Professional Documents
Culture Documents
GeoAmericas 2012
Lima, Per - May 2012
INTRODUCTION
The pipeline is a steel pipe approximately 200 mm in diameter intimately internally lined with an HDPE pipe approximately 5 mm
in thickness. The steel pipe is fillet welded with flanges approximately every 1.5 km. Lengths of HDPE pipe are butt fused
together, the outside diameter (OD) squeeze-out beads removed, and the pipe pulled with a wireline through an entry reduction
box, through the steel pipe, then released so that the liner expands to almost recover its original diameter and to be in intimate
contact with the steel pipe inside surface (ID). HDPE flanges matching the steel flanges are welded to the end of the liner. A
scraper removes the liners internal squeeze out beads, a sizing pig is passed through the pipe to ensure there are no major
flow restrictions, the liner is electrically holiday tested for holes, and finally given an air pressure test.
After a number of blockages in 2004 that could easily be removed by water jetting, on 4 May 2006 there was another blockage
in the pipe estimated to be close to the lowest part of the pipe, specifically between Flanges 143 and 143A (Figure 1). Several
attempts were made to move or break down the blockage by applying higher pressures from the plant and by applying back
pressures from downstream locations. The major blockage could not be removed, although it was thought to be moved about
500 to 700 m downstream then back upstream Between 4 May and 24 May 2006 an intense program of investigation, blockage
removal, pipe repair, and water flow/pressure testing was performed until the pipe was confirmed clear of all blockages.
2.
With over 15 years of loss adjusting cases specially oriented to engineering and all-risks construction projects, we are involved
in major claims in the construction engineering area. Our experience, professionalism, accurate liability and loss management,
and also many years of technical experience and contacts in the worldwide reinsurer market ensure a fair assessment of loss.
In addition, we have a program of serious and constant technical improvement with the capability to form liaisons with experts in
complementary technical disciplines. This was how we became involved in the subject pipeline damage claim, in the northern
part of Chile.
We were appointed to evaluate the rupture in the high density polyethylene (HDPE) interior liner in the steel pipeline, that
showed serious and several damages in different parts of the pipe. We needed to determine the root cause of the failure to
understand if this was one damage event or several different damage events, related to, or independent of the initial failure
event.
LINER INVESTIGATION
Due to a previous thorough and successful joint investigation of an evaporation pond PVC liner failure, (Peggs and Duhalde,
2005) the loss adjuster retained Dr. Peggs to perform the investigation. The failure had occurred on 4 May 2006 and the
pipeline shut down within 8 minutes. The loss adjuster made his first site visit on 29 May 2006 when samples had been
removed and repairs were already underway. Dr. Peggs made his first site visit on 9 to 12 April 2007, almost 1 year later. A
second visit to confirm locations, orientations, and interrelationships of available samples and to seek additional samples from
the removed and stored pipes was made on 16 to 18 May 2007. Therefore, the failure had occurred and samples were
removed well before our technical investigation.
Several interesting features were found at locations shown in Figure 1.
Figure 2. Scale on HDPE liner ID (left) and on steel pipe ID both old and new scale (right)
Figure 6. The Monster sample as removed from pipe (left) and after storage (right)
Figure 9. Two halves of overlap weld. Outer segment (O), collapsed and abraded inner segment (I), weld boxed. Taper on
inner segment arrowed.
It was claimed by other parties that the welding had occurred as a consequence of interface friction after the HDPE liner broke in
service and the upstream segment was pushed into the downstream segment. However, this would not explain the tapering of
the inserted end, nor the grinding marks on the OD of the inner segment. There were no grinding marks on the ID of the outer
segment which would be more difficult to reach. And it would not be possible to make any type of friction weld in a dirty flowing
slurry environment.
On the other hand it would seem illogical for anyone to attempt such a weld, to successfully pull it into and along the steel pipe,
and to pass sizing pig inspections and pressure tests. However, the feature was present.
This was how we started putting this puzzle together, and how we approached our cause and sequence of events
determinations. It was necessary to prepare such a sequence of events that would complement the actions and observations
of, and be accepted by, the assured. This would enable us as loss adjusters to present a serious and technically defensible
presentation to the assured concerning activities and costs covered and those that would be refused. It was also necessary to
identify the as-constructed technical details that would not have been accepted by normal quality control and quality assurance
procedures and that contributed to the failure but that would not be covered..
4. CAUSE AND SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
There were many blockages in the pipeline between Flanges 143 and 158, but several could quite easily be removed by jetting
with water. These blockages would be caused by the scale build-ups initiated at geometrical anomalies in the liner ID or even
Figure 11. The Monster when pipe was cut, Note intact liner
A blockage of the pipe occurs due to scale build up nucleated, most likely, at a geometrical step in, or a partial collapse
of, the liner ID. As the most upstream blockage this has gathered the scale from the longest run of pipe and from acid
cleaning (scale spalling) after a 2004 blockage.
2.
The pressure behind the blockage induces a shear stress on the ID of the liner which eventually exceeds the shear
stress between smooth liner OD and smooth steel pipe ID. If at any location there is liquid between pipe and liner and
therefore a similar pressure behind the liner as inside the liner, liner movement will occur earlier. We know there was
slurry in the liner/pipe interface.
3.
The liner will start to slide along the pipe, generating tensile stresses (and ultimately a tensile break) at the trailing edge
of the moving section, and a compressive stress at the leading edge. When a break occurs, allowing liquid behind the
liner, movement will be accelerated.
4.
The compressive wrinkles built up in the liner at the leading edge of the moving section will ultimately fold and collapse
into the center of the pipe as the upstream moving segment tries to penetrate the static downstream segment, similar
to the overlap weld.
As this penetration occurs the moving liner will tend to an S-shape along its length. However, inward collapse,
lengthening of the S, and penetration of the upstream moving part into the downstream static part will be hindered by
the stiffening effect of the wrinkles and the compressed scales and particulate matter causing the blockage. Movement
will become severely restricted.
6.
At some point a tensile break will occur at some position in the middle section of the S - between the leading fold and
the trailing fold.
7.
When the back pressure is then applied the blockage will extricate itself from the downstream static section, and
fractured ends, prevented by the damaged downstream liner from being pushed out will instead be unfolded and pulled
out.
8.
The ears will occur where the circumferential break was at the trailing fold of the S shape, and no ears will occur
where break was at the leading (downstream) fold.
9.
The axial tears would occur preferentially along the thinner already-stressed folds of the celery-shape collapsed liner,
essentially as shown in Figure 4 of The Claw.
10. The blockage would then move upstream until the 4 m long plug of shattered scale, or parts of The Monster, met
another obstruction, most likely the upstream or downstream edges of the hole in the liner from which The Monster
originated.
All other things being equal, this scenario suggests a downstream movement about the length of the ears (<1m), and an
upstream movement of at least the length of the ears. Therefore, it would be expected that The Monster has, in fact, not moved
very far. It is most unfortunate, and a major omission in the original investigation, that the missing liner from which The Monster
originated was not located.
It should be noted that the as-found geometry of The Monster could be quite different to what it was when the blockage
occurred. In fact, the compressed wrinkled geometry could be a function primarily of the high pressure events, the initial
blockage simply being a function of a locally collapsed liner that could result from a flaw in the liner that allowed liquid behind the
liner as at the overlap weld. Had the origination of The Monster been found a much more complete analysis would have been
achieved.
The area around the overlap weld is an equally interesting area which indicates much more graphically the condition of parts of
the liner at the time of the blockage. As indicated above, the evidence is clear that the weld was made during the installation
process. Although it is difficult to envision the need for such a weld, why anyone would attempt it, and how such a weld could
be successfully made, it is even more difficult to imagine it being made by friction processes while the pipe is in service or being
tested.
5.
SUMMARY
Therefore, while a number of individual failed liner sample geometries can be explained, it was not possible to identify the
specific initial cause of the blockage and the exact sequence of failure events, given the liner samples and pipe sections
available. Clearly, the loss adjuster and appropriate experts need to be involved during the initial investigation in order to obtain
all the relevant information and samples, rather than to be called in a year later. The initial involvement of the loss adjuster
enabled the assured to construct temporary ponds for the containment of manufactured product as repairs to the pipeline were
being made. This required some unexpected costs, but costs that the loss adjuster recommended be covered so as to avoid
much larger payments that could have resulted from a business interruption claim. The plant never did shut down.
Then, having determined the cause and nature of the failure, those items related to pre-existing damages that occurred during
construction of the pipeline, such as the overlap weld, were denied. Ultimately the assured received about 75% of the claim or
about $4M for physical damage. Had a business interruption claim been necessary, the potential payout for the insurance