Religion and Politics: Role of Islam in Modern India

Author(s): Moin Shakir

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 14, No. 7/8, Annual Number: Class and Caste in India
(Feb., 1979), pp. 469-471+473-474
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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Religion

and

Politics

Role of islam in Modern India

Moin Shakir
Communalism may be defined as that tendency which seeks to promote religiouis or sectarian
grouping of a people for political purposes. The AMuslimelite in India has been indulging in this practice
for articulating its grievances, for commuinicating with the Muslim masses, for framing its political strategies and for mnaintaininga separate political statuis for the community.
This article examines the political and sociological dimensions of Muslim communalism in India.
While actual voting behaviour of the MAuslimmasses brings hope to those sections of the Muslim elite
who1, however faintly, are striving to secularise Muslim politics, the obstacles in the path of such secularisation are many. The article briefly touched upon these obstacles, as also on the failure of Muslim intellectutals to present a comprehensive analysis of the Muslim situation in India without recourse to myths
and mystification.
ing facts but the historical process itself by which these facts have assumed
THE connection between religion and attached values.3 Gramsci's observation
politics runs very deep. Religion, both is quite pertinent: "the three elements
in the West and in the East, influences
religion (or 'active' conception of the
political and non-political processes and world), State, Party - are indissoluble,
affects the operation of the institutional and in the real process of historicoframework of the State. Even in the political development there is a necesdeveloped countries where secularism sary passage from one to the other"1 4
has been accepted as an operative prin- it cannot be disputed that religion has
ciple and where it is strengthened by been a part and parcel of cultural and
the progress in the field of science and civilisational development of any comtechnology, religion continues to be munity. It is a dominant theoretical
more than a matter of personal and so- pattern which filters into the major
cial significance. The reason seems to activities of the various religious combe, as pointed out by Grace Jones, that munities.
"basic religious beliefs survive in disIslam has been one of the most
guised forms in moral assumptions and powerful religions of the world. Arising
cultural norms and they continue to at the time of new class formations in
mould the attitudes of many people to Arab society, it consolidated the powei
such institutions as the family, marriage, of the State. The role of the Prophet
and the education system. This influ- ns
a ruler of the State distinguishes
ence is exerted in a concealed way,
Islam from other religions like Chriseither at the individual sub-conscious
tianity or Buddhism. The latter could
level or through the medium of indirect
turn hostile to the acquisition of greater
pressure politics, and it is, therefore,
impossible to assess with any precision. power. In terms of doctrines, Islam is
not much different but the latter phase
It is none the less real for that".'
of the Prophet's life in Medina furniReligion is more pervasive in India shes ample evidence of Islam's potenthan in the West. Probably this promp- tialities for managing a State. The subted Whyte to conclude that India is a sequent Caliph's rule bear-s witness to
"religious and not a political continent".2 many modifications, deviations and even
Besides till the advent of the British contradictions in the political practices.
the idea of secular civic society did not These can be explained away by the
come into being in India and conise- fact that there is no definite political
quently religion, in one way or the theory or practice which has the sancother, dominated State and society. The tion of the Quran. It inevitably resulted
advent of the British power constituted in confusion. The benefit, of course,
a break from the ancient traditions and h1as been taken by the Ulema who by
became, to borrow the apt phase of mystifying and obscuring the realities
Marx, "the unccnscious tool of history" justified the powers that be. By citing
in bringing about a fundamental revolu- certain verses of the sacred book,S quite
tion in the social State of the country. out of context, the Islamic fundamenIdealists as well Marxists agree that talists all over the world argue that
thie rejection of religion as the opiuim the concept of democracy and sociaof the people amounts not only to ignor- lism are thoroughly un-Islamic. One

fails to understand as to how Saudi

Kingship or Pakistan's military dictatorship or Afghanistan'ssocialist government is Islamic. If the institution of
Kingship is Islamic how is Ayatollah
Khomeini's claim that the fight against
Iranian autocracy is based on Islam
justifiable? It is also significant that in
professedly Islamic republics or in the
Muslim majority countries no mention
is made of Islam's principle of social
justice or equitable distribution ol
wealth, but( undue emphasis is placed
on such petty points like cutting off of
the hand for theft, prohibiting wine
(drinking,st.oning to death for adultery,
etc.7
Against this backgroundclthe role of
Islam in Indian politics should be examined. Islam has always been the relegion of a minority in this country.
Although it has been the religion
of the rulers yet neither did it
ensure equality nor emancipation from
the feudal system. It remained fundamental to the system as it could call
forth emotional allegiance of its
adherents. The so-called custodians of
religion wholeheartedly justified the institution of monarchy, slavery and exploitation. The dissent, if any, was on
the issues of fundamentalism or over
socially irrelevant matters. Tolerance
and broad mindedness, if any, was the
result of pragmatism and expediency
rather than religious, (i e, Islamic)
conviction. Consequently the Muslim
government was founded not on Shariat
(holy law) but on the laws and regulations of the king. What Allauddin
Khilji told Qazi Mughisuddin seems to
have been the policy of the Muslim
rulers: "Although I have not studied
science or book, I am a Musalman of
a Musalman stock. To prevent rebellion
in which thousands perish I issue such
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Annual Number February 1979

orders as I conceive to be for the good
of the State and benefits of the people.
If men are heedless, disrespectful and
dis,obey my commands, I am then compelled to be severe to bring them into
obedience. I do not know whether this
is lawful or unlawful. Whatever I think
to be for the good of the State or suitable for the emergency that I decree".8
Under British rule the position of the
Muslim community underwent a change.
The rulers were the bearers of a modem
culture and civilisation superior to that
of the native subjects. The first reaction was antagonism which took a
religious form. It was destined to collapse as it lacked ideological fervour
and the support of the common masses,
being merely a regional and emotional
outburst rather than an all-India movement. It was, according to M Mujeeb,
"a disintegrating rather than a unifying
influence".9 When a section of the Muslim leadership decided to co-operate
with the British and accept the modern
system of education it felt the necessity
of change in socio-political and religious
outlook, for other religious communities had already started thinking along
those lines. The social reform movements in the Hindu community constituted a significant development as far
as the religious outlook was concemed.
The case of the Muslim community
was different. The nature and ethos of
Islam is different from that 0ofHinduism.
Ilinduism has been flexible and tolerant, at least in the field of metaphysics.
It has also been characterised by the
absence of rigidity in matters of belief.
In the process of interpretation and
adaptation, Hinduism has been constantly reviewed and its base broadened.
The basic tenets of Islam have on the
contrary a rigidity which would not
brook any such liberties of interpretation as Hinduism allowed. The Hindus
could reject any scripture or doctrine
which no Muslim could ever do because
of the powerful orthodox divines. The
Muslim intellectual also faced the difficulty of defining his attitude even to
the Hadith literature. The Hindu intellectual had the freedom in matters of
faith and belief which enabled him
to launch movements for religious
reforms and start various organisations for the purpose while the efforts
in the Muslim community centred on
individuals who were careful while
working on the secular plane not to
disturb religious belief and there was.
no possibility also of creating organisa-

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

tions like the religio-social organisations
of the Hindus. Syed Ahmed Khan's
Aligarh Movement had little to dowith
religious reform. It was mainly an
educational and political movement.
Mention of another point of difference
will not be out of place here. Even
after the decline of the Mughal Empire,
the religion-oriented leaders continued
to believe and hope that Muslim power
could be restored in India by the organised effort of Muslims, with the help
of the Hindus, if necessary. When' the
Hindus were making efforts for educational advancement and social uplift
the Muslims thought that political
power would solve all their problems.
What is clear is that the Hindu elite
was getting depoliticised while the
Muslim elite's obsession with political
power was complete. The defeat of the
Mutiny in 1857 threw the Muslinmcommunity into a state of frustration. Syed
Ahmed Khan and his movement failed
to undertake the task of the modernisation of the religious and economic life
of the Muslim community. T'he separatist political stance of the Aligarh movement provided an unhealthy bias to
Muslim politics and thought in modern
India.
It may appear strange but it is true
that the Hindu community practically
remained indifferent and aloof towards
the efforts of the Muslim revivalists.
Similarly the Muslim community was
not stirred by the efforts made by the
Hindu reformers. Thus mutual apathy
may be viewed as the perpetuation of
the medieval legacy. People lived together for centuries but did not constitute a society. In the words of Louis
Dumount their "co-existence was empirically accepted without being legitimised".10In modern India every leader
stuck to his own community or caste
even in initiating social reforms; Rammohan Roy neglected the need of religious and social reform in the Muslim
community, just as Syed Ahmed Khan
failed to take note of the problems of
the Hindu community. In a similar way,
when the extremists advocated Hinduism as the basis of nationalism, they
never tried to anticipate the reactions
of other communities. Similarly, when
Mohammed Ali and other Muslim
leaders expressed their support to PanIslamism as a worthwhile goal, they
likewise ignored its meaning for the
Hindu community.
nTe British government released quite
contradictory forces in Indian polity.
The secular and liberal system of educa-

tion, industrialisation, urbanisation, limited democratic experiment, new value

pattern, growth of the spirit of rationalism, weakening of family ties, understanding of politics in new perspectives,
did undermine the political potentialities of religion. But modernisationin a
democratic framework never frees man
from religion. Religion is not abolished
but its role changes. There is freedom
of religion and not freedom from religion. The prevailing situation in India
has not been conducive to the abolition
of the institution of religion.
The British attitude provided a new
lease of life to religion in politics. The
British viewed the Indian people in
terms of their religion. To them horizontal divisions among the Indian
people were not relevant; they deliberately emphasised vertical considerations.
The vital realities of culture, language,
religion and economic interests were
thoroughly ignored. Conscious efforts
were made to artificially divide the
communities. Francis Robinson is quite
right when he says that Syed Ahmed
Khan was closer to Siva Prasad, his
opponent, than to the Muslim weaver,
as both belonged to what is called Urdu
speaking elite group.11 The fact was
that the division between the elite culture and mass culture was complete.
The British also introduced the politics of 'weightage' and 'counterpoise'
which, directly and indirectly, compelled the religious communities to strengthen their communal identities. Religion was one of the strongest factors
wbich could sustain and promote communal identity and differentiation. Religion reinforced political demands and
furthered political ambitions. It supplied the wished for ideology necessary
for backward classes as theoretical expression of their interests.12 The introduction of separate electorates widened the gulf between the religious communities and permanently closed the
possibility of a secular outlook on the
problems of the community. The communities participated in politics as religious entities. The result was, as Harold
Could says, that "Muslims came to regard their religious identity more and
more as demarcator of the different life
stages, power needs and economic interests which they felt set them, apart
from Hindus. The manoeuvres which
followed the advent of separate Muslim
electorates in 1916 symbolised the politicisation of the religiously demarcated
ethnic identity".1" Communalisation of
politics aggravated social tensions ari&

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ECONOMIC AND

POLITICAL WEEKLY

perpetuated "the struggle between those

demanding a greater role for religion in
the State and other demanding a secular polity".'4 In such a situation political organisations based on religion are
bound to arise. Religionity is used "to
create a system, of instrumental means
and secular objectives rather than theocratic ones".1-5
Religion, in the 19th and 20th century India, has been a motivating factor
behind all major political developments.
In the birth of the Indian National
Congress not only Theosophy but also
Vedantic idealism were seen as the guiding principles. It was claimed that the
revivalist movements were "really so
many threads in the strands of Indian
nationalism".16The manifestation and
expression of Indian nationalism was
"predominantly in a Hindu idiom"; the
prestige of Pandit and Pir was a force
behind the national political bodies, and
the revolutionary nationalist drew
inspiration from Kali, Vedanta and Gita
which was decidedly religious in nature.17 Tilak's view of Indian nationalism is quite significant: "The common
factor in Indian society is the feeling of
Hindutva (Hinduness). I do not speak
of Muslims and Christians as present
because everywere the majority of our
society consists of Hindus. We say that
Hindus of the Punjab, Bengal, Maharashtra, Telengana (Andhra) and Dravid (Madras) are one, and the reason
for this is only Hindu Dharma. There
may be different doctrines in the Hindu
Dharma but certain principles can be
found in common, and because of this
alone a sort *of feeling that we belong
to one religion has remained among
people speaking different languages in
such a vast country. A-nd this feeling
of being

one

still alive. . .".18

Tilak

was for "militancy, resurgent Hinduism,

regional and commutnalsensitivity, casteconsciousness, and social conservatism".19 In the Swadeshi Movement
and the Gandhi dominated Congress
religious sentiments of the people were
constantly exploited. Hindu symbols
were used to mobilise the people. The
Muslim community too adopted a similar strategy of using Islam for political
purposes. Whether it was Syed Ahmed
Khan's Aligarh Movement or Ameer
Ali's Muslim Association, whether it
was politics of the 'Old Party' or the
'New Party', or whether it was Mohammed Ali's Khilafat movement or the

Moplah rebellion or the Pakistan movement, Islam has been a constant. It

has been the unbroken thread of Muslim politics. The leaders wanted the
members of the community believe that
they were fighting for the cause of
Islam.
A lucid explanation of the relationsbip of religion and politics is found
in the writings and speeches 'of the
Muslim League leaders. The following
is a classic statement of these attitudes.
T'he Muslims cannot divorce their
religion from their politics. In Islam,
religious and political beliefs are not
separated from each other. Religion
and politics are inseparably associated in the minds and thoughts of all
Muslims.... Their religion includes
their politics and their politics are a
part of their religion. The mosque not
only constitutes a place of their worship but also the Assembly Hall....
They are born into a system. The
syste.m is not thrust on them. Religion and politics are the same to
them. Hence Hindu-Muslim unity or
nationalism, signifying homogeneity
between them in all non-religious
matters, is unimaginable. The Islamic
polity in which religion and politics
are inseparably united requires perfect isolation for its development. The
idea of a common state with heterogeneous membership is alien to Islam
and can never be fruitful.20
The implications of this approach
are quite clear. It suited both the British rulers and the Indian elite. The
former should have been satisfied with
the growth of the separatist tendencies
and the latter with the tremendous
success in establishing a rapport with
the illiterate masses. The British succeeded in trapping the Indian elite
which willingly played right into their
hands.
It goes without saying that the British had a vested interest in communal
polarisation. It cam,e in the way of the
unity of the poor of the different communities. Religious politics was the
enemy of class politics. Religious politics, therefore, was neither genuine
religion nor genuine politics. It ensured
separate political existence to every religious community and made the consciousness of artificial identity a basic
factor of political thinking. What M
Muieeb said about the Muslim League
of the united provinces was true of
MuLslimpolitician in general: "I do not
remember this belief (i e, of Islamic
state as a guide and a corrective to
political conduct) was shared by the
prominent men and women of TJttar

Annual Number

February 1979

Pradesh in the Muslim League camp.

They were just not the type of persons
who would undertake the intellectual
task of analysing the concept of an Islamic State. Their allegiance to it was
rhetorical; they did not care to be intelligent or serious".21

II
After Independence, secularism has
been accepted as one of the bases of
Indian polity. The horrid experience of
partition riots convinced the Indian
elite to minimise the role of religion in
politics. But the great stumbling block
in the way of such minimising has
been the political heritage of the British era and the inability to deviate
from the British approach to religion
and politics. Except for the abolition of
the separate electorates, the ruling
elite in India has faithfully followed the
British policy. Secularism is not viewed
as separation of religion and politics
but as giving 'equal status' to all religions though in practice the new rulers
consider Hinduism as the fundamental
factor in the field of politics. The renaming of India as 'Bharat' in tune with
old Hindu tradition, the urge to promote Hindi (of a Sanskritised kind) as
the 'all-India' language, an emphasis on
the adoption of such symbols like Dharma Chakra, popularisation of superstition-ridden festivals as Ramlila, broadcasting of Bhajans aud devotional songs
in the early morning programme of All
India Radio, extension of the governmental patronage to the Sadhu Samaj,22
etc, betray a strong Hindu bias in the
approach of the new rulers. It is also
argued that Hinduism not only provides
ideological and cultural content to the
Indian State but also prepared the
people to accept the social and political system.23
Islam is also destined to play an important role in the politics of the Muslim community. Even after the partition
of the country Indian Muslims remain
the second largest segment of the total
population. They are more prone to
accept the authority of religion and the
Ulema.24 Notwithstanding the desire of
a section of the Muslim elite for separating religion from politics, the stresses
and strains of the situation underline the
utility of uniting religious faith with
political interests. After all no community can be oblivious of its milieu and
the larger setting of the community
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ECONOMIC AND POLITiCAL WEEKLY

Annual Number February 1979

nation as a whole.
within the
In a lam. The political ideology of the Mus- mentation of the Muslim electorate
lim political organisations is therefore holds promise for those committed to
competitive democratic polity, the prinopposed to the ideals of nationalism, secularisation of Indian politics and
ciple of religious grouping as an instrumnent of pressure pays
secularism, democracy and socialismn. integration of the Muslims within the
dividends; in
the case of Muslims, it ultimately leads
Such cooicepts are viewed as the con- broad framework of a democratic secuto Islamisation and political communacomitants of modern culture, and not in lar political society.30
lism. Engineered by the religionus groups
consonance with the spirit of Islam.
Nevertheless, one should not carrythe
and
These principles, according to the Mus- impression that the goal of secularisation
exploited by the political elite,
Islamisation
'Muslims from lim leaders, provide for atheistic mate- has been achieved. The obstacles are
separates
the cultural ties existing with Hinduism
rialism, Hinduisation of the country many. A comparative perspective reand increases identity consciousness and and dle-Islamisation of the Muslims.27 garding the growth of secularising
political mobilisation of the community.25
The effectiveness of the political tendencies in other groups of society
Even those Muslims who do not accept
ideology of the Muslim organisation and a meticulous analysis of socio-ecothe autonomy of worldly life feel conshould be judged in the context of the nomic progress in the context of regions
tended with the prevailing notion
of political behaviour of the Muslim com- and communities is urgently called for.
secularism. In the emergence of
new
munity. Abid Hussain is not wrong A probe into the existing gap between
political culture, "the contents of many
when he says that it is not the religious the common man and the elite is also
religions are incorporated not because
feeling but extraneous elements asso- necessary. Sufficient data about the
of their inherent spirituLal authority, but
ciated with religion and the name of class composition of the Muslim elite
because they are high parts of an existhe religion which are used by the elite and the working of the Muslim organitent national 'cultural' mosaic.
Thus,
for achieving certain political objecti- sations are not yet available. The preorthodoxy withers, while a kind of re- ves.28 The notion of identity conscious- sent Muslim elite still carries the burden
ligious revival blossoms.... Indian deness or communalism owing to religion of the past on its shoulders. 'Te reacvice of cultural
pluralism, conceived
can also be questioned. It is not reli- tionary heritage and fundamentalist
internally as an egoistic policy and progion but the plural character of society legacy still haunts it. It still looks upon
bably secularising in its long term effects,
and the federal nature of the State the issue of national integration as one
nevertheless preserves for India a disthat produces communalism. It is nur- of strengthening and uniting religious
tinetly spiritual aura".26
tured not by religion but by the non. communities along sectarian lines and
The tendency to promote the religious
redressal of secular and genuine griev- not as one of transcending and rejectgrouping of a community for political
ances of the Muslim community. It is ing communal divisions. Its politics is
purpose, in other words, the
phenonot Islam but a sense of discrimination of a compromise with the 'national'
menon of imposing religion on politics
which creates a sense of unity. It is elite which is keen to accommodate it.
is described as communalism.
The
the feeling of insecurity which provides This is how the facade of 'consensus'
Muslim elite has been using it for artithe sheet anchor to the notion of soli- in the polity is being maintained. Both
culating grievances,
in c-,mmunicating
darity. It is politics, not the ideal of are inerested in engineering the consent
with the masses, in framing political
Islam or Pan-Islamism, which acts as of the masses and legitimisation of elite
strategies and for maintaining a separate
rule. The simple law of asserting its
the leveller of sectarian differences.
political status for the community.
It
Various' studies of the political and (Muslim elite's) hold in the community,
has been a short cut to political power.
voting behaviour of the Muslim com- as described by Marx in a different
It is strengthened by invoking the supmunity bear this fact out.29 They also, context, is to adopt a religious attitude
port from Islamic feelings,
Muslim so- bring forth the concept
and differ- to politics and political attitude to relidarity and Muslim culture which neence between the Muslim elite's per- ligion. Secularism in India, therefore,
cessarily
mean
non-involvement
in ception of the political realities and that has amounted to no more than political
ideological and non-communal polarisa.
of the masses. The former always per- rhetoric and a compromise with religion
tion. The Muslim political organisations,
ceive the secular issues from the stand- for political purposes.
like
Jamaat-e-Islami, Muslim League,
point of Islam while the masses do not.
The indifference on the part of the
Mailis-e-Mushawarat, etc, fall back on
The Muslim support to the Congress
political
parties to mobilising the Musa romantic view of Islam implying that
can be instanced here, even though lims on secular issues is another obIslam alone is a perfect religion while
several leaders of Muslim opinion stacle. The political and electoral
proall other religions are imperfect.
The
mounted determined and firm opposi- cesses encourage particularism and
Muslims are acclaimed as champions of tion to that party. In the 1971 elections,
solidarity consciousness. The party setthe Truth.
The cause of their backfor instance, the consensus of Muslim up and
electoral system have not proved
wardness is seen as being dule to the community, by and large, had been in
to
be
effective
instruments of seculariabsence of training to draw upon the
favour of committed secular and demo- sation. They have failed to overcome
Quran in the solution
of day-to-day
cratic parties. The principle of en bloc the primordial allegiances
of the elecpolitical and social problems. The Musvoting on communal ground had been torate. Two trends in the Muslim polilims,
according to this view, do not
given up. The religion-oriented Muslim
constitute a religious minority but an leaders who had asked the Muslim vo- tical behaviour are quite significant in
this context - political fragmentation,
international commutnity or a party to ters to boycott the elections proved to
and social and religious solidarity. Poenforce the truth of Islam. Their misbe ineffective. According to Gopal litical parties ought to recognise these
sion is to reform mankind. The consiKrishna, the heavy penetration of the two contrary trends in the Muslim comderations of minority are alien to Issecular forces in and the political frag-

munity. The force of religious solidarity

473

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Annual Number FRebruary1979

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

is being strengthened by the various

culturai movements dominated by the
authentic upholders of the fundamentalist legacy of Islanm.Here lies the failure of the Muslim intellectuals who
are wedded to a non-traditional approach. They are not only in India but
in the entire Muslim world, though
isolated and few in number.31 Their
critical intellect and independent thought
have however not shaken the inertia of
the masses and of the administrative
and governmental organisations.32 Besides, they are keen to take into
account the ideological postures of those
in power and their directives while
offering any new interpretation of sociopolitical principles of Islam. Consequently the Muslim intellectuals in India
have seldom been able to present a
comprehensive analysis of the Muslim
situation without myths and mystifications. The social and economic composition of 'the Muslim community is also
not favourable to the growth of critical
analysis. Consequently the conservative
sujcceed in asserting that Islam still
-ontinues to be "the essence of the
community" and not "the essence of
the dlifference".-33

Notes
1

2
3
4
5
6
7

10

Grace Jones, "The political structure", Second

edition,
London,
1976, p 32. See also Anson Stokes,
Church and State in the
United
States", Vol III, New York, 1950;
and Leo Pfiffer,
"Church, State
and Freedom", Boston, 1953.
F Whyte, "The Future of East and
West", London, 1932, p 37.
D P Mukherji, "Modern Indian Cultture", Allahahad, 1942, p 8.
A Gramsci, "Prison
Notebooks",
New York, 1972, p 266.
"al-Quran", 12:401, 3:154, 6:50.
"al-Quran", 57:25, 3: 110.
For the 'fundamentalist'
political
viewpoint
of Islam see Khurshid
Ahmad (ed), "Essays in Islam: Its
Meaning and Message", New Delhi,
1977.
Mohammed Habih an(d Afsar Sultana, "The political
theory of
Delhi
Sultanate", nd Allahabad,
p 8.
M Muieeb, 'The Partition of India
in Retrospect', in C H Philips a'(d
Marry D Wain Wright "The Partition of India: Politics and Prespectives, 1935-19.47",
London, 1970,
p 407.
Louis Dusmont, "Nationalism and
C,ommunalism in India', Contribu-

tiov to Indi(an Sociology,

11

1,964, p 36.
Francis
Robinson,

March

among
Indian
Delhi, 1975.
12

13

Muslims",

New

K B Krishna,
"The Problem of
Minorities or Communal Representation in India",
London, 1939,
p 187.
H A Gould, "The Emergence of
Modern Indian Politics' (Part II),

Joturnal of Commonwealth and

Comparative politics, July, 1974,
p 181.
Almond and Coleman, "Politics of
Developing
Areas",
Princeton,
1970 p 538.
15 David F Apter. 'Political Religion
in Newv Nations', in C Geertz (ed),
"Old Societies and New States",
New Delhi 1971, p 89.
16 Annie Beasant, "The Birth of New
India" Madras, 1917, pp 358-9; P
"The History of
Sitarammayya,
Indian National Congress". (Vol I),
Bombay, 1946. p 14. See also L
Hutchinson, "The EmDire of the
Nabobs", London, 19.37, p 184.
14

M N Srinivas, 'The Cohesive Role

of Sanskritisation', in Philip Mason
(ed). "India and Cevlon", London,
1967, p 81: Anil Seal, "The Emergence of Indian Nationalism". Camhridge, 1974, p 346; A C Underwood: "Con emporary Thought of
Tndia", London, 1930, pp 40-43;
Farquhar,
"Modern
Religious
Movements in India", London, 1929,
n .358; Huitchinson; op cit, p 192;
W R Smith. "Nationalism and Reform in India", New Haven 1938,
p 49.
18 Wolnert,
"Tilak and Gokhale",
California, 1962, pp 135-136.
19 Ibid, p 325.
17

A Punjabi (Pseudo), "Confederacy

of India", Lahore, 193-2, pp 88-89.
21 M Mujeeb, op cit, p 408.
22 A R Desai, "Recent Trends in Indian
Nationalism", Bombay, 1960, pp
132-4.
23 Don Martindate in A Chakravarti
(ed), "India since 1947", Calcutta,
1967. pp 44-45. See also, Richard
Political System",
Park, "India's
New Jersev, 1967, p 741.
'Fatalism in India',
24 Josenh Elder,
July
Quarterly,
A Pth ropolog.cal
1966, pp 227-43.
25 Yogendra Singh, "Modernisation of
Indian Tradition", New Delhi, 1973
pp 76-7.
'Cultural Policy
26 McKin Marriott,
in the New States', in C Geertz,
op cit, p 37.
27 See, Moin Shakir. "Muislims in Free
Inclia", New Delhi. 1972, pp 46-78.
28 Abid Husain, "The National Culture
of India", New Delhi, 1965 p 9.
2.9 Fnr a more detailed discussion see,
Mfoin Slhakir, 'Muslim Electoral
Behaviour in India', Mainistream,
February 12, 1977, pp 11-14.
30 Gopal Krislhna, 'Muslim Politics',
Senminar, May 1972, p 21.
31 Mohammed Arkoun, 'Islamic ConA Cultural
Profile',
sciousness:
Cultures, Voluime IV, Number 1.
1977, p 89.
20

32

Ali Merad, 'Reformism in Modern

Islam', Cuiltires, Volume IV, Number 1, 1977, pp 120-121.

33

Question',
Karl Max, 'On Jewish
3,
Works", Volume
"Collected
Moscow, 1975, p 155.

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