GOOD by Fagothey

1.

Is the good definable?

According to George Edward Moore, all definition is analysis of a concept into its components; that good is a simple concept unanalyzable into
anything simpler, therefore the concept of good is indefinable. However, that we cannot define the good does not mean we cannot know what
it is. We can define the object that is good, but not the predicate good itself. To reduce good to something non-ethical involves naturalistic
fallacy, as if good were a sort of natural property that some things possess and other lack. Good is just good - irreducible, unanalyzable, and
indefinable.

2.

Is the good an end to be sought?

According to Aristotle, the good is that at which all things aim. This is recognition of the relationship between good and end. The end,
according to him, is that for the sake of which a thing is done, which he locates among four causes: the matter, the form, the agent, and the
end. These four are interrelated to the extent that all change is a process whereby some given underlying substrate (the matter) the acquires
a new specification or determination (the form) through the action of an efficient operator( the agent) moved to act by the attraction of the
same good (the end). Such view supposes teleology, or purposiveness. A directed world needs a principle of direction. Direction supposes not
only a nature, a moving principle to make a thing go, but also a target toward which to move. So nature and end are correlative terms. Natural
activity is teleological activity.
Man also has nature, the source of the inner dynamism of his being, making it natural for man to seek the good as his end.
Principle of Finality or Teleology no action will ever take place unless something removes the indetermination, stirs the being to act, and
points its action in a certain direction. Hence, every agent acts for an end is implicit in the concepts of potency and act, and in the whole
notion of causality. If every agent acts for an end, then the human agent certainly does so.
Failure to adapt to ones conduct to rational ends is the accounted sign of mental derangement. The very admission that there are such things
as rational human acts is an admission that human beings do act for ends.
Moral Good (how can an act fail to be goo, or the human conduct go wrong, if all things, including man, inevitably seek an end that is also
good?) Though some things are physically defective, they are good in so far as they have being, defective in so far as they lack being. There
is some good in all things, but it need not be the ethical or moral good. Because not everything is good for everything, it is up to mans
judgment to determine what the things are good for him. If some lesser good makes impossible the attainment of the absolutely necessary
good, then this lesser good, is not the true good for us. The moral good must always be the true good. Thus, there are three degrees of
goodness:
a. Useful or instrumental good we seek a good not for its own sake but as a means to some further good. It is desirable only because
it leads to something more desirable.
b. Pleasant good we seek a good for the satisfaction or enjoyment it gives without considering whether it will be beneficial to our
whole being.
c. Befitting/Intrinsic good we seek a good because it contributes towards the perfection of our being as a whole, because it fits a man
as such. Intrinsic good - present in the befitting good. It is good not only for us but good in itself as an independent value apart from
its effect on others.
The moral good is always and necessarily the befitting good.
The analysis of the kinds of good shows that human conduct mast always be directed toward the good in some sense, but that this is not
always the moral good; to make it the moral good is lifes purpose and our responsibility.

3.

Are we obliged to seek the good?

Two different sense of the ought: the nonmoral and moral ought. Every good is optional, but the moral good is necessary.
Moral ought it is a kind of necessity that is unique and irreducible to any other. It is not a logical necessity based on the impossibility of
thinking contradictions. It is a moral necessity, that of the ought, guiding us in what we recognize as the proper use of our freedom.

4.

Is a good a value simply in itself?

Characteristics of value:
a. Values are bipolar, with appositive and negative pole. The former is the one preferred, while the latter is a disvalue.
b. Values are not homogenous but of many kinds.
c. Values transcend facts in the same sense that nothing ever wholly comes up to our expectations
d. Values, though no wholly realizable, clamor for realization. They should exist, they deserve to be, even if we have no way of bringing
them into existence.
We call a thing valuable because we clothe it with a value by our attitude towards i. Things exist, but whatever value they have is conferred
on them by us; there is objective being, but not objective value. The thing has no intrinsic worth, but we give it a value because of our
peculiar prejudices, our psychological conditioning, our accountable tastes and fancies. All values have a relation to a valuer; they are values
for somebody. When we call a value objective, we do not deny this relation to a valuing subject but assert the existence of an objective
reason for this relation tin the valued object.
There is no value without a valuer to do the valuing. Values, like other universals, are drawn from the data of experience and have their
concrete fulfillment in existing persons, things, and actions.

5.

What distinguishes moral values from other values?

Moral values are understood to be those that make a man good purely and simply as a man. Moral values are personal, not only because a
person has them, but because they are the expression of each ones unique personality in the innermost center of its being, as shown in the
act of choice. Moral values, therefore, reside both in the acts of a man chooses to do and is the results of those acts on the character of the
man. Moral value and disvalue remain irreducible elements.
Distinction of Moral Values:
a. Moral values can exist only in a free being and his voluntary or human acts. It is done intelligently in the sense that the agent
knows what he is doing and wills to do it, but need not be brilliantly planned and executed.
b. Moral value is universal in the sense that what holds for one holds for all in the same conditions. The reason is that it shows the
worth of ta man as a man.
c. Moral value is self-justifying. Any further justification of moral value will be found to be part of the moral order itself and not
some extrinsic reason/
d. Moral value has preeminence over every other value. A moral value can be compared only with another moral value. If a moral
value conflicts with another type of value, this other must take a subordinate place.
e. Moral value implies obligation. Man may disregard all other values, and we shall call him foolish, etc., but we can still retain
respect for him as a man. Not so if he loses moral integrity.
It is only good conduct that can make a good man, and a man is called good because his past acts show him to be the kind of man from
whom good acts are expected. It is true that no one ever perfectly lives up to it, but it must mean the ideal he could live up to because he
ought to. We all have an ideal of the perfectly living human being. So far as a man approaches his ideal, he has moral values and is good. So
far as he admits into his life that which degrades his ideal, he has moral disvalue and is bad.

Conclusion
Three aspects of good: as an end, ought, and value.
The good as end emphasizes the obligation of any being, if it is not yet perfect, to strive toward perfection as its end and to seek other goods as means
to his end.
The good as ought stresses the fact that each thing ought to be as perfect as it can be, that the ideal is not merely something to be contemplated but to
be put into action, and that this demand is laid in a free being in the form of moral obligation.
The good as a value stresses the intrinsic good, the perfect good, which which is good in itself irrespective of any goodness it may have for anything
else. This is the most fundamental aspect of the good.
The absolute good is the ultimate end that ought to be sought because of its supreme value.
The subject matter of ethics is the concept of good itself and not the correctness in speaking about it.