1.

Cojuangco, Jr vs PCGG
G.R. Nos. 92319-20 October 2, 1990 109 SCRA 266

FACTS:
President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor General to prosecute all persons involved in
the misuse of coconut levy funds.
Pursuant to the above directive the Solicitor General created a task force to conduct a thorough
study of the possible involvement of all persons in the anomalous use of coconut levy funds.
The Solicitor General filed two criminal complaints with respondent PCGG which assigned both
complaints to prosecutor Cesario del Rosario for preliminary investigation. Del Rosario prepared
a subpoena setting the preliminary investigation as to respondents Ma. Clara Lobregat, Jose
Eleazae, Felix Duenas, Jr and Salvador Escudero, Eduardo Conjuangco, Rolando de la Cuesta
and Hermenegildo Zayco.
At the scheduled preliminary investigation petitioner appeared through counsel and Instead of
filing a counter-affidavit, as required in the subpoena, he filed two motions (1) a motion to
disqualify/inhibit PCGG; alternatively, a motion to dismiss; and (2) motion to have the PCGG
itself hear or resolve Cojuangco's motion to disqualify/inhibit PCGG alternatively, motion to
dismiss.
Prosecutor del Rosario denied both motions and declared the proceedings submitted for
resolution.
Petitioner filed in this Court petitions for prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining
order/writ of preliminary injunction. He alleges that the PCGG has no right to conduct such
preliminary investigation.
The PCGG issued an order that the complaints filed against them may now be considered
submitted for resolution by this Commission and this Commission finds the findings and
conclusions of fact of the investigating prosecutor, that a prima facie case has been established
against all the respondents.
A panel of prosecutors designated by the PCGG issued a subpoena to petitioner in order to
compel him to appear in the investigation of said cases. Petitioner prays that, after hearing, the
PCGG be prohibited from continuing with the preliminary investigation and that it be ordered to
forward the records of the case to the Ombudsman for appropriate action.
ISSUE: Whether PCGG has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of the criminal
complaints filed against them by the Solicitor General
RULING:
From the foregoing provisions of law, particularly Sections 2(b) and 3(a) of Executive Order No.
1 and Sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 14, it is clear that the PCGG has the power to
investigate and prosecute such ill-gotten wealth cases of the former President, his relatives and
associates, and graft and corrupt practices cases that may be assigned by the President to the
PCGG to be filed with the Sandiganbayan. No doubt, the authority to investigate extended to the
PCGG includes the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. Thus, the Tanodbayan lost

the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of these types of cases by the
promulgation of the said Executive Order Nos. 1 and 14 whereby the PCGG was vested
concurrent ent jurisdiction with the Tanodbayan to conduct such preliminary investigation and to
prosecute said cases before the Sandiganbayan.
Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the function
of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer conducting the same investigates or inquires
into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of determining
whether or not an information may be prepared against the accused. Indeed, a preliminary
investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of
the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not
be bound as a matter of law to order an acquittal. A preliminary investigation has then been
called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes judicial when there is
opportunity to be heard and for, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision is
rendered thereon. The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to
preside or to conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than that of a municipal judge or even
a regional trial court judge. While the investigating officer, strictly speaking is not a "judge," by
the nature of his functions he is and must be considered to be a quasi judicial officer.
2. First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA
Gr 110571 March 10, 1994
Facts:
The Board of Investments(BOI) in its decision dated December 10, 1992, granted the petitioner's
application to change the scope of its registered products from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic
tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
On February 24, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss holding that the CA had no appellate
jurisdiction because such jurisdiction is vested with the SC according to Art. 82 of the Omnibus
Investments Code (OIC). The CA dismissed the motion to dismiss causing the petitioner to file a
petition for certiorari with the SC.
It is the opinion of the petitioner that the Judiciary Reorganization Act if 1980 (BP 129) and
Circular 1-91, which prescribes rules governing appeals to the CA from decisions of the Court of
Tax appeals and quasi-judicial bodies, cannot be basis of the appeal because it is contrary to
Article 82 of the OIC. However, Mariwasa contended that the inconsistency was resolved by the
issuance if Circular 1-91 which holds that decisions of the Court of tax appeals and quasi-judicial
agencies are appealable to the CA.
Isaue:
Whether or not the decision of the BOI is appealable to the CA.
Decision:
The court ruled that the law governing the appeal of quasi-judicial agencies is the OIC, however,
Circular 1-91 transfers the jurisdiction to the CA. The said circular was issued by the SC
pursuant to the power granted by the constitution to promulgate rules relating to the procedure in
all courts.
By this effect, Curcular 1-91 effectively repealed and superseded the Omnibus Investments
Code insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal decisions of the BOI.

3. PEDRO W. GUERZON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 77707 August 8, 1988
Facts:On January 9, 1981 petitioner Pedro Guerzon executed with Basic Landoil Energy
Corporation, which was later acquired by respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, a
contract denominated as "Service Station Lease" for the use and operation of respondent
SHELL's properties, facilities and equipment for a period of five (5) years from January 15, 1981
and ending on January 14, 1986. Paragraph 9 of the Service Station Lease Contract provides
that the cancellation or termination of the Dealer's Sales Contract executed between the
COMPANY and the LESSEE on January 7,1981 shall automatically cancel this Lease.
On January 7, 1981 petitioner likewise executed with the same Corporation a
"Dealer's Sales Contract" for the sale by petitioner of respondent SHELL's petroleum and other
products in the leased service station which contract expired April 12,1986.
Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) approved the Dealer's Sales Contract and issued a
certificate of authority in petitioner's favor, which had a 5-year period of validity, in line with the
terms of the contract.
As early as January 2, 1986 respondent SHELL wrote to petitioner informing him that
the Company was not renewing the Dealer's Sales Contract which was to expire on April 12,
1986 together with the service station lease, with copy furnished to BEU. But petitioner failed to
turn-over the service station premises and all the equipment.
Subsequently, BEU, through respondent Caasi, Jr., officer- in-charge of its Mindanao
Division Office, issued the assailed order directing the petitioner to immediately vacate the
service station and turn it over to Shell Petroleum Corporation; and show cause in writing, under
oath within ten (10) days from receipt why no administrative and/or criminal proceedings shall be
instituted against petitioner for the aforesaid violation.
Pursuant to the said order, respondent SHELL, accompanied by law enforcement
officers, was able to secure possession of the gasoline station in question together with the
equipment and accessories, and turned them over to SHELL.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental a complaint for
certiorari, injunction and damages with preliminary mandatory injunction to annul the disputed
order of respondent F.C. Caasi, Jr., but the complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to
annul the order of a quasi-judicial body of equivalent category as the RTC.
Petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with a prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction seeking the annulment of respondent Caasi, Jr.'s order and the
restoration to petitioner of possession of the service station and the equipment removed
therefrom. But the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition after holding the disputed order valid
and the proceedings undertaken to implement the same sanctioned by Presidential Decree No.
1206, as amended.
Hence, petitioner's recourse to this Court.
Issue:Whether or not BEU has the power to order the petitoner to vacate theleased service
station

Held:No. Under Section 7 of P.D. No. 1206, as amended the Bureau of Energy Utilization may,
in case of a violation or non- compliance with any term or condition of any certificate, license or
permit issued by the Bureau or any of its orders, decisions, rules or regulations: (1) impose a
fine not exceeding P1,000.00; and (2) in case of failure to pay the fine imposed or to cease and
discontinue the violation or non-compliance, order the suspension, closure or stoppage of
operations of the establishment of the guilty party. Its authority is limited to these two (2) options.
It can do no more, as there is nothing in P.D. No. 1206, as amended, which empowers the
Bureau to issue an order to vacate in case of a violation.
As it is, jurisdiction to order a lessee to vacate the leased premises is vested in the
civil courts in an appropriate case for unlawful detainer or accionpubliciana. There is nothing in
P.D. No. 1206, as amended, that would suggest that the same or similar jurisdiction has been
granted to the Bureau of Energy Utilization. It is a fundamental rule that an administrative
agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are
necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.Moreoverthe text of the assailed order leaves no
room for doubt that it was issued in connection with an adjudication of the contractual dispute
between respondent Shell and petitioner. But then the Bureau of Energy Utilization, like its
predecessor, the defunct Oil Industry Commission, has no power to decide contractual disputes
between gasoline dealers and oil companies, in the absence of an express provision of law
granting to it such. As explicitly stated in the law, in connection with the exercise of quasi-judicial
powers, the Bureau's jurisdiction is limited to cases involving violation or non-compliance with
any term or condition of any certificate, license or permit issued by it or of any of its orders,
decisions, rules or regulations.
4. ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION vs. THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
G.R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987 153 SCRA 399
Facts:By virtue of a Contract to Sell dated 18 August 1970, Jose Hernando acquired
prospective and beneficial ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights
Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation.
On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights over Lot No. 15 to private
respondent VirgilioYuson. The transfer was embodied in a Deed of Assignment and Substitution
of Obligor (Delegacion), executed with the consent of Antipolo Realty, in which Mr. Yuson
assumed the performance of the vendee's obligations under the original contract, including
payment of his predecessor's installments in arrears.
However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance
with its undertaking under Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell,Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages
pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly
installment payments falling due thereafter. Clause 17 of the contract provides that Antipolo
Realty obligates itself to provide the subdivision with: a) Concrete curbs and gutters b)
Underground drainage system c) Asphalt paved roads d) Independent water system e) Electrical
installation with concrete posts. f) Landscaping and concrete sidewall g) Developed park or
amphi-theatre h) 24-hour security guard service. These improvements shall be complete within
a period of two (2) years from date of this contract. Failure by the SELLER (Antipolo) shall
permit the BUYER to suspend his monthly installments without any penalties or interest charges
until such time that such improvements shall have been completed.

Subsequently, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent

Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed,
and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments. Mr. Yuson replied that he
would conform with the request as soon as he was able to verify the truth of the representation
in the notice. In a second letter, Antipolo Realty reiterated its request that Mr. Yuson resume
payment of his monthly installments, citing the decision rendered by the National Housing
Authority (NHA) in the case entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr. vs. Conrado S. Reyes,declaring Antipolo
Realty to have "substantially complied with its commitment to the lot buyers pursuant to the
Contract to Sell executed by and between the lot buyers and the respondent." In addition, a
formal demand was made for full and immediate payment of the amount of P16,994.73,
representing installments which, Antipolo Realty alleged, had accrued during the period while
the improvements were being completed i.e., between September 1972 and October 1976.
Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly installments but
agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the
Contract to Sell, and claimed the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr.
Yuson.
Hence, Mr. Yuson brought the dispute with Antipolo Realty before public respondent
NHA. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion to Dismiss. After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision
ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell under certain conditions.
Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting: (a) that it had been
denied due process of law since it had not been served with notice of the scheduled hearing;
and (b) that the jurisdiction to hear and decide Mr. Yuson's complaint was lodged in the regular
courts, not in the NHA, since that complaint involved the interpretation and application of the
Contract to Sell.
The motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent NHA General Manager G.V.
Tobias, who sustained the jurisdiction of the NHA to hear and decide the Yuson complaint. He
also found that Antipolo Realty had in fact been served with notice of the date of the hearing, but
that its counsel had failed to attend the hearing. The case was submitted for decision, and
eventually decided, solely on the evidence presented by the complainant.
Hence this petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The
petitioner assailed the jurisdiction of the NHA. Petitioner further asserted that, under Clause 7 of
the Contract to Sell, it could validly terminate its agreement with Mr. Yuson and, as a
consequence thereof, retain all the prior installment payments made by the latter.
Issue: Whether or not the NHA, in ordering the reinstatement of contract to sell, acted beyond
its competence.
Held: No.The substantive provisions being applied and enforced by the NHA in the instant case
are found in Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 957 which reads:
Sec. 23.Non-Forfeiture of Payments. No installment payment made by a buyer in a
subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be
forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice to the

owner or developer, desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or
developer to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the
approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer may,
at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization and interests
but excluding delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the legal rate. (emphasis
supplied.)
Having failed to comply with its contractual obligation to complete certain specified
improvements in the subdivision within the specified period of two years from the date of the
execution of the Contract to Sell, petitioner was not entitled to exercise its options under Clause
7 of the Contract. Hence, petitioner could neither rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the
installment payments made by the private respondent as forfeited in its favor. The NHA was
therefore correct in holding that private respondent's prior installment payments could not be
forfeited in favor of petitioner.
Neither did the NHA commit any abuse, let alone a grave abuse of discretion or act in
excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the
parties. Such reinstatement is no more than a logical consequence of the NHA's correct ruling
that the petitioner was not entitled to rescind the Contract to Sell. There is, in any case, no
question that under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally empowered to determine
and protect the rights of contracting parties under the law administered by it and under the
respective agreements, as well as to ensure that their obligations thereunder are faithfully
performed.
1. Bantolino V Coca Cola
GR 153660

10 June 2003

On 15 February 1995 sixty-two (62) employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc., and its
officers, Lipercon Services, Inc., Peoples Specialist Services, Inc., and Interim Services, Inc.,
filed a complaint against respondents for unfair labor practice through illegal dismissal, violation
of their security of tenure and the perpetuation of the Cabo System.
Thereafter, Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera conducted clarificatory hearing to elicit information from
the ten (10) remaining complainants (petitioners herein) relative to their alleged employment with
respondent firm.
On 29 May 1998 Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera rendered a decision ordering respondent company
to reinstate complainants to their former positions with all the rights, privileges and benefits due
regular employees, and to pay their full back wages which, with the exception of Prudencio
Bantolino whose back wages must be computed upon proof of his dismissal as of 31 May 1998,
already amounted to an aggregate of P1,810,244.00.
On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding of the Labor Arbiter that there was indeed an
employer-employee relationship between the complainants and respondents.
Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers appealed to the Court of Appeals which, although affirming the
finding of the NLRC that an employer-employee relationship existed between the contending

parties, nonetheless agreed with respondent that the affidavits of some of the complainants,
namely, Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor Romero, Nilo Espina, Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver Garcia,
Eduardo Garcia and Nelson Manalastas, should not have been given probative value for their
failure to affirm the contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination.
ISSUE:
WON Administrative bodies are bound by the same technicalities of law as used by the courts
HELD:
No, To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of
law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court
and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a
suppletory character and effect. The submission by respondent, citing People v. Sorrel, that an
affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value,
cannot find relevance in the present case considering that a criminal prosecution requires a
quantum of evidence different from that of an administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the
Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial
or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may be decided based
on verified position papers, with supporting documents and their affidavits.

3. G.R. No. 69871

24 August 1990

189 SCRA 34

Anita Villa v. Manuel Lazaro & the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
Naravasa, J.:
FACTS
On 18 January 1980, Anita Villa (petitioner) was granted a building permit to
construct a funeral parlor at Santiago Blvd., General Santos City. The permit was issued by the
City Engineer after the application was processed by Engr. Dominador Solana of the City
Engineers Office, and on the strength of the Certification of Manuel Sales, City Planning and
Development Coordinator that the project was in consonance with the Land Use Plan of the City
and within the full provision of the Zoning Ordinance. Villa then commenced construction of the
building.
CFI In October 1980, as the funeral parlor was nearing completion, Dr. Jose
Veneracion brought a suit for injunction against Villa. Dr. Veneracion was the owner of St.
Elizabeth Hospital about 132.36 meters from the parlor. He averred that the construction of the
funeral parlor was violative of the Zoning Ordinance of General Santos City. CFI dismissed the
complaint as well as the counterclaim pleaded by Villa. The court found that a falsified Zoning

Ordinance, containing a provision governing funeral parlors, was submitted to and ratified by the
Ministry of Human Settlements. That ordinance, however, had never been passed by the
Sangguniang Panglungsod. The genuine Zoning Ordinance contained no prohibition relative to
funeral parlors distance from hospitals. Villa resumed construction.
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission Dr. Veneracion did not appeal from
judgment which therefore became final. Instead, he brought the same case with the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission. He lodged a complaint with a prayer that the funeral parlor
be relocated because it was near St. Elizabeth Hospital and Villa failed to secure the necessary
locational clearance.
Two months after the CFI judgment (22 January 1982), Villa received a telegram from
Commissioner Raymundo R. Dizon requesting for the transmittal of proof of locational
clearance. On that same day, Villa sent a reply telegram. Villa then sent Dizon the certification of
Josefina E. Alaba (Human Settlements Officer) and the certification of Manuel O. Sales, City
Planning and Development Coordinator by registered mail on 27 January 1982. On 8 February
1982, Villa received the official communication referred to in the previous telegram.
Considering that she already sent the clearance earlier, she made no response. On 2 June
1982, Villa received a Show Cause Order signed by Ernesto L. Mendiola in behalf of the
Commission, requiring her to show cause why a fine should not be imposed on her or a ceaseand-desist order issued against her for her failure to show proof of locational clearance. The
order made no reference of the registered mail earlier sent by Villa. On that same day, Villa sent
Dizon by registered mail, the same certifications she already sent. On 27 July 1982, she
received an Order from Dizon imposing on her a fine of P10,000 and requiring her to cease
operations. No reference was again made about the previous mails.

Villa subsequently went to see the Deputized Zoning Administrator of General Santos
City, Isidro M. Olmedo. The latter issued her a Certificate of Zoning Compliance attesting that
the land of Villas commercial building was located in a vicinity in which the dominant land uses
were commercial/institutional/residential and that the project conformed with the land use plan of
the city. Villa sent this certificate to Dizon on the same day she acquired it. This certificate is
entirely consistent the earlier certification. On 16 November 1982, a writ of execution was served
to Villa. She moved for reconsideration and attached copies of the documents earlier sent. The
motion was denied by Dizon saying that the plea was presented out of time and the order had
become final and executory. Villa appealed with the Commission Proper which was likewise
denied on the same ground.
Office of the Pres. Villa appealed to the Office of the President. It was acted on by
the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, Manuel M. Lazaro (respondent). In a Resolution
dated 21 Septemeber 1984, Lazaro denied the appeal and the motion for extension of time to
submit an appeal memorandum. Villa filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
resolution was not in conformity with the law and the evidence and deprived her of due process
of law. This was also denied in a Resolution dated 14 December 1984.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villa was denied due process of law.
HELD
The facts present a picture of official incompetence or gross negligence and
abdication of duty, if not of active bias and partiality, that is most reprehensible. Dr. Veneracion
resorted to the proscribed practice of forum-shopping. Following judgment of CFI, he lodged a
complaint with the Commission instead of appealing that judgment. Also, while the Commission

took cognizance of the complaint and by telegram required Villa to submit locational clearance, it
did not bother to put Villa on notice, formally or otherwise, of Dr. Veneracions complaint. It was
therefore only natural for Villa to assume that no formal adversarial inquiry was underway and
that the telegram was only a routinary request to submit proof of compliance with locational
requirements.
There was absolutely no excuse for initiating what is held out as an administrative
proceeding against Villa without informing her of the complaint which initiated the case; for
conducting that inquiry in the most informal manner by means only of communications requiring
submission of certain documents, leaving the impression that compliance was all that was
expected of her and with which directives she promptly and religiously complied.
Villa not once but thrice furnished the Commission with the required documents by
registered mail. Dizon, however, failed to even acknowledge the existence of the documents.
This was perpetuated by the Commission Proper and Lazaro and kept in limbo evidence that
would have been decisive. No excuse can be advanced for avoiding all mention or consideration
of certifications.
All of the foregoing translates to a denial of due process against which the defense of
failure to take timely appeal will not avail. Administrative proceedings are not exempt from the
operation of certain basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the due process
requirements in investigations and trials. Administrative due process is recognized to include (a)
the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect
a persons legal right; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights, introduce
witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor, (c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him
reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and (d) a
finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing,
or at least contained in the records or disclosed to the parties affected.
Petition is granted, Proceedings complained of are annulled and the challenged
resolutions are vacated and set aside, for having been taken and/or issued in violation of
petitioners right to due process.

4. G.R. Nos. 90660-61

21 January 1991

193 SCRA 132

Ute Paterok v. Bureau of Customs & Hon. Salvador N. Mison

Sarmiento, J.:

rendered on 16 December 1986 by the District Collector of Customs, also an office under BOC.
Before the letter, Paterok had not been informed of this separate seizure case. Paterok later
found out that on 13 November 1986, a notice of hearing set on 2 December 1986 concerning
the Mercedes Benz was posted on the bulletin board of the BOC at Port Area, Manila.

He filed a motion for new trial before the Collector of Customs which was denied,
invoking the formers failure to appear in the hearing despite the posting of notice on the bulletin
board. The Collector of Customs also contended that a reopening of the case was an exercise in
futility since the forfeited property had an engine displacement of more than 2800 cubic
centimeters and therefore under the category of prohibited importation pursuant to BP 73.
Paterok filed a petition for review with the Dept. of Finance which the latter referred to
BOC. He also addressed a letter to the Hon. Cancio Garcia, Assistant Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs, Office of the President requesting assistance for a speedy resolution the petition.
Finally, BOC rendered a decision affirming the previous order of the Collector of
Customs for the Forfeiture of the Mercedes Benz in favor of the government. Hence, this petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not a notice of hearing posted in the bulletin board is sufficient notice.
HELD:
A notice of hearing posted on a bulletin board of the BOC in a forfeiture proceeding
where the owner of the alleged prohibited article is known does not constitute sufficient
compliance with proper service of notice and procedural due process. Time and again, the Court
has emphasized the imperative necessity for administrative agencies to observe the elementary
rules of due process. No rule is better established under the due process clause of the
Constitution than that which requires notice and opportunity to be heard before any person can
be lawfully deprived of his rights.
Although there was a notice of hearing posted on the bulletin board, the said
procedure is premised on the ground that the party or owner of the property in question is
unknown. This is clear from Secs. 2304 and 2306 (Notification of Unknown Owner and
Proceedings in Case of Property Belonging to Unknown Parties) of TCCP relied upon by BOC.
In the case at bar, the petitioner could not have been unknown. Aside from the fact the petitioner
had previous transactions with BOC, there was a similar seizure case instituted by Manila
International Container Port regarding the same property and owner. Respondents did not
exercise reasonable diligence to ascertain the identity of the owner.

FACTS
In March 1986, Ute Petrok (petitioner) shipped from Germany to the Philippines 2
containers: one with used household goods and the other with 2 used automobiles (1 Bourgetti
and 1 Mercedes Benz 450 SLC). The first container was released by the Bureau of Customs
(BOC) and later on, the Bourgetti car too. The Mercedes Benz remained under the custody of
BOC, In December 1987, after earnest efforts to secure the release of the vehicle, Paterok
received a notice of hearing from the legal office of the Manila International Container Port, BOC
informing him that seizure proceedings were being initiated against the Mercedes Benz for
violation of BP 73 in relation to Sec. 2530 (F) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines
(TCCP) and Central Bank Circular 1069. While case was pending, Paterok received on April
1988 a letter informing him that a decision ordering the forfeiture of Mercedes Benz had been

BP 73 Notwithstanding the procedural infirmity, the petition nonetheless cannot be

granted. The Mercedes Benz falls within the prohibited importation specified in BP 73 (a law
intended to promote energy conservation) and as such, is liable for seizure and forfeiture by
BOC.
Redemption of forfeited property Redemption of forfeited property shall not be
allowed in any case where the importation is absolutely prohibited or where the surrender of the
property to the person offering to redeem the same would be contrary to law. Petition is
dismissed.

5. ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED (deceased), Regional Director, DAR-CAR, Represented by his

Heirs, Francisca A. Lumiqued, May A. Lumiqued, Arlene A. Lumiqued and Richard A.
Lumiqued, petitioners, vs. Honorable APOLONIO G. EXEVEA, ERDOLFO V. BALAJADIA
and FELIX T. CABADING, All Members of Investigating Committee, created by DOJ Order
No. 145 on May 30, 1992; HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, HON.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CHIEF Presidential Legal Adviser/Counsel; and HON. LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, and
JEANNETTE OBARZAMUDIO, Private Respondent, respondents.

1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but
neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the
committee deemed the case submitted for resolution.

GR 117565

That the gasoline receipts have been falsified was not rebutted by the respondent. In fact, he
had in effect admitted that he had been claiming for the payment of an average consumption of
108.45 liters/day by justifying that this was being used by the 4 vehicles issued to his office.
Besides he also admitted having signed the receipts.

18 Nov 1997

Facts:
The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and
private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first
affidavit-complaint dated November 16,1989, charged Lumiqued with malversation through
falsification of official documents.
From May to September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts of falsification
by padding gasoline receipts. He even submitted a vulcanizing shop receipt worth P550.00 for
gasoline bought from the shop, and another receipt for P660.00 for a single vulcanizing job. With
the use of falsified receipts, Lumiqued claimed and was reimbursed the sum of P44,172.46.
Private respondent added that Lumiqued seldom made field trips and preferred to stay in the
office, making it impossible for him to consume the nearly 120 liters of gasoline he claimed
everyday.
In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22, 1989, private respondent accused
Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations, alleging that
during the months of April, May, July, August, September and October, 1989, he made
unliquidated cash advances in the total amount of P116,000.00. Lumiqued purportedly
defrauded the government by deliberately concealing his unliquidated cash advances through
the falsification of accounting entries in order not to reflect on Cash advances of other officials
under code 8-70-600 of accounting rules.

After a thorough evaluation of the evidences (sic) submitted by the parties, this committee finds
the evidence submitted by the complainant sufficient to establish the guilt of the respondent for
Gross Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. That most of the gasoline receipts used by the
respondent in claiming for the reimbursement of his gasoline expenses were falsified.

This committee likewise finds that the respondent have (sic) unliquidated cash advances in the
year 1989 which is in violation of established office and auditing rules. His cash advances
totaling to about P116,000.00 were properly documented. The requests for obligation of
allotments and the vouchers covering the amounts were all signed by him. The mere certification
issued by the Administrative Officer of the DAR-CAR cannot therefore rebut these concrete
evidences (sic).
On the third complaint, this committee likewise believes that the respondents act in relieving the
complainant of her functions as a Regional Cashier on December 1, 1989 was an act of
harassment. It is noted that this was done barely two weeks after the complainant filed charges
against her (sic). Accordingly, the investigating committee recommended Lumiqueds dismissal
or removal from office, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges against
him.
Acting on the report and recommendation, former Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon adopted
the same in his Memorandum to President Fidel V. Ramos dated October 22, 1992President
Fidel V. Ramos himself issued Administrative Order No. 52 (A.O. No. 52), finding Lumiqued
administratively liable for dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen gasoline receipts, and dismissing
him from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits

The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15, 1989, charged Lumiqued with oppression and
harassment. According to private respondent, her two previous complaints prompted Lumiqued
to retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier without just cause.

In a petition for appeal addressed to President Ramos, Lumiqued prayed that A.O. No. 52 be
reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his former position with all the benefits accorded to
him by law and existing rules and regulations. (The driver was blamed)

In his counter-affidavit dated June 23, 1992, Lumiqued alleged, inter alia, that the cases were
filed against him to extort money from innocent public servants like him, and were initiated by
private respondent in connivance with a certain Benedict Ballug of Tarlac and a certain Benigno
Aquino III. He claimed that the apparent weakness of the charge was bolstered by private
respondents execution of an affidavit of desistance. He also addressed each charge against him
in the complaint (he claimed that he didnt do anything wrong and the expenses were proper,
tapos ung cashier dishonest and palaging absent).

Treating the petition for appeal as a motion for reconsideration of A.O. No. 52, the OP, through
Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, denied the same on August 31,
1993.

Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued
was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17,

Undaunted, Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration, alleging, among other things,
that he was denied the constitutional right to counsel during the hearing. On May 19, 1994,
however, before his motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died. On September 28, 1994,
Secretary Quisumbing denied the second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal of the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Committee, the October 22, 1992, Memorandum of
then Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52 issued by President Ramos, and the orders of
Secretary Quisumbing. In a nutshell, it prays for the payment of retirement benefits and other
benefits accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued by law, payable to his heirs; and the
backwages from the period he was dismissed from service up to the time of his death on May
19, 1994. Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his
right to counsel during the hearing. They maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived
unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert that the committee
should have suspended the hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to
secure a counsel of his own. If suspension was not possible, the committee should have
appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him.
Issue: Whether or not the committee failed to inform Luminiqued of his right to counsel
Ruling:
These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived
unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an
accused during custodial investigation.
It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and,
with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of
an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own
choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The
investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the
purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the
complaints filed against him.
As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a criminal
prosecution. This was even made more pronounced when, after finding Lumiqued
administratively liable, it hinted at the filing of a criminal case for malversation through
falsification of public documents in its report and recommendation.
(madami tong related to Admin so read the syllabus)
Administrative Law; Right to Counsel; The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the
waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused
during custodial investigation and may not be invoked by a respondent in an administrative
investigation.Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of
his right to counsel during the hearing. They maintain that his right to counsel could not be
waived unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert that the
committee should have suspended the hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within
which to secure a counsel of his own. If suspension was not possible, the committee should
have appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him. These arguments are untenable and
misplaced. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in
the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial
investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal
proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners

invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent
counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the
proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order
No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the
law for the complaints filed against him.
Same; Same; Department of Justice; While it is true that under the Administrative Code of 1987,
the DOJ shall administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes
thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration
of the correctional system, conducting criminal investigations is not its sole functionby its
power to perform such other functions as may be provided by law, prosecutors may be called
upon to conduct administrative investigations.Petitioners misconception on the nature of the
investigation conducted against Lumiqued appears to have been engendered by the fact that the
DOJ conducted it. While it is true that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall
administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof
consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the
correctional system, conducting criminal investigations is not its sole function. By its power to
perform such other functions as may be provided by law, prosecutors may be called upon to
conduct administrative investigations. Accordingly, the investigating committee created by
Department Order No. 145 was duty-bound to conduct the administrative investigation in
accordance with the rules therefor.
Same; Same; Public Officers; The right to counsel is not imperative in administrative
investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are
facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the
purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.While investigations conducted by
an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that
under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondents capacity to represent himself,
and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In an
administrative proceeding such as the one that transpired below, a respondent (such as
Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the
provisions of Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260 (otherwise known as the Civil
Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on Discipline) of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 202 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code
of 1987). Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings attended by
Lumiqued clearly show that he was confident of his capacity and so opted to represent himself.
Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such
inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary
measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the
dignity of government service.
Same; Same; Due Process; The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless
required by the Constitution or the law.The right to counsel is not indispensable to due
process unless required by the Constitution or the law. In Nera v. Auditor General, the Court
said: x x x There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he
shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not
indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that
without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The

ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at
his side.

6. Casimiro V Tandog
GR 146137

Same; Due Process; An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process
as long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be
said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence
of due process.In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain ones side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also,
and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through
pleadings. An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. As long as a
party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have
been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due
process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Lumiqueds appeal and
his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended the
proceedings conducted by the committee.
Same; Same; Public Officers; Security of Tenure; When the dispute concerns ones
constitutional ri ght to security of tenure, public office is deemed analogous to property in a
limited sensehence, the right to due process could rightfully be invoked.When the dispute
concerns ones constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public office is deemed
analogous to property in a limited sense; hence, the right to due process could rightfully be
invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute. Of equal weight is the
countervailing mandate of the Constitution that all public officers and employees must serve with
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. In this case, it has been clearly shown that
Lumiqued did not live up to this constitutional precept.
Same; Evidence; Well-settled is the doctrine that findings of fact of administrative agencies must
be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is
not overwhelming or preponderant.The committees findings pinning culpability for the charges
of dishonesty and grave misconduct upon Lumiqued were not, as shown above, fraught with
procedural mischief. Its conclusions were founded on the evidence presented and evaluated as
facts. Well-settled in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that findings of fact of administrative agencies
must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence
is not overwhelming or preponderant. The quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in
administrative cases is only substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Same; Public Officers; Dishonesty; Dishonesty is a grave offense penalized by dismissal and
under Section 9 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987, the penalty of dismissal carries with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave
credits and retirement benefits, and the disqualification for reemployment in the government
service.Dishonesty is a grave offense penalized by dismissal under Section 23 of Rule XIV of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. Under Section 9 of
the same Rule, the penalty of dismissal carriers with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
leave credits and retirement benefits, and the disqualification for reemployment in the
government service. The instant petition, which is aimed primarily at the payment of retirement
benefits and other benefits, plus back wages from the time of Lumiqueds dismissal until his
demise, must, therefore, fail.

8 June 2005

Facts:
Petitioner Haydee Casimiro began her service in the government as assessment clerk in the
Office of the Treasurer of San Jose, Romblon. In August 1983, she was appointed Municipal
Assessor. On 04 September 1996, Administrative Officer II Nelson M. Andres, submitted a
report2 based on an investigation he conducted into alleged irregularities in the office of
petitioner Casimiro. The report spoke of an anomalous cancellation of Tax Declarations No.
0236 in the name of Teodulo Matillano and the issuance of a new one in the name of petitioners
brother Ulysses Cawaling and Tax Declarations No. 0380 and No. 0376 in the name of Antipas
San Sebastian and the issuance of new ones in favor of petitioners brother-in-law Marcelo
Molina.
Immediately thereafter, respondent Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum Order No. 133 dated 06
September 1996, placing the petitioner under preventive suspension for thirty (30) days. Three
(3) days later, Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum Order No. 15, directing petitioner to answer
the charge of irregularities in her office. In her answer,4 petitioner denied the alleged
irregularities claiming, in essence, that the cancellation of the tax declaration in favor of her
brother Ulysses Cawaling was done prior to her assumption to office as municipal assessor, and
that she issued new tax declarations in favor of her brother-in-law Marcelo Molina by virtue of a
deed of sale executed by Antipas San Sebastian in Molinas favor. On 23 October 1996, thru
Memorandum Order No. 17,5 respondent Mayor extended petitioners preventive suspension for
another thirty (30) days effective 24 October 1996 to give him more time to verify and collate
evidence relative to the alleged irregularities. On 28 October 1996, Memorandum Order No. 186
was issued by respondent Mayor directing petitioner to answer in writing the affidavit-complaint
of Noraida San Sebastian Cesar and Teodulo Matillano. Noraida San Sebastian Cesar7 alleged
that Tax Declarations No. 0380 and No. 0376 covering parcels of land owned by her parents
were transferred in the name of a certain Marcelo Molina, petitioners brother-in-law, without the
necessary documents. Noraida Cesar further claimed that Marcelo Molina had not yet paid the
full purchase price of the land covered by the said Tax Declarations. For his part, Teodulo
Matillano claimed8 deed of absolute sale over the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No.
0236 in favor of Ulysses Cawaling, petitioners brother.
response to Memorandum Order No. 18, petitioner submitted a letter9 dated 29 October 1996,
stating that with respect to the complaint of Noraida San Sebastian Cesar, she had already
explained her side in the letter dated 26 September 1996. As to the complaint of Teodulo
Matillano, she alleged that it was a certain Lilia Barrientos who executed a deed of absolute sale
over the parcel of land subject of the complaint in favor of her brother, Ulysses Cawaling. Not
satisfied, respondent Mayor created a fact-finding committee to investigate the matter. After a
series of hearings, the committee, on 22 November 1996, submitted its report10 petitioners
separation from service, the dispositive portion of which reads: recommending Evaluating the
facts above portrayed, it is clearly shown that Municipal Assessor Haydee Casimero is guilty of
malperformance of duty and gross dishonesty to the prejudice of the taxpayers of San Jose,
Romblon who are making possible the payments of her salary and other allowances.
Consequently, we are unanimously recommending her separation from service.
Undeterred by that setback, petitioner appealed to the CSC, which affirmed12 Mayors order of

dismissal. A motion for reconsideration13 respondent was filed, but the same was denied.14
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated her case to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently affirmed
the CSC decision.15 Her motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was afforded procedural and substantive due process when she was
terminated from her employment as Municipal Assessor of San Jose, Romblon.
HELD:
In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is
enforced. The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of
notice and a real opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at
bar, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain ones side or the
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. To be heard does
not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also thru pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process. In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has
been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the
institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to
be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in
ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as
well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the
parties affected.
7. Globe Telecom, Inc. vs. National Telecommunications Commission
GR 143964 26 July 2004
PETITIONER/S: GLOBE TELECOM, INC.,
RESPONDENT/S:
1.

THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

2.

COMMISSIONER JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO

3.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONERS AURELIO M. UMALI and NESTOR DACANAY

4.

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

and shift the focus of governments intervention towards ensuring service standards and
protection of customers.
Towards this goal, Article II, Section 8 of the PTA sets forth the regulatory logic,
mandating that a healthy competitive environment shall be fostered, one in which
telecommunications carriers are free to make business decisions and to interact with one
another in providing telecommunications services, with the end in view of encouraging their
financial viability while maintaining affordable rates. The statute itself defines the role of the
government to promote a fair, efficient and responsive market to stimulate growth and
development of the telecommunications facilities and services.

The present petition dramatizes to a degree the clash of philosophies between

traditional notions of regulation and the au corant trend to deregulation. Appropriately, it involves
the most ubiquitous feature of the mobile phone, Short Messaging Service (SMS) or text
messaging, which has been transformed from a mere technological fad into a vital means of
communication. And propitiously, the case allows the Court to evaluate the role of the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) in this day and age.
The NTC is at the forefront of the government response to the avalanche of inventions
and innovations in the dynamic telecommunications field. Every regulatory action it undertakes
is of keen interest not only to industry analysts and players but to the public at large. The
intensive scrutiny is understandable given the high financial stakes involved and the inexorable
impact on consumers. And its rulings are traditionally accorded respect even by the courts,
owing traditional deference to administrative agencies equipped with special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters.
At the same time, judicial review of actions of administrative agencies is essential, as
a check on the unique powers vested unto these instrumentalities. Review is available to
reverse the findings of the specialized administrative agency if the record before the Court
clearly precludes the agencys decision from being justified by a fair estimate of the worth of the
testimony of witnesses or its informed judgment on matters within its special competence, or
both. Review may also be warranted to ensure that the NTC or similarly empowered agencies
act within the confines of their legal mandate and conform to the demands of due process and
equal protection.
FACTS: Globe and private respondent Smart are both grantees of valid and subsisting
legislative franchises, authorizing them, among others, to operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone
System (CMTS), utilizing the Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) technology.
Among the inherent services supported by the GSM network is the Short Message Services
(SMS), also known colloquially as texting, which has attained immense popularity in the
Philippines as a mode of electronic communication.
1.

On 4 June 1999, Smart filed a Complaint with public respondent NTC, praying that
NTC order the immediate interconnection of Smarts and Globes GSM networks.
Smart alleged that Globe, with evident bad faith and malice, refused to grant Smarts
request for the interconnection of SMS.

2.

Globe filed its Answer with Motion to Dismiss on 7 June 1999, interposing grounds
that the Complaint was premature, Smarts failure to comply with the conditions
precedent required in Section 6 of NTC Memorandum Circular 9-7-93,19 and its
omission of the mandatory Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.

INTRODUCTION:
Public Telecommunications Act of 1995 (PTA), as noted by one of its principal
authors, Sen. John Osmea, under prior laws, the government regulated the entry of pricing and
operation of all public telecommunications entities. The new law proposed to dismantle gradually
the barriers to entry, replace government control on price and income with market instruments,

3.

On 19 July 1999, NTC issued the Order now subject of the present petition.
a.

b.

c.

4.

both Smart and Globe were equally blameworthy for their lack of
cooperation in the submission of the documentation required for
interconnection and for having unduly maneuvred the situation into the
present impasse
NTC held that since SMS falls squarely within the definition of value-added
service(VAS) or enhanced-service given in NTC Memorandum Circular
No. 8-9-95 (MC No. 8-9-95) the implementation of SMS interconnection is
mandatory
The NTC also declared that both Smart and Globe have been providing
SMS without authority from it

Globe filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to nullify
and set aside the Order and to prohibit NTC from taking any further action in the
case.
Globe
a.

b.

c.

reiterated its previous arguments that the complaint should have been
dismissed for failure to comply with conditions precedent and the non-forum
shopping rule.
claimed that NTC acted without jurisdiction in declaring that it had no
authority to render SMS, pointing out that the matter was not raised as an
issue before it at all.
alleged that the Order is a patent nullity as it imposed an administrative
penalty for an offense for which neither it nor Smart was sufficiently charged
nor heard on in violation of their right to due process

5.

The CA issued a TRO on 31 Aug 1999.

6.

In its Memorandum, Globe called the attention of the CA in an earlier NTC decision
regarding Islacom, holding that SMS is a deregulated special feature and does not
require the prior approval of the NTC. Globe that its departure from its ruling in the
Islacom case constitutes a denial of equal protection of the law.

7.

On 22 Nov 1999, the CA affirmed in toto the NTC Order.

8.

On 21 December 1999, Globe filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, seeking to

reconsider only the portion of the Decision that upheld NTCs finding that Globe lacked
the authority to provide SMS and its imposition of a fine. After the Court of Appeals
denied the Motion , Globe elevated the controversy to the Supreme Court

PETITIONERS (GLOBE) CONTENTION: Globe contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that the NTC has the power under Section 17 of the Public Service Law to subject Globe
to an administrative sanction and a fine without prior notice and hearing in violation of the due
process requirements; that specifically due process was denied Globe because the hearings

actually conducted dwelt on different issues; and, the appellate court erred in holding that any
possible violation of due process committed by
NTC was cured by the fact that NTC refrained from issuing a Show Cause Order with a Cease
and Desist Order, directing instead the parties to secure the requisite authority within thirty days.
Globe also contends that in treating it differently from other carriers providing SMS the Court of
Appeals denied it equal protection of the law.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: Smart has deviated from its original position. It no longer
prays that the Court affirm the assailed Decision and Order, and the twin rulings therein that
SMS is VAS and that Globe was required to secure prior authority before offering SMS. Instead,
Smart now argues that SMS is not VAS and that NTC may not legally require either Smart or
Globe to secure prior approval before providing SMS. Smart has also chosen not to make any
submission on Globes claim of due process violations.
ISSUES:
1.

Whether NTC may legally require Globe to secure NTC approval before it continues
providing SMS;

2.

Whether SMS is a VAS under the PTA, or special feature under NTC MC No. 14-1197; and

3.

Whether NTC acted with due process in levying the fine against Globe

RULING:
1.

The petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 November
1999, as well as its Resolution dated 29 July 2000, and the assailed Order of the NTC
dated 19 July 1999 are hereby SET ASIDE.

2.

The assailed NTC Decision invokes the NTC Implementing Rules of the PTA (MC No.
8-9-95) to justify its claim that Globe and Smart need to secure prior authority from the
NTC before offering SMS.

3.

a.

The statutory basis for the NTCs determination must be thoroughly

examined.

b.

Next, the regulatory framework devised by NTC in dealing with VAS should
be examined. In short, the legal basis invoked by NTC in claiming that SMS
is VAS has not been duly established. The fault falls squarely on NTC.

NTC violated several of these cardinal rights due Globe in the promulgation of the
assailed Order.
a.

The NTC Order is not supported by substantial evidence. Neither does it

sufficiently explain the reasons for the decision rendered.

4.

b.

Globe and Smart were denied opportunity to present evidence on the issues
relating to the nature of VAS and the prior approval. Another disturbing
circumstance attending this petition is that until the promulgation of the
assailed Order Globe and Smart were never informed of the fact that their
operation of SMS without prior authority was at all an issue for
consideration.

c.

The imposition of fine is void for violation of due process. The matter of
whether NTC could have imposed the fine on Globe in the assailed Order is
necessarily related to due process considerations

In summary:
a.

there is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars

promulgated by the NTC to denominate SMS as VAS, and any subsequent
determination by the NTC on whether SMS is VAS should be made with
proper regard for due process and in conformity with the PTA;

b.

the assailed Order violates due process for failure to sufficiently explain the
reason for the decision rendered, for being unsupported by substantial
evidence, and for imputing violation to, and issuing a corresponding fine on,
Globe despite the absence of due notice and hearing which would have
afforded Globe the right to present evidence on its behalf

8. EMILIO SUNTAY Y AGUINALDO, petitioner vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE
HONORABLE NICASIO YATCO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City Branch V, and THE HONORABLE CARLOS P. GARCIA, as Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, respondents.
101 Phil 883

GR No. L-9430

29 June 1957

Facts:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to annul an order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City directing the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs for
them to take proper steps in order that the accused, Emilio Suntay y Aguinaldo, who is alleged
to be in the United States, may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with
in accordance with law, (Exhibit D) and of prohibition to enjoin the Secretary for Foreign Affairs
from cancelling the petitioner's passport without previous hearing.
On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified
complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City for taking Alicia
Nubla from St. Paul's College in Quezon City with lewd design and took her to somewhere near
the U.P. compound in Diliman, Quezon City and was then able to have carnal knowledge of her.
Alicia Nubla is a minor of 16 years. (Seduction)
On 10 January 1955 the petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of
Foreign Affairs. On 20 January 1955 the petitioner left the Philippines for San Francisco,
California, U.S.A., where he is at present enrolled in school. On 31 January 1955 the offended
girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the petitioner with seduction which was filed
in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City after preliminary investigation had been conducted.
On 10 February 1955 the Court granted the motion ofthe private prosecutor praying the Court to
issue an order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the

National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having
the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with
law." On 7 March 1955 the respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States
instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to
the petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges
against him." However, this order was not implemented or carried out in view of the
commencement of this proceedings in order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved.
Counsel for the petitioner wrote to the respondent Secretary requesting that the action taken by
him be reconsidered and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the respondent Court
reconsider its order of 10 February 1955. Both denied. Hence this petition.
The petitioner contends that as the order of the respondent Court directing the Department of
Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order that the" petitioner "may be brought back to the
Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law," may be carried out only
"through the cancellation of ,his passport," the said order is illegal because "while a Court may
review the action of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in cancelling a passport and grant relief
when the Secretary's discretion is abused, the court cannot, in the first instance, take the
discretionary power away from the Secretary and itself order a passport to be cancelled." The
petitioner further contends that while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion in
the cancellation of passports, "such discretion cannot be exercised until after hearing,"
because the right to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning and
protection of the Constitution and hence he cannot be deprived of such liberty without
due process of law.
Issue: Whether or not the order of cancellation by the secretary of DFA is valid
Ruling:
The petitioner's contention cannot be sustained. The petitioner is charged with seduction. And
the order of the respondent Court directing the Department of Foreign Affairs is not beyond or in
excess of its jurisdiction. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by
such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not
specifically pointed out by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be
adopted which appears most conformable to the spirit of said rules. (Section 6, Rule 124.)
Moreover, the respondent Court did not specify what stepthe respondent Secretary must take to
compel the petitioner to return to the Philippines to answer the criminalcharge preferred against
him.
Section 25, Executive Order No. 1, series of 1946, 42 Off. Gaz. 1400, prescribing rules and
regulations for the grant and issuance of passports, provides that
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs is authorized, in his discretion to withdraw or cancel a
passport already issued
True, the discretion granted, to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to withdraw or cancel a passport
already issued may not be exercised at whim. But here the petitioner was hailed to Court to
answer a criminal charge for seduction and although at first an Assistant City Attorney
recommended the dismissal of the complaint previously subscribed and sworn to by the father of
the offended girl, yet the petitioner knew that no final action had been taken by the City Attorney
of Quezon City as the case was still under study. And as the Solicitor General puts it, "His
suddenly leaving the country in such a convenient time, can reasonably be interpreted to mean
as 'a deliberate attempt on his part to flee from justice, and, therefore, he cannot now be heard

to complain if the strong arm of the law should join together to bring him back to justice." In
issuing the order in question, the respondent Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of
justice would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of his sound discretion, he
cannot be enjoined from carrying it out.

January 25, 1984: NTC PROVISIONALLY approved the application and set the case
for hearing within the 30-day period prescribed by law.

February 2, 1984: NTC issued a notice of hearing, setting t on February 22, 1984 at
9:30 am. In the said notice, herein petitioners were not included in the list of affected
parties.

February 22, 1984: At the hearing, herein petitioners moved for some time within
which to file an opposition alleging that they were not informed of the existence of this
provisional authority. Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that the application filed
by PLDT is not actually for approval of rates but for authority to engage in new
services not covered by their franchise.

March 21, 1984: Second Division of this court issued a TRO and transferred the case
to the Court En Banc.

Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or
cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a
passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal
prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a
passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in
withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or
require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an
undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport
holder, hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the
cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law
clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be
deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing
should always be held in order to comply with the due process of law clause of the
Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of
the said clause.

ISSUE: Whether or not NTC gravely abused its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing a provisional authority to PLDT without notice to the petitioners.

9. RCP v. NTC

HELD: NO.

184 SCRA 517

GR No. L-66683

23 April 1990

Section 16 of the Public Service Act (CA 146) provides for the fixing of rates by the
commission, which shall be observed by any public service

PETITIONERS:
The Commission may, in its discretion, approve rates proposed by public services
PROVISIONALLY, and without necessity of any hearing; but it shall call a hearing
within 30 days thereafter, upon publication and notice

Radio Communications of the Philippines (RCP)

Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (PT&T)

The Public Service Commission found that the application is indeed for approval of
rates which it may approve provisionally without the necessity of any notice and
hearing as provided by law.

Under the Public Service Act, the Board of Communications, now the NTC, can fix a
provisional amount for the subscribers investment to be effective immediately, without
hearing. The reason is easily discerned from the fact that provisional rates are by their
nature temporary and subject to adjusted in conformity with the definitive rates
approved after final hearing.

NTC did not grant PLDT any authority to engage in any new communication service,
but merely approved provisionally, PLDTs proposed revision of its then authorized
schedule of rates.

As regards prior notice, it is impossible for the respondent NTC to give personal notice
to all parties affected, not all of them being known to it. The notice of hearing was
published and petitioners have timely opposed the petition in question, so lack of
notice was deemed cured.

There is a legal presumption that the rates are reasonable and it must be conceded
that the fixing of rates by the government through its authorized agent, involves the
exercise of reasonable discretion, and unless there is an abuse of that discretion, the
courts will not interfere. Where the law confines in an administrative office the power

Clavecilla Radio System (Clavecilla)

RESPONDENTS:
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order seeking to annul and set aside the January 25, 1984 order of NTC
and to prohibit them from taking cognizance of and assuming jurisdiction of the
application of PLDT, for lack of jurisdiction.

January 4, 1984: PLDT filed an application with NTC for the Approval of Rates for
Digital Transmission Service Facilities

to determine particular questions or matters upon the facts presented, the jurisdiction
of such office prevail over the courts. Hence, findings of admin officials and agencies
who have acquired jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded
not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial
evidence.
WHEREFORE, petition dismissed for lack of merit. NTC order affirmed. TRO set
aside.

FACTS:

May 19, 1997: MIAA issued Resolution No. 97-51 announcing and increase in
the rentals of its terminal buildings, VIP lounge, other airport buildings and land,
as well as check-in and concession counters. Concessionaire privilege fees was
also increased.

April 2, 1998: Resolution No. 98-30: 20% increase adoption as recommended by

Punongbayan and Araullo (accounting firm) to take effect immediately on June
1st. Thus, the issuance of AO No. 1 Series of 1988 to reflect the new schedule of
fees, charges, and rates.

February 5, 1999: Resolution No. 99-11 which further increased the fees.
Accordingly, AO No. 1 was amended.

Respondents requested that the implementation of the new fess, charges, and
rates be deferred due to lack of prior notice and hearing. Request denied. MIAA
likewise refused to renew the identification cards of respondents personnel, and
vehicle stickers to prevent entry to the premises.

Complaint filed to Makati RTC for Injunction with Application of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or TRO.

August 18, 1999: RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining MIAA from
denying or preventing access to the NAIA premises.

Complaint-In-Intervention was filed by Subic International Charter Inc., Normal

Holdings & Devt. Corp., and Columbian Motor Sales Corp. RTC found that the
intervenors were entitled to preliminary relief and thus issued a TRO for 20 days
enjoining MIAA from denying entry, ejecting, and attempting or threatening
plaintiffs-intervenors.

February 17,2003: RTC nullified MIAAs Resolutions Nos. 98-30 and 99-11 and
AO 1.

10. MANILA INTL. AIRPORT AUTHORITY V. AIRSPAN CORP.

GR No. 157581

1 Dec 2004

PETITIONER:
Manila International Airport Authority: GOCC created on March 4, 1982 by EO 778. It
owns, operates and manages the NAIA.
RESPONDENTS:
Airspan Corporation
LBC Express Inc.
A. Soriano Aviation
Flying Medical Samaritans Inc.
Aboitiz Air Transport Corp.
Asia Craft Overseas Phils. Inc.
Asian Aerospace Corp.
Pacific Jet Maintenance Services Inc.
General Aviation Supplies Trading Inc.
Airworks Aviation Corp.

ISSUE: Whether or not prior notice and conduct of public hearing are required before
petitioner can increase its rates and charges for the use of its facilities.
HELD: NO.

Sec. 17 of the MIAA Charter, as amended by EO 903 provides that the

authority may increase or decrease the rates of the dues, charges, fess or
assessments collectible by the Authority subject to the provisions of BP.
325.

BP 325 provides that the revision of rates shall be in conformity with the
rules and regulations of the Ministry of Finance issued pursuant to Section 4
hereof, upon RECOMMENDATION OF THE IMPOSING AND COLLECTING
AUTHORITIES CONCERNED, SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE
CABINET.

Federation of Aviation Organizations of the Phils. Inc.

Normal Holdings and Devt. Corporation
Columbian Motor Sales Corp.

Users, lessees and occupants of petitioners properties, facilities and services.

Thus, MIAAs authority is limited to a mere recommendatory power. The

Charter directly vests the power to determine revision of fess, and rates in
the Ministry Head and requires the approval of the cabinet.

Since no opposition to the demurrer was submitted despite notice thereof to the parties,
Judge Nestor F. Dantes considered it submitted for resolution and on June 6, 1986, issued the
following ORDER:

Such Ministry Head is now the DOTC Secretary, MIAA being an attached
agency of the DOTC. Accordingly, MIAA is governed by the Administrative
Code which requires notice and public hearing in the fixing of rates and
provided in Sec. 9, Book VII of the Code.

Thus, the rate increases imposed are invalid for lack of prior notice and
hearing as well as ultra vires because they are not the proper official
authorized to issue such increase. Thus, the assailed resolutions and order
are null and void.

Acting on the Demurrer to Evidence dated April 30, 1986 filed by defendants Victorino P.
Evangelista and Golden Star Industrial Corporation to which plaintiff and other defendants did
not file their comment/opposition and it appearing from the very evidence adduced by the
plaintiff that the Sheriffs Auction Sale conducted on July 11, 1983 was in complete
accord with the requirements of Section 3, Act 3135 under which the auction sale was
appropriately held and conducted and it appearing from the allegations in paragraph 13
plaintiffs pleading and likewise from plaintiff Carlos Coquincos own testimony that his
cause is actually against the other officers and stockholders of the plaintiff Nicos
Industrial Corporation x x x for the purpose of protecting the corporation and its stockholders,
as well as their own rights and interests in the corporation, and the corporate assets, against the
fraudulent acts and devices of the responsible officials of the corporation, in breach of the trust
reposed upon them by the stockholders x x x a subject matter not within the competent
jurisdiction of the Court, the court finds the same (demurrer) to be impressed with merit.

WHEREFORE, petition denied for lack of merit. February 17, 2003 decision by
the Makati RTC affirmed.
11. Nicos Industrial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 88709

February 11, 1992. 206 SCRA 127

FACTS:
On January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation (NICOS) obtained a loan of 2M from United
Coconut from private respondent Planters Bank (UCPB) and to secure payment thereof
executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land in Marilao, Bulacan.
The mortgage was foreclosed for supposed non-payment of the loan. Consequently, a sheriffs
sale was held on July 11, 1983, without re-publication of the required notices after the original
date for the auction was changed without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor. UCPB
was the highest and lone bidder and the mortgaged lands were sold to it for P3,558,547.64.
Thereafter, UCPB sold all its rights to the properties to private respondent Manuel Co, who on
the same day transferred them to another private respondent, Golden Star Industrial Corporation
which, upon petition, successfully obtained a writ of possession upon the mortgaged lands.
In view of the foregoing, NICOS, Juan Coquinco and Carlos Coquinco, as Chairman of its Board
of Directors and its Executive Vice-president, respectively, filed an action for annulment of
sheriffs sale, recovery of possession, and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan.
The plaintiffs presented two witnesses, including petitioner Carlos Coquinco, who
testified at three separate hearings. They also submitted 21 exhibits.
Thereafter, Golden Star and Evangelista filed a 7-page demurrer to the evidence where they
argued that the action was a derivative suit that came under the jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission; that the mortgage had been validly foreclosed; that the sheriffs sale had
been held in accordance with Act 3135; that the notices had been duly published in a newspaper
of general circulation; and that the opposition to the writ of possession had not been filed on
time.

Hence, the complaint was dismissed.

On Appeal with the Court of Appeals, the petitioners assailed the aforementioned order for
being contrary to:
1)

Rule 1, Section 36 of the Rules of Court which provides that A judgment or final order
determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared
by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts on which it is based xxx;

2)

Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution which states that No decision shall be
rendered by any court without stating therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based.

Petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and does not clearly and distinctly explain
how it was reached by the trial court. The petitioners also complain that there was no analysis of
their testimonial evidence or of their 21 exhibits, the trial court merely confining itself to the
pronouncement that the sheriffs sale was valid and that it had no jurisdiction over the
derivative suit.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the assailed order in toto, finding
that the Order appealed from, which adverts to the Demurrer to the Evidence, expressly
referred to the evidence adduced by the plaintiff as showing the validity of the Sheriffs
auction sale and to the allegations in paragraph 13 of plaintiffs pleadings and plaintiff
Carlos Coquincos own testimony from which it made the conclusion that the case does not
fall under its jurisdiction, hence, it ruled that the assailed order substantially referred to the facts
of the case and the law on which it was based in compliance with the above-cited rule and
constitutional provision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the assailed order sustaining the respondents demurrer to evidence did not
substantially state the facts and the law on which it is based in contravention of the Rules of
Court and Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:

YES. The questioned order is an oversimplification of the issues and violates both the letter and
spirit of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution. It is a requirement of due process that the
parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and
legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment
is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification
whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a
higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed.
A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based
leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing
party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
The constitutional provision does not, however, apply to interlocutory orders, such as one
granting a motion for postponement or quashing a subpoena, because it refers only to
decisions on the merits and not to orders of the trial court resolving incidental matters.

doubtless have considerably appreciated since then, after more than eight years. These facts
alone justified a more careful and thorough drafting of the order, to fully inform the
parties and the courts that might later be called upon to review it of the reasons why the
demurrer to the evidence was sustained and the complaint dismissed.
Kilometric decisions without much substance must be avoided, to be sure, but the other
extreme, where substance is also lost in the wish to be brief, is no less unacceptable either.
The ideal decision is that which, with welcome economy of words, arrives at the factual
findings, reaches the legal conclusions, renders its ruling and, having done so, ends.
____________________________________________________________________________
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE for lack of
basis. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for revision.
12. Vicente VILLAFLOR v. CA and Nasupit Lumber Co.

As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on

the merits, it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the
facts and the law on which it is based.

280 SCRA 297

It may be argued that a dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction is not considered a judgment on
the merits and so is not covered by the aforecited provision. There is no quarrel with this
established principle. However, the rule would be applicable only if the case is dismissed
on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction and not when some other additional ground is
invoked.

GR 95694

It did not bother to discuss what that evidence was or to explain why it believed that the
legal requirements had been observed. Its conclusion was remarkably threadbare.
Brevity is doubtless an admirable trait, but it should not and cannot be substituted for
substance.
As the ruling on this second ground was unquestionably a judgment on the merits, the
failure to state the factual and legal basis thereof was fatal to the order.

Significantly, the respondent court found that the trial court did have jurisdiction over the case
after all. This made even more necessary the factual and legal explanation for the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs evidence was insufficient.
While it is true that this case does not involve the life or liberty of the defendant, there is still no
reason for the constitutional short-cut taken by the trial judge. The properties being litigated are
not of inconsequential value; they were sold for three and a half million pesos in 1983 and

9 October 1997

Villaflor bought several lots:

A: 6 Jan 1940, from Cirilo Piencenaves, Deed of Absolute Sale (DAS), 50hec

Boundaries: N-public land, E-owned by Serafin Villaflor, S-public land,

W-claimed by H. Patete containing 60hec of land claimed by Villaflor

Deed states: sold to Villaflor on 22 June 1937 but no formal doc then
executed, but since then until present, Villaflor been in possession and
coccupation

A careful perusal of the challenged order will show that the complaint was dismissed not
only for lack of jurisdiction but also because of the insufficiency of the evidence to prove
the invalidity of the sheriffs sale.
Regarding this second ground, all the trial court did was summarily conclude from the very
evidence adduced by the plaintiff that the sheriffs sale was in complete accord with the
requirements of Section 3, Act 3135.

PETITION DISMISSED

B: 6 Jan 40, from Claudio Otero, DAS, 24hec

Planted with corn. Boundaries: N-public land & Tungao Creek, EAgusan river, S-land of Serafin Villaflor and Cirilo Piencenaves, W-land
of Fermin Bacobo 24hec of which claimed by Villaflor

Deed states: sold to Villaflor on 22 June 1937 but no formal doc then
executed, but since then until present, Villaflor been in possession and
coccupation

C: 16 Jan 40, from Hermogenes Patete, DAS, 20hec

Planted with abaca and corn. Boundaries: N-public land-private road,

E-land of Cirilo, S-public land (containing 20hec claimed by Villaflor)

Bought 22 June 37, formal doc executed, since then until present,
Villaflor been in possession and coccupation

D: 15 Feb 40, DAS by Fermin Bacobo, 18hec

Plant abaca, boundaries: N-public land, E-land of Cirilo, S-land of

Hermogenes Patete, W-public land (contains 18hec owned by Villaflor)

DAS executed and annotated by Reg of Deeds

8 Nov 46: Villaflor leaved to Nasipit Lumber Co. 2hec + all improvements
o

5 years starting 6/1/46 @200/year to cover annual rental of 33 house and bldgs
on site

Lessee authorize to build and construct additional but pay lessor P0.50/house or
bldg per month

All constructions/improvements owned by lessor w/o oblig to reimburse lessee

for construct expenses

Villaflor claimed Nasipit occupied in bad faith big portion of land wrote to field manager,
said recalls lease agreement for other property but forgot if did actually occupy. But if Vill
says occupied, will pay rental

No private adverse claim

Villaf undertake to secure and obtain Torrens title for Nasipit, execute
DAS afterwards, Nasipit pay 12,000 provided Villaf be reimbursed of
expenses incurred in processing documents

12/2/48 Villaf filed Sales Application with Bureau of Land, MNL to purchase under
provisions of CA 141 (Public Lands Act) parcels of public land (140hec)
o

App says: app not convey rights to occupy land prior to approval, understand
lands are public domain and any and all rights acquired by virtue of constant
occupation/cultivation are relinquished to Govt.

12/7/48 Villaf and Nasipit executed Agreement

o

Villa possessor since 1930 of lands

7/7/48 contract of Agreement to Sell executed bet. Them covering land amd will
be maintained in full force and effect with all terms and conditions of this present
Agreement and in no way [is old ATS] considered modified

Nasipit bound to pay 5,000 provided:

7/7/48 Agreement to Sell to Nasipit 2 parcels land

o

Land 1 parcel B

Land 2 N-Pagudasan Creek, E-Agusan river, S-Tungao creek, W-public land

48,000 hec, divided into (4) lot nos. + improvements (trees)

Boundaries marked by concrete monuments of Bureau of Lands

Assessed value- 6,290

o

Conditions ATS:

Nasipit occupy props as prospective owners, not lessees

In the sense that Contracts of Lease is terminated

Nasipit pay 5,000 upon presentation of Villaflor or satisfactory evidence

that:

Bureau of Lands not object to Torrens transfer to Nasipit via

ordinary land reg proceedings or admin proceedings

BOL no objection to ATS

No adverse claimant

Villaf submit to BOL Sales Application for 22 lots comprising subject

parcels; Sales App registered with BOL

Villaf assured that Sales request will be expedited

Pay 24,000

7K- already paid upon ececution ATS on 7/7/48

5K- upon signing of present agreement

12K- upon execution of DAS and delivery to Nasipit of Certif of

Ownership

Specially understood that mortgaged constituted by Villaf in favor Nasipit (stated

in ATS 7/7/48) cover not only 7K but also 5K if Villaf fail to comply with conditions
in ATS

Villaf obligated to sign, execute, deliver to Nasipit any time upon demand other
instruments necessary to give full effect to this Agreement

12/31/49 Report by public land inspector: Indorsement recommending rejection of Sales

Application of Villaf since subj props already leased to another even before he had
acquired transmissible rights
o

Villaf sent letter stating he was already occupying property when subdivision
project was inaugurated, property was formerly claimed as private therefore was
segregated/excluded from disposition bec. Claim of private ownership

Nasipit letter says it recog Villaf real owner and claimant of land; since 46
already leased props to company; no other interest on land; Sales App was given
expedited status

6/24/50 auction of property subject of Sales App; Nasipit highest bid @41/hec, but since
applicant under CA 141, Villaf allowed tender equal bid and deposited 10% of bid price and
paid assessment in full Villaf won auction

8/16/50 Villaf executed Deed of Relinquishment of Rights

o

Cant develop/cultiv land

Recog Nasipit very interested and has means to cultiv/develop therefore

voluntarily renounce and relinquish whatever rights and interest in land in favor
thereof

11/27/73 letter to Mr. Mears of Nasipit reminding of verbal agreement in 1955,

replied, referred to other officer new set of officers so refused to recognize
Villaf claim and denied itemized claim saying w/o valid and legal basis

1/5/74 Villaf claimed total amount owed 427,000

Formal protest filed with BOL of Sales App of Nasipit co. not paid Villaf the
agreed 5K as per DOR

Decision of Director of Lands 8/8/77 Nasipit did pay 5K and there was
consideration stated in DOR = Nasipit valid claim [recall: Obli contract w/o
consideration = fictitious = void]

Inconsistency of Villaf claims during proceedings

o

Demand for payment 427K for indemnity for damages to improvements + realty
taxes paid

Recovery of rentals in arrears from supposed Contract of Lease + indemnity for

damages caused by improvements made = 17M

BOL/Dir. Of Lands Decision: no merit in contention fail to pay 5K voided DOR

o

Many collaterals/claims = any claim not w/in scope/sphere of its

adjudicatory authority as an administrative as well as quasi-jud body or
any issue w/c seeks to delve into the merits of incidents clearly outside of
the admin competence of this Office to decide may not be entertained

WN sales patent can be granted to Nasipit for 140-hec public land: Yes.

In consideration of 5K

8/16/50 Nasipit filed Sales App for 2 subject props = 140hec Director of Lands issued
Order of Award 8/17

Villaf claimed only found out about Order of Award on 1/16/74 since was in Indonesia for
past 10 yrs
o

Bro Serafin said Nasipit failed and refused to pay agreed rentals even though
they paid in early years

Bro died so no accounting of rentals made

Art. 14, Consti: No private corp or assoc may hold alienable land of the
public domain except by lease not to extend 1K hec

Sec. of Justice [via Opinion #64], affirmed by DOL: Nasipit complied

with all oblig under Public Land Act to entitle him to a Sales Patent
BEFORE 1973 Consti took effect therefore no legal justification for
refusal to issue/release sale patent.

Furthermore, WN app has fulfilled all terms and conditions to

entitle him to a patent is a question best left to BOL to
determine

Since DOR, Villaf always considered Nasipit having juridical personality to

acquire public lands for agri purposes

5K already paid by Nasipit bec:

Villaf adduced large amounts but not payment of 5K in evid = no evid

at all

DASs NOT clear and convincing evid to estab subj areas as private ownership =
all props held as public domain

Villaf cause of action, for specific perf or rescission of contracts = w/in juris of civil
courts, not admin bodies [ergo, not ruled on by MNR]

Nasipit acquired vested rights to subj props and is NOT deemed affected by new
consti provision

Only asked for payment 24yrs AFTER = nugatory of claim for non-pay
Nasipit has order in possession for payment of 5K upon issuance of
order of award. Reasonable to presume company already paid

RROC: person in possession of an aorder on himself for

payment of money or delivery of anything, has paid or
delivered the thing accdly

Villaf claims subject properties are his private properties. Purchase of

Villaf during auction does not change character of the land from public
to private property. Provision of law clear that public lands only
acquired in manner provided in law (CA 141)

Villaf applied for purchase of the lands BUT condition re.

rights and interests was signed by him [recall condition ^]

What he paid during public auction was NOT for purchase of

subject properties [illogical: why buy something that is
already yours]

At best, Villag considered only a sales applicant vying for

subj props but he already relinquished all rights to Nasipit by
virtue of DOR, so Nasipit considered applicant for subj props
instead

Payment of 12K [refer to MOP in agreement ^] was made to

Edward J. Nell Co. bec. Villaf assigned credit in favor thereof

Villaf filed MR from decision of DOL = Appeal to Ministry of Natural Resources

DISMISSED, Affirmed DOL Decision, bec.:

7/6/87 Villaf filed complaint in RTC for Delcaration Nullity of Contract [the DOR], Recov of
Possession [2 parcels], and Damages + appealed MNR decision to Office of President

1/28/83 Villaf DIED = wife Lourdes substituted

CFI Butuan DISMISSED

o

Verbal lease agreements unenforceable Art. 1403 CC

Causes of action barred by extinctive prescript and/or laches lease ended

1966 but action filed only 1/6/78

Nasipit lawful actual physical possessor-occupant and better right of possession

DOR, Agreement to Sell Real Rights = valid + binding

CA AFFIRMED CFI

SC Reso 6/23/91 DENIED for being late but later reconsidered and granted due course

ISSUE & HELD:

Subject props NOT private props of Villaf

1) WN the DOL has primary jurisdiction over the issue YES.

Claim of ownership via DAS by 4 owners not coincide with tech. descriptions of
properties

[Orig statement in case: Did the Court of Appeals err in adopting or relying on the factual
findings of the Bureau of Lands]

Well-settled that no public land can be acquired by priv persons w/o any grant,
express or implied from the govt. indispensable that there be showing of title
from state or any other mode of acquisition recog by law.

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal,
especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact

Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction

jurisprudential trend to apply this doctrine to cases involving matters that demand the
special competence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial
in character

APPLICATION: claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an admin body

judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the

administrative body for its view

admin body review BEFORE final judicial process

Where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which
is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence
Doctrine IS applicable in this case questions on identity of subj props + factual
qualification of Nasipit as an awardee of a sales application require a technical
determination by the BOL as the administrative agency with the expertise to
determine such matters

Secs. 3 and 4 of CA 141 = Sec. of Agri. and NR shall be the final arbiter on
questions of fact in public land conflicts

Reliance by the trial and the appellate courts on the factual findings of the
Director of Land and the Minister of Natural Resources is not misplaced

special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over

matters falling under their jurisdiction = better position to pass
judgment thereon

their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great

respect, if not finality, by the courts

findings of fact of an

administrative agency must be respected as long as they are

supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence might not be
overwhelming or even preponderant

BUT there are exceptions to rule that factual findings of an

administrative agency are accorded respect and finality by courts

Courts have to stand aside even when they have statutory power to proceed, in
recognition of the primary jurisdiction of the administrative agency

1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on

speculation, surmise or conjecture;

Order of action: BOL MNR Office of Pres

= trial and appellate courts had to
rely on the findings of these specialized administrative bodies by virtue of DPJ

2. When the inference made is manifestly absurd, mistaken

or impossible;

PJ of Dir. Of Lands and Minister NR granted by Sections 3 and 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
141

3. When there is grave abuse of discretion in the

appreciation of facts;

Section 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now Secretary of Natural

Resources) shall be the executive officer charged with carrying out the provisions
of this Act through the Director of Lands, who shall act under his immediate
control.

4. When the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of

facts;

5. When the findings of fact are conflicting;

6. When the Court of Appeals in making its findings went

beyond the issues of the case

and the same is contrary to the admissions of both

appellants and appellees;

7. When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are at

variance with those of the trial court;

Section 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct
executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of
concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain,
and his decision as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.

Director of Lands is a quasi-judicial officer who passes on issues of mixed facts

and law

8. When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation

of specific evidence on which they are based;

9. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the

petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents;

SUB-ISSUE 3: WN Nasipit qualified for award of public land YES.

10. When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are

premised on the supposed absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record
11. When certain material facts and circumstances had been
overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into account,
would alter the result of the case

(1) the possession of the qualifications required by said Act (under Sec29)
(2) the lack of the DQs mentioned

Transfer of ownership via the 2 agreements of 7/7/48 and 12/7/48 and DOR = private
contracts = binding only between petitioner and private respondent

CA 141 no relevance bec. land was covered by said Act only after the issuance of the order
of award for Nasipit

Determination by DOL and MNR of the qualif of Nasipiit to become an awardee or grantee
under the Act is persuasive on CA

Contentious points raised by appellant in this action, are substantially the same
matters he raised in BOL both DPJ of admin agencies and the doctrine of
finality of factual findings of the trial courts APPLY, esp. when affirmed by
the CA as in this case, militate against petitioners cause

powers of the Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources regarding the disposition
of public lands including the approval, rejection, and reinstatement of applications
are of executive and

SUB-ISSUE 2: WN Subj props are public lands YES

Villaf alleges that the deeds did not contain any technical description, as they were
executed prior to the survey conducted by BOL = properties sold were merely described by
reference to natural boundaries WRONG CONTENTION

Reqs. for sales app under CA 141:

administrative nature

Sec. 14, Consti 1973 N/A to Nasipit right to lands because not retroactive effect = N/A to
one who already has vested right on subj props

lack of technical description did not prove that the finding of the Dir. of Lands lacked
substantial evidence

vested right has to be respected = not be abrogated by the new Consti

sales app- petitioner expressly admitted that said property was public land

recall: due process clause effect on vested rights

In the exercise of his primary jurisdiction over the issue, DOL Casanova ruled that
the land was public affirmed by MNR

incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Consti right of Nasipit to buy
props already fixed and established = no longer open to doubt or controversy

issue falls under the primary jurisdiction of the DOL because its reso requires
survey, classification, x x x disposition and management of the lands of the public
domain.

13. LAGUNA CATV NETWORK, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. ALEX E. MARAAN, Regional
Director, Region IV, Dept. of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
GR 139492
19 Nov 2002

THEREFORE: His rulings deserve great respect.

FACTS:

petitioner failed to show that this factual finding was unsupported by substantial
evidence = assumes finality

trial and the appellate courts correctly relied on such finding

SC has to follow suit

*On March 3, 1998, private respondents Pedro Ignacio, Diomedes Castro, Fe Esperanza
Candilla, Ruben Lamina, Jr., Joel Persiuncula, Alvino Prudente, Joel Raymundo, Regie Rocero,
Linda Rodriguez, John Seludo, Alberto Reyes and Anacleta Valois filed with the Department of
Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. IV (DOLE Region IV), separate complaints for
underpayment of wages and non-payment of other employee benefits. Impleaded as respondent
was their employer, Laguna CATV Network, Inc. (Laguna CATV)

*On April 1, 1998, DOLE Region IV conducted an inspection within the premises of Laguna
CATV and found that the latter violated the laws on payment of wages and other benefits.
*In view of Laguna CATVs failure to comply with the Order directing it to pay the unpaid claims
of its employees, DOLE Regional Director Maraan issued a writ of execution on January 29,
19996 ordering Sheriff Enrico Sagmit to collect in cash from Laguna CATV the amount specified
in the writ or, in lieu thereof, to attach its goods and chattels or those of its owner, Dr. Bernardino
Bailon. Sheriff Sagmit subsequently levied on Dr. Bailons L300 van and garnished his bank
deposits.
*On March 2, 1999, Laguna CATV filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, notice of levy
and sale on execution and garnishment of bank deposits.
*On April 21, 1999, Director Maraan issued an Order denying the motion to quash the writ of
execution, because Laguna CATV failed to perfect its appeal of the August 19, 1998 Order
because it did not comply with the mandatory requirement of posting a bond equivalent to the
monetary award of P261,009.19.
*Instead of appealing to the Secretary of Labor, Laguna CATV filed with the Court of Appeals a
motion for extension of time to file apetition for review. Laguna CATV was of the view that an
appeal to the Secretary of Labor would be an exercise in futility considering that the said appeal
will be filed with the Regional Office and it will surely be disapproved.
*The CA dismissed the case because Laguna failed to exhaust administrative remedies
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner Laguna CATV failed to exhaust administrative remedies
HELD:
YES.
As provided under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, earlier quoted, an order issued
by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor may be appealed to the latter.
Thus, petitioner should have first appealed to the Secretary of Labor instead of filing with the
Court of Appeals a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review. Courts, for reasons of
law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative
remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate
opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative
forum.15 Observance of this doctrine is a sound practice and policy.
This Court, in a long line of cases, has consistently held that if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned
every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy
should be exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought.18 The party with an
administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain
relief but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order
to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the court.19 The underlying principle of the rule rests on
the presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the
matter will decide the same correctly.20 Therefore, petitioner should have completed the
administrative process by appealing the questioned Orders to the Secretary of Labor.
Exceptions to the principle:
1. when there is a violation of due process; 2. when the issue involved is a purely legal question;
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; 4.
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; 5. when there is
irreparable injury; 6. when the respondent is a Department Secretary whose acts as an alter ego

of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter
7)when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; 8)when it
would amount to a nullification of a claim; 9)when the subject matter is a private land in land
case proceedings; 10)when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy, adequate remedy;
11)when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; 12)when no
administrative review is provided by law; 13)where the rule of qualified political agency applies;
and 14)when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.
Petitioner fails to show that the instant case falls under any of the exceptions. Its contention that
an appeal to the Secretary of Labor would be futile as it will surely be disapproved, is purely
conjectural and definitely misplaced.
14. Corpus vs. Cuaderno
No. L-17860 March 30, 1962 4 SCRA 749
Facts:
While petitioner-appellant R. Marino Corpus was holding the position of Special
Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines a position declared by the
President of the Philippines as highly technical in nature and placed in the exempt class, he
was charged in an administrative case for alleged dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty
and/or abuse of authority, oppression, misconduct, etc., preferred against him by employees of
the Bank, resulting in his suspension by the Monetary Board of the Bank and the creation of a 3man committee to investigate him. The committee was composed of representatives of the
Bank, Bureau of Civil Service and the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. The committee finds
that there is no basis upon which to recommend disciplinary action against respondent, and
therefore, recommends that he be immediately reinstated.
Unable to agree with the committee report, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution
No. 957 which considered Corpus resigned as of the date of his suspension. Three days after,
the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 995 approving the appointment of respondent
Mario Marcos to the position involved in place of petitioner Corpus. Petitioner filed a complaint
which embodied four causes of action. The first cause of action seeks to reinstate petitioner
immediately and to declare that the action of the respondents per Monetary Board Reso. No.
957 null and void. The second cause of action seeks to remove respondent Mario Marcos from
the Office of Special Assistant in charge of the Export Department of the Central Bank. The third
cause of action is to pay petitioner moral damages, salaries uncollected, bonuses, other
allowances and attorneys fees. The fourth cause of action seeks to immediately reinstate
petitioner to the position of Special Assistant.

The lower court was of the opinion that petitioner-appellant should have exhausted all
administrative remedies available to him, such as an appeal to the Commissioner of Civil
Service, under R.A. No. 2260, or the President of the Philippines who under the Constitution and
the law is the head of all the executive departments of the government including its agencies
and instrumentalities.

Issue:

Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable in

this case.

The recourse by Madrigal to the Commission was unwarranted. It is fundamental that in a case
where pure questions of law are raised, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
cannot apply because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer.
Appeal to the administrative officer of orders involving questions of law would be an exercise in
futility since administrative officers cannot decide such issues with finality. In the present case,
only a legal question is to be resolved, that is, whether or not the abolition of Madrigals position
was in accordance with law.

Held:
No. True, the appellant did not elevate his case for review either by the President or
the Civil Service Commission. However, the Court is of the opinion that a report to these
administrative appeals is voluntary or permissive, taking into account the facts obtaining in this
case. There is no law requiring an appeal to the President in a case like the one at bar. While
there are provisions in the Civil Service Law regarding appeals to the Commissioner of Civil
Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals, the Court believes the petitioner is not bound to
observe them, considering his status and the Charter of the Central Bank. The Civil Service Law
is the general legal provision, whereas Section 14 of R.A. 265, creating the Central Bank of the
Philippines, is a special provision of law which must govern the investigation, suspension or
removal of employees of the Central Bank. Considering the fact that the Charter of Central Bank
provides for its own power, through the Monetary Board, coupled with the fact that the petitioner
has admitted that he belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service, it is evident that an
appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service is not required or at most is permissive and
voluntary. Upon the foregoing, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
inapplicable and does not bar the present proceedings.

Respondents contend that the court cannot pass upon Madrigals right to back salaries without
passing upon the validity of the abolition of his position which is a matter that cannot now be a
subject of judicial inquiry. This is so because the question of back salaries and damages is only
incidental to the issues involving the validity of said abolition and his request for reinstatement.
Again, We uphold the view advanced by public respondents. Madrigal loses sight of the fact that
the claim for back salaries and damages cannot stand by itself. The principal action having
failed, perforce, the incidental action must likewise fail. Needless to state, the claim for back
salaries and damages is also subject to the prescriptive period of 1 year.
The appeal is hereby DENIED. The orders of the Court of First Instance of Marinduque are
AFFIRMED.

15. JOVENTINO MADRIGAL, petitioner-appellant, vs. PROV. GOV. ARISTEO M. LECAROZ

16. Vda. de Tan vs. Veterans Backpay Commission

G.R. No. L-46218 October 23, 1990

No. L-12944. March 30, 1959 105 Phil 377

FACTS:
*On November 25, 1971, public respondents Governor Aristeo M. Lecaroz, Vice-Governor Celso
Zoleta, Jr., Provincial Board of Marinduque members Domingo Riego and Marcial Principe
abolished petitioner-appellant Joventino Madrigals position as a permanent construction
capataz in the office of the Provincial Engineer from the annual Roads and Bridges Fund Budget
for fiscal year 1971-1972 (p. 2, Records) by virtue of Resolution No. 204. The abolition was
allegedly due to the poor financial condition of the province and it appearing that his position
was not essential
*On April 22, 1972, Madrigal appealed to the Civil Service Commission
*On January 7, 1974, the Commission in its 1st Indorsement declared the removal of Madrigal
from the service illegal.
*On August 18, 1975, the Provincial Board, through Resolution No. 93, denied Madrigals
request for reinstatement because his former position no longer exists. In the same resolution, it
ordered the appropriation of the amount of P4,200.00 as his back salaries covering the period
December 1, 1971 up to June 30, 1973.

On March 5, 1957, Maria Natividadvda.de Tan, filed with the CFI Manila a verified petition for
mandamus seeking an order to compel the respondent-appellant Veterans Back Pay
Commission:
1.

to declare deceased Lt. Tan Chiat Bee alias Tan Lian Lay, a Chinese national and

2.

to give due course to the claim of petitioner, as the widow of the said veterans, by issuing to her
the corresponding backpay certificate of indebtedness.
FACTS: Petitioner is the widow of the late Lt. Tan Chiat Bee alias Tan Lian Lay, a Chinese
national, and a bonafide member of the 1st Regiment, United States-Chinese Volunteers in the
Philippines.
The United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines is a guerrilla organization duly
recognized by the Army of the United States and forming part and parcel of the Philippine Army.

*On December 15, 1975, Madrigal filed a petition before the Court of First of Marinduque
*On March 16, 1976, the trial court issued an order dismissing the petition on the ground that
Madrigals cause of action was barred by laches. A person claiming right to a position in the civil
service should file his action for reinstatement within one year from his illegal removal from
office, otherwise he is considered as having abandoned the same.

Tan Chiat Bee alias Tan Lian Lay died in the service in the battle at Ipo Dam, Rizal Province,
Philippines. He was duly recognized as a guerrilla veteran and certified to by the Armed Forces
of the Philippines as having rendered meritorious military services during the Japanese
occupation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable in the
case at bar

Petitioner filed an application for back pay under the provisions of Republic Act No. 897, the
resolution of the Veterans Back Pay Commission and the letter of the Veterans Back Pay
Commission.

HELD:
NO.

At first, the Secretary and Chief of Office Staff of the Veterans Back Pay Commission reaffirmed
its resolution granting the back pay to alien members. However, after due deliberation
respondent revoked its previous stands and ruled that aliens are not entitled to back pay.

recognizes the rights to the backpay of members of "guerrilla forces duly recognized
by the Army of the United States, among others
As regards guerrillas, it seems clear that all the law requires is that they be "duly
recognized by the Army of the United States."

Thus, respondent Veterans Back Pay Commission, through its Secretary & Chief of Office Staff,
denied petitioners request on the ground that aliens are not entitled to back pay.
Upon refusal of the Veterans Back Pay Commission the petitioner brought the case direct to this
Honorable Court by way of mandamus.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The petitioner should have first exhausted her administrative
remedies by appealing to the President of the Philippines, and that her failure to do so is a bar to
her action in court
TRIAL COURT: In favor of petitioner.
ISSUE: WON petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative remedies?
HELD: NO. The respondent Commission is in estoppel to invoke this rule, considering that in
its resolution reiterating its obstinate refusal to abide by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice,
the Commission declared that
"The opinions promulgated by the Secretary of Justice are advisory in nature, which
may either be accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and any
aggrieved party has the court for recourse,"
thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial ruling in her favor
would be accepted by the Commission.
Neither is there substance in the contention that the petition is, in effect, a suit against the
government without its consent. The relief prayed for is simply the recognition of the rights of the
petitioner-appellee, which the agency is bound to perform.

The purpose of the law was "precisely to help rehabilitate members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and recognized guerrillas by giving them the right to acquire public lands and public
property by using the back pay certificate"
17. U.P. Board of Regents vs. Rasul
G.R. No. 91551 August 16,1991 200 SCRA 685
Facts:
On June 26, 1986, Dr. Felipe A. Estrella, Jr., was appointed by the Board of Regents
as Director of the Philippines General Hospital to take effect 1 September 1986 until 30 April
1992. The U.P. Board of Regents intended to have the plaintiff serve his full term, as Director,
since any other arrangement would impede the hospitals development. Barely two (2) weeks
after assuming the presidency of the University of the Philippines, Jose V. Abueva submitted a
memorandum to the Board of Regents to reorganize the U.P. Manila including the Philippine
General Hospital with a draft resolution for approval of the Board of Regents, recommending
that certain key positions of U.P. Manila including that of Estrella be declared vacant. The Board
of Regents approved the so-called reorganization plan for the PGH. Dr. Ernesto Domingo acting
on instruction of Abueva, U.P. President, issued a memorandum creating the Nomination
Committee for the UP-PGH Medical Center Director. The committee thus created was scheduled
to nominate Estrellas replacement as Director. Estrella filed with the lower court his complaint
seeking to enjoin Abueva, Domingo, the Nomination Committee and the Board of Regents from
proceeding with the nomination of UP-PGH Medical Center Director, in order to forestall the
consequent removal/dismissal of Dr. Estrella even before the expiration of his term of office on
April 30, 1992 without any cause provided by law. Respondent Judge concluded that the
reorganization of PGH was done in bad faith. The lower court ruled that Dr. Estrella cannot be
removed from office as a result of such defective abolition of the position to which he was
appointed.

RULING ON THE BACKPAY: In case asked

Issue:
As to the claim that mandamus is not the proper remedy to correct the exercise of discretion of
the Commission, it may well be remembered that its discretion is limited to the facts of the
case, i.e., in merely evaluating the evidence whether or not claimant is a member of a guerrilla
force duly recognized by the United States Army. Nowhere in the law is the respondent
Commission given the power to adjudicate or determine rights after such facts are
established. Having been satisfied that deceased Tan Chiat Bee was an officer of a duly
recognized guerrilla outfit, certified to by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, having served
under the United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines, a guerrilla Unit recognized by the
United States Army and forming part of the Philippine Army, it becomes the ministerial duty of
the respondent to give due course to his widow's application.
The law as contained in Republic Act Nos. 304 and 897 is explicit enough, and it extends its
benefits to members of "guerrilla forces duly recognized by the Army of the United States." From
the plain and clear language thereof, we fail to see any indication that its operation should be
limited to citizens of the Philippines only, for all that is required is that the guerrilla unit be duly
recognized by the Army of the United States.

Whether or not respondent Dr. Felipe Estrella who holds the position of Director of the
PGH can invoke security of tenure during his term of office notwithstanding the abolition of the
said position by the U.P. Board of Regents.
Held:
Yes. Appointees of the UP Board of Regents enjoy security of tenure during their term
of office. It is clear from the record that the PGH itself was not abolished in the reorganization
plan approved by the Board of Regents. The PGH was merely renamed UP-PGH Medical
Center and some of its functions and objectives were expanded or consolidated. There is no
substantial distinction, in terms of functions, between PGH and the proposed UP-PGH Medical
Center. The Board of Regents acted within the scope and limitations of its charter, Act No. 1870,
as amended when it approved the reorganization plan renaming the PGH and expanding and
consolidating some of its functions and objectives. The Board of Regents did not and could not
have abolished PGH. The authority of the UP is limited to combining or merging colleges. The

power to create and abolish offices carries with it the power to fix the number of positions,
salaries, emoluments, and to provide funds for the operation of the office created. This power is
inherently legislative in character. The UP Board of Regents does not have such power. Hence,
the abolition of the position of respondent Dr. Estrella is not valid. Anent the issue regarding
respondent Estrellas failure to exhaust all administrative remedies, the Court holds that this
case has special circumstances that made it fall under the jurisprudentially accepted exceptions
to the rule. He must have believed that airing his protest with the Board of Regents would only
be fruitless and that unless he goes to courts, irreparable damage or injury on his part will be
caused by the implementation of the proposed reorganization.
(Rasul is the presiding judge of RTC Pasig)
18. National Food Authority vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. Nos. 115121-25. February 9, 1996. 253 SCRA 470
The case at bar involves the legality of negotiated security contracts awarded by the National
Food Authority (NFA), a government-owned and controlled corporation and its Administrator,
Romeo G. David, to several private security agencies, in default of a public bidding.
PETITIONERS:

NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY ROMEO G. DAVID

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS: COL. FELIX M. MANUBAY, MASADA SECURITY AGENCY

CONTINENTAL WATCHMAN AND SECURITY AGENCY, ALBERTO T. LASALA, NORMAN D.
MAPAGAY
FACTS: In 1990, the NFA, through then Administrator Pelayo J. Gabaldon, conducted a public
bidding to award security contracts. Twelve security agencies were awarded one-year contracts,
among whom were private respondents Col. Felix M. Manubay, Continental Watchman and
Security Agency, Alberto T. Lasala and and Norman D. Mapagay.
In August 1992, petitioner Romeo G. David became NFA Administrator and caused a review of
all security service contracts, procedures on the accreditation. Pending this review, Administrator
David extended the services of private respondents and the other incumbent security agencies
on a periodic basis.
The review was completed in March 1993 and new terms for accreditation, bidding and hiring of
security agencies were made. The bidding areas were also reclassified and reduced from
fourteen NFA regions to only five NFA areas nationwide.
On April 6, 1993, Special Order No. 04-07 was issued under which Administrator David created
a Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) to undertake the prequalification of
prospective bidders, conduct the bidding, evaluate the bids tendered and recommend to the
Administrator the bids accepted. Notices for prequalification and bidding for security services
were published. All incumbent security contractors were required to pre-qualify and only those
prequalified were to be allowed to participate in the prebidding and bidding scheduled on June 4
and 18, 1993.
The prebidding and bidding dates were later reset to give more time for the participants to
comply with documentary requirements. Forty-one security agencies submitted the necessary
documents for prequalification.

Upon a review, the PBAC disqualified respondent Mapagay and Lasala. Only respondents
Manubay, Continental and Masada participated in the prebidding were declared prequalified to
bid.
Lanting Security and Watchman Agency and respondent Lasala, filed separate complaints with
the RTC Quezon City to restrain Administrator David and the PBAC from proceeding with the
public bidding. Thus, restraining orders were issued.
During the effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction, Administrator David sent to all
incumbent security agencies, including four of herein private respondents, notices of termination.
Private respondents were informed that their services were to end inasmuch as their respective
contracts had expired and they no longer enjoyed the trust and confidence of the NFA and
instructed to withdraw their security guards from all NFA installations.
On August 4, 1993, Administrator David contracted the services of seven new security agencies
on a month-to-month basis pending resolution of the injunction against the bidding.Private
respondents forthwith filed separate complaints with the Regional Trial Court for prohibition,
mandamus and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and
restraining order.
The trial courts issued five separate restraining orders and injunctions ordering the NFA to desist
from terminating the services of respondents.
Petitioners now assail that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals nullifying and enjoining
the implementation of the contracts with the new security agencies. They argue that the new
security agencies were hired as an emergency measure after the contracts with the incumbent
security agencies expired.
On May 18, 1994, SC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from enforcing
the decision of the Court of Appeals and the writs of preliminary injunction issued by the trial
courts insofar as the same nullify or otherwise stop the implementation of the subject interim
negotiated NFA security contracts.
On July 21, 1994, petitioners submitted a report dated July 19, 1994 informing the Court that a
public bidding was held on June 21, 1994 but no contract had been awarded because the PBAC
had to study and evaluate each and every bid proposal.
A second report dated March 3, 1995 was filed by petitioners informing us that deliberation on
the bids was prolonged by the necessity of passing upon the technical merits of each bid and by
the discovery of collusion between two bidders. The PBAC decided to conduct a rebidding in
Areas 1, 2, and 3.
A third report dated July 13, 1995 was submitted where petitioners manifested that still no
contract had been awarded because the minimum number of bidders per area was not met. The
rejection of the two agencies reduced the number of bidders in each area below the required
minimum compelling the PBAC to recommend a failure of bidding in all five NFA areas.
However, petitioners could not act on the PBACs recommendation because of a temporary
restraining order. One of the bidders found in collusion filed a complaint with the said Regional
Trial Court questioning the legality of the PBACs rejection of its bids and enjoining NFA and the
PBAC from awarding security contracts to any lowest or next lowest qualified bidder.

ISSUE: WON private respondents did not avail of, much less exhaust, available administrative
remedies, which rendered their complaint premature and legally deficient to merit the grant of
judicial relief?
HELD: NO. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast
rule. It is subject to some limitations and exceptions. In this case, private respondents
contracts were terminated in the midst of bidding preparations and their replacements hired
barely five days after their termination. In fact, respondent Masada, a prequalified bidder,
submitted all requirements and was preparing for the public bidding only to find out that
contracts had already been awarded by negotiation. Indeed, an appeal to the NFA Board or
Council of Trustees and the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of the law. The urgency of the situation compelled private respondents to go to
court to stop the implementation of these negotiated security contracts.
RULING ON THE BIDDING: In case asked
The Court was neither impressed by petitioners claim that the subject contracts were negotiated
as a necessity to stave off a crisis that gripped the NFA, i.e., the loss, destruction and dissipation
of their properties. First of all, the restraining orders and writ of preliminary injunction issued by
the two Quezon City trial courts on complaint by Lanting and respondent Lasala suspending the
public bidding scheduled did not result in the emergency situation petitioners alleged. The
security vacuum was created when petitioners terminated the services of the incumbent security
agencies after the issuance of the said orders and before the injunctions issued by respondent
trial courts on application by private respondents.

Gravador wrote a protest r to the Dir. of Public Schools that his birth is Dec 11, 1901, attached
with affidavits of LazaroBandoquillo& Pedro Slenes declaring said information as neighbors of
the Gravadors deceased parents who invited them in his baptismal party a few weeks after his
birth. This was also sent to theDivision of Superintendent of Schools.
There are 2 records involved, the pre-war record, consisting of 2 teachers insular cards (nov 26
1987), & post-war record, consisting of Elementary Teachers report card Employees Record
Card & Employees Record of qualifications (dec 11 1901). Baptismal certificate is among the
church records destroyed by fire, municipal civil register contains no record of his birth.
Gravador filed a suit for quo warranto, mandamus and damages in the CFI of negros oriental,
asking to entitle him of the office and for the payment of his back salaries and damages.
Trial court: in favor of Gravador, granted petition, reinstate. Post-war records were intended to
replace pre-war records.
Respondents directly appealed to SC in 1967, contending that the post-war records merely
intend to replace the missing pre-war records, thus those still subsisting are still controlling, and
that the finding of the Superintendent of Schools is an administrative finding & should not
be disturbed by court.Gravador filed for dismissal on the ground of that issue had become
moot, w/ him already retired in 1966 & had received the corresponding benefits.
Issue: WON administrative finding are binding to the courts

Assuming arguendo that an emergency actually existed and the negotiated contracts were
justified, petitioners continued failure to conduct a public bidding and select the bidder within a
reasonable time casts doubts on the good faith behind the negotiated contracts.

SC:
it is necessary to review for the computation of the retirement annuities is based on
the number of years of service of a retiree, & though payments of benefits had already been
made, it would not exempt him to make refunds if it is found out that he is really born on Nov. 26,
1987.

The Administrator should have immediately acted upon the PBACs recommendation and
accordingly scheduled another public bidding but somehow petitioners chose to abide by a
restraining order of the Davao trial court. It must be noted that what the Davao trial court issued
was a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioners from awarding the contracts to the lowest
or next lowest bidder at the June 21, 1994 public bidding. It was not a writ of preliminary
injunction nor was it an order restraining the holding of another bidding.

The findings of a fact of administrative officials are binding on the courts if supported by
substantial evidence, is a settled rule of administrative law. The school official based his
determination of the petitioners age on the pre-war records in the preparation of which the
petitioner does not appear to have taken part. On the otherhand, petitioner relies on post-war
records which he personally accomplished to prove the date of his date of birth. The lower court
correctly relied on upon the post-war records for 3 cogent reasons:

Petitioners manifest reluctance to hold a public bidding and award a contract to the winning
bidder smacks of favoritism and partiality toward the security agencies to whom it awarded the
negotiated contracts and cannot be countenanced.

1. Although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may
testify as to his age as he had learned from his parents & relatives, & in this case
through family tradition (baptismal party);

19. Pedro GRAVADOR vs. Eutiquio MAMIGO

July 21, 1967
L-24989
20 SCRA 742

2. The import of the declaration of his older brother contained in a verifiedcadastral

pleading,stating Gravadors age is 23 in year 1924, is an ante litem motam by a
deceased relative which is a pedigree within the intendment & meaning of sec 33 of
the rule 130 of the rules of court, thus cannot be ignored, and;

FACTS: Pedro Gravador was the principal of Sta. Catalina Elementary School in Sta. Catalina
Negros Oriental. He was advised of his separation, on the ground that he reached the
compulsory retirement, by the then Superintendent of schools Angel Salzar Jr. through
Supervisor TeodolfoDayao. The advice reads that based on pre-war records, his birthday is
Nov26, 1987, making him 66 yrs, 8, mos, &22 days, & unless valid proof of baptismal or birth
certificate proving he is below 65, his separation is effective immediately. A few days later,
EutiquioMamigo was designated teacher-in-charge.

3. and that the year of his older brothers birth, in the same pleading is, 1989,
Gravador could not have been born earlier than his older brother.
20. HILDA RALLA ALMINE vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MINISTRY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM (MAR) AND SULPICIO BOMBALES
G.R. No. 80719 September 26, 1989 117 SCRA 967

GANCAYCO, J
FACTS:
On December 25, 1975, petitioner filed a sworn application for retention of her
riceland or for exemption thereof from the Operation Land Transfer Program with the then
Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) in Tabaco, Albay. After due hearing, Atty. Cidarminda
Arresgado of the said office filed an investigation report for the cancellation of the Certificate of
Land Transfer (CLT) of private respondent who appears to be petitioner's tenant over her
riceland. Upon failure of the Ministry to take the necessary action, petitioner reiterated her
application alleging that her tenant deliberately failed and refused to deliver her landowner's
share from 1975 up to the time of the filing of the said application and that the latter had
distributed his landholding to his children. A reinvestigation was then conducted by Atty. Seth
Evasco who filed his report recommending the cancellation of private respondent's CLT, which
was elevated to the MAR. However, Minister Conrado Estrella still denied petitioners application
for retention.
Petitioner then appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) but to no avail. The
CA likewise dismissed the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction holding that questions as
to whether a landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his land-holdings, if
administratively decided by the Minister of Agrarian Reform, are appealable and could be
reviewed only by the Court of Agrarian Relations and now by the Regional Trial Courts pursuant
to BP Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied, hence this
petition. Petitioner contends that under Section 9 of BP Blg. 129, said appellate court is vested
with the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all decisions, resolutions, or orders of quasi-judicial
agencies except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Since the
appeal involves both calibration of the evidence and the determination of the laws applicable
thereto, then an appeal to the Court of Appeals is the appropriate remedy.
ISSUE: W/N the CA has jurisdiction over the petition for review by way of certiorari of a decision
of the Minister of Agrarian Reform
HELD: YES.

The failure to appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of the Minister of
Agrarian Reform in this case is not a violation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies as the latter is the alter ego of the President .6
21. Datiles and Company vs. Sucaldito
G.R. No. 42380

186 SCRA 704

June 22, 1990

FACTS:
Datiles and Company has in its favor Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 1902 whereby the
Republic of the Philippines, thru the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, agreed to
lease to the company 175.9959 hectares of public land located in Batu, Siay, Zamboanga del
Sur, for fishpond purposes.
About the middle of 1973, Datiles and Company, represented by Spouses Loreta and Larry
Datiles, filed a complaint for Injunction with Writ of Possession with Preliminary and Prohibitory
Injunction, with Damages before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur against Jesus Deypalubos and
Daniel Cabelieza. It was alleged therein that the respondents occupied an area covered by FLA
No. 1902 without a fishpond permit and the knowledge and consent of petitioner and that the
respondents refused to vacate said area despite orders from the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources.
In their answer to the accusation of their unlawful entry, private respondents set up the defense
of good faith at the time of their entry and occupation of the land which they described as
forested and uncultivated.
They added that prior to the filing of their own respective fishpond lease applications over the
disputed area (i.e., Deypalubos on the southern portion of about forty-nine (49) hectares and
Cabelieza on the eastern part of about two (2) hectares) on 3 January 1973, they were assured
by an officer from the Bureau that the areas were unoccupied and not subject of any pending
leasehold agreement or application.

Questions as to whether a landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his

landholdings are exclusively cognizable by the Minister (now Secretary) of Agrarian Reform
whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the President and not to the Court of Agrarian
Relations. These cases are thus excluded from those cognizable by the then CAR, now the
Regional Trial Courts. There is no appeal from a decision of the President. However, the said
decision may be reviewed by the courts through a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, as the case may be under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Meanwhile, respondent Deypalubos submitted to the Bureau of Fisheries his formal

protest against the Datiles and Companys existing fishpond permit over the 49 hectares
subject of the formers fishpond lease application.

Thus, the respondent appellate court erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over
the petition for review by way of certiorari brought before it of a decision of the Minister of
Agrarian Reform allegedly made in grave abuse of his discretion and in holding that this is a
matter within the competence of the Court of Agrarian Reform. The Court of Appeals has
concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the Regional Trial Court over petitions seeking the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. 5

Thereafter, or on 2 June 1974, the Barrio Council of Batu, Siay, Zamboanga del Sur prepared
and submitted to the Bureau of Fisheries a resolution which attests that the 49 hectare
controverted fishpond area was never occupied by the Datiles family and that it was Mr.
Deypalubos who cleared the same and constructed all the improvements therein. The resolution
further requests that the original grant of 175.9959 hectares to Datiles and Company be reduced
to fifty (50) hectares only in accordance with a certain presidential decree limiting the cultivation
of a fishpond to about fifty (50) hectares, with the remaining area to be distributed to poor
families.
No investigation of the barrio councils resolution and Deypalubos formal protest over the forty-

Later, the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against both
respondents resulting in the restoration of possession and occupancy of the disputed areas by
the Company.

nine (49) hectares was held in view of an October 29, 1974 order issued by the Bureau
Director to hold in abeyance any hearing on the matter until such time that the civil case before
the RTC shall have been finally resolved.
However, on January 3, 1975 another memorandum was issued by the Bureau Director
addressed to the Bureaus Regional Director Matias Guieb, directing an immediate formal
investigation of those issues involved in the protest of Mr. Jesus Deypalubos and barrio councils
resolution not touched upon in the civil case pending before the RTC.
Accordingly, Regional Director Guieb notified the parties of the scheduled hearing of the said
protest.
Praying to restrain the proposed investigation and hearing on the fishpond conflict, Distales and
Company instituted a special civil case for Prohibition and/or Injunction with Preliminary
Injunction before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur against Regional Director Guieb and
impleading pro forma Deypalubos and Cabelieza, alleging that Regional Director Guieb has no
longer any authority to conduct the investigation, as the issues proposed to be investigated are
the same issues raised in the then pending civil case before the RTC.

In the present case, however, there is no administrative order or act as above described,
that can be appealed from. The respondent Regional Director has not rendered any decision,
or made any final finding of any sort, and is in fact just about to conduct an investigation which
happens to be the very act sought to be prevented. Consequently, administrative remedies that
must be exhausted, although available, cannot be resorted to.
There being urgency in stopping public respondent Guiebs investigation but no plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners recourse to the respondent court
for relief by way of a petition for prohibition was proper.
22. Arrow Transportation Corporation vs. Board of Transportation and Sultan Rent-A-Car,
Inc.
No. L-39655

March 21, 1975

63 SCRA 193

Justice Fernando
FACTS:

Thereafter, the presiding judge RTC, Hon. Melquiades S. Sucaldito, seeing that a possible
irreparable injury could be caused the company if the investigation in question were to proceed,
issued a restraining order temporarily enjoining the same.
During the trial of the special civil case, private respondents moved to dismiss the case and to
dissolve the restraining order, arguing, among others, that the RTC lacks jurisdiction to try
the case for failure on the part of the complainant to exhaust available administrative
remedies.
After trial, the RTC granted the respondents motion to dismiss and lifter the restraining order.
The RTC, ruled that the investigation falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Fisheries since it involves the right of the parties to lease the premises in question, based on
law, rules and regulations issued by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and that
the company has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to it before filing
the petition for prohibition because the matter of investigation was still appealable to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

Petitioner Arrow Transportation Corporation and private respondent Sultan Rent-A-Car

are both domestic corporations. Arrow has in its favor a certificate of public
convenience to operate a public utility bus air-conditioned auto-truck service from
Cebu City to Mactan International Airport and vice-versa with the use of twenty (20)
units.

Sultan filed a petition with the Board of Transportation for the issuance of a certificate
of public convenience to operate a similar service on the same line.

Eight days later, without the required publication, the Board issued an order granting
the provisional permit applied for.

A motion for reconsideration and for the cancellation of such provisional permit was
filed on October 21, 1974. However, without awaiting final action thereon, Arrow filed
this petition for the reason that the question involved in the case is a purely legal one.

As a preliminary injunction was likewise sought, a hearing was scheduled, but it was
cancelled. The SC issued a resolution instead, requiring respondents to file an
answer and setting the hearing on the merits of the case.

In the answer submitted, respondents substantially admitted the alleged facts. It

denied the allegation that there must be a publication before a provisional permit can
be issued, reference being made, to Presidential Decree No. 101, which authorized
respondent Board to grant provisional permits when warranted by compelling
circumstances and to proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry.

Hence, the complainants filed this petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was no prior exhaustion of administrative remedies on the part of the
petitioner.
RULING:
NO. It is a well-settled rule that, for prohibition to lie against an executive officer, the petitioner
must first exhaust administrative remedies. This doctrine rests upon the assumption that the
administrative body, board or officer, if given the chance to correct its/his mistake or error, may
amend its/his decision on a given matter. It follows therefore that there has to be some sort of a
decision, order or act, more or less final in character, that is ripe for review and properly the
subject of an appeal to a higher administrative body or officer, for the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies to operate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the controversy in the case at bar is ripe for judicial determination as there was a
motion for reconsideration pending with the Board of Transportation when this petition was filed
with the SC.

HELD:
YES. Ordinarily, the resolution of the Board should be awaited. This Court was impelled to go
into the merits of the controversy at this stage, not only because of the importance of the issue
raised but also because of the strong public interest in having the matter settled. As was set
forth in Executive Order No. 101 which prescribes the procedure to be followed by respondent
Board, it is the policy of the State, as swiftly as possible, to improve the deplorable condition of
vehicular traffic, obtain maximum utilization of existing public motor vehicles and eradicate the
harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, as well as update the standards of those
carrying such business, making it imperative to provide, among other urgently needed
measures, more expeditious methods in prescribing, redefining, or modifying the lines and mode
of operation of public utility motor vehicles that now or thereafter, ma y operate in this country. It
is essential then both from the standpoint of the firms engaged as well as of the riding public to
ascertain whether or not the procedure followed in this case and very likely in others of a similar
nature satisfies the procedural due process requirement. Thus its ripeness for adjudication
becomes apparent.
To paraphrase what was said in Edu vs. Ericta where the validity of a legislation was passed
upon in a certiorari proceeding to annul and set aside a writ of preliminary injunction, to so act
would be to conserve both time and effort. Those desiring to engage in public utility business as
well as the public are both vitally concerned with the final determination of the standards to be
followed and the procedure that must be observed. There is to repeat, a great public interest in a
definitive outcome of the crucial issue followed.
23. Luciano AZUR & Nicolas BULALCAO vs. the PROVINCIAL TREASURER, PROVINCIAL
AUDITOR, & PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF CAMARINES SUR
Feb 27, 1969
GR L-22333
27 SCRA 50
FACTS:Azur, Bulalcao and one Pedro Pasilaban are provincial guards holding their positions for
more than 5 years. They took the patrolman qualifying exam on Feb. 27, 1960; on or about jan
15, 1960 they were notified by the Sec. of the provincial board that their positions had been
abolished by Resolution No. 16, as amended by Resolution No. 45, which in order to
economize, reduced 45 existing positions of provincial guards to 35, 10 positions eliminated
and their items abolished subject to the approval of the Sec of Finance
Petitioner filed a complaint against defendants in CFI of Camarines Sur for reinstatement and
damages, contending that. Res.45 had not been approved by the Sec of finance, and was
therefore still ineffectual; that they were separated not to economize, but to have them replaced
by persons belonging to the political party of the new administration, that prior to the separation,
the administration hired 5 new provincial guards who were later on separated to conceal the
intention to replace the plaintiffs, and in fact were again allowed to work in mar 1960; that the
hiring of the replacements is illegal; that from feb 15-23 1960 (t=up to the filing of the complaint)
they rendered services without compensation.

case sustaining that there is no cause of action. Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration was also
dismissed.
Direct appeal to SC
Issue: WON:
there is a cause of action?
legal right to demand for reinstatement?
the abolition of the office is legal and authorized by RA 2260?
all administrative remedies as required by law had not been extinguished?
SC:
1.in order to sustain dismissal on the ground stated, insufficiency of cause of action must appear
on the face of the complaint. The sufficiency test is whether or not in theadmission of the facts
alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of
the complaint. The motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged.
Examining the allegations, if the allegations of the plaintiffs were assumed to be true, they would
have a cause of action.
2. the continuous 5 year service entitles appellants to preferential right under sec 28 of Civil
Service Law. Although temporary employees, they are still protected by the Civil Service Law. It
is not legally deducible that from there 1st appointment that no new appointment had been
extended to them during their more than 5yrs service. To conclude otherwise would go beyond
the allegations of the complaint and the presumption of regularity which arise therefrom. To
dismiss the case under such circumstance is legally insusceptible. There being no allegation that
the 5 who replaced them are civil service eligible, appellants are entitled to preferential rights.
3. requisites to abolish/replace office/employees w/o civil service eligibility:
Be give a qualifying examintation w/n 1 year from approval
he either failed in the examor refused to take it
he could be replaced only by one who has the requisite or appropriate civil service
eligibility w/o these conditions, one has no right to continue his position permanently.
4. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable when the controverted act is patently
illegal. It is settled that the invoked rule is not a hard fast rule; it admits of exceptions. Admitting
the truth of appellants allegations in their complaint to the effect that they were separated from
service in patent violation of the Civil Service Law, immediate recourse to the courts of justice by
appellant is not objectible.
24. Cabada vs. Alunan III

Defendants admitted the employment & subsequent dismissal of the petitioner, and the approval
of resolution 16 & 45. As affirmative defense, they allege that plaintiffs have no cause of action
as theyve admitted that they were still rendering service, that they have not exhausted all
administrative remedies, that the abolition was legal, that them not being civil service eligible
were merely temporary employees whose security of tenure could not be more than 3 months
unless reappointed at the beginning of the present administration. Plaintiffs admit the continued
service.
Trial supposedly held injune 1960, moved to august 1960, and again postponed to give the
provincial fiscal time to file a motion to dismiss on behalf of defendants. Trial court dismissed the

G.R. No. 119645

August 22, 1996 263 SCRA 838

Justice Davide, Jr.

Petitioners: SPO3 Noel Cabada and SPO3 Rodolfo de Guzman

Respondents: Hon. Rafael M. Alunan (DILG Secretary and NAPOLCOM Chairman), Hon. Alexis
Canonizado (Commissioner), Leodegario Alfaro (Regional Appellate Board VIII Chairman).
Edmundo La Villa Larroza (PNP Regional Command VIII Director) and Mario Valdez

ISSUE:
Whether or not this special civil action was prematurely filed for failure of the petitioners to
exhaust administrative remedies.

FACTS:
HELD:

Private respondent Mario Valdez filed a complaint for Grave Misconduct, Arbitrary
Detention, and Dishonesty against petitioners with the Office of the Commission on
Human Rights in Tacloban City.

NO. The petition was GRANTED. The decision of the NAPOLCOM was set aside.

Said complaint was referred to the Philippine National Police Eight Regional
Command (PNP-RECOM 8) which, after conducting its own investigation, filed an
administrative charge of Grave Misconduct against the petitioners and instituted
summary dismissal proceedings.

Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 specifically provides that if a Regional Appellate Board fails
to decide an appeal within the reglementary period of sixty days, the appealed decision
becomes final and executory without, however, prejudice to the right of the aggrieved party to
appeal to the Secretary of the DILG. The said provision is, however, silent as regards the
availability of an appeal from a decision rendered by a RAB within the reglementary period.

The Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8 found petitioners guilty and ordered their
dismissal from police service. Pursuant to this decision, Special Order No. 174, dated
April 23, 1994, was issued ordering the dismissal of petitioners.

Petitioners claimed that they were not formally furnished with a copy of the decision
and that they were able to secure a copy thereof thru their own effort and initiative
only on June 13, 1994. However, they received the copy of Special Order No. 174 on
April 26, 1994.

The Regional Appellate Board of the Eight Regional Command (RAB 8) affirmed the
dismissal.

Cabada and De Guzman filed an appeal and petition for review with the DILG and the
chairman of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). Cabada stated under
oath that he seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Regional Director of PNP- RECOM 8, who failed or refused to act on his motion, and
that he asked that his motion be treated as an appeal to the RAB.

The NAPOLCOM, through Commissioner Alexis Canonizado, denied due course to

the appeal and petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. The NAPOLCOM ruled that
the decision of the RAB had long become final and executory and that there was no
showing that the RAB failed to decide respondents appeal within the reglementary
period of 60 days.

The NAPOLCOMs decision was based on Rule IV of NAPOLCOM Memorandum

Circular No. and Section 5, Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91006.

Hence, they filed this instant petition with the SC.

The Solicitor General seeks to dismiss this petition on the ground of prematurity
because petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies. They should have
appealed to the Civil Service Commission which, pursuant to the Administrative Code
of 1987, was vested with appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases of government
personnel where the penalty imposed is dismissal from office.

In view of the aforementioned gap in Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990, the provisions of the
Civil Service Law and the rules and regulations implementing it must be taken into account in
light of the maxim interpretare concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi or every statute
must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. As thus construed and harmonized, it follows that if a RAB fails to decide an
appealed case within sixty days from receipt of the notice of appeal, the appealed decision is
deemed final and executory, and the aggrieved party may forthwith appeal therefrom to the
Secretary of the DILG. Likewise, if the RAB has decided the appeal within the sixty-day period,
its decision may still be appealed to the Secretary of the DILG.
The court considers the appeal and the petition for review as appeals to the Secretary of the
DILG under Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990. Only the Secretary of the DILG can act thereon,
one way or the other. The NAPOLCOM did not have authority over the appeal and the
petition for review, and just because both mentioned the Secretary of the DILG as
Chairman or Presiding Officer of the NAPOLCOM did not bring them within the
jurisdiction of the NAPOLCOM.
The NAPOLCOM exercises appellate jurisdiction only on the following cases and THROUGH (a)
the National Appellate Board (NAB) in personnel disciplinary actions involving demotion or
dismissal from the service imposed by the Chief of the PNP, and (b) the RAB in administrative
cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police benefits. It has no appellate
jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the NAB and the RAB. Consequently, the
NAPOLCOM did not have the power or authority to issue, through Commissioner Alexis
Canonizado, the 24 March 1995 decision denying due course to the appeal and petition for
review filed by petitioners Cabada and De Guzman, respectively, for lack of jurisdiction.

The plea of the Office of the Solicitor General that the instant action is premature for nonexhaustion of administrative remedies is thus untenable. The Court would have sustained it if the
Secretary of the DILG was the one who denied due course to or dismissed the appeal of
petitioner Cabada and the petition for review of petitioner De Guzman. By then, the appeal
would have to be filed with the CSC.

25. Smart Communications vs National Telecommunications Commission

Gr. 151908 August 12, 2003 408 SCRA 678
Facts:
Pursuant to it,s rule-making powers, the NTC issued Memorandum Circular 13-6-2000
promulgating rules and regulations regarding billing of telecommunications services. The circular
provides that the bill shall be received by the subscriber not later than 30 days after the billing
cycle; there will be no charge for calls that are diverted to the voice mailbox mailbox; the Public
Telecommunications Entity (PTE) shall verify the identification of each purchaser of prepaid sim
cards; subscribers would be informed of their remaining value at the start of every value; and the
unit of billing would be reduced to 6 seconds per pulse from 1 minute per pulse. On August 30,
2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) intending
to minimize cell phone theft which requires the following: strict compliance with MC 13-6-2000
requiring the presentation of identity and addresses of prepaid sim card users; the denial of
users using stolen cell phone units; and requiring all existing prepaid sim card users to register
and present identification cards.
On October 20, 2000, Isla Communications and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed a case
against NTC commissioner Joseph Santiago, Deputy Commissioners Aurelio Umali and Nestor
Dacanay for the declaration of nullity of MC 13-6-2000. They claimed that the NTC had no
jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods since such jurisdiction belongs to the DTI
according to the Consumer Act if the Philippines and that the said bill is oppressive, confiscatory,
and violative of the constitutional prohibition against the deprivation of property without due
process of law. Thereafter, the court granted a motion to intervene by Globe and Smart. The trial
court ruled in favor of the petitioners. However, on appeal, the CA reversed the ruling.
Smart and Piltel question the jurisdiction of NTC over the case, and claimed that the CA erred in
holding that the petitioners failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. They also alleged
that the CA erred in not holding the circular unconstitutional.
Globe and Islacom, on the other hand, claimed that the CA erred because the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply because the case
is for nullification of the circular.

Chapter 5
Different Characteristics of Administrative Proceedings

Issue: Whether or not the NTC has jurisdiction over the case.

1.

Decision:
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi judicial or
administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make
rules and regulations which result in delegated legislation. These rules and regulations have the
effect of law when promulgated within the scope of of the statutory authority granted. It is
required that such is germane to the object and purpose of the law, and must conform to the
provisions of the enabling statute. This power is not to be confused with the quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory power which is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to
which legislative policy is to apply.

Adversary in Nature- although many administrative proceedings are ex parte, every

administrative proceeding is adversary in substance if it results in an order in favor of
one over the other. Moreover, the proceedings are adversary because the main
purpose of administrative agencies is to protect the public interest.

2.

Quasi-judicial/ Judicial in nature- proceeding partake the nature of judicial proceedings

if it involves (a) the taking and evaluation of evidence, (b) the determination of facts
based on evidence presented and, (c) rendering of an order or decision supported by
the facts determined.

3.

Civil in nature, not criminal- administrative proceedings are civil in nature even if the
charge is based upon violation of penal laws

4.

Not an action at law- administrative proceedings are public proceedings looking for
public ends. They are preventive and remedial in nature to implement public policy.

Those mentioned are based on the book but sir mentioned that there are eight. Sorry.
I cant find anything in Cruz book but I think these may be included:

In questioning the validity if issued rules and regulations, administrative remedies need not be
exhausted because this principle applies only to the performance of quasi-judicial functions not
the performance of its quasi-legislative function. Similarly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
applies only to the exercise of quasi-judicial powers. In cases of specialized disputes, the
practice is to refer the case an administrative agency of special competence. Therefore, in cases
where what is disputed is the validity or constitutionality of the rules and regulations issued by
administrative bodies, the regular courts have jurisdiction as the Constitution vests courts the
power of judicial review.

5.

Informal methods of adjudication- there is no requirement for strict adherence to

technical rules however, administrative proceedings are not exempt from the basic
and fundamental procedurals principles.

6.

Liberal construction of rules of procedure- administrative agencies are given liberal

discretion in creating rules of proceeding but within the limits of the law empowering
them as well as the constitutional rights afforded to the individual.

7.

Limited jurisdiction- the administrative proceeding can only proceed on cases falling
under their limited jurisdiction as prescribed by the law creating them.

2.

The tribunal must consider the evidence presented

3.

The tribunal must have evidence to support its decision

4.

Evidence must be substantial

5.

The decision must be based on evidence presented at the hearing or atleast

contained in the records and disclosed or made known to the parties affected.

6.

Tribunal must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy and not simply accept the views of the subordinate in arriving in the
decision

7.

Decision must be rendered in such a manner that the parties to the proceedings can
know the various issues involved and reason for the decision rendered.

Hierarchy of Evidentiary Values on Cases

1.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt

2.

Clear and convincing evidence

3.

Preponderance of evidence

4.

Substantial evidence

5.

Scintilla of evidence

CHAPTER 6
REQUIREMENTS WITH RESPECT TO ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

Quantum of proof in administrative proceedings

Substantial evidence- such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion. Evidence which a substantial basis from which the
fact in issue can be reasonable inferred.

*ART. VIII SEC. 14 (1987 Constitution)

Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused
due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

CONCEPTS
1) DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

Requisites of administrative due process

1.

The right to notice, whether actual or constructive, of the institution of proceedings

2.

Reasonable opportunity to appear personally or with assistance of counsel and

defend his rights, introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor and,
controvert the evidence of the other party

3.

4.

Right to tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction, so constituted to give him

reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality
Right to a finding or decision supported by substantial evidence presented at the
hearing or ascertained in the records and disclosed or made known to the parties
affected.

Elements of due process

1.

Right to a hearing which includes the right to present his case and submit evidence in
support thereof.

(Doctrine of prior resort, exclusive administrative jurisdiction, preliminary resort)

I. MEANING
- not concerned with judicial review but determines in some circumstances whether initial action
should be taken by a court or by an administrative agency
- usually refers to cases involving specialized disputes which are referred to an administrative
agency of special competence to resolve the same
II. RATIONALE
- based on sound public policy and practical considerations
*Two reasons for the rule:
1) to take full advantage of administrative expertness; and
2) to attain uniformity of application of regulatory laws which can be secured only if
determination of the issue is left to the administrative body
III. APPLICATION
1) Where elements of administrative discretion are often important considerations
- prior resort should be required where the reasons mentioned justify its application

e.g. cases involving issuance and revocation of licenses, enforcement of licensing rules
2) Where reasons for doctrine inapplicable (doctrine may still be applicable)

concurrent to a judicial remedy, or there is grave doubt as to the availability of the administrative
remedy

a) Application involves exercise of judicial discretion

2) where the issue involves not a question of fact, but one of pure law, and nothing of an
administrative nature is to be done or can be done

- The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not an inflexible mandate. It is predicated on an

attitude of judicial self-restraint, and its application involves the exercise of judicial
discretion

3) where the issue raised is the constitutionality of the statute under which the administrative
agency acts

- W/N the requirement of prior resort should be imposed is said to depend on the courts
determination whether Congress intended the issues to be left to the administrative
agency for initial determination

3) DOCTRINE OF RIPENESS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

b) Issues involve questions of law

I. MEANING

-Prior resort to an agency should be limited to questions of fact and questions requiring
the skills of administrative specialists.

- this doctrine, like that of exhaustion of administrative remedies, determines the point at which
courts may review administrative action except that the former applies to administrative action
other than adjudication

c) Where concurrent jurisdiction conferred

II. RATIONALE

-Doctrine is applicable whenever courts and administrative agencies have concurrent

jurisdiction

- the basic principle of ripeness is that the judicial machinery should be conserved for problems
which are real and present or imminent, and should not be squandered on problems which are
future, imaginary or remote

2) DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

I. MEANING
- requires that where a remedy within an administrative agency is provided by law or available
against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, and can still be resorted to by
giving the said agency every opportunity to decide correctly a given matter that comes within its
jurisdiction, relief must be first sought by availing this remedy before bringing an action in or
elevating it to the courts of justice for review

III. APPLICATION
An issue is normally ripe for judicial determination
1)

When the Interests of the plaintiff are, in fact subjected to or imminently threatened
with substantial injury

2)

The statute is self-executing, that is, if the mere existence of the statute on the books
without enforcement, in fact, causes substantial injury to plaintiff

3)

A statute or regulation which is enforceable through criminal prosecution brought by a

party who is immediately confronted with the problem of complying or violating

4)

A debilitating legal uncertainty by reason of which private parties may be injured

seriously enough

5)

When the plaintiff is, in fact, substantially harmed by the vagueness of a statute

6)

Informal administrative action, i.e. an instruction issued by an administrative agency

II. RATIONALE
- to allow first the administrative agency to carry out its functions and discharge its
responsibilities within the specialized areas of its competence before resort can be made to the
courts
-based on sound public policy and practical grounds
III. APPLICATION
1) As a prerequisite of judicial review
- In some instances, the statute makes the exhaustion of the remedies a pre-condition of the
right to seek the intervention of the courts
- Only judicial review of decisions of administrative bodies made in the exercise of their quasijudicial function (i.e., adjudicative, not rule-making or legislative power) is subject to the
exhaustion doctrine
2) As affecting ones cause of action
- The only effect of non-compliance with the doctrine is to render the action premature, i.e. the
claimed cause of action is not ripe for judicial determination and for that reason a party has no
cause of action to ventilate in court. Hence, such failure is a ground for dismissal of the action
for lack of cause of action
*EXCEPTIONS
1) where by the terms of the statute authorizing an administrative remedy, such remedy is
permissive , or where the administrative remedy is not exclusive but merely cumulative or

7)

a)

where no administrative remedy is available

b)

the party affected is immediately confronted with the choice between compliance
and non-compliance

c)

violation of the instruction is a criminal offense

When governmental action is contingent upon the plaintiffs action or upon other
events and substantial injury to the plaintiff is present or imminent