BURGOS VS MACAPAGAL ARROYO

FACTS:

At around 1:00 in the afternoon of April 28, 2007, Jonas Joseph T.

Burgos a farmer advocate and a member of Kilusang Magbubukid
sa Bulacan was forcibly taken and abducted by a group of four (4)
men and a woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan
Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall,
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.

On April 30, 2007, the petitioner, Edita Burgos, held a press

conference and announced that her son Jonas was missing. That
same day, the petitioner sought confirmation from the guard if the
person abducted was her son Jonas. In a subsequent police
investigation and Land Transportation Office (LTO) verification, it was
discovered that plate number TAB 194 was registered to a 1991 Isuzu
XLT vehicle owned by a certain Mauro B. Mudlong. The said vehicle
was seized and impounded on June 24, 2006 for transporting timber
without permit. However, in May 2007, right after Jonas abduction
was made public, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 of this
1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle was missing, and the engine and other spare
parts were cannibalized. The police was likewise able to generate
cartographic sketches of two of the abductors of Jonas based on its
interview of eyewitnesses.

On August 29, 2007, the Philippine National Police-Criminal

Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) presented Emerito
Lipio a.k.a. Ka Tibo/Ka Cris, Marlon D. Manuel a.k.a. Ka Carlo, and
Melissa Concepcion Reyes a.k.a. Ka Lisa/Ramil to support the theory
that elements of the New Peoples Army (NPA) perpetrated the
abduction of Jonas.

In its July 17, 2008 decision, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the
petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, denied the
petitioners motion to declare the respondents in contempt; and
partially granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo in favor of the
petitioner. Essentially, the CA found that the evidence the petitioner
presented failed to establish her claimed direct connection between
the abductors of Jonas and the military. It also found that the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the PNP did not fully exert their
effort in the conduct of investigation. The CA ruled that the AFP has
the burden of connecting certain loose ends regarding the identity of
Ka Ramon and the allegation that Ka Ramon is indeed Jonas in the
Order of Battle. As for the PNP-CIDG, the CA branded its
investigation as rather shallow and conducted haphazardly.

PERTINENT ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of the PNP and AFP to
conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation and to exercise
extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties is a fatal to
the grant of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.

ANSWER: Yes.

SUPREME COURT RULINGS:

ON PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO

Effect of the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive and
meaningful investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the
performance of their duties Considering the findings of the CA and

our review of the records of the present case, we conclude that the
PNP and the AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and
meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and
to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their
duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. Because of these
investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until a more
meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is undertaken.

DISPOSITIVE:
In disposing of the case, the Supreme Court issued the following
directives:
DIRECTED the Commission on Human Rights to conduct appropriate
investigative proceedings, including field investigations acting as the
Courts directly commissioned agency for purposes of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo
REQUIRE the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police to make available and
to provide copies, to the Commission on Human Rights, of all
documents and records in their possession and as the Commission
on Human Rights may require, relevant to the case of Jonas Joseph
T. Burgos, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the
Constitution and existing laws;
DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG and its incumbent Chief to submit to the
Commission on Human Rights the records and results of the
investigation the PNP-CIDG claimed to have forwarded to the
Department of Justice, which were not included in their previous
submissions to the Commission on Human Rights, including such
records as the Commission on Human Rights may require, pursuant
to the authority granted under this Resolution;
DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG to provide direct investigative assistance
to the Commission on Human Rights as it may require, pursuant to
the authority granted under this Resolution;

AUTHORIZED the Commission on Human Rights to conduct a

comprehensive and exhaustive investigation that extends to all
aspects of the case (not limited to the specific directives as outlined
above), as the extraordinary measures the case may require under
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; and
REQUIRED the Commission on Human Rights to submit to this Court
a Report with its recommendations, copy furnished the petitioner, the
incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and all the
respondents, within ninety (90) days from receipt of the Resolution.
In light of the retirement of Lt. General Alexander Yano and the
reassignment of the other respondents who have all been impleaded
in their official capacities, all subsequent resolutions and actions from
the Supreme Court were served on, and directly enforceable by, the
incumbents of the impleaded offices/units whose official action is
necessary. The present respondents shall continue to be personally
impleaded for purposes of the responsibilities and accountabilities
they may have incurred during their incumbencies.

The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of the petitions for
Contempt and for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to
President Gloria Macapagal -Arroyo.
SO VS TACLA
FACTS:

Regional Trial Court Proceedings

David E. So (So) filed a petition for the issuance of the writs of habeas
corpus and amparo before Judge Esteban A. Tacla, Jr. (Judge Tacla)
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 208, Mandaluyong City. So
filed this on behalf of his daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande

(Guisande), who is accused of Qualified Theft (a non- bailable

offense) in a criminal case pending before Judge Tacla.

Supreme Court Proceedings [Petition for writs of habeas corpus and

amparo (G.R. No. 190108)]

So alleged, among others, that Guisande was under a life-threatening

situation while confined at the National Center for Mental Health
(NCMH), the government hospital ordered by the RTC Mandaluyong
City to ascertain the actual psychological state of Guisande, to
determine whether she can stand for trial.

So meanwhile filed petition before the Supreme Court for the issuance
of the writs of habeas corpus and amparo claiming life-threatening
circumstances surrounding his daughters confinement at the NCMH.
Such which supposedly worsened her mental condition and violated
her constitutional rights against solitary detention and her right to the
assistance of counsel.

Confinement at the NCMH

Guisande was previously confined at the Makati Medical Center for

Bipolar Mood Disorder. Her personal psychiatrist certified that that she
was not ready for discharge.

The Supreme Court in its Resolution dated 24 November 2009 issued

a joint writ of habeas corpus and amparo and directed the Court of
Appeals to conduct a hearing on the matter.

Court of Appeals Proceedings

However, acting on the prosecutions Urgent Motion to Refer
Accuseds Illness to a Government Hospital, Judge Tacla ordered
Guisandes referral to the NCMH for an independent forensic
assessment of Guisandes mental health to determine if she would be
able to stand arraignment and undergo trial for Qualified Theft.

Subsequently, Judge Tacla, upon motion of the NCMH, ordered that

accused Guisande be physically brought to the NCMH.

In response, Guisande filed a Motion for Relief from Solitary

Confinement before the sala of Judge Tecla.

On 03 December 2009, the NCMH rendered an evaluation report

finding Guisande competent to stand trial. On the same day, the 17th
Division of the Court of Appeals heard the case pursuant to the joint
writ of habeas corpus and amparo. Thereafter, Justice Normandie B.
Pizarro rendered an Order directing Guisande to stand trial for
qualified theft but ordered her confinement at St. Clares Medical
Center in recognition of her right to seek medical treatment.

Supreme Court Proceedings [Petition for review on certiorari (G.R.

No. 190473)]

Thereafter, a petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Office of

the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente,
questioning the Order of Justice Pizarro.

SUPREME COURT RULINGS:

1. AVAILABILITY OF THE REMEDIES OF HABEAS CORPUS AND

AMPARO
On 10 March 2010, the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion praying
for the dismissal of G.R. Nos. 190108 and 190473.

So filed a Comment refuting the OSGs motion to dismiss G.R. Nos.

190108 and 190473.

The OSG thereafter filed a Motion to Admit Reply and a Reply where
the OSG reiterated that GR. Nos. 190108 and 190473 had been
rendered moot and academic with the dismissal of the criminal case
for Qualified Theft against Guisande.

PERTINENT ISSUES:

Whether or not the remedies of habeas corpus and amparo are

proper in instances where the confinement or limitation in liberty is not
illegal or unlawful.
Whether or not the issue of Guisandes alleged illegal detention and
violation of constitutional rights during her incarceration at the NCMH
is moot and academic.
ANSWERS:

No.
Yes.

The act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of

should be illegal or unlawful As pointed out by the OSG, the basis
for the petition for habeas corpus and amparo is the confinement of
Guisande at NCMH in connection with her prosecution for qualified
theft. So alleged that her confinement at the NCMH was life
threatening as the NCMH could not adequately treat Guisandes
mental condition. Thus, to balance the conflicting right of an accused
to medical treatment and the right of the prosecution to subject to
court processes an accused charged with a non-bailable offense, the
CA directed the transfer of Guisande from the NCMH to St. Clares
Medical Center, while noting that because of the peculiarities of this
case, there was a deviation from the regular course of procedure,
since accused Guisande should have been confined in jail because
she was charged with a non-bailable offense.

It bears stressing that nowhere in the transcript of the CA hearing on

December 3, 2009, nor in the Order recited in open court by Justice
Pizarro, is there an affirmation of petitioner Sos claim that the
confinement of accused Guisande at the NCMH was illegal. Neither
were the respective acts performed by respondents Judge Tacla and
Dr. Vicente in ascertaining the mental condition of accused Guisande
to withstand trial declared unlawful. On the contrary, the NCMH, a
well-reputed government forensic facility, albeit not held in high regard
by petitioner Sos and accused Guisandes family, had assessed
Guisande fit for trial.

The Rules on the Writs of habeas corpus and amparo are clear; the
act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of
confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or
threat to violate, a persons life, liberty, and security for amparo cases
should be illegal or unlawful.

The privilege of the writ of amparo is aimed at protecting and

guaranteeing the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons As
was held in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the privilege of the writ of
amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to
life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that
vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized
and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy
ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought
by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate
filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure
amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations.

On the other hand, in Ampatuan v. Macaraig, the Court held that the
general purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether
or not a particular person is legally held. The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient. In passing upon a petition
for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the
petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be
refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where
such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be
unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner
discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be
refused.

In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to
which hospital, the NCMH or a medical facility of accuseds own
choosing, accused Guisande should be referred for treatment of a
supposed mental condition. In addition, we note that it was
procedurally proper for the RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate
opinion on accuseds mental fitness to be arraigned and stand trial.
Be that as it may, the CA allowed the transfer of accused to St. Clares
Medical Center under the custody of Dr. Rene Yat. Notwithstanding,
Guisande remained in custody of the law to answer for the nonbailable criminal charge against her, and was simply allowed to
pursue medical treatment in the hospital and from a doctor of her
choice.

2. EFFECT OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL

PROSECUTION ON THE PRESENT PETITIONS

The dismissal of the criminal prosecution for qualified theft against

Guisande rendered the issue moot and academic Certainly, with the
dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is
no longer under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much less at the
NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisandes person, and treatment of any
medical and mental malady she may or may not have, can no longer
be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In
short, the cases have now been rendered moot and academic which,
in the often cited David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, is defined as one that
ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value.

DISPOSITIVE:

The Supreme Court denied the petitions in G.R. Nos. 190108 and
190473 for the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo, and review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court for being moot and
academic.

AMPATUAN VS MACARAIG

City Prosecutor of Manila due to the alleged murder of Atty. Alioden D.

Dalaig, head of the Law Department of the COMELEC.

However, on 21 April 2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva

ordered the release for further investigation of PO1 Ampatuan. The
Order was approved by the City Prosecutor of Manila. But Police
Senior Superintendent Co Yee Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector
Agapito Quimson refused to release PO1 Ampatuan.

FACTS:
Hence the petition for habeas corpus.
Petitioner Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan filed a petition for the issuance of
a Writ of Habeas Corpus for the release of her husband, Police Officer
I Basser B. Ampatuan (PO1 Ampatuan). The petitioner alleged that on
14 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan, who was then assigned at Sultan
Kudarat Municipal Police Station, was asked by the Chief of Police to
report to the Provincial Director of Shariff Kabunsuan.

He was then brought to the Provincial Director of the Philippine

National Police (PNP) Maguindanao where he was restrained of his
freedom without cause. The next day, 15 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan
was brought to the General Santos City Airport and was made to
board a Philippine Airlines plane bound for Manila. Upon landing at
the Manila Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan was turned over to
policemen of Manila and brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim by
Police Director Geary Barias and General Roberto Rosales.

A press briefing was then conducted where it was announced that

PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for the killing of two (2) Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Officials. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was
brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato Gonzaga of the Office of the

Respondents for their part, alleged that on the evening of 10

November 2007, a sixty-four-year-old man, later identified as Atty.
Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was
killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita,
Manila. The investigation conducted by the Manila Police District
(MPD) Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator
as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to
the MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest
proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutors Office.

On 18 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was charged with the administrative

offense of grave misconduct for the alleged killing of Atty. Dalaig. On
the same day, Police Director General Avelino I. Razon, Jr. ordered
that PO1 Ampatuan be placed under restrictive custody. Acting on the
orders of General Razon, Jr., Special Order No. 921 was issued by
Police Director Edgardo E. Acuna, placing PO1 Ampatuan under
restrictive custody of the Regional Director, NCRPO, effective 19 April
2008.

Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila

recommended that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further
investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is
being held for other charges/legal grounds.

even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of

some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in
Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of
the application.

However, on 25 April 2008, Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig denied the

petition for habeas corpus and held that the placement of PO1
Ampatuan under restrictive custody pursuant to Section 52, par. 4 of
Republic Act No. 8551 (otherwise known as the Philippine National
Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998) constitutes a valid
restraint of his liberty.

Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have
been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The
writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the person
is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.

PERTINENT ISSUE: Whether or not the placement of PO1 Ampatuan

under restrictive custody pursuant to Section 52 of Republic Act No.
8551 is unlawful or illegal for which the remedy of habeas corpus is
proper.

The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that
the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of
movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an
individuals liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of
habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the
grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in
the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action.

ANSWER: No.

SUPREME COURT RULINGS:

PROPRIETY OF THE REMEDY OF HABEAS CORPUS

The writ of habeas corpus applies only to cases of illegal confinement

or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty The
objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or
detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to
be inquired into is the legality of a persons detention as of, at the
earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for

Habeas corpus applies to any form of illegal or unlawful restraint of

liberty In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime
specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an
actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint
of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas
corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the
writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient.

Habeas Corpus: judicial inquiry and discretion In passing upon a

petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into
whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the
writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed
only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter
found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the
petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ
will be refused.

Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the

ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that
would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible
precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police
officers concerned are always accounted for. Since the
basis of PO1 Ampatuans r estrictive custody is the
administrative case filed against him, his remedy is within such
administrative process.

DISPOSITIVE:
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of
course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition.
Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to
the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the
petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a
person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for
habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or
restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is
filed, the petition should be dismissed.

Restrictive custody under R.A. No. 6975, as amended by R.A. No.

8551 is not an unlawful or illegal restraint on liberty Under Section
52 of R.A. No. 8551, the Chief of the PNP has the authority to place
police personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of a
grave administrative case filed against him or even after the filing of a
criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel.
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody,
such constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This
Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements
or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors
is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VS MANALO

FACTS:

On 14 February 2006, at past noon, Raymond Manalo (hereafter

referred to as Raymond) and Reynaldo Manalo (hereafter referred to
as Reynaldo) were abducted by military men belonging to the
Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion
that they were members and supporters of the New Peoples Army
(NPA). After eighteen (18) months of detention and torture, the
brothers escaped on 13 August 2007.

On 23 August 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo filed a Petition for

Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order before the
Supreme Court to stop the military officers and agents from depriving
them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. In a Resolution

dated 24 August 2007, the Supreme Court ordered the Secretary of

the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), their agents, representatives,
or persons acting in their stead, and further enjoined them from
causing the arrest of Raymond and Reynaldo. Forthwith, they filed a
Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as
Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim
and Final Amparo Reliefs.

PERTINENT ISSUES:

Whether or not statements from the victims themselves is sufficient for

amparo petitions.
Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for the right to
security of a person may be invoked.

While the aforementioned case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007. Raymond and Reynaldo
subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their
existing peti tion as amparo petition.

ANSWER:

On 25 October 2007, the Supreme Court resolved to treat the 23

August 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule. The
Supreme Court likewise granted the Writ of Amparo and remanded
the petition to the Court of Appeals to conduct the summary hearing
and decide the petition.

No.

On 26 December 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of

the writ of amparo. The Court of Appeals ordered the Secretary of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the
Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation
reports as to the custody of Raymond and Reynaldo, confirm the
present places of official assignment of two military officials involved,
and produce all medical reports and records of Raymond and
Reynaldo while under military custody.

Aggrieved, the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of

the AFP filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.

It depends on the credibility and candidness of the victims in their

statements.

SUPREME COURT RULINGS:

1.

ON EVIDENCE REQUIRED ON AMPARO PETITIONS

Effect of the nature of enforced disappearance and torture to the

quantum of evidence required With the secret nature of an enforced
disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during
detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence
of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity
of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their
written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated
by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they
suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were
detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the
hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as
no surprise.

xxx
2. ON RIGHT TO SECURITY AS A GROUND FOR AMPARO
PETITION

Permutations of the Right to Security A closer look at the right to

security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of
this right. First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In
its whereas clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) enunciates that a world in which human beings shall enjoy
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has
been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.
Some scholars postulate that freedom from fear is not only an
aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human
right. It is the right to security of person as the word security itself
means freedom from fear. Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of

ones rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo,
this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty
under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to
security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily
and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to
security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the
State guarantees full respect for human rights under Article II,
Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief
guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the
rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if
government does not afford protection to these rights especially when
they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective
investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances
(or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the
bar of justice.

xxx

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and

psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987
Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be
searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries
inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body.
It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful
physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the
danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries
constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the
bodily integrity or security of a person.

Freedom from fear as a right In the context of Section 1 of the

Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the right and any threat to the
rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state
of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear
caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to wellfounded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from
one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their
imagination, strength of character or past experience with the
stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that
the right to security is actually the freedom from threat. Viewed in
this light, the threatened with violation Clause in the latter part of
Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to
security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.

Deprivation of liberty is not necessary before the right to security may

be invoked While the right to security of person appears in
conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has
ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of the
right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a
deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked.

DISPOSITIVE:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 26 December 2007.

FERIA VS CA
Facts: Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention since May
21, 1981, up to present by reason of his conviction of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, in Criminal Case 60677, by the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 2, for the jeepney hold-up and killing of
United States Peace Corps Volunteer Margaret Viviene Carmona.
Some 12 years later, or on 9 June 1993, Feria sought to be
transferred from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in
Muntinlupa City, but the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail informed
the Presiding Judge of the RTC-Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer
cannot be effected without the submission of the requirements,
namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and
Information. It was then discovered that the entire records of the case,
including the copy of the judgment, were missing. In response to the
inquiries made by counsel of feria, both the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 2 attested to the fact that the records of Criminal Case
60677 could not be found in their respective offices. Upon further

inquiries, the entire records appear to have been lost or destroyed in

the fire which occurred at the second and third floor of the Manila City
Hall on 3 November 1986. On 3 October 1994, Feria filed a Petition
for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme Court
against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of
Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of
Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground that
his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and
violative of his constitutional right to due process. In its Resolution
dated 10 October 1994, the Second Division of the Supreme Court
resolved (a) to issue the Writ of Habeas Corpus; (b) to order the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to conduct an
immediate raffle of the case among the incumbent judges thereof; and
(c) to require [1] the Judge to whom this case is raffled to set the case
for hearing on 13 October 1994, try and decide the same on the
merits and thereafter furnish the Supreme Court with a copy of his
decision thereon; [2] the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, et. al. to
make a return of the Writ on or before the close of office hours on 12
October 1994 and appear personally and produce the person of
Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing on said date and time of hearing to the
Judge to whom the case is raffled, and [3] the Director General,
Philippine National Police, through his duly authorized
representative(s) to serve the Writ and Petition, and make a return
thereof as provided by law and, specifically, his duly authorized
representative(s) to appear personally and escort the person of
Norberto Feria y Pacquing at said date and time of hearing. The case
was then raffled to Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
which on 15 November 1994, after hearing, issued an Order
dismissing the case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of
the case does not invalidate the judgment or commitment nor
authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper remedy
would be reconstitution of the records of the case which should be
filed with the court which rendered the decision. Feria duly appealed
said Order to the Court of Appeals, which on 28 April 1995, rendered
the Decision affirming the decision of the trial court with the
modification that "in the interest of orderly administration of justice"
and "under the peculiar facts of the case" Feria may be transferred to

the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City without submission of

the requirements. With the motion for reconsideration being denied for
lack of merit, Feria filed the petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the mere loss or destruction of the records of a

criminal case subsequent to conviction of the accused would render
the judgment of conviction void, or would it warrant the release of the
convict by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus.
Held: The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is
traced to antiquity, was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and
only sufficient defense of personal freedom. It secures to a prisoner
the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined
by a court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether
he is held under lawful authority. Consequently, the writ may also be
availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there
has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint
of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence,
or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is
void as to such excess. 15 Petitioner's claim is anchored on the first
ground considering, as he claims, that his continued detention,
notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is
violative of his constitutional right to due process. Herein, based on
the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is
sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of
Feria which serves as the legal basis for his detention. Petitioner
made judicial admissions, both verbal and written, that he was
charged with and convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
and sentenced to suffer imprisonment "habang buhay". Further, the
records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated
January 1985 of then Judge Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the fact
that Feria was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide on 11
January 1985. Such Monthly Report constitutes an entry in official
records under Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on

Evidence, which is prima facie evidence of facts therein stated. As a

general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint rests on the
petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return
is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process which
on its face shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is
incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends to
invalidate the apparent effect of such process. If the detention of the
prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the return is
considered prima facie evidence of The validity of the restraint and the
petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal.
Since the public officials have sufficiently shown good ground for the
detention, Feria's release from confinement is not warranted under
Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, there is also
no showing that petitioner duly appealed his conviction of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, hence for all intents and purposes, such
judgment has already become final and executory. When a court has
jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged,
its judgment, order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by
habeas corpus. Put another way, in order that a judgment may be
subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must be void for lack
of jurisdiction.

MONCUPA VS ENRILE
As early as 1919, in the leading case of Villavicencio v.
Lukban (39 Phil. 778, 790), this Court ruled:
A prime specification of al application for a writ of
habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient. ...
This latitudinarian scope of the writ of habeas-corpus has, in
law, remained undiminished up to the present. The

respondents' contention that the petition has become moot

and academic must necessarily be denied. Efren C.
Moncupa may have been released from his detention cell. The
restraints attached to his temporary release, however,
preclude freedom of action and under the Villavicencio v.
Lukban rule warrant this Court's inquiry into the nature of his
involuntary restraint and our relieving him of such restraints as
may be illegal.

Against the other accused, however, the cases filed were for
violation of P.D. 885 as amended. Significantly, the petitioner
was excluded from the charge under the Revised AntiSubversion Law. During the pendency of this petition, it is
significant that his arraignment and further proceedings have
not been pursued. And yet, the petitioner's motions for bail
were denied by the lower court.
Hence, the petitioner filed the instant petition.

Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa, together with

others, was arrested on April 22, 1982 at
about 10:50 P.M., at the corner of D. Street
and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Moncupa
D. Tuazon was brought to MIG-15 Camp
Bago Bantay, Quezon City where he was
detained. On April 23, 1982, on the allegation
that he was a National Democratic Front
(NDF) staff member, a Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) was issued
against him and eight (8) other persons.
After two separate investigations, conducted first, by Lieutenant
Colonel Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Chief of Task Force Makabansa
Investigation Group and second, by Investigating Fiscal Amado
Costales of Quezon City, it was ascertained that the
petitioner was not a member of any subversive
organization. Both investigators recommended the
prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal possession of
firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents
under Presidential Decree No. 33.
Consequently, two separate informations were filed against
the petitioner, one, for illegal possession of firearms before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for
violation of P.D. 33 before the City Court of Quezon City.

The respondents, in their return of the writ justified the validity

of petitioner's detention on the ground that the privilege of
the writ had been suspended as to the petitioner. However,
on August 30, 1983, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss
stating that on May 11, 1983, the petitioner was temporarily
released from detention on orders of the Minister
temporary of National Defense with the approval of the
President. The respondents stated. "Since the petitioner is free
and no longer under the custody of the respondents, the present
petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and
academic as in similar cases.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the instant petition
has become moot and academic in view of the petitioner's
temporary release.
It is to be noted that attached to the petitioner's temporary
release are restrictions imposed on him. These are:
1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that
petitioner gets the approval of respondents for any travel
outside Metro Manila.
2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of
respondents is also required in case petitioner wants to
change his place of residence.
3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he
should not "participate in any interview conducted by any

local or foreign mass media representatives nor give any

press release or information that is inimical to the interest
of national security."

In the light of the above ruling, the present petition for habeas
corpus has not become moot and academic. Other precedents
for such a conclusion are not wanting.

4) He is required to report regularly to respondents or their

representatives.

The decision in Caunca v. Salazar (82 Phil. 851) states:

The petitioner argues that although admittedly his temporary

release is an improvement upon his actual detention, the
restrictions imposed by the respondents constitute an
involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom.
The petitioner stresses that his temporary release did not render
the instant petitioner moot and academic but that "it merely
shifted the inquiry from the legality of his actual detention to the
legality of the conditions imposed by the respondents."
We agree with the petitioner.
The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions
attached to the temporary release of the petitioner
constitute restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. Such
restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is
not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the
writ of habeas corpus.
In Villavicencio v. Lukban, the women who had been illegally
seized and transported against their will to Davao were no
longer under any official restraint. Unlike petitioner Moncupa,
they were free to change their domicile without asking for official
permission. Indeed, some of them managed to return to Manila.
Yet, the Court condemned the involuntary restraints caused by
the official action, fined the Mayor of Manila and expressed the
hope that its "decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of
an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty
from Megal encroachment."

An employment agency, regardless of the amount

it may advance to a prospective employee or
maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her
freedom of movement. The fact that no physical
force has been exerted to keep her in the house of
the respondent does not make less real the
deprivation of her personal freedom of movement,
freedom to transfer from one place to another,
from to choose one's residence. Freedom may be
lost due to external moral compulsion, to
founded or groundless fear, to erroneous
belief in the existence of the will. If the actual
effect of such psychological spell is to place a
person at the mercy of another, the victim is
entitled to the protection of courts of justice as
much as the individual who is illigally deprived
of liberty by deprived or physical coercion.
In Tibo v. The Provincial Commander (85 SCRA 564), this Court
ruled:
Although the release in the custody of the Deputy
Minister did not signify that petitioners could once
again enjoy their full freedom, the application
could have been dismissed, as it could be
withdrawn by the parties themselves. That is a
purely voluntary act. When the hearing was held
on September 7, 1978, it turned out that counsel
for petitioner Bonifacio V. Tupaz could have
academic in a hasty manner when he set forth the
above allegations in his manifestation of August
30, 1978, for Attorney Jose C. Espinas, who
appeared for petitioners, while conceding that

there was such a release from confinement, also

alleged that it was conditioned on their restricting
their activities as labor union leaders to the
premises of the Trade Unions of the Philippines
and ABSOLUTE Services, presumably in
Macaraig as well as the Ministry of labor. As the
voting was to take place in the business firm in
Bataan, the acts set would nullify whatever efforts
they could have exerted. To that extent, and with
the prohibition against their going to Bataan, the
restraint on liberty was undeniable. If so, the moot
and academic character of the petition was far
from clear.
More recently, we had occasion to rule squarely on whether or
not a temporary release from detention renders the petition for
writ of habeas corpus moot and academic. As in this case of
Moncupa, the petitioners in Toyoto, et al v. Hon. Fidel Ramos, et
al, G.R. No. 69270, October 15, 1985, were temporarily
released from detention. The respondents filed a motion to
dismiss the petition for habeas corpus on the ground that the
petitioners had been temporarily released and their case had,
therefore, become moot and academic. The petitioners insisted,
however, that their case may be considered moot and academic
only "if their release would be permanent." In ruling for the
petitioners, we said:
Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes
moot and academic when the restraint on the
liberty of the petitioners is lifted either temporarily
or permanently. We have so held in a number of
cases. But the instant case presents a different
situation. The question to be resolved is whether
the State can reserve the power to re-arrest a
person for an offense after a court of competent
jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An
affirmative answer is the one suggested by the
respondents because the release of the petitioners
being merely 'temporary' it follows that they can be

re-arrested at anytime despite their acquittal by a

court of competent jurisdiction. We hold that such
a reservation is repugnant to the government of
laws and not of men principle. Under this
principle the moment a person is acquitted on
a criminal charge he can no longer be detained
or re-arrested for the same offense. This
concept is so basic and elementary that it
needs no elaboration.
In effect the principle is clear. A release that renders a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be
one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a
person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due
process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but
appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom
originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments,
become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his
behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.
The respondents have failed to show why the writ may not
issue and why the restraints on the petitioner's freedom of
movement should not be lifted.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The conditions
attached to the temporary release of the petitioner are declared
null and void. The temporary release of the petitioner is
declared ABSOLUTE. No costs,
SO ORDERED.
ILAGAN VS CA
http://www.scribd.com/doc/35854147/Habeas-Corpus-Reviewer
ARRIBA VS PEOPLE
FACTS:

Abdon A. Arriba, as counsel for Edmundo Ramirez, filed a petition for

the issuance of a habeas corpus on the ground that the continued
detention of his client, accused of attempted rape but unable to post
his bail bond even after two years and five months had elapsed since
the termination of the trial, was illegal. On 11 June 1981, the Supreme
Court issued the writ applied for, required respondent to make a return
on or before 03 July 1981, and set the hearing of the petition on 07
July 1981 at 11:00 oclock in the morning. The Supreme Court
likewise dispensed with the appearance in person of detainee
Edmundo Ramirez, who, according to the petition, was then confined
in the provincial jail of Misamis Oriental. It further required the Solicitor
General to inquire as to whether under the circumstances, release
can be ordered and, if so, inform the Court.

considered moot and academic. A copy of the release order as well

as the decision was thereafter submitted to the Supreme Court.

PERTINENT ISSUE: Whether or not the plea of the Solicitor General

to consider the petition moot and academic is warranted.

ANSWER: Yes

SUPREME COURT RULINGS:

ON PROPRIETY OF THE WRIT OF HABE AS CORPUS

In a compliance Med on 03 July 1981, Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza stated the following: 1. In its subject resolution, the Solicitor
General is required to inquire as to whether under the circumstances,
release of the detainee, Edmundo Ramirez, can be ordered, and, if
so, inform the Court. 2. Immediately upon receipt of a copy of said
resolution on June 17, 1981, undersigned counsel dispatched
separate telegrams to Judge Tago M. Bantuas of the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Oriental, Branch VII, before whom the criminal
case of attempted rape against the subject detainee is pending, and
to the respondent Provincial Warden of Misamis Oriental for
information regarding the status and the facts and circumstances
surrounding the detention in question. 3. Per information relayed to
the undersigned counsel through long distance telephone by the
Provincial Warden on 01 July 1981, detainee Edmundo Ramirez had
been released on 29 June 1981, by virtue of an order issued by Judge
Tago M. Bantuas who, on the same date, allegedly promulgated a
decision in the aforementioned criminal case acquitting Edmundo
Ramirez of the charge of attempted rape and that the foregoing is
incorporated in the return which he allegedly filed with this Honorable
Court. 4. In view of detainees release, the instant petition may now be

Nature of Habeas Corpus Chief Justice Marshall correctly

characterized habeas corpus as a high prerogative writ, known to the
common law, the great object of which is the liberation of those who
may be imprisoned without sufficient cause. Correctly then was it
described by Justice Malcolm as having been devised and exists as
a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. Not so long ago the Supreme Court expressed a similar
view: The fundamental issue, to repeat, is the availability of the writ of
habeas corpus under the circumstances disclosed. Its latitudinarian
scope to assure that illegality of restraint and detention be avoided is
one of the truisms of the law. It is not known as the writ of liberty for
nothing. The writ imposes on judges the grave responsibility of
ascertaining whether there is any legal justification for a deprivation of
physical freedom. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement
must thereby cease. If there be a valid sentence it cannot, even for a
moment, be extended beyond the period provided for by law. Any

deviation from the legal norms calls for the termination of the
imprisonment.

It can be said that the accused obtained justice ultimately but at too
high a cost. Had the case been terminated promptly as the law
requires, he would have been set free much sooner. In the traditional
sense, the right to a speedy trial cannot be invoked after the
termination of the proceedings. Nor is mandamus the only appropriate
remedy for a decision to be rendered if the statutory period set forth
by law had been exceeded. There could be cases where the writ of
liberty would, in the language of Justice Malcolm be the most
efficacious remedy. The judgment of acquittal, long overdue,
reinforces such an approach.

DISPOSITIVE:

of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional
requisites.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.
HELD: The
doctrine established
in Barcelon and Montenegro was
subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC declared that it had
the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul
the same if no legal ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings
were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including two closeddoor sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by
the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the
petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a
massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the
government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously
decided to uphold the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus.

MERALCO VS LIM
FACTS:

The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of habeas corpus for being
moot and academic. The Supreme Court likewise required Judge
Tago M. Bantuas to explain within fifteen (15) days the delay in
rendering the decision of the case.

Respondent Rosario G. Lim, also known as Cherry Lim, is an

administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO). On
04 June 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the
Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel,
Bulacan. The letter reads:

LANSANG VS GARCIA
Cherry Lim:
Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in
1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that
there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently,
Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation
and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the suspension

MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO,

NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG
KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA
MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB.

Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO

linesmen.

In a Memorandum dated 04 July 2008, Alexander Deyto, Head of

MERALCOs Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of
respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as A/F
OTMS Clerk, effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of
reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her]
from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her]
safety and security.

The respondent however, did not agree with her transfer and filed an
appeal with Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice- President and Head of
MERALCOs Human Resource Administration, and requested for a
dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the
matter, claiming that the punitive nature of the transfer amounted to
a denial of due process. She likewise claimed the grueling travel from
her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation
of the provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA).

Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation

of her transfer pending resolution of the issues she raised.

No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a

petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan. She claimed
petitioners unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued
failure and refusal to provide her with details or information about the
alleged report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning

threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to

privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data.
Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her
transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.

In its Decision dated 22 September 2008, the RTC granted

respondents petition including the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing
respondents transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the
disclosures required. The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that
recourse to a writ of habeas data should extend not only to victims of
extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens,
like respondent whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by
petitioners refusal to provide her with information or data on the
reported threats to her person.

Thus, the petition for review.

PERTINENT ISSUE: Whether or not the remedy of habeas data may

be properly issued to protect purely property or commercial concerns
where there is no clear showing of any unjustifiable or unlawful
violation of the right to privacy in relation to the rights to life, liberty,
and security.

ANSWER: No.

SUPREME COURT RULINGS:

PROPRIETY OF THE REMEDY OF HABEAS DATA

The remedy of habeas data can only be invoked to protect the right to
privacy in relation to the rights to life, liberty, and security The
habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of
judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom
of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to
enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus
safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life,
liberty and security against abuse in this age of information
technology.

In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that

petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of
respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or
security. To argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of
reports allegedly received on the threats to respondents safety
amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative.
Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from
unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008
letter as highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they
existed at all. And she even suspects that her transfer to another
place of work betray[s] the real intent of management and could be a
punitive move. Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is
labor-related.

It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was
conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available
remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings
and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy
independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.

DISPOSITIVE:

The Writ of Habeas Data cannot be invoked in labor disputes where

there is no unlawful violation of the right to life, liberty, or security
Castillo v. Cruz (G.R. No. 182165, November 25, 2009) underscores
the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario (G. R. No. 182484,
June 17, 2008) that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT
issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the context of
the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that
respondents reservations on the real reasons for her transfer a
legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones
employment are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary
remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably
lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.

The Supreme Court granted the petition for review on certiorari. The
assailed decision of the trial court was reversed and set aside.

CASTILLO VS CA
FACTS:

Spouses Francisco and Amanda Cruz leased a parcel of land located

at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos, Bulacan from the Provincial Government
of Bulacan. However, the Provincial Government of Bulacan intended
to use the property for projects, thus upon expiry of the lease, it
demanded that the respondents vacate the property. When the
respondents refused to heed its demands, it filed an action for

unlawful detainer before the M unicipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bulacan,

Bulacan.

The MTC rendered judgment against the respondents which was

affirmed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan. The
judgment for ejectment became final and executory.

Despite the said judgment, respondents refused to vacate the

property and filed cases against the Provincial Government of
Bulacan and the judges who presided over the case. Notwithstanding
the cases filed by the respondents, judgment for ejectment was
executed on 25 January 2008 pursuant to a Second Alias Writ of
Demolition issued by the MTC. However, the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan
acted favorably on an application for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) by the respondents.

Thus, the Spouses Cruz, along with their sonsrespondents Nixon

and Ferdinand, thereupon entered the property, placed several
container vans and purportedly represented themselves as owners of
the property which was for lease.

On 03 March 2008, respondents herein filed for a Respectful MotionPetition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data alleging that despite the
permanent injunction, petitioners entered the property and arrested
the respondents when they attempted to resist the entry.

The RTC of Malolos granted the petition for amparo and habeas data
as the respondents has sufficiently proven that the petitioners
committed acts subjecting the former to bodily harm, mental torture,
degradation, and the debasement of a human being, reminiscent of
the martial law police brutality, sending chill in any ordinary citizen.

PERTINENT ISSUES:

Whether or not the remedies of amparo and habeas data are proper
in cases involving property disputes without a showing of a
considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on
respondents right to life, liberty and security.
Whether or not the privilege of amparo may still be granted despite
the dismissal of the case for qualified theft against Guisande.
ANSWER:

In response, the Mayor of Malolos sought assistance from the

Philippine National Police who were led by Police Superintendent
Felixberto Castillo and sought to protect, secure and maintain the
possession of the property. The respondents, however, refused to
surrender possession invoking a prior permanent injunction issued by
the RTC of Malolos which they claimed enjoined the Provincial
Government of Bulacan from repossessing the property.

No
No.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:

PROPRIETY OF THE REMEDY OF AMPARO

The remedy of amparo can only be invoked to protect the right to life,
liberty, and security Under the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and
Habeas Data, the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of
rights to life, liberty, and security although the writs cover not only
actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions. As was held in
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, the Amparo Rule was
intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is
confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal
killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand,
enforced disappearances are attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting
with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal
of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which
places such persons outside the protection of law.

Thus, to be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must

meet the threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission.
Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute
between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any
considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on
respondents right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve
on the propriety of petitioners entry into the property.

It bears emphasis that respondents petition did not show any actual
violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and
security. Bare allegations that petitioners in unison, conspiracy and in
contempt of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with
the use of force and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically
manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested the herein

petitioners (respondents) will not suffice to prove entitlement to the

remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was
present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the
offenses a day after thei r arrest.

Habeas data cannot be invoked when respondents are not gathering,

collecting, or storing data or information Oddly, respondents also
seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not even alleged
that petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing data or information
regarding their person, family, home and correspondence. More
importantly, respondent Amanda and one of her sons, Francisco Jr.,
likewise filed a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data before the
Sandiganbayan, they alleging the commission of continuing threats by
petitioners after the issuance of the writs by the RTC. Such petition
was correctly dismissed for insufficiency and forum shopping.

It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in
fact taken full advantage of the legal system with the filing of civil,
criminal and administrative charges.

It need not be underlined that respondents petitions for writs of

amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies which cannot be
used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in
a property dispute.

An independent action for Amparo and Habeas Data is improper once

criminal proceedings have been commenced; must be raised by
motion in the criminal proceedings At all events, respondents filing
of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been
barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after
they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in

accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of

the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that
may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for
writs of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the writs
may, however, be made available to the aggrieved party by motion in
the criminal proceedings.

It bears stressing that nowhere in the transcript of the CA hearing on

December 3, 2009, nor in the Order recited in open court by Justice
Pizarro, is there an affirmation of petitioner Sos claim that the
confinement of accused Guisande at the NCMH was illegal. Neither
were the respective acts performed by respondents Judge Tacla and
Dr. Vicente in ascertaining the mental condition of accused Guisande
to withstand trial declared unlawful. On the contrary, the NCMH, a
well-reputed government forensic facility, albeit not held in high regard
by petitioner Sos and accused Guisandes family, had assessed
Guisande fit for trial.

The Rules on the Writs of habeas corpus and amparo are clear; the
act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of
confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or
threat to violate, a persons life, liberty, and security for amparo cases
should be illegal or unlawful.

As was held in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the privilege of the writ

of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights
to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that
vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized
and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy
ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought
by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate
filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure

amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated

allegations.

On the other hand, in Ampatuan v. Macaraig, the Court held that the
general purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether
or not a particular person is legally held. The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient. In passing upon a petition
for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the
petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be
refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where
such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be
unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner
discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be
refused.

In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to
which hospital, the NCMH or a medical facility of accuseds own
choosing, accused Guisande should be referred for treatment of a
supposed mental condition. In addition, we note that it was
procedurally proper for the RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate
opinion on accuseds mental fitness to be arraigned and stand trial.
Be that as it may, the CA allowed the transfer of accused to St. Clares
Medical Center under the custody of Dr. Rene Yat. Notwithstanding,
Guisande remained in custody of the law to answer for the nonbailable criminal charge against her, and was simply allowed to
pursue medical treatment in the hospital and from a doctor of her
choice.

DISPOSITIVE:

5. The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to RTC.

The Supreme Court granted the Supreme Court granted the petition
for review on certiorari. Accordingly, the 04 March 2008 Order of the
RTC of Malolos, Bulacan is declared null and void, and its 28 March
2008 Decision is reversed and set aside. The Supreme Court likewise
dismissed Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008.

TAPUZ VS DEL ROSARIO

6. On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents motion for

the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction upon posting
of a bond. The writ authorizing the immediate implementation of the
MCTC decision was actually issued by respondent Judge del Rosario
after the private respondents had complied with the imposed condition.
The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private
respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.

FACTS:

7. The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners MR and to

Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.

1. The private respondents spouses Sanson filed with the Aklan MCTC a
complaint for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of

8. Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. The

a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners and

other John Does numbering about 120.
2. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the
registered owners of the disputed land; (2) they were the disputed lands
prior possessors when the petitioners armed with bolos and carrying
suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons entered the
disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private respondents
permission and against the objections of the private respondents security
men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
3. In their Answer, the petitioners denied the material allegations and
essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior possessors of the
disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the
intruders; and (3) the private respondents certificate of title to the
disputed property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the
complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages.
4. The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered a decision in the private
respondents favor, finding prior possession through the construction of
perimeter fence in 1993.

respondent Judge nevertheless issued via a Special Order a writ of

demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriffs written
notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the
private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.
9. The petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Review of the Permanent
Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition in CA.
10. Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff issued the Notice to Vacate and for
Demolition. Hence, the present petition for certiorari with writs of
amparo and habeas data.
ISSUE: W/N petition for certiorari with writ of amparo and habeas data
is proper
HELD:
No. We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas
data fatally defective, both in substance and in form. The petition for the
issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with
respect to content and substance.

Based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that
the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data
requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient.

out of time. Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the
petitioners have been guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation

Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful

violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or

before this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping. In sum, the
petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal

security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated,
any need for information under the control of police authorities other

deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having

been filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.

than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or
justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as

previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In
sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more

a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and

enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and
effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended
to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security,
as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available
under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules.
What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in
line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable
certainty that its issuance demands requires that every petition for the
issuance of the Writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact.
On the whole, what is clear from these statements both sworn and
unsworn is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition
traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property
disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life
or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the
occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the
other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments
implied from the presence of armed men bare to the waist and the
alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting
affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty
and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.

than the fishing expedition that this Court in the course of drafting
the Rule on habeas data had in mind in defining what the purpose of a
writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.
PETITION DENIED.