Explanation and Definition

in Physics 11
Lucas Angjoni

In the first chapter of the Physics, Aristotle presents a description of the

heuristic process by which the first principles of natural science would
be attained:
The natural course is to proceed from what is clearer and more knowable to us, to what is more knowable and clear by nature; for the two
are not the same. Hence we must start thus with things which are less
clear by nature, but clearer to us, and move on to things which are by
nature clearer and more knowable. The things which are in the first
instance clear and plain to us are rather those which are compounded.
It is only later, through an analysis of these, that we come to know the
elements and principles. That is why we should proceed from the
universal to the particular. It is the whole which is more knowable by
perception, and the universal is a sort of whole: it embraces many
things as parts. (184316-26)1

In the opposition between the 'more knowable/known to us' and the

'more knowable/known by nature', the terms 'katholou' and 'kath' hekastori seem to designate the two extremes of the process of scientific
inquiry. On the one hand, the 'universal' seems to be the immediate
datum clear to sense-perception and to be further explained. On the

1 This is Charlton's translation. Instead of 'compounded' (sugkekhumena), we could

also read 'mixed together' (Waterfield's translation) or, perhaps more adequately,
'confused'.

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308 Lucas Angioni

other hand, the 'particular' seems to be either the explanans itself, or else
the point of arrival in which the immediate datum would be finally
explained by its appropriate principles and causes. This use of these
terms contrasts with another passage, where the sense attributed to them
seems to be diametrically opposite: Posterior Analytics 1-2 (71b32-72a5):
Things are prior and more knowable in two ways; for it is not the same
to be prior by nature and prior in relation to us, nor to be more
knowable and more knowable to us. I call prior and more knowable in
relation to us items which are nearer to perception, prior and more
knowable simpliciter items which are further away. What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest. (Barnes's translation, with some modifications).

Aristotle makes these considerations in order to elucidate the way in

which the principles of science should be 'more knowable' (gnrimtera).
He seems to conclude that they must be universals, if they are to be
principles. By contrast, the data initially known by us and to be explained
by scientific principles are particulars. In this way, there seems to be at
least some prima facie inconsistency between Posterior Analytics 12 and
Physics 11.
This inconsistency can become a major one, if we analyse the conceptions of scientific explanation that seems to be presupposed in each text.
Posterior Analytics 12 seems to conceive of scientific explanation as a kind
of generalisation, that is, a kind of subsumption of particular cases under
universals. On the other hand, Physics 11 seems to conceive of scientific
explanation as a kind of analysis into particular elements contained in
universals.
But this first impression of inconsistency is not right. Nothing invites
us to imagine an insurmountable gap between the two texts, as though
they are representative of two conceptions incompatible with one another, or as though they had been composed in different times of Aristotle's intellectual career. My aim is to prove that there is only a slight
terminological discrepancy between the two texts. Even if we can assign
a different kind of explanation to each text, there is no incompatibility
between them. Quite to the contrary, the completeness of scientific
explanation should depend upon an articulate cooperation between the
two kinds of explanation. Furthermore, I think that the picture Posterior
Analytics I 2 builds is not opposite to Physics I 1, but it is only a more
general picture, under which the picture of Physics 11 can be classified
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Explanation and Definition in Physics 11 309

A good beginning for my argument is to take the exact meaning of

the expressions 'more known/knowable to us' and 'more known/
knowable simpliciter or by nature'. In the former expression, the word
'gnrimteron' is modified by the clause 'to us', while in the latter it seems
to be taken in its primitive or more fundamental sense.2 The meaning of
this word can be understood according to a general rule: a predicate F is
more properly assigned to an item which is not only an F, but also a
cause by which other items are Fs.3 Thus, in these conditions, a cause is
always F-er than its effect. Applied to the word 'griorimon' ('known/
knowable'), this rule allows us to say that the cause responsible for the
knowability of the consequences is more knowable than the consequences, since it is in virtue of the cause that the consequences can
receive the predicate 'known'. In this way, in Metaphysics 12,982a30-b4,
Aristotle takes the causes as more knowable ('malista episteton') because
the 'subordinate items' are known from them and through them,
whereas the causes themselves are not known from and through the
'subordinate items'.4 An item deserves the designation of 'more knowable' if it stands in a causal relation to another. Applied to notions, this
expression can designate more primitive concepts through which others
must be elucidated. But, taking the expression in this way, we risk
overestimating an epistemological aspect which is not the most important. Applying the expression to propositions, we get its proper sense,
or at least the sense most important in Posterior Analytics I 2: a 'gnrimteron' proposition is a premise from which conclusions can be deduced. Ultimately, the principles are 'gririmtera' inasmuch as the
conclusions are to be known through them and from them. Thus, 'gnrimteron', without qualification, has little to do with evidence and other

2 In 71b34-72a2, the expressions 'prior by nature' and 'more knowable' are used
together in contrast to 'prior to us' and 'more knowable to us'. In 72a3, Aristotle,
developing this contrast, seems to take 'prior simpliciter' and 'more knowable
simpliciter' as equivalent to 'prior by nature' in 71b34 and 'more knowable' in 72al.
This last expression is introduced as an absolute one, with no kind of qualification.
3 This rule appears in A Po 72a29-30 and Metaph 993b24-25. Lesher [1973], 62-5,
appealed to it in order to overcome some problems about the interpretation of the
terms 'akribesteron' and 'alethesteron'. I believe that it can be applied appropriately
also to the case I am considering.
4 I thank an anonymous referee for pointing me to this passage
of the Metaphysics.
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310 Lucas Angioni

epistemological concepts; rather, it is to be applied to items which have

explanatory power.5
On the other hand, the qualification added by the phrase 'to us' takes
the word 'gnorimon' in a sense very common in Greek ordinary usage:
'familiar', that which we are generally acquainted with. Thus, 'more
known/knowable to us' is applicable to items more familiar to our
ordinary perceptions of the world. It means a priority concerning the
subjective origin of the notions in our soul.
To sum up the point: Aristotle applies the denomination of 'gnrimteron' to a premise from which conclusions can be deduced.6 For it is
'more known' ('gnrimteron') that which, being known ('gnorimon') in
itself, is also a cause by which other items can become known ('gnorimon'). Consequently, inasmuch as a principle is something able to explain other things, that which can explain a greater number of things is
more of a principle and so is gnrimteron. Thus, a premise from which can
be deduced a greater number of consequences will be more of a principle
and more knowable than another premise, from which a lesser number of
consequences can be deduced.
But this criterion can be taken in two aspects. In one sense, from a
universal proposition, the same feature can be proved about a great
number of things. Since the things under the universal would provide
us with minor terms, about each of these we can state the same feature
attributed to the universal. In another sense, from a universal proposition, many features can be proved about one and the same thing,
inasmuch as we analyse the universal predicate into its elements and
transitively assign these elements to the initial subject.7 These two as-

5 Wieland [1975], 129-130, and [1993], 89-106, is right to say that 'gnrimteron hemin'
is applied to the previous knowledge that frames our ordinary background; but he
is not right when he says that 'gnrimteron hapls/phusei' has a mere protreptical
origin and sense. Bames [1995], 96-7, and Scholz [1975], 56-7, seem to have understood 'gnrimteron phusei' as an epistemological notion, having to do with certainty
and/or evidence. That view does not seem right to me.
6 See the characterization of the proper principles of demonstration in A Po I 2,
71bl9-33.
7 It is true that transitiveness does not hold for every kind of predicate, or at least so
Aristotle conceives. Some kind of coincidental predicates do not admit transitiveness (see A Pol 22,83a25-8, Metaph IV 4,1007a32-3). But, to my point, it is enough
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Explanation and Definition in Physics I I 311

pects stand in a relation of inverse proportion. A more universal predicate can be attributed to a greater number of things, but can be analysed
in a lesser number of constitutive elements. A less universal predicate
can be attributed to a lesser number of things, but can be analysed in a
greater number of constitutive elements.
It is not difficult to see that these two aspects are not incompatible and
can answer to different contexts of scientific inquiry or to different
concerns in the work of science.8 But, for the moment, let us suppose that
there is an opposition between two kinds of explanation. According to
one conception, to explain would be to group the data under wider
classes. The propositions describing the universal properties of these
classes would function like laws able to cover the particular cases. In this
way, to locate a thing in a universal kind would be to subordinate it to
a general rule able to predict its behaviour. And the explanatory power
of a rule would be proportional to the level of its universality: the first
principles would be the most universal notions or the most universal
propositions, applicable to the greatest number of things.9
According to another conception, to explain would be to define a
thing, i.e., to state what it is, enumerating the whole of its essential

ness is another way to increase (auxesthai A Po 78al4) syllogisms, besides the one
described in this paragraph.
8 The idea that Aristotle recognises at least two stages in the explanatory work of the
sciences has received widespread agreement. Ferejohn [1991], 19, sees Aristotelian
apodeixis as a 'two-stage affair', in which the syllogistic chains are preceded by a
'framing stage' performed by Aristotelian division, which organizes and gives
existential import to 'merely universals' definitional starting-points. Bayer [1997],
131-2,135-6 states that to explain is not to classify, for the classification performed
by selection of commensurate universals is a mere introductory work to the real
explanation. In the same way, see Lennox [2001a], 46-8, 51-3: the historia, which
establishes the commensurate universals, is a predemonstrative and preliminar
work, and the explanation that states the causes and answers the 'why' question
also states what the thing is. See also Lennox [1987], 92,97.
9 This conception of explanation as classification in wider classes becomes similar to
the Hempelian pattern, once we realise that the classes have a prepositional content
about the manner of being of the items they include. Classification asserts, for
instance, that 'horses are animals'; but this means that, inasmuch as 'animals are so
and so', we can infer (and, in some way, predict) that 'horses will be so and so and
behave in such and such a way'. To classify is to put an item under a more general
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312 Lucas Angioni

properties and differentiations. A thing would be more properly and

fully explained, not if it has been subsumed under a generic feature or
rule, but if it has been analysed in the whole of its constitutive elements.
Now, is this the contrast that we can find in our initial texts? One
might claim that the rules set out in Posterior Analytics seem to be
committed to the former kind of explanation.10 If this assumption is right,
the terminology of Physics I 1 will be a clumsy infelicity, or will be
representative of another conception of explanation. For if explanation
is of the former kind, it is unreasonable to assert (as in the Physics
passage) that the universal is the immediate datum to be explained,
whereas the particular is the explanans to be reached through inquiry
for it is the contrary that should be expected. But we could only find that
contrast in the texts if the meaning of the terms 'katholou' and 'kath'
hekaston' were the same in both texts, and if the only important feature
in the contrast between them was the level of generality. But I intend to
show now that this is not the case.
There is no indication in Posterior Analytics I 2 that the correlation
between katholou and kath' hekaston should be understood merely as a
correlation between levels of generality (e.g., between genus and species). Aristotle is just employing a terminology he usually employs: 'kath'
hekaston' means an individual or particular phenomenon empirically
given to sense-perception, whereas, on the other hand, 'katholou' means
only a universal concept, in whatever level of generality, in opposition
to immediate data. This terminological use provides us with an opposition between empirical data, which is grasped more or less immediately
by sense-perception11 (that is, particular phenomena or individuals) and,
on the other hand, concepts to be apprehended by scientific knowledge
(that is, universals understood as explanatory notions).

10 Barnes [1992], 97, commenting 71b33, proposes the following rule: 'if P is more
familiar by nature than Q, then P cannot be less general than Q'. But if''gnrmiteron
phusei' (in Barnes's translation: 'more familiar by nature') points to a greater explanatory power, as I am claiming, Barnes's rule at least suggests a close tie between
level of generality and explanatory power, so that a thing would be more fully
explained according to the greater generality of its principle.
11 I will not go into the details of this issue; for the sake of my argument, I have
deliberately oversimplified it. But it is surely true that, for Aristotle, apprehension
of an individual is not an outcome of mere sense-perception, but rather a complex
cognitive process, which in some way involves a cooperation of nous and aistfsis.

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Explanation and Definition in Physics 11 313

This use of these terms also appears in other passages: in Posterior

Analytics I 31, 87b37-9, in On the Soul II 5, 417b22-3, and in the initial
chapter of Metaphysics (981a5-12,15-24). In all these texts, Aristotle states
that aisthesis is responsible for the knowledge of kath' hekaston,12 and, no
matter what this aisthesis is, the result is the same: the 'kath' hekaston'
designates the ordinary information we are initially acquainted with.
This information is almost always particular: a particular instance of a
lunar eclipse (88b39 ff.), individuals like Socrates and Callias (981a8-9,
19), etc. But Aristotle did not say that it cannot be universal in some way,
nor did he say that a piece of information is universal in the relevant
sense because it is attributed to many particular events or individuals.
A piece of information becomes universal in the relevant sense if it has
explanatory power and can receive the designation of 'knowledge'
(87b33-88a2). If we perceive that the triangle has its internal angles equal
to two right angles, this perception would still be in need of further
explanation (87b35-7) and would not be 'knowledge'.
Thus, between katholou and kath' hekaston, there is not a mere quantitative difference in levels of generality; there is rather heterogeneity.
What defines an item as kath' hekaston is not its particularity (even if all
kath' hekasta were particulars), but the fact that it is an immediate datum
that requires explanation. On the other hand, what defines an item as
katholou in the relevant sense is not its applicability to many instances
(even if all katholou were applicable to many instances), but its explanatory power.
On the other hand, this contrast between explanatory power and
unexplained immediate evidence is inverted in the use of 'katholou' and
'kath' hekaston' in Physics I 1. In this passage, katholou is a whole to be
divided or analysed, whereas kath' hekaston seems to be the elements
furnished by that division or analysis. But Aristotle says nothing about
the level of generality of these notions, nor about a presumed role to be
played by the level of generality in the explanatory efficacy of them.13

12 See Metaph 981blO-12.

13 About the level of generality, I think that the use of Physics 11 is not incompatible
with the habitual doctrine: a katholou is attributed to a larger number of items,
whereas a kath' hekaston is attributed to a narrower range than the katholou. This
contrast between katholou and kath' hekaston can be found in whatever level of
generality, as we can see in Parts of Animals I: see specially 642a25-6 and 644a25-30
ff. Balme [1960] and Pellegrin [1987] have proved that the
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314 Lucas Angioni

Even so, we can ask ourselves what kind of explanation this use of the
terms 'katholou' and 'kath' hekaston' would imply. The process from
katholou to kath' hekaston cannot mean a subsumption of particular cases
under more universal laws, nor an application of universal rules to
particular instances. Quite to the contrary, this process means an analysis
of a whole into its constitutive elements. In this text, 'universal' designates the features more known to us by sense-perception. These features
are so called because they are common to various objects, inasmuch as
this kind of universal 'is a sort of whole' (184a25) which we perceive not
in all its articulations and its inner diversity, but as a sort of crowd of
objects which share certain features (and only certain features) in common. Indeed, these features do not comprehend a full characterisation
of those objects, but only allow a preliminary identification of them. Each
of those objects is classified under the same class and is marked by the
same feature, but none is fully known in its own properties.
Thus, the work of scientific explanation consists in a discrimination
of the elements of confused generic universals. The causes and principles
which provide us with full knowledge about natural things are their
essences.14 According to this, scientific inquiry ought to discern differences of the preliminary data and so to specify the particular essential
properties of each natural object initially contained in the 'katholou'
crowd. In this way, by 'division' of the initial muddled mixture, i.e., by
an analysis which finds the appropriate elements, the natural scientist is
able to reach an exact determination of the essence of each particular
item.15

in the biological writings has no taxonomic value, and this position has received
general agreement (see Lloyd [1990], 8). I think this position would be equally right
about this use of 'katholou' and 'kath' hekaston'.
14 I take this for granted. Aristotle is famous for having introduced the four aitiai. But
I believe that in Physics II7-9 the multiplicity of these aitiai is unified in an articulated
account of the natural thing. In this account, the form, conceived as equivalent to
the telos and the moving cause (198a24-7), determines a set of material properties
necessary to its effectivity (200a5-15) This form, capable to determine its adequate
matter, is fully responsible for the account of what a thing is and, in this way, can be
conceived as the essence (cf. 193b2-3), inasmuch as it is capable of explaining not
only the set of functional properties of the thing, but also its behaviour, its capabilities and its material properties.
15 For an interpretation in these same lines, see Wieland
[1993], 108. The use of
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Explanation and Definition in Physics 11 315

This process is described in Posterior Analytics II8: we first get to know

that a thing exists inasmuch as we grasp some generic features able to
ensure an initial identification of it. These generic features can be articulated in a preliminary definition, as when we say that a 'thunder is such
a noise in the clouds' or that a 'man is such and such an animal' (93a23-4).
Then, we can pursue the investigation a step further, seeking for the
more fundamental features which explain why the thing has the properties we initially grasp. These more fundamental features play the role
of causes which answer not only the 'why', but also the 'what it is'
question: once attained, they can be articulated into the full definition of
the thing.16

'dwirousi' at 184a23 can suggest that the task of a natural scientist would be a mere
division of universal classes into more specific ones. This suggestion is strengthened
once we realize that Aristotle (at least prima facie) takes division as a privileged
instrument to build definitions (see Metaph 1037b27-30ff., Parts of Animals 643b2324ff.: Aristotle's criticisms are directed against dichotomy, not against every kind
of dmrein). But definitions of natural things can be built also as a hylomorphic
account and the differentiae that will enter into this account are not mere classificatory notions (see note 16). Thus, the diairesis is not a mere classificatory tool, but also
an analysis (on this point, Charlton's translation seems to me very proper) that
discerns the properties which allow us to define a thing. The evidences for a
conception of hylomorphic definitions of natural ousiai in Metaph Vn-VTH are
controversial. It is well known that Frede-Patzig and others have denied this
evidence. I think they are wrong, for there is enough evidence for this conception
in Metaph VII 17 and VIE 2-3. But it is enough for my argument to point to the
following texts, as evidence for a conception of hylomorphic definitions of natural
things: Physics 2,194a5-7,12-17; II9,200M-8; de Anima 11,403a24-bl6; Metaphysics
VI1,1025b32-1026a6.
16 These more fundamental features are not a differentia ultima (see Metaph 1038al9-20),
nor mere classificatory notions which will keep the thing separate from all others.
In Parts of Animals 12-3, Aristotle does not admit that only one differentia ultima could
sum up the essence of a thing (see 642b5ff.). He advises the natural scientist to apply
simultaneously many lines of differentiation, not dependent upon each other, to
reach the form and the definition of the essence (see 643b23ff.). In the same book,
he conceives the form i.e., that which enables us to state what a thing is as a
functional property which subordinates an articulated set of material properties,
assumed as necessary conditions to a thing's essence. Thus, it is not mere classificatory notions, but rather the form so conceived that determines fully what a thing is
and why it has the properties it has. See 640al6-19,640bl8ff. In this way, Aristotle
can say that the 'what it is' and the 'why it is' are questions identical with each other
(see A Po 90al4-15, and also 93a3ff.: Aristotle states that a definition, which says
what a thing is, also displays its cause, by which it exists
or is astoityou
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316 Lucas Angioni

Physics I 1 pictures this process: from generic features which grant

only an unsatisfactory assortment of many things, the natural scientist
should attain an exact articulation of all essential properties which
constitute each thing contained in that assortment. It is precisely this
process that the examples illustrate: the relation between the name and
the definition of the circle (184bl-3) is to be understood not as pure
logical relation between definiendum and definiens, but rather as an epistemological relation between preliminary definition, based upon generic
features, and a more satisfactory and exact one. Onoma' can be understood as 'designation'not only the linguistic item which we mark with
inverted commas, but also the full logical-semantic fact of using a
linguistic item to refer to the world.17 This designation is the ordinary
use of the term, a use that is justified by its repeated efficacy in picking
up always the same things, but that is not grounded on reflective criteria.
On the other hand, the definition goes beyond this ordinary efficacy of
the designation, since it displays the criteria that ground the right use of
the term. In a similar way, a child uses a designation in a quite inadequate
manner and later learns to use it properly, as if she has as criteria for the
use of that designation only some confused and muddled notions (as in
a preliminary definition), but later finds the proper criteria (as in an
adequate definition).
In the field of natural science, the causes by which we can say that 'we
scientifically know' are differentiae which define the essence of things.
Some of these differentiae are mere corporeal properties, others are
activities, capabilities and dispositions, etc. But, in all cases, they are

[2001a], 51, 60). In the same way, he can state that the form is the cause of being
that is, the cause by which the thing is as it is that explains 'why the thing is so
and so' and answers 'what it is' (see Metaph 17, specially 1041b7-9,25-27; but the
same view is also implied in VIE 2,1043a2-3, VTII3,1043b4-14).
17 I think that the use of Onoma' can be understood in this way at Metaph 982b8 and
1006a30. In the first passage, 'zetoumenon onoma' does not mean a word or name
which is being investigated, that is, whose definition is being searched; it means
rather a designation, that is, the application of a term to an item which satisfies the
relevant requirements for that application; in other words, when Aristotle says
'zetoumenon onoma', the 'investigation' implied in this expression is a search for a
thing to which a designation or name, already defined, can be properly applied. The
second text is much more controversial, but I think that 'semainet to onoma to einai e
me einai todi' can be read as 'the application of a word F [to an item x] means that [x]
is (or is not) G', G ('todi') giving the proper criteria for the use of 'F'.

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Explanation and Definition in Physics 11 317

responsible for the proper constitution of a thing as it is, different from

all others.18 Consequently, they give us the ultimate criteria for a more
exact definition of each thing. In order to know scientifically, a scientist
should discern these differentiae, and, from a preliminary definition
grounded in features a thing shares with others, he ought to proceed to
a definition grounded in those differentiae. For explanation is ultimately
the account of these differentiae.19
Now, the other kind of explanation mentioned above is not incompatible with this one. For, in order to attain a full discrimination of the
differentiae, it is quite useful first to gather things under generic groups.
The classification of a multiplicity under some generic notion allows us
to establish the right sort of explananda. First, the scientist must identify
groups by the proper generic features; then, he must proceed to a full
specification of the constitutive elements of each thing rightly grouped
under those generic features.20
There is no incompatibility between the two kinds of explanation I
have mentioned. Nor is it necessary to imagine that Aristotle changed
his mind concerning the paradigm of explanation to be observed in
natural science. But, it is even not correct to believe that Posterior Analytics
12 describes only that kind of explanation concerned with subsumption
under generic sorts. For Posterior Analytics I 2 only develops a more

18 See Metaph VIII2,1042b28-3a7.

19 See note 18. Explanation, as an account that explains why the thing is so and so,
turns out to be the same as the definition that states what the thing is. See note 16
for the texts that explicitly establish this connection.
20 See Lennox [1987], 92. He distinguishes two types of scientific explanation: (A) one
that explains by a subsumption under a wider class, and (B) another that explains
by the object's specific nature. Though sometimes (111) reluctant about the hierarchy to be established between (A) and (B), Lennox asserts (97) that type A explanations in some way prepare the subject for type B explanations. See also the careful
distinction between the historia (establishment of commensurate universals as relevant explananda) and the causal explanations in Lennox [2001a], 46-8,51-3.1 believe
that the 'division of scientific work' as proposed by Bayer [1995], 242-4, can be more
interesting if reformulated in this direction, as Bayer himself in a later paper ([1997],
131-6) suggests, proposing a distinction between the previous classificatory induction work and the task of finding the real explanations; in this way, the relation
between 'identificatory and explanatory syllogism' (see Bayer [1995]) could be
understood as a relation between subsuming under genera and specifying the
differences. See also Kullmann [1990], 338-41 and his notion
of a Tsipartite
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318 Lucas Angioni

general point of view: Aristotle is solely concerned with the hill characterisation of scientific principles in general. When he denominates them
as 'universale', he is only contrasting them with the ordinary data which
provides us with explananda. Aristotle does not say that explanation
should proceed, in every case, from the more particular to the more
universal, as though explanation was a mere classification under wider
classes and as though more universal principles could furnish a fuller
knowledge of all things they are applied to. Aristotle says that scientific
principles should not only be true, primitive and immediate, but also
prior to and more knowable than their consequents and, finally, causes
responsible for their consequents (71b20-2). But all these predicates are
quite well suited to specific differentiations by which we can state what
a thing is and why it is as it is.
Therefore, there is no contradiction between the characterisation of
scientific principles in Posterior Analytics 12 and the description in Physics
I 1 of the heuristic path by which these principles should be attained.
There is, indeed, a discrepancy in the sense of 'katholou' and 'kath'
hekaston', but this can be explained by the context and terminological
malleability of Aristotelian texts. In Posterior Analytics I 2, scientific
principles are characterised as more knowable by nature inasmuch as
they are not only self-explanatory but also able to make other things be
known. These principles are not near to ordinary data of sense-perception, but should be attained by further inquiry. In these points, Posterior
Analytics I 2 and Physics I 1 agree with each other. There is only a
terminological difference: in Posterior Analytics 12, Aristotle denominates
scientific principles as 'katholou', whereas in Physics I 1 these same
principles are denominated rather as 'kath' hekaston'. On the other hand,
in Posterior Analytics 12 'kath' hekaston' denominates ordinary data more
known to us, whereas in Physics I 1 these data are denominated as
'katholou'. In other words, the opposition between 'katholou' and 'kath'
hekaston' means in Posterior Analytics 12 an opposition between explanatory concepts and empirical data, whereas in Physics I 1 it means an
opposition between generic features (understood as data) and specific
elements (understood as principles and causes).
Thus, the terminology of Physics 11 is not a mere idiosyncrasy of a
clumsy text. It can be perfectly understood under the picture of Posterior
Analytics 12. The ordinary data, grasped by sense-perception and more
known to us, are equivalent to generic features that many things share
in common. These features are not able to discern specific properties of
each item to which they are applied. Rather, they include these items as
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in a confused crowd, 'in a whole', that is, in a whole
of yetto you
undifferenti-

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Explanation and Definition in Physics 11 319

ated and undefined things.21 On the other hand, the principles able to
explain ordinary data (and so more knowable by nature) and to be
attained by further inquiry (and so less known to us) are not universale
more and more undifferentiated and able to include a greater number of
things. They are rather differentiations through which each thing can be
properly defined, so that a crowd marked off only be generic features
can become an articulated whole. And these differentiations fit perfectly
well the definition of principles we find in Posterior Analytics 12: they are
true, self-explanatory and immediate ('amesa', in the sense that they
cannot be demonstrated through another meson), as well as more knowable than, prior to, and causes of the generic features, inasmuch as they
can explain why things have these generic features.
Research in the natural science consists exactly in this inquiry into
differentiations and exact definitions, and this explains why Aristotle
describes it as a path from 'katholou' towards 'kath' hekaston'. According
to this itinerary of research, scientific explanation does not consist in a
mere inclusion of data in more and more general classes. This work of
classification is a mere preparatory step to another kind of work: to
discern specific features able (i) to explain why things have the generic
features we first are acquainted with and (ii) to ground a definition more
satisfactory than the preliminary one.22
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21 This expression is taken from Bolton [1991], 9.

22 It is not necessary to conceive these specific features as mere classificatory notions.
They can be features of whatever kind, provided that they allow a more exact
understanding of the thing they are attributed to. For instance: the interposition of
the Earth between the Sun and the Moon, which Aristotle attributes to the lunar
eclipse. Through this 'feature' of the eclipse, we can explain why it has the properties
we initially have grasped (why it is a privation of light) and we can reach a more
exact definition of what it is, for then the eclipse can be defined not only as 'privation
of light in the moon' (93a23), but as 'privation of light in the moon by the interposition of the Earth between the Sun and the Moon' (90al5-6). See also the thunder
example (94a5-9).
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320 Lucas Angioni

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