Persons Case Digest Compiled (Part1)

CIVIL CODE
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
1. TAADA VS. TUVERA (L-63915) 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
[MABINI],
petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive
Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity
as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the
Official Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the
people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and
validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general
applicability is a requirement of due process. Before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The
Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not
been published have no force and effect.
TAADA VS. TUVERA 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as

well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel
respondents to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24,

1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was
not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees themselves declared that
they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of
the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the
instant petition. Further, respondent contended that publication in the Official
Gazette is not a requirement when the law provides for the date of its effectivity.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general

applicability and laws which are not as to their publication;
Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general
circulation.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or
statute becomes valid and enforceable.
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers only to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous
publication.
HELD:
The unless otherwise provided clause of Article 2 of the Civil Code does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette even if the law
itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is
to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws, which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of Article 3. It would be
the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some
that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public
would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the
public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated
by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
Persons Case Digests Compilation//Cambri
validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by

the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must a also be published
if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to
inform the public of the content of the law. The publication must be made
forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
installments, the first to be paid on or before the last working day of February,
and the second to be paid on or before the last working day of August.
(Emphasis supplied); Sec. 6 (b) "The date of cancellation of the postage
stamps of envelopes containing money orders, checks, or cash shall be
considered as the date of application. . . .
Since August 31 was declared a holiday, payment could still be made on the next
day, under Sec. 31 of the Revised Adm. Code. The last working day in August
for the general public in paying fees is NOT necessarily the same as the last
working day in August for employees in the Motor Vehicles
The Court observed that newspapers of general circulation could better perform
the function of communicating, the laws to the people as such periodicals are
more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly.
3. RURAL BANK OF CALOOCAN V COURT OF APPEALS
However, since Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must
be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, the Supreme Court is not
called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
impractical.
FACTS:
2. GONZAGA V DE DAVID
Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the official
gazette only on 1951 after the act or omission charged to Que Po Lay.
G.R. No. L-14858
December 29, 1960
MARIANO S. GONZAGA, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
AUGUSTO CE DAVID, as Registrar of the Motor Vehicles Office of
Cagayan, respondent-appellant.
Facts: On February, 1957, Mariano Gonzaga, as owner, registered with the
Motor Vehicles Office a cargo truck and a passenger bus, paying the first
installment for registration fees due on said vehicles for 1957. The postal
cancellation mark on the envelope containing the remittance of Gonzaga bears
the date August 31, 1957.August 31 was the usual last day for payment of
registration fees but it was declared a special public holiday by Presidential
Proclamation No. 437. Now then under the law, the last day for said payment,
was the last working day in August (ordinarily August 31) but because of the
holiday, the last working day in August for the Motor Vehicles was on August 30.
Issue: Whether the remittance of petitioner-appellee covering the second
installment of registration fees for 1957, made by registered mail with postal
cancellation dated August 31, 1957, was within the time fixed by law.
Held: The remittance by petitioner-appellee was within the by law, as provided
in Section 8 (I), in connection with Section 6 (b) of Act 3992, as amended. The
following are the pertinent provisions of Act 3992 as amended Sec. 8 (I) ". . .
The registration fees provided in this Act for trucks may be payable in two equal
4. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs QUE PO LAY
The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US

checks and US money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the
same to the central bank as required under Circular No. 20.
Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of
violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265
sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine 0f P 1000 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular No. 20 in the Official Gazette is
needed for it to become effective and subject violators to corresponding
penalties.
HELD:
As a rule, circular and regulations of the central bank in question prescribing a
penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. This is
based in the theory that before the public is bound by its contents especially its
penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the
people to be officially and specifically informed of such contents.
If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been published as required by law
before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such circular to be
violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or
committed any offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no
jurisdiction.
The SC revised the decision appealed from and acquits the appellant.
5. ALBINO S. CO VS COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES
6. D.M. CONSUNJI VS. CA AND JUEGO
G.R. 100776 October 28, 1993
TITLE: D.M. Consunji Inc. v Court of Appeals and Maria J. Juego

CITATION: GR No. 137873, April 20, 2001 | 357 SCRA 249
Facts:
FACTS:
Petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983, in

connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat a sunken vessel, a check
drawn against the Associated Citizens Bank, postdated November 30, 1983. The
check was deposited on January 3, 1984, and was dishonored two days later,
the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: Closed Account. A criminal
complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage
company against Albino Co, hence, eventuated in Cos conviction of the crime
charged. Co appealed to Court of Appeals, in which, he sought exoneration upon
the theory that it was reversible error for the Regional Trial Court to have relied,
as basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on September 21,
1987 by this Court in Que v. People 154 SCRA 160 (1987) i.e., that a check
issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless
covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of the issuance of the
check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of
the judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a
rubber or bouncing check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered
a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the
Ministry of Justice.
Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a construction worker of

D.M. Consunji Inc. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He was
immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending
physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival (DOA) at around
2:15PM.
Issue:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals erred in convicting
Co liable of Batas Pambansa 22 prior for the prospectivity of the basis case of
Que v. People (1987), as the judicial decisions applied on the said case.
Held:
Hence, the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the
Courts decision of September 21, 1987 Que v. People (1987) that a check
issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless
covered by B.P. Blg. 22 should not be given retrospective effect to the
prejudice of the petitioner and other persons similarly situated, who relied on the
official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such check did not fall within the
scope of B.P. Blg. 22. This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which,
pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the
accused. The Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita
should override the principle of prospectivity, negativing criminal liability.
Wherefore, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional
Trial Court are reversed and set aside, and the criminal prosecution against the
accused-petitioner is dismissed, with costs de oficio.
Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo, performing their
work as carpenter at the elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance
Tower Building were on board a platform. Jose was crushed to death when the
platform fell due to removal or looseness of the pin, which was merely inserted
to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety
lock. Luckily, Jessie and Delso jumped out of safety.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and
filed report dated Nov. 25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Joses widow filed a complaint on
May 9, 1991 for damages in the RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to
receive support from DM Consunji amounting to P644,000.
DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision.
ISSUE: Whether Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart
from the death benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund.
HELD:
The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code.
Maria Juergo was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for
death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She filed the civil complaint for
damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the
Prosecutors Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioners
personnel.
Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig City to determine whether the
award decreed in its decision is more than that of the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC). Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than
that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent
pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom.
7. EMETRIO CUI vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
2 SCRA 205 May 30, 1961
Facts:
Cui was a law scholar at the Arellano University; he paid the tuition fees
but it was returned to him at the end of every semester. Before Arellano
awarded the scholarship grant, Cui was made to sign a contract covenant and
agreement saying that he waives his right to transfer to another school in

consideration of the scholarship grant and if he transfers, he shall pay the tuition
fees awarded to him while being a scholar. He transferred to another school to
finish his last term in law school. When he was about to take the Bar, his TOR at
Arellano was not issued unless he pays the amount of the tuition fees that were
returned to him when he was still their scholar. He paid under protest.
Issue:
Whether or not the provision of the contract between plaintiff and the
defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school
without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarship grants in cash, is
valid or not.
Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed
for benefits under the WCA then they will be prohibited from proceeding with a
civil case before the regular courts. On the contrary, if they sued before the civil
courts then they would also be prohibited from claiming benefits under the WCA.
The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this
deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they
may have not availed of such a remedy. The SC ruled that the dismissal of the
case in the lower court be reversed and case is remanded for further
proceedings.
However, if in case the petitioners win in the lower court, whatever
award may be granted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be
deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go strictly by the book in this
case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. (Refer to excerpt below)
Held:
The waiver signed by Cui was void as it was contrary to public policy; it
was null and void.
Scholarship grants, as pointed out by the Director of the Bureau of
Private Schools in Memorandum No. 38, are awarded in recognition of merit and
not to attract and keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda value. To
look at such grants as a business scheme designed to increase the business
potential of an educational institution is not only inconsistent with sound public
policy but also good morals. Consequently, the waiver signed by the student,
waiving his right to transfer to another school unless he refunds to the university
the equivalent of his scholarship grants, is null and void.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reverse and another
one shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date
of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and dismissing defendants
counterclaim. It is so ordered.
8. PERFERCTO FLORESCA VS PHILEX MINING CORPORATION
FACTS:
On June 28, 1967, some employees of Philex Mining Corporation died
as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the copper mine
(Tuba, Benguet) during underground operations. Allegedly, Philex was in
violation of government rules and regulations for negligently and deliberately
failing to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men
working underground. The Petitioners (Floresca et al) are the heirs of the
deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation. Petitioners moved to claim
their benefits pursuant to the Workmens Compensation Act before the
Workmens Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the regular
courts and sued Philex for additional damages. Philex invoked that they can no
longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the
WCA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time
sue.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURTS ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY

REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN
FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM
PURSUANT TO THE WORKMENS COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO
COSTS.
10. BELLIS V BELLIS

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLES BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositorsappellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Procedural Facts:
Case filed in Court of First instance of Manila, which overruled Petitioners
opposition approving the executors final account, report and administration and
project of partition. Relying on Article 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national
law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for
legitimes.
Substantive Facts:
Amos G. Bellis, a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. died testate. His will
was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila. He left the bulk
of his testate to his legitimate children resulting in the impairment of the
legitime of his other heirs (illegitimate children).
Issue: Which law shall apply in executing the deceaseds will Texas law or
Philippine law?
Held:
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
4
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and
the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escao left without the
knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and
Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of
moral damages and attorneys fees to be paid by Escao and not her parents.
Reasoning:
Article 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items:
(a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
On the part of Escaos parents:
Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of

succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the
Escaos is unfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and
caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their
reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common
occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly
established in the decision of the court below, is that they were not guilty of any
improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages
awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only.
11. TENCHAVEZ V. ESCAO

FACTS:
In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escao secretly married each other and of
course without the knowledge of Escaos parents who were of prominent social
status. A military chaplain celebrated the marriage. When Escaos parents
learned of this, they insisted a church wedding to be held but Escao withdrew
from having a recelebration because she heard that Tenchavez was having an
affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years
later, Escao went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce
and she subsequently became an American citizen and also married an
American.
In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that
Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and causing her to be
estranged from him hence hes asking for damages in the amount of
P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the legal separation being sought
for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the
Escaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case
at bar
HELD: Yes.
On the part of Tenchavez:
His marriage with Escao was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did
not result to public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even
consented to annulling the marriage earlier (because Escao filed for annulment
before she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to her nonappearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaos parents dissuaded
their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot
HUMAN RELATIONS (ARTICLES 19-36)
12. RELLOSA, ET AL. VS. PELLOSIS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 138964, August 9, 2001
A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution,

statute or decisional law, or recognized as a result of long usage, constitutive of
a legally enforceable claim of one person against another.
The defendant might verily be the owner of the land, with the right to enjoy, and
to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof, but the exercise
of these rights is not without limitations. The abuse of rights rule established in
Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person to act with justice, to give
everyone his due, and to observe honesty and good faith. When a right is
exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to
another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable.
Facts:
A lease contract was entered into where the lessee has been in possession of the
premises for more than 20 years. The lessee constructed a house on the land
leased. The lessor sold the land to another who after obtaining a title, filed a
petition for condemnation of the house. After due hearing, the Office of the
Building Official issued a resolution ordering the demolition of the house of the
lessee. She was served with a copy of the resolution on December 7, 1989 and
the following day, the new owner hired workers to commence the demolition. It
was stopped due to the intervention of police officers, but during the pendency
of the appeal, she again hired workers to demolish the house. An action for
damages was filed but it was dismissed. The CA reversed the order and made
the defendant liable for damages. On appeal, it was contended that she cannot
be made liable because the order of condemnation was eventually upheld by the
Department of Public Works where the house was considered dangerous and
could be abated to avoid danger to the public.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have acted in conformity with, and not in disregard
of, the standards set by Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Held:
The defendant is liable for damages because she abused her right. Under the
law, every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith. This provision in our law is not just a declaration of principle for it can
in itself constitute, when unduly ignored or violated, a valid source of a cause of
action or defense.
It is true that there was a condemnation order which was eventually affirmed by
the Department of Public Works, but five (5) days after the defendant received a
copy of the order which has not yet become final and executory, she caused the
precipitate demolition of the plaintiffs house. The fact that the Department
eventually affirmed the order is of no moment. The act of obtaining an order of
demolition is not condemnable but implementing it unmindful of the plaintiffs
right to contest is utterly indefensible.
13. ALBENSON ENTERPRISES

MENDIONA, Petitioners,
CORP.,
JESSE
YAP,
AND
BENJAMIN
VS THE COURT OF APPEALS AND EUGENIO S. BALTAO, Respondents

G.R. No. 88694 January 11,1993
FACTS:
Albenson Enterprises delivered Guaranteed Industries Inc. , located at 3267 V
Mapa St Mla, mild steel plates which the latter ordered. As payment Albenson
was given a Pacific Banking Corporation Check amounting to P2, 575.00 drawn
against the account of E.L. Woodworks. When the check bounced Albenson
asked SEC, Ministry of Trade and Industry, and PCB whom to run after and came
across a certain Eugenion S. Baltao, president of Guaranteed. They wrote to
him asking to clear the check he then denies ever transacting with Albenson and
further saying that Guaranteed is already a defunct entity since 1975 therefore
could not have transacted with petitioner. However he has failed to mention that
he has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III which also runs a business in the
same building where Guaranteed used to be. Albenson filed a criminal complaint
to the Fiscal of Rizal against private respondent on the violation of B.P. 22. The
Fiscal then asked for Baltao to respond to the charges. With the respondent
failing to do so the fiscal considered him to have waived his right. When the
respondent claimed to not have been informed of the said order of the fiscal he
filed a motion for reinvestigation to a new Fiscal in the Province of Rizal where
he further denied dealings with Albenson and asked for damages against
petitioners for damages (against Art. 19, 20, 21 of the Civil Code). The lower
court ruled in favor of the respondent dismissing the first complaint of Albenson
for lack of merit and asking them to pay Baltao for damages. After being
elevated to the Court of Appeals the decision of the lower court was modified
where the costs to be paid by Albenson was lessened. Albenson not satisfied
with the decision brought it further to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: What are needed in order for a claim of unjust persecution and abuse
of right invoking Art. 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code to merit claims for
exemplary and actual damages.
HELD: The elements of abuse of right under Art. 19 are 1) There is a legal right
or duty 2) which is exercised in bad faith 3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another. Art. 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of
law which do not especially provide for their own sanction. Thus, anyone who,
whether willfully or negligently in the exercise of his legal right or duty causes
damage to another shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Art.
21 has the following elements 1) There is an act which is legal 2) but which is
contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy 3) and is done
with the intent to injure. Thus under any of these 3 provisions of law an act
which causes injury to another may be made basis for an award of damages.
What promoted the petitioners to file a the case for the violation of BP22 against
the private respondent was their failure to collect the payment due on a bounced
check which they honestly believed was issued by the respondent. If indeed
Baltao wanted to clear himself from the baseless accusations made against him
he should have made mention to Albenson that he had namesakes running a
business in the same building. Baltao however did nothing to clarify the case of a
mistaken identity. Instead he waited in ambush and thereafter pounced on the
hapless petitioners at a time he thought was propitious by filing an action for
damages. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or of bad faith
exemplary and actual damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of
an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the
payment of damages for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on
the right to litigate. To constitute malicious prosecution there must be proof that
the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing his
charges were false and groundless. In order for such a case under the grounds
of unjust prosecution to prosper three elements must be present 1) the fact of
the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the
prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal, 2) that
in bringing the action the prosecutor acted without probable cause3) the
prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice. Albenson filed a case on
the hopes of being able to recover the amount duly his in the good faith of
believing that the private respondent was the one that owes the money (later on
found out that it was his son Eugenio Baltao III, president of E.L. Woddworks,
who issued the check and did the transaction). It is well-settled that one cannot
be he held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted
with probable cause. Proof and motive that the institution of the action was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person must be clearly and
preponderantly established to entitle the victims to damages. There is no proof
that the petitioners acted maliciously or in bad faith in filing the case against
private respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith
committed by the petitioners, they cannot be held liable for damages both actual
and exemplary.
FACTS:
VERSION 1 of the Facts (Reyes)
Respondent Reyes assured that, Dr. Filart approached him in the lobby of the
hotel and invited him in the party of the hotels manager in the penthouse to
which he attended. But when the buffet dinner was ready, as Reyes lined up for
the food, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, petitioner Ruby Lim
(executive secretary of the hotel) stopped him and in a loud voice, enough to be
heard and noticed by the other guest told him to leave the party causing
humiliation on the part of Reyes. Reyes also alleged that he tried to explain that
he was invited by Dr. Filart, but Ruby Lim ignored his explanation. Not long after
such incident, policeman approached him and asked him to step outside the
hotel. He then claims for damages in virtue of the Human Relations provisions of
the Civil Code.
VERSION 2 (Ruby Lim)
Ruby Lim claimed that she already noticed the uninvited presence of
Reyes in the party because as the Executive Secretary she had the full
knowledge of the guest list. Mindful of hotels manager request to keep the party
intimate, she approached the captain waiter to inquire as to the uninvited
presence of Reyes. The captain waiter said that he saw Reyes with the group of
Dr. Filart but when she asked the sister of Dr. Filart, the latter said Reyes was
not invited. Lim then asked the sister and captain Batung to asked Reyes to
leave but Reyes still lingered. Ruby Lim then decided to approach Reyes, but he
waited until Reyes went to a corner and started to eat different from Reyes
version that he was stopped while in queue. She then approached Reyes and
asked to leave the party after he finished eating. She turned around trusting
that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he
began screaming and making a big scene and even threatened to dump food on
her.
VERSION 3 (Dr. Filart)
Dr Filart said she did not Reyes to the party. According to her Reyes volunteered
to carry the basket of fruits for the celebrant as he was also going to take the
elevator not to the penthouse (party venue) but to Altitute 49. When they
reached the penthouse she then asked Reyes to go down as he was not properly
dressed and not invited. She thought that Reyes left but was surprised when she
saw the commotion involving Reyes. She ignored it because she didnt want to
be embarrassed by the alleged fact that she invited Reyes.
ISSUE:
14. NIKKO HOTEL MANILA V REYES

G.R. NO. 154259 February 28, 2005
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners
vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a AMAY BISAYA, respondent
WHETHER or NOT Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a
Amay Bisaya, to leave the party where the celebrant did not invite him thereby
becoming liable under Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeal and
favored the ruling of the trial court, stating that herein petitioner Ruby Lim and
Nikko Hotel are not liable for damages in accordance to the Article 19 and
21 of the Civil Code.
Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly
and rudely ordered him to leave, could not offer any satisfactory explanation
why Ruby Lim would do that and risking the intimate affair which she prepared
for the manager of the hotel. Reyes, unwittingly sealed his fate in the crossexamination when he said, they were very close when Ruby Lim shouted
him, close as to nearly kiss each other. Considering such closeness of
Ruby Lim to Reyes it was evidently shown that the request for him to
leave was meant to be heard by him only and there could have need no
intention on the part of Lim to cause embarrassment and humiliation.
(failure to comply with the 3rd element; there should be in ill intent to injure
another)
According to Art. 19, 20 and 21. (PLEASE REFER ACCORDINGLY)
The object of these articles are clear as to set a standards in the
exercise of ones right and performance of ones duties and when a right is
exercised in a manner contrary to the norms prescribed by Art. 19 and such act
resulted in damage to another, a legal wrong thereby committed and the
wrongdoer must be responsible. To consider it a legally wrong act the following
elements must be present (1) there must be a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith (3) with the intention to injure another (Art. 21)
The case at hand did not qualify to be a legally wrongful act
because the third element which is the intention to injure another was not
established by the petitioner herein REYES. These two persons didnt know each
other and Reyes did not prove that Ruby Lim was driven by animosity against
him. Without proof and ill-motive on the part of Ruby Lim cannot amount to
abusive conduct.
Therefore, herein petitioner Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden
are not liable for any damages.
15. SPS. QUISUMBING V. MERALCO

GR No 142943 April 3, 2002
FACTS:
Spouses Quisumbing are owners of a house and lot located at No. 94
Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. They alleged to be business entrepreneurs engaged in the
export of furnitures under the business name 'Loran Industries' and recipient of the 1993 Agora
Award and 1994 Golden Shell Award. Mrs. Quisumbing is a member of the Innerwheel Club
while Mr. Quisumbing is a member of the Rotary Club, Chairman of Cebu Chamber of
Commerce, and Director of Chamber of Furniture.On March 3, 1995, MERALCOs inspectors
headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned toconduct a routine-on-the-spot inspection of all
single phase meters at Greenmeadows Avenue it is a standard operating procedure of asking
permission from the spouses, through their secretary which was granted. The secretary
witnessed the inspection. After the inspection, MERALCO's inspectors discovered that the terminal
seal of the meter was missing; the meter cover seal was deformed; the meter dials of the meter
were out of alignment and there were scratches on the meter base plate. Lorna Quisumbing,
who was outraged of the result of the inspection and denied liability as to the tampering of the
meter. The spouses were advised by MERALCO's inspectors that they had to detach the meter
and bring it to their laboratory for verification/confirmation of their findings. In the event the
meter turned out to be tampered, MERALCO had to temporarily disconnect the electric services
of the spouses unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential billing,
their electric supply would be disconnected. Orlina informed the spouses that they were just
following their standard operating procedure. Due to the disconnection of the Quisimbings electric
services, they had to cancel an exhibit of pieces of furniture that is held in their residence once a
year for all employees and buyers. Lorna Quisimbing as as a witness, said they lost P50,000 due
to the cancellation of the catering services for the exhibit. An action for damages by the spouses
alleging that MERALCO acted with reckless, capricious, malicious and malevolent manner in
disconnecting their power supply which was done without due process, and without due regard
for their rights, feelings, peace of mind, social and business reputation
ISSUES
I.
Whether or not Meralco observed the requisites of law
when it disconnected the electrical supply of the
Quisumbings.
II.
Whether or not such disconnection entitled petitioners to
damages.
III.
Whether or not petitioners are liable for the billing differential computed by
respondent
HELD
I.
No. Meralco failed to observe the requisites of law when it disconnected the
electrical supply of the Quisumbings. Section 4 of RA 7832, otherwise known as
the Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of
1994 provides:
(a) The presence of any of the following circumstances shall
constitute prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, as defined in
this Act, by the person benefitted thereby, and shall be the basis for:
(1) the immediate disconnection by the electric utility to such person
after due notice.
xxx
(viii) x x x Provided, however, That the discovery of any of the
foregoing
circumstances,
in
order
to
constitute
prima
facie evidence, must be personally witnessed and attested to by an
officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB)."
At the time the alleged meter tampering was discovered, only the
Meralco inspection team and Quisumbings' secretary were present. Plainly, there
was no officer of the law or ERB representative at that time. Because of the
absence of government representatives, the prima facie authority to disconnect,
granted to Meralco by RA 7832, cannot apply.
II.
amount.
Yes. Petitioners are entitled to moral damages, but in a reduced
Article 2219 of the Civil Code lists the instances when moral damages
may be recovered. One such case34 is when the rights of individuals, including
the right against deprivation of property without due process of law, are
violated.35
Respondent had no legal right to immediately disconnect petitioners'
electrical supply without observing the requisites of law which, in turn, are akin
to due process. Had respondent been more circumspect and prudent, petitioners
could have been given the opportunity to controvert the initial finding of alleged
meter tampering. Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled in Meralco v. CA40 that
respondent is required to give notice of disconnection to an alleged delinquent
customer.
The award of exemplary damages, the award of attorney's fees is
likewise granted.50 It is readily apparent that petitioners needed the services of a
lawyer to argue their cause, even to the extent of elevating the matter to this
Court;51 thus, an award of P50,000 is considered sufficient.
III.
Yes. Quisumbings should still pay MERALCOs for the billing differential.
MERALCO.
Not only did MERALCO show how the meter examination had been
conducted by its experts, but it also established the amount of P193,332.96 that
the Quisumbings owed respondent.
16. UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST (PLAINTIFF) VS. ROMEO A. JADER

(RESPONDENT)
FACTS:
Romeo A. Jader was enrolled at University of the East College of Law from 1984
up to 1988. In the first semester of his last academic year (S.Y 1987-1988) in
the University, he failed to take his final examination for the subject Practice
Court I. As a consequence, Professor Carlos Ortega, his professor for the said
subject, gave him an incomplete grade. On his second semester, Mr. Jader filed
an application for the removal of the incomplete grade he received in Practice
Court I. His application was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after he paid
the required fee. Subsequent to the approval of the Dean, Mr. Jader was given
the chance to take the examination in Practice Court I. Meanwhile, the Dean
together with the Faculty Members of the College of Law met to deliberate who
among the senior students should be allowed to graduate. Mr. Jader was
included in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the Degree of
Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) for the 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies
although below the list of candidates annotation supply stating that [t]his is a
tentative list. Degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily
complete requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and as approved of
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Mr. Jader got the invitation
for the Commencement Exercise and his name appeared as one of the
candidates. He attended the investiture ceremonies and Dean Celedonio handed
him a rolled white sheet symbolical of the Law diploma. Later that day, Mr. Jader
tendered a blow out which was attended by his family, neighbors, friends and
relatives. Thereafter, he prepared himself for the 1988 bar examination and took
a leave of absence from his job. He enrolled himself in a pre-bar review class in
Far Eastern University only later to discover that there was a deficiency with his
academic standing in the previous school. As a result, Mr. Jader was not able to
take the bar examination. It is for this reason that he sued the plaintiff for
damages. He prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages, unrealized
income, attorneys fees and costs of suit.
ISSUE:
Whether University of the East should be held liable for misleading Romeo Jader
into believing that the latter satisfied all the requirements for graduation when it
is not the case.
HELD:
Yes. The University of the East is not justified with its counter claim that they
should be freed from any liability alleged by Romeo Jader and hence liable to pay
for the damages. The Court ruled that considering the contract entered into by
the institution and the student the moment the latter is enrolled in the
University, it is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and
furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to whether
he or she had already complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a
degree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal
examination, particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing
for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good
faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the
aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic
status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious
indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may
be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. A person
should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that
is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with
negligence or abuse.
The Court held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to
respondent for the latters actual damages except those of moral damages.
17.
UNITED
AIRLINES,
INC
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
ANICETO
FONTANILLA
Facts: Dated March 1, 1989, respondents Fontanilla purchased three Visit the
USA tickets for himself, his wife and minor son through Philippine Travel Bureau
in Manila. All of which had been confirmed by United Airlines. Mr. Fontanilla had
the previously bought tickets rewritten at the office in Washington Dulles Airport.
The boarding passes issued to them with Flight No. 1108 set to leave LA to San
Francisco contained words, CHECK-IN REQUIRED. There are two versions of
the testimonies presented by both the respondents and defendants. According to
the respondents, they were not allowed to board the plane for they allegedly had
no assigned seat numbers and the plane was already overbooked. In addition,
the customer representative Ms. Linda Allen also insulted and humiliated the
respondents. The Fontanillas waited for their trip to be rebooked to the next
available flight. According to United Airlines, the respondents did not directly go
to the check-in counter to secure their seat number; instead they joined the
queue boarding the aircraft. Allen denied the accusation that she insulted the
respondents. RTC Makati dismissed the complaint of the respondents for
damages. Court of Appeals however reversed the decision and ruled in favor of
the respondents. In addition moral, exemplary damages and attorneys fee had
been rewarded to the respondents.
Issue: whether or not United Airlines would be held liable for the civil damages
in reason of breach of contract in bad faith
Ruling: United Airlines would not be held liable for the civil damages in reason of
lack of preponderance of evidence from the plaintiffs in proving that the
defendants breach of contract was due to bad faith (not violated Article 19).
Although the evidence presented by the plaintiff is stronger than the defendants,
judgment cannot be ruled in favor of them since their evidence is insufficient to
sustain cause of action. The plaintiffs failure to check-in as expressly required in
their passes was the very reason for their being denied in boarding. Given that it
was not proven that the airlines exceeded the 10% overbooking capacity, this
was not considered as deliberate intent, therefore was not tantamount to bad
faith.
18. GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH V COURT OF APPEALS
219 SCRA 115
Facts:
This is an appeal by certiorari. On October 27, 1987, without the assistance of
counsel, private respondent filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for
damages against petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get
married. She alleges in said complaint that she is 20 years old, single, Filipino
and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her
country; other petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at
Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student, before
August 20, 1987 the latter courted and proposed to marry her, she accepted his
love on the condition that they get married; they therefore agreed to get
married. The petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano apartments.
She was a virgin at that time; after a week before the filing of complaint,
petitioners attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated and
threatened to kill her; as a result of the complaint. Petitioner repudiated the
marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that the
petitioner is already married to someone in Bacolod City. Private respondent
then prayed for judgment ordering petitioner to pay her damages. On the other
hand, petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be
married with the private respondent and denied all allegations against him. After
trial on the merits, the lower court ordered petitioner to pay the private
respondent damages
Issue:
Is a breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong? Is Article 21 of the Civil
Code applicable in the case?
Held:
The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the
provisions that would have made it so.
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is
designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books.
Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a
sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and
that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept his and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could
justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise
to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that
such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.
19. GLOBE MACKAY RADIO CORPORATION VS COURT OF
APPEALS/TOBIAS
FACTS : Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay
Cable and Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a
purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering
operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious
purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several
thousands of pesos.
He was told as the number one suspect and ordered him to take a one
10
week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his
table drawers open, and to leave the office keys. Tobias returned to
work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry went up to him and
called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take
a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his
handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police
investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies. The results
had him not guilty.
Not satisfied, company hired a private investigator that convicted him
of the offense. Another police report yielded that Tobias is not guilty of
the alleged offense. Notwithstanding the reports, petitioner still filed a
suit against him.
Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on
alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners.
Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during the hearings.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge
Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent by
ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as
actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral
damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages,
thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs.
ISSUE: Is Globe Mackay liable for damages to private respondent.?
HELD: Yes, because they exercised abuse of right and malicous
prosecution of the respondent. Filing 6 criminal cases have been found
to be based on acting in bad faith noting the fact that it was also filed
during the pendency of illegal dismissal appeal.
They were held for violation of Article 19, 20, and 21 of Civil Code
having been guilty of baseless imputation of guilt and harassment
during investigations; oral defamation and the letter sent to RETELCO,
which resulted to possible loss of employment and malicious criminal
complaints. Court held that the damage awarded are of reasonable
circumstances,
Cigarette Factory in Gasan Marinduque who was treated like a son by Cecilio Pe,
one of the petitioners. Cecilio introduced Alfonso to his children and was given
access to visit their house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, 24 year old single,
daughter of Cecilio. The defendant frequented the house of Lolita sometime in
1952 on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary.
Eventually they fell in love with each other.
Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove Alfonso
deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolitas affection. The case on moral
damages was dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolitas family on the ground of
moral, good custom and public policy due to their illicit affair.
HELD:
Alfonso committed an injury to Lolitas family in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the civil code. The
defendant took advantage of the trust of Cecilio and even used the praying of
rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita. The wrong caused by Alfonso is
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby
sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00
as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.
21. WASSMER V VELEZ

12 SCRA 648
FACTS: Francisco Velez and Beatriz, following their promise to love, decided to
get married. Two days before their marriage Francisco wrote Beatriz telling her
that their marriage had to be postponed as his mother opposes it. A day before
his marriage he sent a telegram informing her nothing changed rest assured
returning soon. Francisco was never heard from again. Beatriz sued for
damages for breach of promise to marry.
ISSUE: Is breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?
HELD: The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with
impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that any
person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damages.
20. PE VS PE
CITATION: 5 SCRA 200
FACTS:
Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar and
This is not a case of mere breach to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through
all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is
about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in
11
damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code.

When a breach to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral
damages may be awarded under Article 2219(10) of the said Code. Exemplary
damages may also be awarded under Article 2232 of said Code where it is
proven that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive
manner.
22. HERMOSISIMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
109 PHIL. 629
FACTS: The complainant Soledad Cagigas is thirty-six years old, a former high
school teacher and a life insurance agent. The petitioner Francisco Hermosisima
is ten years younger than complainant, and an apprentice pilot. Intimacy
developed between them and thus sometime 1953 after coming from the
movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin. In February 1954, the
woman advised the man that she is pregnant whereupon the man promised to
marry her. Their daughter Chris Hermosisima was born June 1954 in a private
clinic. However, subsequently the man married one Romanita Perez. Hence,
Soledad filed a complaint against Francisco for acknowledgement of her child as
a natural child of the petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral
damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. The CFI declared the child a
natural daughter of the defendant, ordered Francisco to support the child by
giving a monthly alimony, awarded actual damages and moral damages.
On appeal of the petitioner, the CA affirmed the assailed decision however
increased the amount for actual and moral damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award for moral damages is valid.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that no moral damages can be had in the
instant case because it was the woman who virtually seduced the man by
surrendering herself to him because she a girl ten years older was overwhelmed
by her love for him, she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
23. CONSTANTINO V MENDEZ

209 SCRA 18
Facts: Amelita Constantino and Ivan Mendez, both of legal age, met for the
first time at a restaurant where the former worked as waitress. The day
following their first meeting, Mendez succeeded on having sexual intercourse
with Constantino through a promise of marriage. However, after sexual congress
Mendez immediately admitted that he is a married man. Despite his admission,
their sexual encounters were repeated on the succeeding months (Sept and Nov
1974), as a result of which Constantino got pregnant. As relief, Constantino
prayed for recognition of the illegitimate child, the payment of actual, moral and
exemplary damages, and atty.s fees plus other costs. In the court proceedings
and presentation of evidence, Constantino admits her attraction to Mendez
(through a letter addressed to Mrs.Mendez) .
Issue: Whether or not sexual intercourse is a basis for recovery of damages

and civil liability under article 19 and 21 of the civil code.
Held: Plaintiffs claim for damages, which is based on article 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code on the theory that through Ivans proposal of marriage she
surrendered her womanhood, court promulgates that mere sexual intercourse is
not by itself a recovery for damages. Damages could only be awarded if sexual
intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. The admission of
attraction showed that attraction is the reason that she surrendered her
virginity. Moreover, had she been induced or deceived, she could have
immediately severed her relationship with Mendez. Their repeated sexual
encounters showed that passion and attraction was the moving force that made
her submit to Mendez.
24. TITLE: ST. LOUIS REALTY CORP. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Citation: 133 SCRA 179
Facts:
This case is about the recovery of damages for a wrongful advertisement in the
Sunday Times where St. Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented a house.
St. Louis Realty Corporation published an ad on December 15, 1968 and was
republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured was
the house of Dr. Aramils and not Mr. Arcadios house with whom the company
asked permission to be published. After Dr. Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote
a letter to St. Louis Realty Corp. demanding an explanation. No rectification or
apology was published despite that it was received by Mr. Ernesto Magtoto, the
officer in charge of the advertisement. This prompted Dr. Aramils counsel to
demand actual, moral, and exemplary damages.
Moreover, there was a
violation of Dr. Aramils right to privacy. On March 18, 1969, St. Louis Realty
Corp. published an ad and this time was with Mr. Arcadios real house but
nothing on the explanation or apology about the error. Dr. Aramil filed a
complaint for damages on March 29, 1969. During the April 15, 1969 noticed of
rectification and apology was published issue of Manila Times which had been
late in action.
Issue: Whether St. Louis Realty Corporation is liable for damages to Dr. Aramil.
Held:
St, Louis Realty Corporation was grossly negligent in mixing up Dr. Aramil and
Mr. Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication. Furthermore, it never
made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up.
The trial court awarded Dr. Aramil Php 8,000 as actual damages, Php 20,000 as
moral damages and Php 2,000 as attorneys fees. When St. Louis Realty
committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code
because the questioned advertisements featured a beautiful house which did not
12
belong to Mr. Arcadio but to Dr. Aramil was who really annoyed by that
contretemps.
Wherefore, the judgement of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Cost against the
petitioner.
25. ASILO V PEOPLE
FACTS: The respondent inherited a a lot and a store which was leased
for her deceased mother by the municipality for enjoyment for 20
years. One day, the public market beside the their lot was burned.
Following this, the sandigan bayan ordered that her lot be demolished
in lieu of the new public market that is going to be built on the lot of
the burned old market. She contended that the contract is legally
binding for 20 years and she is willing to vacate if and only if the same
space would be given to her in the new public market which will take
over her space. Another letter was sent to her again claiming that the
mayor has the power to demolish whatever structure that impedes the
construction of the new public market. She retorted in a letter alleging
that there is no legal right to demolish the store in the absence of a
court order and that the Resolutions did not sanction the demolition of
her store but only the filing of an appropriate unlawful detainer case
against her. She further replied that if the demolition will take place,
appropriate administrative, criminal and civil actions will be filed against
Mayor Comendador, Asilo and all persons who will take part in the
demolition.
ISSUE: Is Asilo and the municipal mayor liable for damages?
HELD: YES, A violation of Article 32 (6)
the crime herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and
taking advantage of their official functions, conspiring and
confederating with each other, and with evident bad faith, manifest
partiality or through gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, criminally cause the demolition of a public market
stall leased by the municipal government in favor of one Visitacion
Coronado-Bombasi without legal or justifiable ground,
the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements
except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the
judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to
remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.
The above-stated rule is clear and needs no interpretation. If demolition
is necessary, there must be a hearing on the motion filed and with due
notices to the parties for the issuance of a special order of demolition.53
This special need for a court order even if an ejectment case has
successfully been litigated, underscores the independent basis for civil
liability, in this case, where no case was even filed by the municipality.
26. SPOUSES YU VS PCIB
CITATION: GR No. 147902, March 17, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners Vicente Yu and Demetria Lee-Yu mortgaged their title, interest, and
participation over several parcels of land located in Dagupan City and Quezon
City, in favor of the Philippine Commercial International Bank, respondent and
highest bidder, as security for the payment of a loan.
As petitioners failed to pay the loan and the interest and penalties due thereon,
respondent filed petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage on
the Dagupan City properties on July 21, 1998. City Sheriff issued notice of
extra-judicial sale on August 3, 1998 scheduling the auction sale on September
10, 1998.
Certificate of Sale was issued on September 14, 1998 in favor of respondent, the
highest bidder. The sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan
City on October 1, 1998. After two months before the expiration of the
redemption period, respondent filed an ex-parte petition for writ of possession
before RTC of Dagupan. Petitioners complaint on annulment of certificate of sale
and motion to dismiss and to strike out testimony of Rodante Manuel was denied
by said RTC. Motion for reconsideration was then filed on February 14, 2000
arguing that the complaint on annulment of certificate of sale is a prejudicial
issue to the filed ex-parte petition for writ of possession, the resolution of which
is determinative of propriety of the issuance of a Writ of Possession.
ISSUE: Whether prejudicial question exist in a civil case for annulment of a
certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of
a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance
of a writ of possession in a special proceeding since the two cases are both civil
in nature which can proceed separately and take their own direction
independently of each other.
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into play in a situation where a
civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former
an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed because issue raised in civil action would be determinative de jure of the
guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.
27. DONATO vs. LUNA
13
GR No. 53642, April 15, 1988

FACTS. An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was filed on
January 23, 1979 with the lower court in Manila. This was based on the
complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan. Before the petitioners arraignment
on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner
contracted on September 26, 1978. The civil case was based on the ground that
Paz consented to entering into the marriage, which was Donatos second.
However, since she had no previous knowledge that Donato was already married
to a certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978. Donato defensed that his
second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license
and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by
private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the
solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint
affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978 for which reason, the
requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil
Code. Donato continued to live with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left
their home upon learning that Donato already previously married.
ISSUE: Whether a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court be
suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the
juvenile and domestic relations court on the ground that latter constitutes a
prejudicial question.
HELD: NO. Petitioner Leonilo Donato cant apply rule on prejudicial question
since a case for annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial
question to the bigamy case against the accused if it was proved that petitioners
consent to such marriage and was obtained by means of duress violence and
intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and
cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
Accordingly, there is no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial
issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby dismissed for
lack of merit.
CIVIL PERSONALITY (ART 37-51)
28. QUIMIGUING VS ICAO

FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were
neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the
fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff
several times under force and intimidation and without her consent. As a result,
Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant and as a
consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120
per month, damages and attorneys fees. The complaint was dismissed by the
lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of action.
Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she
gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that no amendment was allowable
since the original complaint averred no cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by
law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as
explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted by those persons who
will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in Article 742.
Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an
obligation of parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to
children as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced
a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of
Carmens rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage
caused.
29. GELUZ VS CA
FACTS:
Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz,
the petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became
pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally married. As
14
advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she decided to have it
aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 since
she found it inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC. After two years,
on February 21, 1955, she again became pregnant and was accompanied by her
sister Purificacion and the latters daughter Lucida at Geluz clinic at Carriedo and
P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan
campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesnt have any idea
nor given his consent on the abortion.
Held:
The SC upheld the decision of the trail court in refusing to give damages to
Antonia for breach of promise to marry. The action for breach of promise to
marry has no standing in civil law, apart from the right to recover money or
property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.
As for the recognition of the child, the acknowledgment of paternity is satisfied
by the production of more than 1 document of indubitable authenticity.
ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion,

could recover damages from the physician who caused the same.
HELD:
31. CONTINENTAL STEEL CORP V MONTANO
The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the
death of a person does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed
with personality which trial court and Court of Appeals predicated.
Facts:
Both trial court and CA wasnt able to find any basis for an award of moral
damages evidently because Oscars indifference to the previous abortions of Nita
clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental
affections. Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he
turned his wifes indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for
damages of which not only he but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries.
It shows that hes after obtaining a large money payment since he sued Geluz
for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorneys fees that serves as indemnity claim,
which under the circumstances was clearly exaggerated.
30. DE JESUS V SYQUIA

58 Phil 866
Facts:
This is an action by Antonia Loanco de Jesus, as mother of two infants, for the
purpose of recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia damages arising from
(1) breach of promise to marry, (2) to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael
as his natural child and pay maintenance for him. Cesar met Antonia at the
barbershop where she works as a cashier. Soon, she became pregnant. Cesar
was a constant visitor at her home, and wrote a letter to the priest saying that if
the child was a boy, it will be christened in his name. On his trip to China and
Japan, he was writing letters to Antonia cautioning her to keep in good condition
so that junior will be strong. When she gave birth, Syquia took her and the
child to live in a house where they lived together for 1 year as a family, with
expenses being shouldered by Syquia. She became pregnant again, but soon
Syquia left her to marry another woman.
Issue:
WON (1) there would be damages for the breach to marry. (2) WON Syquia is
compelled to recognize Ismael loanco as his natural child
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing

Corporation (Continental Steel) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement
Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The claim was based on the death of
Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife had a premature delivery while she
was in the 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during labor due to
fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency. Petitioner immediately
granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for
bereavement leave and other death benefits.
It was maintained by Hortillano, through the Labor Union, that the provisions of
the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born
alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent
death could be covered by the CBA death benefits.
Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the
death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there
are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2)
status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillanos case.
ISSUE: Whether or not a fetus can be considered as a dependent
HELD: Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child
could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending
upon its mother, Hortillanos wife, for sustenance. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or
must have acquired civil personality. Without such qualification, then child shall
be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the
mothers womb.
32. LIMJUCO VS PEDRO FRAGANTE
CITATION: 45 OG No. 9, p.397
FACTS:
15
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate
of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His
intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The
Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate
Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or
Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction,
to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of
certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial
judicial personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality
because under the Civil Code, estate of a dead person could be considered as
artificial juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his
properties. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration
includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived
after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending application
for public convenience before the Public Service Commission.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said
case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the
personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended,
within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony
with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.
ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be
annulled on the ground of lack in juridical capacity.
HELD:
Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just learned that Oria was
already dead prior case T-662 was filed. The Dumalaos agreed in their
stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics was unaware of Orias death and that
they acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.
However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against him
is a patent nullity. Lower courts judgment against Oria in T-662 is void for lack
of jurisdiction over his person as far as Oria was concerned. He had no more
civil personality and his juridical capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of
legal relations was lost through death.
The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul the judgment
against Oria does not follow that they are entitiled to claim attorneys fees
against the corporation.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment
in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction.
The execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void.
33. DUMLAO V QUALITY PLASTICS

FACTS:
Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, 1962 ordering
defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay
solidarity Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest from
November 1958 before its decision became final or else Quality Plastics is hereby
authorized to foreclose the bond. Defendants failed to pay the amount before
the limit given. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold
by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has given as
security under the bond.
Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960. Quality
Plastics was not aware on Orias death. The summons and copies of complaint
was personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the
latter acknowledged and signed in his own behalf and his co-defendants.
Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all
testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc
on March 1, 1963 for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the
execution against his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in his capacity as
administrator of Orias testate estate.
16
The value given by the Constitution to this inviolable social institution is

reflected on the provision of the Labor Code.
FAMILY CODE PROVISIONS
Article 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful

for an employer to require as a condition of employment or
continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not
get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon
getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned
or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or
otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of
her marriage.
ARTICLE 1
34. PT&T VS NLRC
G.R. No. 118978 May 23, 1997
Facts:
Hence, the Court dismissed the petition of PT&T.
Petitioner PT&T hired private respondent Grace de Guzman as a reliever

from November 21, 1889 until April 21, 1991 due to a certain employee who was
on maternity leave. Subsequently, she was hired twice (first, June 10, 21, 1991July 1-1991; second: July 19, 1991-August 8, 1991) also as a reliever for a
different employee who went on leave.
On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was once more asked to join the
company as a probationary employee for 150 days. In the job application form,
she indicated that she was single even though she had married a few months
before. She had also made the same representation in the previous reliever
contracts. When the company learned this information, they sent de Guzman a
memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy, and reminding her of the
companys policy not to accept married women for employment.
She explained the she was not aware of the companys policy, and she
had not deliberately hidden her true civil status. Unsatisfied with de Guzmans
explanation, petitioner dismissed her. Private respondent filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living
allowances, before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission in Baguio City. The labor arbiter decided that private
respondent was illegally dismissed. On appeal, respondent NLRC affirmed the
decision.
Hence, petitioner filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court,
asserting that de Guzman was not illegally dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not Grace was illegally dismissed.
Held:
Yes. Marriage as a special contract cannot be restricted by
discriminatory policies of private individuals or corporations. The Supreme Court
stated that a companys policy which disqualifies women from work by reason of
her marriage runs afoul the constitutional provision on equal protection and the
fundamental policy of the State on marriage. The danger of such policy against
marriage is it strikes at the very essence, ideals, and purpose of marriage as an
inviolable social institution, and ultimately of the family as the foundation of the
nation.
35. EMILIO TUASON V. CA

FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals in denying Emilio Tuasons appeal from an order
of the Regional Trial Court.
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria L. Tuason filed with the RTC of Makati
a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner
Emilio Tuason. In her complaint Maria alleged that she and Emilio were married
on June 3, 1972. At the time of the marriage Emilio Tuason was already
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligation
which became manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights between them.
Emilio was alleged to be a drug user, womanizer, and a spendthrift.
Emilio denied the imputations against him. Because of the extreme animosities
between them, he left the home for a cooling off period. He asked the court to
return to his conjugal home and continue his administration of the conjugal
partnership.
During the course of the trial, Maria Tuason presented witnesses, documentary
evidence consisting of newspaper articles of her husband's relationship with
other women, his apprehension by the authorities for illegal possession of drugs;
and copies of a prior a church annulment decree. Emilio Tuason, the petitioner
meanwhile didnt appear in court to answer the allegations against him because
of medical and rehabilitation reasons.
Issues:
WON Marias claim that Emilio was already psychologically incapacitated at the
time of the marriage and becomes manifest only after their marriage is a valid
ground for the nullity of their marriage.
Held:
Yes. Emilio Tuason failed to present witnesses or evidences that would prove his
innocence that led to the courts decision to declare their marriage void ab initio
17
based on the evidences presented by Maria Tuason. The finding of the trial court
as to the existence or non-existence of petitioner's psychological incapacity at
the time of the marriage is final and binding on this court Petitioner has not
sufficiently shown that the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the
testimonies of private respondent's witnesses vis-a-vis petitioner's defenses are
clearly and manifestly erroneous.
36. ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant vs. JOSE CAMPOS

RUEDA, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda, defendant, were
legally married in the city of Manila. They established their residence 115 Calle
San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month. However, the
plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The allegations of the complaint
were that the defendant, one month after they had contracted marriage,
demanded plaintiff to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs
in which the latter reject the said demands. With these refusals, the defendant
got irritated and provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to
induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of
maltreating her, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take
refuge in the home of her parents. The plaintiff appeals for a complaint against
her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. However, the
defendant objects that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of
action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal domicile
HELD:
Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the
rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the
parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights,
duties and obligations. When the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering
its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible
good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the
solemnities established in so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the
consent of the parties. Upon the termination of the marriage ceremony, a
conjugal partnership is formed between the parties. Marriage is something more
than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of
which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which
defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations. Marriage is an
institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply
interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any
shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make.
The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill
this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his
own home at his option. However, the option given by law is not absolute. The
law will not permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support
his wife if the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd
designs and physical assaults of the defendant, the plaintiff may claim support
from the defendant for separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal
home.
Decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which
marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a
stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such
separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals
may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage
contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
37. BALOGBOG VS. CA
Facts:
Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basillio
Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal who died respectively. Also, they older brother
Gavino died predeceasing their parents. Private respondent Ramonito and
Generoso claims that they were the legtimate children of Gavino by Catalina
Ubas and as such, they should be entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the
estate of their grandparents. Petitioners denied such allegations. As such private
respondent presented Priscilo Y. Trazo claimed that he knew that Gavino and
Catalina to be husband and wife and Ramonito to be their first child. The second
witness presented Matias Pogoy, who testified that private respondents are the
children of Gavino and Catalino. Catalina Ubas testified which she was handed a
receipt presumably the marriage certificate, but it was burned during the war,
as such, Ubas begot three children one of which died, also she stated that after
the death of Gavino, she lived in common law relation with a man for a year
they separated. Private respondents produced a certificate from the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar tha the Register of Marriages did not have the record of
marriage, as such, it was presumed that the record was lost or destroyed during
the war.
Petitioner Leoncia claims that Gavino died single, which she denied that
her brother had any legitimate children. Also, Juan Maranga assistant municipal
treasurer that there was no record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in the
Book of Marriages. Witness Jose Narvasa testified that Gavino died single and
that Catalina lived with a certain Eleuterio Keriado.
The Court of First Instance, rendered judgment for private respondents
ordering petitioners to render an accounting from 1960 until the finality of its
judgment, to partition the estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of
the estate of Basilio and Genoveva.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that private respondents failed to
overcome the legal presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife are in fact married, that a child is presumed to be
18
legitimate, and that things happen according to the ordinary course of nature
and the ordinary habits of life.
Issue:
Is the filiation of private respondents as their children are valid?
Held:
The marriage of Gavino and Catalina has already been shown in the
preceding discussion. The treasurer of Asturias, Cebu certified that the records
of birth of that municipality for the year 1930 could not be found, presumably
because they were lost or destroyed during the war. But Matias Pogoy testified
that Gavino and Catalina begot three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at
the age of six.
Catalina testified that private respondents Ramonito and
Generoso are her children by Gavino Balogbog. That private respondents are
the children of Gavino and Catalina Balogbog cannot therefore be doubted.
Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that petitioner Gaudioso Balogbog
admitted to the police of Balamban, Cebu that Ramonito is his nephew.
Wherefore, the decision appealed if affirmed.
ARTICLES 2-6
38. COSCA VS. PALAYPAYON

237 SCRA 249
FACTS:
The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo
B. Peralta (Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora
(Process Server). Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding
judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTCTinambac, Camarines Sur.
Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the
requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get
married just by paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano
& Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria
Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario;
Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of
the following couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition,
Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of
solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage
license to be submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after
the marriage ceremony.
Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under
Article 34 of the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license
requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions to complainant

Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same
with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the
problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a
marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was
then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally
solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the
date and place of marriage are not included. It was alleged that copies of these
marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged
marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater &
Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the
absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was
celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties
to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the
marriage contract.
An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.
HELD:
Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along
with the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including
the photographs taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who
solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by judge to
return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage
license. They already started living together as husband and wife even without
the formal requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge explained that it
was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. However,
considering that there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up
to the signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it
is hard to believe that it was simulated.
On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage
between Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code
so the marriage license was dispensed with considering that the contracting
parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband
and wife for almost 6 years already. However, it was shown in the marriage
contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and
Edralin had been living together for 6 years already before they got married as
what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years
old when they started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon
should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the
contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to
avoid the marriage license requirement.
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisite of
marriage, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that,
while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
19
criminally and administratively liable. Thus, respondent judge is liable for illegal
solemnization of marriage.
39. EUGENIO VS VELEZ
FACTS:
This case is about the having the authority of the court to decide on the custody
and burial of a dead person who is in a common law marriage.
Upon Vitaliana Vargas' death (due to heart failure from toxemia of pregnancy in
respondent's residence) on Aug 28 1988, her full blood brothers filed a petition
for habeas corpus alleging that she was forcibly taken from her residence
sometime in 1987 by the respondent and forced her to live with the latter and
denied of her liberty without legal authority. She was 25, single and living with
Tomas Eugenio.
Petitioner refused to surrender the body and contended that it cannot be subject
anymore to habeas corpus or any legal summons because it is dead already.
Moreover, he already obtained a burial permit authorizing to bury her in the
Philippine Christian Missionary Inc. Moreover, petitioner argued that it is not
applicable to a dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal confinement
or detention of a live person.
Issue: Whether the court has jurisdiction over the case and if petitioners can
claim custody of the body
(1) The court has jurisdiction of the body according to Sec.19 of Batas Pambansa
Blg 129 where jurisdiction in civil cases is exercised in ALL actions involving the
contract of marriage and marital relations. The mere reading and allegation that
she was restrained and deprived of her liberty during the time she was alive
gives the court ample jurisdiction to try on the case.
(2) COMMON-LAW MARRIAGES. With the praying for custody, the court gave
support to the family of the deceased basing on Art 294, Since there was no
surviving spouse, ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters were
preferred over petitioner who was merely a common law spouse, the latter being
himself legally married to another woman.
Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code,
the term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in
the absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body.
Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does
not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married
who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to
the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in
the community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common
law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
40. WASSMER VS VELEZ
FACTS:
Paquing (Francisco Velez) and Bet (Beatriz Wassmer) are lovers who,
following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married. The couple
applied for a marriage license, which was subsequently issued. All the planning
and preparations were done for the couples wedding which was set for
September 4, 1954(including printing and distribution of invitations, purchasing
of brides gown and other details). Unfortunately, two days before their wedding,
Paquing sent a note to Bet stating that they need to postpone the wedding
because his mother opposes it and that he was going home to Mindanao. The
next day, another telegram was sent stating that nothing has changed and he
would be returning soon. However, Paquing never appeared and was never
heard from again. Hence, Beatriz Wassmer sued her ex-fianc Francisco for
damages.
ISSUE: Is this a case of mere breach of promise to marry?
HELD: Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated,
mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set
a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21
aforesaid. The lower courts judgment is hereby affirmed.
41. ALCANTARA VS ALCANTARA

G.R. No.167746 August 28, 2007
FACTS: A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner Restituto M.
Alcantara against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging thaton December 8,
1982 she and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went
to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange
a marriage for them. They met Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of
the CDCC BR Chapel, who assisted their wedding for a fee and get married for
that same day. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage
ceremony which was celebrated without the marriage license at the San Jose de
Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on March 26, 1983. The alleged marriage
license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a
sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to
Carmona to apply for a license with thelocal civil registrar. They then have a
child in 1985. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner
prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void
and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract
and its entry on file. Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of
marriage be denied for lack of merit. The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of
the Respondent, and dismiss the Petition for lack of merit. Petitioner then
submits at the C.A that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent
was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just
went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a fixer who arranged everything for
them. The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC
BR Chapel where Rev.Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs. He
and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license.
20
ARTICLES 7-10
Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither
he nor the respondent was a resident of the place.
ISSUE:1.)Was the absence of the marriage license before the marriage shall
render the marriage void?
2.) Whether or not the marriage license issued in Carmona Cavite was
valid.
HELD: To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license,
the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on
the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the
local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In
this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a
marriage license number. Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative
value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident
of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to
annul petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a
city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and
issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the
completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere
irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any
of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively
liable. The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona,
Cavite, reads: This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed
in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto
Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.Likewise, the issue
raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a fixer who arranged
everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain
Rev.Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not
strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have
performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing
to the contrary. Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to
investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued
by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the
license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from
the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain
whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14
February 2000, are AFFIRMED.
42. NAVARRO VS DOMAGTOY

FACTS:
Complainant Mayor Rodolfo Navarro of Dapa, Surigao del Norte filed this case to
the Supreme Court against respondent Judge Henando Domagtoy of MCTC of
Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte, for gross misconduct as well as inefficiency
and ignorance of the law.
First, on Sept. 24, 1994, Judge Domagtoy solemnized the marriage of Gaspar
Tagadan and Arlyn Borja despite his knowledge that Tagadan was merely
separated from his wife. Second, her performed a marriage ceremony between
Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario in October 1994 at respondent judges
residence in Dapa, SDN. As to the first, Domagtoy contended that he merely
relied on the affidavit issued by the RTC Judge of Bassey, Samar, which stated
that Tagadan and his wife have not seen each other for almost seven years.
However, the certified true copy of the marriage contract between Tagadan and
Borja showed that his civil status was separated.
ISSUE:
(1)
Whether or not a court may solemnize another marriage of a husband
who was merely separated from his wife for almost seven years.
(2)
Whether or not a Judge may solemnize a marriage at his
residence.
HELD:
(1) Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides that a marriage
contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth
in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding
as provided in the Code for the declaration of presumptive death. Absent this
judicial declaration, he remains to be married to Pearanda. Wittingly or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have
accepted the joind affidavit submitted by Tagadan. Such neglect or ignorance of
the law has resulted in a bigamous and therefore void marriage.
(2) Art. 7. A marriage may be solemnized by (1) any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction xxx . Article 8, however,
states that marriages shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge
21
or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consulgeneral, consul or vice consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in
cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in
accordance with Art. 29 of the Family Code, or where both parties in which case
the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement to that effect.
ISSUE:
There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the

point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented
addressed to the respondent judge is the authority of the solemnizing officer.
Under Art. 8, which is only a discretionary provision, refers only to the venue of
the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the
solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance
herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
The court held that the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is

limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the
marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary
to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to
gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of
human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the
law on marriage.
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdiction may officiate in

marriages only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a
marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3 which while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of

the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
Judge Domagtoy was suspended for six months for demonstrating

gross ignorance of the law.
44. JOSE L. LAXAMANA, petitioner, vs. JOSE T.

BALTAZAR, respondent
43. ARANAS V OCCINIO
Doctrine: When the mayor of a municipality is suspended, absent or

temporarily unable, his duties should be discharged by the vice-mayor in
accordance with sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a

duly issued marriage license and conducting it outside his territorial jurisdiction.
HELD:
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged respondent Judge Occiano
with gross ignorance of the law. Occiano is the presiding judge in Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, he solemnized the marriage of Aranes and
Dominador Orobia on February 17, 2000 at the couples residence in Nabua,
Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction and without the
requisite of marriage license.
FACTS:
It appeared in the records that petitioner and Orobia filed their

application of marriage license on January 5, 2000 and was stamped that it will
be issued on January 17, 2000 but neither of them claimed it. In addition, no
record also appeared with the Office of the Civil Registrar General for the alleged
marriage.
ISSUE: WON Respondent is the right person to assume office.
Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully examined the

documents and first refused to conduct the marriage and advised them to reset
the date considering the absence of the marriage license. However, due to the
earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors and fear that the postponement
of the wedding might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just
suffered from stroke, he solemnized the marriage on the assurance of the couple
that they will provide the license that same afternoon. Occiano denies that he
told the couple that their marriage is valid.
The Mayor of Sexmoan, Pampanga was suspended. By virtue of Sec. 2195 of

the Revised Administrative Code, Respondent Vice Mayor Jose Baltazar assumed
the office. However, the Provincial Governor, by virtue of Sec. 21 of the Revised
Election Code, appointed herein Petitioner as the mayor.
HELD:
Yes, Respondent should assume the vacated position. Sec. 21 of the Revised
Election Code, which was taken from Sec. 2180 of the Revised Admin Code,
applies to municipal officers in general while Sec. 2195 of the Revised
Administrative Code applies to the office of mayor in particular. A special
provision overrides a general one. Also, the incorporation of Sec. 2180 in Sec. 21
does not enlarge its scope but merely supplements it. It has also been
consistently held in case of suspension of the mayor, the vice-mayor shall
assume office; the legislature is presumed to be acquainted with this
contemporaneous interpretation. Hence, upon re-enacting Sec. 2180, the
interpretation is deemed to have been adopted.
22
ARTICLE 22
45. LIM TANHU VS. RAMOLETE
66 SCRA 425
FACTS:
Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po
Chuan, who was a partner and practically the owner who has controlling interest
of Glory Commercial Company and a Chinese Citizen until his death. Defendant
Antonio Lim Tanhu and Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua were partners in name but they
were mere employees of Po Chuan and were naturalized Filipino Citizens. Tan
Put filed complaint against spouses-petitoner Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay including
their son Tech Chuan and the other spouses-petitoner Ng Sua and Co Oyo
including also their son Eng Chong Leonardo, that through fraud and
machination took actual and active management of the partnership and that she
alleged entitlement to share not only in the capital and profits of the partnership
but also in the other assets, both real and personal, acquired by the partnership
with funds of the latter during its lifetime."
According to the petitioners, Ang Siok Tin is the legitimate wife, still living, and
with whom Tee Hoon had four legitimate children, a twin born in 1942, and two
others born in 1949 and 1965, all presently residing in Hong Kong. Tee Hoon
died in 1966 and as a result of which the partnership was dissolved and what
corresponded to him were all given to his legitimate wife and children.
Tan Put prior of her alleged marriage with Tee Hoon on 1949, was engaged in
the drugstore business; that not long after her marriage, upon the suggestion of
the latter sold her drugstore for P125,000.00 which amount she gave to her
husband as investment in Glory Commercial Co. sometime in 1950; that after
the investment of the above-stated amount in the partnership its business
flourished and it embarked in the import business and also engaged in the
wholesale and retail trade of cement and GI sheets and under huge profits.
Defendants interpose that Tan Put knew and was are that she was merely the
common-law wife of Tee Hoon. Tan Put and Tee Hoon were childless but the
former had a foster child, Antonio Nunez.
ISSUE: Whether Tan Put, as she alleged being married with Tee Hoon, can claim
from the company of the latters share.
HELD:
Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting parties that
they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument"
signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing
the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an
authentic copy of the marriage contract. While a marriage may also be proved
by other competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be
satisfactorily explained. Surely, the certification of the person who allegedly
solemnized a marriage is not admissible evidence of such marriage unless proof

of loss of the contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production
is first presented to the court. In the case at bar, the purported certification
issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine Independent Church,
Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent evidence, there being absolutely no
showing as to unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the
authenticity of the signature of said certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a
second assistant provincial fiscal not being authorized by law, since it is not part
of the functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not testify, the
same is hearsay.
An agreement with Tee Hoon was shown and signed by Tan Put that she
received P40,000 for her subsistence when they terminated their relationship of
common-law marriage and promised not to interfere with each others affairs
since they are incompatible and not in the position to keep living together
permanently. Hence, this document not only proves that her relation was that of
a common-law wife but had also settled property interests in the payment of
P40,000.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted. All proceedings held in
respondent court in its Civil Case No. 12328 subsequent to the order of dismissal
of October 21, 1974 are hereby annulled and set aside, particularly the exparteproceedings against petitioners and the decision on December 20, 1974.
Respondent court is hereby ordered to enter an order extending the effects of its
order of dismissal of the action dated October 21, 1974 to herein petitioners
Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy Ochay, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo. And
respondent court is hereby permanently enjoined from taking any further action
in said civil case gave and except as herein indicated. Costs against private
respondent.
46. VDA DE CHUA VS. CA

GR No. 70909, January 5, 1994
FACTS:
Roberto Lim Chua, during his lifetime, lived out of wedlock with private
respondent Florita A. Vallejo from 1970-1981. The couple had two illegitimate
children, Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo, all surnamed Chua.
Roberto died intestate in Davao City on May 28, 1992. Vallejo filed on July 2,
1992 with RTC-Cotabato a petition for declaration of guardianship of the two
child and their properties worth P5,000,000.00.
Antonietta Garcia Vda De Chua, the petitioner, filed a motion alleging
that she was the true wife of Roberto. However, according to Vallejo, she is not
the surviving spouse of the latter but a pretender to the estate since the
deceased never contracted marriage with any woman and died a bachelor.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is indeed the true wife of Roberto Chua.
23
HELD:
The court ruled that petitioner was not able to prove her status as wife
of the decedent. She could not produce the original copy or authenticated copy
of their marriage certificate. Furthermore, a certification from the Local Civil
Registrar was presented that no such marriage contract between petitioner and
Roberto Chua was ever registered with them, attested by Judge Augusto Banzali,
the alleged person to have solemnized the alleged marriage, that he has not
solemnized such alleged marriage.
Hence, it is clear that petitioner failed to establish the truth of her
allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a
valid marriage contract which she failed to produce.
24
ARTICLES 25
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before
June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a license. Neither did she sign any
application therefore. She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract on
June 24, 1970 in Pasay City. Le
47. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 103047. September 2, 1994.]
FACTS:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a
civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay
City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents.
Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents
required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the
marriage license.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the
marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. The couple only lived together when
Castro found out she was pregnant in March of 1971. However, their
cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways.
On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's
brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro
wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for the States. She thus
consulted a lawyer regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through
her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued
to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil
Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:
"February 20, 1987
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA
M. CASTRO who were allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on
June 21, 1970 under an alleged (s)upportive marriage license no.
3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot
be located as said license no. 3196182 does not appear from our
records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio
(Sgd.) CENONA D.
QUINTOS
Senior Civil Registry
Officer"
The trial court denied the petition. It held that the above certification was
inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to
the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of
the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that
there was no marriage license issued."
Castro appealed to the Court of Appeals and insisted that the certification from
the local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and declared the marriage
between the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of
Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by

private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued
by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of Angelina
Castro to Edwin Cardenas.
HELD: SC affirmed Court of Appeals Decision and petition is denied.

At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law
governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. It provides that no marriage
shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil
registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a
license would render the marriage void ab initio.
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, authorized the custodian of
documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not
exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be
found in a register. The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued
by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and
inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license
no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of
her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer
any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar
25
circumstances of the case he marriage being a secret marriage a legally

non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated
without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the
contracting parties. This fact cannot be held against her. Despite notice,
defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was
declared in default. Trial proceeded in his absence. Private respondent cannot be
faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There
was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was an agreement
between private respondent and her husband Cardenas.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently
established the absence of the subject marriage license.
ARTICLE 26
Held:
1.At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points
for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence,
our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil
Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the
Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry."A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws.
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are
concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees "aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law." Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as
a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
48. GRACE GARCIA VS. REDERICK RECIO

GR No. 138322
Facts:
Rederick Recio, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Rizal in the year 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In
1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly
dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent herein acquired Australian
citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, petitioner in the case at
bar, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, respondent
was declared as single and Filipino. Since October 1995, Rederick and Grace
lived separately; and in 1996, their conjugal assets were divided in accordance
with their Statutory Declarations in Australia. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she
learned of the respondents former marriage only in November of 1997. On the
other hand, respondent, claims that he told the petitioner of his prior marriage
as early as 1993 before they got married. Respondent also contended that his
first marriage was dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989
and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry herein petitioner in 1994. The
trial court declared that the first marriage between Rederick Recio and Editha
Samson was dissolved on the ground of the divorce decree issued in Australia as
valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition before the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was
proven.
2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to

be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. 35 However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules
on evidence must be demonstrated.
2. Based on the above records (records refer to the Exhibits attached as
evidence in this case), we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on
January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a quo
erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the
legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to
show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to
prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
49. ROEHR VS RODRIGUEZ, HON. SALONGA
FACTS: On 1980, petitioner Wolfgang Roehr, a German national, and Maria
Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipino Citizen got married in Hamburg, Germany which
was ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. They had two children. On August 28,
1996, private respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity in RTC,
subsequently on 1997, petitioner filed motion to dismiss, the latter being denied.
Petitioner then obtained a decree of divorce in the Court of First Instance in
Germany. The decree provided custody of their children under the care of the
father. However, the German court to represent herself in the issue did not give
the private respondent. Petitioner then filed in the Philippine court a motion to
dismiss the petition to declare the nullity of marriage because the German court
had already dissolved their marriage. Judge Salonga granted the motion to
dismiss, but the private respondent filed motion for partial consideration in order
to discuss the property relations and the custody of their children such as effects
of the divorce. The respondent judge assailed such motion for partial
consideration. Petitioner argues that Philippine courts should no longer have
26
jurisdiction of the above case since German courts had already release its
decision.
Issue: Do Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the above case despite the
petitioner already obtaining a divorce decree from the German court?
Ruling: Yes, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the above case. Article 26
states that if a marriage in a foreign country is valid, such marriage shall be
valid in the Philippines. As a general rule, Philippines recognize divorce decrees
but our courts must determine the effects of this such as children custody. Since
the private respondent was not given the equal opportunity to err in the German
court during the divorce decree, it is just that Philippine courts allow the
respondent to state her side and discuss custody matters.
50. PILAPIL VS. IBAY-SOMERA

174 SCRA 653
Facts: Article 26; On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino
citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in
the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and
the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila. Thereafter, marital
discord set in, followed by a separation de facto between them. After about three
and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding
against petitioner in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their
marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982. On January 15,
1986, Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation,
support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila on
January 23, 1983.More than five months after the issuance of the divorce
decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City
Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner
"had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another
man named James Chua sometime in1983". On October 27, 1987, petitioner
filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower
court denying her motion to quash.
Issue: Whether or not the divorce decree is valid in the Philippines and if the
private respondent can file a complaint of adultery against the petitioner.
R u l i n g : Yes, the divorce decree is valid in the Philippines. In the present
case, the fact that the private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country
is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is concern in view of the nationality
principle on our civil law on the matter of the status of persons.
offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration
and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has
no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he
was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
51. VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO JR.

139 SCRA 139 October 8, 1985
Facts:
Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States, were married on 1972 at
Hongkong. On1982, they got divorced in Nevada, United States; and the
petitioner remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.
On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner, asking
that the petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita,
Manila, and be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceeding before Nevada Court where
respondent acknowledged that they had no community property. The lower court
denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located
in the Philippines, that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
Respondent avers that Divorce Decree abroad cannot prevail over the prohibitive
laws of the Philippines.
Issue:
(1)Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each of them.
(2)Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on conjugal properties.
Held:
As to Richard Upton the divorce is binding on him as an American
Citizen. As heirs bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property. Only Philippine Nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorce the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. Alicia Reyes under our National law is still
considered married to private respondent. However, petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage,
the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and
nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the
27
52. CANG VS. CA
53. TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCAO
FACTS
FACTS:
In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escao secretly married each other and of
course without the knowledge of Escaos parents who were of prominent social
status. The marriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaos
parents learned of this, they insisted a church wedding to be held but Escao
withdrew from having a recelebration because she heard that Tenchavez was
having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2
years later, Escao went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute
divorce and she subsequently became an American citizen and also married an
American.
In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that
Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and causing her to be
estranged from him hence hes asking for damages in the amount of
P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the legal separation being sought
for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the
Escaos.
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Ana Maria Clavano, who were married begot 3
children. During early years of marriage the relationship of the couples is
undisturbed. Not long thereafter Ana found out about her husbands extramarital
affair. Ana subsequently filed a legal action for separation, which was granted.
They had an agreement for support of the children. And that Ana Marie can enter
in agreement without a written consent of Herbert. Petitioner left for us.
Meanwhile, the brother and sister in law of Ana Marie filed for the adoption of 3
minor children of Cang. Upon learning the adoption Herbert went back to the
Philippines to contest it. But the petitioner for adoption was granted by court.
ISSUE: Can minor children be legally adopted without a written consent of the
natural parent on the ground that the latter abandoned them?
HELD:
Article 256 of the family code provide for its retroactivity insofar as it does
not prejudiced or impair vested or acquired right in accordance with the
civil code or other laws as amended by the family code, the statutory
provision on consents for adoption now reads art 188 the written consent of
the following to the adoption shall be necessary , the parents by nature
of the child, the legal guardian,
or the proper government
instrumentality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar.
Whether or not the divorce and the second marriage of Escao were valid.
Whether or not sexual infidelity of Escao may beinvoked by Tenchavez as a
ground for legal separation.
Based on the foregoing it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments

to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has
remained a requisite for its validity.
On the part of Tenchavez:
As clearly inferred for the foregoing provision of law, the written consent of the
natural parent is indispensible for its validity.
As clearly inferred for the foregoing provision of the law, the written consent of
the natural parent. Is indispensible for the validity of the decree Of adoption.
Nevertheless the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with
if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is insane or
hopeless intemperate.
In the instant case records disclose that petitioners conduct did not manifest a
settled purpose to forego all parenteral duties and relinquish all parenteral
claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement
alone, without moral and financial desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
While admittedly petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the united
state, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and
children through telephone and letters.he used to send package through mail
and whims.
HELD: Yes.
His marriage with Escao was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did
not result to public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even
consented to annulling the marriage earlier (because Escao filed for annulment
before she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to her nonappearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaos parents dissuaded
their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot
be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escao left without the
knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and
Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of
moral damages and attorneys fees to be paid by Escao and not her parents.
On the part of Escaos parents:
It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the
Escaos is unfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and
caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their
reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common
occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly
established in the decision of the court below, is that they were not guilty of any
improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages
awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only.
The Supreme Court held that the divorce is notvalid, making the second
marriage void since marriageties of Escao and Tenchaves is existing.Tenchavez
28
can file a petition for legal separationbecause Escao committed sexual infidelity
because ofthe fact that she had children with the American.Sexual infidelity of a
spouse is one of thegrounds for legal separation.
one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following

are compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was
born in Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this
American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there;
and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport.
54. BAYOT VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and
represented herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage
as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3)
when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic.
Facts:
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose,
Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco,
California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then
on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the
latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican
Republic.
Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo,
Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On
February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96. On
March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa
City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of
Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a
Motion to Dismiss. To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition,
insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of. RTC ruled
against Vicente. CA ruled in favor of Rebecca stating that the marriage between
the spouses was already dissolved upon the grant of divorce since Rebecca was
an American citizen when she applied for such decree.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Guam was sufficient
to dissolve the marriage bond between them.
Thus, the application for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC
was no longer needed.
Arguments:
Petitioner: On March 21, 2001, Rebecca sought the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix.
Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly
support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
Respondent: On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on, inter
alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the
prior judgment of divorce.
Supreme Court Ruling:
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be
recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a
Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American
citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her
divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship.
Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident
in the text of the Civil Decrees.
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the
United States of America, a country which allows divorce.
Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated
through their Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No.
362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree
No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca was valid.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its
efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect
to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment
merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party
and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the
foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr.
Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce
decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and,
consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen
by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the
October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to
nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American
citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining
whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the
country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of
the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and
obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be
29
55. PEOPLE VS ORBECIDO

Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in Quezon City, Philippines and had a son & daughter. Cipriano's wife left
for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. 4
years later, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed
with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was
denied.
Issue:
Whether the Filipino spouse can remarry under Philippine law (Art. 26 of the
Family Code) in which a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one
party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree
capacitating him or her to remarry.
Ruling:
Yes. The court is unanimous in holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry. The two elements for the application of Art. 26 are present which are a
valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner and a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. when
Cipriano's wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. Hence, Cipriano,
the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
56. CORPUZ V. STO. TOMAS

G.R. NO. 186571, 11 AUGUST 2010
FACTS: Gerbert Corpuz (Gerbert) was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization. He later married a Filipina, Daisylyn
Sto. Tomas (Daisy). Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding because of
his work. He returned after 4 months to surprise Daisy, but discovered that she
was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned
to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice in
Ontario, Canada granted his petition for divorce.
2 years after the divorce, Gerbert found another Filipina to love. Gerbert went to
the Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisys marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an
official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed him that the marriage
between him and Daisy still subsists under Philippine law. To be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to a NSO Circular.
Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC. Daisy did not file any
responsive pleading and offered no opposition to the petition. In fact, Daisy
alleged her desire to file a similar case but was prevented by financial
constrains. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest
with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
The RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was NOT THE
PROPER PARTY to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree as he is a NATURALIZED CANADIAN CITIZEN. It ruled that ONLY
THE FILIPINO spouse can avail of the remedy, under Art. 26, 2 of the Family
Code.1
ISSUE: WON Art. 26, 2 extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
HELD: NO. The alien spouse can claim no right under Art. 26, 2 of the Family
Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the FILIPINO SPOUSE.
Art. 26, 2 was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for
the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling
the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, Art. 26, 2 provided the
Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien
spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without Art.
26, 2, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a
proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another
proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do
not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond.
An action based on Art. 26, 2 is not limited to the recognition of the foreign
divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to
remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to
contract another marriage. However, no Philippine court can make a similar
declaration for the alien spouse, whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law.
30
58. MANZANO VS SANCHEZ
MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE

REQUIREMENT
ARTICELS 27-34
57. NINAL VS BAYADOG

FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They
had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot
inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the
children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later,
Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They
instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years
exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on
February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void
for lack of marriage license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
FACTS:
Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having
been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan.
They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another
marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage
contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated thus,
respondent Judge ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He
claims that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that
the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years as
manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never
cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels.
ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting
parties who both have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have
been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of Family Code.
HELD:
Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment
to marry each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as
indicated in their marriage contract that they are both separated is an
impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like
separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5
years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly,
respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he
solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the
nullity of Pepitos marriage after his death?
HELD:
59. COSCA VS PALAYPAYON
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license.
They cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed
that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20
months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage
to Norma is still void.
237 SCRA 249
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of
rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
FACTS:
The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo
B. Peralta (Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora
(Process Server). Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding
judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTCTinambac, Camarines Sur.
Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the
requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get
married just by paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano
& Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria
Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario;
Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of
the following couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition,
31
Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of
solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage
license to be submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after
the marriage ceremony.
Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under
Article 34 of the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license
requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions to complainant
Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same
with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the
problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a
marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was
then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally
solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the
date and place of marriage are not included. It was alleged that copies of these
marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged
marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater &
Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the
absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was
celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties
to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the
marriage contract.
An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.
HELD:
Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along
with the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including
the photographs taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who
solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by judge to
return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage
license. They already started living together as husband and wife even without
the formal requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge explained that it
was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. However,
considering that there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up
to the signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it
is hard to believe that it was simulated.
On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage
between Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code
so the marriage license was dispensed with considering that the contracting
parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband
and wife for almost 6 years already. However, it was shown in the marriage
contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and
Edralin had been living together for 6 years already before they got married as
what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years
old when they started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon
should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the
contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to
avoid the marriage license requirement.
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of
the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio
whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the
marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally, and administratively liable.
60. MARIATEGUI VS. CA
FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3
marriages during his lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was
still a bachelor. He had 4 children with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who
died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo. With his
second wife Flaviana Montellano, he had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo
got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children
namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got married
before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal. The spouses deported themselves
as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.
Lupos descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the
Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary registration proceedings and
a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in the third
marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased
father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a
marriage certificate.
HELD:
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and
Felipas marriage, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts.
Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate
the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place
between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting
themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or
from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to
the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
Thus, Lupos children in his third marriage are considered as legitimate children
and therefore have succession rights.
32
61. DE CASTRO VS DE CASTRO

G.R. No. 160172
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned
to get married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual
relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter.
When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage
license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu
of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating
that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years.
The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites.
Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their
respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid.
HELD:
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential
requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from
the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage
license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit
stating that they had been living together for more than five years. However,
respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was
asked during cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered
as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses
with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous
and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this
provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside
a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage
license. In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect;
in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and
respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the
marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage
license renders their marriage void ab initio.
had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted
marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the
National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an
action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of
the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for
annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they
executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five
years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage.
Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months
before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of
the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the
law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the
sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which
would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a
marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential
fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is void ab initio. The court also
ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to
impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any ti
62. REPUBLIC VS DAYOT

GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008
FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24,
1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they
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CIVIL CODE

TAADA VS. TUVERA 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24,

Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general

Persons Case Digests Compilation//Cambri

validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by

3. RURAL BANK OF CALOOCAN V COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-14858

December 29, 1960

MARIANO S. GONZAGA, petitioner-appellee,

4. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs QUE PO LAY

The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US

5. ALBINO S. CO VS COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE

6. D.M. CONSUNJI VS. CA AND JUEGO

G.R. 100776 October 28, 1993

TITLE: D.M. Consunji Inc. v Court of Appeals and Maria J. Juego

Petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983, in

Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a construction worker of

agreement saying that he waives his right to transfer to another school in

WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURTS ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY

10. BELLIS V BELLIS

On the part of Escaos parents:

Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of

11. TENCHAVEZ V. ESCAO

HUMAN RELATIONS (ARTICLES 19-36)

12. RELLOSA, ET AL. VS. PELLOSIS, ET AL.

A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution,

Persons Case Digests Compilation//Cambri

13. ALBENSON ENTERPRISES

VS THE COURT OF APPEALS AND EUGENIO S. BALTAO, Respondents

14. NIKKO HOTEL MANILA V REYES

Persons Case Digests Compilation//Cambri

15. SPS. QUISUMBING V. MERALCO

Yes. Petitioners are entitled to moral damages, but in a reduced

16. UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST (PLAINTIFF) VS. ROMEO A. JADER

21. WASSMER V VELEZ

damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code.

23. CONSTANTINO V MENDEZ

Issue: Whether or not sexual intercourse is a basis for recovery of damages

24. TITLE: ST. LOUIS REALTY CORP. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 53642, April 15, 1988

CIVIL PERSONALITY (ART 37-51)

28. QUIMIGUING VS ICAO

Persons Case Digests Compilation//Cambri

ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion,

31. CONTINENTAL STEEL CORP V MONTANO

30. DE JESUS V SYQUIA

Persons Case Digests Compilation//Cambri

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing

33. DUMLAO V QUALITY PLASTICS

The value given by the Constitution to this inviolable social institution is

FAMILY CODE PROVISIONS

Article 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful

Hence, the Court dismissed the petition of PT&T.

Petitioner PT&T hired private respondent Grace de Guzman as a reliever

35. EMILIO TUASON V. CA

36. ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant vs. JOSE CAMPOS

38. COSCA VS. PALAYPAYON

requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions to complainant

Persons Case Digests Compilation//Cambri

41. ALCANTARA VS ALCANTARA

42. NAVARRO VS DOMAGTOY

Persons Case Digests Compilation//Cambri