REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1

Assignment No. 6.1

Emile Justin Cebrian
#1

SPOUSES ALGURA vs. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT OF THE CITY OF

NAGA,
G.R. No. 150135
October 30, 2006
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS: Spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura filed with the Naga RTC
a Verified Complaint for damages against the Naga City Government and its officers,
arising from the alleged illegal demolition of their residence and boarding house and
for payment of lost income derived from fees paid by their boarders.
Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent
Litigants, to which petitioner Antonio Algura's Pay Slip was appended, showing a
gross monthly income of P10,474.00 and a net pay of P3,616.99 for July 1999. Also
attached was a Certification issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Naga City,
which stated that petitioners had no property declared in their name for taxation
purposes.
Finding that petitioners' motion to litigate as indigent litigants was meritorious, the
RTC granted petitioners' plea for exemption from filing fees.
Respondents filed an Answer with Counterclaim, arguing that the defenses of the
petitioners in the complaint had no cause of action, the spouses' boarding house
blocked the road right of way, and said structure was a nuisance per se.
Respondents also filed a Motion to Disqualify the Plaintiffs for Non-Payment of Filing
Fees. Petitioners subsequently interposed their Opposition to the Motion. The RTC
issued an Order disqualifying petitioners as indigent litigants on the ground that
they failed to substantiate their claim for exemption from payment of legal fees and
to comply with the third paragraph of Rule 141, Section 18 of the Revised Rules of
Courtdirecting them to pay the requisite filing fees.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration; respondents then filed their
Comment/Objections to petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The trial court
issued an Order giving petitioners the opportunity to comply with the requisites laid
down in Section 18, Rule 141, for them to qualify as indigent litigants. Petitioners
submitted their Compliance attaching the affidavits of petitioner Lorencita Algura
and Erlinda Bangate, to comply with the requirements of then Rule 141, Section 18
of the Rules of Court and in support of their claim to be declared as indigent
litigants.

The RTC denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, ratiocinating that the
pay slip of Antonio F. Algura showed that the "GROSS INCOME or TOTAL EARNINGS
of plaintiff Algura [was] P10,474.00 which amount [was] over and above the amount
mentioned in the first paragraph of Rule 141, Section 18 for pauper litigants residing
outside Metro Manila." Said rule provides that the gross income of the litigant
should not exceed P3,000.00 a month.
ISSUE: Should petitioners be considered as indigent litigants exempt from paying
filing fees?
RULING: YES.
[The] rule on pauper litigants was inserted in Rule 141 without revoking or
amending Section 21 of Rule 3, which provides for the exemption of pauper litigants
from payment of filing fees.
Amendments to Rule 141 (including the amendment to Rule 141, Section 18) were
made to implement RA 9227 which brought about new increases in filing fees. []
Even if there was an amendment to Rule 141 on August 16, 2004, there was still no
amendment or recall of Rule 3, Section 21 on indigent litigants.
It is undisputed that the Complaint (Civil Case No. 99-4403) was filed on September
1, 1999. However, the Naga City RTC, in its April 14, 2000 and July 17, 2000
Orders, incorrectly applied Rule 141, Section 18 on Legal Fees when the applicable
rules at that time were Rule 3, Section 21 on Indigent Party which took effect on July
1, 1997 and Rule 141, Section 16 on Pauper Litigants []
The Court opts to reconcile Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 19 because it is
a settled principle that when conflicts are seen between two provisions, all efforts
must be made to harmonize them. Hence, "every statute [or rule] must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes [or rules] as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence."
The Court concedes that Rule 141, Section 19 provides specific standards while Rule
3, Section 21 does not clearly draw the limits of the entitlement to the exemption.
Knowing that the litigants may abuse the grant of authority, the trial court must use
sound discretion and scrutinize evidence strictly in granting exemptions, aware that
the applicant has not hurdled the precise standards under Rule 141. The trial court
must also guard against abuse and misuse of the privilege to litigate as an indigent
litigant to prevent the filing of exorbitant claims which would otherwise be regulated
by a legal fee requirement.
Thus, the trial court should have applied Rule 3, Section 21 to the application of the
Alguras after their affidavits and supporting documents showed that petitioners did
not satisfy the twin requirements on gross monthly income and ownership of real
property under Rule 141. Instead of disqualifying the Alguras as indigent litigants,
the trial court should have called a hearing as required by Rule 3, Section 21 to
enable the petitioners to adduce evidence to show that they didn't have property
and money sufficient and available for food, shelter, and basic necessities for them
and their family. In that hearing, the respondents would have had the right to also

present evidence to refute the allegations and evidence in support of the

application of the petitioners to litigate as indigent litigants. Since this Court is not a
trier of facts, it will have to remand the case to the trial court to determine whether
petitioners can be considered as indigent litigants using the standards set in Rule 3,
Section 21.
Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for
exemption meets the salary and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule
141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On the other hand, when the
application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the application should
not be denied outright; instead, the court should apply the "indigency test" under
Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the
prayer for exemption
.
#2
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUARIA AGRICULTURAL
AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 160758
January 15, 2014
Bersamin, J.
FACTS: Guaria Corporation (Guaria) applied for a loan from DBP to finance the
development of its resort complex. Guaria executed a promissory note and a real
estate mortgage over several real properties in favor of DBP as security for the
repayment of the loan. Guaria likewise executed a chattel mortgage over the
personal properties existing at the resort complex and those yet to be acquired out
of the proceeds of the loan, also to secure the performance of the obligation. Prior
to the release of the loan, DBP required Guaria to put up a cash equity for the
construction of the buildings and other improvements on the resort complex. The
loan was released in several installments, and Guaria used the proceeds to defray
the cost of additional improvements in the resort complex. Guaria demanded the
release of the balance of the loan, but DBP refused. Instead, DBP directly paid some
suppliers of Guaria Corporation over the latter's objection. Later, DBP found upon
inspection of the resort project, its developments, and improvements, that Guaria
had not completed the construction works. DBP thus demanded that Guaria
expedite the completion of the project, and warned that it would initiate foreclosure
proceedings should Guaria not do so.
Unsatisfied with Guarias non-action and objection, DBP initiated extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings. A notice of foreclosure sale was sent to Guaria. The notice
was eventually published, leading the clients and patrons of Guaria to think that its
business operation had slowed down, and that its resort had already closed.
Guaria sued DBP in the RTC to demand specific performance of the latter's
obligations under the loan agreement, and to stop the foreclosure of the mortgages.
However, DBP moved for the dismissal of the complaint, stating that the mortgaged

properties had already been sold to satisfy the obligation of Guaria at a public
auction. Due to this, Guaria Corporation amended the complaint to seek the
nullification of the foreclosure proceedings and the cancellation of the certificate of
sale. In the meantime, DBP applied for the issuance of a writ of possession by the
RTC. At first, the RTC denied the application but later granted it upon DBP's motion
for reconsideration. Aggrieved, Guaria assailed the granting of the application
before the CA on certiorari, with the petition docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP.
After the CA dismissed this petition for certiorari, DBP sought the implementation of
the order for the issuance of the writ of possession. Over Guaria's opposition, the
RTC issued the writ of possession.
The RTC rendered its judgment in the specific performance case, ruling that the
extra-judicial sales of the mortgaged properties are null and void. On appeal, DBP
challenged the judgment of the RTC. However, the CA, in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491,
sustained the RTC's judgment. DBP timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
CA denied its motion hence, this appeal by DBP.
DBP insisted that the decision of the CA in C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP already
constituted the law of the case, and therefore, the CA could not decide the appeal in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491 differently. Guaria countered that the ruling in C.A.-G.R. No.
12670-SP did not constitute the law of the case because C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP
concerned the issue of possession by DBP as the winning bidder in the foreclosure
sale, and had no bearing whatsoever to the legal issues presented in C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 59491.
ISSUE: Did the CA fail to adhere to the law-of-the-case doctrine?
RULING: NO.
The doctrine of [the] law of the case simply means [] that when an appellate court
has once declared the law in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that
case even on a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down
may have been reversed in other cases. For practical considerations, indeed, once
the appellate court has issued a pronouncement on a point that was presented to it
with full opportunity to be heard having been accorded to the parties, the
pronouncement should be regarded as the law of the case and should not be
reopened on remand of the case to determine other issues of the case, like
damages. But the law of the case, as the name implies, concerns only legal
questions or issues thereby adjudicated in the former appeal.
The foregoing understanding of the concept of the law of the case exposes DBP's
insistence to be unwarranted. [] To start with, the ex parte proceeding on DBP's
application for the issuance of the writ of possession was entirely independent from
the judicial demand for specific performance herein. In fact, C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP,
being the interlocutory appeal concerning the issuance of the writ of possession

while the main case was pending, was not at all intertwined with any legal issue
properly raised and litigated in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491, which was the appeal to
determine whether or not DBP's foreclosure was valid and effectual. And, secondly,
the ruling in C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP did not settle any question of law involved
herein because this case for specific performance was not a continuation of C.A.G.R. No. 12670-SP (which was limited to the propriety of the issuance of the writ of
possession in favor of DBP), and vice versa.

#3
ROBERTO R. DAVID vs. EDUARDO C. DAVID
G.R. No. 162365
January 15, 2014
Bersamin, J.
FACTS: Respondent Eduardo C. David (Eduardo) initiated a replevin suit against
Roberto R. David (Roberto), his first cousin and former business partner, to recover
the possession of one unit of International CO 9670 Truck Tractor and Mi-Bed Trailer.
The cases origins can be traced to when Eduardo and his brother Edwin C. David
(Edwin), acting on their own and in behalf of their co-heirs, sold their inherited
properties to Roberto, specifically: (a) a parcel of land in Baguio City; and (b) two
units International CO 9670 Truck Tractor with two Mi-Bed Trailers. A deed of sale
with assumption of mortgage embodied the terms of their agreement, which
provided, inter alia, that Eduardo and Edwin have the right to repurchase the
properties within a period of three years from the execution of the deed of sale
based on the purchase price agreed upon, plus 12% interest per annum.
Later, Roberto and Edwin executed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with the
Spouses Marquez and Soledad Go (Spouses Go), by which they agreed to sell the
Baguio City lot to the latter. The MOA stipulated that "in order to save payment of
high and multiple taxes considering that the [] subject matter of this sale is
mortgaged with DBP, Baguio City, and sold [to Roberto], Edwin will execute the
necessary Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of [the Spouses Go], in lieu of
[Roberto]." The Spouses Go then deposited the amount of P10,000,000.00 to
Robertos account. After the execution of the MOA, Roberto gave
Eduardo P2,800,000.00 and returned to him one of the truck tractors and trailers
subject of the deed of sale. Eduardo demanded for the return of the other truck
tractor and trailer, but Roberto refused to heed the demand.
This led to the filing of the replevin suit, with Eduardo alleging that he was
exercising the right to repurchase under the deed of sale; and that he was entitled
to the possession of the other motor vehicle and trailer. Roberto, however, denied

that Eduardo could repurchase the properties in question, and insisted that the MOA
had extinguished their deed of sale by novation. The RTC rendered judgment in
favor of Eduardo, holding that the stipulation giving Eduardo the right to repurchase
had made the deed of sale a conditional sale; that Eduardo had fulfilled the
conditions for the exercise of the right to repurchase; that the ownership of the
properties in question had reverted to Eduardo; that Robertos defense of novation
had no merit; and that due to Robertos bad faith in refusing to satisfy Eduardos
claim, Eduardo should be awarded litigation expenses and attorneys fees.
Roberto appealed to the CA, which affirmed the RTC decision. The CA likewise
denied Robertos motion for reconsideration hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in holding that respondent has exercised their right to
repurchase and that there was no novation of the deed of sale when the parties
executed a memorandum of agreement for the sale of the subject house and lot
and, thereafter sold the said property to third persons?
RULING: NO.
[To begin, the] CA and the RTC both found and held that Eduardo had complied with
the conditions stipulated in the deed of sale and prescribed by Article 1616 of the
Civil Code.
Considering that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are
binding on the Court, [the Supreme Court] affirms the judgment of the CA upholding
Eduardos exercise of the right of repurchase. Roberto could no longer assail the
factual findings because his petition for review on certiorari was limited to the
review and determination of questions of law only. A question of law exists when the
doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of undisputed facts, while a
question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. Whether the conditions for the right to repurchase were complied with, or
whether there was a tender of payment, is a question of fact. With both the RTC and
the CA finding and holding that Eduardo had fulfilled the conditions for the exercise
of the right to repurchase, therefore, we conclude that Eduardo had effectively
repurchased the properties subject of the deed of sale.
On the other hand, [the Supreme Court] dismisses as devoid of merit Robertos
insistence that the MOA had extinguished the obligations established under the
deed of sale by novation.
The issue of novation involves a question of fact, as it necessarily requires the
factual determination of the existence of the various requisites of novation, namely:
(a) there must be a previous valid obligation; (b) the parties concerned must agree
to a new contract; (c) the old contract must be extinguished; and (d) there must be
a valid new contract. With both the RTC and the CA concluding that the MOA was

consistent with the deed of sale, novation whereby the deed of sale was
extinguished did not occur. In that regard, it is worth repeating that the factual
findings of the lower courts are binding on the Court.

#4
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. YATCO AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES
G.R. No.172551
January 15, 2014
Brion, J.
FACTS: Respondent Yatco Agricultural Enterprises (Yatco) was the registered owner
of a parcel of agricultural land (property) in Calamba, Laguna. The government later
placed the property under the coverage of its Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). Pursuant to E.O. No. 405, petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) valued the property at P1,126,132.89. Yatco did not find this valuation
acceptable and thus elevated the matter to the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of San Pablo City, which then
conducted summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just
compensation.
The PARAD computed the value of the property at P16,543,800.00; it used the
propertys current market value (as shown in the tax declaration that Yatco
submitted) and applied the formula "MV x 2." The PARAD noted that the LBP did not
present any verified or authentic document to back up its computation; hence, it
brushed aside the LBPs valuation. The LBP did not move to reconsider the PARADs
ruling. Instead, it filed with the RTC-SAC a petition for the judicial determination of
just compensation.
The RTC-SAC fixed the just compensation for the property at P200.00 per square
meter. The RTC-SACs relied on the valuation made by Branches 35 and 36 in the
civil cases and opted not to give weight to the LBPs evidence in justifying its
valuation, pointing out that the LBP failed to prove that it complied with the
prescribed procedure and likewise failed to consider the valuation factors provided
in Section 17 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL). The RTCSAC subsequently denied the LBPs motion for reconsideration. The LBP appealed to
the CA.
The CA dismissed the LBPs appeal. Significantly, it did not find the LBPs assigned
errors as to the RTC-SACs basis for its valuation to be persuasive. First,
according to the CA, the parcels of land in the civil cases were the very same
properties in the appealed agrarian case. Second, Branch 36s valuation was based
on the report of the duly appointed commissioners and was arrived at after proper

land inspection. As the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial

function, the CA thus affirmed the RTC-SACs valuation which was founded on
factual and legal bases. The CA denied its motion for reconsideration hence, this
petition. Yatco claims, inter alia, that the present petitions issues and arguments
are purely factual and they are not allowed in a petition for review on certiorari and
that the LBP did not point to any specific error that the CA committed when it
affirmed the RTC-SACs decision.
ISSUE: Was the issue raised by the LBP a question of law as required for a Rule 45
petition?
RULING: YES.
As a general rule, the Courts jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the
review of pure questions of law. A question of law arises when the doubt or
difference exists as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. Negatively put,
Rule 45 does not allow the review of questions of fact. A question of fact exists
when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
The test in determining whether a question is one of law or of fact is "whether the
appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law." Any question that invites calibration
of the whole evidence, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, is a
question of fact and thus proscribed in a Rule 45 petition.
The LBP essentially questions in the present petition the RTC-SACs adoption of the
valuation made by Branch 36 in fixing the just compensation for the property. The
LBP asks the question: was the just compensation fixed by the RTC-SAC for the
property, which was based solely on Branch 36s valuation, determined in
accordance with law?
[The Supreme Court finds] the presented issue clearly one of law. Resolution of this
question can be made by mere inquiry into the law and jurisprudence on the
matter, and does not require a review of the parties evidence. [The Supreme
Court], therefore, [disagrees] with Yatco on this point as [] the present petition [is
found to be] compliant with the Rule 45 requirement.
The determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function that the
Judiciary exercises within the parameters of the law. [] Section 57 of R.A. No.
6657 explicitly vests the RTC-SAC the original and exclusive power to determine just
compensation for lands under CARP coverage.

#5

INC. SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC., CAPTAIN SIGFREDO E. MONTERROYO AND/OR

INTERORIENT NAVIGATION, LTD. vs. ALEXANDER L. MORADAS
G.R. No. 178564
January 15, 2014
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS: Respondent was employed as wiper for the vessel MV Commander (vessel)
by petitioner INC Shipmanagement, Inc. for its principal, petitioner Interorient
Navigation, Ltd. (petitioners), for a period of 10 months, with a basic monthly salary
of US 360.00, plus benefits. Respondent later claimed that while he was disposing of
the garbage in the incinerator room of the vessel, certain chemicals splashed all
over his body because of an explosion. He was sent to the Burns Unit of the Prince
of Wales Hospital on the same day wherein he was found to have suffered deep
burns. Eventually, upon his own request, respondent was sent home, and later
admitted to the St. Lukes Medical Center where he was diagnosed to have
sustained thermal burns at his upper and lower extremities and abdomen. The
attending physician reported that the respondents thermal burns were healing well
and that they were estimated to fully heal within a period of 3 to 4 months.
Claiming that the burns rendered him permanently incapable of working again as a
seaman, respondent demanded for the payment of his full disability benefits under
Section 20 (B) in relation to Sections 30 and 30-A of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA) Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), in the
amount of US$60,000.00, which petitioners refused to heed. Thus, respondent filed
a complaint against petitioners for the same, seeking as well moral and exemplary
damages, including attorneys fees. Petitioners denied respondents claims,
contending that his injury was self-inflicted and, hence, not compensable under
Section 20 (D) of the POEA-SEC. They denied that the vessels incinerator exploded
and claimed that respondent burned himself by pouring paint thinner on his overalls
and thereafter set himself on fire. They averred that he was led to commit such act
after he was caught stealing the vessels supplies during a routine security
inspection where respondent was informed that he was to be dismissed. They also
stated that just before they discovered respondent to be burning, the vessels
engine room became flooded; it was respondents fault as well, they
said. Respondent denied burning himself, contending that such act was contrary to
human nature and logic and that there was no showing that he was mentally unfit.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of petitioners, dismissing respondents
complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) sustained the findings of the LA. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied. Dissatisfied, he filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA.

The CA rendered the assailed Decision, holding that grave abuse of discretion
tainted the NLRC ruling. It found no logical and causal connection between the act
of pilferage as well as the act of causing the flooding in the engine room and the
conclusion that respondents injury was self-inflicted. It added that it was contrary
to human nature and experience for respondent to burn himself. Aggrieved,
petitioners moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in finding that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it
denied respondents claim for disability benefits?
RULING: YES.
The [Supreme] Courts jurisdiction in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45
of the Rules of Court is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. The Court is not
the proper venue to consider a factual issue as it is not a trier of facts. This rule,
however, is not ironclad and a departure therefrom may be warranted where the
findings of fact of the CA are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the NLRC
and LA, as in this case. In this regard, there is therefore a need to review the
records to determine which of them should be preferred as more conformable to
evidentiary facts.
With respect to the applicable rules, it is doctrinal that the entitlement of seamen
on overseas work to disability benefits is a matter governed, not only by medical
findings, but by law and by contract. [] In the foregoing light, the Court observes
that respondent executed his contract of employment [] incorporating therein the
terms and conditions of the 2000 POEA-SEC [but] since the implementation of the
provisions of the foregoing 2000 POEA-SEC was temporarily suspended by the Court
[] and was lifted only through POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, series of
2002, the determination of respondents entitlement to the disability benefits
should be resolved under the provisions of the 1996 POEA-SEC as it was, effectively,
the governing circular at the time respondents employment contract was executed.
The prevailing rule under Section 20 (B) of the 1996 POEA-SEC on compensation
and benefits for injury or illness was that an employer shall be liable for the injury or
illness suffered by a seafarer during the term of his contract. There was no need to
show that such injury was work-related except that it must be proven to have been
contracted during the term of the contract. The rule, however, is not absolute and
the employer may be exempt from liability if he can successfully prove that the
cause of the seamans injury was directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act
[] [h]ence, the onus probandi falls on the petitioners herein to establish or
substantiate their claim that the respondents injury was caused by his willful act
with the requisite quantum of evidence. In labor cases, as in other administrative
proceedings, only substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion is required. 50 To note,

considering that substantial evidence is an evidentiary threshold, the Court, on

exceptional cases, may assess the factual determinations made by the NLRC in a
particular case.
The evident conflict between the NLRCs and CAs factual findings as shown in the
records of this case prompts the Court to sift through their respective factual
determinations if only to determine if the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
in reaching its disposition, keeping in mind that the latters assessment should only
meet the threshold of substantial evidence.
In view of the above-discussed considerations and after a judicious scrutiny of the
facts on record, the Court holds that the CA erred in attributing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC in affirming the LAs dismissal of respondents
complaint. This is based on the Courts observation that the NLRC had cogent legal
bases to conclude that petitioners have successfully discharged the burden of
proving by substantial evidence that respondents injury was directly attributable to
himself.

#6
HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS SR. vs. JUANA GONZALES, et al.
G.R. No. 185922
January 15, 2014
Perez, J.
FACTS: Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (Dr. Favis) was married to Capitolina Aguilar
(Capitolina) with whom he had seven children named Purita A. Favis, Reynaldo Favis,
Consolacion Favis-Queliza, Mariano A. Favis, Jr., Esther F. Filart, Mercedes A. Favis,
and Nelly Favis-Villafuerte. When Capitolina died in March 1944, Dr. Favis took Juana
Gonzales (Juana) as his common-law wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano G.
Favis (Mariano). When Dr. Favis and Juana got married in 1974, Dr. Favis executed
an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate children. Mariano is
married to Larcelita D. Favis (Larcelita), with whom he has four children, named Ma.
Theresa Joana D. Favis, Ma. Cristina D. Favis, James Mark D. Favis and Ma. Thea D.
Favis. Dr. Favis died intestate, leaving a number of properties.
Before his death, Dr. Favis allegedly executed a Deed of Donation transferring and
conveying properties described in (1) and (2) in favor of his grandchildren with
Juana. Claiming that said donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis children with
Capitolina, petitioners herein, filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation,
inventory, liquidation and partition of property before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 20 against Juana, Spouses Mariano and Larcelita and
their grandchildren as respondents.

In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents assert that the properties donated
do not form part of the estate of the late Dr. Favis because said donation was made
inter vivos, hence petitioners have no stake over said properties.
The RTC nullified the Deed of Donation. The trial court found that Dr. Favis, at the
age of 92 and plagued with illnesses, could not have had full control of his mental
capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation. Holding that the subsequent
marriage of Dr. Favis and Juana legitimated the status of Mariano, the trial court also
declared Juana and Mariano as compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis.
Respondents interposed an appeal before the Court of Appeals challenging the trial
courts nullification, on the ground of vitiated consent, of the Deed of Donation in
favor of herein respondents. The Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the
petitioners nullification case. However, it did so not on the grounds invoked by
herein respondents as appellant.
The Court of Appeals motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure
of petitioners to make an averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family Code. The appellate court
justified its order of dismissal by invoking its authority to review rulings of the trial
court even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal. Petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration contending that the case is not subject to compromise as it
involves future legitime. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners contention when
it ruled that the prohibited compromise is that which is entered between the
decedent while alive and compulsory heirs. In the instant case, the appellate court
observed that while the present action is between members of the same family it
does not involve a testator and a compulsory heir. Moreover, the appellate court
pointed out that the subject properties cannot be considered as "future legitime"
but are in fact, legitime, as the instant complaint was filed after the death of the
decedent. Undaunted by this legal setback, petitioners filed the instant petition.
ISSUE: Can the appellate court dismiss the order of dismissal of the complaint for
failure to allege therein that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been
made?
RULING: NO.
The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint. The
appellate courts decision hinged on Article 151 of the Family Code [] correlated
[] with Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [] The
appellate courts reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16 treats of the
grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished from the
grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9 which specifically deals with dismissal of
the claim by the court motu proprio.

Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio
dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis
pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription of action. []
The error of the Court of Appeals is evident even if the consideration of the issue is
kept within the confines of the language of Section 1(j) of Rule 16 and Section 1 of
Rule 9. That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with, a
ground for a motion to dismiss emanating from the law that no suit between
members from the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but
had failed, is, as the Rule so words, a ground for a motion to dismiss. Significantly,
the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed "within the time for but before
filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim." The time frame
indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss based on the absence of the
condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable from the opening sentence of
Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. There are, as just noted,
only four exceptions to this Rule [] Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest
efforts at a compromise has been made but had failed is not one of the exceptions.
Upon such failure, the defense is deemed waived. []

The Court of Appeals ignored the facts of the case that clearly demonstrated the
refusal by the respondents to compromise. Instead it ordered the dismissal of
petitioners complaint on the ground that it did not allege what in fact was shown
during the trial. The error of the Court of Appeals is patent. [] The trial court's
factual finding, therefore, stands unreversed; and respondents did not provide us
with any argument to have it reversed.
The issue of the validity of donation was fully litigated and discussed by the trial
court. Indeed, the trial court's findings were placed at issue before the Court of
Appeals but the appellate court chose to confine its review to the procedural aspect.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, even if it dealt only with procedure, is
deemed to have covered all issues including the correctness of the factual findings
of the trial court. Moreover, remanding the case to the Court of Appeals would only
constitute unwarranted delay in the final disposition of the case.

#7
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 186063
January 15, 2014
Peralta, J.

FACTS: Respondent San Miguel Corporation (SMC) entered into an Exclusive

Dealership Agreement with a certain Rodolfo R. Goroza (Goroza), wherein the latter
was given by SMC the right to trade, deal, market or otherwise sell its various beer
products. Goroza applied for a credit line with SMC, but one of the requirements for
the credit line was a letter of credit. Thus, Goroza applied for and was granted a
letter of credit by the PNB in the amount of two million pesos (P2,000,000.00).
Under the credit agreement, the PNB has the obligation to release the proceeds of
Goroza's credit line to SMC upon presentation of the invoices and official receipts of
Goroza's purchases of SMC beer products to the PNB, Butuan Branch. Goroza
availed of his credit line with PNB and started selling SMC's beer products. Goroza
later applied for an additional credit line with the PNB. The latter granted the same.
Initially, Goroza was able to pay his credit purchases with SMC; however, Goroza
started to become delinquent with his accounts.
Demands to pay the amount were made by SMC against Goroza and PNB, but
neither of them paid. Aggrieved, SMC filed a Complaint for collection of sum of
money against PNB and Goroza with the Butuan City RTC. After summons, herein
petitioner filed its Answer, while Goroza did not. Upon respondent's Motion to
Declare Defendant in Default, Goroza was declared in default. Trial ensued insofar
as Goroza was concerned and respondent presented its evidence ex parte against
the former.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of SMC. Goroza filed a Notice of Appeal, while
SMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC granted SMC's motion for
reconsideration. The trial court amended its Decision by increasing the award of
litigation expenses. Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order giving the appeal due
course.
In the meantime, trial continued with respect to PNB. Later on, PNB filed an Urgent
Motion to Terminate Proceedings on the ground that a decision was already
rendered finding Goroza solely liable. The RTC denied PNB's motion.
The RTC issued a Supplemental Judgment inserting the phrase "without prejudice to
the decision made against the other defendant PNB which was not declared in
default" in the dispositive portion of its decision in favor of SMC. On even date, the
RTC also issued an Amended Order including the phrase "this appeal applies only to
defendant Rolando Goroza and without prejudice to the continuance of the hearing
on the other defendant Philippine National Bank" to the Order giving due course to
Gorozas appeal. PNB then filed a Motion for Reconsideration for both issuances, but
the RTC denied said motion.
Aggrieved, PNB filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA imputing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. The CA denied the petition and affirmed
the RTC. PNB filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it hence, the
instant petition.

ISSUES:
(1) Did the CA err in holding that the court a quo ruled properly in rendering a
supplemental judgment and amended order against the bank despite the
perfection of appeal of one of the defendants?
(2) Did the CA err in holding that proceedings may continue against PNB despite
the complete adjudication of relief in favor of SMC?
RULING: NO.
The petition lacks merit.
It is clear from the proceedings held before and the orders issued by the RTC that
the intention of the trial court is to conduct separate proceedings to determine the
respective liabilities of Goroza and PNB, and thereafter, to render several and
separate judgments for or against them. While ideally, it would have been more
prudent for the trial court to render a single decision with respect to Goroza and
PNB, the procedure adopted the RTC is, nonetheless, allowed under Section 4, Rule
36 of the Rules of Court, which provides that "in an action against several
defendants, the court may, when a several judgment is proper, render judgment
against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others." In
addition, Section 5 of the same Rule states that "when more than one claim for
relief is presented in an action, the court at any stage, upon a determination of the
issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim may render a
separate judgment disposing of such claim." Further, the same provision provides
that "the judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed
of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims." Thus, the appeal of
Goroza, assailing the judgment of the RTC finding him liable, will not prevent the
continuation of the ongoing trial between SMC and PNB. The RTC retains jurisdiction
insofar as PNB is concerned, because the appeal made by Goroza was only with
respect to his own liability. In fact, PNB itself, in its Reply to respondent's Comment,
admitted that the May 10, 2005 judgment of the RTC was "decided solely against
defendant Rodolfo Goroza."
The propriety of a several judgment is borne by the fact that SMC's cause of action
against PNB stems from the latter's alleged liability under the letters of credit which
it issued. On the other hand, SMC's cause of action against Goroza is the latter's
failure to pay his obligation to the former. As to the separate judgment, PNB has a
counterclaim against SMC which is yet to be resolved by the RTC.
[] PNB cannot evade responsibility on the sole ground that the RTC judgment
found Goroza liable and ordered him to pay the amount sought to be recovered by
SMC. PNB's liability, if any, under the letter of credit is yet to be determined.

#8
UNIVERSAL ROBINA SUGAR MILLING CORPORATION, et al. vs. FERDINAND
ACIBO, et al.
G.R. No. 186439
January 15, 2014
Brion, J.
FACTS: URSUMCO is a domestic corporation engaged in the sugar cane milling
business; Cabati is URSUMCOs Business Unit General Manager. The complainants
were employees of URSUMCO. At the start of their respective engagements, the
complainants signed contracts of employment for a period of one (1) month or for a
given season. URSUMCO repeatedly hired the complainants to perform the same
duties and, for every engagement, required the latter to sign new employment
contracts for the same duration of one month or a given season.
The complainants filed before the LA complaints for regularization, entitlement to
the benefits under the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA),and
attorneys fees. The LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The LA held that
the complainants were seasonal or project workers and not regular employees of
URSUMCO. Accordingly, the complainants were not entitled to the benefits granted
under the CBA that, as provided, covered only the regular employees of URSUMCO.
Of the twenty-two original complainants before the LA, seven appealed the LAs
ruling before the NLRC.
The NLRC reversed the LAs ruling; it declared the complainants as regular, for
having performed activities which were usually necessary and desirable in the usual
trade or business of URSUMCO, and had been repeatedly hired for the same
undertaking every season. The petitioners moved to reconsider this NLRC ruling
which the NLRC denied. The petitioners elevated the case to the CA via a petition
for certiorari.
The CA affirmed the NLRCs ruling finding the complainants to be regular
employees. The petitioners filed the present petition after the CA denied their
motion for partial reconsideration.
ISSUE: Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion?
RULING: YES.
[In] this jurisdiction, only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review on
certiorari. This Courts power of review in a Rule 45 petition is limited to resolving
matters pertaining to any perceived legal errors, which the CA may have committed

in issuing the assailed decision. In reviewing the legal correctness of the CAs Rule
65 decision in a labor case, [the Supreme Court examines] the CA decision in the
context that it determined, i.e., the presence or absence of grave abuse of
discretion in the NLRC decision before it and not on the basis of whether the NLRC
decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, [the Supreme Court
has] to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on
appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it.
[] To recall, the NLRC declared the respondents as regular employees of
URSUMCO. With such a declaration, the NLRC in effect granted the respondents
prayer for regularization and, concomitantly, their prayer for the grant of monetary
benefits under the CBA for URSUMCOs regular employees. In its challenged ruling,
the CA concurred with the NLRC finding, but with the respondents characterized as
regular seasonal employees of URSUMCO.
The CA misappreciated the real import of the NLRC ruling. The labor agency did not
declare the respondents as regular seasonal employees, but as regular employees.
This is the only conclusion that can be drawn from the NLRC decisions dispositive
portion [] Citing jurisprudential standards, [the CA explained] that the respondents
cannot be lumped with the regular employees due to the differences in the nature
of their duties and the duration of their work vis-a-vis the operations of the
company. The NLRC was well aware of these distinctions as it acknowledged that
the respondents worked only during the milling season, yet it ignored the
distinctions and declared them [as] regular employees, a marked departure from
existing jurisprudence. This, to us, is grave abuse of discretion, as it gave no reason
for disturbing the system of regular seasonal employment already in place in the
sugar industry and other industries with similar seasonal operations. For upholding
the NLRCs flawed decision on the respondents employment status, the CA
committed a reversible error of judgment.
In sum, [] the complaint [is] devoid of merit. The issue of granting affirmative
relief to the complainants who did not appeal the CA ruling has become academic.

#9
RIVELISA REALTY, INC. vs. FIRST STA. CLARA BUILDERS CORPORATION
G.R. No. 189618
January 15, 2014
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS: Rivelisa Realty entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with First Sta.
Clara for the construction and development of a residential subdivision located in
Cabanatuan City (project). In the course of events, First Sta. Clara filed a
complaint for rescission of the JVA against Rivelisa Realty before the RTC, claiming

the payment of damages for breach of contract and delay in the performance of an
obligation.
The RTC dismissed the complaint and ordered First Sta. Clara to pay Rivelisa Realty
on its counterclaims for actual expenses and damages. Dissatisfied, First Sta. Clara
elevated the matter on appeal. The CA found Rivelisa Realty still liable for First Sta.
Claras actual accomplishments in the project after deducting certain costs it
advanced.
Rivelisa Realty received a copy of the CA Decision and moved for a fifteen (15) day
extension within which to file its motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, Rivelisa
Realty filed its Motion for Reconsideration by registered mail. However, the CA
denied Rivelisa Realtys motion for extension as the 15-day period for filing a motion
for reconsideration cannot be extended, and merely noted without action the
subsequently filed motion for reconsideration. The CA eventually denied Rivelisa
Realtys motion for reconsideration on the ground that the same was filed out of
time hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Is the 15-day reglementary period for the filing of a motion for
reconsideration non-extendable?
RULING: YES.
The CA Decision subject of the instant petition for review had already attained
finality in view of Rivelisa Realtys failure to file a motion for reconsideration within
the 15-day reglementary period allowed under the CAs internal rules []
While a motion for additional time is expressly permitted in the filing of a petition
for review before the Court under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a similar
motion seeking to extend the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is
prohibited in all other courts [] the Court emphasized that the 15-day period for
filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration is non-extendible. Hence, the filing of
a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration did not toll the 15day period before a judgment becomes final and executory.

#10
MAGDALENA T. VILLASI vs. FILOMENO GARCIA, et al.
G.R. No. 190106
January 15, 2014
Perez, J.
FACTS: Sometime in 1990, petitioner Magdalena T Villasi (Villasi) engaged the
services of respondent Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc. (FGCI) to construct a sevenstorey condominium building located at Aurora Boulevard corner N. Domingo Street,
Cubao, Quezon City. For failure of Villasi to fully pay the contract price despite
several demands, FGCI initiated a suit for collection of sum of money before the RTC
of Quezon City, Branch 77. In its action docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-8187, FGCI
prayed, among others, for the payment of the amount ofP2,865,000.00,

representing the unpaid accomplishment billings. Served with summons, Villasi filed
an answer specifically denying the material allegations of the complaint.
Contending that FGCI has no cause of action against her, Villasi averred that she
delivered the total amount of P7,490,325.10 to FGCI but the latter accomplished
only 28% of the project. After the pre-trial conference was terminated without the
parties having reached an amicable settlement, trial on the merits ensued.
ISSUE: Did the CA grievously err in upholding the decision of the trial court to
suspend and hold in abeyance the sale on execution of the buildings levied upon on
the basis of respondents affidavit of third-party claim?
RULING: NO.
It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against the
property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if the property
belonging to any third person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for another mans
indebtedness, such person has all the right to challenge the levy through any of the
remedies provided for under the Rules of Court. Section 16, Rule 39 specifically
provides that a third person may avail himself of the remedies of either terceria, to
determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the property not
belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent "separate action" to
vindicate his claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property.
However, the person other than the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right
over levied properties is not precluded from taking other legal remedies to
prosecute his claim.
Our perusal of the record shows that, as the party asserting their title, the Spouses
Garcia failed to prove that they have a bona fide title to the building in question.
Aside from their postulation that as title holders of the land, the law presumes them
to be owners of the improvements built thereon, the Spouses Garcia were unable to
adduce credible evidence to prove their ownership of the property. In contrast,
Villasi was able to satisfactorily establish the ownership of FGCI thru the pieces of
evidence she appended to her opposition. Worthy to note is the fact that the
building in litigation was declared for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI and not
in the Spouses Garcias. While it is true that tax receipts and tax declarations are
not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute credible proof of claim of
title over the property.

#11
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ONATE
G.R. No. 192371
January 15, 2014
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS: Land Bank is a government financial institution created under Republic Act
No. 3844.7 From 1978 to 1980, Oate opened and maintained seven trust accounts
with Land Bank. Each trust account was covered by an Investment Management
Account (IMA) with Full Discretion and has a corresponding passbook where deposits

and withdrawals were recorded. Pertinent portions common to the IMAs provide that
Land Bank will be Onates agent with full powers and discretion subject to some
limitation. In a letter, Land Bank demanded from Oate the return ofP4 million it
claimed to have been inadvertently deposited to Trust Account No. 01-125 as his
additional funds but actually represents the total amount of the checks issued to
Land Bank by its corporate borrowers as payment for their pre-terminated loans.
Oate refused. To settle the matter, a meeting was held, but the parties failed to
reach an agreement. Since then, the issue of "miscrediting" remained unsettled.
Then on June 21, 1991, Land Bank unilaterally applied the outstanding balance in all
of Oates trust accounts against his resulting indebtedness by reason of the
"miscrediting" of funds. Although it exhausted the funds in all of Oates trust
accounts, Land Bank was able to debit the amount of P1,528,583.48 only.
To recoup the remaining balance of Oates indebtedness, Land Bank filed a
Complaint for
Sum
of
Money
seeking
to
recover
the
amount
of P8,222,687.8920 plus interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum computed from
May 15, 1992 until fully paid.
The RTC ruled against Land Bank. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts
ruling.
ISSUE: Was Onate entitled to claim the amount of P1,471,416.52 which is not
pleaded as counterclaim in his answer?
RULING: YES.
Land Bank failed to prove that the miscredit funds came from proceeds of the preterminated loans of its corporate borrowers. As a consequence of its failure to prove
the source of the claimed miscredited funds, Land Bank had no right to debit the
said amount and therefore, must restore the same. Land Bank never prayed for the
recovery of the negative balances in its Complaint. It is settled that courts cannot
grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by
the party. Due process considerations require that judgments must conform to and
be supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in court. During the pre-trial
conference, the issue of the validity of undocumented withdrawals was properly put
into issue. The parties also agreed, as a collateral issue, that should it appear that
the bank was not authorized to make the undocumented withdrawals, the next
issue for consideration would be whether the amount subject thereof should be
credited back to Oates accounts. The case of negative balances as alluded to by
Land Bank, however, is different. It was never put into issue during the pre-trial
conference. The determination of issues at a pre-trial conference bars the
consideration of other questions on appeal." Land Bank interposed its claim to the
negative balances for the first time only when it filed its Memorandum with the RTC.

#12
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. vs. BPI/MS INSURANCE CORP.
G.R. No. 193986
January 15, 2014

Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS: On separate dates, Sumitomo Corporation shipped through MV Eastern
Challenger, a vessel owned by petitioner herein, various steel sheets in coil from
Yokohama, Japan for delivery in favor of the consignee Calamba Steel. It was insured
against all risk with Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co. When the shipment arrived in
Manila, upon unloading from the vessel, some of the coils were observed to be in
bad condition as evidenced by the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order. The cargo was
then turned over to Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI) for stevedoring, storage and
safekeeping pending Calamba Steels withdrawal of the goods. When ATI delivered
the cargo to Calamba Steel, the latter rejected its damaged portion.
Calamba Steel filed an insurance claim with Mitsui through the latters settling
agent, respondent BPI/MS Insurance Corporation (BPI/MS), and the former was paid
the the total amount of US$30,210.32. Correlatively, as insurer and subrogee of
Calamba Steel, Mitsui and BPI/MS filed a Complaint for Damages against petitioner
and ATI. The RTC ruled that Eastern Shipping Lines and Asian Terminals Inc. be
jointly and severally liable. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower
court.
On appeal, it was raised that the survey reports clearly show that the cause of the
damage was the rough handling of the goods by ATI during the discharging
operations. Petitioner attests that it had no participation whatsoever in the
discharging operations and that petitioner did not have a choice in selecting the
stevedore since ATI is the only arrastre operator mandated to conduct discharging
operations in the South Harbor.
ISSUE: Were Eastern Shipping Lines and ATI solidarily liable?
RULING: YES.
Well-entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that factual questions may not be
raised before this Court in a petition for review on certiorari as this Court is not a
trier of facts. This is clearly stated in Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, which provides:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court
of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth.
In this petition, the resolution of the question as to who between petitioner and ATI
should be liable for the damage to the goods is indubitably factual, and would
clearly impose upon this Court the task of reviewing, examining and evaluating or
weighing all over again the probative value of the evidence presented something
which is not, as a rule, within the functions of this Court and within the office of a
petition for review on certiorari.

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING vs. ICAO

G.R. No. 196047
January 15, 2014
Sereno, CJ.
FACTS: The instant petition stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal and
damages filed by private respondent Belio C. Icao against petitioners Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company (LCMC) and its Chief Executive Officer Felipe U. Yap
before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. Private respondent claimed that his
dismissal from work was without just or authorized cause since petitioners failed to
prove by ample and sufficient evidence that he stole gold bearing high grade ores
from the company premises. As such, private respondent prayed that petitioners be
held liable for illegal dismissal, to reinstate him to his former position without loss of
seniority rights and benefits, and to pay his full backwages, damages and attorneys
fees.
The Labor Arbiter held that LCMC is liable for illegal dismissal. The NLRC dismissed
the appeal of LCMC for failure to post the appeal bond. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of NLRC.
ISSUE: Was the petitioner compliant with the appeal bond requirement in his filing
a consolidated motion to release the cash bond posted in another case?
RULING: YES.
The petitioner substantially complied with the appeal bond requirements. First,
there is no question that the appeal was filed within the 10-day reglementary
period. Except for the alleged failure to post an appeal bond, the appeal to the NLRC
was therefore in order. Second, it is also undisputed that petitioner has an
unencumbered amount of money in the form of cash in the custody of the NLRC. To
reiterate, petitioner had posted a cash bond of P401,610.84 in the separate case
Dangiw Siggaao, which was earlier decided in its favor. Under the Rule VI, Section 6
of the 2005 NLRC Rules, "[a] cash or surety bond shall be valid and effective from
the date of deposit or posting, until the case is finally decided, resolved or
terminated, or the award satisfied." Hence, it is clear that a bond is encumbered
and bound to a case only for as long as 1) the case has not been finally decided,
resolved or terminated; or 2) the award has not been satisfied. Therefore, once the
appeal is finally decided and no award needs to be satisfied, the bond is
automatically released. Since the money is now unencumbered, the employer who
posted it should now have unrestricted access to the cash which he may now use as
he pleases as appeal bond in another case, for instance. This is what petitioner
simply did. Third, the cash bond in the amount of P401,610.84 posted in Dangiw
Siggaao is more than enough to cover the appeal bond in the amount
of P345,879.45 required in the present case. Fourth, this ruling remains faithful to
the spirit behind the appeal bond requirement which is to ensure that workers will
receive the money awarded in their favor when the employers appeal eventually
fails. There was no showing at all of any attempt on the part of petitioner to evade
the posting of the appeal bond. On the contrary, petitioners move showed a

willingness to comply with the requirement. Hence, the welfare of Icao is adequately
protected.

#14
LZK HOLDINGS and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. PLANTERS
DEVELOPMENT BANK.
G.R. No. 187973
January 20, 2014
Reyes, J.
FACTS: LZK Holdings obtained a loan from Planters Bank and secured the same
with a Real Estate Mortgage over its lot located in La Union. On September 21,
1998, the lot was sold at a public auction after Planters Bank extrajudicially
foreclosed the real estate mortgage thereon due to LZK Holdings' failure to pay its
loan. Planters Bank emerged as the highest bidder during the auction sale and its
certificate of sale was registered on March 16, 1999.

On April 5, 1999, LZK Holdings filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, a
complaint for annulment of extra judicial foreclosure, mortgage contract, promissory
note and damages. LZK Holdings also prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the consolidation
of title over the lot by Planters Bank.

Planters Bank filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession with
the RTC-San Fernando.

Three (3) days before the expiration of LZK Holdings' redemption period, the RTCMakati issued a TRO effective for 20 days enjoining Planters Bank from
consolidating its title over the property. Then, the RTC-Makati ordered the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction for the same purpose but the writ was issued only
on June 20, 2000 upon LZK Holdings' posting of a P40,000.00 bond.

In the meantime, Planters Bank succeeded in consolidating its ownership over the
property on April 24, 2000. However, the proceedings for its ex-parte motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession was suspended by the RTC-San Fernando in an
Order in view of the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC-Makati.

Planters Bank moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied by the RTC-San
Fernando in an Order dated September 1, 2000.

Meanwhile, upon motion of LZK Holdings, the RTC-Makati declared as null and void
the consolidated title of Planters Bank in an Order dated June 2, 2000. Such ruling
was affirmed by the CA in a Decision dated February 26, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No.
59327. When the matter reached the Court via G.R. No. 164563, we sustained the
CA's judgment in our Resolution7 dated September 13, 2004.

Planters Bank also appealed the May 11, 2000 Order of the RTC-San Fernando which
held in abeyance the resolution of its ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession. This time, Planters Bank was victorious. The CA granted the appeal and
annulled the assailed order of the RTC-San Fernando. Aggrieved, LZK Holdings
sought recourse with the Court in a petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 167998.
In Our Decision dated April 27, 2007, we affirmed the CA's ruling and decreed that
Planters Bank may apply for and is entitled to a writ of possession as the purchaser
of the property in the foreclosure sale,

Armed with the above ruling, Planters Bank filed before the RTC-San Fernando a
motion to set ex-parte hearing for the issuance of a writ of possession. LZK Holdings
opposed the motion. In an Order dated April 2, 2008, the RTC-San Fernando denied
the opposition and set the hearing on April 14, 2008. On April 8, 2008, the RTC-San
Fernando issued another Order declaring the scheduled hearing moot and academic
and granting Planter Bank's ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession
which was filed as early as December 27, 1999. The decretal portion of the order
reads:

ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the right of

Planter's Bank to a writ of possession as adjudged in their previous case is binding
and conclusive on the parties

RULING: YES.
The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that "when a
right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent

jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of
the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties
and those in privity with them."
All the elements of the doctrine are present in this case. The final judgment in G.R.
No. 167998 was rendered by the Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over the review of
decisions and rulings of the CA. It was a judgment on the merits of Planters Banks's
right to apply for and be issued a writ of possession. Lastly, the parties in G.R. No.
167998 are the same parties involved in the present case

Hence, LZK Holdings can no longer question Planter Bank's right to a writ of
possession over the subject property because the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment bars the relitigation of such particular issue

#15
PEBLIA ALFARO AND THE HEIRS OF PROSPEROUS ALFARO, NAMELY: MARY
ANN PEARL ALFARO & ROUSLIA ALFARO vs. SPOUSES EDITHO AND HERA
DUMALAGAN, SPOUSES CRISPIN AND EDITHA DALOGDOG, ET AL.
G.R. No. 186622
January 22, 2014
Perez, J.
FACTS: Olegario Bagano sold a lot covered by a TCT and registered in his name to
petitioner Spouses Alfaro through a deed of absolute sale. The spouses then caused
the immediate transfer of the title in their names. They also paid the real property
tax and constructed a perimeter fence around the property.
The respondent Spouses Dumalagan, on the other hand, alleged that they are the
real owners of a portion of the subject property based on a notarized deed of
absolute sale. To prove their ownership and possession, they offered in evidence a
Certificate of Completion and a Certificate of Occupancy and electric bills. Right
after they bought the land, the Spouses immediately took possession of the
property and built a nipa hut on it. They leased the nipa hut to one Ramil Quiineza.
After Ramils lease ended, several other tenants have occupied and paid monthly
rentals to the Spouses Dumalagan.
The Spouses Bagano filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Sale with
Damages and Preliminary Injunction against the Spouses Alfaro. The RTC sustained
the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
The Spouses Dumalagan then filed an action for the Annulment of Title, Preliminary
Injunction with Temporary Restraining Order and Damages against the Spouses

Alfaro. The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. According to the
trial court, the spouses Dumalagan failed to establish that the defendants were in
bad faith when they bought the subject property.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was reversed and
set aside. According to the appellate court, the Spouses Alfaro cannot claim good
faith because the annotations written on the back of Baganos title have the effect
of charging the petitioners as subsequent buyers with constructive notice of the
defect of the sellers title.
ISSUE: Whether an adverse claim continues to be effective after the lapse of the
thirty-day period provided in PD 1529
RULING: YES.
Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered
owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other
provision is made in this decree for registering the same, make a statement in
writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom
acquired, a reference to the number of certificates of title of the registered owner,
the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or
interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimants
residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement
shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The
adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of
registration. After the lapse of the said period, the annotation of adverse claim may
be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefore by the party in interest:
Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the
same ground shall be registered by the same claimant. x x x x
The above ruling would seem to restrict the effectivity of adverse claims to 30 days.
However, the same should not be read separately, but should be read in relation to
the subsequent sentence, which reads:
After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled
upon filing of a verified petition therefore by the party in interest.
The law, taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is
still necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain
annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property; for if the adverse claim
already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of the said period, its cancellation is
no longer necessary and the process of cancellation would be a useless ceremony.
Therefore, petitioners cannot claim good faith on the basis of the supposed
ineffectivity of the annotated adverse claims as the same have not been cancelled
at the time of purchase. Assuming arguendo that the annotated adverse claims
expired on 23 March 1995, petitioners still cannot claim good faith as they were
fully aware that there were occupants in the subject property other than the seller.

Worse, they were also fully aware that an occupant in the subject property bought
the same; that aside from the nipa hut, there were also other structures in the
subject property, one of which was built by Epifanio Pesarillo.

#16
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL MANILA AND/OR BRIAN McCAULEY, vs.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE)
G.R. No. 167286
February 5, 2014
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS: Santos was first hired by the School in 1978 as a full-time Spanish language
teacher. In April 1992, Santos filed for and was granted a leave of absence for the
school year 1992-1993. She came back from her leave of absence sometime in
August 1993. Upon Santoss return to the School, only one class of Spanish was
available for her to teach. Thus, for the school year 1993-1994, Santos agreed to
teach one class of Spanish and four other classes of Filipino that were left behind by
a retired teacher.

Since it was Santoss first time to teach Filipino, the Schools high school
administrators observed the way she conducted her classes. The results of the
observations on her classes were summarized in Classroom Standards Evaluation
Forms accomplished by the designated observers. In accordance with said forms,
Santos was evaluated in the areas of Planning, the Teaching Act, Climate,
Management and Communication.

Santos was eventually fired by the school. An action was filed a case against the
latter for illegal dismissal, entitlement of separation pay and back wages. The NLRC
ruled in favor of the school which prompted Santos to elevate the case to the
appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court can reverse the decision of an
administrative body such as the NLRC.
RULING: YES.
Generally, on appeal, the findings of fact of an administrative agency like the NLRC
are accorded not only respect but also finality if the findings are supported by
substantial evidence. Such rule, however, is by no means absolute. As held in San
Miguel Corporation v. Aballa, "when the findings of fact of the labor arbiter and the
NLRC are not supported by substantial evidence or their judgment was based on a

misapprehension of facts, the appellate court may make an independent evaluation

of the facts of the case." The Court finds the said exceptions extant in this case.

#17
RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 170462
February 5, 2014
Brion, J.
FACTS: Rodolfo and his son, Joey, were charged with the crimes of frustrated
homicide and homicide against one Erwin Ordonez and David Ordonez, respectively.
Although the informations stated that the crimes were committed on January 8,
2000, the true date of their commission is November 8, 2000, as confirmed by the
CA through the records. The parties failed to raise any objection to the discrepancy.
Petitioners pleaded not guilty to both charges. The cases were jointly tried with the
conformity of the prosecution and the defense. At the pre-trial, the petitioners
interposed self-defense, which prompted the RTC to conduct a reverse trial of the
case.
The defense presented the testimonies of Rodolfo, Joey, and the petitioners'
neighbor, Balbino Agustin. On the other hand, prosecution presented the sole
testimony of Erwin who survived the hacking. He narrated that he, his brother David
and Philip went to a birthday party and passed in front of the petitioners' compound.
He was 20 meters ahead of his companions when, suddenly, Philip ran up to him
saying that David was being stabbed by Joey with a bolo. While approaching the
scene of the stabbing, which was three (3) meters away from where his brother
David was, Erwin was met by Rodolfo who then hacked him, hitting his arm and
back. Thereafter, Rodolfo and Joey dragged Erwin inside the petitioners' compound
and kept on hacking him. He was hacked and stabbed thirteen (13) times. Erwin
denied that he and David threw stones at the petitioners' house and damaged
Rodolfo's tricycle.1wphi1 they did not likewise destroy the petitioners' gate, which
was only damaged when his brother David clung on to it while he was being pulled
by Rodolfo and Erwin into their compound. While they were being hacked and
stabbed by Rodolfo and Erwin, stones actually rained on them and people outside
the petitioners' gate were saying, "Do not kill the brothers. Allow them to come
out."
RTC gave credence to the prosecution's version of the incident and found the
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of frustrated homicide and
homicide. It disbelieved the defense's version of the events due to material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the defense witnesses. It denied the

petitioners' claim of self-defense for lack of clear, convincing and satisfactory

supporting evidence.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment and convicted the petitioners of the
crimes charged.
The CA further held that the petitioners' plea of self-defense was belied by the
nature and number of wounds inflicted on Erwin, who sustained thirteen (13) stab
wounds on his arm and back, and David, who suffered around ten (10) stab wounds
on his back and stomach causing his death. These wounds logically indicated that
the assault was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined homicidal
aggression on the part of the petitioners.
ISSUE: Are questions of fact reviewable under Rule 45?
RULING: NO.
At the outset, the Court's review of the case is via a petition for review under Rule
45, which generally bars any question pertaining to the factual issues raised. The
well-settled rule is that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review
under Rule 45, subject only to certain exceptions, among them, the lack of sufficient
support in evidence of the trial court's judgment or the appellate court's
misapprehension of the adduced facts.
The petitioners fail to convince us that we should review the findings of fact in this
case. Factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great
weight and respect by this Court and are deemed final and conclusive when
supported by the evidence on record. We find that both the RTC and the CA fully
considered the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense, and they
have adequately explained the legal and evidentiary reasons in concluding that the
petitioners are guilty of the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide.
In the absence of any showing that the trial and appellate courts overlooked certain
facts and circumstances that could substantially affect the outcome of the present
case, we uphold the rulings of the RTC and the CA which found the elements of
these crimes fully established during the trial.

#18
PASIG PRINTING CORPORATION vs. ROCKLAND CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.
G.R. No. 193592
February 5, 2014
Mendoza, J.

FACTS: Mid-Pasig Land Development Corporation (MPLDC) leased the subject

property to ECRM Enterprises (ECRM). Subsequently, ECRM assigned all its rights in

the contract of lease including the option to renew to Rockland. Later, Rockland
erected a building on the area and subleased certain portions to MC Home Depot. In
December of 2000, MPLDC demanded that Rockland vacate the property.
To pre-empt any action by MPLDC, Rockland filed a civil case for specific
performance docketed as Civil Case No. 68213, asking MPLDC to execute a 3-year
extended contract of lease in its favor. It also filed an unlawful detainer case
docketed as Civil Case No. 8788.
The first case for specific performance reached its way to the Court when MPLDC
filed a petition questioning the CA affirmation of the RTCs denial of its motion to
dismiss on account of the subsequent filing of the unlawful detainer case with the
MeTC. Before the Court could rule on the merits of the petition with regard to the
specific performance case, the separate unlawful detainer case was dismissed by
the MeTC on April 29, 2002, reasoning out that the issue sought to be resolved was
not one of possession, but an exercise of the option to renew a contract cognizable
by the RTC.
The Court granted MPLDCs petition stating that the issues in the specific
performance case should be addressed in the unlawful detainer proceedings before
the MeTC, thus, the specific performance case was dismissed.
At this point, the CA decision in the unlawful detainer case was elevated to the
Court as G.R No. 162924, entitled Mid-Pasig Land Development Corporation v. Mario
Tablante (Tablante).
On February 4, 2010, in Tablante, the Court declared that a remand to the MeTC for
the unlawful detainer case would have been proper if not for the circumstances
which rendered the issue of possession moot and academic. Hence, the Court
declared the case as closed and terminated.
Despite its mootness as held in Tablante, the issue of possession again surfaced in
the third case, an indirect contempt case pending before the RTC docketed as SCA
Case No. 2673. This was filed against MPLDC for its refusal to reconnect the electric
supply in the subject property. On September 17, 2004, this case was dismissed.
The RTC, however, awarded the possession to MPLDC with Rockland being ordered
to refrain from exercising any possessory rights over the same..
On November 12, 2004, the RTC issued the Omnibus Order denying Rocklands
motion for reconsideration on the dismissal of the indirect contempt case, granting
PPCs motion to intervene, and ordering the immediate implementation of the
September 17, 2004 Resolution
On November 16, 2004, the above resolution was implemented by the Sheriff, thus,
possession of the subject property was turned over to PPC on the basis of the option
to lease agreement with MPLDC.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the dismissal of the indirect contempt case, but annulled
the award of possession to MPLDC.

Again, the above decision of the CA reached the Court but was only affirmed. In its
resolution on the petition, believing that the affirmation awarded the possession of
the property to it, Rockland sought restoration in the possession of the subject. In
the course of the execution proceedings, the trial court issued flip-flopping orders,
the last (August 10, 2007 RTC) Order of which awarded the possession to PPC.
In its May 11, 2010 Decision involving a petition questioning the RTC order, the CA
ruled that the order directing movants to restore Rockland in the possession of the
property be reinstated. Motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in declaring that Rockland still has the right to possess the
subject property following the ruling in Tablante?
RULING: YES.
It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass
upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are
involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become
moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to
which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of
the petition.
At the time the CA issued its assailed May 11, 2010 decision, the Court had already
pronounced in Tab/ante the end of Rockland's claim over the subject prope1iy
because of the expiration of its lease. By that very fact, Rockland has no more
possessory right over it.
Granting that the CA was not aware of Tablante, nonetheless, it had no factual or
legal basis in ordering the restoration of the possession of the subject prope1iy to
Rockland. It was very clear in the records that the original lease contract entered
into by and between MPLDC and ECRM, the predecessor in interest of Rockland, had
long expired in 2003.

#19
INTEL TECHNOLOGY PHILIPPINES, INC., vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and JEREMIAS CABILES
G.R. No. 200575
February 5, 2014
Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Jeremias Cabiles was initially hired by Intel Phil. on April 16, 1997 as an
Inventory Analyst. He was subsequently promoted several times over the years and
was also assigned at Intel Arizona and Intel Chengdu. He later applied for a position
at Intel Semiconductor Limited Hong Kong (Intel HK).

In a letter, dated December 12, 2006, Cabiles was offered the position of Finance
Manager by Intel HK. Before accepting the offer, he inquired from Intel Phil., through
an email, the consequences of accepting the newly presented opportunity in Hong
Kong. Intel Phil replied that he will not be eligible to receive the retirement benefit
because he have not reached 10 years of service at the time he moved to Hong
Kong. However, despite such knowledge Cabiles signed the job offer. Intel Phil.
issued Cabiles his "Intel Final Pay Separation Voucher". As a result, Cabiles executed
a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim (Waiver) in favor of Intel Phil. After 7 months of
employment, Cabiles resigned from Intel HK.
About two years thereafter, Cabiles filed a complaint for non-payment of retirement
benefits and for moral and exemplary damages with the NLRC Regional Arbitration
Branch-IV. He insisted that he was employed by Intel for 10 years and 5 months
from April 1997 to September 2007 a period which included his seven (7) month
stint with Intel HK. Thus, he believed he was qualified to avail of the benefits under
the companys retirement policy allowing an employee who served for 10 years or
more to receive retirement benefits.
The LA ordered Intel Phil to pay Cabiles retirement benefits with legal interest and
attorneys fees. The LA held that Cabiles did not sever his employment with Intel
Phil. when he moved to Intel HK, similar to the instances when he was assigned at
Intel Arizona and Intel Chengdu. Despite the clarification made by Intel Phil.
regarding his ineligibility to receive retirement benefits, the LA stated that Cabiles
could not be faulted if he was made to believe his non-entitlement to retirement
benefits. Thus, it should not prevent him from asserting his right to receive them.
Finally, the Waiver executed by Cabiles when he left Intel Phil., was treated by the
LA as no bar for claiming his retirement pay because it merely covered the last
salary and commutation of sick leaves and vacation leaves to the exclusion of
retirement benefits.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed with modification the LA decision. Intel Phil. moved
for reconsideration but its motion was denied in the NLRC Resolution.
ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals commit serious error in dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which its
decision was based?
RULING: YES.
As a general rule, this Court is not a trier of facts and a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must exclusively raise questions of
law. Nevertheless, the Court will not hesitate to deviate from what are clearly
procedural guidelines and disturb and strike down the findings of the CA and those
of the labor tribunals if there is a showing that they are unsupported by the
evidence on record or there was a patent misappreciation of facts. Indeed, that the
impugned decision of the CA is consistent with the findings of the labor tribunals

does not per se conclusively demonstrate its correctness. By way of exception to

the general rule, this Court will scrutinize the facts if only to rectify the prejudice
and injustice resulting from an incorrect assessment of the evidence presented. It is
in this wise that the Court agrees with Intel Phil. that the CA seriously erred in
affirming the findings of the NLRC on the face of substantial evidence showing
Cabiles disqualification to receive the retirement benefits. The Court, therefore,
reverses the ruling of the CA for the reasons hereinafter discussed.

#20
UNITED TOURIST PROMOTIONS vs. KEMPLIN
G.R. No. 205453
February 5, 2014
Reyes, J.
FACTS: Ariel Jersey, with the help of two American expatriates, Kemplin and the late
Mike Dunne, formed UTP. UTP employed Kemplin to be its president from 20022007, renewable for the same period, subject to new terms and conditions.
Kemplin continued to render his services to UTP even after his fixed term contract of
employment expired. Records show that in 2009, Kemplin, signing as President of
UTP, entered into advertisement agreements with Pizza Hut and M. Lhuillier.
Thereafter, UTPs legal counsel sent Kemplin a letter telling him that he can no
longer enter the company premises because of his inhuman treatment of the rank
and file employees. Kemplin filed before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC a Complaint against UTP and its officers for illegal dismissal, among others. In
his Position Paper, he claimed that he was sent the letter after noticing some
accounting discrepancies which he e-mailed to the other officers.
The LA held that Kemplin was illegally dismissed and ordered UTP to reinstate him
to his former position with backwages. The NLRC affirmed the LAs Decision.
However, Lorena Lindo and Larry Jersey were expressly excluded from assuming
liability for lack of proof of their involvement in Kemplins dismissal. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the decisions of the LA and the NLRC. Thus, UTP filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Can the SC resolve the issues of whether Kemplin was illegally dismissed
and whether the dismissal was invalid because of UTPs failure to afford him due
process of law in this petition?
RULING: NO.
The first two issues raised are factual in nature, hence, beyond the ambit of a
petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is settled that Rule 45 limits the
Court merely to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA
decision. The Court is generally bound by the CAs factual findings, except only in
some instances, among which is, when the said findings are contrary to those of the

trial court or administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions from which the
action originated. In the case at bar, the LA, NLRC, and CA uniformly ruled that
Kemplin was dismissed sans substantive and procedural due process. While the
Court need not belabor the first two factual issues presented therein, it bears
stressing that the Court finds the rulings of the appellate court and the labor
tribunals as amply supported by substantial evidence.

#21
REPUBLIC vs. OLAYBAR
G.R. No. 189538
February 10, 2014
Peralta, J.
FACTS: Respondent requested from the NSO a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five
years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a
certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean national, at the MTCC Palace of Justice. She denied
having contracted the marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged
husband, and that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers.
She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract,
especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. The RTC rendered a decision
granting the petition of respondent. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,
contesting, that there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. The RTC denied the motion, holding that it had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding required.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUES:
(1) Was a recourse to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 proper in the case at bar
(2) May the cancellation of entries in a marriage contract which, in effect,
nullifies the marriage be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding?
RULING:
(1) At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to the Court from
the decisions and final orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions
of law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt arises
as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which did not call for the
examination of the probative value of the evidence of the parties. Here, the
issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the cancellation of entries in the
marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken
in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a pure question of law.
(2) To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct

action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to

prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts, as a petition
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
RTC where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino
citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his
entry of marriage in the civil registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to
show the existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming
evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware
of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly
established that the only evidence of marriage which is the marriage
certificate was a forgery. While the Court maintains that Rule 108 cannot be
availed of to determine the validity of marriage, the Court cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the
opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were
followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and
examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as
there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such
marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in
allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the
wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage
void as there was no marriage to speak of.

#22
AGUSTIN vs. CRUZ-HERRERA
G.R. No. 174564
February 12, 2014
Reyes, J.
FACTS: Respondent was the President of Podden International Philippines Inc., while
complainants were assemblers and/or line leader assigned at the production
department. Complainants were terminated from employment due to financial
reverses. Upon verification of the DOLE, however, no such report of financial
reverses or even retrenchment was filed. This prompted the complainants to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal, monetary claims, and damages against Podden and
Herrera. The LA ruled in favor of complainants. No appeal was taken from the
judgment, hence, a motion for execution was subsequently filed. The motion was
set for a hearing but was reset twice upon the parties request for the purpose of
exploring the possibility of settlement. Herrera filed a Manifestation and Motion to
deny issuance of the writ stating, among others, that Podden ceased operations
almost four years before judgment was rendered by the LA on the illegal dismissal
complaint and that nine of the eleven employees have executed Waivers and
Quitclaims rendering any execution of judgment inequitable. Atty. Agustin opposed
Herreras motion and argued that the issuance of a writ of execution is ministerial
because the LA decision has long been final and executory there being no appeal
taken therefrom. He further claimed that the alleged Waivers and Quitclaims were

part of a scheme adopted by Podden to evade its liability and defraud the
complainants.
Resolving the conflict, the LA issued its Order denying the motion for the issuance of
a writ of execution. The LA sustained as valid the Waivers and Quitclaims signed by
all and not just nine of the complainants. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA
Order for the reason that it unlawfully amended, altered and modified the final and
executory LA Decision. The quitclaims were also held invalid based on the
unconscionably low amount received by each of the complainants thereunder.
Herrera filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the issuances of the
NLRC. During the pendency of the petition or on August 30, 2005, a joint
compromise agreement was submitted to the CA. The CA found the joint
compromise agreement consistent with law, public order and public policy, and
consequently stamped its approval thereon and entered judgment in accordance
therewith.
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolutions of the CA violated the principle of res
judicata because they amended and altered the final and executory LA Decision and
NLRC Resolution on the basis of an unconscionable compromise agreement that was
executed without the knowledge and consent of Atty. Agustin
RULING: The petition is dismissible outright for being accompanied by a defective
certification of non-forum shopping having been signed by Atty. Agustin instead of
the complainants as the principal parties. It has been repeatedly emphasized that in
the case of natural persons, the certification against forum shopping must be signed
by the principal parties themselves and not by the attorney. The purpose of the rule
rests mainly on practical sensibility. The Court has espoused leniency and
overlooked such procedural misstep in cases bearing substantial merit
complemented by the written authority or general power of attorney granted by the
parties to the actual signatory. However, no analogous justifiable reasons exist in
the case at bar neither do the claims of Atty. Agustin merit substantial consideration
to justify a relaxation of the rule. It is apparent that the complainants did not seek
the instant review because they have already settled their dispute with Herrera
before the CA. It is Atty. Agustins personal resolve to pursue this recourse premised
on his unwavering stance that the joint compromise agreement signed by the
complainants was inequitable and devious as they were denied the bigger monetary
award adjudged by a final and executory judgment.
In the present case, the allegations of vitiated consent proffered by Atty. Agustin are
all presumptions and suppositions that have no bearing as evidence. There is no
proof that the complainants were forced, intimidated or defrauded into executing
the quitclaims. Furthermore, it is the complainants themselves who can impugn the
consideration of the compromise as being unconscionable but no such repudiation
was manifested before the Court or the courts a quo. It must be noted that the
complainants were laborers who desired to contest their dismissal for being illegal.
With no clear means to pay for costly legal services, they hired Atty. Agustin whose
remuneration was subject to the success of the illegal dismissal suit. Before a
judgment was rendered in their favor, however, the company closed down and
settlement of the suit for an amount lesser than their monetary claims, instead of
execution of the favorable judgment, guaranteed the atonement for their illegal

termination. To make the complainants liable for the P335,844.18 attorneys fees
adjudged in the LA Decision of September 27, 1998 would be allowing Atty. Agustin
to get a lions share of the P385,000.00 received by the former from the
compromise agreement that terminated the suit; to allow that to happen will
contravene the raison d'tre for contingent fee arrangements.
It cannot be said that Herrera negotiated for the compromise agreement in bad
faith. It remains undisputed that Podden has ceased operations almost four years
before the LA Decision dated September 27, 1998 was rendered. In view thereof,
the implementation of the award became unfeasible and a compromise settlement
was more beneficial to the complainants as it assured them of reparation, albeit at a
reduced amount. This was the same situation prevailing at the time when Herrera
manifested and reiterated before the CA that a concession has been reached by the
parties. Thus, the motivating force behind the settlement was not to deprive or
prejudice Atty. Agustin of his fees, but rather the inability of a dissolved corporation
to fully abide by its adjudged liabilities and the certainty of payment on the part of
the complainants.

#23
HEIRS OF MARCELO SOTTO vs. PALICTE
G.R. No. 159691
February 17, 2014
Bersamin, J.
FACTS: This case is the fifth suit to reach the Court dividing the several heirs of the
late Don Filemon Y. Sotto (Filemon) respecting four real properties that had belonged
to Filemons estate (Estate of Sotto).
The first case held that herein respondent Matilde S. Palicte (Matilde), one of four
declared heirs of Filemon, had validly redeemed the four properties pursuant to the
assailed deed of redemption, and was entitled to have the title over the four
properties transferred to her name, subject to the right of the three other declared
heirs to join her in the redemption of the four properties within a period of six
months. The second was the civil case filed by Pascuala against Matilde to annul the
formers waiver of rights, and to restore her as a co-redemptioner of Matilde with
respect to the four properties. The third was an incident (that is, the suit brought by
the heirs of Carmen Rallos against the Estate of Sotto) wherein the heirs of Miguel
belatedly filed in a motion for reconsideration praying that the order be set aside,
and that they be still included as Matildes co-redemptioners. After the trial court
denied their motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit, the heirs of Miguel
elevated the denial to the CA on certiorari and prohibition, but the CA dismissed
their petition and upheld the order. Thence, the heirs of Miguel came to the Court on
certiorari, but the Court dismissed their petition for being filed out of time and for
lack of merit. The fourth was The Estate of Don Filemon Y. Sotto, represented by its
duly designated Administrator, Sixto Sotto Pahang, Jr. v. Matilde S. Palicte, et al.,
whereby the Court expressly affirmed the ruling rendered by the probate court in
Cebu City entitled Intestate Estate of the Deceased Don Filemon Sotto denying the
administrators motion to require Matilde to turn over the four real properties to the

Estate of Sotto. The fifth is this case. It seems that the disposition by the Court of
the previous cases did not yet satisfy herein petitioners despite their being the
successors-in-interest of two of the declared heirs of Filemon who had been parties
in the previous cases either directly or in privity. They now pray that the Court undo
the decision promulgated on November 29, 2002, whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) declared their action for the partition of the four properties as already barred
by the judgments previously rendered, and the resolution denying their motion for
reconsideration
At the order of the Court, Atty. Mahinay submitted a so-called Compliance (With
Humble Motion for Reconsideration) containing his explanations, praying that he not
be sanctioned for violating the rule against forum shopping, as follows:
(1) The first three cases did not resolve the issues raised in Civil Case No. CEB24393;
(2) Marcelo Sottos cause of action arose only when respondent Palicte violated
her "hypothetically admitted" agreement with Marcelo Sotto;
(3) He (Atty. Mahinay) was not the one who had prepared and signed the
complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-24393, although he assumed the
responsibility as to its filing;
(4) He (Atty. Mahinay) had filed a motion for referral or consolidation of Civil Case
No. CEB-24293 with the intestate proceedings of the Estate of Filemon Y.
Sotto, and
(5) He (Atty. Mahinay) had acted in good faith in assisting the administrator of
the Estate of Filemon Y. Sotto in filing the Motion to Require Matilde Palicte To
Turn Over And/or Account Properties Owned by the Estate in Her Possession.
ISSUE: Was counsel guilty of forum shopping?
RULING: YES.
What we have seen here is a clear demonstration of unmitigated forum shopping on
the part of petitioners and their counsel. It should not be enough for us to just
express our alarm at petitioners disregard of the doctrine of res judicata. The acts
of a party or his counsel clearly constituting willful and deliberate forum shopping
shall be ground for the summary dismissal of the case with prejudice, and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as be a cause for administrative sanctions
against the lawyer. Forum shopping can be committed in either of three ways,
namely: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the
same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (litis pendentia); (2)
filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the
previous case having been finally resolved (res judicata); or (3) filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of
action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).
If the forum shopping is not willful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall be
dismissed without prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned above. But if the
forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two)
actions shall be dismissed with prejudice.

#24
PRYCE CORPORATION vs. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 172302
February 18, 2014
Leonen, J.
FACTS: The present case originated from a petition for corporate rehabilitation
filed by petitioner Pryce Corporation. The rehabilitation court found the petition
sufficient in form and substance and issued a stay order on July 13, 2004 appointing
Gener T. Mendoza as rehabilitation receiver. In its disposition, the court found
petitioner Pryce Corporation "eligible to be placed in a state of corporate
rehabilitation."5 The disposition likewise identified the assets to be held and
disposed of by petitioner Pryce Corporation and the manner by which its liabilities
shall be paid and liquidated.6
On February 23, 2005, respondent China Banking Corporation elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals. Its petition questioned the January 17, 2005 order that
included the following terms:
1. The indebtedness to China Banking Corporation and Bank of the Philippine
Islands as well as the long term commercial papers will be paid through a
dacion en pago of developed real estate assets of the petitioner.
xxxx
4. All accrued penalties are waived[.]
5. Interests shall accrue only up to July 13, 2004, the date of issuance of the
stay order[.]
6. No interest will accrue during the pendency of petitioners corporate
rehabilitation[.]
7. Dollar-denominated loans will be converted to Philippine Pesos on the date
of the issuance of this Order using the reference rate of the Philippine
Dealing System as of this date.
Respondent China Banking Corporation contended that the rehabilitation plans
approval impaired the obligations of contracts. The Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI), another creditor of petitioner Pryce Corporation, filed a separate petition with
the Court of Appeals assailing the same order by the rehabilitation court. BPI called
the attention of the court "to the non-impairment clause and the mutuality of
contracts purportedly ran roughshod by the [approved rehabilitation plan].
The Court of Appeals granted respondent China Banking Corporation's petition, and
reversed and set aside the rehabilitation courts: (1) July 13, 2004 stay order that
also appointed Gener T. Mendoza as rehabilitation receiver; (2) September 13, 2004
order giving due course to the petition and directing the rehabilitation receiver to
evaluate and give recommendations on petitioner Pryce Corporations proposed
rehabilitation plan; and (3) January 17, 2005 order finding petitioner Pryce
Corporation eligible to be placed in a state of corporate rehabilitation, identifying
assets to be disposed of, and determining the manner of liquidation to pay the
liabilities.

With respect to BPIs separate appeal, the Court of Appeals First granted its petition
initially and set aside the January 17, 2005 order of the rehabilitation court in its
decision dated May 3, 2006. On reconsideration, the court issued a resolution dated
May 23, 2007 setting aside its original decision and dismissing the petition.
The First (1st) Division of the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals and ordered the remand of the case to the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner Pryce Corporation filed an omnibus motion for (1) reconsideration or (2)
partial reconsideration and (3) referral to the court En Banc dated February 29,
2008. Respondent China Banking Corporation also filed a motion for reconsideration
on even date, praying that the February 4, 2008 decision be set aside and
reconsidered only insofar as it ordered the remand of the case for further
proceedings "to determine whether petitioner's financial condition is serious and
whether there is clear and imminent danger that it will lose its corporate assets."
ISSUE: Was the validity of the rehabilitation order constitutive of res judicata?
RULING:
This judgment in BPI v. Pryce Corporation covers necessarily the rehabilitation
courts September 13, 2004 order giving due course to the petition. The general
rule precluding relitigation of issues extends to questions implied necessarily in the
final judgment, viz:
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions
which were in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied
to all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation.
Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied in the final judgment,
although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto and
although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not
actually or formally presented. x x x.
In the present case, the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision in BPI v.
Pryce Corporation, reversed on reconsideration, only mentioned the January 17,
2005 order of the rehabilitation court approving the amended rehabilitation plan.
Nevertheless, the affirmation of its validity necessarily included the September 13,
2004 order as this earlier order gave due course to the petition and directed the
rehabilitation receiver to evaluate and give recommendations on the rehabilitation
plan proposed by petitioner.
In res judicata, the primacy given to the first case is related to the principle of
immutability of final judgments essential to an effective and efficient administration
of justice, viz:
x x x [W]ell-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any
respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land.

The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice
that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the
fruits of the verdict. Courts must guard against any scheme calculated to bring
about that result and must frown upon any attempt to prolong the controversies.
The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the socalled nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments,
and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable. []
Generally, the later case is the one abated applying the maxim qui prior est
tempore, potior est jure (he who is before in time is the better in right; priority in
time gives preference in law). However, there are limitations to this rule as
discussed in Victronics Computers, Inc. v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati:
As a final note, this is not the first time this court was made to review two
separate petitions appealed from two conflicting decisions, rendered by two
divisions of the Court of Appeals, and originating from the same case. In
Serrano v. Ambassador Hotel, Inc., we ordered the Court of Appeals to adopt
immediately a more efficient system in its Internal Rules to avoid situations
as this.
In this instance, it is fortunate that this court had the opportunity to correct the
situation and prevent conflicting judgments from reaching impending finality with
the referral to the En Banc.
We reiterate the need for our courts to be "constantly vigilant in extending their
judicial gaze to cases related to the matters submitted for their resolution" 89 as to
"ensure against judicial confusion and [any] seeming conflict in the judiciarys
decisions."

#25
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 199310
February 19, 2014
Reyes, J.
FACTS: Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed an application 4 with the RTC
for judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of land situated in Barangay
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila. The RTC issued the Order 5 finding the respondents
application for registration sufficient in form and substance and setting it for initial
hearing. When the RTC called the case for initial hearing, only the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an
order of general default except LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its
comment/opposition to the respondents application for registration. Trial on the
merits of the respondents application ensued thereafter.

The respondent presented four witnesses: Teresita Villaroya, the respondents

corporate secretary; Ronnie Inocencio, an employee of the respondent and the one
authorized by it to file the application for registration with the RTC; Cenon Cerquena
(Cerquena), the caretaker of the subject properties since 1957; and Engineer
Mariano Flotildes (Engr. Flotildes), a geodetic engineer hired by the respondent to
conduct a topographic survey of the subject properties.
For its part, the LLDA presented the testimonies of Engineers Ramon Magalonga
(Engr. Magalonga) and Christopher A. Pedrezuela (Engr. Pedrezuela), who are both
geodetic engineers employed by the LLDA.
Essentially, the testimonies of the respondents witnesses showed that the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of land long before June 12,
1945. The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, as evidenced by the
certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).
In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented the following
documents: (1) Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1989 executed by Salvador
and Mijares in favor of the respondent; (2) survey plans of the subject
properties; (3) technical descriptions of the subject properties; (4) Geodetic
Engineers Certificate; (5) tax declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002; and
(6) certifications dated December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno
(Calamno), Senior Forest Management Specialist of the DENR, attesting that Lot
Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain.
On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondents application for
registration should be denied since the subject parcels of land are not part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed out that pursuant to
Section 41(11) of Republic Act No. 4850 (R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding the
Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters
are public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga,
testifying for the oppositor LLDA, claimed that, upon preliminary evaluation of the
subject properties, based on the topographic map of Taguig, which was prepared
using an aerial survey conducted by the then Department of National DefenseBureau of Coast in April 1966, he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and
3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon actual area verification of the subject properties
on September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of the
subject properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.
The RTC granted the application for registration. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in granting the application for application filed by the
respondent?

RULING: YES.
The petitioner maintains that the lower courts erred in granting the respondents
application for registration since the subject properties do not form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The petitioner insists that the
elevations of the subject properties are below the reglementary level of 12.50 m
and, pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, are considered part of the bed of
Laguna Lake.
That the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of
12.50 m is a finding of fact by the lower courts, which this Court, generally may not
disregard. It is a long-standing policy of this Court that the findings of facts of the
RTC which were adopted and affirmed by the CA are generally deemed conclusive
and binding. This Court is not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual findings
of the lower courts unless there are substantial reasons for doing so.
The certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that the
subject properties are alienable and disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v.
T.A.N. Properties, Inc., the Court clarified that, in addition to the certification issued
by the proper government agency that a parcel of land is alienable and disposable,
applicants for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved
the land classification and released the land of public domain as alienable and
disposable. They must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the records.
Thus:
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is
alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that
the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by
the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to
prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so
because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves,
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain and that it and its predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the same since June 12, 1945, or earlier, the respondent's application for
registration should be denied.

#26
PROCTER AND GAMBLE ASIA PTE LTD., vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE

G.R. No. 202071

February 19, 2014
Sereno, CJ.
FACTS: On 3 June 2013, we required Respondent to submit its Comment, which it
filed on 4 December 2013. Citing the recent case CIR v. San Roque Power
Corporation, respondent counters that the 120-day period to file judicial claims for a
refund or tax credit is mandatory and jurisdictional. Failure to comply with the
waiting period violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
rendering the judicial claim premature. Thus, the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction
over the judicial claim.
ISSUE: Was the 120-day waiting period mandatory and jurisdictional?
RULING: YES.
Respondent is correct on this score. However, it fails to mention that San Roque also
recognized the validity of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03. The ruling expressly states that
the taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it
could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of Petition for Review.
The Court, in San Roque, ruled that equitable estoppel had set in when respondent
issued BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03. This was a general interpretative rule, which
effectively misled all taxpayers into filing premature judicial claims with the CTA.
Thus, taxpayers could rely on the ruling from its issuance on 10 December 2003 up
to its reversal on 6 October 2010, when CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.,
was promulgated.

#27

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. SPOUSES ENRIQUE MANALO & ROSALINDA

JACINTO, ARNOLD J. MANALO, ARNEL J. MANALO, and ARMA J. MANALO
G.R. No. 174433
February 24, 2014
Bersamin, J.
FACTS: Spouses Manalo applied for an All-Purpose Credit Facility in the amount
of P1m with PNB to finance the construction of their house. After PNB granted their
application, they executed a REM in favor of PNB over their property as security for
the loan. The credit facility was renewed and increased several times over the
years. The credit facility was again renewed for P7M. As a consequence, the parties
executed a Supplement to and Amendment of Existing REM. The additional security
was registered in the names of respondents who were their children. It was agreed
upon that the Spouses Manalo would make monthly payments on the interest. After
the Spouses Manalo still failed to settle their unpaid account despite the two
demand letters, PNB foreclose the mortgage. During the foreclosure sale, PNB was
the highest bidder of the mortgaged properties of the Spouses Manalo. After the

Certificate of Sale had been issued to PNB, the Spouses Manalo instituted this action
for the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings and damages. They alleged that
they had obtained a loan from a certain Benito Tan upon arrangements made by
Antoninus Yuvienco, then the General Manager of PNBs Bangkal Branch where they
had transacted; that they had been made to understand and had been assured that
the P1M would be used to update their account, and that their loan would be
restructured and converted into a long-term loan; that they had been surprised to
learn, therefore, that had been declared in default of their obligations, and that the
mortgage on their property had been foreclosed and their property had been sold;
and that PNB did not comply with Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended. PNB and
Yuvienco countered that the loan obtained by the Spouses Manalo from Benito Tan
had been credited to their account; that they did not make any assurances to make
the loan a long-term; that PNBs right to foreclose the mortgage had been clear
especially because the Spouses Manalo had not assailed the validity of the loans
and of the mortgage. RTC ruled in favor of PNB stating that not having raised the
matters as issues during the pre-trial, plaintiff-spouses are presumably estopped
from allowing these matters to serve as part of their evidence, because at the pretrial they expressly recognized the defendant banks right to foreclose upon the
subject property and that the Spouses Manalo were now estopped from questioning
the interest rates unilaterally imposed by PNB because they had paid at those rates
for three years without protest; and that their allegation about PNB violating the
notice and publication requirements during the foreclosure proceedings was
untenable because personal notice to the mortgagee was not required under Act
No. 3135. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC insofar as it upheld the validity of the
foreclosure proceedings initiated by PNB and it found that PNB did not adduce proof
showing that the Spouses Manalo had been notified before the increased interest
rates were imposed. The CA deemed to be untenable the Spouses Manalos
allegation that PNB had failed to comply with the requirements for notice and
posting under Section 3 of Act 3135. The CA stated that Sheriff Norberto Magsajos
testimony was sufficient proof of his posting of the required Notice of Sheriffs Sale
in three public places; that the notarized Affidavit of Publication presented by Sheriff
Magsajo was prima facie proof of the publication of the notice
ISSUE: WON the court erred in nullifying the interest rates imposed despite the fact
that the same was raised first time on appeal and it was never part of their
complaint?
RULING: NO.
Contrary to PNBs argument, the validity of the interest rates and of the increases,
and on the lack of mutuality between the parties were not raised by the Spouses
Manalos for the first time on appeal. Rather, the issues were impliedly raised during
the trial itself, and PNBs lack of vigilance in voicing out a timely objection made
that possible. It appears that Enrique Manalos Judicial Affidavit introduced the
issues of the validity of the interest rates and the increases, and the lack of
mutuality between the parties. PNB cross-examined Enrique Manalo upon his
Judicial Affidavit. There is no showing that PNB raised any objection in the course of
the cross examination. The RTC rightly passed upon such issues in deciding the

case, and its having done so was in total accord with Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules
of Court. The RTC did not need to direct the amendment of the complaint by the
Spouses Manalo. Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically declares that
the "failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues." Section
5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court is applicable in two situations. The first is when
evidence is introduced on an issue not alleged in the pleadings and no objection is
interposed by the adverse party. The second is when evidence is offered on an issue
not alleged in the pleadings but an objection is raised against the offer. This case
comes under the first situation. Enrique Manalos Judicial Affidavit would introduce
the very issues that PNB is now assailing. The question of whether the evidence on
such issues was admissible to prove the nullity of the interest rates is an entirely
different matter. The RTC accorded credence to PNBs evidence showing that the
Spouses Manalo had been paying the interest imposed upon them without protest.
The CAs nullification of the interest rates was based on the credit agreements that
the Spouses Manalo and PNB had themselves submitted. The validity of the interest
rates and their increases, and the lack of mutuality between the parties were issues
validly raised in the RTC, giving the Spouses Manalo every right to raise them in
their appeal to the CA. PNBs contention was based on its wrong appreciation of
what transpired during the trial. PNB did not itself assail the RTCs ruling on the
issues obviously because the RTC had decided in its favor. In fact, PNB did not even
submit its appellees brief despite notice from the CA.

#28
CORAZON MACAPAGAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 193217
February 26, 2014
Peralta, J.
FACTS: RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa for
misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total amount of P800K, which is the value
of the unreturned and unsold pieces of jewelry. Petitioner received the decision then
she timely moved for reconsideration, but was likewise denied in an Order dated
May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly received on July 31, 2009. She
supposedly filed a Notice of Appeal on but the same was denied for having been
filed out of time.
Petitioner filed a petition for review to the SC citing that the court erred in denying
her notice of appeal and convicting her of estafa.
ISSUE: WON the court erred in denying petitioners petition?
RULING: NO.

The instant case suffers from various procedural infirmities which this Court cannot
ignore and are fatal to petitioners cause because of petitioners complete disregard
of the procedural rules and the orders of the Court. First, petitioner availed of the
wrong mode of assailing the trial courts denial of her notice of appeal. Sections 2
and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down the rules on
where, how and when appeal is taken. The disallowance of the notice of appeal
signifies the disallowance of the appeal itself. A petition for review under Rule 45 of
the ROC is a mode of appeal of a lower courts decision or final order direct to the
SC. However, the questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is not a decision or
final order from which an appeal may be taken. The ROC specifically provides that
no appeal shall be taken from an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal. Rather,
the aggrieved party can elevate the matter through a special civil action under Rule
65. In availing of the wrong mode of appeal in this petition under Rule 45 instead of
the appropriate remedy of Rule 65, the petition merits an outright dismissal.
Second, even if the court treats the petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is
still dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court
has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this
should not be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which an application will be directed. Direct resort to this
Court is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling reasons clearly
and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this case. Third,
even if the court ignores the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an
appeal of the trial courts decision convicting her of estafa, again, the court cannot
do so for yet another fatal procedural shortcoming committed by petitioner.
Petitioner elevated to this Court not only the Order denying her notice of appeal but
also the Decision convicting her of estafa and the Order denying her motion for
reconsideration. In utter disregard of the rules of procedure, petitioner attached to
the petition only the RTC Order denying her notice of appeal but she failed to attach
a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the assailed decision
convicting her of estafa and the order denying her motion for reconsideration. A
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must contain a
certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or
judgment. Failure to comply with such requirement shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition. Lastly, the petition is bound to fail because of petitioners
repeated disregard of the Rules and the Courts lawful orders. In a Resolution the
Court required petitioner to fully comply with the Rules of Court but failed to do so
despite the opportunity given to him to comply to such order.

#29
PAGLAUM MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and HEALTH MARKETING
TECHNOLOGIES, INC. vs. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, NOTARY

PUBLIC JOHN DOE, and REGISTER OF DEEDS of CEBU CITY AND CEBU
PROVINCE
G.R. No. 179018
June 18, 2012
Sereno, J.
FACTS: PAGLAUM is the registered owner of three parcels of land located in the
Province of Cebu. These lots are co-owned by Benjamin B. Dy, the president of
HealthTech, and his mother and sibling.
Respondent Union Bank extended
HealthTech a credit line in the amount of P 10M. To secure this obligation, PAGLAUM
executed three REM on behalf of HealthTech and in favor of Union Bank. The REM,
on the provision regarding the venue of all suits and actions arising out of or in
connection therewith, originally stipulates: Section 9. Venue. The venue of all suits
and actions arising out of or in connection with this Mortgage shall be in Makati,
Metro Manila or in the place where any of the Mortgaged Properties is located, at
the absolute option of the Mortgagee, the parties hereto waiving any other venue.
However, under the two Real Estate Mortgages the venue for the 2 nd states that it
shall be in Cebu City, Metro Manila while in the 3 rd the place of venue was left blank.
HealthTech and Union Bank agreed to subsequent renewals and increases in the
credit line, with the total amount of debt reaching P 36.5M. Unfortunately, according
to HealthTech, the 1997 Asian financial crisis adversely affected its business and
caused it difficulty in meeting its obligations with Union Bank. Both parties then
entered into a Restructuring Agreement, which states that any action or proceeding
arising out of or in connection therewith shall be commenced in Makati City, with
both parties waiving any other venue. Despite the Agreement, HealthTech failed to
pay its obligation which prompted Union Bank to extra-judicially foreclosed the
mortgaged properties. The bank, as the sole bidder in the auction sale, was then
issued a Certificate of Sale. Thereafter, it filed a Petition for Consolidation of Title.
HealthTech filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Titles with Damages and
Application for TRO and Writ of Injunction. Union Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the following grounds: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the issuance of the injunctive
relief; (b) improper venue; and (c) lack of authority of the person who signed the
Complaint. RTC Br. 134 granted this Motion resulting in the dismissal of the case, as
well as the dissolution of the WPI. CA affirmed RTCs decision. PAGLAUM and
HealthTech argue that: (a) the Restructuring Agreement governs the choice of
venue between the parties, and (b) the agreement on the choice of venue must be
interpreted with the convenience of the parties in mind and the view that any
obscurity therein was caused by Union Bank. Union Bank contends that: (a) the
Restructuring Agreement is applicable only to the contract of loan, and not to the
Real Estate Mortgage, and (b) the mortgage contracts explicitly state that the
choice of venue exclusively belongs to it. Intervenor J. King & Sons Company, Inc.
adopts the position of Union Bank and reiterates the position that Cebu City is the
proper venue.

ISSUE: WON the Makati City is the proper venue to assail the foreclosure of the
subject real estate mortgage?
RULING: YES.
Under Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rules
on venue of actions shall not apply where the parties, before the filing of the action,
have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the
venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case
in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive.
In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed
as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the
specified place. According to the Rules, real actions shall be commenced and tried
in the court that has jurisdiction over the area where the property is situated. In this
case, all the mortgaged properties are located in the Province of Cebu. Thus,
following the general rule, PAGLAUM and HealthTech should have filed their case in
Cebu, and not in Makati. However, the Rules provide an exception, in that real
actions can be commenced and tried in a court other than where the property is
situated in instances where the parties have previously and validly agreed in writing
on the exclusive venue thereof. In the case at bar, the parties claim that such an
agreement exists. The only dispute is whether the venue that should be followed is
that contained in the REM, as contended by Union Bank, or that in the Restructuring
Agreement, as posited by PAGLAUM and HealthTech. This Court rules that the venue
stipulation in the Restructuring Agreement should be controlling. The REM were
executed by PAGLAUM in favor of Union Bank to secure the credit line extended by
the latter to HealthTech. All three mortgage contracts contain a dragnet clause,
which secures succeeding obligations, including renewals, extensions, amendments
or novations thereof, incurred by HealthTech from Union Bank. Meanwhile, Section
20 of the Restructuring Agreement as regards the venue of actions state:
20. Venue Venue of any action or proceeding arising out of or connected with this
Restructuring Agreement, the Note, the Collateral and any and all related
documents shall be in Makati City, [HealthTech] and [Union Bank] hereby waiving
any other venue. These quoted provisions of the Real Estate Mortgages and the
later Restructuring Agreement clearly reveal the intention of the parties to
implement a restrictive venue stipulation, which applies not only to the principal
obligation, but also to the mortgages. The phrase "waiving any other venue" plainly
shows that the choice of Makati City as the venue for actions arising out of or in
connection with the Restructuring Agreement and the Collateral, with the REM being
explicitly defined as such, is exclusive. Considering that Makati City was agreed
upon by the parties to be the venue for all actions arising out of or in connection
with the loan obligation incurred by HealthTech, as well as the REM executed by
PAGLAUM, the CA committed reversible error in affirming the dismissal by RTC Br.
134 on the ground of improper venue.

#30

REMEDIO V. FLORES vs. HON. JUDGE HEILIA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS,

IGNACIO BINONGCAL & FERNANDO CALION
G.R. No. L-66620
September 24, 1986
Feria, J.

FACTS: Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge Phillipps of the
RTC of Baguio City and Benguet Province which dismissed his complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner did not attach to his petition a copy of his complaint in the
belief that the entire original record of the case shall be transmitted to the Court
pursuant to Section 39 of BP129. The order appealed from states that the first cause
of action alleged in the complaint was against respondent Ignacio Binongcal for
refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires which he
purchased on credit from petitioner on various occasions from August to October,
1981; and the second was with respondent Fernando Calion for P10,212.00 for the
same reason purchased from March, 1981 to January, 1982. Counsel for respondent
Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the
amount involved was below the jurisdictional amount of the exclusive jurisdiction of
the RTC. It was further averred Calions obligation was separate and distinct from
that of the other respondent. Counsel for respondent Calion joined in moving for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Counsel for
petitioner opposed the Motion to Dismiss. The trial court dismissed the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over
the case following the totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section
11 of the Interim Rules. Petitioner compares the provisions with the pertinent
portion of the former rule under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 separate
claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test and argues that with the deletion of the
proviso in the former rule, the totality rule was reduced to clarity and brevity and
the jurisdictional test is the totality of the claims in all, not in each, of the causes of
action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions.
ISSUE: WON the totality rule shall apply to this case?
RULING: NO.
The Court rules that the application of the totality rule under Section 33(l) of BP Blg.
129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules is subject to the requirements for the
permissive joinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3. If the causes of action are
separate and independent, their joinder in one complaint is permissive and not
mandatory, and any cause of action where the amount of the demand is twenty
thousand pesos or less may be the subject of a separate complaint filed with a

metropolitan or municipal trial court. Under the present law, the totality rule is
applied also to cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action
against a defendant join in a single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff
has separate causes of action against two or more defendants joined in a single
complaint. However, the causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or
against the two or more defendants should arise out of the same transaction or
series of transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact, as
provided in S6R3. In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the
jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5
of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful
scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the
reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and
distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.

#31
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. JULIE CHANDUMAL
G.R. No. 195619
September 5, 2012
Reyes, J.
FACTS: A contract to sell a parcel of land together with improvements between BF
Homes and respondent Chandumal is the subject of this case. BF Homes sold to
PDB all its rights, participations and interests over the contract.
Chandumal defaulted in her payments. A Notice of Delinquency and Rescission of
Contract with Demand to Vacate dated July 14, 1998 was sent by PDB, giving
respondent thirty days from receipt within which to settle her installment arrearages
together with all its increments; otherwise, all her rights under the contract shall be
deemed extinguished and terminated and the contract declared as rescinded.
Despite demand, Chandumal still failed to settle her obligation.
On June 18, 1999, an action for judicial confirmation of notarial rescission and
delivery of possession was filed by PDB against Chandumal .
Consequently, summons was issued and served by the deputy sheriff. According to
his return, he attempted to personally serve the summons upon Chandumal on July
15, 19 and 22, 1999 but it was unavailing as she was always out of the house on
said dates.
Hence, the sheriff cause substituted service of summons to
Chandumals mother who acknowledged receipt thereof.
Chandumal was declared in default upon motion of PDB. Chandumal filed an Urgent
Motion to Set Aside Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer stating that she
did not receive the summons and was not notified of the same.
ISSUE:

(1) Whether there was valid substituted service of summons

(2) Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over her person
RULING:
(1) NO.
There was no valid substituted service of summons due to his failure to serve
it personally. In Manotoc v CA, the requisites for a valid substituted service of
summons are as follows: (1) impossibility of prompt personal service the
party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that the
defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt
service; (2) specific details in the return the sheriff must describe in the
Return of Summons the facts and Circumstances surrounding the attempted
personal service; (3) a person of suitable age and discretion the sheriff must
determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of
defendant is legal age, what the recipients relationship with the defendant is,
and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of
summons, which matters must be clearly and specifically described in the
Return of Summons; and (4) a competent person in charge, who must have
sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the
summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on
the summons.
The sheriffs return failed to justify a resort to substituted service of summons
for failure to specifically show or indicate in detail the actual exertion of
efforts or any positive steps taken by the officer or process server in
attempting to serve the summons personally to the defendant.
(2) YES.
Despite that there was no valid substituted service of summons, the Court,
nevertheless, finds that Chandumal voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction
of the trial court.
When Chandrumal filed an affirmative motion, she effectively submitted her
person to the jurisdiction of the court.

#32
JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC ET AL.,
vs. FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC. ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 152272 & 152397
March 5, 2012
Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. (JCHA) together with
individual residents of Juana Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions instituted

a complaint for damages in its own behalf and a class suit representing the regular
commuters and motorists of Juana Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who
were deprived of the use of La Paz Road against Fil-Estate Land, Inc et.al (Fil-Estate).
The complaint alleged that they were regular commuters and motorists who
constantly travelled towards the direction of Manila and Calamba; that they used
the entry and exit toll gate of SLEX by passing through right-of-way public road
known as La Paz Road; that they have been using the said road for more than ten
year; that in August 1998, Fil-Estate excavated, broke and deliberately ruined La Paz
Road that led to SLEX so JCHA would not be able to pass through said road; that
they restored the road but Fil-Estate excavated the road again causing damage,
prejudice, inconvenience, annoyance, loss of precious hours due to re-routing of
traffic.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the complaint states a cause of action
(2) Whether the case is properly filed as a class suit
RULING:
(1) YES.
The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined
by its averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as an act or
omission by which a party violates the right of another. A complaint states a
cause of action when it contains the three essential elements of a case of
action namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation
of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right.
The JCHA complaint sufficiently shows a demandable right over La Paz Road.
These are: (1) their right to use the road on the basis of their allegation that
they had been using the road for more than 10 years; and (2) an easement of
a right of way has been constituted over the said roads.
(2)YES.
The suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La
Paz Road.
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines class suit as follows:
Section 12 Class Suit When the subject matter of the controversy is
one of common or general interest to many persons so numerous that
it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the
court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully
protect the interest of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit

of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect
his individual interest.

#33
GOODLAND COMPANY, INC., vs. ASIA UNITED BANK
G.R. Nos. 195546 and 195561
March 14, 2012
Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS: Sometime in July 1999, petitioner Goodland Company, Inc. (petitioner)
mortgaged its two parcels of land situated in Sta. Rosa, Laguna (Laguna Properties).
The Third Party Real Estate Mortgage (REM) secured the loans extended by
respondent Asia United Bank (AUB) to Radio Marine Network ((Smartnet), Inc.
(RMNSI).
In addition to the said collaterals, petiioner executed a Third Party REM over its
property located at Pasong Tamo St., Makati city (Makati Property). The REMs, both
signed by Gilbert Guy, President of Goodland Company Inc., were duly registered by
AUB with the Registry of Deeds for Calamba, Laguna and Registry of Deeds for
Makati city, and annotated on the said titles.
Laguna Property
On January 16, 2003, petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of mortgage before
the RTC of Bian, Laguna on the ground that said REM was falsified and in
contravention of the parties' agreement that the blank mortgage form would merely
serve as "comfort document" and not to be registered by AUB. While said case was
pending, RMNSI defaulted on its loan obligation, which promptedd AUB to exercise
its right under the REM by filing an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of real
estate mortgage. In the public auction sale, AUB emerged as the highest bidder and
was issued a Certificate of Sale which was registered. Prior to the consolidaion of
title in the foreclosing mortgagee (AUB), petitioner commenced a second suit,
seeking to annul the foreclosure sale and enjoin the consolidation of title in favor of
AUB, on the ground of alleged falsification of the REM.
Respondents AUB moved to dismiss calling the attention of the RTC to petitioner's
forum shopping. They argued that the two cases were anchored on the alleged
falsification of the REM as basis for the reliefs sought. The RTC granted the said
motion. Upon Appeal to the CA, it reversed the RTC's order.
Makati Property
Petitioner filed the first suit assailing the REM over its property alleging that its
president merely signed such by way of accommodation as security for the loan of
Smartnet Philippines, Inc. (SPI) with the understanding that the document shall not
be completed and not to be registered with the Register of Deeds as it would serve
as comfort document to prove petitioner's willingness to execute a REM in the
future if so demanded by AUB and agreed upon by Smartnet.

Petitioner filed the second suit which sought the annulment of the REM based on
alleged irregulariies in its execution. Respondents moved to dismiss with prejudice
to the cases on the grounds of forum shopping and for failure to pay the proper
docket and other legal fees. The RTC dismissed with prejudice the complaints in
both cases. The CA also agreed with the RTC on the ground of forum shopping.
ISSUE: Was there forum shopping?
RULING: YES.
There is forum shopping when the following elements are present: (1) identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (2)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars suh that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the action under consideration; said requisites are also
constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens.
All the foregoing elements are present in this case.

#34
SPOUSES ANTONIO ALGURA AND LORENCITA ALGURA vs. LGU ET. AL
G.R. No. 150135
October 30, 2006
Velasco, Jr., J.:
FACTS: Spouses Algura filed a Verified Complaint dated August 30, 1999 for
damages against the Naga city Government and its offices, arising from the alleged
illegal demolition of their r3sidence and boarding house and for payment of lost
income derived from fees paid by their boarders.
Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent Litigants,
which was granted by the court.
Respondents filed a motion to disqualify petitioners as indigent litigants which the
court granted on the ground that they failed to substantiate their claim for
exemption from payment of legal fees and to comply with the third paragraph of
Rule 141, Section 18 of the Revised Rules of Court - directing them to pay the
requisite filing fees.
Consequently, the court issued an Order disqualifying petitioners as indigent
litigants.
ISSUE: Were the spouses Algura indigent litigants?
RULING: THE NAGA CITY RTC WAS ORDERED TO SET THE "EX-PARTE
MOTION TO LITIGATE AS INDIGENT LITIGANTS" FOR HEARING AND APPLY

THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE TO DETERMINE WHETHER PETITIONERS

CAN QUALIFY AS INDIGENT LITIGANTS.
Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 19 are the rules governing the grant of
indigent litigants exemption. Section 19 Rule 141 provides specific standards while
Section 21 Rule 3 does not clearly draw the limits of the entitlement to the
exemption.
If the applicant for exemption meets the salary and property requirements under
Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On the other
hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both of the requirements, then
the application should not be denied outright; instead, the court should apply the
"indigency test" under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in
determining the merits of the prayer for exemption.

#35
THEODORE and NANCY ANG, represented by ELDRIGE MARVIN B. ACERON
vs. SPOUSES ALAN and EM ANG
G.R. No. 186993
August 22, 2012
Reyes, J.
FACTS: Respondents spouses Alan and Em Ang obtained a loan from petitioners
Theodore and Nancy Ang. Respondents executed a promissory note in favor of
petitioners wherein they promised to pay the latter the said amount, with interest,
upon demand. However, despite repeated demands, the respondents failed to pay
the petitioners.
Petitioners, who were then residing in Los Angeles, California, executed their
respective Special Powers of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Attorney Eldrige Marvin B.
Aceron (Atty. Aceron) for the purpose of filing an action in court against the
respondents, which Atty. Aceron promptly did -- a collection case against
respondents filed with the Quezon City RTC.
Respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint filed by the petitioners on,
inter alia, the ground of improper venue; they asserted that the complaint against
them may only be filed in the court of the place where either they or the petitioners
reside. They averred that they reside in Bacolod City while the petitioners reside in
Los Angeles, California, USA. Thus, the respondents maintain, the filing of the
complaint against them in the Quezon City RTC was improper. The RTC issued an
Order denying the respondents motion to dismiss.
Reconsideration was sought but denied, leading to the respondents filing with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. The respondents contended that the
petitioners SPA in favor of Atty. Aceron notwithstanding, the complaint may not be
filed in the court of the place where Atty. Aceron resides, i.e., the Quezon City RTC;
Atty. Aceron, being merely a representative of the petitioners, is not the real party in
interest in the case, and therefore, his residence should not be considered in

determining the proper venue of the said complaint. The CA annulled and set aside
the Orders of the RTC. Petitioners sought a reconsideration, but in vain -- hence, this
petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Did the Quezon City RTC have jurisdiction over the case?
(2) Was Atty. Aceron a real party in interest to the case?
RULING:
(1)NO.
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for
the convenience of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled,
however, is the principle that choosing the venue of an action is not left to a
plaintiffs caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.
The petitioners complaint for collection of sum of money against the
respondents is a personal action as it primarily seeks the enforcement of a
contract. The Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his
complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them
resides, or (2) where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may
be found. The plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the place where
the action has been instituted at the time the action is commenced.
However, if the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the complaint in
such case may only be filed in the court of the place where the defendant
resides. [The] situs for bringing real and personal civil actions is fixed by the
Rules of Court to attain the greatest convenience possible to the litigants and
their witnesses by affording them maximum accessibility to the courts.
(2)NO.
[Atty. Aceron] does not stand to be benefited or injured by any judgment [in
the case at bench]. He was merely appointed by the petitioners as their
attorney-in-fact for the limited purpose of filing and prosecuting the
complaint against the respondents. Such appointment, however, does not
mean that he is subrogated into the rights of petitioners and ought to be
considered as a real party in interest. Being merely a representative of the
petitioners, Atty. Aceron in his personal capacity does not have the right to
file the complaint below against the respondents. He may only do so, as what
he did, in behalf of the petitioners the real parties in interest.
[To] construe the express requirement of residence under the rules on venue
as applicable to the attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff would abrogate the
meaning of a real party in interest, as defined in Section 2 of Rule 3 of the
1997 Rules of Court vis--vis Section 3 of the same Rule.

#36
LIVING @ SENSE, INC., vs. MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.
G.R. No. 193753
September 26, 2012
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Living @ Sense, Inc. was the main contractor of the FOC Network
Project of Globe Telecom in Mindanao. In connection with the project, petitioner
entered into a Sub-Contract Agreement (Agreement) with Dou Mac, Inc. (DMI),
under which the latter was tasked to undertake an underground open-trench work.
Petitioner required DMI to give a bond, in the event that DMI fails to perform its
obligations under the Agreement. Thus, DMI secured surety and performance bonds
from respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. (respondent) to answer: (1) for
the unliquidated portion of the downpayment, and (2) for the loss and damage that
petitioner may suffer, respectively, should DMI fail to perform its obligations under
the Agreement. Under the bonds, respondent bound itself jointly and severally liable
with DMI.
During the course of excavation and restoration works, the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) issued a work-stoppage order against DMI after finding
the latters work unsatisfactory. Notwithstanding the said order, however, DMI still
failed to adopt corrective measures, prompting petitioner to terminate the
Agreement and seek indemnification from respondent. However, respondent
effectively denied petitioners claim on the ground that the liability of its principal,
DMI, should first be ascertained before its own liability as a surety attaches. This led
to the filing of a complaint with the Paraaque City RTC, premised on respondents
liability under the surety and performance bonds secured by DMI.
Seeking the dismissal of the complaint, respondent claimed that DMI is an
indispensable party that should be impleaded and whose liability should first be
determined before respondent can be held liable. On the other hand, petitioner
asserted that respondent is a surety who is directly and primarily liable to indemnify
petitioner, and that the bond is "callable on demand" in the event DMI fails to
perform its obligations under the Agreement.
The RTC dismissed the complaint (without prejudice) for failure to implead DMI as a
party defendant. It ruled that before respondent could be held liable on the surety
and performance bonds, it must first be established that DMI, with whom petitioner
had originally contracted, had indeed violated the Agreement. DMI, therefore, is an
indispensable party that must be impleaded in the instant suit. The RTC later denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration for failure to set the same for hearing as
required under the rules hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Was DMI an indispensable party in this case?

RULING: NO.
Records show that when DMI secured the surety and performance bonds from
respondent in compliance with petitioners requirement, respondent bound itself
"jointly and severally" with DMI for the damages and actual loss that petitioner may
suffer should DMI fail to perform its obligations under the Agreement [] The term
"jointly and severally" expresses a solidary obligation granting petitioner, as
creditor, the right to proceed against its debtors, i.e., respondent or DMI.
The nature of the solidary obligation under the surety does not make one an
indispensable party. An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no
final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined mandatorily
either as plaintiffs or defendants. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary
to vest the court with jurisdiction, thus, without their presence to a suit or
proceeding, the judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.
In this case, DMI is not an indispensable party because petitioner can claim
indemnity directly from respondent, having made itself jointly and severally liable
with DMI for the obligation under the bonds. Therefore, the failure to implead DMI is
not a ground to dismiss the case, even if the same was without prejudice.
Moreover, even on the assumption that DMI was, indeed, an indispensable party,
the RTC committed reversible error in dismissing the complaint. Failure to implead
an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, as the remedy
in such case is to implead the party claimed to be indispensable, considering that
parties may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action.

#37
SIMNY G. GUY, et al., vs. GILBERT G. GUY
G.R. Nos. 189486, 189699
September 5, 2012
Perez, J.
FACTS: Respondent Gilbert G. Guy (Gilbert) practically owned almost 80 percent of
the 650,000 subscribed capital stock of GoodGold Realty & Development
Corporation (GoodGold), one of the multi-million corporations which Gilbert claimed
to have established in his 30s. GoodGolds remaining shares were divided among
his parents, Francisco Guy (Francisco) and petitioner Simny Guy (Simny), and
Benjamin Lim and Paulino Delfin Pe.

However, Simny alleged that it was she and her husband who established
GoodGold, putting the bulk of its shares under Gilberts name. Simny further
claimed that upon the advice of their lawyers, upon the incorporation of GoodGold,
they issued stock certificates reflecting the shares held by each stockholder duly
signed by Francisco as President and Atty. Emmanuel Paras as Corporate Secretary,
with corresponding blank endorsements at the back of each certificate under
Gilberts name. These certificates were all with Gilberts irrevocable endorsement
and power of attorney to have these stocks transferred in the books of corporation.
All of these certificates were always in the undisturbed possession of the spouses
Francisco and Simny.
Years later, the aging Francisco instructed Benjamin Lim, a nominal shareholder of
GoodGold and his trusted employee, to collaborate with Atty. Emmanuel Paras, to
redistribute GoodGolds shareholdings evenly among his children, namely, Gilbert,
Grace Guy-Cheu (Grace), Geraldine Guy (Geraldine), and Gladys Guy (Gladys), while
maintaining a proportionate share for himself and Simny. Accordingly, some of
GoodGolds certificates were cancelled and new ones were issued to represent the
redistribution of GoodGolds shares of stock.
Five years after the redistribution of GoodGolds shares of stock, Gilbert filed with
the Manila RTC a complaint for the Declaration of Nullity of Transfers of Shares in
GoodGold and of General Information Sheets and Minutes of Meeting, and for
Damages with Application for a Preliminary Injunctive Relief, against Simny and his
sisters, Geraldine, Grace, and Gladys. Gilbert alleged, among others, that no stock
certificate ever existed; that his signature at the back of the spurious stock
certificates which purportedly endorsed the same was forged, and, hence, should be
nullified. Gilbert, however, withdrew the complaint, after the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) submitted a report to the RTC of Manila authenticating Gilberts
signature in the endorsed certificates.
Three years after the complaint with the RTC of Manila was withdrawn, Gilbert again
filed a complaint, this time, with the Mandaluyong RTC, captioned as Intra
Corporate Controversy: For the Declaration of Nullity of Fraudulent Transfers of
Shares of Stock Certificates, Fabricated Stock Certificates, Falsified General
Information Sheets, Minutes of Meetings, and Damages with Application for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction, against his mother,
Simny, his sisters, Geraldine and Gladys, and the heirs of his late sister Grace.
Gilbert alleged that he never signed any document which would justify and support
the transfer of his shares to his siblings and that he has in no way, disposed,
alienated, encumbered, assigned or sold any or part of his shares in GoodGold. He
also denied the existence of the certificates of stocks. Meanwhile, Gilberts siblings
filed a manifestation claiming that the complaint is a nuisance and harassment suit
under Section 1(b), Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate
Controversies. The RTC denied the motion for inhibition. The RTC dismissed the
case, declaring it a nuisance and harassment suit.
This constrained Gilbert to assail the above Order before the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA found merit on Gilberts contention that the complaint should be heard on
the merits.

ISSUE: Was the decision of the CA on the case below not being a nuisance and
harassment suit proper?
RULING: NO.
It bears emphasis that this controversy started with Gilberts complaint filed with
the RTC of Mandaluyong City in his capacity as stockholder, director and VicePresident of GoodGold.
Gilberts complaint essentially prayed for the return of his original 519,997 shares in
GoodGold, by praying that the court declare that there were no valid transfers [of
the contested shares] to defendants and Francisco. It baffles this Court, however,
that Gilbert omitted Francisco as defendant in his complaint. While Gilbert could
have opted to waive his shares in the name of Francisco to justify the latters noninclusion in the complaint, Gilbert did not do so, but instead, wanted everything
back and even wanted the whole transfer of shares declared fraudulent. This cannot
be done, without including Francisco as defendant in the original case. The transfer
of the shares cannot be, as Gilbert wanted, declared entirely fraudulent without
including those of Francisco who owns almost a third of the total number.
The definition in the Rules of Court, Section 7, Rule 3 thereof, of indispensable
parties as parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action has been jurisprudentially amplified.
Settled is the rule that joinder of indispensable parties is compulsory being a sine
qua non for the exercise of judicial power, and, it is precisely when an
indispensable party is not before the court that the action should be dismissed for
such absence renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
It bears emphasis that Gilbert, while suing as a stockholder against his costockholders, should have also impleaded GoodGold as defendant [...] GoodGold is a
separate juridical entity distinct from its stockholders and from its directors and
officers. The trial court, acting as a special commercial court, cannot settle the
issues with finality without impleading GoodGold as defendant. Like Francisco, and
for the same reasons, GoodGold is an indispensable party which Gilbert should have
impleaded as defendant in his complaint.

#38
PHILIP L. GO, et al. vs. DISTINCTION PROPERTIES DEVELOPMENT AND
CONSTRUCTION, INC.
G.R. No. 194024
April 25, 2012
Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Philip L. Go, Pacifico Q. Lim and Andrew Q. Lim (petitioners) are registered
individual owners of condominium units in Phoenix Heights Condominium in Pasig.

Respondent Distinction Properties Development and Construction, Inc. (DPDCI) is a

corporation existing under the laws of the Philippines, incorporated as a real estate
developer, engaged in the development of condominium projects, among which was
the Phoenix Heights Condominium. Pacifico Lim, one of the incorporators and the
then president of DPDCI, executed a Master Deed and Declaration of
Restrictions (MDDR) of Phoenix Heights Condominium, which was filed with the
Registry of Deeds. As the developer, DPDCI undertook, among others, the
marketing aspect of the project, the sale of the units and the release of flyers and
brochures.
Thereafter, Phoenix Heights Condominium Corporation (PHCC) was formally
organized and incorporated. Sometime in 2000, DPDCI turned over to PHCC the
ownership and possession of the condominium units, except for two saleable
commercial units/spaces. Through its Board, PHCC approved a settlement offer from
DPDCI for the set-off of the latters association dues arrears with the assignment of
title over the above-mentioned saleable commercial units and their conversion into
common areas. Thus, CCTs were issued by the Registrar of Deeds of Pasig City in
favor of PHCC in lieu of the old titles. The said settlement between the two
corporations likewise included the reversion of the 22 storage spaces into common
areas. With the conformity of PHCC, DPDCIs application for alteration (conversion of
unconstructed 22 storage units and units GF4-A and BAS from saleable to common
areas) was granted by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
Soon after, petitioners, as condominium unit-owners, filed a complaint before the
HLURB against DPDCI for unsound business practices and violation of the MDDR.
They alleged that DPDCI committed misrepresentation in their circulated flyers and
brochures as to the facilities or amenities that would be available in the
condominium and failed to perform its obligation to comply with the MDDR. In
defense, DPDCI denied that it had breached its promises and representations to the
public concerning the facilities in the condominium. It alleged that the brochure
attached to the complaint was a mere preparatory draft and not the official one
actually distributed to the public, and that the said brochure contained a disclaimer
as to the binding effect of the supposed offers therein. Also, DPDCI questioned the
petitioners personality to sue as the action was a derivative suit.
After due hearing, the HLURB rendered its decision in favor of petitioners. Aggrieved,
DPDCI filed with the CA its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. The CA held that
jurisdiction over PHCC, an indispensable party, was neither acquired nor waived by
estoppel. Finally, the CA held that the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies could be relaxed. Appeal was not a speedy and adequate remedy as
jurisdictional questions were continuously raised but ignored by the HLURB. In the
present case, however, [t]he bottom line is that the challenged decision is one that
had been rendered in excess of jurisdiction, if not with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration; the motion, however, was denied hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Did the HLURB have jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the petitioners?
(2) Was the PHCC an indispensable party?

(3) Did the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies apply in this case?
RULING:
(1)NO.
[Jurisdiction] over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The
nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the
plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon
all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains
vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon
all or some of the claims asserted therein. Thus, it was ruled that the
jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear and decide cases is determined by the
nature of the cause of action, the subject matter or property involved and the
parties.
Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its
powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute
creating or empowering such agency. With respect to the HLURB, to
determine if said agency has jurisdiction over petitioners cause of action, an
examination of the laws defining the HLURBs jurisdiction and authority
becomes imperative. P.D. No. 957, specifically Section 3, granted the
National Housing Authority (NHA) the "exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the
real estate trade and business." Then came P.D. No. 1344, expanding the
jurisdiction of the NHA (now HLURB) [to cover unsound] real estate business
practices [(cf. Sec. 1, PD 1344)]. P.D. No. 957, as amended, aims to protect
innocent subdivision lot and condominium unit buyers against fraudulent real
estate practices.
The HLURB is given [] wide latitude in characterizing or categorizing acts
which may constitute unsound business practice or breach of contractual
obligations in the real estate trade. This grant of expansive jurisdiction to the
HLURB does not mean, however, that all cases involving subdivision lots or
condominium units automatically fall under its jurisdiction. The CA aptly
quoted the case of Christian General Assembly, Inc. vs. Ignacio, wherein the
Court held that [] mere relationship between the parties, i.e., that of being
subdivision owner/developer and subdivision lot buyer, does not
automatically vest jurisdiction in the HLURB. For an action to fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB, the decisive element is the nature of the
action as enumerated in Section 1 of P.D. 1344 [and in] this case, the
complaint filed by petitioners alleged causes of action that apparently are not
cognizable by the HLURB considering the nature of the action and the reliefs
sought. A perusal of the complaint discloses that petitioners are actually
seeking to nullify and invalidate the duly constituted acts of PHCC the []
Agreement entered into by PHCC with DPDCI and its Board Resolution which

authorized the acceptance of the proposed offsetting/settlement of DPDCIs

indebtedness and approval of the conversion of certain units from saleable to
common areas. All these were approved by the HLURB.
(2)YES.
As it is clear that the acts being assailed are those of PHHC, this case cannot
prosper for failure to implead the proper party, PHCC. [] An indispensable
party is defined as one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject
matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without
injuring or affecting that interest [and] a final decree would necessarily affect
the rights of indispensable parties so that the Court could not proceed
without their presence.
From all indications, PHCC is an indispensable party and should have been
impleaded, either as a plaintiff or as a defendant, in the complaint filed
before the HLURB as it would be directly and adversely affected by any
determination therein.
Evidently, the cause of action rightfully pertains to PHCC. Petitioners cannot
exercise the same except through a derivative suit. In the complaint,
however, there was no allegation that the action was a derivative suit. In fact,
in the petition, petitioners claim that their complaint is not a derivative suit.
[] Without PHCC as a party, there can be no final adjudication of the
HLURBs judgment. The CA was, thus, correct in ordering the dismissal of the
case for failure to implead an indispensable party. []
Moreover, considering that petitioners, who are members of PHCC, are
ultimately challenging the agreement entered into by PHCC with DPDCI, they
are assailing, in effect, PHCCs acts as a body corporate. This action,
therefore, partakes [of] the nature of an intra-corporate controversy, the
jurisdiction over which used to belong to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), but transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction or the
appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC), pursuant to Section 5b of P.D.
No. 902-A, as amended by Section 5.2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799 [] for
being between a condominium corporation and its members-unit owners.
(3)NO.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our
judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative
agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities
within the specialized areas of their respective competence. It has been held,
however, that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not ironclad rules. In the case of Republic
of the Philippines vs. Lacap, the Court enumerated the numerous exceptions
to these rules, namely: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party
invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently
illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable
delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d)

where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule

impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal
and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where
judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may
cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate
due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo
warranto proceedings. (Underscoring supplied.)
The situations (b) and (e) in the foregoing enumeration obtain in this case.

#39
POLYTRADE CORPORATION vs. VICTORIANO BLANCO
G.R. No. L-27033
October 31, 1969
Sanchez, J.
FACTS: The instant case began as a suit before the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan on four causes of action to recover the purchase price of rawhide delivered
by plaintiff to defendant. Plaintiff corporation has its principal office and place of
business in Makati, Rizal. Defendant is a resident of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Defendant moved to dismiss upon the ground of improper venue. He claims that by
contract suit may only be lodged in the courts of Manila. The Bulacan court
overruled him. He did not answer the complaint. In consequence, a default
judgment was rendered against.
Defendant appealed.
ISSUE: Was venue properly laid in the province of Bulacan?
RULING: YES.
Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on venue of personal actions triable by
courts of first instance and this is one provides that such "actions may be
commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may
be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff." Qualifying this provision in Section 3 of the same Rule which states that
venue may be stipulated by written agreement "By written agreement of the
parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to
another." []
Defendant places his case upon Section 3 of Rule 4 just quoted. According to
defendant, plaintiff and defendant, by written contracts covering the four causes of
action, stipulated that: "The parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of
Manila." This agreement is valid. Defendant says that because of such covenant he
can only be sued in the courts of Manila. [However, no] such stipulation appears in
the contracts covering the first two causes of action. The general rule set forth in

Section 2 (b), Rule 4, governs, and as to said two causes of action, venue was
properly laid in Bulacan, the province of defendant's residence.
The stipulation adverted to is only found in the agreements covering the third and
fourth causes of action. An accurate reading, however, of the stipulation, "The
parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila," does not preclude the
filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant. The plain meaning is that the
parties merely consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words which
would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the venue are totally absent
therefrom. We cannot read into that clause that plaintiff and defendant bound
themselves to file suits with respect to the last two transactions in question only or
exclusively in Manila. For, that agreement did not change or transfer venue. It
simply is permissive. The parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as
tribunals to which they may resort. They did not waive their right to pursue remedy
in the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4. Renuntiatio non
praesumitur.
Venue here was properly laid.

#40

SWEET LINES, INC. vs. HON. BERNARDO TEVES, et al.

G.R. No. L-37750
May 19, 1978
Santos, J.

FACTS: Private respondents Atty. Leovigildo Tandog and Rogelio Tiro, contractors by
profession, bought tickets at the branch office of petitioner Sweet Lines, Inc., a
shipping company transporting inter-island passengers and cargoes, at Cagayan de
Oro City. Respondents were to board petitioner's vessel, M/S "Sweet Hope" bound
for Tagbilaran City via the port of Cebu. Upon learning that the vessel was not
proceeding to Bohol, since many passengers were bound for Surigao, private
respondents went to the branch office for proper relocation to M/S "Sweet Town".
Because the said vessel was already filled to capacity, they were forced to agree "to
hide at the cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers of the Philippine
Coastguard." Private respondents alleged that they were, during the trip, "exposed
to the scorching heat of the sun and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn

grits," and that the tickets they bought at Cagayan de Oro City for Tagbilaran were
not honored and they were constrained to pay for other tickets. In view thereof,
private respondents sued petitioner for damages and for breach of contract of
carriage before respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. This
motion was premised on the condition printed at the back of the tickets stating that
any and all actions arising out of the conditions and provisions of this ticket,
irrespective of where it is issued, shall be filed in the competent courts in the City of
Cebu. The motion was denied by the trial court. Petitioner moved to reconsider the
order of denial, but no avail hence, this instant petition for prohibition for
preliminary injunction, 'alleging that the respondent judge has departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceeding" and "had acted without or in
excess or in error of his jurisdiction or in gross abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: Was the condition printed at the back of the petitioner's passage tickets
purchased by private respondents, which limits the venue of actions arising from
the contract of carriage to the Cebu CIF, valid and enforceable?
RULING: NO.
[The condition] is subversive of public policy on transfers of venue of actions. For,
although venue may be changed or transferred from one province to another by
agreement of the parties in writing t to Rule 4, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, such
an agreement will not be held valid where it practically negates the action of the
claimants, such as the private respondents herein. The philosophy underlying the
provisions on transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of the plaintiffs as well
as his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice. Considering the expense and
trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim
in the City of Cebu, he would most probably decide not to file the action at all. The
condition will thus defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice. Upon the other
hand, petitioner has branches or offices in the respective ports of call of its vessels
and can afford to litigate in any of these places. Hence, the filing of the suit in the
CFI of Misamis Oriental, as was done in the instant case, will not cause
inconvenience to, much less prejudice, petitioner.
Public policy is ... that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can
lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the
public good... [u]nder this principle, ... freedom of contract or private dealing is
restricted by law for the good of the public. Clearly, [the condition], if enforced, will
be subversive of the public good or interest, since it will frustrate in meritorious
cases, actions of passenger cants outside of Cebu City, thus placing petitioner
company at a decided advantage over said persons, who may have perfectly
legitimate claims against it. The said condition should, therefore, be declared void

and unenforceable, as contrary to public policy to make the courts accessible to all
who may have need of their services.