Civilisational Epistemology in Weber & Ibn Khaldun

Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131
www.brill.nl/ajss
Beyond Science as a Vocation:

Civilisational Epistemology in Weber and Ibn Khaldun
Nurullah Ard
University of California, Los Angeles
Abstract
Both Ibn Khaldun and Weber discuss science as a vocation, but their epistemologies go beyond
it by incorporating the civilisational dimension. Commonly used as a unit of analysis by classical
theorists, the term civilisation has recently been rediscovered in social sciences. It has been
argued that the epistemological paradigms of civilisations produced by the mainstream intellectual traditions are fundamental factors shaping the minds of key intellectuals. his article tests
this argument by analysing to what extent Ibn Khaldun and Webers views of knowledge and
science are inuenced by Islamic and Western epistemological paradigms, respectively. Based on
a close and critical reading of their relevant work, it argues that there are some resemblances, but
also signicant dierences, between Ibn Khaldun and Weber, which can indeed be explained
with reference to civilisational epistemological paradigms.
Keywords
civilisation, epistemology, Ibn Khaldun, knowledge, paradigm, Weber
Introduction
his article aims to comparatively analyse Max Weber and Abdurrahman Ibn
Khalduns views on knowledge and science within the context of their respective civilisational frameworks. he two intellectuals epistemologies are worth
comparing in civilisational context for a number of reasons: (i) Weber and
Ibn Khaldun are two of the founders and leading theorists of social sciences,
and sociology in particular; (ii) both see science as a vocation; (iii) both are
conscious about, and discuss, their methodologies that are based on distinctive
epistemologies; and (iv) nally, they both take civilisation as their unit of
analysis in their epistemological writings, seeing science as a product of civilisation. Despite these similarities, however, they also have signicant dierences
in terms of the geographical and social environments in which they lived,
the sources and paradigms to which they make reference, the concepts and
Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008
AJSS 36,3-4_Ardic_1-31.indd 1
DOI: 10.1163/156853108X327038
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N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131
terminologies they employ, the ultimate purpose of their intellectual projects,

and nally, their cosmological and epistemological assumptions.
Ibn Khalduns (AH 732808 / 13321406 CE) epistemological perspective, which he formulates as the source of all knowledge is Allah (1415:38),
is based on the Islamic principle of tawhid (unity) that involves an epistemological hierarchy, whereas Webers (18641920 CE) view of knowledge
expressly excludes the metaphysical in accordance with the intellectual context
characterised by the Enlightenment thought in which he lived a view that
he sums up when he writes: hat science today is irreligious no one will
doubt in his innermost being (1958a:142). his fundamental dierence in
their assumptions stems from dierent epistemological paradigms of the two
civilisations to which they belonged.1 As discussed below, these paradigms
emerged and got systematised by many intellectuals; they were also shaped by
historical processes and took their mature form in (mainstream) Medieval
Islamic thought and Enlightenment philosophy, respectively. In this article,
therefore, Ibn Khaldun and Webers approaches to knowledge and science will
be compared within the framework of their respective civilisational epistemological paradigms, focusing more on the intellectual, than historical, context
due to connes of the article.
Taking civilisation as a meaningful unit of analysis can be justied on the
grounds that both Ibn Khaldun and Weber use it in their own investigations,
not just as an insignicant unit of analysis, but as one of the main ones. In
particular, Weber and Ibn Khaldun employ civilisation as the unit of analysis
in their epistemological writings; the latter further argues that he has actually
founded a science of civilisation (ilm al-umran). In addition, civilisation
has recently been re-discovered as a unit of analysis by social scientists and
increasingly been employed in their studies.2 he present analysis can, therefore, be read to test the plausibility of this endeavour as well.
Islamic and Western Epistemological Paradigms

he dierences between Ibn Khaldun and Weber, in terms of how they view
knowledge and science, can, as mentioned above, be better understood if
I borrow the term epistemological paradigms of civilizations from Davutolu (1994a). See
below (Section One) for a brief discussion.
2
See, for example, Samuel Huntingtons (1993) infamous clash of civilizations thesis, a
statement of wishful thinking, if not a self-fullling prophecy, and Ahmet Davutolus (1994b)
response to it, which also takes civilization as a unit of analysis but emphasizes their interaction
and dialogue, rather than clash and conict. See also Ard et al. (2007) for a discussion on the
relationship between civilization and classics by a group of authors from dierent social science
disciplines.
1
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compared against Islamic and Western historical and epistemological backgrounds, which together form the civilisational one. Accordingly, Ibn Khalduns theory of knowledge can be understood with reference to what Davutolu
(1994a) calls the Islamic epistemological paradigm, which was developed by
Muslim intellectuals by the 11th century. Briey stated, this paradigm is based
on the principle of tawhid (unity of God), and consists of three dimensions:
(i) the relationship of dependency between the theory of existence and that of
knowledge (i.e., epistemology being derived from ontology); (ii) dierentiation
of epistemological spheres (i.e., a hierarchy of the sources of knowledge); and
(iii) harmonisation of epistemological sources (i.e., the principle of the unity
of truth) (Davutolu, 1994a:7882; see also Schuon, 1972; Izutsu, 1987;
Nasr, 1981, 2002; zel, 1992). Developed by such leading Islamic theologians as al-Maturidi, al-Ashari and al-Taftazani, and philosophers, such as alKindi, al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ghazali and al-Tusi, this view takes epistemological
dierentiation, which refers to dierent forms and sources of knowledge
located at dierent levels within a hierarchical order, as a reection of the
ontological dierentiation that implies a categorical distinction and a hierarchy between God and ma-siva (rest of the existence). In other words, the idea
of an ontologically-dependent epistemology involves the notion of tashkik
(hierarchy) as its essential feature (Sadra, 2000) which is a reection of the
Islamic ontological paradigm onto the eld of epistemology.3 We nd the concept of the hierarchy of knowledge (tashkik al-marifa) in Ibn Khalduns view
of knowledge as well.4 his tashkik-based understanding of knowledge is, as
discussed below, the major factor that helps his epistemology stay away from
reductionism and inter-source conict.
he notion of the Islamic epistemological paradigm does not necessarily mean, of course,
that there is only one single theory of knowledge in the Islamic intellectual tradition. Rather, it
refers to the dominant view originating from mainstream schools of thought, namely, the Sunni
tradition. More specically, within the spectrum of theological schools in Islam, ranging from
the Murjia and the Khawarij to the Mutazila and the Shia, the two major Sunni schools, the
Maturidiyya and the Ashariyya, have come to represent the mainstream Islamic theology by
being accepted by the majority of Muslims throughout history. Moreover, among these theological schools, the two Sunni schools representatives were closest to the philosophers (mentioned in the text) who helped develop this epistemological paradigm despite some
disagreements between them. Note also that there is not a very big gap between these Islamic
philosophers who represent the orthodoxy on the one hand, and Sadra, who is a Shia philosopher, on the other. In addition to its constituting the mainstream epistemology in Islam, this
view was the one that inuenced Ibn Khaldun most, as his thought was essentially part of
the Sunni tradition (see Azmeh, 1981; Ahmad, 2003; cf. Mahdi (1964) for an interpretation
that incorrectly situates Ibn Khaldun within the Aristotelian philosophical tradition as
opposed to the mainstream Islam).
4
For an analysis of the inuence of Islamic worldview on Ibn Khalduns political theory, see
Gibb (1962).
3
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On the other hand, Webers view of knowledge, too, can be understood

from a historical perspective and within the context of the Western epistemological paradigm, for the way he approaches knowledge and science is shaped
by the modern Western epistemology. During the early centuries of Western
intellectual history, as in that of Islam, there were, in general, three legitimate
sources of knowledge: reason, sense perceptions, and revelation. However, a
new, anthropocentric (as opposed to theo-centric), epistemology emerged as a
result of the process of secularisation that occurred, with the help of Christianity, as well as the well known scientic, economic and political developments,
during the late-Medieval and modern times (see Martin, 1978); this new epistemology displaced revelation from its status as a legitimate source of knowledge. In its essence, this modern epistemology is rooted in the Aristotelian
empirical philosophy, and developed by many intellectual interventions,
including Ren Descartes rationalist argument that reason (or mind) is the
only source of knowledge; John Lockes seemingly opposite empiricist
argument that sense perceptions are the only legitimate source of knowledge;
Immanuel Kants double impact with the argument that knowledge could be
derived both by reason and from sense perceptions, which tried to synthesise
rationalism and empiricism, on the one hand, and his categorical exclusion of
metaphysical knowledge on the other; and nally, August Comtes positivism
that emphasised the scientic phase of human history as opposed to its theological and metaphysical phases, the former representing the highest level:
the modern (Western) society. Moreover, David Humes critique of Christianity within the context of miracles, when he argued that religious dogmas are
no more reliable than sense perceptions as a source of knowledge, was the last
blow to revelation, which announced the uncontested superiority of the
human-centric epistemology (Davutolu, 1994a:38). At the end of this process, the new positivistic understanding of science, which rst emerged in natural sciences, dominated social sciences as well. During their rst several decades,
social sciences were largely inspired by the conceptual revolution and empirical achievements of natural sciences, and then aimed to apply to human phenomena the methods that natural sciences employed in investigating the objects
of nature (Gordon, 1993:16). In its essence, this positivistic and humanistic
scientic mentality was a refutation of the authority of the Church over human
knowledge, which by extension implied the exclusion of metaphysical knowledge (Whitehead, 1957:3). One of the main features of the Enlightenment
philosophy, this paradigm also shaped social sciences and, in this connection, formed the main framework of Webers epistemology.5
5
As in the case of Islamic epistemology, the Western epistemological paradigm may not be
the only theory of knowledge in Western history, but here I take modern epistemology based on
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Webers Epistemological Approach

Webers epistemology requires a reconstruction through an exposition of his
various writings because, unlike Ibn Khaldun, Weber did not explain his view
of knowledge and science systematically, but sporadically expressed it in his
dierent writings and speeches. First and foremost among them is his wellknown conference, Science as a Vocation, which he delivered in 1919. In this
speech, he discusses several topics including the nature of scientic knowledge
and sociology, the relationship between knowledge and society, and the functions and applications of knowledge. Secondly, in his famous work, he Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1992), particularly in its Introduction
which he wrote in 1920 for his entire series of books in the sociology of religion, Weber compares forms of knowledge and science in Western civilisation
with those in Eastern (Oriental) civilisations.
he roots of Webers epistemology go back to the intellectual and philosophical environment in Europe that was re-shaped by the Renaissance and
the Enlightenment. In the intellectual context of the 19th century, German
philosophy, which was dominated rst by idealism and then by Marxism, was
very dierent from its counterparts in Britain, where utilitarianism and classical political economy prevailed (Giddens, 1992:viii). Raised in this environment, the foundations of Webers epistemological approach were shaped by
Kant and Neo-Kantianism; therefore, in this (epistemological) sense he can be
seen as an idealist. his is true despite Webers claim at the end of the Protestant Ethic, with reference to what he sees as Marxs reductionist materialism,
that: [I]t is, of course, not my aim to substitute for a one-sided materialistic
and equally one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture and of history . . . (Weber, 1992:183). When one takes his work in its entirety, one can
recognise the dominance of idealist epistemology, however. Later, in the lectures he delivered towards the end of his life, he tried to insert material factors,
as well as ideal (cultural) ones, into his analysis in explaining the fundamental question of his entire sociological theory, which was: Why is it that modern capitalism rst emerged in the West[ern Europe], but not in any other part
of the world? (Weber, 1950). As Randall Collins (1980) stresses, however,
Webers rational spirit characterises all aspects of life, particularly the economic realm, and functions as the foundation of such essential elements of
early capitalism as rational and continuous entrepreneurship, rational bookkeeping, rational technology, and rational law. It is clear, therefore, that by its
Enlightenment thought as its representative, both because it was and mostly still is
dominant in modern West, and because Weber was greatly inuenced by this epistemology.
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emphasis on the notion of the (rational) Geist, Webers epistemology was very
much inuenced by Hegelian idealism, too.
On the other hand, since Weber opposes, unlike Hegel and Marx, to a
holistic view of society, he must be considered an anti-idealist in the sense of
being anti-systemic in his overall sociological approach (Mardin, 1994:123).
In this connection, unlike Spencer, Marx, Durkheim (and Ibn Khaldun),
Weber did not propose a general theory of society, but rather studied other,
more specic and relatively narrower topics, including the history of modern
economic development, world religions, types of authority and domination,
bureaucracy, law, music, and dierent forms of organisation. While Comtes
positivism never found a ready soil in Germany, as noted by Giddens (1992:
viii), Weber joined the interpretive Geistwissenschaften tradition, and argued
that, unlike natural events that could be explained by causal laws, understanding (verstehen) should occupy a central position in making sense of human
actions. Yet, recognition of the meaningful nature of human action does not
necessarily mean that there is no room at all for causal explanations in Webers
approach (Runciman, 1972:19).
At a closer look, one can see that Webers methodology consists of two main
dimensions. First, the subjective, ideographic dimension, which involves three
essential elements (value-relevance, meaning imposition, and ideal types),
implies that social science methods are value-laden and far from being purely
objective, that social world makes sense only by imposing meaning on it by
both actors/members and researchers and that social reality can best be
studied by abstracting its essential parts into a set of coherent and pure (ideal)
concepts, with which dierent civilisations and their main institutions (economy, religion, law, etc.) could also be compared to each other.6 Secondly, the
(relatively) objective, nomothetic (law-like) dimension involves verstehen, an
emphasis on social action, and value-neutrality as its three main elements.
hese imply the rational understanding of individuals actions in a social context by social scientists staying away from both positivism and a biased and
prescriptive approach in order to reach, as much as possible, a relatively objective understanding of the phenomenon at hand (Weber, 1949). By emphasising the notion of intention (of actors) and rational understanding, Webers
methodology bases sociological analysis on both subjective meaning and causal
explanation. hus, according to Weber (1947:85), sociology is the study of
social action that should be explained by understanding and interpreting the
meanings attached to it by social individuals.
6
Webers ideal types are identical neither to Platos ideas, nor to Aristotles essences, which also
have universal character. For this reason, philosophically, Weber can be considered a nominalist
and instrumentalist (Gordon 1993:474).
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he Nature of Scientic Knowledge

Webers epistemological approach is shaped by this non-holistic, piecemeal
methodological perspective. In his view, perception of the external world
occurs through a Kantian selection from among various phenomena, which
then forms a pattern for our understanding. Weber argues that knowledge
about social relationships is produced as a result of a similar process of the
selection of a slice of social reality, and with an interpretive and systematic
understanding of it. Unlike Marx who argues that knowledge is produced as
part of the dominant ideology created by the dominant group within the context of certain relations of production, and that, ultimately, knowledge is a
product of material conditions that underlies a particular mode of production
(Marx and Engels, 1968), Weber (1947) makes a distinction between the
material world and the world of human beings where values prevail, emphasising the signicance of ideal factors in the construction of reality, including,
among others, knowledge production in a particular society (or civilisation).
An example of Webers approach is his Protestant Ethic thesis. For him, religion
is one of the most important institutions involving those values that frame
not only the production of knowledge, but also almost every other aspect of
social life. hus, he argues, Protestantism (or more specically, Calvinism)
played a crucial role in the emergence of capitalism through the moral values
that it prescribed. herefore, ideas and values, like switchmen, play a signicant
role in the direction of history shaping the material aspects of it as well as
being shaped by them (Weber, 1992).
he Western Background of Webers Epistemology

As Weber was very much inuenced by Enlightenment thought, his epistemological views can be understood, as mentioned before, within the context of
the wider Western epistemological paradigm. A child of the 19th century,
Weber had a deep belief in the Enlightenment project and its fundamental
principles, including rationalism, progress and universalism. For this reason,
he celebrates the displacement of religious knowledge by the modern, secular
science and actually predicts that being replaced by science, religion would
disappear in the modern world as a result of rationalisation and the disenchantment of the world (1958a:139; 1958b:351). Moreover, he argues, parallel to the universalistic claims of Enlightenment thinkers, that only Western
science has a universal character as part of the wider Western culture: . . . in
Western civilisation, and in Western civilisation only, cultural phenomena
have appeared which . . . lie in a line of development having universal signicance
and value (1992:13; emphasis in original).
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He also stresses other unique characteristics of Western science which make

it a true science. He posits three conditions rationality, progress and specialisation as fundamental criteria for scientic knowledge, which are at
the same time among the main parameters of the modern epistemological
paradigm of Western civilisation. he concept of rationality refers to the spatial dierences between civilisations regarding the nature of knowledge produced by them; progress to the temporal dimension, that is, the historical
process of knowledge production; and specialisation is used by Weber to
dierentiate dierent forms of knowledge within the Western civilisation.
According to him, all three preconditions have existed only in the West
throughout history.
Rationality: Dierentia Specica of Western Science
Weber sees rationality as a unique element of Western civilisation and thus
employs it to dierentiate Western science from forms of knowledge produced in other civilisations (he also uses it to emphasise the primarily rational
character of the modern science in comparison with the scientic activities of
the Antiquity and the Middle Ages). Science, or the systematic production of
knowledge, according to Weber, is one of the unique features of the West. He
does not deny, of course, the existence of knowledge and observation in nonWestern civilisations, including China, Babylonia, India and Egypt; however,
he argues that these civilisations lacked some fundamental scientic elements
that can be commonly called rationality, which has been the dierentia
specica of Western science throughout history, as will be elaborated in the
following paragraphs.
Weber argues that conceptualisation for scientic purposes rst emerged in
the West; for the concept, which is one of the most important tools of scientic
knowledge, was discovered by Socrates. Similarly, according to him, though
rst seeds of the study of logic similar to the Aristotelian one had been found
in India, the signicance of logical research was rst discovered by Plato in
Greece, and . . . nowhere else do we nd this realisation of the signicance of
the concept . . . (Weber, 1958a:141). Likewise, although astronomy rst
emerged in Babylonia, it did not have a mathematical foundation. Natural
sciences, including also geometry and medicine, existed in India, but they did
not have such notions as rational proof , experimental method and biological infrastructure. Accordingly, a . . . rational chemistry has been absent from
all areas of culture except the West . . . (1992:14).
Weber makes the same argument for social sciences, too. For him, the
historical studies started in China did not involve hucydides method, and
political thought in the Indian civilisation lacked the rational method;
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rational concepts in this area were rst used by Aristotle. Likewise, the rational
law, which had not existed in the Indian and Near Eastern traditions, rst
emerged in the Roman law. Islamic and Ottoman law (what he terms kadi
justice) was irrational, unpredictable and arbitrary. At the same time, theology in Islam and Hinduism was far from being systematic; a systematic theology existed only in the Christian tradition. In addition, according to Weber,
Western theology which was primarily created by the Hellenic mind has
always had the greatest signicance from a scientic perspective throughout
history (1992:28; cf. Weber, 1993:166183). Also, scientic institutions in
Islam and China lacked the essential features of Western science, that is,
rationality, progress and specialisation: . . . a rational, systematic, and specialised pursuit of science, with trained and specialised personnel, has only existed
in the West . . . (1992:1516).
In addition, argues Weber, the state, based on a rational and codied constitution, rational rules and laws, as well as a bureaucratic mechanism managed by educated ocials, was known only in the West (1992:16). He also
argues that even the art that developed in the West had a very dierent nature
than the one in other cultures. For example, the rational, harmonious music,
with its unique chromatics and enharmonics, its orchestrate, a system of notation, modern work, sonatas, and symphonies, as well as its instruments, such
as the piano, organ and violin, is unique to the Western civilisation: . . . all
these things are known only in the Occident . . . (1992:15; see also Weber,
1958c). Similarly, the printing press that was invented in China was, unlike in
the Occident, not for press and periodicals; just like there was never a written
culture in the Orient. Likewise, the West is distinguished from other civilisations in architecture by its use of the rational Gothic style, through which
the West found the solution to the problem of dome that led to the classical
rationalisation of the entire art (1992:15). Needless to say, this feature did
not exist in any other civilisation.7
hough he emphasises the signicance of rationality in terms of every subject he analyses, Weber is pessimistic about the impact of rationalisation,
which leads to the disenchantment of the world, particularly on bureaucracy
and politics. It is therefore possible to see Nietzsches inuence on Webers idea
7
he idea of the uniqueness of Western civilization was not, of course, conned to Weber.
Rather, this trend was very common among social scientists especially in the late-19th and early20th centuries. Based on the assumption of a primitive other, which led intellectuals to search
for the roots of existing societies (or rather, to often make unfounded speculations regarding
them), this tendency was particularly strong among some anthropologists and sociologists,
including Herbert Spencer and Emile Durkheim. For a discussion of politico-ideological aspects
of classical sociological theory, see Connell (1997).
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10
that in the modern world organisational life would increasingly be mechanised as a result of bureaucratisation, and that the individuals freedom would
be limited within the iron cage of rationality (1992:182). On the other
hand, Webers emphasis on rationalisation has been inuential on later theorists, including also some Marxian approaches, such as the critical theory of
the Frankfurt School (cf. Adorno and Horkheimer, 1972).
Progress: The Nature of Scientic Knowledge
By progress Weber refers to the specicity of (scientic) knowledge among
other elements of Western civilisation. For him, characterising the temporal
dimension of this civilisation, progress underlines the superiority of science
within the Western tradition. Here Weber compares knowledge with art in
order to emphasise its signicance. He argues that though in scientic and
artistic works there are certain common preconditions, such as passion, inspiration and rationality, these common elements do not go beyond psychological processes on the part of the artist and the scientist. What clearly distinguishes
science from art is the notion of progress, for it cannot be claimed that a work
of art that is created with a new technique is greater than other works of art
that belong to earlier periods. In other words, while a product of artistic eorts
cannot make another work of art obsolete, for a scientic work, it is its destiny
to be out of fashion sooner or later: In science, each of us knows that what
he has accomplished will be antiquated in ten, twenty, fty years. hat is the
fate to which science is subjected; it is the very meaning of scientic work
(Weber, 1958a:138). By the same token, he argues that becoming obsolete is
not only the destiny of science, but it also is the common purpose of scientists
themselves: We cannot work without hoping that others will advance further
than we have (Weber, 1958a:138).
he notion of progress constitutes, according to Weber, a dimension of the
process of intellectual rationalisation which has been going on for millennia
in the West. What makes this process, which consists of rational thinking, science and technology, unique to the Western hemisphere is its progressive
nature. What, then, does rationalisation mean exactly? According to Weber, it
does not mean that today we understand the (social and physical) world better
than the savages of the past. Rather it refers to the notion of the disenchantment of the world (Entzauberung) which means that principally there are no
mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in
principle, master all things by calculation. his means that the world is disenchanted (1958a:139). For this reason, thanks to the scientic age we live in,
we do not need to resort to magic or nd ways to connect to spirits, as savages
of the past did. What give us this freedom, according to Weber, are (rational)
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11
technology and calculation. Furthermore, science is not only a dimension of

this intellectual rationalisation, but it also functions as its driving force
(1958a:140).
Moreover, after locating science, this specically irreligious power, at the
center of the process of breaking free from magic and superstition, Weber also
asks whether this progress, which has been going on for millennia in Western
culture, has any meaning beyond purely technical or practical purposes. To
answer this question, he cites Tolstoy who questions the meaning of death,
and concludes that death has no meaning for the modern, civilised man who,
unlike the people of the past, is placed into an innite progress . Here
emerges, therefore, a huge gap between the past and the present:
Abraham, or some peasant of the past, died old and satiated with life because he
stood in the organic cycle of life; because his life, in terms of its meaning and on the
eve of his days, had given to him what life had to oer; because for him there remained
no puzzles he might wish to solve; and therefore he could have had enough of life.
Whereas civili[s]ed man, placed in the midst of the continuous enrichment of culture
by ideas, knowledge, and problems, may become tired of life but not satiated with
life. (Weber, 1958a:140)
he second most important tool after the concept for scientic endeavour for Weber is the rational experiment that rst emerged with the discovery of the Hellenic spirit during Renaissance. It is a crucial instrument to
control experience, and one without which todays empirical science would
be impossible. In earlier periods, since scientic experiments were not
rational, they were not reliable. For example, experiments done in India were
connected to Yogis spiritual techniques; similarly, in the Hellenic Antiquity,
they were done for military technology, and in the medieval period for purposes of mining. But to raise the experiment to a principle of [scientic]
research was the achievement of the Renaissance (1958a:141). According to
Weber, the pioneers of rational experimentation were such experimenters in
music as Leonardo da Vinci and other innovators in art. From these circles,
says Weber, the experiment entered science, especially through Galileo, and it
entered theory through Bacon (1958a:1412).
According to these artistic experimenters and novelists in music who stood
at the threshold of modernity, science was a way to true art; for scientists it
was a way to true nature. herefore, art should be elevated to the level of
science, and the artist to that of philosopher/doctor. Later, when natural sciences further developed, expectations from science also rose, and with the
indirect impact of Protestantism and Puritanism in particular, science became
a way to God. Weber then asks the question: What about today? In response,
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12
he refers to the dierence between the past and present: Todays youth, he
observes, does not share Platos feelings, who, after seeing the Sun (or true
science), returned to the cave sacricing himself in order to lead people who
could see only their own shadows in the cave to the way to true Being
(1958a:142). herefore, science is no longer a way to true nature, nor a way
to God, for it is undoubtedly a secular force: hat science today is irreligious
no one will doubt in his innermost being, even if he will not admit it to himself. Redemption from the rationalism and intellectualism of science is the
fundamental presupposition of living in union with the divine (1958a:142).
Weber also adds that, after Nietzsche, nobody believes that science is a way to
happiness anymore.
Despite Webers secular(-ist) discourse, however, we know that common
feature of the concept of progress with that of rationalisation is that both
are metaphysical and value-laden concepts. hough Weber argues for the
detachment of the scientist from his/her political inclinations, and strictly
excludes metaphysical knowledge from the realm of true knowledge by labelling it irrational, he himself employs these two metaphysical and broadly
dened political terms as his central concepts. Moreover, the centrality of
these (implicitly metaphysical) concepts is not conned to his view of science,
but rationalisation and progress are two of the most important elements of
Webers entire conceptual arsenal; as such they are essential to his understanding of the various topics he studied, ranging from music to methodology, from
medieval agrarian structures to the rise of capitalism, and from religion to
dierent forms of authority. For Weber, the progressive unfolding of rational
Geist in history is the single most important unifying pattern among these
dierent themes he studied.
Specialisation: Dierentia Specica of Scientic Knowledge
Another unique feature of Western science for Weber is specialisation, which is
closely related to, though less metaphysical and value-laden than, progress and
rationalisation. He argues that the concept of specialisation distinguishes
Western science not only from its counterparts in other civilisations but also
from forms of knowledge produced in the past within the Western civilisation.
He claims that in Islamic and Chinese civilisations the processes of knowledge
production and its transmission to subsequent generations lacked specialisation. Western science, however, has reached the highest level of specialisation
in the history of mankind due to progress: Science has entered a phase of
specialisation previously unknown and this will forever remain the case
(1958a:134).
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13
In explaining the superiority of knowledge produced with specialisation,

Weber makes a distinction between idea and knowledge, which is similar to
Platos distinction between doxa and episteme in his Republic. According to
Weber, compared to an idea, the value of knowledge that is a product of specialisation comes from the certainty that it involves. In other words, even if a
dilettantes idea may have the very same or even a greater bearing for science
than that of a specialist, the methods the amateur employs to reach this idea
lack certainty, which is supposedly an integral part of scientic method. For
this reason, an idea put forward by a non-specialist, no matter how important
it is, cannot be at the level of the scientic knowledge that is produced by exact
methods; for the idea is not a substitute for [scientic] work (1958a:136).
herefore, a work produced by a non-specialist is necessarily far from being
perfect; it is only experts who can achieve creating valuable, certain knowledge
in science. For this reason, a really denitive and good accomplishment is
today always a specialised accomplishment (1958a:135).
Moreover, according to Weber, this specialised knowledge is an important
element of modern capitalism, a socio-economic system that emerged only in
the West. Greatly beneting from the development of modern technology,
capitalism is dependent on the peculiarities of modern science, especially the
natural sciences based on mathematics and exact and rational experiment
(1992:24). On the other hand, it is a fact that capitalism has helped the development of Western science, too: [T]he development of these sciences and of
the technique resting upon them now receives important stimulation from
these capitalistic interests . . . (1992:24). Since capitalism is a uniquely Western
system, specialisation, like rationality and progress, then, is one of the fundamental criteria for the validity of knowledge as an element of Western science.
In addition to these three main aspects, Webers view on the relationship
between science and practical life is one of the areas where the impact on him
of Enlightenment philosophy, particularly that of Kant, can be clearly
observed. Regarding the method that scientists should employ, he argues that
science cannot deal with moral questions such as the meaning of life and
whether the world has any value. For, these questions cannot be answered by
scientic methods. Rather, [n]atural science gives us an answer to the question of what we must do if we wish to master life technically (1958a:144).
Here the necessity of controlling life via technique is taken for granted and not
questioned. For this reason, according to Weber, science cannot be seen as
devoid of any presuppositions, for at least [all] scientic work presupposes
that the rules of logic and method are valid; these are the general foundations
of our orientation in the world. In addition, [s]cience further presupposes
that what is yielded by scientic work is important in the sense that it is worth
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14
being known (1958a:143). herefore, just as law does not discuss the necessity of the existence of rules and regulations, historical and cultural sciences
do not seek to answer the question of whether social phenomena are worth
existing. For this reason, (social) sciences should accept as legitimate existing
social reality and all of its constituent elements. Moreover, these presuppositions are self-evident, according to Weber, especially in natural sciences.
The Exclusionary Character of Western Science
he civilisational background of Webers epistemology can also be observed in
its exclusionary character. He claims that only the forms of knowledge produced in the West deserve the name of science: Only in the West does
science exist at a stage of development which we recognise today as valid
(1992:13). Weber was very much inuenced by Enlightenment scepticism,
which was best articulated by Kants categorical distinction between metaphysical knowledge and knowledge based on the (human) ratio, which implied
that those forms of knowledge that did not conform to the criteria put forward by (positivist) science were to be excluded from the realm of (true)
knowledge.8 Accordingly, even though he is not a positivist, Weber nevertheless rejects the validity of all knowledge that is not based on rational empirical
methods. his is apparent in his (explicit) denial of metaphysical knowledge
the status of true knowledge, as it is not characterised by rationality and cannot be veried by scientic methods. In contrast to his secular discourse,
however, his whole epistemology is based on the above-mentioned metaphysical, albeit secular, concepts of rationalisation and progress. his exclusionary
attitude can be said to be related, at least partly, to his concern for the political
and economic, as well as epistemological, superiority of the modern, secular
civilisation over others; he seems to be interested in establishing the superior
position of Western science in connection with the already-proven politicomilitary and economic superiority of Western civilisation.
8
he concept of rationality in the discourse of Enlightenment thinkers, including Webers,
in reality meant that which is rational according to white/European, middle-class, male subjects
reasoning. Similarly, both rationality and positivism, as two pillars of the secular world view,
were employed during the 17th to 19th centuries as eective tools against the epistemological
and political domination of the (oppressive) Church, and gradually evolved to be the elements
of the superiority of Western civilization over others in the 18th and 19th centuries. herefore,
together with other key elements of the Enlightenment, they functioned as exclusionary devices
against both the Church (though Christianity has been one of the dening features of Western
civilisation) and other civilizations attributing to all of them such negative qualities as darkness,
obscurantism, irrationality and despotism. his is particularly evident in Webers treatment of
other (especially Islamic) civilisations.
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15
By the same token, secondly, Weber discusses the connection between the
ideological (scientic and intellectual) superiority of the West and its nonideational, organisational dimensions. In particular, he argues that the rational
organisation of law and administration, two crucial and unique features of
Western societies, have made it possible for scientic and artistic
domains, as well as political and economic, developments to take the path of
rationalisation which is peculiar to the West (1992:25). herefore, he evaluates all these institutions, including science, from the subjective stand point of
inter-civilisational comparison based on certain selected characteristics of
them within the frameworks of the West versus the rest dichotomy.
hird, Webers overall approach is problematic in terms of its political
implications as well. he dominant feature of his discourse is Euro-centrism
with strong connections to both Orientalism and Occidentalism (see Said,
1995; Carrier, 1995). he way he approaches to non-Western civilisations is
based, particularly in connection with the concept of rationality, on a crude
orientalist perspective. He attributes several negative qualities to Eastern civilisations, including homogeneity (e.g., all Oriental civilisations and their
scientic institutions are far from being rational), lack of change (e.g., the
ability to change and improve is absent in scientic institutions outside the
West), and arbitrariness (e.g., Islamic and Hindu theologies, and Ottoman
law are neither systematic nor standardised or predictable) etc.
Furthermore, Weber adapts the same essentialist and reductionist perspective
that he has for the Orient for the Western world as well hence his Occidentalism. His overall discourse strongly implies that rationalisation and disenchantment of the world are unitary processes common to all societies within the West
and to all of their institutions unifying them as a homogenous whole. Moreover,
rational forms of knowledge and experimental methods, as well as various sciences,
such as astronomy and chemistry; rational institutions such as law, education,
theology and administrative mechanisms; even the rational kinds of music, literature and architecture all these belong to Western civilisation only and are of
uniquely scientic and systematic character. In contrast, no corresponding institution in the non-Western world can attain this status. Webers approach thus implies
the existence of insurmountable walls that prevent any possibility of interaction
and dialogue between the Orient and the Occident. his is very dierent from the
implications of the Khaldunian view of knowledge and science.
Ibn Khalduns Epistemological Approach

Ibn Khaldun systematically explains his view of knowledge and science in
Chapter Six of his al-Muqaddimah, where he also explores the emergence and
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16
historical development of Islamic civilisations knowledge-based institutions,

such as education, sciences, art, and political structures, as well as sciences that
are not unique to Islam.9 Here we will analyse Ibn Khalduns approach to science and knowledge in three sections: (i) the nature and forms of knowledge;
(ii) Ibn Khalduns methodology; and (iii) Ibn Khalduns classication of sciences. hen we will explore the Islamic background of his epistemology.
hroughout, we will observe that he employs a dierent (more religious and
philosophical) terminology than Weber does.
he Nature and Forms of Knowledge

According to Ibn Khaldun, knowledge is one of the most important characteristics of human beings that distinguish them from animals (1415:108).
his is for him a privilege that stems from mans ontological position. We can,
therefore, argue that Ibn Khalduns epistemology is closely related to his ontology. According to him, the human mind has the ability to comprehend three
dierent worlds: (i) the world of creation (takween) (i.e., the realm of sensual
perception consisting respectively of minerals, plants, animals and human
beings, which we become aware of by means of the perception of the senses,
which the animals share with us [1415:125]); (ii) the world of human beings
(a uniquely human world of concepts and ideas, or of scientic perceptions
which are above the perceptions of the senses [1415:125]); and (iii) the world
of angels (malakut) (the spiritual realm that consists of pure comprehension
and reasoning or intellection [taaqqul ] that we become aware of through the
inuences they exercise upon us, despite the gap between us and them
[1415:125], a world about which we can have only general knowledge, but no
particulars). Since the human being is located in the middle world, his/her
spirit has the ability to travel to the higher spiritual world and then return
to the world of creation (1415:125127).
Ibn Khaldun, therefore, argues, in line with the Islamic cosmological paradigm (see Nasr, 1968; Davutolu, 1994a), that the universe is based on a cosmological hierarchy in which the human being is located right in the middle.
his way he/she can have access to the knowledge of the material world using
his/her mind; he/she also can have contact with the spiritual world through
his/her spirit and can receive knowledge and light from this higher world
(Badawi, n.d.:31). Accordingly, there are two kinds of comprehension (idrak):
9
Unlike Weber, however, he does not discuss Islamic civilisations unique elements in
order to prove its superiority over others, evidenced by the fact that there is very little intercivilisational comparison in Chapter 6 of the Muqaddimah.
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17
(1) the minds knowledge of the external qualities of the phenomenal world;
and (2) the spirits inward knowledge that it acquires by being exposed to the
higher world of angels. However, the innate ability of the spirit to have access
to lower and higher worlds is not equally distributed among human beings. Ibn
Khaldun therefore distinguishes between three groups of human spirits:
(1) hose who are naturally incapable of acquiring the inward, spiritual
knowledge: he people in this group can produce knowledge only
through sense perceptions and experimentation.
(2) Spirits that have access to the non-material world: he Sus and fortune
tellers who are able to know inward phenomena are included in this
group.
(3) hose who have access to the world of angels without any extra eort or
special training: Only prophets sent by God are included in this group.
his classication implies three forms of knowledge:
(1) Rational knowledge: he knowledge produced by human beings by
relating to the sensual world and through thinking and learning by
mental faculty; its source is the mind/intellect and the external world.
he mind comprehends this knowledge in three stages, and is accordingly called the distinguishing intellect (aql tamyizi), the empirical
intellect (aql tajrubi) and the theoretical intellect (aql nazari).10
(2) Spiritual knowledge: he knowledge that the human spirit acquires
through special spiritual training and hard work, by worshipping Allah,
and via the true dreams that are divinely inspired (ruya salih). However, the precondition for the authenticity of this knowledge is its correspondence to the physical and social reality. Otherwise this
information is said to be a product of hallucination or confused dreams
(adgas ahlam) not inspired by God, and thus cannot be treated as coming from the higher world.
(3) Prophetic knowledge: he knowledge that is revealed by God to a certain
group of select individuals in order for them to guide the rest of the
humanity to the righteous path. his is also a kind of spiritual knowledge, but its source is Gods revelation. It is also unique to prophets,
10
As this paragraph and the rest of our examination in this article indicate, Ibn Khaldun does not dene the concept of rationality (aql, taaqqul) in the same metaphysical
way as Weber. Unlike the latters more specic and modern understanding of the term, Ibn
Khalduns denition of it is broader and more neutral, referring simply to that which is related
to human mind or reason. Moreover, given his overall epistemological approach, rationality also
implies a limited capacity for acquiring knowledge due to the limited nature of human beings
intellectual capacities a view that is diametrically opposed to Webers.
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18
and therefore cannot be acquired through mental eort by ordinary

human beings (1415:126127). Moreover, unlike the defective knowledge of ordinary human beings, prophetic knowledge is always perfect.
his schema implies that there are two main sources of knowledge in Ibn
Khalduns view. First is the world of phenomena from which the mind/intellect derives knowledge through its various capacities. he second source of
knowledge is the spiritual world that is not sensual, and it is the human spirit
that can access to the knowledge of this world. Also, human beings may
inuence the lower world of creation via their senses [and mind], and get
inuenced by the higher world through their spirits (Badawi, n.d.:33). he
fact that Ibn Khaldun places human beings in the middle of the hierarchy of
beings implies that among created beings only humans have the capacity to
access both sources of knowledge. his Khaldunian epistemology that is
shaped by his ontological assumptions also frames his methodological approach
in his investigations.
Ibn Khalduns Methodology

Ibn Khaldun presents his methodology of studying history and social reality
by presenting a critique of the study of Islamic history by his contemporaries.
As a historian, Ibn Khaldun often refers to, and quotes, some great historians
of Islam before him, as well as presenting and analysing historical data. For
him the necessary condition for the authenticity of information given by historians is that this information must correspond to the reality of the time and
a particular event mentioned by a historian must be within the limits of the
possible. As a 14th-century scholar, Ibn Khalduns distinguishing character in
his own study of history is his eorts and ability to verify the reliability of the
data at hand by taking a very critical position towards the reports by other
historians, as well as the historical data themselves. In this context, he often
resorts to what might be called today a critical textual analysis of his sources.
As an indication of his emphasis on sound methods, he explains it in a separate section (titled Muqaddamah) within his Muqaddimah, in which he praises
the rst generation of Muslim historians while criticising later generations for
not being careful enough about the reliability of their methods of data collection (1415:1011,1620).
Within this framework, we can specify ve major elements of Ibn Khalduns methodology, which also indicate the criteria he employs for a sound
analysis in his own theoretical and empirical investigations:
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19
(1) he role of social conditions: Ibn Khalduns Muqaddimah is, in a sense, an

exposition of the new science that he argues he founded: the (sociological) study of civilisations (ilm al-umran). As a sociologist he states
(like Weber) that sciences are ultimately crafts (sinaat) and, as such, they
vary depending upon the fundamental conditions of the society in which
they thrive. Accordingly, his examination of the emergence and development of sciences draws heavily on social structures, including especially
economy, politics and urbanisation. He discusses the role of social structures in a separate section in his Muqaddimah, whose title reads: he
sciences are numerous only where civilisation is large and sedentary culture highly developed (Chapter 6, Section 8). He makes a similar argument for educational institutions (Chapter 6, Sections 3640) and the
evolution of language (Chapter 6, Sections 4349). Likewise, one of
the most important points he emphasises in his both theoretical and
empirical analyses is that the reliability of a piece of information and/or
knowledge about a phenomenon depends on whether its occurrence is
reasonably possible given the social and material conditions surrounding it. When a particular phenomenon is reported to have happened,
he tests the authenticity of this report by rst looking at the social and
material conditions that shape it; and sometimes rejects its reliability
on the grounds that it does not t to the circumstances conditioned by
social structure (e.g., economic relations) and/or material conditions of
that geographical region. He, therefore, does not see, as some scholars do,
the purely logical possibility as a sucient condition in assessing a piece
of knowledge. In this respect, the modern sociological method (especially
the Marxian one) has a similarity to that of Ibn Khaldun. However, his
emphasis on material conditions does not mean that he has no room for
human agency (see below).
(2) he role of cultural structures: A second, and closely related, element of
Ibn Khalduns methodology in his study of civilisations is taking as a
factor the inuence of culture (in a more anthropological sense) on
individual events. He cites the development of urban/sedentary culture, together with political stability, as a precondition for the development of sciences in any civilisation. Moreover, he requires that a
phenomenon reported to have occurred in a particular social setting be
in conformity (mutabaqah) with the inuence that traditional structures and the dominant normative system may have in that context.
For, according to Ibn Khaldun, . . . if one relies only on how an event is
reported ignoring the impact of traditions, social structures and political principles . . ., one cannot possibly be assured of the authenticity
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20
and/or reliability of this report (1415:16). In many occasions in the

Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldun stresses the signicance of structures and
traditions taking them as elements, and criteria for the validity, of an
explanation. One of the most revealing examples of this method is his
dierentiation of civilisation (umran) into nomadic (badawi) and urban
(khadari) types where he requires that reports about a particular event
must t to either of these societal types and their cultural structures.11
(3) Comparative method: Ibn Khalduns understanding of comparative
method involves not only comparison of social phenomena across time
and space (comparison between the past and present, and between
dierent socio-geographical areas), but also what might be referred to
as counter-factual analysis; for he argues that what is seen and visible
(shahid ) must be compared with what is not (gaib). Like the scholars of
Islamic theology and jurisprudence (qh), Ibn Khaldun employs comparative method as an inferential proof in rational arguments and
religious matters. Unlike many scholars, however, he also applies this
method to social phenomena in his theory of umran, arguing that certain social laws (general principles of social relations) can be derived
on the basis of comparative analysis. his method is, therefore, one of
the best tools to reach a sound understanding of the way social relations
work; for . . . if the visible is not compared with the invisible and the
present with the past, one cannot be sure not to deviate from the path
of true knowledge . . . (1415:16). Ibn Khaldun also states that he relied
on comparative method for analysis in his seven-volume world history,
Kitab al-Ibar (1867), of which the Muqaddimah constitutes Volume 1:
Here I provide a detailed account and causal analysis of, and the evidence for, many
subjects associated with civilisation (umran), including the state, religion, nomadic
and sedentary life styles, [political] domination and subordination, the growth and
decline [of population], sciences and arts, [economic] gain and loss, changing and
stable structures, rural and urban life, and what occurs and what might occur etc.
(1415:1314).
(4) Scepticism: Ibn Khaldun cites evidence only after criticising it from
dierent angels. He starts o by doubting the reliability of every piece
of information (except for the Quranic revelation); then he evaluates it
in light of the criteria based on reason, empirical evidence and revelation. hough his overall method is quite original, this methodical scep11
For an excellent analysis of Ibn Khalduns theories of nomadic and urban cultures, see
Yldrm (1999).
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21
ticism of his was inuenced by earlier Islamic scholars, particularly

Ghazali who argued that mental faculty, just like sense perceptions, is
not a sucient source of knowledge by itself, and Ibn Taymiyya who
argued that rational universals do not have an external existence but
exist only in our minds (Saati, 1981:42).
(5) Avoiding bold generalisations: hough he mostly relies on induction in
the examination of historical and social phenomena (Saati, 1981:196),
Ibn Khaldun usually avoids making across-the-board generalisations
based on his assumption that the human (free) will makes it possible
for them to play an active role in the making of social life. Even when
arguing for the existence of some general principles guiding societies
and social groups, he takes into account the changing nature of social
structures, and qualies his conclusions reached through induction
with such stints as usually, often, probably, with some exceptions, etc. his style of writing is also reected in many chapter and
section titles in the Muqaddimah. hough he reserves room for human
agency in explaining changing structures, we also observe that on some
fundamental and durable institutions such as solidarity (assabiyya),
religion and their eects on social life, he reaches some sharp and generalised conclusions as well.
Ibn Khalduns Classication of Sciences

As an application of the Khaldunian theory of knowledge, his classication of
sciences reects Ibn Khalduns epistemological perspective. He examines all
the existing scientic disciplines of his own time analysing their epistemological foundations. In his Muqaddimah (Chapter 6), he describes each disciplines
main subject-matters and fundamental questions, as well as its development
and leading gures in it, and then critically examines the epistemological
assumptions of some of these disciplines.
He divides sciences into two broad categories of rational (or natural) and
traditional ones. he rst category consists of sciences that are natural for
rational human beings, which they can acquire through (theoretical) reasoning and (empirical) research, whereas the second category includes sciences
that are mostly unique to a particular civilisation and can be acquired only
from the one who establishes them (1415:110). We can elaborate on this
classication as follows:
(1) Traditional sciences: hese are [religious] sciences based on knowledge
bestowed by [God], in which reason plays the role only of connecting
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22
minor or subordinate questions to principal sources via the qiyas (analogical deduction), sciences that are made known to human beings by
prophets (1415:110). Ibn Khaldun states that in Islam the two main
sources of these sciences are the Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet,
and can be classied as follows:
(a) Quranic sciences (tafsir [interpretation] qiraat [recitation] and
nash [abrogation]) (Chapter 6, Section 10); and
(b) Hadith sciences (sanad [chain of transmission], rijal [narrators of
hadith], akhz al-ruwat and jarh wa tadil [evaluation and criticism
of transmitters]), Fiqh [Jurisprudence] and the Science of Inheritance Laws, Usul al-qh [Principles of Jurisprudence], Kalam
[heology], Tasawwuf [Susm] and Interpretation of dreams
(Chapter 6, Sections 1117).
Ibn Khaldun states that these sciences emerged one after another and
have been systematised becoming disciplines in their own right by his
own time. He also discusses the level and quality of scholarship in the
Muslim world from a sociological point of view arguing that in the
Eastern Muslim geography (mashriq) scholarship has reached to a very
high level due to the development of culture and civilisation, including an advanced economy, and a high degree of urbanisation and education supported by various public and private institutions, such as
foundations, enhancing educational opportunities for many people.
He makes the opposite observation for the Western world of Islam
(maghrib), where he himself lived, complaining about its backwardness
in terms of the development of sciences (1415:111). hese arguments
exemplify Ibn Khalduns general method of emphasising the eects of
social structures on, among other things, the development of scientic
knowledge and scholarship, implying the fact, similar to his classication
of sciences described above, that his sociology of civilisations is an
application of his overall epistemology.
(2) Rational/intellectual sciences: hese are the philosophical sciences that
human beings can understand via rational thought; sciences whose
subject-matters, questions, and research methods can be acquainted
with through rational thinking (nazar), research and training
(1415:110). hey are not unique to a particular civilisation, and have
existed throughout history. hey can be divided into four groups:
(i) logic; (ii) the natural science (including medicine and the science
of agriculture); (iii) mathematical sciences (including engineering,
arithmetic, music and astronomy); and (iv) metaphysics (Chapter 6,
Sections 1826).
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23
Ibn Khaldun further classies each of these sciences into several sub-groups
discussing each of them separately. He also says that this classication implies
a hierarchy (logic being the rst and easiest) and must be taught within this
order (1415:135). In addition, he includes within this categorisation some
sciences that he considers illegitimate, such as astrology, alchemy, and magic.
He harshly criticises them for being harmful and dangerous (Chapter 6, Sections 2732).
It is striking that his classication of (classical) sciences does not include
social sciences which he himself would add calling it the ilm al-umran.
he reason for this is that many of what would correspond to modern social
sciences did not exist in the Muslim society of his time nor did they exist
anywhere else. Among the Islamic sciences, the Fiqh (Jurisprudence) includes
some subject-matters that are studied by social sciences and humanities today,
such as economy and law. However, the Islamic Fiqh does not involve the
study of social life per se, instead it tries to explain particular aspects of social
relationships focusing on some of them in order to help regulate peoples lives
not only in this world, but also in the other.12 For much of the Islamic history,
therefore, there did not emerge a science studying the social, most likely due
to fact that the category of the social was not considered a bounded entity
in itself to be studied because, until the 12th century, Muslim societies lived
mostly under stable political systems and with relative prosperity. herefore,
with the help of a very strong belief system, too, problems encountered by
individuals and groups were not thought to be social problems that need special attention and understanding in their own right. For, only after problems
faced in everyday life, politics and economy start being perceived as social
problems does the social emerges as an essential dimension of human life and
becomes a legitimate topic to be systematically studied and understood as it
is. his is what happened in 19th-century Europe: modern social sciences
were born with the emergence of the social as a legitimate and independent
category as social problems associated with industrialisation, urbanisation and
poverty were regarded as signicant to be systematically analysed and solved.
A similar case can be made for Islamic history as well. Starting from the
12th century when the Abbasid Caliphate was in decline, and particularly after
the Mongolian invasions (mid-13th century), Muslim peoples encountered
many social (economic, political and military) problems that could not be
solved by a single government or individual groups. hese led to the emergence of a social context where the need for understanding and explaining
social life and problems associated with it, as well as its positive aspects by
12
For a comparison between Islamic jurisprudence and modern social sciences, see entrk
(1996).
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24
empirically studying them, was born among intellectuals. his is particularly

true for the western parts of the Muslim World (the maghrib, North and
North-West Africa in particular), where Ibn Khaldun lived. It is understandable, therefore, that as an intellectual, political advisor and jurist (he worked
as a judge in Egypt and the maghrib) dealing with day-to-day problems of
people and travelling around the Muslim World, Ibn Khaldun was very much
interested in dierent manifestations of the social, made observations about
them, and developed theories explaining them on the basis of his empirical
studies. His Muqaddimah (Prolegomena), which he wrote as an introduction
to his study on world history, the Kitab al-Ibar, is also an exposition of his
sociology of civilisations. He argues that he has founded a new scientic discipline with a main subject-matter (civilisation) and various major questions
and methods (1415:42). His proposal of the empirical study of social reality
as it is can, therefore, be read as a manifestation of a profound transformation
in socio-economic and political life of Muslim society in the 14th century.
Despite this sea change, however, the main contours of Ibn Khalduns epistemology may be said to have remained within the boundaries of classical Islamic
intellectual tradition, as exemplied by his classication of sciences, which is
very similar to those done earlier by al-Kindi, al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, who
were also prominent gures in the making of Islamic epistemological paradigm itself (see above). hough he harshly criticises some of these philosophers for what he thinks is their overemphasis on rationality (Chapter 6,
Section 30), Ibn Khaldun is loyal to this mainstream tradition in terms of his
classication of Islamic sciences as well.
he Islamic Background of Ibn Khalduns Epistemology

If we place Ibn Khaldun in the wider civilisational context, we see, as discussed above, that his view of knowledge can be understood within the framework of the Islamic epistemological paradigm that maintains a parallelism
between ontology and the theory of knowledge, as a result of which it involves
a hierarchy and harmony among sources of knowledge. Having being raised
and produced his work within a social and scholarly environment which was
based on Islamic world view and dominated by the Islamic intellectual tradition, Ibn Khaldun avoided making categorical distinctions between dierent
sources and forms of knowledge elevating the status of one of them at the
expense of others.
his inclusive attitude has a number of implications. First, he locates each
form and source of knowledge into their proper place (as dened by Islamic
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25
epistemology), rather than assuming the existence of competition and conict

among them. Naturally, on top of this hierarchical structure is located wahy
(Quranic revelation). In his discussions on various topics, ranging from
nomadism and urbanism to solidarity and civilisation, from consumption
habits to moral values, and from philosophy of history to the interaction
between geography and social relations, etc., Ibn Khaldun takes into account
what the wahy (the Quran and Sunna) has to say, often building his rational
explanations on it as well as on historical data and his own observations (e.g.,
1415:18,37,89,143,178,299). Furthermore, he often supports his own empirical arguments and even his criticisms of other scholars by reference to the
sacred texts of Islam (e.g., 1415:47,90,94,171,217).
Secondly, Ibn Khaldun does not conceive of dierent methods of acquiring
knowledge as alternative to each other, either. his helps his methodology
avoid reductionism in terms of the relative signicance of scientic methods.
For this reason, it would be wrong to place Ibn Khaldun into certain categories such as rationalism and empiricism, which is common in Western intellectual history. Likewise, the fact that Ibn Khaldun emphasises the signicance
of material conditions within the framework of his original methodology cannot be interpreted, as some do (e.g., Khalidi, 1985:125), as a Marxist view
that sees knowledge as a reection of material infrastructure. It would then be
wrong to say that Ibn Khaldun argues that sciences, [t]hese generally nonmaterial aspects of culture are . . . extensions of the material (Khalidi, 1985:125).
For, successfully integrating into his analyses the role played by human agency,
Ibn Khaldun avoids crude materialism in his examination of the emergence,
institutionalisation and disappearance of sciences; in this connection, he even
claims to have founded a new scientic discipline, as mentioned above.
hirdly, and in a similar fashion, due to the fact that Ibn Khaldun often
describes human beings as relatively independent social actors rather than passive beings based on his assumption of human free will, though also often
emphasising the eects of material and social environments on human behaviour, it would not be correct to include his sociological methodology within
either of the two broad categories of objectivism and subjectivism. For, unlike
many social scientists including Weber himself that fall in either
category, Ibn Khaldun does not see a fundamental conict between structure and agency, or between physical and social environment and the
individual.13 he wider Islamic theory of knowledge does not involve such
13
As is well known, transcending these dichotomies has been an important endeavour and a
hot topic in modern sociology, particularly in the second half of the 20th century, constituting a
substantial literature in itself; see e.g., Bourdieu (1977), Giddens (1986), Sewell (1992), etc.
6/19/08 5:18:54 PM
26
dichotomies as man versus nature and society versus individual, but rather
conceives them as two dierent manifestations of the divine will. Accordingly, Ibn Khaldun, too, sees them as complementary, rather than alternative
concepts, treating them as inclusive, as opposed to exclusive and conicting,
social categories.
A fourth feature of Ibn Khalduns epistemology in relation to the relationship between reason and revelation, or more broadly, science and religion, is
his interpretive understanding of sacred texts. Perceiving no possibility of
conict between the knowledge acquired through rational thinking and
empirical methods on the one hand, and the non-rational knowledge based
on revelation on the other, he interprets revelation (the Quran and Sunna) in
a way that supports his own argument (cf. 1415:107109). When there is
seemingly a conict between the two forms of knowledge in other scholars
arguments, moreover, he often claims that others misinterpret the revelation,
thereby still denying any possibility of conict as part of his overall discursive
strategy. On the other hand, however, we observe in many instances that Ibn
Khaldun does a literal reading of sacred texts even though, sometimes, they
might include statements that the modern mind would nd dicult to accept.
herefore, given this traditionalist approach, it would not be correct to see
Ibn Khaldun as a rationalist who adopts revelation to reason interpreting it
freely, which is an essential feature of the modern Islamic intellectual movement known as Islamic modernism, which emerged in the 19th century as a
reaction to the challenge of modernity (see Moaddel, 2005).
Finally, the impact of Islamic epistemology on Ibn Khaldun may also be
observed in his terminology and key concepts. In the Islamic intellectual tradition, the world view that is the source of Islamic epistemology is a theo-centric
system. It conceives God (Allah) as the centre of the existential realm, in which
human beings and other creatures are located below Him in the hierarchy of
beings due to the unbridgeable gap and categorical distinction between ontological spheres (see above). he linguistic and semantic manifestations of this
God-centred ontology can be found in the Quran, too.
Allah is the highest focus-word in the Koranic system, which is surpassed by no
other word in rank and importance. he Weltanschauung of the Koran is essentially
theo-centric, and quite naturally in this system the concept of Allah reigns over the
whole from above, and exerts a deep inuence on the semantic structure of all the keywords. (Izutsu, 1987:96)
he concept of Allah has a central semantic position in Ibn Khalduns work as

well. For in Islamic epistemology the Quran (revelation) is at the top of the
hierarchy of sources of knowledge. his hierarchical structure is also true for
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27
Islamic sciences, which inuenced Islamic scholars themselves in the way they
approached knowledge. his is also exemplied by Ibn Khalduns view of the
nature and forms of knowledge and his classication of sciences, as discussed
above. herefore, it is quite natural that he borrows many concepts from the
Quran and hadiths (prophetic traditions), as well as employing the terminology of classical Islamic sciences, including rst and foremost the concept of
Allah and wahy. Although for his sociological analyses he also invents some
original terms (such as umran) and employs dierent concepts (such as sedentary civilisation) that are not so common in Islamic sciences, his key concepts are never in conict with the God-centred epistemology. In addition to
terms invented by him, of course, he also borrows many other concepts from
other Islamic philosophers.
Civilisational Epistemology in Ibn Khaldun and Weber

When one compares Ibn Khaldun and Weber in terms of their epistemological views, one sees some common features among them despite many
dierences. First and foremost, both see science or knowledge having two
functions: it is both a product of civilisation (hence phrases Western science
and Islamic sciences) and a tool to build civilisation (science as a vocation). Furthermore, in their empirical investigations, both intellectuals
emphasise the indispensability of empirical evidence and causal explanation
for understanding social phenomena. hey also agree (contra Marx) that there
are mutual interactions and interdependence, rather than a relationship of
determination, between dierent spheres of social life, namely, political, economic and cultural institutions. Again, both thinkers employ a number of
ideal-typical conceptual tools through which they analyse dierent sets of
social relations applying the comparative method. In addition, both theorists
manage to stay away from crude materialism paying attention to the role
played by cultural values and human agency. However, it is also a fact that
compared to Weber the idealist, Ibn Khaldun stresses structure and material
conditions more than agency.
Another common feature of the two intellectuals is their pessimism: while
Ibn Khaldun states that every state (or political system) will one day collapse
due to the cyclical logic of history, Weber rightly predicted, after he
lived through World War I as part of the bureaucracy of the German army,
that bureaucratic rationalisation would ultimately create an iron cage that
would limit individuals freedom and lead to loss of meaning in life. On the
other hand, there are both similarities and dierences in terms of the terminology they employ: Weber strongly emphasises the rationalisation process as
6/19/08 5:18:54 PM
28
his central concept also referring to such concepts as progress, disenchantment of the world and civilisation, whereas Ibn Khaldun re-denes and
widely employs some concepts such as assabiyya (solidarity), nomadism and
urbanism as well as inventing a new concept, umran. his dierentiation is a
consequence of the dierent time periods and social contexts in which they
lived in and produced their works, i.e., 14th-century maghrib as part of the
wider context of Islamic civilisation versus 19th-century Germany of modern
Western civilisation. Moreover, they both employ a number of dichotomous
conceptual pairs, such as nomadism/urbanism and rational/irrational, etc.14
However, Ibn Khalduns use of these dichotomies does not stem from the idea
of progress, as in the case of Weber. For, the perception of history and change
that frames Ibn Khalduns thinking is not linear but cyclical. Unlike Weber,
who conceives history as the progressive unfolding of rational Geist, Ibn Khaldun sees it as recurrent patterns of interaction between structural forces
(including physical environment) and human social action. Moreover, the
absence of a linear conception of progress does not mean, unlike some Orientalists believe (e.g., Watt, 1970), that the Muslim mindset does not involve
the notion of change. In fact, Ibn Khaldun, himself, not only discusses changing nature of societies, but even claims to have discovered the laws (principles) of social and political change in history. herefore, it is due to this
dierence between Ibn Khaldun and Weber regarding their philosophy of history that the latter argues that the past and the present are diametrically
opposed to each other (Weber, 1958a:140) whereas the former states that the
past resembles the future more than one [drop of ] water another (Ibn Khaldun, 1415:17).
With respect to their epistemological views, we observe that though both
Weber and Ibn Khaldun regard science as a vocation, their fundamental
assumptions about what knowledge and science are dier substantially. Weber
has an exclusive (and exclusionary) understanding of science in terms both of
dierent forms of knowledge and of an inter-civilisational comparison, whereas
Ibn Khalduns epistemology is more inclusive. In other words, Webers narrow
epistemology presents certain maps of knowledge within the connes of
modern(-ist) view of knowledge, denying the status of (valid) knowledge for
anything outside of this rationalist framework. Ibn Khalduns broader
epistemological approach, in contrast, does not imply a reductionist and
exclusionary paradigm, mainly by including non-rational (i.e., metaphysical)
forms of knowledge, as well as reserving room for civilisational interaction.
For a brief comparison between the Khaldunian thought and various epistemological
approaches in Western philosophy, see Badawi (n.d.).
14
6/19/08 5:18:54 PM
29
he inclusion of metaphysical knowledge, which he does explicitly, is one of

the strongest connecting points between Ibn Khaldun and the broader Islamic
epistemology. A second strong connection between the two has to do with the
fact that both locate dierent sources of knowledge in a harmonious, albeit
hierarchical, and internally-coherent system. In contrast, Weber explicitly
denies metaphysical knowledge the status of true knowledge, but implicitly
includes them in his epistemology. As mentioned above, some of his most
central terms (namely, rationalisation and progress) are of metaphysical nature,
albeit in a secular form, which is also the case in the Enlightenment philosophy that framed Webers epistemology.
We can argue that the roots of dierence between the two go back, at least
partly, to what they see as the ultimate purpose of doing science. Weber argues
that scientic activities are instrumental in nature, and are mostly aimed at
practical use to control life via technique; or at best one does science for its
own sake (1958a:144). For Ibn Khaldun, the ultimate purpose of knowledge
acquisition is the well-being and happiness of human beings both at the micro
(individual) and macro (humanity) level, and both in this world and in the
other (1415:16). In other words, while Ibn Khaldun sees knowledge as Gods
grace for human beings to maintain a civilised life (umran) in this world and
an accomplished and cultivated one (mamour) in the hereafter, Weber assumes
that science is a eld that is independent of Gods inuence, perceiving it
within a secular framework as a valuable tool for this-worldly purposes, particularly that of the domination of nature. herefore, their dierences in terms
of the methods of acquiring knowledge, forms of knowledge and how to use
the knowledge produced by science, etc. are rooted in this fundamental
dierence in terms of how Weber and Ibn Khaldun conceive the ultimate
purpose of scientic knowledge.
From a broader angle, then, despite some similarities between the two,
Weber and Ibn Khaldun mostly dier in terms of their epistemologies, mainly
due to perceiving knowledge with diering mindsets that are shaped by the
respective (mainstream) world views of Western and Islamic civilisations.
hese world views are, as discussed above, shaped not only by intellectual/
ideological frameworks and self-perceptions of each civilisation penetrating
into the mindsets of intellectuals, but also by diering patterns of historical
(political, economic and cultural) processes, which together constitute the
civilisational context in which the two thinkers operate. It is fair, then, to argue
that as the two leading intellectual gures in the West and Islam with a high
representative capacity, Weber and Ibn Khalduns views of knowledge and science exemplify the Western and Islamic epistemological paradigms. Needless
to say, this comparison between the two intellectuals is not exhaustive, nor is
6/19/08 5:18:54 PM
30
it enough for a complete comparative analysis of the two wider paradigms. For
a full comparison of Weber and Ibn Khaldun, one needs to analyse the interaction between the historical and intellectual contexts in both cases, which is
beyond the connes of this article. Moreover, for a better comparison between
Islamic and Western epistemologies, one needs to examine the views of key
intellectual gures, including, among others, al-Kindi, Ibn Sina, al-Farabi,
Ghazali, al-Taftazani, al-Tusi and Ibn Rushd, on the one hand, and Descartes,
Hume, Locke, Kant, Hegel, Comte and Marx, on the other. hen, these comparisons need to be expanded to include other civilisations as well. Complemented with the comparative examinations of other (political, economic etc.)
dimensions of the Western, Islamic and other civilisations, these analyses may
contribute to the mutual understanding among them, and hopefully, keep
open the channels of communication and interaction instead of conict, clash
and domination.
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Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

Beyond Science as a Vocation:

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

terminologies they employ, the ultimate purpose of their intellectual projects,

Islamic and Western Epistemological Paradigms

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

On the other hand, Webers view of knowledge, too, can be understood

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

Webers Epistemological Approach

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

he Nature of Scientic Knowledge

he Western Background of Webers Epistemology

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

He also stresses other unique characteristics of Western science which make

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

technology and calculation. Furthermore, science is not only a dimension of

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

In explaining the superiority of knowledge produced with specialisation,

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

Ibn Khalduns Epistemological Approach

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

historical development of Islamic civilisations knowledge-based institutions,

he Nature and Forms of Knowledge

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

and therefore cannot be acquired through mental eort by ordinary

Ibn Khalduns Methodology

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

(1) he role of social conditions: Ibn Khalduns Muqaddimah is, in a sense, an

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

and/or reliability of this report (1415:16). In many occasions in the

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

ticism of his was inuenced by earlier Islamic scholars, particularly

Ibn Khalduns Classication of Sciences

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

empirically studying them, was born among intellectuals. his is particularly

he Islamic Background of Ibn Khalduns Epistemology

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

epistemology), rather than assuming the existence of competition and conict

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

he concept of Allah has a central semantic position in Ibn Khalduns work as

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

Civilisational Epistemology in Ibn Khaldun and Weber

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

he inclusion of metaphysical knowledge, which he does explicitly, is one of

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

N. Ard / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 131

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Civilisational Epistemology in Weber & Ibn Khaldun

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