The Greco-Turkish War 1920-1922

The Greco-Turkish War, 1920-1922
Author(s): Peter Kincaid Jensen

Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Nov., 1979), pp. 553-565
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/162217
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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 10 (I979), 553-565
Printed in Great Britain
553
Peter Kincaid Jensen

THE GRECO-TURKISH
WAR, 1920-1922
The Greco-Turkish War was one of the major aftershocks in the wake of
World War I. In attacking war-ravaged Turkey, Greece sought to realize her
goal of a new Hellenic presence in Asia Minor. This action, together with
British, French, and Italian designs upon Anatolian territory, threatened
Turkey's existence as a nation.
After the Mudros Armistice of I918, the Great Powers moved swiftly into
Anatolia to ensure acquisition of territory promised in the secret treaties made
during World War I. The British established small garrisons, particularly
on the railways, to supervise demobilization and to prevent outbreaks of violence.
While Constantinople was not officially occupied, a fleet that was largely Royal
Navy lay in the Golden Horn, and British land troops represented the largest
component of the Allied 'presence' there. In Kurdistan, British 'advisors' were
present as the nationalistic tendencies of that people began to rise.'
The French, meanwhile, had marched north from Syria into Adana and its
Cilician hinterland. The Italians had landed in Antalya and had occupied the
outlying areas. One major alteration had to be made in the Allied occupation
plan. In addition to Antalya, the Italians had initially been promised the sector
about Smyrna. But in 1915, as an inducement to enter the war, Britain's Sir
Edward Grey had offered the Greeks 'large concessions on the coast of Asia
Minor.' When Venizelo* returned to power as Greek premier in 1917, he was
naturally amenable to the idea of a 'Big Greece' and promptly entered his nation
into the war.2
To David Lloyd George, who consideredVenizelos 'the greateststatesmanthe Greeks
had thrown up since the days of Pericles,' . . . (this) seemed both fair and expedient.
The Greeks could serve Britain'sinterests by replacingthe Turks as the protectorsof
her imperialcommunicationswith India. Thus, despite Lord Curzonand the Foreign
Office, who preferredto compensatethe Greeks in Thrace; despite doubts from the
generals as to the military feasibility of Greek penetrationinland; despite opposition
on the very grounds of self-determinationwhich Venizelos had invoked, despite
President Wilson - despite all of these powerful factors, Lloyd George resolved to
give his wholeheartedsupport to the claims of the Greeks in Asia Minor.3
The issue lay before the Supreme Council through the early months of I9I9.
1Dagobert Von Mikusch, Mustafa Kemal, trans. J. Linton (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday,
2
Doran & Co., I931), pp. 210-215.
Herbert Adams Gibbons, Venizelos(Boston and N.Y.: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1923), p- 304.
3 Lord
Kinross, Ataturk (New York: W. Murrow & Co., 1965), pp. I64-I65.
oo20-7438/79/o300-o408$01.50 ? 1979 CambridgeUniversityPress
554
When the Italians walked out over the Fiume issue, Lloyd George saw his
opportunity. He concocted a report that an armed uprising of Turkish guerrillas
in the Smyrna area was seriously endangering the Greek and other Christian
minorities. It had the desired effect upon the pious Wilson. Clemenceau, who
had no desire to see vast Italian holdings in Asia Minor, readily agreed that a
Greek military presence would be in order. In early May I919, the three gave
their consent to a Greek occupation of Smyrna.4 The Italians acquiesced on the
issue, and on 15 May 1919 the Greeks landed in the city. Their entrance was
chaotic. There was a shooting incident; the troops opened fire and killed
hundreds.5
The prisonersare led in a long processionto the quay. The Christiancrowd rages and
yells. Many . . . fall under the bayonet thrusts. The officersare spat on and everything
that is Turkish is insulted. The men are forced to tear the fezes from their heads and
trample them under foot - the worst outrage to a Mohammedan- all who refuse
are cut down with the sword. The veils are torn from the womens' faces. The mob
begins to plunder the houses of the Mohammedan.6
The occupation gave impetus to the formation of various groups of organized
Turkish resistance. While there were many such groups, they were, at this time,
not coordinated into a unified front; they were more of a nuisance than a threat
to the Allies and the Greeks. By May I920, however, this situation changed
dramatically. Under Mustafa Kemal, the irregular forces, together with the
crack Turkish Ninth Army (undefeated in the Caucusus), plus the remnants
of other armies shattered in the war had driven the French back to Aleppo.7
A reactionary anti-Kemalist group, the so-called Security Army of the Sultan,
had been thoroughly routed. The nascent Armenian state was only weakly
supported by the Great Powers, and would soon be crushed in the RussoTurkish vice. The Kurds had been driven back to the hills. Major Novak, the
British officer responsible for the coordination of Kurdish semi-autonomy, was
escorted by the Turks to the frontier.8
With these victories to the Kemalists' credit, the popularity of the Nationalist
movement had grown tremendously among the Turkish population. This
was accentuated by the British full military occupation of Constantinople in
March, 1920, in which many prominent Turkish officials were jailed. Despite
stringent British measures, an exodus of Nationalists made their way to Ankara.9
By the summer of 1920, the Turks had forced the French to an armistice (it
must be remembered that most French troops were now occupying the Rhineland), the Kurdish problem had been ameliorated, and the unprotected Armeni4 Von
Mikusch, Mustafa Kemal, pp.
I92-I93.
5Hanns Froembgen,Kemal Ataturk,trans. J. Kirkness(Freeport,N.Y.: Books for
Libraries Press,
1935),
pp. 104-Io8.
Von Mikusch, Mustafa Kemal, pp. 192-193.

7 Sidney Nettleton Fisher, The Middle East (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p.
384.
8 Von Mikusch,
Mustafa Kemal, p. 255.
9 Halide Edib, Turkey Faces West (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), p. I78.
6
The Greco-Turkish War, I920-I922
555
ans were fair game. In their antagonism to the Greeks, the Italians were sympathetic to the Nationalists from the start. They went as far as to sell arms to the
Turks and to assist Kemalist gun-runners in avoiding the Allied control points.10
Domestically, the only forces opposed to Kemal and his new Grand National
Assembly were those of the virtually captive government of the Sultan, a
government whose survival grew more imperiled as the Nationalists grew in
strength.
This was the moment for which the cunning and captivating Venizelos had been
waiting. He had remainedat his listening post in Paris, strengtheningmeanwhile the
Greek forces in Smyrna and keeping them in marching order. Hitherto they had
been strictly forbidden to cross the boundariesthat had been allotted to Greece by
the Peace Treaty. But now the GreekArmy was the only one that could help the Allies
out of their dilemma. Venizelos declaredhis readinessto be used as the dagger of the
Allies, and demandedonly as small recompensefor his services importantadditional
slices of Anatolian territory.... The English fleet was to act in cooperation with
the Greeks.The French . . . urged that action be taken as speedily as possible in order
that their troops might be relieved from the pressurefrom the Turks in Cilicia."1
The Supreme Council authorized a Greek offensive from Smyrna and the
occupation of Eastern Thrace.
To facilitate the occupation, the Greeks planned to approach the Turks
from two fronts. On 21 July, after two British dreadnoughts bombarded the weak
Turkish resistance, the Greeks entered the Sea of Marmara port of Tekirdag
with a division and an infantry regiment. Smaller forces entered another
Marmara port, Eregli. Meeting only slight resistance, the Tekirdag forces
converged with the troops from Eregli, and immediately marched north to the
Constantinople railway where the bulk of the Turks had dug in. Meanwhile,
another Greek column prepared to cross the Maritza River on the GrecoTurkish frontier to attack Adrianople and the Turkish forces there.12
At this time, the Turks, under Colonel Jafar Tayar had irregular forces
scattered north of the railway. The main Turkish concentration, however, was
along the railway in a line extending from Adrianople to Lulebergaz.
The Greek plan was to split the Tekirdag column in two. One part would
attack Lulebergaz on the Turkish left, while another would sweep west to join
the Maritza forces. The third component (from Eregli) would make a swift
sweep to the north and block the Turkish retreat. The reinforced Maritza forces
would meanwhile press Adrianople and other points along the railway.13
The scheme worked well. On 23 July the Greeks crossed the Maritza under
heavy fire. The Tekirdag forces marched to the north and west, making as much
as thirty miles a day. On 25 July both Lulebergaz and Adrianople fell, Colonel
Tayar was captured and the Turks were in full retreat. In a move of consolidation,
10Lord Kinross, Ataturk, p. 236.
11Von Mikusch, Mustafa Kemal, p. 255.
12 The New York Times, July 22, I920,
13
p. I7.
Ibid., 24 July, 1920, p. 4.
556
another Greek force entered the Black Sea port of Midye and marched inward to
occupy Vize.14
As planned, the Greek forces pressed north after the fall of Adrianople,
but failed to keep pace with the rapid Turkish retreat. On 31 July, the Turks
crossed the Bulgarian frontier, where they were subsequently disarmed and
interned.15
On 22 July 1920 the Greeks commenced their campaign in Asia Minor. Six
divisions strong, they fanned out in three directions over the Milne Line demarcating their Smyrna claim and Turkey proper. A column of one division marched
from Aydin, while another, consisting of two divisions, advanced rapidly east to
Salihli. The northern column of three divisions pressed toward Balikesir,
and took that city within a week.16
The Turkish resistance in the west still consisted of loosely tied irregular
bands; the regular forces were still active in central Anatolia.
The army that confrontedthe Greeks must have looked very strange . . . the soldiers
were often bare-footedand in rags, armedwith the most variedassortmentof flintlocks
and rifles.... On the other hand, the GreekArmy was not only superiorin numbers,
but was completely equipped with up-to-date equipment supplied by France and
England, and its leaders had experiencedEnglish officersto guide them. Against the
systematiconslaughtof these troops, the raggedand motley Nationalistforces had very
little chance.17
Through the end of June and the month of July, the Greeks advanced without
any serious Turkish opposition. The Aydin column advanced east through
Nazilli; the main southern force reached Alasehir on 24 June. The northern
forces proceeded without difficulty and captured the holy city of Bursa in the
first week of July. With British assistance, a Greek division entered Mudanya
and Panderma for the purpose of cleaning up small Turkish forces in the area.18
'They are beaten,' Lloyd George boasted in full conference. . . , 'and are fleeing
with their forces towards Mecca.'
'Angora,'correctedCurzon acidly.
'Lord Curzon is good enough to admonish me on a triviality,' the Prime Minister
replied. 'Nevertheless. .'.19
The intention of the Greeks was to swing the northern force to the southeast
and advance upon the strategically important railway junction at Eskisehir.
The southern force was to press upon Afyon, another crucial railway point.
The capture of these two towns would cut the Turks' lateral communications,
open most of central Anatolia, and pave the way for a general Greek offensive on
Ankara.20
To prepare for their fall offensive on the railway, the Greeks halted their
drive in August. At this time, they held, with the exception of Constantinople
14
Ibid., 2 August,
1920, p. 3.
A Speech by Gazi Mustafa Kemal (Leipzig: K. F. Koehler,

17 Von Mikusch, MustafaKemal,p.
254.
18A Speech by Gazi Mustafa Kemal, p. 396.
16
15
Ibid.
p. 396.
1929),
20
Ibid., p. 294.
557
and the Straits, all territory in Turkey west of a line extending from the sea of
Marmara to nine miles east of Bursa, to the Menderes Valley, to a few miles east
of Nazilli.21
As the fighting with the Greeks came to a halt, the Nationalists had their
hands full with another problem. A major pro-Constantinople revolt had broken
out in Anatolia and was crushed only with great effort. Meanwhile, negotiations
with the Russians were under way.22
The new Soviet government, which at that time was busy denouncing imperialism
and the imperialisticsecret agreementsof the Czaristregime, was likewise threatened
by the WesternPowers. Thus it was a naturalally of the nationalisticTurkish government. Hence Kemal's first step in diplomacywas directedtowardsreachingan understanding with Soviet Russia. This was designed to relieve to some extent the eastern
frontier and to also obtain some materialaid from Russia.23
By September's end, powerful Turkish and Soviet forces were marching into
Armenia, and, within a few months, all Armenia was under Nationalist and
Bolshevik boots.24
The expected Greek offensive came in late October. The Turks were driven
back, yielding Yenesehir and Inegol in the northern sector. But while Lloyd
George was exuberant, the Italians and French, who did not relish the idea of
a Greek-controlled western Anatolia, were alarmed. They were able, despite the
wishes of Lloyd George and Venizelos, to use their combined weight on the
Supreme Council to restrain the Greeks. The Greek Army was promptly wired
to halt its advance. It gave the Turks a much needed breathing spell which they
used to reorganize and strengthen their troops.25
The political situation in late 1920 was in flux. In August, the helpless
Sultan had signed the ruinous Treaty of Sevres. Two months later saw the fall
of Venizelos from power, as Constantine took the throne. The war-weary
French and Italians took the opportunity to informally liquidate their military
commitments to the Greeks, leaving the British as the sole investor in this
venture of questionable profit. The Greeks were now removed from the restraining hand of the Supreme Council, and they accordingly began planning a new
offensive.26
As the Greeks contemplated their next move, the scene was changing on the
Turkish side. Ali Fuad, the commander of the Turkish forces in the west, was
replaced by a close confidante of Kemal's, Ismet Pasa. The Nationalist army
had undergone intensive reorganization. The various irregular bands were
incorporated into the regular troops, some quietly, other by force. By the new
year, the Nationalist army, though numerically inferior to the Greeks, was an
organized and viable fighting force.27
21
GeoffreyLewis, Turkey(New York: F. PraegerInc., I965), p. 65.
22AltemurKilic, Turkeyandthe World
(WashingtonD.C.: PublicAffairsPress, 1959),
p. 38.
23 Ibid.
25 Lord
Kinross, Ataturk, p. 274.
26
Ibid., p. 291.
24
27
Ibid., p. 46.
Ibid., pp. 283-289.
558
On 6 January 1921, the Greeks, still maintaining the objectives previously

described, launched their offensive. Concentrating their attack in the northern
sector, they met the Turks in a valley near the village of Inonu. After an all-day
battle, Ismet counterattacked and forced the Greeks to retire. Albeit small,
this was the first Nationalist victory, and the Turks played up its importance for
both local morale and Soviet opinion. The commander of the Greeks in Asia
Minor, General Papoulas, was impressed by the Turks' performance and asked
Athens for a few thousand reinforcements for the next offensive.28
In the temporary quiet after Inonii, a conference was called in London,
consisting of Lloyd George and delegations from Athens, Ankara, and Constantinople. The basis for discussion was Lloyd George's proposal that the
Treaty of Sevres be modified. The conference failed to accomplish anything,
but gave the Nationalists time to gather strength and to negotiate a behind-thescenes agreement with the French. In return for well-defined economic concessions to France, the French would evacuate all their troops in Cilicia. This
action would free thousands of battle-hardened Nationalist troops there for the
struggle against the Greeks. This agreement and a similar one with the Italians
were rejected by Kemal who wanted no economic concessions by Turkey.
But it was clear that the French and Italians, sick of war and wrestling with
reparations and postwar domestic problems, were weary of maintaining troublesome peripheries in Asia Minor. The Nationalists had all to gain in holding out
for more.29
The Greek offensive came soon enough. On 23 March 1921 the Greeks
advanced in both the Bursa and Usak sectors. Their southern columns did well,
capturing the railway junction at Afyon. But their northern forces were stopped
again at Innii by fierce Turkish resistance. Ismet routed them to Bursa after a
counterattack.30
Following the retreat of the northern group, Turkish units were rushed
south to cut the railway between Afyon and Usak. This would have effectively
cut communications and supplies from the overextended Greek southern group,
and thus endanger its very survival. Fortunately for the Greeks, the Turks
were hampered by difficulties in troop transport. A Greek regiment managed to
hold the arriving Turks at Dumlupinar in twenty-four hours of desperate fighting until relieved by the rapidly retreating bulk of the southern forces. Having
narrowly avoided this dangerous trap, the Greeks retired to their old positions
about Usak.31
This halt of the Greek offensive, later called the Second Battle of Inonii,
marked the first actual Greek reversal in Asia Minor. The General Staff in
Athens dourly realized that they now faced a regular, well-organized Turkish
army. Papoulas saw that substantially more reinforcements were needed than he
A Speech by Gazi Mustafa Kemal, p. 404.
Mikusch, Mustafa Kemal, pp. 267-271.
30
Toynbee and Kirkwood, Turkey (London: Everett Press, 1926), p. 99.
31 Michael Smith, Ionian Vision (London: Allen Lane, 1973), pp. I98-201.
28
29 Von
559
had originally anticipated. The Greek government authorized the formation

of three divisions of conscripts to be used in the next assault.32
Following the Greek setback at In6nii, the disgruntled Allies formally
proclaimed their neutrality in May 1921. This left the Greeks only the personal
and political support of Lloyd George. Undaunted by this show of Allied passivity, the Greeks planned yet another Asia Minor offensive. This time, however,
they decided upon a change of strategy. Instead of a costly frontal attack by the
northern group, they elected to put their emphasis on the southern column.
These forces would, in a turning manoeuver, capture Afyon and march north
up the railway. Meanwhile the northern forces would split; one part would hold
the Turks in the north while another would march south and converge with
the southern forces. This powerful combined force would storm Eskisehir
and attempt to cut off the Turkish retreat.33
It was a brilliant plan. As the offensive commenced on Io July, one Greek
column detained the Turks in the Bursa sector; another advanced to the south.
The southern forces, as planned, overran Afyon, then moved rapidly north.
On 17 july, Kutahya fell, the southern forces and the column from the north
linked, and the attack on Eskisehir began.
Ismet saw that the situation was rapidly deteriorating. Two Greek divisions
were already swinging around to the east of Eskisehir. To prevent encirclement,
the Turks gave up the town and executed a rapid retreat eastward. Although
the Greeks had failed to surround the Turkish forces, they quickly consolidated
their positions about Eskisehir. On July 21, the Turks mounted a full-scale
counterattack which, at the cost of many lives, failed miserably.34
Kemal and Ismet elected to withdraw to the area of Ankara as quickly as
possible. The Turks would dig in on the banks of the Sakarya and await the
next attack.35In retrospect, the decision to withdraw to the Sakarya must have
been an exceedingly difficult one.
This retreat. .. gave up Turkish soil (over ioo miles) and Turkish men, women and
children to the national enemy who would burn, rape and destroy. But that did not
complicatehis (Kemal's) decision. He saw the problem as a military one; if they had
stood and fought at Eskisehirthe Turkish main army would have been wiped out.36
The withdrawal would give the Turks precious time to reorganize for the
coming onslaught. The Greeks, in their pursuit, would dangerously extend their
already long lines of communication. In short, the decision to fall back was a
purely military one. With their backs against the wall, the Turks saw that all
other considerations were now irrelevant.
As the Greeks prepared their pursuit, the Turks, hard-pressed, were under32H.R.H. Prince Andrew of Greece, TowardsDisaster (London: John Murray,
1930), p. 18.
Smith, Ionian Vision, p. 255.

Prince Andrew, Towards Disaster, pp. 34-35.
35H. C. Armstrong, Grey Wolf (New York: Milton, Balch & Co., I933), p. 145.
33
34
36 Ibid., p. I46.
560
going intense preparations of their own behind the Sakarya. If the Greek Army
could not be halted here, Ankara was doomed to fall. The loss of the capital
city would be a severe blow to Turkish morale as well as a serious strategic loss.
Every available man was mobilized. Kemal, in order to get the most possible
material for his men, established National Commissions for Requisitions. From
the population was confiscated stocks of food, clothing, shoes, horses, and any
other imaginable material which would be of use in the upcoming struggle.37
The Greeks arrived in full force on 23 August. Their forces numbered over
80,000 men, facing only about 25,000 Turks.38 Papoulas decided on a turning
manoeuver at the Turkish left with the objective of forcing the Turks back
and opening the road to Ankara. With this in mind, the Greek right engaged a
Turkish division and seized a hilltop after an all-night battle. At this point
however, Papoulas changed his strategy. Incorrect aerial reconnaissance informed
him of strong forces on the Turkish left. Papoulas elected to open the Ankara
road at the center where in fact the Turks were most heavily concentrated.39
The ensuing battle, of some of the most murderous fighting in history,
lasted twenty-two days and nights.40 Entire units perished as rugged hills were
lost, captured and lost again.
The Greeks exploited their heavy numerical advantage as much as they
could. Despite heavy Turkish resistance (and heavy artillery fire from guns
the Allies had failed to confiscate) the Greeks gained slowly and steadily,
gaining ten miles in as many days. The Nationalists' situation was now acute.
As the Greeks smashed their center and left, the line of battle swung from a
north-south to an east-west axis.41A few miles more loss meant the loss of the
road, the battle, and with it, Ankara. The remaining Turkish stronghold was a
high ridge on their left named Cal Dag. Holding this and other protective
mountains would, for the time being, safeguard the capital.42
The Greeks realized this as well and, on 2 September, stormed the ridge of
Cal Dag. After intense fighting, the Turks were driven off the commanding
heights.
In the small room at Alaghersh staff officers were discussing final possibilities. The
situationwas desperatein the extreme. A retreatmeant certaindefeat while continued
resistancemeant probabledefeat. Was there any alternative?Time was getting on to
two o'clock. Nerves were threatening to give out. Suddenly the phone bell rang.
The officers roused themselves and strained themselves to catch the message....
Distinctly now they heard his (Kemal's) cold metallic voice: '.. . The Chal Heights
regained?The enemy is at the end of their strength?'. .Mustafa Kemal sprang to
his feet.
'Gentlemen, this is the great turning-point.'43
37Froembgen, Kemal Ataturk, p. I73.
38
Edib, Turkey Faces West, p. I97.
39 Lord Kinross, Ataturk, pp. 3I6, 317.
40 A
Speech by Gazi Mustafa Kemal, p. 522.
41 Von
Mikusch, Mustafa Kemal, p. 292.
42 Lord
Kinross, Ataturk, p. 3I9.
43 Von Mikusch, Mustafa Kemal, p.
294.
The Greco-Turkish War,
I920-I922
56I
Both sides had been bled white in the intense fighting, and a group commander warned Kemal that only one counterattack would be possible. Kemal,
now personally leading the Turks, elected to press the Greek southern flank.
Hard fighting continued for seven more days. The Greeks, under steady hammering of the Turkish counterattack, and threatened with cutoff by the Turkish
cavalry, were at last ordered by Papoulas to execute a general retreat to their old
positions about the railway. The Greek Army had lost 20,000 men in the
ferocious struggle. The Turks, too exhausted to mount a full-scale pursuit,
paused to catch their breath.44
As the military components rested, the Turks were winning significant
victories on diplomatic battlefields. On 20 October 192I Kemal and France's
Franklin-Bouillon agreed to the complete withdrawal of French forces from
Cilicia, save Alexandretta.45 This was undertaken immediately; as the French
left, they turned over huge stocks of arms. They were eventually to be used in
the struggle against the Greeks.46
Shortly after the Franco-Turkish agreement, the Italians began pulling
out of Antalya, asking for no economic benefits in return. Both the French
and Italians, much to the ire of the British, informally pledged to support the
Nationalists in the upcoming Peace Conference.47
As the Kemalists were making new friends, the Greeks were not faring well.
Their treasury in Athens was drying up; millions of drachmas were being
absorbed by the Anatolian sponge. Prime Minister Gounaris ventured to London
and discovered with dismay that neither arms nor money would be forthcoming.
Aside from the zealous Prime Minister, the British were not enthusiastic about
resharpening the blunted Greek dagger.48
After the defeat at the Sakarya, General Papoulas, despairing of victory,
resigned his post. His replacement was a political appointee, General Georgios
Hatzianestis. A martinet and prone to delusions (he often thought his legs were
made of glass and was afraid to stand for fear of breaking them), Hatzianestis
preferred to conduct the war from the relative comfort of Smyrna rather than
take direct command at the front.49
Faced with growing Turkish military might and the lack of Allied assistance,
the Greeks decided to take a desperate gamble. They correctly reasoned that a
Greek occupation of Constaninople would make an excellent trump card.
The Allied contingents in the city were small and weak. To intimidate them into
permitting the Greeks to enter, four regiments were withdrawn from Anatolia
and linked up with the troops in Eastern Thrace for a show of force. The
British and French swiftly issued a statement, backed by Lloyd George, that the
44
Ibid.
by Gazi Mustafa Kemal, p. 527.
Ibid., p. 341.
Valentine Chirol and Lord Eversley, The Turkish Empire (New York: Fertig, I969),
45A Speech
46 Lord
47
48
p. 417.
49 Smith,
Ionian Vision, p. 273.
562 Peter Kincaid Jensen

two powers would combine to resist any encroachment by the Greeks on
Constantinople.50
The Greek gamble had failed badly; in their troop transfers they had nearly
equalized their manpower with that of the Turks. As soon as Kemal got wind of
the troop movement, he moved up the date of the long-awaited Turkish offensive. First, however, he sent his Minister of the Interior, Fethi Bey, to the capitals
of the Allies in a last-ditch attempt to dislodge the Greeks from Anatolia by
diplomatic means.
In Rome and Paris the ambassadorwas given at least an honorable reception ... in
London, however, Fethi Bey tried in vain to get within sight of Lord Curzon or
Lloyd George. The only person who condescended to listen to him was one of the
secretariesof,the Foreign Office. As Fethi Bey no longer had any doubt that he stood
before a closed door, he telegraphed . . . the single word ....'attack!'51
As the hot sun beat down on the Anatolian plateau, the Greek commanders
nervously awaited the imminent Turkish offensive. The Greek lines lay as
before along the railway concentrated about Afyon and Eskisehir. Their intelligence sources correctly informed them of the main Turkish strength in the
north; therefore, they expected the bulk of the fighting to be in the Eskisehir
sector.52
The Turks, meanwhile, under absolute secrecy, were switching their strength
from north to south to gain the element of surprise. To prevent detection by
aerial reconnaissance, Turkish troops were marched south by night. During the
day, they were required to rest inside houses or under trees.53
The Nationalist design was to drive the Greeks from Afyon and to follow
that with a cavalry sweep to hamper any retreat. To confuse the Greeks there
would be a temporary feint by the Turkish forces remaining in the north.
On 26 August 1922, the Turks, with a terrific artillery barrage, commenced
their attack at dawn. As they smashed through the defenses about Afyon, the
Greek field commander, General Tricoupis, belatedly realized that the Turks'
main thrust was in the south.54
The situation grew rapidly worse for the Greeks. The Turks were advancing
relentlessly with a local superiority of three to one.55 Adequate reinforcements
from the northern forces would have taken days to arrive, much too long.
Tricoupis hoped that his troops could retreat to Usak and there assume a solid
defensive posture.56 The Turks, however, had dealt a blow that made this
impossible. In the confusion of the retreat from Afyon, the Greek forces split
and subsequently lost contact with each other. The main group under Tricoupis
withdrew into the rugged hills northeast of the town. A sizable splinter force
composed of General Frangou's Ist and 7th Divisions hugged the railway
50 Gibbons,
Venizelos, pp. 395, 396.

51Von Mikusch, Mustafa Kemal, pp. 313, 314.
52 Lord Kinross, Ataturk, p.
353.
53 A Speech by Gazi Mustafa Kemal, p. 566.
54Froembgen, Kemal Ataturk, p. I88.
55 Smith, Ionian Vision, pp. 294-296.
56
Ibid.
The Greco-Turkish War, 1920-1922
563
retreating west. This group of 20,000 attempted a stand at Dumlupinar, but a

strong Turkish attack made them withdraw. Effective reunion with Tricoupis
was now virtually impossible. Frangou elected to abandon Asia Minor and ordered
a withdrawal to Smyrna.57
Tricoupis's troops were in the meantime struggling toward Dumlupinar
in an attempt to make contact with the 'lost divisions.' Although one division
got to within five miles of Frangou's group, it could not bridge the gap in the
face of heavy Turkish fire. Tricoupis then moved westward, the Turks hotly in
pursuit. On the evening of 3I August the Greek troops retreated in haphazard
fashion down the valley toward Usak. A large force, including 4th Division
commander General Dimaras, stumbled around in the darkness without finding
the valley's entrance. They surrendered to the Turks the next morning. The 5th
Division and the bulk of the 9th Division pushed ahead. Shambling and hungry,
they merged with the retreating troops of Frangou. This rabble, no longer a
fighting force, evacuated Usak on the morning of September 2.58
About noon on 2 September what remained of the Tricoupis group (5,ooo00
men)
approached Usak. They saw with horror that the town was now occupied by the
Turks, who had arrived there only hours before. Tricoupis's troops were now
completely surrounded, bottled up in a steep valley with a Turkish division
before them and another two at their rear. Choosing between surrender and
certain annihilation, Tricoupis grimly ordered the raising of the white flag.59
As the rest of the southern forces made helter-skelter for Smyrna, combat
activity in the north remained low. Upon hearing of the disaster which befell
Tricoupis however, the 3rd Army Corps there retreated toward Panderma and
Mudanya for evacuation.60
The Greek Army broke. The officers made for safety, each to save his own skin.
The Greeksoldiers,starvedfor food and ammunition,discontented,homesick,without
heart for the fight, made off as fast as they could.... Divisions ceased to exist;
regimentssplit up and became a rabble of individuals.61
The Greeks, displaying a characteristic often a mark of defeated armies,
pursued a 'scorched earth' policy toward western Anatolia.
Most of the towns that existed in its path were in ruins. One third of Usak no longer
existed. Alasehirwas a scorched cavity, defacing the hillside. Village after village had
been reduced to an ash heap. Of the eighteen hundred buildings in the historic holy
city of Manisa, only five hundred remained.62
The Turkish population was subjected to horrible atrocities by the retreating
troops and accompanying civilian Christian mobs. The pursuing Turkish
cavalry did not hesitate in kind on the Christian populace; the road from Usak
to Smyrna lay littered with corpses.
From the start of their offensive, it took the Turks fifteen days to recover their
57Ibid.
61
Armstrong, Grey Wolf, pp. 159-I60.
58Ibid.
Ibid, p. 362.
62 Lord Kinross, Ataturk, p. 362.
60
564 Peter Kincaid Jensen

Anatolian soil. In pursuit of the Greeks they quickly reoccupied Usak, Eskisehir,
and Bursa. While the Greek Army was largely out of range of their pursuers,
the IIth Division, in its haste to reach Mudanya, became mired in the hills
near that town and was forced to surrender. The last remnants of the 3d Army
Corps straggled into Panderma and were evacuated in a few days. In the south,
the Greeks left Smyrna on September 9. An Allied force, primarily British,
entered the city to prevent looting and arson before the arrival of the Turks.63
Kemal entered Smyrna the next day; he and his haggard troops were greeted
with wild enthusiasm by the Turkish population. A few days later saw a disastrous fire destroy half the city; most of the Christian quarter was razed. To this
day, it has not been ascertained whether the fire was started by Turks, Greeks,
Armenians, or by accident.64
Even though the Greeks had been routed and Anatolia recovered, the work,
in Turkish eyes, was not yet complete. Greek forces remained in Eastern Thrace
and Constantinople was still in Allied hands. The Turks intended to cross the
Straits to enter Eastern Thrace. The Allies however, had established a neutral
zone along each side of the waterway. In view of Italy's and France's past support
of Kemal, London realized that these powers would probably not assist the
British in resisting a Turkish encroachment on the Straits. As the Turks arrived
at the border of the neutral zone near Chanakkale, the British wired General
Harington, the local commander there, to withdraw his forces.65
Harington, however, had other designs. At a High Commission meeting in
Constantinople, he managed to pursuade the French and Italians to send small
detachments to join the British on the Asiatic side of the Straits. The rationale
was that the Turks would be intimidated by a show of three Allied flags instead
of one.66
Kemal called the bluff. Having received notice that Harington would defend
the neutral zone, he sent a cavalry unit across the frontier. The French and
Italians promptly withdrew their forces. An enraged Lord Curzon rushed to
Paris, where he and Poincare managed to stop shouting long enough to ask the
Nationalists to attend a meeting to determine lines of demarcation between
Greece and Turkey. It was, in other words, a proposal for an Allied-mediated
armistice.67
To the thorough alarm of London, the Turks did not immediately reply.
On 29 September, still hearing nothing from the Nationalists, the British drew
up an ultimatum which Harington was to deliver - the Turks must leave the
neutral zone or run the risk of immediate war.68
Harington, one of the cooler heads, kept the ultimatum in his pocket. Kemal
sent his acceptance to the meeting to be held in Mudanya. His representative
would be Ismet Pasa, the hero of In6nii. There was one tacit condition to the
63
The New York Times, September II,

64 Froembgen, Kemal Ataturk, p. I92.
65
I922,
p. I.
David Walder, The Chanak Affair (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, I969), pp.
195-208.
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid., pp.
281-282.
68
Ibid.
The Greco-Turkish War,
I920-1922
565
Turks' attendance - the immediate occupation of Eastern Thrace.69 For four

days, the British, Turkish, French, and Italian delegations wrangled over several
small points. The issue of Constantinople, already promised to the Nationalists,
was put off for another time. One of the rockier points was the temporary British
retention of small parts of the neutral zone.70Harington, the chief British representative, described the scene:
Ismet Pasha said he could not agree, and there was a deadlock... the scene is before
me now - that awful room - only an oil lamp.... I paced up one side of the room
saying I must have that area and nothing less. Ismet paced up the other side saying
he would not agree. Then quite suddenly he said 'J'accepte!'I was never so surprised
in my life!71
The agreement was signed at once, and the Greek troops in Eastern Thrace
began to cross westward over the Maritza for home.
In a meeting at London's Carlton Club, the Conservatives decided to withdraw
support for a coalition that had taken Great Britain to the brink of another war.
David Lloyd George's panhellenic schemes brought him a strange reward.
He resigned, and retired with his mistress to his native Wales.
Shortly after the Mudanya Armistice, a military coup d'etat in Greece
deposed the monarchy. Among those subsequently executed for treason were
Prime Minister Gounaris and General Hatzianestis.72
The following year (1923) brought sweeping changes in Turkey. The anachronistic Sultanate passed into the tapestry of history. The Treaty of Sevres
was dramatically altered at Lausanne, transforming the certainty of foreign
domination to the certainty of a self-determining Turkish national state. This
end had been achieved against all odds; against the designs of British and French
imperialism, against the Armenian and Kurdish proteges of those powers,
against reactionary domestic elements, against the ambitions of their worst
enemies, the Greeks. The 'sick man of Europe' had survived the fever and was
well on his way to recovery.
PRINCETON
69 Smith,
71 Lord
UNIVERSITY
Ionian Vision, p. 3I8.

70
Walder, The Chanak Affair, p. 316.

72 Gibbons, Venizelos, p. 399.

The Greco-Turkish War 1920-1922

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The Greco-Turkish War, 1920-1922

Author(s): Peter Kincaid Jensen

Int. J. Middle East Stud. 10 (I979), 553-565

Printed in Great Britain

Peter Kincaid Jensen

Doran & Co., I931), pp. 210-215.

Herbert Adams Gibbons, Venizelos(Boston and N.Y.: Houghton Mifflin Co.,

oo20-7438/79/o300-o408$01.50 ? 1979 CambridgeUniversityPress

Peter Kincaid Jensen

Mikusch, Mustafa Kemal, pp.

5Hanns Froembgen,Kemal Ataturk,trans. J. Kirkness(Freeport,N.Y.: Books for

Von Mikusch, Mustafa Kemal, pp. 192-193.

The Greco-Turkish War, I920-I922

Ibid., 24 July, 1920, p. 4.

Peter Kincaid Jensen

A Speech by Gazi Mustafa Kemal (Leipzig: K. F. Koehler,

The Greco-Turkish War, I920-I922

Ibid., pp. 283-289.

Peter Kincaid Jensen

On 6 January 1921, the Greeks, still maintaining the objectives previously

The Greco-Turkish War, I920-I922

had originally anticipated. The Greek government authorized the formation

Smith, Ionian Vision, p. 255.

Peter Kincaid Jensen

The Greco-Turkish War,

Ionian Vision, p. 273.

562 Peter Kincaid Jensen

Venizelos, pp. 395, 396.

The Greco-Turkish War, 1920-1922

retreating west. This group of 20,000 attempted a stand at Dumlupinar, but a

564 Peter Kincaid Jensen

The New York Times, September II,

The Greco-Turkish War,

Turks' attendance - the immediate occupation of Eastern Thrace.69 For four

Ionian Vision, p. 3I8.

Walder, The Chanak Affair, p. 316.

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