Professional Documents
Culture Documents
During the months of March, April and May 1969, twenty-three (23)
checks were prepared, processed, issued and released by NWSA, all
of which were paid and cleared by PNB and debited by PNB against
NWSA Account No. 6, to wit:
Check No. Date Payee Amount Date Paid
By PNB
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin Law Offices for respondent
PCIB.
Int. Inc.
cident Inc.
Marsan
Torres
Santos
Inc. --------------------
P 320,636.26
Bulletin
During the same months of March, April and May 1969, twenty-three
(23) checks bearing the same numbers as the aforementioned NWSA
checks were likewise paid and cleared by PNB and debited against
NWSA Account No. 6, to wit:
---------------
PNB also filed a third party complaint against the negotiating banks
PBC and PCIB on the ground that they failed to ascertain the Identity
of the payees and their title to the checks which were deposited in the
respective new accounts of the payees with them.
P3,457,903.00
The petitioner submits that the above provision does not apply to the
facts of the instant case because the questioned checks were not
those of the MWSS and neither were they drawn by its authorized
signatories. The petitioner states that granting that Section 24 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law is applicable, the same creates only a
prima facie presumption which was overcome by the following
documents, to wit: (1) the NBI Report of November 2, 1970; (2) the
NBI Report of November 21, 1974; (3) the NBI Chemistry Report No.
C-74891; (4) the Memorandum of Mr. Juan Dino, 3rd Assistant
Auditor of the respondent drawee bank addressed to the Chief Auditor
of the petitioner; (5) the admission of the respondent bank's counsel
in open court that the National Bureau of Investigation found the
signature on the twenty-three (23) checks in question to be forgeries;
and (6) the admission of the respondent bank's witness, Mr. Faustino
Mesina, Jr. that the checks in question were not printed by his printing
press. The petitioner contends that since the signatures of the checks
were forgeries, the respondent drawee bank must bear the loss under
the rulings of this Court.
It must therefore be held that the proximate cause of loss was due to
the negligence of the Bank of the Philippine Islands in honoring and
cashing the two forged checks. (San Carlos Milling Co. v. Bank of the
P. I., 59 Phil. 59)
It is admitted that the Philippine National Bank cashed the check upon
a forged signature, and placed the money to the credit of Maasim,
who was the forger. That the Philippine National Bank then endorsed
the chock and forwarded it to the Shanghai Bank by whom it was
paid. The Philippine National Bank had no license or authority to pay
the money to Maasim or anyone else upon a forged signature. It was
its legal duty to know that Malicor's endorsement was genuine before
cashing the check. Its remedy is against Maasim to whom it paid the
money. (Great Eastern Life Ins. Co. v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank,
43 Phil. 678).
We have carefully reviewed the documents cited by the petitioner.
There is no express and categorical finding in these documents that
the twenty-three (23) questioned checks were indeed signed by
persons other than the authorized MWSS signatories. On the
contrary, the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation in its
Report dated November 2, 1970 show that the MWSS fraud was an
"inside job" and that the petitioner's delay in the reconciliation of bank
statements and the laxity and loose records control in the printing of
its personalized checks facilitated the fraud. Likewise, the questioned
Documents Report No. 159-1074 dated November 21, 1974 of the
National Bureau of Investigation does not declare or prove that the
signatures appearing on the questioned checks are forgeries. The
report merely mentions the alleged differences in the type face,
checkwriting, and printing characteristics appearing in the standard or
submitted models and the questioned typewritings. The NBI
Chemistry Report No. C-74-891 merely describes the inks and pens
used in writing the alleged forged signatures.
It is clear that these three (3) NBI Reports relied upon by the petitioner
are inadequate to sustain its allegations of forgery. These reports did
not touch on the inherent qualities of the signatures which are
indispensable in the determination of the existence of forgery. There
must be conclusive findings that there is a variance in the inherent
characteristics of the signatures and that they were written by two or
more different persons.
(4) The petitioner failed to furnish the respondent drawee bank with
samples of typewriting, cheek writing, and print used by its printer in
the printing of its checks and of the inks and pens used in signing the
same; and
This gross negligence of the petitioner is very evident from the sworn
statement dated June 19, 1969 of Faustino Mesina, Jr., the owner of
the printing press which printed the petitioner's personalized checks:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Q: Do you have any business transaction with the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA)?
A: Yes, sir. I have a contract with the NAWASA in printing NAWASA
Forms such as NAWASA Check
xxx xxx xxx
15. Q: Were you given any ingtruction by the NAWASA in connection
with the printing of these check vouchers?
A: There is none, sir. No instruction whatsoever was given to me.
16. Q: Were you not advised as to what kind of paper would be used
in the check vouchers?
(1) The petitioner failed to give its printer, Mesina Enterprises, specific
instructions relative to the safekeeping and disposition of excess
forms, check vouchers, and safety papers;
(2) The petitioner failed to retrieve from its printer all spoiled check
forms;
20. Q: Where did you buy this Hammermill Safety check paper?
(3) The petitioner failed to provide any control regarding the paper
A: From Tan Chiong, a paper dealer with store located at Juan Luna,
Binondo, Manila. (In front of the Metropolitan Bank).
58. One factor which facilitate this fraud was the delay in the
reconciliation of bank (PNB) statements with the NAWASA bank
accounts. x x x. Had the NAWASA representative come to the PNB
early for the statements and had the bank been advised promptly of
the reported bogus check, the negotiation of practically all of the
remaining checks on May, 1969, totalling P2,224,736.00 could have
been prevented.
The records likewise show that the petitioner failed to provide
appropriate security measures over its own records thereby laying
confidential records open to unauthorized persons. The petitioner's
own Fact Finding Committee, in its report submitted to their General
manager underscored this laxity of records control. It observed that
the "office of Mr. Ongtengco (Cashier No. VI of the Treasury
Department at the NAWASA) is quite open to any person known to
him or his staff members and that the check writer is merely on top of
his table."
When confronted with this report at the Anti-Fraud Action Section of
the National Bureau of Investigation. Mr. Ongtengco could only state
that:
A. Generally my order is not to allow anybody to enter my office. Only
authorized persons are allowed to enter my office. There are some
cases, however, where some persons enter my office because they
are following up their checks. Maybe, these persons may have been
authorized by Mr. Pantig. Most of the people entering my office are
changing checks as allowed by the Resolution of the Board of
Directors of the NAWASA and the Treasurer. The check writer was
never placed on my table. There is a place for the check write which is
also under lock and key.
Q. Is Mr. Pantig authorized to allow unauthorized persons to enter
your office?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why are you tolerating Mr. Pantig admitting unauthorized persons
in your office?
A. I do not want to embarrass Mr. Pantig. Most of the people following
SO ORDERED.