National Federation of Labor, Zamboanga Monthly Employees Union vs Hon.

Eisma,
Zamboanga Wood Products
- Subject of contention was a July 20, 1982 order requiring union officers and
members to appear before the court to show cause why a preliminary injunction
should not be issued against them.
- WON Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the
cases of all employees
-

Petitioner NFL filed for certification and sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the monthly paid employees of Zamboanga Wood products.
Petitioner Union filed for a notice of strike on May 3, 1982, against the illegal
termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of local union; unfair labor practice,
non-payment of living allowances, employment of oppressive labor management
personnel without proper permit.
On July 9, Respondent Zambawood filed a complaint for damages for obstruction
of private property and a prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order. It was alleged that the petitioners blockaded the road leading to its
manufacturing division, preventing customers and suppliers free ingress and
egress from the premises. Petitioners contend that such conduct were incidents of
picketing, and that Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction, not the court of first instance.
Article 217 provided jurisdiction to the Labor Arbiters; it was amended by P.D.
1367 which vested jurisdiction to ordinary courts; amended again by P.D. 1691
returning original jurisdiction to the Labor Arbiters to settle all money
claims x x x or any other claims arising from employer-employee relations.

Colgate Palmolive Philippines Inc. vs Gimenez

- The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. is a corporation duly organized
and existing under Philippine laws engaged in the manufacture of toilet
preparations and household remedies. On several occasions, it imported from
abroad various materials such as irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium
saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as
stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every
importation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the
Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the
payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incident thereto, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law.
- On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications
for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid in the aggregate sum of
P113,343.99. The claim for refund was based on section 2 of Republic Act 601,
which provides that "foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost,
transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the
Philippines of . . . stabilizer and flavors . . . shall be refunded to any importer
making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation
under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven
thereof."

After the applications were processed, the officer-in-charge of the Exchange

Tax Administration of the Central Bank, that official advised, the petitioner
that of the total sum of P113,343.99 claimed by it for refund, the amount of
P23,958.13 representing the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange
used to import irish moss extract, sodium benzoate and precipitated calcium
carbonate had been approved. The auditor of the Central Bank, however,
refused to pass in audit its claims for refund even for the reduced amount fixed by
the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory that
toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under section 2 of the
Exchange Tax Law.
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter affirmed the decision of
the auditor. Hence this petition.
WON whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the
importation of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17%
special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law, (Republic Act No. 601)
so as to entitle it to refund under section 2 thereof
The auditor general ruled that terms stabilizer and flavors used in the law refers to
those used in the manufacturing of food and food products based on the principle
"general terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the
general language will be limited by the specific language which indicates the
statute's object and purpose." The rule, however, is, in our opinion, applicable
only to cases where, except for one general term, all the items in an
enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class.
While it is true that the items preceding stabilizer and flavors are those of food
products, those immediately succeeding it are not. E.g. fertilizer, poultry feed,
vitamin concentrate.
This view is supported by the principle "Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos
distinguire debemos", or "where the law does not distinguish, neither do we
distinguish". The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are
restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection with
them, does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended
merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be
taken in connection with other rules of construction.

Hidalgo vs Hidalgo
- Two petitions for review of decisions of the Court of Agrarian Relations
dismissing petitioners' actions as share tenants for the enforcerment of the right to
redeem agricultural lands, under the provisions of section 12 of the Agricultural
Land Reform Code. As the same issue of law is involved and the original
landowner and vendees in both cases are the same, the two cases are herein jointly
decided.
- In Case L-25326, respondent-vendor sold the 22,876-square meter parcel of land,
together with two other parcels of land for P4,000.00. Petitioners-spouses Igmidio
Hidalgo and Martina Resales, as tenants thereof, alleging that the parcel worked
by them as tenants is fairly worth P1,500.00, "taking into account the respective
areas, productivities, accessibilities, and assessed values of three lots, seek by way

of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same amount of P1,500.00
by respondents-vendees 1 in their favor.
-

In Case L-25327, respondent-vendor sold the 7,638-square meter parcel of land

for P750.00, and petitioners-spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo as tenants
thereof, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same
price of P750.00 by respondents-vendees in their favor.
Petitioners-tenants have for several years been working on the lands as share
tenants. No 90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the right
of pre-emption prescribed by section 11 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code
(Republic Act No. 3844, enacted on August 8, 1963) was given by respondentvendor to petitioners-tenants. Subsequently, the deeds of sale executed by
respondent-vendor were registered by respondents register of deeds and
provincial assessor of Batangas in the records of their respective offices
notwithstanding the non-execution by respondent-vendor of the affidavit required
by section 13 of the Land Reform Code.
But proceeding from several erroneous assumptions and premises, it arrived at its
erroneous conclusion that the right of redemption granted by section 12 of the
Land Reform Code is available to leasehold tenants only but not to share tenants,
and thus dismissed the petitions.
WON the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844
applicable to share tenants
Yes. It was error, therefore, for the agrarian court to state the premise after the
Land Reform Code had already been enacted, that "the systems of agricultural
tenancy recognized in this jurisdiction are share tenancy and leasehold tenancy."
A more accurate statement of the premise is that based on the transitory
provision in the first proviso of section 4 of the Code, i.e. that existing share
tenancy contracts are allowed to continue temporarily in force and effect,
notwithstanding their express abolition, until whichever of the following
events occurs earlier: (a) the end of the agricultural year when the National
Land Reform Council makes the proclamation declaring the region or
locality a land reform area; or (b) the shorter period provided in the share
tenancy contracts expires; or (c) the share tenant sooner exercises his option
to elect the leasehold system.
the Land Reform Code forges by operation of law, between the landowner and the
farmer be a leasehold tenant or temporarily a share tenant a vinculum juris
with certain vital juridical consequences, such as security of tenure of the tenant
and the tenant's right to continue in possession of the land he works despite the
expiration of the contract or the sale or transfer of the land to third persons, and
now, more basically, the farmer's pre-emptive right to buy the land he cultivates
under section 11 of the Code 6 as well as the right to redeem the land, if sold to a
third person without his knowledge, under section 12 of the Code. This is an
essential and indispensable mandate of the Code to implement the state's
policy of establishing owner-cultivatorship and to achieve a dignified and
self-reliant existence for the small farmers that would make them a pillar of
strength of our Republic.

In Case L-25326, however, the deed of sale executed by respondent-vendor in

favor of respondents-vendees for the price of P4,000.00 covers three parcels of
land, while what is sought to be redeemed is only the first parcel of land of 22,876
square meters, described in the deed. Petitioners-tenants' allegation that the
proportionate worth of said parcel "taking into account the respective areas,
productivities, accessibilities and assessed values of the three lots," is P1,500.00,
was traversed by respondents in their answer, with the claim that "the said land is
fairly worth P20,000.00. 20 While the vendor would be bound by, and cannot
claim more than, the price stated in the deed, and the Code precisely provides that
the farmer shall have "the preferential right to buy the (landholding) under
reasonable terms and conditions" or "redeem the same at a reasonable price and
consideration"
In Case L-25327, there is no question as to the price of P750.00 paid by the
vendees and no additional consideration or expenses, unlike in Case L-25326,
supra, assumed by the vendees. Hence, petitioners therein are entitled to redeem
the landholding for the same stated price.
Therefore, in case L-25326 the case is remanded to the agrarian court to
determine the reasonable price.

U.S. vs Toribio
- Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered.
His request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He
nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was eventually
sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the other argued that
the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid
exercise of police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it is not a taking of the
property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate
exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the
property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the publics. All
property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to
injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the
community.
If, however, the construction be placed on these sections which is contended for by the
appellant, it will readily be seen that all these carefully worked out provisions for the
registry and record of the brands and marks of identification of all large cattle in the
Islands would prove in large part abortion, since thieves and persons unlawfully in
possession of such cattle, and naturally would, evade the provisions of the law by
slaughtering them outside of municipal slaughterhouses, and thus enjoy the fruits of their
wrongdoing without exposing themselves to the danger of detection incident to the
bringing of the animals to the public slaughterhouse, where the brands and other
identification marks might be scrutinized and proof of ownership required. Where the

language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction

should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the
lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction
should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and
to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment.
Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Co., G.R. No. L-27489,April 30,1970
Objects and Methods of Construction: Mens Legislatoris/Mischief Rule
It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as
much a part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal
provision would not be attained.
F
acts:
Conrado Macabenta was a laborer in the sawmill of the Davao Stevedore Terminal
Company. Although some sort of quarters were provided by the respondent to its
employees at the sawmill, many of them apparently preferred to commute (the Company
furnishes their transportation), and the deceased in particular went home about three
times a week. At the time that the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 13,
1961 which led to his death on September 29, 1961, the claimant-widow, Leonora Tantoy
Vda. de Macabenta, was not yet married to the decedent although they had already been
living together as husband and wife for the past three months. However, on the day
following the accident, they were lawfully wedded in a marriage ceremony solemnized in
the hospital where the deceased was hospitalized up to his death. The claimant widow
gave birth on April 8, 1962 to the posthumous daughter of the deceased who was given
the name Raquel Tantoy Macabenta. The Workmen's Compensation Commission
awarded to the claimant widow for herself and in behalf of her minor child the amount of
P2,708.00 as compensation and the sum of P270.80 as attorney's fees.
Issue:
Whether or not the widow of a deceased employee whose marriage occurred after the
accident as well as the posthumous child could be considered dependents within the
meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Held:
Yes
. From the
express language
of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or actually
dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or
incapable of supporting him or herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent
upon the deceased are
considered dependents
.
Ratio:

It is true that the marriage took place after the fatal accident but there was no question
that at the time of his death she was married to him. She, therefore, comes entirely within
the letter of the law. Nor can there be any doubt that the child, Raquel Macabenta, also
falls within the words the Act employs. Our Civil Code, in no uncertain terms, considers
a conceived child born for all purposes that are favorable to her provided the birth is
attended with the conditions specified, namely, that she is alive at the time she is
completely delivered from the mother's womb. Time and time again, we have stressed
that where
the law is clear, our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found.
What is more, we have taken pains to defeat any evasion of its literal language by
rejecting an interpretation, even if not totally devoid of plausibility, but likely to attach to
it a significance different from that intended by the lawmakers. A paraphrase of an
aphorism from Holmes is not inappropriate. There can always occur to an intelligence
hostile to a piece of legislation a misinterpretation that may, without due reflection, be
considered not too far-fetched.
Our conclusion likewise finds support in the fundamental principle that
once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by
the judiciary. Even if honest doubts could be entertained, therefore, as to the meaning of
the statutory provisions, still respect for such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of the
plea of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company. Assuming a choice is necessary between
conflicting theories,
that which best conforms to the language of the statute and its purpose should prevail.
To quote from the Lingad case anew: For it is undeniable that
every statute, much more so one arising from a legislative implementation of a
constitutional mandate, must be so construed that no question as to its conformity with
what the fundamental law requires need arise.

Equity of the Statute

Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. (6)
Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that
the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. (n)
Amatan vs Judge Aujerio
- A criminal complaint against Rodrigo Umpad Meon for murder was filed at the
PNP station in Bato, Leyte.
- Upon arraignment, with acquiescence of the public prosecutor, Meon entered into
a plea bargain where he would plea guilty to the lesser offense of attempted
homicide as opposed to homicide originally charged in the information.
- On October 16, 1992, a letter-complaint addressed to the Chief Justice and signed
by Pedro S. Amatan, a brother-in-law of the deceased, accused Judge Vicente

Aujero of gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct,
in finding the accused guilty without reasonable doubt on the crime of attempted
homicide.
Judge Aujerio based his ruling on Sec 2. Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure which allows the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense whether or
not it is included in the offense charged in the complaint or information, with the
consent of the offended party and the fiscal. In this regard, it is inferred that the
fiscal consented to abbreviate the proceedings and in order not to run the risk of
the accused being acquitted, because there was no conclusive evidence to obtain
the conviction of the accused to the offense charged in the complaint of
information.
In instances where a literal application of a provision of law would lead to
injustice or to a result so directly in opposition with the dictates of logic and
everyday common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code admonishes
judges to take principles of right and justice at heart. In case of doubt the intent is
to promote right and justice. Fiat justice ruat coelum. Stated differently, when
a provision of law is silent or ambiguous, judges ought to invoke a solution
responsive to the vehement urge of conscience.
Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law, and is fined P1,000.

Kuenzle & Streiff vs Collector of Customs

- Kuenzle & Streiff is engaged in the import of cases roast coffee, chicory,
cereals. to the Philippines. The department of customs classified their import as
bonanza mixture, thus it was not exempted from tariff.
- Plaintiff, through its attorney, protested, alleging that the mixture is a product
and manufacture of the United States, in chief value of the growth of the United
States; the shipment came direct, was accompanied by the proper certificate of
origin; the goods should have been passed free of duty as American products,
under section 5 of American Tariff of 1909.
- The collector of customs ruled that the roast coffee, chicory and cereals have not
changed from one to another by virtue of a manufacturing process, and should be
considered as adulterated coffee. Thus, denying the protest.
- The decision of the Court of First Instance in customs appeal No. 125, on said
protest No. 7298, held that the bonanza mixture could not be admitted free of
duty into the Philippine Islands, under section 12 of the Tariff Law.
- Plaintiffs assail that the trial court erred in holding that the customs authorities, in
passing upon the article known as bonanza mixture, were or should have been
governed by section 12 of the Tariff Law of 1909.
- SC defined manufacture as: The application of labor to an article, either by
hand or by mechanism, does not make the article necessarily a manufactured
article within the meaning of that term as used in the tariff laws, unless the
application of such labor is carried to such an extend that the article suffers a

species of transformation and is changed into a new and different article,

having a distinctive name, character or use.
Judgment of Collector of Customs and CFI is AFFIRMED.

Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs Central Bank of the Philippines

- During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9, 1953, the plaintiff appellant
imported sun dried cocoa beans for which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17
per cent totalling P74,671.04. Claiming exemption from said tax under section 2
of same Act, it sued the Central Bank that had exacted payment; and in its
amended complaint it included the Treasurer of the Philippines.
- The suit was filed in the Manila Court of First Instance, wherein defendants
submitted in due time a motion to dismiss on the grounds: first, the complaint
stated no cause of action because cocoa beans were not "chocolate"; and second,
it was a suit against the Government without the latter's consent.
- SEC. 2 of the aforesaid Act provides that "the tax collected or foreign
exchange used for the payment of costs transportation and/or other charges
incident to importation into the Philippines of rice, flour ..soya beans,
butterfat, chocolate, malt syrup .. shall be refunded to any importer making
application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation . . ."
- In support of its contention appellant quotes from dictionaries and encyclopedias
interchangeably using the words "chocolate", "cacao" and "cocoa". Yet we notice
that the quotations refer to "cocoa" as chocolate nut" "chocolate bean" or
"chocolate tree.
- In view of the foregoing, and having in mind the principle of strict construction of
statutes exempting from taxation,3 we are of the opinion and so hold, that the
exemption for "chocolate" in the above section 2 does not include "cocoa beans".
The one is raw material, the other manufactured consumer product; the latter is
ready for human consumption; the former is not.
- WON cocoa beans may be considered as "chocolate" for the purposes of
exemption from the foreign exchange tax imposed by Republic Act No. 601 as
amended.
- Other parts of the congressional record seem to indicate that it was their intention
to exempt cocoa beans instead of chocolate to favor local chocolate
manufacturers. Meanwhile, President's proclamation No. 62 of September 2, 1954
issued in accordance with Republic Act No. 1197 specifying that said exemption
(of cocoa beans) shall operate from and after September 3, 1954 not before. As
a general rule, it may be added, statutes operate prospectively.
- Since the cocoa beans were imported on January-October 1953, it was before the
exemption decree. As a rule, statutes operate prospectively.
- Order of dismissal is AFFIRMED; It is a suit against the Government without its
consent.
Tan et. al. vs People = DENIED
- On October 26, 1989 is Sibuyan Island, Romblon, forest guards Panadero and
Rabino intercepted a dump truck driver by Moreno full of narra and white lauan
lumber. On October 30, the same guards apprehended another dump truck driven

by Cabudol containing tanguile lumber. Both trucks and the construction firm
owning it (A & E Construction) is owner by Petitioner Alejandro Tan. No proof of
legal possession of the lumber were presented, thus the pieces of lumber were
confiscated.
In another Information, 8 Tan and Ramilo, together with Crispin Cabudol, were
also charged for the same violation in connection with the October 30, 1989
incident. During the trial, the defense did not contest the above factual
circumstances except to deny that the forest guards demanded, on either of the
two occasions, papers or documents showing legal possession of the lumber.
The trial court brushed aside the version of the defense and ruled that the
confiscated pieces of lumber which were admittedly owned by Accused Tan were
not legitimate deliveries but aborted nocturnal hauling. It convicted all the
accused as charged, for their failure to comply with the Forestry Reform Code,
which requires the following legal documents: (1) an auxiliary invoice, (2) a
certificate of origin, (3) a sales invoice, (4) scale/tally sheets and (5) a lumber
dealer permit.
Sec. 68.
Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest
Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove
timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land without any authority, or possess
timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case
of partnerships, associations or corporations, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such officers are
aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceeding on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as
well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found.
Accordingly, we shall rule on the following legal issues: (1) the constitutionality
of Section 68 of EO 277, (2) the treatment by the lower court of lumber as timber
and/or forest product within the contemplation of PD 705, as amended, and (3)
the alleged retroactive application of EO 277.
ISSUE 1; petitioners were not "charged with the [unlawful] possession of
firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, 'the associated water' or
fish"; thus, the inclusion of any of these enumerated items in EO 277 "is
absolutely of no concern" to petitioners.
ISSUE 2; the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the
1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is
defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market." Simply
put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
ISSUE 3; Petitioners insist that EO 277 is not applicable to them, because the
seized lumber had been lawfully possessed by Cajidiocan Trading since March
1987, while the amendatory law was issued only on July 25, 1987, and took effect

fifteen days after publication. This strained reasoning deserves scant

consideration. First, at no time during the apprehensions did petitioners claim that
the lumber belonged to Cajidiocan Trading. First, at no time during the
apprehensions did petitioners claim that the lumber belonged to Cajidiocan
Trading. Second, the supposed sale of the subject lumber by Matzhou to
Cajidiocan Trading, as evidenced by the auxiliary invoice, occurred in March
1987, or more than two and a half years prior to the apprehension and seizure that
gave rise to this case. It is highly doubtful if the lumber bought at the earlier date
was the very same lumber confiscated in October 1989. Third and most important,
assuming that indeed they were the very same lumber, forest laws and regulations
also require the following documents: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2) sales
invoice, (3) delivery receipt, (4) tally sheet, and (5) certificate of transport
agreement. 30 None of these documents were proffered in court or elsewhere.
None of these documents were proffered in court or elsewhere. Petitioners'
unlawful possession of the subject lumber occurred in October 1989. EO 277,
which specifically included "possession" of timber and other forest products
within the contemplation of PD 705, had already been issued and in effect more
than two years previous thereto. Nothing will prevent the indictment of petitioners
for violation of EO 277 at the time they were caught by the forest guards in
flagrante delicto. The prohibited act is a malum prohibitum, and absence of
malice or criminal intent will not save the day for them.
Bernardo vs Bernardo
-

Petitioners sought to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in ruling that
respondent has preference over the acquisition of lot 462-A of Cappelania
Concepcion by virtue of Commonwealth Acts 20 & 539. The subject lot is
located in Malabon, Rizal with an area of 208 square meters.
It is an uncontested fact that on December 31, 1947, the Republic of the
Philippines purchased from Roman Catholic Church the estate known as the
"Capelania de Tambobong" in Malabon, Rizal, under the provisions of section 1,
of Commonwealth Act No. 539. Said Act authorizes the expropriation or purchase
of private lands and that lands acquired thereunder should be subdivided into lots,
for resale at reasonable prices to " their bona fide tenants or occupants."
Crisostomo R. Bernardo, respondent herein, applied to the Rural Progress
Administration for the purchase of the lot in question. Petitioners Enrique
Bernardo, et al ., contested the application and claimed preferential right to such
purchase, and on January 12, 1948, the Rural Progress Administration resolved to
recognize the petitioners as entitled to preference. The respondents then appealed
to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and the latter upheld their claim, and the
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
. . . It has been incontestably proven that the disputed lot had been held under
lease by appellee's deceased parents and later by him (appellee) continuously
from 1912 to 1947. The appellee's predecessors paid the rentals due on the said lot
from the commencement of their leasehold rights up to 1936, when Teodora

Santos died. The appellee continued paying the rents on the same lot from 1936 to
December 31, 1947, when the Government acquired the entire Capellania de
Concepcion estate. Since 1912 the values of the leasee hold right of appellee
amounts to about P4,000.00.
-

The alleged preferential right of the appellant to the purchase of the disputed lot,
which was also the main basis of the decision of the Rural Progress
Administration, is their claim of actual occupation of the lot for many years
before the acquisition of the Concepcion estate by the Government. The
appellants' witness, Otilia Santos, however, said that the late Romulo Bernardo
had allowed his uncle, appellant Enrique Bernardo, to stay in the premises since
the year 1918. (petitioner's Brief, pp. 72-73).
The house standing on the lot since July 13, 1944 was sold by petitioner to
respondent, who then became its owner. The petitioners were allowed to stay in
the premises out of charity.
There are thus before us, disputing the right of preference to the acquisition of the
lot, the respondent who is the owner of the house standing on said lot since 1944,
and has held the land in lawful tenancy since 1912, paying rents and taxes
thereon; and the petitioner, who was allowed by respondent, out of the deference
and charity, to gratuitously occupy the lot and live therein since 1918. Upon the
facts on record, we are of the opinion that petitioner does not come under the
description "bona fide tenant or occupant" employed in the statute.
The petitioners seeks to justify his stand by claiming that the policy of the
government, ever since the start of the American sovereignty, had been to acquire
the landed estates for the benefit of their "actual occupants," as allegedly
exemplified in Acts 1170 and 1933 (friar Lands' Acts), and Commonwealth Acts
Nos. 20, 260, 378, and 539 (Homesite Acts); that the words "bona fide occupants"
employed in the Commonwealth Acts are equivalent to "actual" occupants.
Tambobong Estate by the Government, has been gratuitously occupying a lot
therein by mere tolerance of its lessee, and who does not own the house erected
on such lot, is not a "bona fide occupant" entitled to its acquisition.

Malanyaon vs Lising
-

Nilo A. Malanyaon, the petitioner, was formerly a member of the Sangguniang

Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur. He filed an action to declare illegal the
disbursement made by Cesario Goleta as Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality
of Bula, Camarines Sur, to Venancia Pontanal, widow of the late Mayor S.B.
Pontanal, in the amount of P5,000.00 representing a portion of the salary of the
late Mayor as such mayor of said municipality during the period of his suspension
from August 16, 1977 up to November 28, 1979, and to restrain or prevent
respondent Cesario Goleta as such Municipal Treasurer of the aforementioned
municipality from further paying or disbursing the balance of the claim.
However, respondent Judge dismissed the claim, on the ground that the criminal
case against the late Mayor S.B. Pontanal due to his death amounted to acquittal.

Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted
because the evidence does not show that defendants guilt is beyond a reasonable
doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is
not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a
court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense
was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or
information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc. The only case in
which the word dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of the
proper term acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has presented all its evidence,
the defendant moves for the dismissal and the court dismisses the case on the
ground that the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because
the case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense
was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is
dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the
defendant could not be again prosecuted before the court of competent
jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case the defendant may again be
prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Respondents claim that under Article 81 no.1 of the Revised penal Code, Death
of the accused pending appeal extinguishes his criminal and civil liability. We do
not see the relevance of this provision to the case at bar. For one thing the case
against Mayor Pontanal was not on appeal but on trial. For another thing the claim
for back salaries is neither a criminal nor a civil liability. It is in fact a right
provided the conditions of the law are present.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be well-taken, the same is hereby granted,
the order of the court a quo is hereby set aside and another one is entered
declaring illegal the payment of municipal funds for the salaries of the late Mayor
S.B. Pontanal during his suspension from office and ordering the respondent
treasurer to retrieve payments so far disbursed. No pronouncement as to costs.