Adams, Don - Socrates Polutropos - Apeiron, 43, 1 - 2010!33!62

Socrates Polutropos?
Don Adams
In the Hippias Minor a comparison between Odysseus and Socrates is

suggested. Just as Alcibiades compares Socrates to the satyr Marsias in
his ability to bewitch people with words (Symposium 215a6-16a8), and
Meno compares Socrates to the flat ray in his ability to benumb people
with his words (Meno 80a4-6), so also I think Hippias subtly compares
Socrates to Odysseus in his ability to mislead people by twisting words.
In contrast with Achilles, whom Hippias describes as 'alethes te kai haplous', he describes Odysseus as 'polutropos te kai pseudes' (365b4-5). By
this contrast, Hippias hopes to capture the deceit (365d8) and kakourgia
(e8-9) of Odysseus as compared to the 'straight-talking' Achilles. After
Socrates has refuted him, Hippias is reluctant to continue the conversation, and I suspect it is no accident that he uses the word 'kakourgia'
the same word he used to describe Odysseus to describe how he
thinks Socrates has treated him (373b5). On top of that, after Socrates
concludes his first refutation, Hippias immediately throws the blame
onto Socrates: 'you always twist (plekeis) logoi, and seizing the most difficult logos, grabbing hold of the small details, you don't wrestle with
the issue as a whole which is the real point of the logos' (369b8-c2).1 Just
as Odysseus twisted (plexamenos, Odyssey 10.168) a make-shift rope to
hog-tie a magnificent stag and carry him whither we willed, so also
Hippias charges Socrates with twisting logoi and intentionally missing
1 All translations are my own.
Brought
to you by | UNAM
APEIRON a journal for ancient philosophy and
science
003-6390/2010/4301 033-062 30.00 Academic Printing andAuthenticated
Publishing
Download Date | 2/22/15 8:27 PM
34
Don Adams
the real point to fasten on trivia, and by such disreputable means carrying Hippias off to the conclusion of Socrates' choice. Many recent
scholars would agree with such an allegation if the relevant kind of
word-twisting is fallacious argument.2
I disagree. I suspect that Plato wrote the Hippias Minor in part to
combat the image of Socrates polutropos. In this paper I hope to show
that our historical distance from Plato has made it more difficult than
it should be to see Plato's successful defense of Socrates. In the wake
of European empiricism philosophers increasingly turned to conceptual, and even linguistic, analysis as a means of solving philosophical
problems. If we treat Socrates' arguments in the Hippias Minor as exercises in conceptual or linguistic analysis, they will appear far less convincing than Plato intended them to be. In addition, no scholar has yet
paid sufficient attention to the range of meanings a Greek intellectual
in Plato's day would call to mind when considering Hippias' view of
Odysseus as polutropos. If we correct for these anachronisms, we will
see that Plato has given Socrates valid arguments for surprising conclusions. In the end I will explain two different strategies Plato may have
had in mind for responding to the conclusions, both of which involve a
recommendation for further philosophical inquiry into the explanation
of human action. In addition, I will argue that Plato portrays Hippias as
the real polutropos who cannot back up his pretensions to wisdom and
who doesn't succeed in saying what he really means. Socrates is the
one who turns out to be the straight-talker who helps Hippias to clarify
what he believes, and who faithfully follows an argument through to
its logical conclusion.
II
Before each of Socrates' two arguments begins, and when each ends,
Plato gives us a formulation of the central issue at stake. These 'bookend' statements tell us what each argument is about. Here are those
statements.
Here are several who think this, in chronological order: Grote 1865, 1:394; Apelt
1912,205; Sprague 1962,67-76; Hoerber 1962; Mulhem, 1968; Guthrie 1975, 4:195;
Levystone 2005,199-208.
Brought to you by | UNAM

Authenticated
Socrates Polutropos? 35
First Argument (365d6-9b7)
Initial Statement: So Homer thought, as it seems, the alethes man to be
one, and the pseudes to be another, and that the two are not one
and the same man (365c3-4).
Concluding Statement: So now do you perceive that the pseudes and
the alethes have been revealed to be one and the same, with the
result that if Odysseus is pseudes he is also alethes, and if Achilles is alethes he is also pseudes, and the two men are not opposed
to one another but are alike (369b3-7).
Second Argument (373c9-6c6)
Initial Statement: I eagerly desire, Hippias, to consider what was just
said, namely, which of the two is better (ameinous), the willing
errant (hekontes ... hamartanontes) or the unwilling (373c6-8).
Concluding Statement: So the willing errant (hekon hamartario), the
willing doer of shameful and unjust things, Hippias, if there
is such a person, would be none other than the good man (ho
agathos, 376b4-6).
In both cases Socrates frames the issue at hand as being a choice between two alternatives, and in both cases Socrates defends the more
counter-intuitive view. In the first case we have a choice between contradictories ('they are the same' as opposed to 'they are not the same'),
and in the second we have a choice between contraries ('the willing is
better' as opposed to 'the unwilling is better' and also to 'neither is better'). Very roughly, Socrates' strategy is the following: One view seems
obviously correct, but if you take time to think it through carefully, reasonable assumptions logically entail that the view which seems obviously incorrect is the correct view.' If I'm right about this, then Socrates
is giving what he thinks to be valid arguments for his conclusions. I will
also consider whether Socrates accepts the 'reasonable assumptions,'
and hence whether he also believes his arguments to be sound.
Before we consider the arguments and the assumptions on which
they rest, I need to sort out what I take to be a confusion that has set
much of the secondary literature on the Hippias Minor off on the wrong
foot. In identifying what the Hippias Minor is about, I ignored almost
the first three Stephanos pages of the dialogue, and I entirely ignored
the narrative or dramatic frame of the dialogue. I went straight to the
arguments and took Socrates at his word when he says what his arguments are about. My intent in this is to separate (i) what the topic is,
from (ii) how the topic arose. Here is, in outline, how the topic arose.
Authenticated
36 Don Adams
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
363bl-4, b7-cl, 364B4-5: Socrates asks Hippias regarding Odysseus and Achilles (a) which of the two is better (ameirin,
363b3-4; amein, cl and 364b4), and (b) according to what (kata
ti, 364b4) is the better one better?
364c5-7: Hippias answers both questions with remarkable
brevity by answering that Achilles is the best (ariston, 364c5)
and Odysseus is the polutroptaton (c6-7). (In other words, the
answer to Socrates' first question is 'Achilles', and his answer
to Socrates' second question is 'according to Odysseus' possession and Achilles' lack of polutropia'.)
364el-6: Socrates calls both of Hippias' answers into question by saying that he does not know what Hippias is saying
(ouk aid' hoti legeis, e4) when he calls Odysseus 'polutroptaton'.
Socrates asks whether Homer has also made Achilles polutropos (e5) which would entail that one cannot be better than the
other, at least not in this respect (kata tf).3
364e7-365b5: Hippias rejects the claim that Achilles is polutropos, and gives a quotation from Book IX of the Iliad, which Hippias interprets as implying that Achilles is alethes and haplous
(b4) while Odysseus is polutropos and pseudes (b5).
365b7-8: Socrates immediately pounces on Hippias' use of the
word pseudes and gradually shifts the discussion away from
'polutropos' and towards 'pseudes' ('polutropos' occurs twice at
365e2, but in its first occurrence it is added to 'dunatoi', and in
its second occurrence it is being replaced by 'panourgias' and
'phroneseos'; in Socrates' summary at 366a2-4 it has disappeared
entirely and doesn't return again until the very conclusion of
the argument at 369bl where it surprisingly pops up again in
the phrase 'pseude kai polutropon').
I think this sequence of textual events has misled many scholars into
thinking that (a) the main subject of the Hippias Minor or at least its
first argument is the claim that Odysseus is polutropos, and (b) there
is a fallacious equivocation of some sort in Socrates' first argument (and
3 Of course it would still be open to Hippias to argue that Odysseus is more polutropos than Achilles, but Hippias seems committed to the view that Achilles is not
polutropos at all.

Authenticated
perhaps as a result, in his second argument also). As I indicated in Section 1 above, I think that polutropia is an important background to the
dialogue, and that Plato has a meta-dialogic point in mind regarding
who is the true polutropos: Socrates or Hippias. However, I think that
polutropia is not that actual topic or at least, not the best way of stating the topic of either of Socrates' arguments in the dialogue.
In our eagerness to be faithful to the text, I think we scholars of ancient philosophy sometimes do not sufficiently distinguish between the
order of the dialogue and the order of the logic. Authors often present their conclusions first and then give their premises, but a logical
reconstruction will do violence to this order and put the conclusion last,
after setting out the premises in logically proper order. The structure of
the logic Socrates is trying to get Hippias to see may be very different
from the structure of the dialogue by which he gets him to see it. I think
Plato intentionally set the parallel Tjookends' of initial statement and
concluding statement for each argument in order to signal the reader
what is logically primary as opposed to what is important for moving
the dialogue towards what is logically primary.
Something similar happens at the beginning of the Laches. Initially
the question put to Socrates is whether Lysimachus should teach his
sons to fight in armor (Laches 181c8-9), but Socrates thinks that's not the
proper issue with which to begin. He sets that issue aside in order to
focus on the logically prior issue of what courage is (185b6-7). So when
Socrates refutes Laches' first definition of courage, he is not arguing fallaciously by equivocation: he is not equivocating between two issues,
he has set one issue aside to deal with a distinct issue. Socrates even
gives an explicit justification for this kind of move: when considering
whether to apply medicine to eyes, bridle to horse, or in general for
y, the primary consideration is y and not (185c5-dll). That is grounds
for setting aside for the time being in order to focus on y.
Similarly, the Meno begins with the question of whether or not virtue is teachable, but Socrates sets that issue aside to deal with what he
thinks is a prior issue, i.e., what virtue is (Meno 70al-2, 71bl-8). Again,
we cannot convict Socrates of committing the fallacy of equivocation
when he refutes Meno. The shift is not an illicit equivocation but an
intentional setting aside of one issue in order to focus on a prior issue.
In my view, Socrates is doing something similar in the Hippias Minor.
When he says that he doesn't know what Hippias is saying (364e4),
he is indicating that the word 'polutrop taton' (and hence 'polutropos')
isn't the real issue, or at least doesn't identify the real issue with sufficient clarity, and hence that the discussion ought not proceed as an
Authenticated
38 Don Adams
examination of polutropia. I think that Socrates is right about this, and
that in focusing on the word 'polutropos' Hippias is misrepresenting his
own view. In effect, scholars have taken Hippias at his word in assuming that the topic of the Hippias Minor (or at least the first argument) is
Odysseus' polutropia, and have been suspicious of Socrates' Ijookend'
statements of what the arguments are about. Quite to the contrary, I
am arguing that we should take Socrates at his word, and treat Hippias' early statements with suspicion because he clearly hasn't thought
through his own view sufficiently, as Socrates quickly shows.
Ill
Our first clue that something is wrong with Hippias' view not with
Socrates' inquiry is in the 'proof text' Hippias chooses. To explain
to Socrates what he is saying in calling Odysseus 'polutropos' Hippias
quotes Iliad IX 308-314. The problem is that no form of 'polutropos' occurs in that passage. Achilles calls Odysseus 'polumechan'. If they are
doing linguistic or conceptual analysis here, Hippias has just made a
substantial and obvious error. Clearly it is not the exact word 'polutropos' that matters to Hippias. He himself in his very 'proof text' is willing
to substitute a different word in order to identify (a) what it is that bothers him about Odysseus and (b) what forms the basis for his negative
evaluation of Odysseus in relation to Achilles. So the fact that Socrates
shifts the dialogue away from the word 'polutropos' is not evidence that
there is anything suspicious at all in Socrates' inquiry: Hippias himself is explicitly willing to use other words to identify what he has in
mind.
'Polutropos' is just as surely to be associated with Odysseus as 'menis'
is with Achilles because in their respective epics the heroes are described with those words in the very first line of the very first book
(Menin ... Achileos, Iliad 11; Andra ... polutropon, Odyssey 11). However,
at Odyssey 11, 'polutropos' may very well refer simply to the fact that
Odysseus was 'much-traveled' or 'much-wandering' (especially since
lines 2-3 explicitly mention that he was 'driven off course many times').
Surely that is not kata ti Odysseus is a worse man than Achilles. Circe
describes Odysseus as 'polutropos' after Odysseus resists the effects of
her potion (Odyssey X 330). Here I think Murray's now-stilted Of ready
device' (Homer 1984,369) is probably closer to her meaning than Fagels'
'man of twists and turns' (Homer 1996,240). She is probably remarking
on his resourcefulness which allowed him, unlike everybody else, to
Authenticated
find the means of resisting her magic. Notice that she does also call him
'polumechan" at X 504, but there she is allaying his fears about steering a
course safely back from Hades and so probably is referring to his ability
to find some way of landing on his feet safely no matter how difficult
the circumstances. Hence, Murray's 'many devices' (Homer 1984, 381)
is probably better than Fagels' l^orn for exploits' (Homer 1996,246) as a
translation of what she means in calling Odysseus polumechanos. Again,
neither of these can be kata ti Odysseus is a worse man than Achilles.
This is confirmed if we consider another famous individual who is
described as 'polutropos': Hermes. Twice in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes
the god is described thus, first by the poet (hymnus ad Mercurium 13) and
second by Apollo (439).4 But when Apollo addresses him as 'polutrope',
he is about to ask Hermes how he got his tortoise-shell kithara. Not by
coincidence, I think, is Hermes' invention of the tortoise-shell kithara
the very first story the poet tells of Hermes after calling him 'polutropon'
(17, 25-61). 'Resourceful' or 'inventive,' then, would be good translations. Again it is hard to see how being 'polutropos' could be grounds for
saying that Odysseus is a worse man than Achilles.
Ironically, these false leads bring us to the solution. In addition to
being 'polutropos', or perhaps as a part of being 'polutropos', Odysseus
shares with Hermes a facility for putting on a false face. Twice Hermes
plays the sweet-innocent-child-bom-only-yesterday routine (273, 376).
Playing dumb, he protests under Apollo's interrogation, that he is not
to blame for the theft of the cattle, 'whatever cattle might be' (277). The
poet sums up Apollo's interrogation of Hermes by saying,
Apollo spoke unerringly (riemertea) * * * he sought, not unjustly, to
catch glorious Hermes in the case of the missing cattle. But he, the
Cyllenian, wished to deceive (exapatan) the god of the silver bow with
cunning (techriesin) and wily5 words (haimulioisi logoisin). And when
4 There is no explicit reference to Hermes or to the Homeric Hymn to Hermes in the

Hippias Minor. I use this text to give us a little more evidence regarding a Greek's
linguistic intuitions regarding 'polutropos' and related words. In addition, the Hippias Minor is set immediately after a speech by Hippias in which he discoursed not
only on Homer but also on Other poets' (363c2). It is not unreasonable to think
that Hippias is familiar with Hermes' hymn, or that it occurred to him that both
Odysseus and Hermes are described more than once as 'polutropos.'
5 I think 'wily' is not an acceptable translation of 'polutropos' since I think 'wily' must
be reserved for 'haimulos' (and hence the Homeric 'haimulws'). It is with tremen-

Authenticated
40
Don Adams
Hermes, though he was of many counsels (polumetis), found that the

other was of many devices (polumechanon), he walked across the sand
in front, with the son of Zeus and Leto behind. (315-21)
Odysseus shares with Hermes not only polutropia but also polumetis (cf.
Iliad 1311). Odysseus is described as polumetis at Odyssey XXI274 when
he is at what is perhaps the single most crucial moment in the plot of
the epic, in the guise of a beggar he is about to persuade the suitors to
allow him to test the bow of Odysseus. Both Odysseus and Hermes are
experts at using words to drive a wedge between appearance and reality. This is what makes Hermes so slippery and hard to catch, and it is
what allows Odysseus to 'fly under the radar' of the suitors. Both are
proverbial wolves in sheep's clothing. This is the kind of deceit (exapatan) that Hermes tries on Apollo (hymnus ad Mercunum 318), and which
bothers Hippias about Odysseus (Hippias Minor 365d8).
Apollo speaks unerringly (riemertea = rie + hamartario, often translated 'truly'); when he represents reality in words, there is no slippage
between appearance and reality, reality is simply revealed. Hermes and
Odysseus are adept at creating just such slippage; they introduce a dichotomy between appearance and reality. Since a dichotomy may be
called, in Greek, 'diplous'; the absence of dichotomy a 'simplicity'
may be called 'haplous'. Hence Apollo could be called 'true and simple',
which in Greek could be 'alethes te kai haplous', precisely what Hippias
calls Achilles at 365b4. So what Hippias should chiastically call Odysseus in the next line is 'diplous te kai pseudes'. Hippias is making an error
in calling Odysseus 'polutropos te kai pseudes', unless (a) in addition to
its other meanings 'polutropos' can refer to just this kind of dichotomy,
this slippage between appearance and reality, and (b) this more obscure
dous trepidation that I suggest Liddell and Scott are wrong in accepting 'wily' as
a translation for 'polutropos' (s.v. polutropos, ). 'Haimulos' is, and as far as I can tell
'polutropos' is never, associated with foxes (cf. Aristophanes, Lysistrata 1268); and
the words with which Calypso beguiles Odysseus into forgetting Ithaca are quite
'wily' (haimuloisi logoisin, Odyssey 1.56). Hence I disagree with Weiss who accepts
both Jowett's and Foster's translation of 'polutropos' as 'wily' (see Weiss 1992, 245
and note 15 on 257). TWiliness' is closely connected to craftiness, artifice, and the
cunning use of strategem; it probably derives from the Old Norse vel meaning
craft, artifice, contrivance or engine (Oxford English Dictionary s.v. wile). 'Wily',
therefore, can be a good translation of 'polumechanos' and so we will be tempted to
use it for 'polutropos' only if we make precisely the same mistake Hippias makes
when he quotes Iliad IX 308.

Authenticated
meaning of 'polutropos' is familiar to Plato. We find precisely this use of
'polutropos' at Politicus 291b2 where it refers to the ability of some animals to camouflage themselves, i.e., to present an appearance as being
something other than they truly are.
In other words, when Socrates says that he doesn't know what Hippias is saying by describing Odysseus as 'polutroptaton' (364c6-7), he is
actually being helpful. He is about to lead Hippias into a clearer understanding of what bothers him about Odysseus. Recently, Levystone has
argued to the contrary that Socrates is actually exploiting an ambiguity
in 'polutropos' for the purpose of confusing Hippias. Regarding the word
'polutropos' Levystone says, 'il ne faut pas oubUer que Socrate ne donne
lui-meme aucune definition du terme et qu'il suit, mais pour mieux la
critiquer, 1'intuition d'Hippias qui le lie au pseudes' (Levystone 2005,
206). Perhaps it is fair to say that Socrates never gives 'any definition'
of 'polutropos', but that is because semiotically 'polutropos' is all over the
map. As I have just shown, the word has several different meanings;
hence defining 'polutropos' is a complex matter and most of the effort
would be wasted because it is only an obscure sense of the word that is
relevant to Hippias' condemnation of Odysseus.
What remains, then, is to establish that this obscure sense of 'polutropos' is (a) accurately captured by 'pseudes' and (b) a reasonable basis
for Hippias' condemnation of Odysseus. What I am suggesting is that
Socrates' two uses of 'polutropoi' at 365e2 are his way of making sure
that Hippias is on board with his bracketing 'polutropos' for a clearer
explanation of the respect in which Hippias thinks Achilles is better
than Odysseus.6
Begin with what I call 'synchronic polutropia'. This is the statistically
obscure sense in which it is used at Politicus 291b2: the wolf-in-sheep'sclothing phenomenon. The only difficulty in seeing a strong connection
with 'pseudes' that would be clearly reasonable to Hippias is the same
trouble I have with my Freshmen in explaining to them Aristotle's virtue of 'truthfulness' (Nicomachean Ethics IV 7). They think the vice of
Hence I agree with Mulhem when he denies that 'pseudes' is introduced as a mere
synonym for 'polutropos' (Mulhem 1968,284). But I disagree with Mulhem's claim
that Socrates is merely stipulating 'pseudes' as the meaning of 'polutropos'. This
would amount to gutting a clearer term ('pseudes') of its natural sense in order to
give it all the obscurity of another term ('polutropos'). Socrates has accurately detected the sense in which Hippias thinks Odysseus is 'polutropos', and has helped
Hippias to express himself more clearly.

Authenticated
42 Don Adams
excess must be lying to give someone a false idea, and that the vice
of deficiency must be failing to speak up to correct someone who has
a false idea. It makes no sense to them to say that boastfulness is the
excess and self-deprecation is the deficiency. They associate those vices
with pride and humility, making boastfulness very bad and self-deprecation not very bad at all. So I have to explain to them that Aristotle's
idea of 'truthfulness' might better be expressed by our phrase Tjeing
honest about yourself. Truthful' people make accurate representations
of themselves and their abilities. Boastful people 'put on airs' and present themselves as better than they are or as being capable of things they
can't do: they 'talk big' but when it comes time to follow through, they
let you down. Self-deprecating people 'sell themselves short' and fail
to assert themselves when they really could and should. You may miss
out on a lot of great opportunities because you think your friend is incapable of providing significant help, which they truly could provide.
These slippages between appearance and reality could be described as
'falsifying' one's appearance, like a counterfeit coin appears to be but
isn't genuine legal currency. Hence it is quite natural in Greek to associate 'polutropos' in this sense with 'pseudes'.
Second, consider 'diachronic polutropia'. This is what Ajax discovers
in the eponymous Sophoclean tragedy. After he has been cheated out
of Achilles' armor by Odysseus (as he sees it), he explains the lesson he
has learned: have just learned that my enemy is to be hated only so
much, since he may soon be my friend; and the friend I help, I will help
only so much since he may not always remain my friend' (Ajax 67882). This lesson can be given a very positive interpretation, i.e., that we
should take neither friendship nor enmity for granted: we can lose our
friends if we take them for granted, and it is possible to turn enemies
into allies or friends by finding common aims in the pursuit of which
we may unite with them. But Ajax clearly takes this in its worst possible sense, i.e., you are a fool if you assume that people who profess
their friendship will stand by your side when the going gets tough, and
hence you yourself must stand ready to cross the line and ally yourself
with those against whom you have professed enmity. In other words,
just as the wolf in sheep's clothing camouflages itself synchronically,
Ajax has learned that he lives in a world of diachronic camouflage: professed friends will sooner or later prove themselves faithless and will
abandon you in your time of need, failing to be the friends they presented themselves as being; and despite our professions of implacable
enmity, shifting alliances will eventually force us to unite in friendship
with those we vowed to destroy. Ajax has learned that he lives in a
Authenticated
world of false friendship and false enmity. Those who appear now to be
your friends/enemies will later reveal themselves to be your enemies/
friends. This is a diachronic slippage between appearance and reality.
Ajax is so disgusted at such a world that he can no longer live in it.
This is the proof I need to show that when Socrates shifts the discussion with Hippias away from 'polutropos' and towards 'pseudes' he is
neither equivocating nor allowing Hippias to be confused. He is in fact
helping Hippias more accurately to identify the respect in which he
thinks Achilles is a better man than Odysseus: Odysseus is and Achilles
is not a 'falsifier'. In Hippias' 'proof text', Achilles twice affirms that his
declarations will be accomplished (Hippias Minor 365a2-3 and b2), and
he expresses enmity for the one who has one thing in mind but says
something different (a4-bl). Achilles' use of polumechari to describe
what is objectionable about Odysseus (365al), and Hippias' substitution of 'polutropos' for Achilles' 'poluniechanos' (a) identifies a reasonable
basis for Hippias' condemnation of Odysseus and (b) makes 'pseudes' a
better substitution for 'poluniechanos'. Achilles has in mind a polutropia
similar to that which disgusts Ajax.7 The person who has one thing in
mind but says something different is synchronically polutropos, and if
he fails to do in the future what in the past he said he would do, then
he is diachonically polutropos, e.g. a false friend ('pseudes philos') or a
false enemy ('pseudes echthros'). Such a person is a traitor and hence a
proper object of condemnation, and such a person may legitimately be
described as 'poluniechanos' or 'polutropos', but is most clearly identified
as 'pseudes'. There is no equivocation, only clarification.
Hence, when Hippias answers Socrates' question about which of the
two men is better and in what respect the better one is better, his answer
is crucially unclear. To say that Achilles is better on the grounds that he
lacks but Odysseus possesses polutropia is unclear because the adjective
'polutropos' has so many diverse meanings. The specific sense that Hippias seems to have in mind, though he said something somewhat different, is synchronic and diachronic camouflage when there is slippage
between appearance and reality. Achilles presents himself as a genuine
or authentic man, one who to use a modern expression says what
he means and means what he says, aptly described by Hippias' 'alethes
te kai haplous'. Hippias agrees with Achilles' portrayal of Odysseus as
Perhaps they are not identical because Ajax has in mind a diachronic shift between
contraries (friendship and enmity) and what Achilles says is broader than, though
inclusive of, this.

Authenticated
44 Don Adams
an inauthentic or counterfeit man who is synchronically and/or diachronically duplicitous, unclearly indicated by Hippias' 'polutropos te
kai pseudes', and clearly expressed by the more accurate chiasm 'diplous te kai pseudes'. The crucial assumption, then, from Socrates' point of
view (because he believes it to be a false assumption), is that the alethes
te kai haplous man is numerically distinct from the diplous te kai pseudes
man. If Hippias insisted, they could continue to use 'polutropos te kai
pseudes', but that would introduce a constant tendency to wander from
the point, since 'polutropos' is semiotically complex. Hippias indicates
that he is fine with the clarification.
Notice also that Plato has made Hippias out to be polutropos. There
is a slippage between what he says and what he means. What he says
cannot be taken at face value; his real meaning must still be explored.
Moreover, as we are about to see, Plato shows Hippias to be diachronically polutropos in that he fails to defend the claim he sets out to defend.
I suspect this irony is intentional on Plato's part: the people who slur
Socrates actually don't understand him, and show themselves to be the
true guilty ones.
IV
In the first stage of his argument (365d6-6c4), Socrates gets Hippias

to agree that the pseudes has dunamis, phroriesis, epistenie and sophia. I
will lump these together with the acronym DPES. Sprague might object to my lumping these together because she sees in this sequence a
sly ambiguity Socrates uses to entrap Hippias in a fallacious argument
(Sprague 1962,67-70). In Sprague's view, Hippias agrees to each member of the list with one thing in mind, i.e., the power and mental capacity for wrongdoing, but Socrates plays on the positive connotations of
the intelligence-related words fallaciously to conclude that the pseudes
has the mental capacity, and hence power, for good.
Influenced, I suspect, by twentieth-century philosophical practice,
Sprague's error here is in taking Socrates to be asking conceptual questions, not substantial questions.81 am relying here on the work of Terry
Penner. For example, when Socrates asks in the Laches, 'What is bravery?' Socrates is not asking a conceptual but a substantive question.
I have very similar objections to the evaluations of the Hippias Minor by Hoerber
1962 and Mulhem 1968.

Authenticated
The general asks this question not out of interest in mapping our
concepts, but out of a desire to learn something substantial about the
human psyche. He wants to know what psychological state it is, the imparting of which to his men will make them brave. (Penner 1992,164)
Penner compares this with conceptual as opposed to substantive psychological questions. The conceptual analysis of hysteria won't find a
cure for the condition, but the substantive analysis might; prior to Daiton, 'H)' could not have been the correct answer to the conceptual
question 'What is water?' but it was always the correct answer to the
substantive question (Penner 164-5). Irwin has defended the same view
of Socrates' questions: when Socrates asks for a definition, he is not
seeking a nominal but a real definition (Irwin 1995,25-7). Hence, when
Socrates asks Hippias about the pseudes, he is not asking Hippias for a
conceptual analysis (I believe I have given that analysis above), he is
seeking to understand what makes the pseudes tick, he is looking for a
psychological diagnosis of the pseudes. Right off the bat he contrasts the
pseudes with the sick (365d6-7) precisely because he wants to focus Hippias on the underlying condition of each. The fact that each word in the
DPES set has many different senses allows for but does not necessitate
the fallacy of equivocation.
Consider a more recent analogy. We might say that some of the alleged witches burned after the Salem witch trials suffered from schizophrenia, and on the basis of that diagnosis derive some surprising
claims about them. Our conclusions will not be a result of fallacious
equivocation (e.g., fallaciously inferring claims about dopamine levels
from claims about pacts with Satan); they will instead count as scientific predictions to be verified, if possible, by collecting more data.
So when Socrates asks Hippias about the pseudes and the alettes, he
is asking whether we are in a caterpillar-butterfly situation in which
the real essence of one is surprisingly identical to the real essence of
the other, or in a worm-butterfly situation in which we are dealing with
two distinct real essences. The logical structure of Socrates' argument
(not to be confused with the dialogic structure of the conversation by
which Socrates gets Hippias to see the logical structure) that the pseudes
and the alethes are one and the same, therefore, looks like this:
1.
2.
.. 3.
The real essence of the pseudes is DPES (365d6-6a4).

DPES is the real essence of the alethes (366a8-9a2).
The pseudes and the alethes are one and the same (369a4-b7).

Authenticated
46 Don Adams
This is just as valid as the following:
4.
5.
.. 6.
The real essence of Hesperus is the planet Venus.

The planet Venus is the real essence of Phosphorus.
Hesperus and Phosphorus are one and the same.
and the following:

7.
8.
.. 9.
The real essence of the Painted Lady caterpillar is Cynthia

cardui.
Cynthia cardui is the real essence of the Thistle Butterfly.
The Painted Lady caterpillar and the Thistle Butterfly are one
and the same.
This argument structure is valid whether we are considering the numerical identity of particular individuals or the membership of individuals in a numerically identical class or species.9 The latter is what is
going on in the Hippias Minor: Socrates is considering whether Achilles
and Odysseus belong in one and the same group when we claim that
the former is alethes while the latter is pseudes. At first they appear to be
in distinct species, but on further analysis, Socrates argues, they surprisingly turn out to be members of one and the same species. 'Look,
the one is alethes and the other pseudes, obviously they are not one and
the same', can be as misleading as, 'Look, one has wings and drinks
nectar while the other has no wings and eats leaves, so obviously they
are not one and the same'. The conceptual difference between butterflies and caterpillars is irrelevant to their substantive unity.
Instead of setting a trap for Hippias by inducing him to accept ambiguous words, Socrates is instead helping Hippias to examine the issue more deeply, precisely and accurately. By bringing in the DPES set,
Socrates is helping Hippias to clarify the point that the person he describes as pseudes is the deceitful knave and not the misleading fool.10
9 While I think the comparison with the modem notion of a biological species is
helpful, obviously I cannot attribute this notion to Socrates. In fact, Socrates is
notoriously cavalier when it comes to species, forms or paradigms (cf. Euthyphro
5dl-5,6d9-e6).
10 Hence, although I agree with much of her analysis, Weiss is wrong to make

Authenticated
Homer says that Odysseus told 'many false things' (pseudea polla, XIX
203) to Penelope when he was pretending to be the beggar Aithn and
told her a story of when he met Odysseus on the island of Crete. Penelope prudently tests 'Aithn' by asking him what Odysseus wore,
and he is able to give a detailed and accurate account of Odysseus'
purple woolen cloak and gold brooch (225-31). If he had been a misleading fool, he would have failed this test. It is only because Odysseus
knew the truth that he was able to deceive Penelope so successfully. Or
consider the foolish thief captured by the authorities who tries to lie
about where the loot is hidden, but because he incorrectly takes himself
to know what in fact he does not know (because his partners doublecrossed him), he actually ends up leading the authorities right to the
loot he hoped to keep hidden. The deceitful knave and the misleading
fool may appear alike in many cases (both may utter plenty of falsehoods), but psychological conditions which give rise to these similar
appearances are importantly distinct. Danaus plexippus (the Monarch
butterfly) and Limenitis archippus (the Viceroy butterfly) present very
similar appearances, but only the former is poisonous.
This is why Mulhem simultaneously asks too much and too little
when he distinguishes between 'merely the possession of an ability'
and 'its typical and regular employment' (Mulhern 1968, 285). First,
Mulhem is asking too much when he asks about the actual employment of the specifying capacity of the pseudes. Socrates is consistently
focused on what capacity is conferred on the pseudes by the DPES set.
When Socrates considers specific employments, he does so hypothetically by asking what the pseudes does if he wishes. Mulhern asks about
actual employment when Socrates is concerned only with hypothetical employment. Second, Mulhern asks too little because he asks only
about the 'typical or regular employment' of the specifying capacities
of the pseudes when Socrates is interested in something more determinate. Socrates is not interested in WHAT the pseudes does but in HOW
he does it. In theory you could have a deceitful knave and a misleading
fool who with equal regularity employ their specifying capacities to
say false things, but Socrates would point out that we should not allow
this appearance to mislead us. Even if they say false things with equal
'polutropos = pseudes' the first step of the first argument (Weiss 1992, 247); competent Greek speakers cannot think that 'polutropos' and 'pseudes' are synonyms with
the very same meaning (Weiss 246,247).

Authenticated
48 Don Adams
regularity, they do so in significantly different ways.11 The misleading
fool says many false things simply because he speaks in ignorance, and
the odds are mat a large portion of what he says will be false, though
he doesn't actually know that most of the false things he says are false.
The deceitful knave speaks false things in a very different manner, i.e.,
he does so if he wishes.
Compare, for example, a beginner in Mandarin and an expert in the
language. The beginner will make plenty of errors when writing Mandarin characters whether he wishes to make errors or not. The expert
will make plenty of errors if he wishes, and there is a strong correlation
between his wishing to make errors and his actually making errors (if
he makes them). This strong correlation is secured because it is an explanatory relationship: his making errors is explained by his wishing
to make errors. There is no such explanatory connection in the actions
of the beginner: we explain his errors by citing his ignorance of the
language, not by his wishing to write accurately or inaccurately. He
might accidentally get it right when he wishes to make an error, and
he might accidentally make an error when he wishes to get it right.
What accounts for the explanatory connection between one's linguistic
wishes and one's linguistic performance is one's developed capacity
for the language, i.e., one's satisfaction of the DPES set with respect to
the language.
Hippias thinks of Odysseus as a deceitful knave, not a misleading
fool, and Socrates helps him to clarify this point.12 The pseudes Hippias
11 Mulhem himself equivocates when he defines a tropos as a 'typical and regular

employment' of a dunamis (Mulhem 1968,285), and then relies on tropos in a purely statistical sense of 'lie regularly' or 'tell the truth regularly' on the very next
page. Neither Hippias nor Socrates is ever interested in a purely statistical sense
of 'polutropos'', 'pseudes' or 'alethes'. Hippias is engaging in literary and character
analysis and it is a textually unsupported anachronism to attribute to Hippias the
'Empiric' or 'Method' school of medicine familir to Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of
Empiricism 34), or the modem homeopathism or behaviorism more familiar to us.
The dunamis and the tropos are as intimately connected as disease and symptom
(365d6-7). The doctor is not equivocating when he proves to the parents that the
child with a fever and the child with chills are suffering from one and the same
disease. The parents were never concerned about shivering-behavior or sweatingbehavior as such, they were concerned about the child with a fever and a child
with chills understanding that dunamis and tropos are connected. They just falsely
assumed that such different tropoi had to be connected to different dunameis.
12 Hence I object to Zembaty's characterization of Hippias as trying to make careful,
qualified claims while Socrates is trying to strip off those qualifications (Zembaty

Authenticated
has in mind is not merely someone who utters many things, some false
some true; he is someone who judiciously uses truths and falsehoods
depending upon the circumstances. The judicious use of truths and
falsehoods demands facility with both, hence the DPES set. The Odyssean pseudes is so adept because he knows which claims are true and
which are false, allowing him reliably, not accidently, to choose from
one or the other category depending on the circumstances. The misleading fool, by contrast, might think he is choosing his utterance from
among the true claims when in fact he is choosing from among the false
claims, and vice versa. What state of a person explains the facility of the
deceitful knave? The DPES set. This is proven by repeated illustration
in the remainder of Socrates' argument.3
Here is where the appeal to a real essence has its surprising result.
The DPES set explains the (real, not nominal) defining fact about the
pseudes: if he wants (boulomai: 366b2-3, b8, c2-3, e5-6, 367a2) to deceive
someone by affirming as true something he knows to be false, or denying as false something he knows to be true, then what he affirms as true
is in fact false, or what he denies as false is in fact true, i.e., he reliably
selects a true claim to deny or a false claim to affirm. But a moment's
reflection reveals that the DPES set also explains the (real, not nominal) defining fact about the alethes: if he wants to inform someone by
affirming as true something he knows to be true, or denying as false
something he knows to be false, then what he affirms as true is in fact
true, or what he denies as false is in fact false. A facility for reliably
selecting from among the false claims as opposed to the true claims
entails a facility for reliably selecting from among the true claims as
opposed to the false claims. The pseudes and the atetHes really are one
and the same.14
1989, 55). Socrates is helping Hippias to realize the explanatory priority of the
DPES set.
13 I disagree with Aristotle (Metaphysics V 29.1025a6-13) and with Robinson who
both characterize much of the arguments in the Hippias Minor as epagogai (cf. Robinson 1953, 39). I think the many examples Socrates gives should be considered
confirmation of, not data leading to, a general theory. He has already established
his basic claims, in the second part of the dialogue he is showing Hippias how he
has accounted for a wide variety of data.
14 Although my account of Socrates' argument is quite different from that of Weiss, I
agree with her basic contention that 'neither Socrates nor Hippias is to be accused
of equivocation' on the grounds that neither of them equivocate between using

Authenticated
50
Don Adams
If you insist, like Hippias, that Achilles is 'alethes te kai haplous', then you
might have something like Spragues' response to Socrates' argument.
You might insist that although someone who is 'haplous' may in some
sense be able to affirm as true something he knows to be false, or deny
as false something he knows to be true, he never would do such a thing
precisely because he is 'haplous'. Look at the list of passages I just cited
where Plato uses some form of 'boulomai' and you will see that every
single instance is in a conditional context. Gomperz takes the Hippias
Minor to be a reductio ad absurdum of the idea that cognitive factors alone
account for good action (Gomperz 1920, 296). A facility for accurately
selecting from among the false claims as opposed to the true claims, or
the true claims as opposed to the false claims, does not (Gomperz might
argue) tell us whether one has a proclivity for selecting the true or the
false claims. Socrates' premises might be true for calculation, arithmetic
and so on, but false for behavior like willful deception. Perhaps Plato is
confronting us with this argument intentionally to provoke us to have
this thought.15 Perhaps Plato intends his readers to distinguish between
(a) 'polutropos' as a 'dwnamz's-concept' referring to a power, capacity or
potentiality, and (b) 'polutropos' as a 'fropos-concept' referring to actual,
usual or typical employment of some power.16
polutrapos as a "fropos-concept" sometimes and as a "dunamis-concept" at other

times' (Weiss 1992, 245). I disagree with Weiss when she claims that this leaves
us with the dual problems of (a) explaining why Hippias identifies the polutropos
and the pseudes in the first place, and (b) why Hippias balks at the conclusion of
the argument. Neither are problems. Hippias' pre-reflective identification of the
polutropos and the pseudes derives from pre-reflective assumptions about Achilles
and Odysseus: based on Achilles' speech at Iliad IX 308-14 Hippias thinks that Odysseus has and Achilles lacks a facility for hiding the truth behind manipulative
falsehoods. 'Ho pseudes' and 'ho alettes' seem perfectly good expressions to mark
this distinction. This also explains why Hippias balks at the conclusion of the argument: if the pseudes and the alethes are one and the same, then Achilles has exactly
the same facility with falsehoods as Odysseus, something Hippias denies.
15 For something like this view see Hoerber 1962,128.
16 This is a philosopher's distinction (Mulhem 1968, 286-7) and not one I find in
Greek uses of 'polutropos' (etc.). Hence, 1 think Zembaty should assert not that Hippias has both senses in mind, but that he doesn't rule out either (Zembaty 1989,
53-4). Hence, contra Zembaty, this does not ruin Weiss' account of Socrates' first
argument. If Hippias is not ruling out the duami's-sense, then by the time Socrates
concludes that the pseudes and alethes are one and the same, he has reached a

Authenticated
Perhaps. However, this does not ruin the validity of the argument.
Socrates has successfully demonstrated a fundamental unity of the
alethes and the psuedes. At most what Gomperz showed is the possibility that the alethes and the psuedes are members of distinct species
of one and the same genus. Socrates has successfully shown that the
alethes and the psuedes are at the very least generically one and the same.
The knowing haplous and the knowing diplous, if there are two distinct
such individuals, will each recognize in the other a fundamental unity
which separates them from the ignorant haplous and the ignorant diplous, whom they pity as ignorant fools in need of instruction. This is just
what we would expect of someone who believed that 'the unexamined
life is not worth living for a human being' (Apology 38a5-6).
The implications of this sound strikingly at odds with Greek common sense. Hippias points out that Athenian law excuses the ignorant
pseudes and punishes the knowing pseudes, (372a3-5).17 The implications
may be an even more striking violation of Christian common sense,
which might see something innocent or even angelic in the ignorant
haplous, and something degenerate or even demonic in the knowing
diplous.
The following table sums up three ways of ranking the four kinds of
people distinguished by Socrates' argument, the people who are higher
up are better than those who are lower down. Notice that Socrates' position on whom to put on the bottom is just what you would expect of
someone who believes that, 'if I unwillingly corrupt someone, it is not
appropriate to take such unwilling errants (hamartemafn) to court, but
to take them aside privately and teach and advise them; for it is clear
that if I learn, I will stop what I unwillingly do' (Apology 26al-4).18 But
contradiction with at least part of what Hippias didn't rule out earlier. Hippias
may then clarify his earlier comments if he wishes, but he seems not to wish to do
that.
17 The Athenian legal conceptual scheme is different from ours, so it is difficult to
make cross-scheme identifications. However, if we follow Aristotle's Magna Moralia, the Athenians did distinguish between willing (hekn) and unwilling homicide
(though probably not between willing and deliberate homicide, 1188b29-38). Otherwise there seems to be nothing in Athenian legal (or religious) practice corresponding to our distinction between mens rea and actus reus (cf. MacDowell 1978,
113-18).
18 I think Zembaty is correct to see a 'wedge' between the evaluation of humans and
the evaluation of their actions (Zembaty 1989, 58), but this is not a special feature
of the Hippias Minor, it is in this passage of the Apology as well.

Authenticated
52 Don Adams
Christian Common
Sense
Pagan Common
Sense
Socrates' Position
ignorant haplous
knowing haplous
knowing haplous
knowing haplous
ignorant haplous
knowing diplous
ignorant diplous
ignorant diplous
ignorant haplous
knowing diplous
knowing diplous
ignorant diplous
whereas pagan and Christian common sense morally blame those below and morally praise the people above the mid-line, Socrates only
morally praises those above the mid-line.19 The fact that claims Socrates
makes in the Apology fit the position that results from his first argument
in the Hippias Minor suggests not only that Socrates (correctly) thinks
his argument is valid, but also that he thinks it is sound.
To defend Gomperz' position according to which Plato intends the
argument to be unsound (at least when applied to wrong behavior
like willful deception), and to provoke the reader to uncover the false
assumption (i.e., that there are no non-cognitive factors involved in
19 This is what we would expect of someone who sincerely believes what Socrates
says at Protagoras 352bl-c8, i.e., if someone truly knows what is good and what is
bad, he will not be mastered by anger, pleasure, pain, love or fear. Knowledge is
the crucial element (as usual, Socrates does not follow the modern penchant for
technical terms, he appears to use episteme and gignsk interchangeably at 352c45). Without knowledge, people may do the right thing but they may not; "they
produce just whatever chances" (Crz'fo 44d6-10; Penner gets this Crito passage exactly right, and I think the same idea underlies Protagoras 352bl-c8 and the Hippias Minor; Penner 1997a, 153-5). As I pointed out above, Socrates is not primarily
concerned with what people do or what they are capable of doing, he is primarily
concerned with how they do what they do. More specifically, he is concerned with
the difference between people who act with as opposed to without knowledge. Aristotle thinks Socrates is right to have this focus, but he thinks that Socrates gives
up too quickly: once you have figured out that someone acts with knowledge,
Aristotle thinks there is still a further question regarding manner, i.e. how they
choose among alternatives they know (right reason does little good without right
choice). Virtuous, continent and incontinent people all have knowledge, but all
choose in different manners (cf. Eudemian Ethics 1227bl2-19; I agree with Woods
who argues that Aristotle has Socrates in mind here, Woods 1992,154).

Authenticated
human action), we would have to say that the examination Socrates has
in mind at Apology 38a5-6, and the instruction he has in mind at Apology 26al-4, include some sort of non-cognitive training or therapy that
ensures that with knowledge necessarily comes rectitude of will. Both
premises of Socrates' argument, then, will be false when applied to actions like willful deception since in addition to the DPES set, a non-cognitive condition must also be included in the real essence of the pseudes
and a different non-cognitive condition included in the real essence of
the atethes. Hence the 'if he wishes' of 'the alethes says what is false, if he
wishes' will be nugatory. Socrates can put the knowing diplous above
the ignorant diplous only if the knowing diplous is diplous in capacity
only, not in actual employment.
The problem with this suggestion is that it seems obviously false in
all the cases Socrates considers in his first argument, i.e., calculation,
arithmetic, geometry and astronomy. The specifying capacities involved seem strictly cognitive. We might further support this with an
example from the Laches. Nicias points out that the doctor's knowledge
extends only to health and sickness, not to good and bad; hence the
doctor knows only how to cure and how to kill, but does not (qua doctor) know what is better or worse for a given patient (Laches 195c7-d2).
If the doctor is convinced that it is better for the patient to live, he cures
the patient (non-accidentally); if the doctor is convinced that it is better
for the patient to die, he kills the patient (non-accidentally). If the geometer is convinced that it is better to give a wrong answer, then he gives
a wrong answer (non-accidentally); if he is convinced that it is better to
give a right answer, then he gives a right answer (non-accidentally).
Gomperz might reply that this is true with all the various crafts he
has considered so far, but that the case is quite different when it comes
to virtue. In fact, Gomperz might argue that the Hippias Minor was designed by Plato precisely to indicate to readers the limitations of 'the
craft analogy' Socrates repeatedly uses.20 Craft cognition does not necessarily come with 'craft conation' that assures that the one who knows
a craft will always use it to produce 'the good' of the craft; e.g., that the
one with medical knowledge will always use that knowledge to cure
and never to kill, that the one with geometric knowledge will always
use that knowledge to get right answers and never wrong answers in
20 On the tangled set of issues involved in what Socrates means by comparing arete to
techne, and the voluminous secondary literature on this topic, see Roochnick 1992
and Irwin 1995,68-77.

Authenticated
54
Don Adams
geometrical problems. Perhaps Plato's point in writing the Hippias Minor is to indicate the need to argue that virtue-cognition does necessarily come with virtue-conation so that the one who knows the just thing
to do will always do the just thing and never the unjust thing. Since
Socrates explicitly brings injustice into his second argument, let us examine that argument before deciding this issue.
VI
Socrates' second argument focuses on comparative evaluation: he

wants to know 'which of the two is better (ameinous), the willing errant
(hekontes ... hamartanontes) or the unwilling' (373c7-8). Erring in nonmoral tasks results in non-moral error; erring in moral tasks results in
moral error (or perhaps I should say that erring in 'non-arete' tasks results in 'non-areteic' error, and so on). Socrates' 'hamartano' is intended
to be general enough to cover both kinds of error: the moral case is just
a special case of the more general point Socrates has made. This is a
return to the issue that started the dialogue: Socrates began by asking
whether Hippias agrees with his own father that Achilles is better (ameirin, 363b3-4; ameiri, cl) than Odysseus. Socrates' question at 371e7-8
suggests that Hippias is threatened by the following argument:
10. The willing pseudes is better (beltious, 371e8) than the unwilling
pseudes.
11. Odysseus is the willing pseudes and Achilles is the unwilling
pseudes.
.'. 12. Odysseus is better than Achilles.
Hippias insists on 11 (370e5-9,371d8-e3) and recoils at the thought of 10
(371e9-372a5). Socrates seems a bit frustrated because he asks, 'weren't
the willing pseudeis just now (arti) shown to be better than the unwilling' (371e7-8). Presumably he has in mind 368a8-bl, but this takes a bit
of explaining.
The evaluative terminology was introduced at 366c5-d5 where
Socrates connects experience (empeiros, 366c5) in calculation and arithmetic with dunamis and sophia, and then asks whether the person with
most dunamis and sophia in calculation and arithmetic is also the best
(aristos) in calculation and arithmetic. Hippias agrees, since he thinks
himself to be dunattatos, sophtatos and aristos in calculation and arithmetic. Then, at 367c2-d3, Socrates concludes that with respect to calculation and arithmetic the man who is dunatos is one and the same with
Authenticated
the man who is alethes and also with the man who is agathos. Finally, at
368a8-bl Socrates generalizes this to all epistemai. In effect, he has given
the following argument for 10.
13. The willing pseudes has, and the unwilling pseudes lacks, both
dunamis and sophia.
14. The one who has both dunamis and sophia is good and is better
than the one who lacks both dunamis and sophia.
.. 15. The willing pseudes is good and is better than the unwilling
pseudes.
Notice that this also entails the final conclusion of the dialogue (376b46) if we assume that the DPES and skill associated with calculation,
arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, epistemai generally, running and other
bodily actions generally, wrestling, exercise, singing, archery, medicine, lute and flute playing are univocally associated with justice.21 If
Socrates accepts 'the craft analogy', then for him this association is unproblematic: the willing pseudes of 371e7-8 is one and the same as the
willing errant (hekn hamartand) of 376M-5 if the DPES and skill of the
first argument apply without equivocation to justice.
This final 'if' could be the key to unraveling the second argument.
If Plato wants the reader to call 'the craft analogy' into question, then
he intends for the reader to balk at precisely the place where Hippias
balks, i.e., 375dl where Socrates brings in 'kakourge'. If Hippias rejects
'the craft analogy,' then he can reject premise 14: when it comes to
virtue (arete), cognitive development alone is without value (or 'areteic value') unless it is combined with proper conative development.22
This is reasonable, but there is another way to solve the apparently
paradoxical conclusion of the dialogue.
21 Hence, I disagree with Weiss who argues that we don't get the evaluative claims
of the second argument in the first argument (Weiss 1992, 250-1). Weiss is right
about the specific evaluative claims, but those specific claims are entailed by the
general evaluative claims of the first argument. The only things that are new are
the specific applications of the generic claims in the first argument.
22 This is currently one of the most important issues in Socrates scholarship: does
Socrates attempt to account for human action without appealing to non-rational or
irrational desires (i.e., desires that arise independently of, and may conflict with,
our knowledge of, or reasoned beliefs about, the good). There is a substantial body
of work that defends an affirmative answer to that question, including Irwin 1995,

Authenticated
56 Don Adams
VII
Socrates says that he himself has trouble accepting his own conclusion
(S/obS).23 Just as parents might be surprised to learn that the child suffering from a fever and the child suffering chills are both suffering from
one and the same disease, it is surprising to learn that willing error/
injustice and willing success/justice derive from the same fundamental condition of the soul. The application to arete makes this extremely
problematic.24
Socrates is uncomfortable with the conclusion because it is still governed by the issue that got the dialogue going: Hippias believes that
Achilles is a better man than Odysseus. If we add this premise (together
with Hippias' other assumptions about Odysseus) to Socrates' argument, then Socrates' ultimate conclusion entails that a deceitful (365d8)
man whom Hippias implies is to be associated with people who actually
do bad and unjust things willingly (371e9-2a5) is a good man. The good
man is the man with the good soul, the man with the good soul is the
man whose soul is skillful and has everything on the DPES list; that is
the person who does wrong if he wishes (366a8-b3, e3-7a5), and Odysseus wishes to do wrong quite often (in Hippias' view). It is paradoxical
68-76; Penner 2000, 164 (see also Penner 1990, 1996 and 1997b); Reshotko 1992.
Brickhouse and Smith go so far as to call this "the received account of Socratic motivation" (Brickhouse and Smith 2002,22) But there is growing body of work that
defends a negative answer to the question, including Devereux 1995; Brickhouse
and Smith 2002,2005; Singpurwalla 2006. While my conclusions here are relevant
to this debate, explicitly addressing the thorny interpretive issues is beyond the
scope of this paper.
23 Taylor and Shorey think this is the key to avoiding the apparently paradoxical
conclusion of the Hippias Minor (Taylor 1937, 37; Shorey 1958, 89). Zembaty suggests that on this view we would have to interpret Socrates' final claim that he
himself goes back and forth on this issue (376cl-6) as an 'ironical swipe' at Hippias
(Zembaty 1989,63). I disagree. When (as in the Hippias Minor), Socrates discusses
the willing errant (if there is such a person), he rums out to be the better person
because of his wisdom and power (he knows what is right and hence can knowingly and intentionally do what is right if he wishes). But when he discusses the
willing errant (as in Gorgias 467b-8e), he turns out to be the worse person because
his errors demonstrate that he doesn't really know what he is doing, and hence
lacks the power to do the right thing knowingly or willingly.
24 Laguna argued that both of Socrates' arguments in the Hippias Minor are sound,
but he does not confront the interpretive difficulties that arise from this position
(cf. Laguna 1920,553,555).

Authenticated
to say that a good man with a good soul wishes to do, and hence does,
wrong things quite often.
We don't solve the paradox by rejecting Hippias' view of Odysseus
because it still seems reasonable that there will in fact be many instances where a man who can do wrong if he wishes (and hence is a 'good
man' according to Socrates' argument) will wish to do wrong things,
e.g., lie, cheat, steal, murder. We solve the paradox only if we can deny
the antecedent of the relevant conditional claim: if he wishes, the good
man does wrong things. If we can prove that the good man does not
and cannot wish to do wrong things, then the apparent paradox is no
real trouble.
To clarify what we need, allow me to use a Kantian distinction.25
Kant distinguishes between 'problematical' and 'assertoric' hypothetical imperatives.26 What distinguishes them is that problematical imperatives are grounded on contingent ends that a rational being may have
or lack while assertoric imperatives are grounded on ends that rational
beings have and cannot lack, i.e., ends that are necessarily attributable
to all rational beings. For Kant, happiness is the end that is attributable
to all rational beings, and so is the ground for the assertoric imperatives of prudence. Any theory that accepts assertoric imperatives must
also accept what I call 'nugatory imperatives', i.e., imperatives that are
grounded on ends no rational being may have. If we can say that lying,
cheating, stealing, murdering and so on can form the apodosis only of
nugatory hypothetical imperatives, then we can dissolve the paradox at
the end of the Hippias Minor.
Kant points the way. If happiness is the ground for assertoric imperatives, then the contrary of happiness will ground nugatory imperatives.
'If you want to be unhappy, then ' will always constitute a nugatory
hypothetical imperative. We might call Kant a 'rational eudaimonist'
because he thinks that, as Allen Wood says, 'it belongs to the essence of
rationality that a rational being is bound to form the idea of its happiness and make that happiness an end' (Wood 1999, 66). Hence, anyone
25 I have complained about anachronism in the interpretation of ancient Greek philosophy in my critique of Sprague above. I believe that my use of Kant is not
anachronistic because I think that the relevant distinctions drawn by Kant suggest
what we might look for in Socrates if we want a solution to the argument at the
end of the Hippias Minor different from that of Gomperz. We may or may not find
the elements of a Kantian solution.
26 I follow Wood's analysis of Kant's distinction (Wood 1999,65-70)

Authenticated
58
Don Adams
who actually obeys a nugatory imperative will be irrational. Since rational eudaimonism does not entail psychological eudaimonism, Kant
can accept that people obey nugatory imperatives, and hence behave irrationally, quite often. If he were a psychological eudaimonist he could
say that although it is logically possible for a rational agent to obey a
nugatory imperative, it is psychologically impossible, so you will never
actually find any instance of obedience to a nugatory imperative (at
least not by a sane person).
Finally, notice that if you add to psychological eudaimonism ethical eudaimonism, the result is precisely what we need to dissolve the
paradox at the end of the Hippies Minor. If the only way unjust, immoral
or vicious actions can be commanded is via an imperative which begins, 'If you want to be unhappy', i.e., if ethical eudaimonism is true
and if no one can actually satisfy that antecedent i.e., if psychological eudaimonism is true then the good man will never in fact do
anything wrong, even though in some sense he can. Socrates' conspicuous 'if in fact there is such a man' (376b5-6) might be taken as an invitation to consider the principles of human action, and such consideration
might lead us to accept psychological and ethical eudaimonism. Irwin
has argued that in fact Socratic investigations lead precisely to these
conclusions (Irwin 1995, 61-3, 72-6).
So now we have two ways of solving the apparent paradox at the
end of the Hippias Minor: (1) that of Irwin and (2) that which I've attributed to Gomperz. Notice that both of these solutions point us in the
same direction, i.e., the philosophy of human action. Need we distinguish between cognitive and conative elements in the explanation of
human action, or does our pursuit of eudaimonia sufficiently account for
what we do? Centuries of philosophy since Socrates verify that these
are indeed important questions to answer if we hope with any confidence to make the kinds of evaluative judgments important to Hippias.
Socrates has not woven a web of deceit to confound Hippias, instead he
has introduced him to sober reflection on human action and human life.
Socrates has introduced Hippias to the examined life and, as a result,
Hippias may lead it, if he wishes.27
Notice, finally, that Plato has shown Hippias to be polutropos both
synchronically and diachronically. Achilles portrays himself as a man
27 I am in fundamental agreement with Garcia-Baro 2000 who argues that in the Hippias Minor Plato is, among other things, intentionally displaying what it is to pursue philosophy seriously.

Authenticated
who 'says what he means and means what he says' and on this basis
contrasts himself with Odysseus. Hippias turns out to be more like Odysseus than Achilles on this count. Like the synchronic polutropos, there
is significant slippage between appearance and reality when it comes
to claims Hippias explicitly affirms and claims he genuinely believes.
Although he explicitly frames his belief in terms of who is and who is
not 'polutropos', Socrates shows that what Hippias really has in mind is
more accurately described in terms of 'alethes' and 'pseudes'. Socrates is
the one who consistently makes an effort to be sure that he and Hippias
say clearly what it is they truly believe. Also, like the diachronic polutropos, there is failure over time on the part of Hippias to stand by his
earlier protestations. Hippias affirms Socrates' premises, the validity
of his arguments, and hence his general conclusions, but then when it
comes to applying those general conclusions to specific claims Hippias
finds an embarrassment to himself, he betrays the logic. Socrates is the
one who consistently abides by the claims he and Hippias have agreed
to, even if that entails something embarrassing for him. Socrates refuses
to betray the logic of the arguments. If, as I suspect, Plato was aware
that some people had compared Socrates to Odysseus in the respect of
being polutropos, then in the Hippias Minor Plato put that allegation to
rest.
Philosophy Department
Central Connecticut State University
New Britain, CT 06050
U.S.A.
adamsde@ccsu.edu
Works Cited
Apelt, K. 1912. Platonische Aufstze. Leipzig.
Brickhouse, Thtmas C. and Nicholas D. Smith. 2002. 'Incurable Souls in Socratic Psychology'. Anaent Philosophy 22:21-36.
Devereux, Danel T. 1995. 'Socrates' Kantian Conception of Virtue'. Journal of the History
ofPhilosaihy 33: 381^08.
Garcia-Baro, Mguiel. 2000. Hipias menor, que el hombre se diria que es malo par su bondad.
Daimm 2:39-54.
Gomperz, T. 1910. Greek Thinkers. Vol. 2, trans. L. Magnus. London.
Grote, G. 1865."lato and the Other Companions ofSokrates. 4 vols. London.

Authenticated
60
Don Adams
Guthrie, W.K.C. 1975. A History of Greek Philosophy. Vol.4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hoerber, R.G. 1962 Plato's Lesser Hippies. Phronesis 7:121-31.
Homer. 1984. The Odyssey. Translated by AT. Murray Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. First published 1919.
. 1996. The Odyssey. Translated by Robert Fagles. New York. Penguin Books.
Irwin, Terence. 1995. Plato's Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Laguna, Theodore. 1920. The Lesser Hippias. The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 17:550-556.
Levystone, David. 2005. 'La figure dTJlysse chez les Socratiques: Socrate polutropos'. Phronesis 50:181-214.
Mulhem, ].}. 1968. 'Tropos and Polytropia in Plato's Hippias Minor'. Pheonii 22:283-288.
Penner, Terry. 1990. 'Plato and Davidson: Parts of the Soul and Weakness of the Will'. In
D. Copp, ed., Canadian Philosophers: Celebrating Twenty Years of the Canadian Journal
of Philosophy (Supplementary Volume 16 of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy), 3572.
. 1992. The Unity of Virtue'. In Hugh H. Benson, ed., Essays on the Philosophy of
Socrates, 242-262. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Originally appeared in Philosophical Review 82 (1973) 35-68).
. 1996. 'Knowledge vs. True Belief in the Socraac Psychology of Action'. Apeiron
29:199-229.
. 1997a. Two Notes on the Crito: The Impotence of the Many, and "Persuade or
Obey" '. The Classical Quarterly 47:153-66.
. 1997b. 'Socrates on the Strength of Knowledge: Protagoras 351b-357e'. Archiv fr
Geschichte der Philosophie 79:117-149.
Reshotko, Naomi. 1992. "The Socratic Theory of Motivation'. Apeiron 25:145-170.
Robinson, R. 1953. Plato's Earlier Dialectic. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Roochnik, David L. 1992. 'Socrates' Use of the Techne-Analogy'. In Hugh H. Benson, ed.,
Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates, 185-97. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Originally appeared in Journal of the History of Philosophy 24 (1986) 295-310).
Shorey, Paul. 1958. What Plato Said. Chicago. First published 1933.
Singpurwalla, Rachel. 2006. 'Reasoning with the Irrational: Moral Psychology in the Protagoras'. Ancient Philosophy 26:243-58.
Sprague, Rosamond Kent. 1962. Plato's Use of Fallacy. London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul.
Taylor, A.E. 1937. Plato: The Man and His Work. 4* edition. London.

Authenticated
Weiss, Roslyn. 1992. 'Ho Agathas and Ho Dunatos in the Hippias Minor'. In Hugh H. Benson, ed.. Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates, 242-262. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. (Originally appeared in Classical Quarterly 31 (1981) 287-304).
Wood, Allen W. 1999. Kant's Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Woods, Michael. 1992. Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics, Books 1, II, and VIII. 2nd edition. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Zembaty, Jane S. 1989. 'Socrates' Perplexity in Plato's Hippias Minor'. In John Anton and
Anthony Preus, eds.. Essays in Ancient Creek Philosophy III: Plato, 51-69. New York:
State University of New York Press.

Authenticated

Authenticated

Adams, Don - Socrates Polutropos - Apeiron, 43, 1 - 2010!33!62

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Adams, Don - Socrates Polutropos - Apeiron, 43, 1 - 2010!33!62

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Socrates Polutropos?

In the Hippias Minor a comparison between Odysseus and Socrates is

1 All translations are my own.

Download Date | 2/22/15 8:27 PM

Brought to you by | UNAM

Brought to you by | UNAM

4 There is no explicit reference to Hermes or to the Homeric Hymn to Hermes in the

Brought to you by | UNAM

Hermes, though he was of many counsels (polumetis), found that the

Brought to you by | UNAM

Brought to you by | UNAM

Brought to you by | UNAM

In the first stage of his argument (365d6-6c4), Socrates gets Hippias

Brought to you by | UNAM

The real essence of the pseudes is DPES (365d6-6a4).

Brought to you by | UNAM

The real essence of Hesperus is the planet Venus.

and the following:

The real essence of the Painted Lady caterpillar is Cynthia

Brought to you by | UNAM

Brought to you by | UNAM

11 Mulhem himself equivocates when he defines a tropos as a 'typical and regular

Brought to you by | UNAM

Brought to you by | UNAM

polutrapos as a "fropos-concept" sometimes and as a "dunamis-concept" at other

Brought to you by | UNAM

Brought to you by | UNAM

Brought to you by | UNAM

Brought to you by | UNAM

Socrates' second argument focuses on comparative evaluation: he

Brought to you by | UNAM

Brought to you by | UNAM

Brought to you by | UNAM

Brought to you by | UNAM

Brought to you by | UNAM

Brought to you by | UNAM

Brought to you by | UNAM

Brought to you by | UNAM

You might also like