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WSO BRIEFING: BOP the engine of neorealism

Balance of power (BOP) theory is the engine of neorealism, in that it does all the work for
neorealist theory. BOP politics prevails whenever two or more states coexist in an anarchic
order with no superior agent to rein in powerful states or protect weak states. In other words,
it is characteristic of anarchical orders. Waltz argues that, as a rule, states balance rather
than bandwagon in anarchy. Balancing involves states forming alliances to stop the rise of
an especially powerful state before it becomes so powerful that it threatens to dominate the
international system. Bandwagoning is a term from US electoral politics. In the days before
television, candidates for public office used to tour their constituencies with musical bands to
drum up support. To bandwagon, therefore, meant literally to jump on the band wagon of the
dominant candidate, usually the incumbent, when it drove into town. To bandwagon in
international politics is for states to align with rising dominant powers.
Waltz recognizes the logic of bandwagoning under hierarchies the rational actor will want to
be on the winning team and share the spoils. But in anarchy, bandwagoning contradicts the
logic of self-help. Joining the bandwagon of a rising power is to risk the inevitable, namely
becoming its prey later on. Waltz was sufficiently nuanced to recognize that weak powers
may have no choice but to bandwagon, or face being swallowed-up anyway this, after all, is
the lesson of the Melian dialogue. But he argues that great powers will always balance.
Thus, he notes, how the United States and Soviet Union formed a counterbalancing alliance
against the rise of Germany in Europe and Japan in the Pacific during World War II. The point
to note is that the USSoviet alliance was preceded and proceeded by intense rivalry
balancing dynamics brought these unlikely bedfellows together.

Why bipolarity is preferable

Of the two kinds of systems, bipolar examples are preferable to multipolar systems, in that
they are more stable. Here stability is defined in terms of war-proneness. Bipolar systems are
less prone to war because they are relatively simple to manage. As Waltz puts it: two great
powers can deal with each other better than more can. Moreover, both superpowers have
interest in maintaining bipolarity. Bipolarity would only collapse as a result of a major war
between the superpowers a war that neither would want to fight or as a result of the rise of
a third power which both would resist.
Waltz argues that, in contrast, multipolar systems are vulnerable to all sorts of dangerous
dynamics. Multipolar orders can slip into war due to chain-ganging and buck-passing.
Again, both are American expressions (reflecting the American origins and tone of neorealist
theory). Chain-ganging is the practice of chaining convicts together when they work outside
prisons. The purpose is to prevent any single convict from escaping if one goes, all those
chained to him must also run. In world politics, chain-ganging refers to one state dragging
other states into war through alliance commitments. Thus, in 1914, a dispute between
Austria-Hungary and Serbia escalated into World War I as allies of each state were sucked
into the conflict. Buck-passing involves passing the burden or responsibility for action on to
somebody else. Hence, President Harry Truman sought to promote his integrity by declaring:
the buck stops with me. In world politics, buck-passing refers to states trying to push onto
one another the responsibility for balancing against a rising power. Arguably, this dynamic
operated in the late 1930s, when the Allied powers were reluctant to stand up to a militarizing
and increasingly aggressive Germany. The point is that, in bipolarity, superpowers cannot

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pass the buck elsewhere they must stand up to one another. Moreover, they are unlikely to
be chain-ganged into major war by some commitment to a small state.

A product of the Cold War

Waltzs neorealism was a product of its time. IR scholars turned their attention in the 1970s to
new liberal theories that emphasized the role of non-state actors and the importance of the
global economy. Recall that the 1970s was a decade dominated by the Third World debt
crisis and the oil shocks, at the centre of which were banks and OPEC. Neorealism returned
attention to the importance of states and military power in world politics at a time, in 1979,
when the world was slipping back into a second Cold War following the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan.
More specifically, Waltzian neorealism was a product of its time in that Waltzs understanding
of the advantages of bipolarity was based on the history of the Cold War. With the end of
World War II, the multipolar order dominated by Britain, France, Germany and Japan gave
way to a bipolar order dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. US power was
based on the monopoly of atomic weapons and US dominance of the air and seas, as well as
the size and technological advancement of the US economy (which amounted for half of
world economic output in the postwar period). Soviet power was based on the massive Red
Army sitting in Europe. The most remarkable thing, on the face of it, was the absence of great
power war from 1945 to 1979. When Waltz wrote about the stability of bipolar systems, he
had in mind this 35 year period of relative world peace (obviously, wars raged around the
world, but none of these flared up into a third world war). Cold War stability was the product of
balancing by both superpowers as each responded forcefully to the advances, technological
and geo-strategic, of the other.

Problems with BOP

However, neorealist BOP theory may be criticized on a number of points:
1. It is a static theory of world politics. It is unable to explain significant change. Since
polarity is the key structural variable, there is nothing to explain why any system
should move from peace to war. Why do multipolar systems experience periods of
peace if they are prone to such dangerous chain-ganging and buck-passing
dynamics. And why should war break out in bipolar systems if they are so
marvellously stable? BOP theory is also unable to explain the rise of a challenging
power and decline of leading power. History is full of examples where the lead power
in a bipolar order is replaced by the up-and-coming challenger Sparta replacing
Athens in the 5th century BC, Rome replacing Carthage in the 2nd century BC, and
France replacing the Habsburgs in early 16th century.
2. Polarity cannot explain the motivation for peace and war. Waltz assumes that the two
lead powers in a bipolar order will be conservative. But this need not be so. Either
could be revisionist that is to say, seek to effect a profound change in the
international order. Indeed, the rising power has a strategic interest in being
revisionist, in order to outmanoeuvre the dominant power. And even the dominant
power may be revisionist if that promises to increase its position of dominance within
the international system. A good example is Athens in the 5th century BC, which
chose expansion over status quo.

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3. It could be argued that anarchy does not produce balancing, but rather fear does.
This argument is advanced by Stephen Walt in a book called The Origins of Alliances
(1987). In place of BOP theory, Walt develops what he calls balance of threat theory.
The basic gist is that states do not balance against power, but against threat. And the
important point here is that threat cannot be specified without recourse to intent and
character of states. Thus, the United States does not seek to balance against a
nuclear-armed Britain. But acquisition of even a single nuclear weapon by North
Korea, for instance, would trigger balancing action by the United States. Note that in
this scenario, Britain is far more powerful than North Korea, but given its intent and
character, North Korea presents a far greater threat to the United States. In other
words, balance of threat theory suggests that we do need to look at the units of the
system. Focusing just on the structure of the system is not sufficient to explain
balancing dynamics.
4. The final criticism of neorealism is that it assumes too much functional similarity on
the part of states. In fact, states are remarkably unlike. The world contains great
powers, middle powers, developed states, developing states, micro states, quasistates, divided states and failed states. Some states have major warfare functions,
others lack even armies. Some states are net exporters of security, others are
creators of insecurity. Some provide the full range of welfare services, others depend
on external sources of aid to provide even the basics for their citizens. In short, not
only do states vary in their material capabilities (as highlighted by neorealism), they
also vary greatly in functionality. If we accept this, then it underlines the need to
include consideration of the units of the international system in any theory of world
politics.