In Re: KAY VILLEGAS KAMI

Facts:

Kay Villegas Kami Inc. claiming to be a recognized non-stock, non-profit corporation questions the validity
of RA No. 6132 Sec. 8 on the grounds that it violates due process,r ights of association, and freedom of
expression and that it is an ex post facto law.
Issues:
Does the Provision violate due process, rights of association, and freedom of expression?Is it an ex post
facto law?
Held:
Petition denied. It is a Constitutional act.Constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws which are
given retroactive effect.Penalty for violation of law is imposed to acts committed after the approval of the
law.
1.Does the Provision violates due process, rights of association, and freedom of expression?
No, the questioned provision is a valid limitation on due process, rights of
association,freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and equal protection
clause.R.A. No. 6132 is designed to prevent both prostitution of electoral process and
denial of theequal protection of laws.
2.Is it an ex post facto law?
No. Ex post facto law defined:
a. makes criminal an act done before law was passed and punishes act innocent when done. b.
aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it wasc. inflicts greater punishment than the law prescribed
when committedd. alters legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less or different testse.
assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of right which
when done was lawfulf. deprives a person accused of a crime some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, suchas the protection of a former conviction of acquittal or a proclamation of amnesty.
While R.A. 6132 penalizes a violation of the provision it only punishes acts committed after the approval
of the law.

TITLE OF THE CASE: SALVADOR V. MAPA

DATE OF PROMULGATION: November 28, 2007

SUBJECT AREA: Civil Procedure; Criminal Law

KEY DOCTRINES/CONCEPTS: Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65) vs. Petition for Review on
Certiorari (Rule 45); Prescription; Ex Post Facto Laws

FACTS:

On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans. Behest loans are loans granted by government banks or GOCC at
the behest, command, or urging by previous government officials to the disadvantage of the Philippine government.
The Committee was tasked to inventory all behest loans and determine the courses of action that the government
should take to recover these loans.

By Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9, 1992, the functions of the Committee were expanded to include
all non-performing loans which shall embrace behest and non-behest loans. Said Memorandum also named criteria
to be utilized as a frame of reference in determining a behest loan

Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for investigation, including the loan transactions between
Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc. (PEMI) and the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP). The Committee determined that they bore the characteristics of behest loans, as defined under
Memorandum Order No. 61 because the stockholders and officers of PEMI were known cronies of then President
Ferdinand Marcos; the loan was under-collateralized; and PEMI was undercapitalized at the time the loan was
granted.

Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Fact-Finding Committee, and representing the PCGG,
filed with the Ombudsman a sworn complaint for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the respondents Mapa, Jr. et. al.

The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. It stressed that Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019
as originally enacted, provides that the prescriptive period for violations of the said Act (R.A. 3019) is ten (10) years.
Moreover, the computation of the prescriptive period of a crime violating a special law like R.A. 3019 is governed by
Act No. 3326 which provides that prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of the judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment. Corollary thereto, the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Dinsay, C.A. 40
O.G. 12th Supp., 50, ruled that when there is nothing which was concealed or needed to be discovered because the
entire series of transactions were by public instruments, the period of prescription commenced to run from the date
the said instrument were executed.

In the case at bar, the loans were entered into by virtue of public documents (e.g., notarized contracts, board
resolutions, approved letter-request) during the period of 1978 to 1981. Records show that the complaint was
referred and filed with the Ombudsman on October 4, 1996 or after the lapse of more than fifteen years from the
violation of the law. Therefore, the offenses charged had already prescribed.

Also pointed out was that the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans was created on October 8, 1992
under Administrative Order No. 13. Subsequently, Memorandum Order No. 61, dated November 9, 1992, was issued
defining the criteria to be utilized as a frame of reference in determining behest loans. Accordingly, if these Orders

are to be considered the bases of charging respondents for alleged offenses committed, they become ex-post facto
laws which are proscribed by the Constitution.

ISSUE : WON ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 13 AND MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 61 ARE EX-POST
FACTO LAW[S].
NO.
The SC did not sustain the Ombudsmans declaration that Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No.
61 violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws for ostensibly inflicting punishment upon a person for an act done
prior to their issuance and which was innocent when done.

The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable implication. Furthermore, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction
to entertain questions on the constitutionality of a law. The Ombudsman, therefore, acted in excess of its jurisdiction
in declaring unconstitutional the subject administrative and memorandum orders.

In any event, the SC held that Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are not ex post facto
laws.

An ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) which makes an action done before the passing of the law and
which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it
greater than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant. This Court added two (2) more to the list, namely: (e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and
remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or (f) that which
deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.

The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws.
Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or
those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. The subject administrative and
memorandum orders clearly do not come within the shadow of this definition. Administrative Order No. 13 creates the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and functions. It
does not mete out penalty for the act of granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame
of reference for determining behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum
Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws.