civil and political rights under section 5
of the act provided they meet the requirements under section 1, Art. 5 of the
constitution in relation to R.A 9189.
According to COMELEC, duals must first establish their domicile/residence in the
Philippines, but Supreme Court disagrees. SC asserts that there is no provision in
thedual citizenship law or R.A 9225 requiring duals to actually establish
residence and physically stay in the Philippines before they can vote.
Therefore, dual citizens are allowed to exercise their right to vote and exercise
their political exercise.