Professional Documents
Culture Documents
that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano, despite repeated demands, refused "to restore
possession of the said portion of land" to the Spouses Valdez. The Spouses Valdez prayed that the
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano be ordered to vacate and restore to the Spouses Valdez
possession of the Subject Lot. The Spouses Valdez also prayed for payment of litigation expenses, as
well as unearned income from the Subject Lot and moral damages.
In their answer, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano asserted that the Spouses Valdez had no
cause of action against them because Cab is the owner of the Subject Lot while Atuel is the administrator
of the Cab Property. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano claimed that upon Cabs instruction
and consent, they had been occupying the Cab Property since 1964, long before the Spouses Valdez
leased a portion of the Cab Property in 1978. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano also pointed
out that the Spouses Valdez never set foot on the Subject Lot nor cultivated the same, thus, there is no
dispossession to speak of.
Moreover, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano alleged that the emancipation patent issued to
Valdez is null and void. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano maintained that the entire Cab
Property, which is covered by the Free Patent issued to Cab, has already been classified as residential,
hence, no longer covered by PD No. 27. 10
On 4 March 1993, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, after hearing the case, issued a decision which
disposed of as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, premises above considered, the DAR Agusan del Sur is hereby ordered to segregate the
TWO THOUSAND (2,000) SQ. METERS, more or less, from the land of the complainants, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1261 covered by Emancipation Patent No. A-159969, and award the same to the
respondents; and hereby ordered this case dismissed.
SO ORDERED. 11
Dissatisfied with the decision, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano appealed to the DARAB
Central Office. The DARAB Central Office reversed the decision of the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator,
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED. Judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Enjoining the respondents-appellants from committing acts of intrusion and maintain the possessory
rights of the complainants over the EP (Emancipation Patent) covered land; and
(2) Ordering the MARO (Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer) or PARO (Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer)
concerned to assist the parties in determining the amount to be reimbursed in favor of the respondents for
whatever improvements made on the 2,000 square meter portion to be paid by the complainants.
SO ORDERED. 12
Aggrieved by the decision, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano filed a petition for review 13 with
the Court of Appeals. On 20 May 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the DARAB Central
Office and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied. On 14 January 1998, while the case was
pending in the Court of Appeals, the Spouses Valdez sold 5,000 square meters out of the PD 27 Land to
the Municipality of Sibagat. 14
Hence, the instant petition.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the decision of the DARAB, the Court of Appeals ruled that the DARAB has primary and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of emancipation
patents. The Court of Appeals held that the DARABs decision should be respected because it enjoys the
presumption of regularity.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that the DARAB correctly relied on Pagtalunan v. Tamayo 15 where this
Court held that upon issuance of an emancipation patent, a holder acquires a vested right of absolute
ownership in the land.
The Court of Appeals further held that the doctrine laid down in Teodoro v. Macaraeg 16 is applicable. In
Teodoro, this Court ruled that a landowner has full liberty to enter into a civil lease contract covering his
property. However, "once a landowner enters into a contract of lease whereby his land is to be devoted to
agricultural production and said landholding is susceptible of personal cultivation by the lessee, solely or
with the help of labor coming from his immediate farm household, then such contract is of the very
essence of a leasehold agreement." Otherwise, the Court added, "it would be easy to subvert, under the
guise of the liberty to contract, the intendment of the law of protecting the underprivileged and ordinarily
credulous farmer from the unscrupulous schemes and pernicious practices of the landed gentry." 17
The Issue
After a review of the issues raised, 18 the question boils down to whether the Spouses Valdez are entitled
to seek redress from the DARAB in recovering possession of the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot from the
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano.
The Courts Ruling
We grant the petition based not on the arguments of the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano but on
an entirely different ground. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals because of the DARABs
lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the present controversy.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The DARAB has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Spouses Valdezs complaint for recovery of
possession of the Subject Lot. Though the parties do not challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB, the
Court may motu proprio consider the issue of jurisdiction. 19 The Court has discretion to determine
whether the DARAB validly acquired jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by law. It may not be conferred on the court by consent or waiver of the parties where the
court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. 20
In their complaint for recovery of possession, the Spouses Valdez alleged, among others, that they are
farmers and beneficiaries of an emancipation patent. The Spouses Valdez also alleged that the Spouses
Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano stealthily and fraudulently occupied the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot.
The Spouses Valdez claimed that despite repeated demands, 21 the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses
Galdiano refused to vacate and restore possession of the Subject Lot to the Spouses Valdez. 22 The
Spouses Valdez prayed that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano be ordered to vacate and
restore possession of the Subject Lot to the Spouses Valdez.
The Spouses Valdez did not allege the existence of tenancy relations, if any, between them and the
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano. In Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, 23 this Court ruled:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it,
are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint.
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint, which are contained in the decision of the MARO, 24
indicate that the nature and subject matter of the instant case is for recovery of possession or accion
publiciana. The issue to be resolved is who between the Spouses Valdez on one hand, and the Spouses
Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano on the other, have a better right to possession of the 2,000-square meter
Subject Lot forming part of the PD 27 Land. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano likewise raise
the issue of ownership by insisting that Cab is the real and lawful owner of the Subject Lot. In Cruz v.
Torres, 25 this Court had occasion to discuss the nature of an action to recover possession or accion
publiciana, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . This is an action for recovery of the right to posses and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil
proceeding in a regional trial court to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of
the title. Accion publiciana or plenaria de posesion is also used to refer to an ejectment suit filed after the
expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of
possession of the realty. In such case, the regional trial court has jurisdiction. . . . 26
For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must exist a tenancy relations between the
parties. 27 This Court held in Morta, 28 that in order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute,
it is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of
the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4)
that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
. . . 29 (Emphasis supplied)
Emphasizing the DARABs jurisdiction, this Court held in Hon. Antonio M. Nuesa, Et. Al. v. Hon. Court of
Appeals, Et Al., 30 that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian
reform program." The DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction "to determine and adjudicate
all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. 3844 as
amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the CARP Law, an agrarian dispute is
defined as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(d) . . . any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
In the instant case, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano are not and do not claim to be the
owners of the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot where their houses are constructed. They also do not claim
ownership to any other portion of the PD 27 Land. They and the Spouses Valdez have no tenurial,
leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that will bring this controversy within Section 3(d) of RA
No. 6657. 31 The instant case is similar to Chico v. CA, 32 where this Court ruled that the DARAB had no
jurisdiction over a case which did not involve any tenurial or agrarian relations between the parties. Since
the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the present controversy, it should not have taken cognizance of the
Spouses Valdezs complaint for recovery of possession. Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in
a court of general jurisdiction. 33 Specifically, the regional trial court exercises exclusive original
jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve . . . possession of real property." 34 However, if the assessed
value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside
of Metro Manila, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real
property. 35 Moreover, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over all cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer.
The Court of Appeals correctly stated that the DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases
involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of registered emancipation patents. However, the
Spouses Valdezs complaint for recovery of possession does not involve or seek the cancellation of any
emancipation patent. It was the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano who attacked the validity of the
emancipation patent as part of their affirmative defenses in their answer to the complaint. The rule is well
settled that the jurisdiction of the court (or agency in this case) cannot be made to depend on the
defenses made by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of
jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. 36
Jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the
parties. 37 The active participation of the parties in the proceedings before the DARAB does not vest
jurisdiction on the DARAB, as jurisdiction is conferred only by law. The courts or the parties cannot
disregard the rule of non-waiver of jurisdiction. Likewise, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a
tribunal that has none over a cause of action. 38 The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of
the DARAB does not prevent this Court from addressing the issue, as the DARABs lack of jurisdiction is
apparent on the face of the complaint. Issues of jurisdiction are not subject to the whims of the parties. 39
In a long line of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an order or decision rendered by a tribunal
or agency without jurisdiction is a total nullity. 40 Accordingly, we rule that the decision of the DARAB in
the instant case is null and void. Consequently, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision
of the DARAB is likewise invalid. This Court finds no compelling reason to rule on the other issues raised
by the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 May 1999 and
the Resolution dated 14 July 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48682 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
MAROs Decision dated 4 March 1993, and the DARABs Decision dated 17 June 1998, are declared
NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Ynares-Santiago and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Platinum filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, praying that Civil
Case No. 96-365 be returned to Branch 146 or re-raffled to another RTC Branch of Makati. However, the
motion was denied by the Court of Appeals on April 2, 1998.
In the instant petition, Platinum insists that the Makati RTC, Branch 62, has no jurisdiction to try Civil
Case No. 96-365. It argues that, when Judge Dioknos July 23, 1996 order allowing the consolidation of
the two cases was annulled and set aside, RTC Branch 62s basis for acquiring jurisdiction over Civil
Case No. 96-365 was likewise extinguished.
We disagreee.
Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case. 6 In general, jurisdiction
may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or
over the issues framed in the pleadings.
Jurisdiction over the nature of the action and subject matter is conferred by law. It is determined by the
allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein. 7 Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired from the
time he files his complaint; while jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by his voluntary
appearance in court and his submission to its authority, or by the coercive power of legal processes
exerted over his person.
Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a particular case, it does not depend upon the
regularity of the exercise by the court of that power or on the correctness of its decisions.
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that Panlilios collection case docketed as Civil Case No. 96-365 falls
within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati, Branch 62. The fact that the Court of Appeals subsequently
annulled Judge Dioknos order granting the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 941634, did not affect the jurisdiction of the court which issued the said order.
"Jurisdiction" should be distinguished from the "exercise of jurisdiction." Jurisdiction refers to the authority
to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has
jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, as in the instant case, the decision on all questions
arising from the case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment which does not affect its authority to decide the
case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.
We find no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals when it left to Judge Diokno of Branch 62
the discretion on whether to return Civil Case No. 96-365 to Branch 146 or to decide the same as a
separate case in his own sala.
Moreover, we find the instant petition premature and speculative. Had Platinum waited until Judge Diokno
decided on what to do with Civil Case No. 96-365, the parties would have been spared the trouble and
the expense of seeking recourse from this Court, which in turn would have had one petition less in its
docket.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The unfounded fear that Civil Case No. 96-365 would unduly delay the final resolution of Civil Case No.
94-1634, if the former were retained by Branch 62, made Platinum act with haste. In so doing, it wasted
the precious time not only of the parties but also of this Court.
All told, nothing legally prevents the RTC of Makati, Branch 62, from proceeding with Civil Case No. 96365. Should it decide to retain the case, it is hereby directed to resolve the same with dispatch.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.
By Order of March 26, 1997, the RTC denied respondents petition for certiorari for lack of merit and nonexhaustion of administrative remedies, as it did deny his motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals, before which respondent assailed the RTC orders by petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, granted said petition, and accordingly reversed and set aside the assailed
orders of the RTC and ordered the DENR to process the MSA of Respondent. 8
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration 9 of the appellate courts decision having been denied by
Resolution of March 2, 2000, 10 she lodged the present petition, alleging that the Court of Appeals acted
contrary to law and jurisprudence 1) in holding that the RTC of Midsayap had jurisdiction over
respondents petition, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not applicable to the
instant case, and the contested land is public land; and 2) in ordering the processing of respondents MSA
pursuant to R.A. 730. 11
Petitioner contends that the RTC of Midsayap had no jurisdiction over respondents petition for certiorari
as (a) it "is in the nature of an appeal" 12 falling within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under
Section 9(3) 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129), as amended; and (b) respondent failed to
exhaust administrative remedies when he failed to appeal the questioned Orders to the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources. 14
Petitioners petition fails.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Petitioner has apparently confused the separate and distinct remedies of an appeal (i.e. through a petition
for review of a decision of a quasi judicial agency under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court) and a special civil
action for certiorari (i.e. through a petition for review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court). In Silverio v.
Court of Appeals, 15 this Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, distinguished
between these two modes of judicial review as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The provisions of the Rules of Court permit an aggrieved party, in the general types of cases, to take a
cause and apply for relief to the appellate courts by way of either of two distinctly different and dissimilar
modes through the broad process of appeal or the limited special civil action of certiorari. An appeal
brings up for review errors of judgment committed by a court with jurisdiction over the subject of the suit
and the persons of the parties or any such error committed by the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction
amounting to nothing more than an error of judgment. On the other hand, the writ of certiorari issues for
the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari "cannot legally be used for any other purpose." In terms of its function,
the writ of certiorari serves "to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it
from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction" or to relieve parties
from arbitrary acts of courts acts which courts have no power or authority in law to perform. 16 (Italics,
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Concomitantly, appellate jurisdiction is separate and distinct from the jurisdiction to issue the prerogative
writ of certiorari. An appellate jurisdiction refers to a process which is a continuation of the original suit
and not a commencement of a new action. In contrast, to invoke a courts jurisdiction to issue the writ of
certiorari requires the commencement of a new and original action therefor, independent of the
proceedings which gave rise to the questioned decision or order. 17 As correctly held by the Court of
Appeals, 18 the RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over
original petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus 19 under Section 21 20 of B.P. 129.
A perusal of respondents Petition dated April 3, 1995 filed before the RTC clearly shows that it alleged
that the DENR Regional Executive Director and OIC Regional Executive Director acted with "grave abuse
of discretion and without or in excess of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction" when they issued the
questioned Orders dated February 17, 1994 and February 27, 1995. Evidently, respondent sought a
judicial review of the questioned Orders through a special civil action for certiorari which, as
aforementioned, was within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Midsayap, Cotabato. 21
Additionally, this Court finds no reason to disturb the Court of Appeals conclusion that the instant case
falls under the recognized exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable if it should appear that an irreparable
injury or damage will be suffered by a party if he should await, before taking court action, the final action
of the administrative official concerned on the matter as a result of a patently illegal order (Vivo v. Cloribel,
18 SCRA 713; De Lara v. Cloribel, 14 SCRA 269); or where appeal would not prove to be speedy and
adequate remedy. 22
True, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same
may be elevated to the courts of justice for review, and non-observance thereof is a ground for the
dismissal of the complaint, 23 the rationale being:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded
an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error
committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from
entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the
courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner. 24
However, this requirement of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute, there being
instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately,
among which are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in
estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial
intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; and 9) in
quo warranto proceedings.25cralaw:red
Hence, where the act complained of is patently illegal since the administrative body acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to be tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, as
was alleged in respondents petition before the RTC, prior exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
required and resort to the courts through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is
permitted:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
We hold that it was an error for the court a quo to rule that the petitioners should have exhausted its
remedy of appeal from the orders denying their application for waiver/suspension to the Board of Trustees
and thereafter to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules. Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to
question the validity of the challenged issuances of the HDMF which are alleged to have been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Moreover, among the accepted exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies are: (1)
where the question in dispute is purely a legal one; and (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or
was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. Moreover, while certiorari as a remedy may
not be used as a substitute for an appeal, especially for a lost appeal, this rule should not be strictly
enforced if the petition is genuinely meritorious. It has been said that where the rigid application of the
rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are
justified in exempting a particular case from the operation of the rules. 26 (Emphasis supplied)
To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, however, it must be clearly shown that there is a patent and
grave abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. 27
The crux of the case at bar is, therefore, whether the DENR Regional Executive Director and OIC
Regional Director acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the questioned Orders dated February 17, 1994 and February 27, 1995, respectively.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In resolving respondents second MSA and petitioners protest thereto, the DENR Regional Executive
Director, after considering the conflicting interest of the parties, found it equitable to resolve the same by
directing the sale of the subject land at public auction pursuant to Section 67, C.A. No. 141, as amended.
Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as "The Public Land Act," provides the
procedure for the disposition of lands of the public domain which are open to disposition or concession
and intended to be used for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive purposes other than
agricultural, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 67. The lease or sale shall be made through oral bidding; and adjudication shall be made to the
highest bidder. However, where an applicant has made improvements on the land by virtue of a permit
issued to him by competent authority, the sale or lease shall be made by sealed bidding as prescribed in
Section twenty-six of this Act, the provisions of which shall be applied wherever applicable. If all or part of
the lots remain unleased or unsold, the Director of Lands shall from time to time announce in the Official
Gazette or in any other newspapers of general circulation, the lease or sale of those lots, if necessary.
(Emphasis supplied)
With the enactment of Republic Act No. 730 28 on June 18, 1952, however, an exception to the foregoing
procedure was created by authorizing disposition of lands of the public domain by private sale, instead of
bidding, provided that: (1) the applicant has in his favor the conditions specified therein and (2) the area
applied for is not more than 1,000 square meters. 29 The pertinent provision of R.A. 730 thus
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 61 and 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Republic Act No. 293, any Filipino citizen of legal age who is not the owner of a home lot in
the municipality or city in which he resides and who has in good faith established his residence on a
parcel of the public land of the Republic of the Philippines which is not needed for the public service, shall
be given preference to purchase at a private sale of which reasonable notice shall be given to him not
more than one thousand square meters at a price to be fixed by the Director of Lands with the approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It shall be an essential condition of this sale that the
occupant has constructed his house on the land and actually resided therein. Ten percent of the purchase
price shall be paid upon the approval of the sale and the balance may be paid in full, or in ten equal
annual installments.
SEC. 2. Land acquired under the provisions of this Act shall not be subject to any restrictions against
encumbrance or alienation before and after the issuance of the patents thereon. 30
SEC. 3. The provisions of the Public Land Act with respect to the sale of lands for residential purposes
which are not inconsistent herewith shall be applicable.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 18, 1952. (Emphasis supplied)
Given the foregoing provisions of R.A. 730 which took effect on June 18, 1952, and the DENR Regional
Executive Directors February 17, 1994 finding that the subject land was "suitable for residential
purposes," it was incumbent upon him to determine whether the provisions of R.A. 730 were applicable to
respondents MSA. As held by the Court of Appeals:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Finally, petitioner contends that the DENR Regional Executive Director and OIC Regional Executive
Director gravely erred in ordering the sale of the subject lot through oral bidding applying Section 67,
Commonwealth Act No. 141 and not Republic Act 730 authorizing the sale of public land without bidding.
We agree with the petitioner.
Apropos is the case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 785, ruling that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"When public land lots of not more than 1,000 sq. ms. are used, or to be used as a residence . . . they can
be sold on private sales under the provisions of Republic Act No. 730."cralaw virtua1aw library
In Agura v. Serfino, Sr., (204 SCRA 569), the Supreme Court held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"R.A. 730 authorizes a sale by private sale, as an exception to the general rule that it should be by
bidding, if the area applied for does not exceed 1,000 square meters, . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
We see no reason why these ruling should not be applied in this case which involves 415 [should have
been 334] square meters only. 31
The Regional Director, however, summarily chose to apply Section 67 of the Public Land Act upon a
finding that it was more "equitable" in light of the "conflicting interest" of the parties. In his "Answer" to
respondents petition before the RTC, the Director justified his non-application of R.A. 730 in this
wise:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . Republic Act No. 730 is not applicable to the case at bar, the land being disputed, Republic Act No.
730 requisite (sic) vas not meet (sic) that for this law to apply to a particular case, the land must be in the
first place not a land in conflict. There being a pending protest for final adjudication, the said conflict
continues to exist thus an impediment to the application of Republic Act 730 32 (Emphasis supplied)
which justification he reiterated in his Opposition 33 to respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the
RTC decision.
The Directors reliance on equity as basis for his action was misplaced, however. It is well-settled that
"equity follows the law." 34 Described as "justice outside legality," it is applied only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law or legal pronouncements. 35 Where pertinent positive rules are present, they
should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity. 36
A reading of R.A. 730 (or of the Public Land Act for that matter) shows nothing therein to support the
Directors contention that the pendency of a protest is a bar to the application of R.A. 730 to an MSA.
Indeed, that Section 1 of R.A. 730 gives a qualified applicant preference to purchase alienable public land
suitable for residential purposes implies that there may be more than one party interested in purchasing
it.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw library
What is more, under Section 91 of the Public Land Act, it is the duty of the Director of the Lands
Management Bureau (formerly the Director of Lands) to determine whether the material facts set forth in
an MSA are true:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 91. The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of
any concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement therein or
omission of facts altering, changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such
statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the
application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. It shall be
the duty of the Director of Lands, from time to time and whenever he may deem it advisable, to make the
necessary investigations for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the
application are true, or whether they continue to exist and are maintained and preserved in good faith,
and for the purposes of such investigation, the Director of Lands is hereby empowered to issue
subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and, if necessary, to obtain compulsory process from the courts.
In every investigation made in accordance with this section, the existence of bad faith, fraud,
concealment, or fraudulent and illegal modification of essential facts shall be presumed if the grantee or
possessor of the land shall refuse or fail to obey a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum lawfully issued by
the Director of Lands or his authorized delegates or agents, or shall refuse or fail to give direct and
specific answers to pertinent questions, and on the basis of such presumption, an order of cancellation
may issue without further proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, under Section 102 of the same Public Land Act, it is the duty of the Director of the Lands
Management Bureau to, after due hearing, verify whether the grounds of a protest or objection to an MSA
are well founded, and, if so, to cancel the MSA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 102. Any person, corporation, or association may file an objection under oath to any application or
concession under this Act, grounded on any reason sufficient under this Act for the denial or cancellation
of the application or the denial of the patent or grant. If, after the applicant or grantee has been given
suitable opportunity to be duly heard, the objection is found to be well founded, the Director of Lands shall
deny or cancel the application or deny patent or grant, and the person objecting shall, if qualified, be
granted a prior right of entry for a term of sixty days from the date of the notice. (Emphasis supplied)
There was thus clearly a positive duty on the part of the DENR Director to process respondents MSA,
and to ascertain, particularly in light of petitioners protest, whether respondent was qualified to purchase
the subject land at a private sale pursuant to R.A. 730. This, he did not do.
In fine, by abdicating his duty to process respondents MSA and summarily ordering, without factual or
legal basis, that the subject land be disposed of via oral bidding pursuant to Section 67 of the Public Land
Act, the Director acted with patent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
As the Court of Appeals held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Considering that the assailed Orders of public respondent DENR Regional Executive Director applying
Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and ordering the sale of the subject lot by oral bidding are
patently erroneous, the authority of the court to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is
warranted. 37
The Directors commission of grave abuse of discretion does not, however, mean that respondent
automatically has the better right to the subject land. As mandated by law, the Director must process
respondents MSA, conduct an investigation, and determine whether the material facts set forth therein
are true to bring it within the coverage of R.A. 730.
A thorough investigation is all the more imperative considering that petitioners protest raises serious
factual issues regarding respondents qualification to purchase the subject land in particular, whether
he already owns a home lot in Midsayap and whether he has, in good faith, constructed his house on the
subject land and actually resided therein. These factual issues are properly within the authority of the
DENR and the Land Management Bureau, which are tasked with carrying out the provisions of the Public
Land Act and R.A. 730, 38 do determine, after both parties have been given an opportunity to fully
present their evidence.
As for petitioners claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the Salunayan
Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her predecessor-in-interest,
Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when she purchased the adjoining property from the
latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of
the Civil Code, the same must fail.
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man 39 and not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription, 40 the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant
of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public
domain. 41 It is only after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted
for purposes of an imperfect title. 42
A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb
and flow of the sea. 43 As such, under Articles 420(1) 44 and 502(1) 45 of the Civil Code, the Salunayan
Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. 46 And, absent any declaration by the government, that a
portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
This, in fact, was the very reason behind the denial of respondents first MSA, the District Engineer having
certified that the government may need the subject land for future expansion, and the office of the
Municipal Mayor having certified that it was needed by t he municipal government for future public
improvements. 47 Consequently, it was only after the same offices subsequently certified 48 that the
subject land was suitable for residential purposes and no longer needed by the municipal government that
it became alienable and disposable. Confronted with similar factual circumstances, this Court in Bracewell
v. Court of Appeals 49 held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove that the land is alienable public
land. On this score, we agree with respondents that petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land
subject of his application are alienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was conclusively shown by the
government that the same were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972. Thus, even
granting that petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same since 1908, he still
cannot claim title thereto by virtue of such possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet
alienable land at that time nor capable of private appropriation. The adverse possession which may be
the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable
portions of the public domain. 50 (Emphasis supplied)
With respect to petitioners invocation of the principle of accession under either Article 370 of the Spanish
Civil Code of 1889 or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same does not apply to vest her with ownership
over subject land.
Under Article 370 51 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which took effect in the Philippines on December
7, 1889, 52 the beds of rivers which remain abandoned because the course of the water has naturally
changed belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout their respective lengths. If the abandoned
bed divided estates belonging to different owners, the new dividing line shall run at equal distance
therefrom. 53
When the present Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950, 54 the foregoing rule was abandoned in
favor of the present Article 461, which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ART. 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso
facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost.
However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying
the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 461 provides for compensation for the loss of the land occupied by the new bed since it is believed
more equitable to compensate the actual losers than to add land to those who have lost nothing. 55 Thus,
the abandoned river bed is given to the owner(s) of the land(s) onto which the river changed its course
instead of the riparian owner(s). 56
Petitioner claims that on October 22, 1966, when she purchased the property adjoining the subject land
from Marcelina Basadre, the said subject land was already a dried-up river bed such that "almost one-half
portion of the residential house . . . was so already built and is still now situated at the said dried-up
portion of the Salunayan Creek bed . . ." 57 She failed to allege, however, when the subject portion of the
Salunayan Creek dried up, a fact essential to determining whether the applicable law is Article 370 of the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889 or Article 461 of the Civil Code.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code took effect, the
subject land would clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest since under the
aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river beds which are abandoned through the natural change in
the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners of the land occupied by the new course," and the
owners of the adjoining lots have the right to acquire them only after paying their value. 58
And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are applicable only when"
[r]iver beds are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters." It is uncontroverted,
however, that, as found by both the Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive Director, the
subject land became dry as a result of the construction of an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation
Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, 59 this Court held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies only if there is
a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial
accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems.
Considering our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the
active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del
Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the
public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. . . 60 (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the course of a river,
not where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek
changed its course. In such a situation, commentators are of the opinion that the dry river bed remains
property of public dominion. 61
Finally, while this Court notes that petitioner offered to purchase the subject land from the government, 62
she did so through an informal letter dated August 9, 1989 63 instead of the prescribed form. By such
move, she is deemed to have acknowledged that the subject land is public land, for it would be absurd for
her to have applied for its purchase if she believed it was hers. She is thus stopped from claiming
otherwise. 64
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On 02 December 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 18 affirming the Order of Dismissal
issued by the RTC.19 A motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied in a resolution dated
30 January 1998.20
Hence, this petition.
The following issues21 are raised by the petitioners for resolution:
(a) Whether or not the reclassification of the subject lands to industrial use by the Municipality of
Balamban, Cebu pursuant to its authority under Section 20(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local
Government Code of 1991 (the "LGC") has the effect of taking such lands out of the coverage of the
CARL and beyond the jurisdiction of the DAR;
(b) Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction may be dismissed under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction;
(c) Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction is an appropriate remedy against the order of the DAR
enjoining development works on the subject lands;
(d) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City had authority to issue a writ of injunction against
the DAR.
In sum, petitioners are of the view that local governments have the power to reclassify portions of their
agricultural lands, subject to the conditions set forth in Section 20 22 23 of the Local Government Code.
According to them, if the agricultural land sought to be reclassified by the local government is one which
has already been brought under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) and/or
which has been distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries, then such reclassification must be confirmed
by the DAR pursuant to its authority under Section 6522 of the CARL, in order for the reclassification to
become effective. If, however, the land sought to be reclassified is not covered by the CARL and not
distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries, then no confirmation from the DAR is necessary in order for
the reclassification to become effective as such case would not fall within the DAR's conversion authority.
Stated otherwise, Section 65 of the CARL does not, in all cases, grant the DAR absolute, sweeping and
all-encompassing power to approve or disapprove reclassifications or conversions of all agricultural lands.
Said section only grants the DAR exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural
lands which have already been brought under the coverage of the CARL and which have already been
distributed to farmer beneficiaries.
The petition lacks merit.
After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through the process of conversion, jurisdiction
over which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural lands already reclassified before the effectivity of
Rep. Act No. 6657 are exempted from conversion.
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, provides:
". . . True, the DAR's express power over land use conversion is limited to cases in which agricultural
lands already awarded have, after five years, ceased to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic
value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes. But to suggest that these are the only instances
when the DAR can require conversion clearances would open a loophole in R.A. No. 6657, which every
landowner may use to evade compliance with the agrarian reform program. Hence, it should logically
follow from the said department's express duty and function to execute and enforce the said statute that
any reclassification of a private land as a residential, commercial or industrial property should first be
cleared by the DAR."
The requirement that agricultural lands must go through the process of conversion despite having
undergone reclassification was underscored in the case of Alarcon v. Court of Appeals,24 where it was
held that reclassification of land does not suffice:
In the case at bar, there is no final order of conversion. The subject landholding was merely reclassified.
Conversion is different from reclassification. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece
of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for nonagricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to
the requirements and procedure for land use conversion. Accordingly, a mere reclassification of
agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use and thus cause the ejectment
of the tenants. He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural
land for other purposes.
Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect on 15 June 1988. Municipal Ordinance No. 101 of Balamban, Cebu, which
reclassified the subject lands, was passed on 25 March 1992, and Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8 of the
Provincial Board of Cebu, which adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 101, was passed on 03 April 1995,
long after Rep. Act No. 6657 has taken effect. Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 6657 provides:
SEC. 4. Scope. - The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable
for agriculture.
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or
that can be raised thereon.
To further clarify any doubt on its authority, the DAR issued Administrative Order No. 12 dated October
1994 which reads:
Administrative Order No. 12
Series of 1994
SUBJECT: CONSOLIDATED AND REVISED RULES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING CONVERSION
OF ARICULTURAL LANDS TO NON-AGRICULTURAL USES
I. PREFATORY STATEMENT
The guiding principles on land use conversion is to preserve prime agricultural lands. On the other hand,
conversion of agricultural lands, when coinciding with the objectives of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law to promote social justice, industrialization, and the optimum use of land as a national
resource for public welfare, shall be pursued in a speedy and judicious manner.
To rationalize these principles, and by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, as amended, Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 27, P.D. No. 946, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 129-A and R.A. No. 6657, the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has issued several policy guidelines to regulate land use conversion. This
Administrative Order consolidates and revises all existing implementing guidelines issued by the DAR,
taking into consideration, other Presidential issuances and national policies related to land use
conversion.
II. LEGAL MANDATE
A. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is mandated to "approve or disapprove applications for
conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses," pursuant to
Section 4(i) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987.
B. Section 5(i) of E.O. No. 129-A, Series of 1987, vests in the DAR, exclusive authority to approve or
disapprove applications for conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial, and
other land uses.
C. Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,
likewise empowers the DAR to authorize under certain conditions, the reclassification or conversion of
agricultural lands.
D. Section 4 of Memorandum Circular No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office of the President, provides that
"action on applications for land use conversion on individual landholdings shall remain as the
responsibility of the DAR, which shall utilize as its primary reference, documents on the comprehensive
land use plans and accompanying ordinances passed upon and approved by the local government units
concerned, together with the National Land Use Policy, pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 and E.O. No. 129-A."
III. DEFINITION OF TERMS
A. Agricultural land refers to land devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land (Section 3[c], R.A. No. 6657).
B. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use.
C. Reclassification of agricultural lands is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for
non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan. It also
includes the reversion of non-agricultural lands to agricultural use.
V. COVERAGE
These rules shall cover all private agricultural lands as defined herein regardless of tenurial arrangement
and commodity produced. It shall also include agricultural lands reclassified by LGUs into non-agricultural
uses, after June 15, 1988, pursuant to Memorandum Circular (M.C.) No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office
of the President and those proposed to be used for livestock, poultry and swine raising as provided in
DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993.
In the case of Advincula-Velasquez v. Court of Appeals,25 we held:
Our ruling in the Natalia case was reiterated in National Housing Authority v. Allarde (318 SCRA 22
[1999]).
The Court of Appeals' reliance on DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, is in order. In the said opinion, the
Secretary of Justice declared, viz:
Based on the foregoing premises, we reiterate the view that with respect to conversions of agricultural
lands covered by R.A. No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of DAR to approve such
conversions may be exercised from the date of the law's effectivity on June 15, 1988. This conclusion is
based on a liberal interpretation of R.A. No. 6657 in the light of DAR's mandate and extensive coverage
of the agrarian reform program.
Following the DOJ opinion, the DAR issued Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1994, stating that lands
already classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6657 no longer needed any
conversion clearance:
I. Prefatory Statement
In order to streamline the issuance of exemption clearances, based on DOJ Opinion No. 44, the following
guidelines are being issued for the guidance of the DAR and the public in general.
II. Legal Basis
Sec. 3(c) of RA 6657 states that agricultural lands refers to the land devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in this act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990 has ruled that, with respect to the conversion of
agricultural lands covered by RA No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of DAR to approve such
conversion may be exercised from the date of its effectivity, on June 15, 1988. Thus, all lands that are
already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before 15 June 1988 no longer need any
conversion clearance.
The authority of the DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands covered by Rep. Act No. 6657 to
non-agricultural uses has not been pierced by the passage of the Local Government Code. The Code
explicitly provides26 that "nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any
manner the provisions of Rep. Act No. 6657."
It being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested in the DAR, the complaint for injunction
was correctly dismissed by the trial and appellate courts under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This
Court, in Bautista v. Mag-isa Vda. De Villena,27 found occasion to reiterate the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction'
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which
jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative body of special competence. For agrarian
reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Executive Order 229 vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. This law divested the regional trial courts of their
general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters.
Under Republic Act 6657, the DAR retains jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters. The pertinent
provision reads:
"Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction
to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
"It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide
all cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case. Toward
this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination of every action or proceeding before it. . . ."
Finally, the third and fourth issues which may be summed up into whether or not an injunction is the
appropriate remedy against the order of the DAR enjoining petitioners in developing the subject land, we
rule in the negative. Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 6657 provides:
SEC. 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. - No injunction, restraining order,
prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42666 dated 02 December 1997 affirming the order dated 12 August 1996
of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 29, in Civil Case No. T-590 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
At the outset, it should be stressed that petitioners are seeking from us the annulment of a trial court
judgment based on lack of jurisdiction. Because it is not an appeal, the correctness of the judgment is not
in issue here. Accordingly, there is no need to delve into the propriety of the decision rendered by the trial
court.
Petitioners claim that the recent decisions of this Court have already abandoned the doctrine laid down in
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. 5 We do not agree. In countless decisions, this Court has consistently held that,
while an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any stage,
active participation in the proceedings in the court which rendered the order or decision will bar such party
from attacking its jurisdiction. As we held in the leading case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy: 6
"A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons.
Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
x
"It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against
his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question that same
jurisdiction . . . [T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action
or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not
because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason
that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy."cralaw virtua1aw library
Tijam has been reiterated in many succeeding cases. Thus, in Orosa v. Court of Appeals; 7 Ang Ping v.
Court of Appeals; 8 Salva v. Court of Appeals; 9 National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals; 10
Province of Bulacan v. Court of Appeals; 11 PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 12 this Court affirmed the rule that a partys active participation in all stages of the case before
the trial court, which includes invoking the courts authority to grant affirmative relief, effectively estops
such party from later challenging that same courts jurisdiction.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo by
instituting an action for reformation of contract against private respondents. It appears that, in the
proceedings before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from start to finish. Not even
once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the courts jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which
lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution
against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction and it was only because said
decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question the courts
jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.
Petitioners should bear the consequence of their act. They cannot be allowed to profit from their omission
to the damage and prejudice of the private Respondent. This Court frowns upon the undesirable practice
of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment but only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if not. 13
Public policy dictates that this Court must strongly condemn any double-dealing by parties who are
disposed to trifle with the courts by deliberately taking inconsistent positions, in utter disregard of the
elementary principles of justice and good faith. 14 There is no denying that, in this case, petitioners never
raised the issue of jurisdiction throughout the entire proceedings in the trial court. Instead, they voluntarily
and willingly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of said court. It is now too late in the day for them to
repudiate the jurisdiction they were invoking all along.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Moreover, the dire need for financial resources arising out of a plainly valid, just, and binding obligation,
justifies execution pending appeal (Ma-ao Sugar central Co., Inc. v. Canete, 19 SCRA 646). Lastly, it
appears from the evidence presented during the hearing that defendants are seeking to evade judgment
in this case by disposing of or encumbering their properties to defeat execution. 3
Respondents received a copy of this order on July 31, 2000. On August 1, 2000, they moved for a
reconsideration but their motion was denied by the trial court on August 18, 2000. On August 21, 2000,
the trial court ordered the issuance of the writ of execution, to implement which the sheriffs garnished the
bank accounts of respondents and levied six parcels of land belonging to respondent Go. On November
8, 2000, the sheriffs issued a notice of sale of the levied real properties on December 14, 2000. But
execution was stayed on September 29, 2000 in view of a temporary restraining order (TRO) issued by
the Court of Appeals at the instance of respondents (CA-G.R. SP No. 60354). On August 8, 2000,
respondents also filed a notice of appeal of the trial courts decision of May 31, 2000. Initially, in its order
of August 21, 2000, the trial court denied due course to the appeal for failure of respondents to pay the
appellate docket fees on time. But, on November 29, 2000, it reconsidered its order and gave due course
to respondents appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 69113).
Petitioner filed two motions, one entitled "Ex-Parte Motion for Break Open Order" and another one entitled
"Ex-Parte Motion for Encashment of Check," to implement the writ of execution earlier issued by the trial
court. However, in view of the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals, which it received on October 4, 2000,
the trial court, on November 27, 2000, denied the aforesaid motions of petitioner, set aside its earlier
order for the release of garnished funds, and canceled the sheriffs notice of sale of November 8, 2000.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the order of November 29, 2000 giving due course to respondents
appeal and, after the expiration of the 60-day TRO, again moved for the issuance of a "break open" order
and the encashment of checks. In addition, he filed two other motions entitled "Ex-Parte Motion to
Proceed" and "Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint Cebu City Sheriff Jessie A. Belarmino as Special Sheriff."
Respondents opposed the motion for the appointment of a special sheriff.
In an order dated December 18, 2000, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
order giving due course to respondents appeal. As to petitioners motions for the implementation of the
order of execution and respondents opposition to the motion for the appointment of a special sheriff, it
directed the parties to reiterate the same before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 69113 on the ground
that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case by reason of the perfection of respondents appeal.
On January 29, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in CA-G.R. SP. 60354, granting
respondents petition for certiorari and setting aside the trial courts orders of execution pending appeal.
The appeals court subsequently denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution of August
31, 2001. The Court of Appeals held in its decision:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
True, at the time that the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal was filed, the court a quo had the
jurisdiction to exercise its good discretion to direct discretionary execution. However, at the time it recalled
its earlier Order dated August, 21, 2000 (denying due recourse to the appeal), and gave due course to the
appeal, the TRO issued by the former Fifth Division of this Court was still in force and effect, the same to
expire on 04 December 2000 [per] the Resolution dated 29 September 2000 declaring the TRO in full
force and effect. Such recall gives due course to the appeal retroactive to the time of the actual filing of
the Notice of Appeal on 08 August 2000.
However, what militates against the discretionary execution long prayed for by private respondent is the
fact that the court a quo has no more discretion to order the same as it was already relinquished of
jurisdiction over Civil Case Q-98-35332. Under paragraph 3, Section 9, Rule 41 of the [1997] Rules [of
Civil Procedure]" (i)n appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the
perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time of appeal of the other parties." As
to private respondent, [the] time to appeal expired on 05 July 2000, or on the sixteenth day after he was
served a copy of the Decision of 31 May 2000 on 19 June 2000, he not having filed a motion for new trial
or reconsideration which tolls the reglementary period to appeal. Discretionary execution was temporarily
but effectively enjoined by the TRO issued by the former Fifth Division of this Court which expired on 04
December 2000. However, before the expiration of the TRO, the Court a quo issued the Omnibus Order
dated 27 November 2000, canceling the Sheriffs Notice of Sale, the same being null and void, which
consequently cancelled the public auction sale to be held on 14 December 2000. From such order, we
could infer that on the motion for discretionary execution, action is deferred, if it is not altogether denied.
This observation may be confirmed from the fact that on 29 November 2000, it issued an Order giving due
course to petitioners Notice of Appeal, and directing the Branch Clerk of Court to forward the entire
records of Civil case No. Q-98-35332 to this Court for proper action and disposition, without reserving its
right to act upon the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal because technically, prior to transmittal of the
original record, it may order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2, Rule 39 (Ultimate
paragraph, Section 9, Rule 41).
x
It may be observed that the Order dated 28 July 2000 granting execution pending appeal as well as the
Writ of Execution Pending Appeal issued on 21 August 2000 remained outstanding, for which an inquiry
as to whether the same w[as] issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction would have been ripe. However, the original records of Civil Case No. Q-98-35332 ha[ve]
already been received by this Court on 19 December 2000, and the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV. No.
69113. Thus, granting that Sheriff Belarmino had the authority to issue the Sheriffs Notice of Sale of Real
Properties, its implementation has been rendered moot by the loss of jurisdiction of the court which
appointed him, coupled by the transmittal of the original records of Civil Case No. Q-98-35332. Whether
execution pending appeal is warranted by the circumstances of the case is a matter for the better
consideration of this Court, not in this petition but in the appeal of the case. 4
Petitioner, therefore, brought this appeal. He alleges
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD LOST ITS
JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE ORDER FOR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL, AND ORDERS IN
FURTHERANCE THEREOF, SINCE THE TRIAL COURT RETAINED ITS RESIDUAL JURISDICTION
INASMUCH AS PETITIONERS MOTION FOR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL WAS FILED WITHIN
THE FIFTEEN (15) DAY PERIOD FOR APPEAL AND THE RECORDS WERE STILL IN THE
POSSESSION OF THE TRIAL COURT AT THE TIME IT WAS ISSUED.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD NO JURISDICTION TO EXTEND THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED IN THIS CASE.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE RESPONDENTS PETITION
SINCE THE PETITION HAD THE FOLLOWING FORMAL DEFECTS;
A. THE PETITION WAS NOT PROPERLY SERVED TO THE RESPONDENT;
B. THE PETITION FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RULE 13 OF THE RULES OF COURT IN THAT IT DID
NOT STATE A WRITTEN EXPLANATION AS TO WHY PERSONAL SERVICE WAS NOT RESORTED TO
IN THIS CASE;
C. THE PETITION WAS, IN TRUTH, NOT VERIFIED;
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO RESOLVE
PETITIONERS NUMEROUS PENDING MOTION[S]. 5
The petition has no merit. Rule 39, 2 (a) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has
jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the
case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a
judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court had lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the
appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due
hearing.
On the other hand, Rule 41, 9 pertinently states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the
appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
x
[P]rior to the transmittal of the original record . . ., the court may issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve
compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with
Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.
Petitioner contends that, since at the time he filed his motion for execution pending appeal on June 14,
2000, the trial court still had jurisdiction over the case (as respondents appeal was perfected only on
August 8, 2000) and still had the records of the case (as the same were ordered elevated to the Court of
Appeals only on December 18, 2000), it can validly implement its order of execution notwithstanding the
perfection of respondents appeal.
To be sure, the trial court still had jurisdiction of the case when it ordered the execution of its judgment
pending appeal. However, the fact is that the enforcement of its order was restrained by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354. On the other hand, the subsequent perfection of respondents appeal
forced the elevation of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals. The twin moves of respondents
rendered execution pending appeal impossible not only while the TRO was effective but even after its
expiration, in view of the elevation of the records to the Court of Appeals. Eventually, on January 29,
2001, the Court of Appeals set aside the trial courts order of execution pending appeal. Petitioner cannot
take advantage of the expiration of the TRO to seek an implementation of the trial courts order of
execution, as this was the very issue in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354 (for certiorari).
The trial court properly held itself to have no jurisdiction to act further on the case. Instead, in its order of
December 18, 2001, it referred petitioner to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69113 with regard to
his efforts to seek implementation of the order of execution. Petitioner did not appeal from this ruling.
Anent petitioners claim that respondents petition in the Court of Appeals was deficient because it lacked
verification and an explanation for lack of personal service of the petition on him; that the same was
improperly served on petitioner instead of his counsel; and that the Court of Appeals failed to resolve the
motions filed by him for the dismissal of the petition, lifting of the TRO, and setting of the case for oral
arguments, suffice it to say that these matters have been raised before, and were found to be without
merit by, the Court of Appeals in its decision of January 29, 2001 and resolution of August 31, 2001, and
this Court finds no reason to modify its rulings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 29, 2001 and
its resolution, dated August 31, 2001, are AFFIRMED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw library
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.