Asia Program

Policy Brief

March 2015

Summary: On July 17, 2014,

The German Marshall Fund of
the United States (GMF), with
assistance from the Embassy
of Japan in Washington, DC,
convened a workshop to discuss
Japans diplomatic outreach and
the implications for Asia, the
United States, and Europe. This
paper draws on that discussion.

Japans Global Re-Emergence: How

Japans Active Diplomacy Strengthens the
Foundations of the U.S.-Japan Alliance
by Joshua W. Walker and Sharon Stirling-Woolsey

Introduction
Japan has reappeared on the world
stage. After 20 years of economic
stagnation and a decade of political
malaise, Shinzo Abe, in his second
incarnation as prime minister, has won
two major elections and is attempting
to use his political capital to reform the
sluggish Japanese economy.
At the same time, he is placing a
renewed emphasis on global affairs.
Central to this has been the Abe
governments effort to diversify Tokyos
international partnerships. Japan is
forging closer relations across the
Indo-Pacific and increasing dialogue
with Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN). Farther abroad,
Japan is deepening cooperation with
Europe and reinforcing its security
anchor, the U.S.-Japan alliance. Just
when global rules and norms are being
tested, Tokyos proactive diplomatic
outreach, aimed at strengthening the
international system, is a welcome
development for Washington.
1744 R Street NW
Washington, DC 20009
T 1 202 683 2650
F 1 202 265 1662
E info@gmfus.org

Japan has benefited tremendously

from the U.S.-led international rulesbased order established after World
War II and now seeks to stand-up to
the threats that are challenging this

order by strengthening its connectivity

with other countries especially
other democracies. Japan is seizing the
opportunity to be not only a contributor to regional peace and stability, but
an active player on the global stage.
Japans determination to be a global
actor is underscored by recent contributions to international peace and
prosperity efforts in combating the
so-called Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) and the ongoing crisis
in Ukraine. Japan joined the United
States and Europe in implementing
sanctions against Russia.1 This position runs contrary to the prior Japanese goal of settling its long-standing
territorial dispute with Moscow
and securing much needed energy
resources from Russia. Sadly, Japans
increased global profile has not come
without controversy or tragedy,
witnessed most starkly by the recent
public killing of two Japanese hostages
by ISIS.2
The Abe government has sought to
diversify Japans traditional partner1 http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/InternationalRelations/Japan-rethinking-Russia-strategy
2
http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/the-islamic-statemay-have-derailed-japans-foreign-policy-outreach/

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Policy Brief
ships and policy instruments by pursuing a grand strategy
of connectivity among democracies, while balancing its
pragmatic and opportunistic relations with other states.
This strategy begins with Japans newly established National
Security Council, and employs the use of a variety of levers
including foreign aid, defense commerce, and multilateral
diplomacy.3
Ultimately, Abes success in this endeavor will hinge on his
much-vaunted Abenomics an economic policy aimed
at resuscitating the sluggish Japanese economy. The success
of this daunting task will likely determine whether Abe
will have the political capital to sustain Japanese leadership abroad. There is little public appetite for Japans international leadership role if direct interests are not at stake.
It is therefore vital for Abes government to conclude the
Trans-Pacific Partnership as soon as possible, and clarify
the benefits of various new trilateral partnerships involving
Australia, India, and Southeast Asia.
Japans Emerging Role in Southeast Asia
Abe tried to promote value-based diplomacy during his first
term as prime minister in 2006-07, but a lack of a political
capital and personal health issues hampered his effectiveness.4 However, a renewed vigor and popular political
mandate allowed Abe to stage a political comeback in 2012
and his second term has seen a return to proactive diplomacy. This time, Abe is balancing value-based diplomacy
with selective strategic pragmatism in order to engage more
widely in Southeast Asia. Myanmar and Vietnam are the
best examples of Abes willingness to engage pragmatically
with non-democratic counties. This engagement however
does not undermine Japans unique role as Asias oldest and
most developed democracy. It is unquestionably a supporter
of the current international order in Asia, which puts it in
stark contrast to a politically closed China that has been
increasingly assertive in Southeast Asia.
In recent years, the United States and Europe have placed
considerably less focus on Southeast Asia because of
ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine. Meanwhile, Abe visited all 10 member countries of ASEAN in
his first year as prime minister filling the void left by
the West. In the case of Myanmar, Japan has been careful
in its promotion of democracy. Over the years, Japan has
3 http://csis.org/publication/japan-takes-step-forward-defense-policy-reform
4 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/japan-is-back

It is vital for Abes government

to conclude the Trans-Pacific
Partnership as soon as possible.
cultivated relationships with a range of stakeholders in
Myanmar and can now use these to play a distinct and
meaningful role.
Japan has pragmatically increased its administrative, business, and institutional networks within Southeast Asia,
regardless of a countrys political system. After the March
11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami, resilience has become
a recurrent theme of Abes speeches, which has played
particularly well in a region that has dealt with similar types
of natural disasters and frequently benefited from Japans
development assistance. There is an appreciation in Tokyo
for the ASEAN way of engagement regardless of the type
of government. Japan has also attempted to engage Americans and Europeans more on Southeast Asia in order to
offer an even more attractive counter-balance to China.
There are a number of obstacles ahead for Southeast Asia.
Particularly acute is the challenge of economic disparity, an
issue that can quickly trigger dangerous social and political
disruptions. Southeast Asia is multi-ethnic and multi-religious, factors that have led to serious conflict in other parts
of the world. Japan has identified the need to manage these
risks and is trying to put its assets into disparity management in the hope of improving the regional situation.
Environmental issues and the high risk of natural disasters
are other key issues for Southeast Asia, which are difficult
for countries to tackle independently. If governments do
not have effective ways to manage disasters, trust in the
institutions and government will wane. Disaster preparedness and risk-management capabilities are strong pillars for
maintaining political structures and Japan is particularly
well-suited to take the lead with the encouragement of the
United States and Europe. Militarily capabilities in Southeast Asia are domestic security-oriented and lag behind
those of Northeast Asia. Overall, Southeast Asian capabilities are incredibly limited, as demonstrated during last
years search for the missing Malaysian Airlines flight 370.
There is therefore an urgent need to increase basic capabilities such as coast guard and radar equipment. Japan is wellpositioned to provide such assistance.

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Policy Brief
In the case of Myanmar, Japan believes that one of the roles
it can play is making all parties aware of the benefits of
democracy. Over the years, Japan has cultivated a number
of important channels for communication, which are now
assets that Japan can use to play a distinct and meaningful
role. Japan envisions a similar role for itself in Indonesia
and Thailand. The strategy of Southeast Asian nations
has always been one of diversified relationships never
becoming overly reliant on any one country. Given this
reality, the biggest opportunities often lie in countries that
seem furthest away, such as Cambodia or Vietnam.
When it comes to Southeast Asia, Tokyos strategic interest
and engagement strategy remains at a predominantly bilateral level rather than multilateral via ASEAN. However, we
are likely to see continued efforts to engage with ASEAN
and Southeast Asia as a whole, a carry-over from Abes first
term and the previous government led by the Democratic
Party of Japan. There should be little doubt that Japans
Southeast Asian engagement has legs far beyond the current
administration.
Tokyos Value-Based vs Strategic Diplomacy
Tokyos delicate yet effective dance, between value-based
and strategic diplomacy, has been made possible by Abes
personal chemistry and unprecedented travel schedule.
Abes burgeoning bromance with leaders such as Indian
Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Australian Premier
Tony Abbott has been on full display, which has, of course,
attracted the attention of China. The United States encouragement of trilateral cooperation between each of these new
partners for Japan is seen as being particularly important
for maintaining the current global balance and liberal order
that is the main driver of regional stability and economic
integration.5

There should be little doubt

that Japans Southeast Asian
engagement has legs far beyond
the current administration.
5 http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/24/asias-emerging-triple-alliance-india-china-japanmodi-obama/

Despite Japans more active diplomacy in Southeast Asia,

China is reaping the benefits of the Wests preoccupation elsewhere. On their own, Japan, South Korea, India,
Australia, Vietnam, Philippines, and all of ASEAN are at a
significant military disadvantage against China. However,
with the military support of the United States and economic
cooperation with Europe along with proactive diplomacy
at the various Asian summits that now take place regularly
across the region, there are numerous opportunities for
Japan to play a leadership role. With the right set of policies, resources, and attention, Southeast Asia provides an
important opportunity for Western policymakers to achieve
favorable outcomes in terms of economic cooperation and
regional stability.
With regard to values-based diplomacy, Tokyos outreach to
Indo-Pacific democracies, particularly India and Australia,
has been transformational. Arguably the bilateral relationship that holds the most potential is between Asias largest
and most prosperous democracies, Japan and India. Yet,
while the two countries have a good foundation and chemistry between their leaders, cooperation remains more
aspirational than functional. The challenge for Abe and
Modi is how to turn their effusively warm rhetoric into real
action. How will Japan and India increase the scale of their
economic and security relations, which at this time remains
relatively small? Perhaps more striking is that India and
Japans interpretation of the Law of the Sea and Freedom of
Navigation differs, with Indias interpretation falling much
closer to that of the Chinese, a topic that India has been
reluctant to discuss. So while the two countries have voiced
a desire to increase their maritime cooperation, differences
of this magnitude create obstacles.
Assertive China
Chinas aggressive behavior in Asia throughout most of
2014 brought several of the United States allies closer
together, reinforced the significance of the U.S. presence
in the region, and reestablished the reliance on Japan as a
host nation. Some nations previously influenced by Chinas
charm offensive have become nervous about Chinas
regional aspirations. However, relations with China remain
an important factor for every Asian capital economically and strategically. As a result, Japans increased tension
with China complicates its relationships with others. Abes
success in increasing Japans global presence is not solely the
result of his own initiatives but also thanks to an interna-

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Policy Brief
tional environment in which China seems to be overplaying
its hand. As a result of Chinas increased aggressiveness,
in the South China Sea for instance, perceptions of China
have changed. Polls showing that Asians, led by the Japanese, tend to be more pro-American and anti-Chinese than
in years past and decreased Japanese investment in China
underscores the importance of Sino-Japanese relations for
both sides.6
In Washington, where despite a perception gap between
business communities that want to increase relations with
China and geostrategic communities that view Beijing as
a rival, everyone predominantly focuses on the significant
rise and strength of China. In contrast, Tokyo tends to see
the weaknesses of its communist neighbor as it struggles
with variant systems of governments in both Hong Kong
and Taiwan along with restive populations in Tibet and
Xinjang, not to mention the growing environmental and
economic inequality challenges across China. As seen from
the Japanese perspective, this Chinese weakness means that
President Xi Jinping cannot show signs of acquiescing or
compromising on issues such as sovereignty disputes.
The traditional distinction between Tokyos relations with
Beijing and that with Seoul hinged on the legitimacy the
Chinese Communist Party. This was derived in part by
keeping historical memories and tensions alive against
Japan. However, increasingly a new generation of South
Koreans sees their identity formed in opposition to Japan.
U.S. encouragement to repair Japanese-South Korean ties
runs against this crosscurrent.
The economic dimension, in particular the commercial
gravitational pull of China, cannot be ignored. Many in
Japan have recognized that the Trans-Pacific Partnership is
a strategic tool for Tokyo to shape Chinese behavior in the
region as well as a way to reform Japans domestic economic
structure. Global businesses are belatedly realizing that
China is not the only place to focus. Rising labor costs in
China have led to a need to rethink supply chains just as
Chinas traditional role as the workshop of the world is
changing. This has resulted in a slowing Chinese economy
with the projected rate of slowdown differing only by scale.
Observers outside China tend to be more pessimistic.
A revitalization of the Japanese economy through real
economic reform and the establishment of significant trade
6 http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/americas-global-image-remains-more-positivethan-chinas/; http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-07-16/with-tensions-risingjapanese-investment-in-china-plummets

deals could present Tokyo with a unique opportunity to

rebalance its economic relationship with Beijing.
Abes Korea Problem
Tokyos regional engagement stems from what Abe frames
as being part of Japans 70 year-long pacifist history postWorld War II. However as Chinese, Korean, and even
Russian leaders have reminded Abe, his own conservative and personal leanings generate suspicion from these
important neighbors. It has become impossible to discuss
Japans desire to engage with regional democracies without
pointing out the strained relationship Japan has with one
of its closest neighbors and fellow democracy South Korea
a country with whom it is commemorating 50 years of
diplomatic relations this year. Here too, personalities matter,
but in the negative sense given that Abe chose to exclude
South Korea from his strategic planning while focusing on
kick-starting relations with North Korea and leveraging his
relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The
feeling that Japan and South Korea no longer share the same
regional strategic focus seems to prevail within the Abe
administration, much to the concern of the United States,
which grounds its Asian policy with these two democratic
allies. Therefore as South Korea, under President Park
Geun-hye, remains focused on the Korean Peninsula and
seems to be increasingly under Chinas sphere of influence,
Japan under Abe has sought to be more globally focused
with its Indo-Pacific partnerships seeking to project influence beyond its traditional Northeast Asian neighborhood.7

Tokyo tends to see the

weaknesses of its communist
neighbor as it struggles with
variant systems of governments in
both Hong Kong and Taiwan along
with restive populations in Tibet
and Xinjang.
7 http://www.cfr.org/diplomacy-and-statecraft/president-obama-japan-south-koreanrelations/p32761

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Policy Brief
The South Korean leaderships populist criticism of Japans
war history and the issue of war-time comfort women
has only increased since Abes return to power. At the very
least, in private, Seoul seems to simply want reassurances
that no official in Tokyo will visit the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, which celebrates the spirits of Japans wartime
dead, including several convicted war criminals. However,
it has become quite apparent that this Prime Minister Abe
is resistant to making concessions under pressure. At the
same time, despite the popular affinity exhibited in celebrity,
cultural, and culinary exchanges between Koreans and Japanese, a level of Korea fatigue, or wariness about engaging
with Seoul, has developed in Japan because of a perception
that South Korea is constantly moving the goal posts when
it comes to resolving issues of history.
Nonetheless, Tokyo appears to be looking into ways to
improve its bilateral relationship with Seoul. Track II
conversations and shared cultural affinities can help narrow
the perception gap and create a common understanding
of the strategic vision for Asias future. While South Korea
enjoys free-trade associations with the European Union
and the United States, Japans negotiations for its own
free-trade agreement with the EU and eventual conclusion
of the Trans-Pacific Partnership could potentially further
strengthen economic relations. At the same time, due to the
commonality of alliances with the United States, militaryto-military cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo have been
surprisingly close, meaning that if populist political rhetoric
can be contained, there might be a real possibility for strategic cooperation.
An important occasion will present itself on August 15 of
this year, a date that marks the 70th anniversary of the end
of World War II for Japan and 50 years since the rapprochement between Japan and South Korea under the leadership
of President Parks father. On this occasion, Abe is expected
to deliver a statement, the initial drafts of which are already
in the works. This statement is expected to echo previous
apologies such as those made by Prime Minister Tomiichi
Murayama8 and Foreign Minister Yohei Kono,9 both of
which expressed remorse for atrocities Japan committed
during World War II. While the two previous statements
were delivered by left-leaning politicians, the credibility of
a new statement of empathy and regret from the leader of
the nationalist center-right ruling LDP could offer a new
8 http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html
9 http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/state9308.html

Military-to-military cooperation
between Seoul and Tokyo have
been surprisingly close, meaning
that if populist political rhetoric
can be contained, there might
be a real possibility for strategic
cooperation.
window of opportunity to mend relationships and further
deepen regional cooperation.
Japans New Old Partner: Europe
Europe is not a completely new partner for Japan. However,
what is new for Tokyo is being able to view Europe as a
partner on more than simply economics but also potentially
on security matters. Increased interest in Japans NATO
partnership along with the 2+2 bilateral dialogues with
the British and French defense and foreign ministers has
further reinforced this shift in perception. While Japans
Arc of Freedom and Prosperity initiative was seen by some
as a move away from Washington, it was really about Tokyo
reaching out to other partners including Europe. Abe has
demonstrated his sincerity in cultivating a strategic partnership with Europe in his multiple visits to the continent and
initiatives aimed at deepening European-Japanese cooperation. When it comes to Europes role in Asia, Tokyo does
not expect Europe to play a direct military role but rather
be a partner working to uphold the international rulesbased system the continuation of which is seen as vital
for continued peace and prosperity in Asia. Europe is also
viewed as a fellow developed-market democracy that shares
similar demographic and economic realities with Japan in a
way few Asian countries have yet to experience.
It is clear that economic cooperation remains front and
center for any deepening of European-Japanese relations.
Initially, the desire for an EU-Japan free trade agreement
(FTA) was driven by concerns of market disparities with
South Korea, which already enjoys an FTA with Europe.

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Policy Brief
There has been a considerable shift in economic dynamism
to the Pacific that has created new possibilities in Asia for
Europe. This shift in European attitudes toward Asia opens
up more possibilities, particularly for Japan and Europe to
engage in softer domains such as economics, human rights,
and humanitarian issues. However there are concerns that
the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), being negotiated alongside the Japan-EU FTA, is subordinate to the
larger TPP and TTIP negotiations. Unfortunately, because
there is low public awareness in Japan of the SPA/FTA
negotiations, many remain skeptical and question Europes
importance.
There appears to be mutual skepticism from Europe and
Japan about a deep commitment to increased cooperation. Japan seems to question Europes engagement in Asia
beyond economic interests. And in Europe, the belief that
Japans key focus remains on the U.S.-Japan Alliance makes
a true deepening of cooperation with Europe appear to be
a peripheral concern. The differences in how countries in
Europe have responded to the U.S. rebalance or pivot
to Asia have informed Tokyos policymaking thus far.
Germanys interest in Asia, particularly China, has been
solely economic, with little to no interest in strategic affairs.
The French, on the other hand, have citizens and islands
in the South Pacific, resulting in a distinct strategic view
of the region, with clear interest in nuclear and proliferation threats from Asia. French defense doctrine includes
contingencies for Paris to play a military role in future
Asian conflicts. And while the British have shown a similar
interest in doing more, they remain limited by budget and
capability restraints. British and French approaches have
been different, but in terms of substance, these bilateral
relations with Japan are denser than any other Japan-Europe
bilateral relationship. The United Kingdom has historically
been the obvious first partner in Europe for Japan, perhaps
the result of being fellow island nations and the first foreign
alliance partner to Japan in the early 20th century. The
missing German-Japanese link is further exasperated by
Germanys undisputed role as leader and Britains diminishing place in Europe.
There is great potential to build upon Japans bilateral relations in Europe to deepen Japan-NATO and Japan-EU
ties. However a coherent approach is muddied by the lack
of a coherent European foreign policy on Asia. Tokyo has
an opportunity under Abe to help clearly spell out Japans
possible expanded global role. However, as seen from

Tokyo, there appears to be no consensus among European

allies about what partnerships outside the Euroatlantic
relationship should look like. That it should be a demanddriven process seems to be part of NATOs rhetoric. The
newly revived G7 under Japans leadership next year presents one opportunity to advance ties.
During his public speech in Brussels on the sidelines of
GMFs Japan Trilateral Forum, Foreign Minister Fumio
Kishida proclaimed 2015 as the start of a new chapter in
Japan-European relations, an important statement that
will require action on both sides.10 Areas of possible cooperation between Japan and Europe include political and
economic development in Myanmar, capacity building in
Southeast Asia, Europes role as an arms exporter to Asia,
the promotion of human rights, freedom of navigation, and
the rule of law. Having Europe support Tokyos push for the
application of a universal norm-based international order
in Asia is important. Regardless, it is clear that with Japans
resurgence, Chinas rise, Southeast Asias dynamism, and
Indias growth potential, Asia is a region of growing interest
to Europe that cannot be ignored. Therefore, there is a very
real opportunity for Japan and Europe to partner together
to uphold international rules and norms and deepen
cooperation on issues linked to the promotion of peace and
prosperity.
Conclusion
A revitalized Japan, empowered to undertake important
trade negotiations and reinterpret the traditional definitions
of collective self-defense, is a welcome global development.

It is clear that with Japans

resurgence, Chinas rise,
Southeast Asias dynamism, and
Indias growth potential, Asia is
a region of growing interest to
Europe that cannot be ignored.
10 http://blog.gmfus.org/2015/01/22/the-importance-of-japanese-european-and-united-states-trilateral-engagement/; http://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/ep/page24e_000068.html

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Japans proactive diplomacy is not a threat to the U.S.-Japan
alliance; rather it is a tribute to it. By the same token, strategic diplomacy with partners in the region or elsewhere
who share common interests but not values should be
viewed as complementary to U.S. and European interests.
Tokyos diversification of its partnerships with like-minded
powers in the Indo-Pacific and Europe along with the deepening of relations in Southeast Asia works to ensure a prosperous and strong Japan, which in turn guarantees regional
stability. Rather than being a zero-sum game for the U.S.Japan alliance, it is a force multiplier for both parties.
The United States remains the indispensable link between
the Atlantic and Pacific. In turn, Japan has a key role to
play not just as an important ally of the United States in
Asia, but also as the worlds fourth largest economy, the
biggest donor of international aid, and home to many of the
worlds most respected multinational businesses, assets that
Tokyo can bring to bear in international affairs to reinforce
global norms and the existing international order. Success
in tackling its own domestic and economic challenges will
ultimately determine the longevity of Tokyos global renaissance. Japans global emergence should be welcomed and
encouraged by its partners to weather the challenges in the
21st century.

The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the

views of the authors alone.

About the Authors

Joshua W. Walker, Ph.D. is a transatlantic fellow at The German
Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and vice-president of
global programs at APCO Worldwide. Sharon Stirling-Woolsey is a
program officer with the Asia Program at GMF.

About GMFs Asia Program

The German Marshall Funds Asia Program addresses the
economic, foreign policy, and security implications of Asias rise
for the United States and Europe through research, publications,
commentary, conferences, fellowships, study tours, and collaborations with other GMF programs. The programs initiatives include
the Stockholm China Forum, India Trilateral Forum, the Global
Swing States Project, the Young Strategists Forum, Trilateral Forum
Tokyo, Transatlantic Workshop on Pakistan, and high-level conversations at GMFs major conferences. The program also publishes
independent analysis by more than 15 in-house experts on Asia
and externally commissioned papers looking at U.S. and European
approaches to the Asia-Pacific and on deepening cooperation
between democratic Asia and the West.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens
transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan.
GMF contributes research and analysis and convenes leaders on
transatlantic issues relevant to policymakers. GMF offers rising
leaders opportunities to develop their skills and networks through
transatlantic exchange, and supports civil society in the Balkans
and Black Sea regions by fostering democratic initiatives, rule of
law, and regional cooperation. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan,
non-profit organization through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong
presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin, Paris, Brussels,
Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has smaller
representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.