Terry v. Ohio (No.

67)
392 U.S. 1
Argued: December 12, 1967 | Decided: June 10, 1968
Warren, C.J.
A Cleveland detective (McFadden), on a downtown beat which he
had been patrolling for many years, observed two strangers
(petitioner and another man, Chilton) on a street corner. He saw
them proceed alternately back and forth along an identical route,
pausing to stare in the same store window, which they did for a
total of about 24 times. Each completion of the route was
followed by a conference between the two on a corner, at one of
which they were joined by a third man (Katz) who left swiftly.
Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a stick-up," the officer
followed them and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of
blocks away in front of a store. The officer approached the three,
identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The
men "mumbled something," whereupon McFadden spun
petitioner around, patted down his outside clothing, and found in
his overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove, a pistol. The
officer ordered the three into the store. He removed petitioner's
overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to face the
wall with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing
of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton's outside
overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer
garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing in his pat-down
which might have been a weapon), or under petitioner's or
Chilton's outer garments until he felt the guns. The three were
taken to the police station. Petitioner and Chilton were charged
with carrying concealed weapons. The defense moved to
suppress the weapons. Though the trial court rejected the
prosecution theory that the guns had been seized during a
search incident to a lawful arrest, the court denied the motion to
suppress and admitted the weapons into evidence on the ground
that the officer had cause to believe that petitioner and Chilton
were acting suspiciously, that their interrogation was warranted,
and that the officer, for his own protection, had the right to pat
down their outer clothing having reasonable cause to believe
that they might be armed. The court distinguished between an
investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of the
outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence
of crime. Petitioner and Chilton were found guilty, an
intermediate appellate court affirmed, and the State Supreme

Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that "no substantial

constitutional question" was involved.
Held:
1. The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches
and seizures, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment, "protects people, not places," and therefore applies
as much to the citizen on the streets as well as at home or
elsewhere.
2. The issue in this case is not the abstract propriety of the
police conduct, but the admissibility against petitioner of the
evidence uncovered by the search and seizure.
3. The exclusionary rule cannot properly be invoked to exclude
the products of legitimate and restrained police investigative
techniques, and this Court's approval of such techniques should
not discourage remedies other than the exclusionary rule to
curtail police abuses for which that is not an effective sanction.
4. The Fourth Amendment applies to "stop and frisk" procedures
such as those followed here.
(a) Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that
person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
(b) A careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's
clothing in an attempt to find weapons is a "search" under
that Amendment.
5. Where a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the
circumstances of a given case in believing that his safety or that
of others is endangered, he may make a reasonable search for
weapons of the person believed by him to be armed and
dangerous regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest
that individual for crime or the absolute certainty that the
individual is armed.
(a) Though the police must, whenever practicable, secure a
warrant to make a search and seizure, that procedure cannot
be followed where swift action based upon on-the-spot
observations of the officer on the beat is required.

(b) The reasonableness of any particular search and seizure

must be assessed in light of the particular circumstances
against the standard of whether a man of reasonable caution
is warranted in believing that the action taken was
appropriate.
(c) The officer here was performing a legitimate function of
investigating suspicious conduct when he decided to
approach petitioner and his companions.
(d) An officer justified in believing that an individual whose
suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is
armed may, to neutralize the threat of physical harm, take
necessary measures to determine whether that person is
carrying a weapon.
(e) A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to
arrest must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies of the
situation.
(f) An officer may make an intrusion short of arrest where he
has reasonable apprehension of danger before being
possessed of information justifying arrest.
6. The officer's protective seizure of petitioner and his
companions and the limited search which he made were
reasonable, both at their inception and as conducted.
(a) The actions of petitioner and his companions were
consistent with the officer's hypothesis that they were
contemplating a daylight robbery and were armed.
(b) The officer's search was confined to what was minimally
necessary to determine whether the men were armed, and
the intrusion, which was made for the sole purpose of
protecting himself and others nearby, was confined to
ascertaining the presence of weapons.
7. The revolver seized from petitioner was properly admitted into
evidence against him, since the search which led to its seizure
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Affirmed.

See original copies for:

People v. Bagista
People v. Lapitaje
People v. Balingan
People vs Salanguit
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO, accused-appellant
G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001
Mendoza, J.
On 26 December 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, to
search the residence of Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St.,
Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1
Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was
able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from Salanguit. The sale
took place in Salunguit's room, and Badua saw that the shabu
was taken by Salunguit from a cabinet inside his room. The
application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued
by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol. At about 10:30 p.m. of
said day, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian
informer, went to the residence of Salunguit to serve the
warrant. The police operatives knocked on Salanguits door, but
nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house,
apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door
open and entered the house. After showing the search warrant to
the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started
searching the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed
transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline
substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline
substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be
marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a total weight of
approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was
prepared, but Salanguit refused to sign it.
After the search, the police operatives took Salanguit with them
to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the
items they had seized. PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory
examination of the confiscated evidence. The white crystalline
substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained
in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other
hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams
and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana.

Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic

Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana,
(Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q- 95-64358, respectively) were
filed on 28 December 1995. After hearing, the trial court
rendered its decision, convicting Salanguit in Criminal Cases Q95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16 and 8,
respectively, RA 6425, and sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate sentence with a minimum of 6 months of arresto
mayor and a maximum of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional, and reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P700,000.00, respectively.
Salanguit appealed; contesting his conviction on the grounds of:
(1) The admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his
residence as evidence against him on the ground that the
warrant used in obtaining it was invalid;
(2) The admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly
seized from Salanguit to the "plain view" doctrine; and
(3) The employment of unnecessary force by the police in the
execution of the warrant.
Issues:
Whether or not the warrant was invalid for failure of providing
evidence to support the seizure of drug paraphernalia.
Whether or not the marijuana may be included as evidence in
light of the plain view doctrine.
Held:
Yes. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined
quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia. Evidence was
presented showing probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there
was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure
of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the
search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug
paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that
none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all,
therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized
the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure
of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was
presented showing probable cause as to its existence.
In sum, with respect to the seizure of shabu from Salanguits
residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such

warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined

by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. With respect to, and in light of the plain
view doctrine, the police failed to allege the time when the
marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous
with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was
recovered on Salanguits person or in an area within his
immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during
the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from
the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was
invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case
Q-95-64357 only.
Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, finding accused-appellant
Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugs under
16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act, and sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging from six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and
ordering the confiscation of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride is AFFIRMED.
Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, finding accused-appellant
Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs
under 8 of R.A. No. 6425, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
Confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the
11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its
disposition as ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED.

State vs. von Bulow

447 A.2d 380 (1982)
STATE v. Claus von BULOW.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
July 6, 1982.
KELLEHER, Justice.
The defendant, Claus von Bulow (von Bulow), stands convicted
by a Superior Court jury, which returned its verdict after listening

to evidence relating to a two-count indictment, each count of

which charged von Bulow with assaulting his wife with an intent
to murder her. Later, on April 2, 1982, von Bulow's motion for a
new trial on both counts was denied. During this period he was
allowed to remain free on the $50,000 surety bail posted for
each count at the time he was arraigned. When von Bulow
returned to the Superior Court on May 7, 1982, he received a
ten-year sentence on the first count and a consecutive twentyyear sentence on the second count. At that time the trial justice
rejected the state's request that von Bulow be held without bail
pending his appeal. The trial justice set bail at $1 million and
allowed von Bulow to execute a personal recognizance but
conditioned the grant upon von Bulow's satisfying "the Attorney
General and/or the Superior Court that he is the owner and is
presently in possession of $1,000,000.00 (One Million Dollars)
worth of assets" and agreeing "not to divest himself of any of
these assets, without the express approval of the Attorney
General and the Superior Court."
Two weeks later, on May 21, 1982, von Bulow, his counsel, and
counsel for the state were once again before the trial justice. At
that time the trial justice reiterated his willingness to place von
Bulow on bail. He noted the receipt of von Bulow's confidential
statement of assets. The trial justice also observed that he had
permitted von Bulow to post $100,000 as part of the $1 million
requirement but again stressed the need of documentation by
von Bulow regarding his ownership of an additional $900,000 in
assets. In continuing the bail proceeding to June 7, the trial
justice remarked, "[I]f on the 7th the State is satisfied, then no
further proceeding will be necessary."
When the hearing reconvened on June 7, the trial justice alluded
to his previous reluctance *382 to accept $100,000 cash bail as
sufficient surety. He also referred to certain inventories that had
been submitted to the Attorney General's department as having
an alleged value in excess of $2 million. Some of the property
listed was located in New York, and other articles were situated
in a Newport estate once occupied by von Bulow and his wife.
Much of the Rhode Island property, the trial justice said, was
"brought to the marriage and * * * enjoyed by the victim and this
defendant throughout their married life." After expressing the
belief that von Bulow and his attorneys had attempted in good
faith to comply with the terms of the recognizance, the trial
justice found that the ownership issue was still unresolved. He
obviously thought that the point of no return had been reached;

and since von Bulow's "right to remain on the street" was keyed
to proof of ownership, the trial justice ordered the sheriff to take
von Bulow into his custody for his ultimate delivery to the Adult
Correctional Institutions. However, von Bulow's counsel was
given until 2 p.m. to seek a stay in this court.
The stay was granted, and on June 29, 1982, this court heard
arguments relative to the trial justice's actions. The review was
sought pursuant to our Rule 9.
In faulting the trial justice's action, von Bulow's counsel argue
that the trial justice, by accepting the $100,000, representing 10
percent of the scheduled bail, was then foreclosed from insisting
on proof of the ownership of another $900,000 in assets. In
taking this position, counsel rely upon G.L. 1956 (1981
Reenactment) 12-13-10, which, in its pertinent portion, allows
any person who is "entitled to be released on bail" and who "is
held in custody or committed on a criminal charge" to be
released on personal recognizance rather than on surety bail by
depositing, in cash with the court before which he or she is
obligated to appear, 10 percent of the bail that he or she has
been ordered to furnish. The 10-percent factor came about as a
result of action taken by the General Assembly at its January
1972 session. Public Laws 1972, ch. 267, 1. However, 12-1310 has been part of the statutory framework concerning the
posting of bail since 1915. An examination of chapter 13 of title
12 and its statutory predecessors makes it quite clear that the
type of bail referred to in 12-13-10 is pretrial rather than
postconviction bail.
We would also emphasize that von Bulow cannot be considered
as a person who comes within the statutory classification of one
who is "entitled to be released on bail" because in Quattrocchi v.
Langlois, 100 R.I. 741, 219 A.2d 570 (1966), this court pointed
out that the constitutional guarantee of the right to bail found in
art. I, sec. 9, of our State Constitution is applicable only to
pretrial bail and is of no assistance to a convicted felon who
seeks to have bail set pending appellate review of his conviction.
Additionally, the Federal Constitution does not guarantee a right
to bail, but it does bar the imposition of excessive bail. Morris v.
D'Amario, R.I. , 416 A.2d 137 (1980). Postconviction bail is not a
matter of entitlement but is an issue that is directed to the
sound discretion of the trial court.

At oral argument the state, through its assistant attorney

general, told us that von Bulow had never convinced the
Department of the Attorney General that he in fact was the
owner of the property that he claimed was his. As noted earlier,
the trial justice was of the mind that if von Bulow convinced the
department, the bail issue would be resolved. However, the
discretion that is involved in a postconviction-bail controversy is
that of a Superior Court justice rather than that of the
prosecutor.
An adequate review of what occurred in the postconviction facet
of this controversy is well nigh impossible because much of what
was relied on by the trial justice apparently came to him by way
of "confidential information," in-chambers meetings, or the
prosecutor's protestations that he was not convinced of the
validity of von Bulow's ownership claims. There is nothing in this
record that would indicate what happened when the
representatives of the Attorney General attempted to determine
the legitimacy *383 of von Bulow's alleged ownership of assets
that were set forth on what still is an undisclosed list.
In light of the present state of the record, a remand is necessary.
In remanding the bail controversy to the Superior Court, it is vital
that questions concerning ownership and assets be thrashed out
in open court where a record can be established. As will be seen,
the remand hearing should be held by someone other than the
trial justice.
At the June 7, 1982 hearing, the trial justice announced that
earlier he had informed counsel that he had "little respect for the
defendant." This attitude apparently was motivated by
information furnished to the trial justice after trial but before
imposition of sentence in a presentence report prepared by the
Probation Department. In our opinion, such negative sentiments
are sufficient cause for us to direct the Presiding Justice of the
Superior Court to designate a different trial justice to preside at
the remand hearing.
In conclusion, we would emphasize that the single issue on
remand is whether von Bulow satisfies the factfinder that he
does indeed own $900,000 worth of either tangible or intangible
assets and that proper steps can be taken so that the assets will
be preserved during the pendency of the appeal.

The case is remanded to the Superior Court for a further hearing

that shall be held forthwith and in compliance with the dictates
of this opinion. Jurisdiction for appellate purposes is retained by
this court.
Nardone vs. US
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939)
Argued November 14, 1939 | Decided December 11, 1939
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
1. In a prosecution in a federal court, evidence procured by
tapping wires in violation of the Communications Act of 1934 is
inadmissible. This applies not only to the intercepted
conversations themselves, but also, by implication, to evidence
procured through the use of knowledge gained from such
conversations.
2. The burden is on the accused in the first instance to prove to
the trial court's satisfaction that wiretapping was unlawfully
employed.
3. Once that is established, the trial judge must give opportunity
to the accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case
against him was the result of the illicit wiretapping.
4. Claims that this taint attaches to any portion of the
Government's case must satisfy the trial court with their solidity,
and not be merely a means of eliciting what is in the
Government's possession before its submission to the jury. And if
such a claim is made after the trial is under way, the judge must
likewise be satisfied that the accused could not at an earlier
stage have had adequate knowledge to make his claim.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are called upon for the second time to review affirmance by
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit of petitioners'
convictions under an indictment for frauds on the revenue. In
Nardone v. United States,302 U. S. 379, this Court reversed the
convictions on the first trial because they were procured by
evidence secured in violation of 605 of the Communications
Act of 1934 (c. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103; 47 U.S.C. 605). For
details of the facts reference is made to that case. Suffice it here

to say that this evidence consisted of intercepted telephone

messages, constituting "a vital part of the prosecution's proof."
Conviction followed a new trial, and "the main question" on the
appeal below is the only question open here -- namely, "whether
the [trial] judge improperly refused to allow the accused to
examine the prosecution as to the uses to which it had put the
information" which Nardone v. United States, supra, found to
have vitiated the original conviction. Though candidly doubtful of
the result it reached, the Circuit Court of Appeals limited the
scope of 605 to the precise circumstances before this Court in
the first Nardone case, and ruled that
"Congress had not also made incompetent testimony which had
become accessible by the use of unlawful 'taps,' for to divulge
that information was not to divulge an intercepted telephone
talk."
The issue thus tendered by the Circuit Court of Appeals is the
broad one whether or no 605 merely interdicts the introduction
into evidence in a federal trial of intercepted telephone
conversations, leaving the prosecution free to make every other
use of the proscribed evidence. Plainly, this presents a farreaching problem in the administration of federal criminal
justice, and we therefore brought the case here for disposition.
Any claim for the exclusion of evidence logically relevant in
criminal prosecutions is heavily handicapped. It must be justified
by an overriding public policy expressed in the Constitution or
the law of the land. In a problem such as that before us now, two
opposing concerns must be harmonized: on the one hand, the
stern enforcement of the criminal law; on the other, protection of
that realm of privacy left free by Constitution and laws but
capable of infringement either through zeal or design. In
accommodating both these concerns, meaning must be given to
what Congress has written, even if not in explicit language, so as
to effectuate the policy which Congress has formulated.
We are here dealing with specific prohibition of particular
methods in obtaining evidence. The result of the holding below is
to reduce the scope of 605 to exclusion of the exact words
heard through forbidden interceptions, allowing these
interceptions every derivative use that they may serve. Such a
reading of 605 would largely stultify the policy which compelled
our decision in Nardone v. United States, supra. That decision

was not the product of a merely meticulous reading of technical

language. It was the translation into practicality of broad
considerations of morality and public wellbeing. This Court found
that the logically relevant proof which Congress had outlawed, it
outlawed because "inconsistent with ethical standards and
destructive of personal liberty." 302 U. S. 302 U.S. 379, 302 U. S.
383. To forbid the direct use of methods thus characterized, but
to put no curb on their full indirect use, would only invite the
very methods deemed "inconsistent with ethical standards and
destructive of personal liberty." What was said in a different
context in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S.
385, 251 U. S. 392, is pertinent here:
"The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so
acquired shall not be used before the court, but that it shall not
be used at all." See Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 255
U. S. 307. A decent respect for the policy of Congress must save
us from imputing to it a self-defeating, if not disingenuous,
purpose.
Here, as in the Silverthorne case, the facts improperly obtained
do not "become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is
gained from an independent source, they may be proved like any
others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's own
wrong cannot be used by it" simply because it is used
derivatively.
In practice, this generalized statement may conceal concrete
complexities. Sophisticated argument may prove a causal
connection between information obtained through illicit
wiretapping and the Government's proof. As a matter of good
sense, however, such connection may have become so
attenuated as to dissipate the taint. A sensible way of dealing
with such a situation -- fair to the intendment of 605, but fair
also to the purposes of the criminal law -- ought to be within the
reach of experienced trial judges. The burden is, of course, on
the accused in the first instance to prove to the trial court's
satisfaction that wiretapping was unlawfully employed. Once
that is established -- as was plainly done here -- the trial judge
must give opportunity, however closely confined, to the accused
to prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was a
fruit of the poisonous tree. This leaves ample opportunity to the
Government to convince the trial court that its proof had an
independent origin.

Dispatch in the trial of criminal causes is essential in bringing

crime to book. Therefore, timely steps must be taken to secure
judicial determination of claims of illegality on the part of agents
of the Government in obtaining testimony. To interrupt the
course of the trial for such auxiliary inquiries impedes the
momentum of the main proceeding and breaks the continuity of
the jury's attention. Like mischief would result were tenuous
claims sufficient to justify the trial court's indulgence of inquiry
into the legitimacy of evidence in the Government's possession.
So to read a Congressional prohibition against the availability of
certain evidence would be to subordinate the need for rigorous
administration of justice to undue solicitude for potential and, it
is to be hoped, abnormal disobedience of the law by the law's
officers. Therefore, claims that taint attaches to any portion of
the Government's case must satisfy the trial court with their
solidity, and not be merely a means of eliciting what is in the
Government's possession before its submission to the jury. And if
such a claim is made after the trial is under way, the judge must
likewise be satisfied that the accused could not at an earlier
stage have had adequate knowledge to make his claim. The
civilized conduct of criminal trials cannot be confined within
mechanical rules. It necessarily demands the authority of limited
direction entrusted to the judge presiding in federal trials,
including a well established range of judicial discretion, subject
to appropriate review on appeal, in ruling upon preliminary
questions of fact. Such a system as ours must, within the limits
here indicated, rely on the learning, good sense, fairness and
courage of federal trial judges.
We have dealt with this case on the basic issue tendered by the
Circuit Court of Appeals, and have not indulged in a finicking
appraisal of the record, either as to the issue of the time limit of
the proposed inquiry into the use to which the Government had
put its illicit practices or as to the existence of independent
sources for the Government's proof. Since the Circuit Court of
Appeals did not question its timeliness, we shall not. And the
hostility of the trial court to the whole scope of the inquiry
reflected his own accord with the rule of law by which the Circuit
Court of Appeals sustained him, and which we find erroneous.
The judgment must be reversed and remanded to the District
Court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Reversed.

Esquillo vs People
SUSAN ESQUILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182010 August 25, 2010
Carpio-Morales, J.
Susan Esquillo was convicted of the violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Acts. On the time of the arrest, two police officers came to
Esquillo and another person while they were transacting. While
the officers were coming, one of the officers saw Esquillo hide a
transparent plastic bag with white substance in it. When asked,
she fled but was eventually caught.
Esquillo argues that the arrest was invalid and that the officers
planted evidence against her. The lower court said that the
officers had probable cause to search Esquillo under the stopand-frisk doctrine.
Issue: Whether or not the arrest was valid.
Held:
The SC denied the appeal.
Firstly, the issue whether the arrest was valid was waived by the
petitioner when she did not quash it before arraignment. The
issue was only raised the first time during appeal on the
appellate court.
On regards her arrest, when the officer saw the white substance
from a distance, the plain view doctrine was imposed. When
searched the officers followed the definition and requirements of
a valid stop-and-frisk as stated in People v. Chua - that he should
properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach
and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious
conduct, in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly
concealed weapons.
Stop and Frisk; validity. In a stop-and-frisk, it is essential is
that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has
weapons or contraband concealed about him. Such a stop-andfrisk practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the

recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate

circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person
for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of
safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to
take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals
is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against the police officer.

their law enforcement efforts when PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner

placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
into her cigarette case. Given his training as a law enforcement
officer, it was instinctive on his part to be drawn to curiosity and
to approach her. That petitioner reacted by attempting to flee
after he introduced himself as a police officer and inquired about
the contents of the plastic sachet all the more pricked his
curiosity. Susan Esquillo y Romines vs. People, G.R. No. 182010,
August 25, 2010.

The circumstances under which petitioner was arrested indeed

engender the belief that a search on her person was warranted:
The police officers were on a surveillance operation as part of